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Papers Relating to the
Foreign Relations
of the
United States

The Paris Peace Conference
1919

Volume III



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DIRECTORIES OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

DIRECTORIES OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

Paris Peace Conf 182/70

Composition and Organization of the Preliminary Peace Conference, April 1, 1919 ¹

PART I. Composition of the Conference

N. B. To facilitate use, the members of the delegations of the powers have been divided into four categories, according to the functions which they perform at the Conference:

- (1) Plenipotentiary delegates;
- (2) Delegates and technical advisers;
- (3) Technical experts;
- (4) The secretariat general.

Accordingly where one category of delegates is not represented in a particular delegation the following category will be numbered according to the division above.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA*

Hotel de Crillon
(Tel. Élysées: 03-72)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (5 Places)

The President of the United States;
Hon. Robert Lansing, Secretary of State;
Hon. Henry White, former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris and at Rome;
Hon. Edward M. House;
General Tasker H. Bliss, Military Representative of the United States on the Supreme War Council.

¹ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

* Index of abbreviations.

U. S. A.	United States Army.
U. S. N.	United States Navy.

[Footnote in the original]

II. DELEGATES AND TECHNICAL ADVISERS

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Mr. Ellis Loring Dresel, Chief of Division;
Mr. Jordan Herbert Stabler, Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs in the Department of State;
Mr. E. T. Williams, former Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of State;
Mr. Frederic R. Dolbeare, Second Secretary of Embassy;
Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Second Secretary of Embassy;
Mr. Lithgow Osborne, Secretary of Embassy;
Mr. Sidney Y. Smith, Chief of Protocol;
Mr. J. G. D. Paul, Assistant.

LEGAL QUESTIONS

Mr. David Hunter Miller;
Mr. James Brown Scott;
Mr. H. G. Crocker;
Mr. Amos Scott Hershey;
Mr. Manley O. Hudson;
Mr. Joseph Bailey Brown.

MILITARY QUESTIONS

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Major General Mason N. Patrick, U.S.A.;
Colonel W. S. Browning, U.S.A.;
Colonel S. D. Embick, U.S.A.;
Colonel E. S. Gorrell, U.S.A.;
Captain C. E. Morton, U.S.A.

NAVAL QUESTIONS

Admiral W. S. Benson, U.S.N.;
Rear Admiral H. S. Knapp, U.S.N.;
Captain F. H. Schofield, U.S.N.;
Captain L. McNamee, U.S.N.;
Commander A. F. Carter, U.S.N.

FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

Mr. Norman H. Davis, Financial Commissioner;
Mr. John Foster Dulles;
Mr. Thomas W. Lamont;
Mr. Albert Strauss, Vice Governor of the Federal Reserve Board;
Mr. Hayden B. Harris.

LABOR AND SHIPPING QUESTIONS

Mr. Edward N. Hurley, Chairman of the Shipping Board (Labor and Shipping);
Mr. Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor (Labor);
Mr. Henry M. Robinson.

ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL QUESTIONS

Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, Chairman of the War Industries Board;
Mr. Vance McCormick, Chairman of the War Trade Board;
Mr. Bradley W. Palmer;
Mr. L. L. Summers;
Mr. Fred. K. Neilsen;
Mr. George McFadden;
Mr. L. C. Sheldon.

FOOD AND RELIEF QUESTIONS

Mr. Herbert Hoover, Chief of the Food Administration;
Colonel J. A. Logan, U.S.A.;
Mr. R. A. Taft.

III. TECHNICAL EXPERTS

Director:

Dr. S. E. Mezes.

Chief of Territorial Questions:

Dr. Isaiah Bowman.

ECONOMIC AND STATISTICAL QUESTIONS

Dr. A. A. Young;
Colonel L. P. Ayres, U.S.A.

ETHNOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS

Dr. R. B. Dixon;
Captain W. C. Farabee.

HISTORICAL QUESTIONS

Dr. James T. Shotwell.

GEOGRAPHICAL QUESTIONS

Professor Mark Jefferson.

COLONIAL QUESTIONS

Mr. George Louis Beer.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO SPECIAL AREAS

Germany—Dr. Wallace Notestein.
 Austria-Hungary—Dr. Charles Seymour.
 Western Asia—Dr. W. L. Westermann.
 Balkans—Dr. Clive Day.
 Western Europe—Dr. Charles H. Haskins.
 Far East—Captain S. K. Hornbeck.
 Italy—Dr. W. E. Lunt; Major D. W. Johnson.
 Russia and Poland—Dr. R. H. Lord; Dr. Isaiah Bowman.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General:

Mr. Joseph Clark Grew, Minister Plenipotentiary.

A. *Secretariat of the Conference**Secretaries:*

Mr. Arthur Hugh Frazier, Counselor of Embassy;
 Mr. Leland Harrison, Counselor of Embassy;
 Mr. Philip H. Patchin, Counselor of Embassy;
 Colonel U. S. Grant, 3rd, of the General Staff;
 Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Second Secretary of Embassy;
 Mr. Gordon Auchincloss, Special Assistant in the Department of State;
 Mr. Christian A. Herter, Special Assistant in the Department of State;
 Mr. Grafton Winthrop Minot, Assistant;
 Major van S. Merle-Smith, U.S.A.;
 Captain James S. Garfield, U.S.A.;
 Lieutenant Chester Burden, U.S.A.;
 Lieutenant R. Emmet Condon, U.S.A.

B. *Secretariat of the Delegation**Secretary for the League of Nations:*

Mr. Whitney Shepardson.

Secretary for Questions Relating to the Responsibility of the War:

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk.

Secretary for Questions Relating to the Reparation of Damage:

Mr. Jerome D. Greene.

Secretary for Labor Questions:

Mr. Guy H. Oyster.

Secretary for Transport Questions:

Mr. Christian A. Herter.

Secretaries for Financial and Economic Questions:

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 Mr. W. W. Cumberland;
 Lieutenant R. C. Effinger, U.S.A.;
 Mr. D. P. Frary;
 Lieutenant Bertram F. Willcox, U.S.A.;
 Dr. Leo Wolman;
 Mr. Andrew P. Martin;
 Captain Jeremiah Smith, Jr.;
 Mr. George Whitney;
 Mr. Clarence C. Stetson;
 Captain Fred. G. Tryon, U.S.A.;
 Captain E. H. Hart, U.S.A.;
 Lieutenant R. L. Ducros.

Secretaries for Territorial Questions:

Mr. Parker Thomas Moon;
 Captain Lester W. Perrin, U.S.A.;
 Captain J. E. Ewell, U.S.A.;
 Mr. Arthur W. Dubois;
 Captain Stuart Montgomery, U.S.A.;
 Lieutenant Reuben Horchow, U.S.A.;
 Mr. George Redington Montgomery;
 Mr. Frank L. Warrin, Jr.

*C. Press Bureau**Director:*

Mr. Ray Stannard Baker.

Assistant Director:

Mr. Arthur Sweetser.

BRITISH EMPIRE *

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I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES**GREAT BRITAIN (5 Places)**

The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George, M. P., Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury;

The Rt. Hon. Arthur James Balfour, O. M., M. P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

* [See footnote on following page.]

The Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law, M. P., Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons;
 The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes, Minister without Portfolio;
 The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G., Secretary of State for the Colonies;
 The Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, M. P., Secretary of State for War and Aviation.

THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA

Dominions

CANADA (2 Places).

The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden, G. C. M. G., Prime Minister;
 The Rt. Hon. Sir George Foster, G. C. M. G., Minister of Commerce;
 The Hon. C. J. Doherty, Minister of Justice;
 The Hon. A. L. Sifton, Minister of Customs.

* Index of Abbreviations.

A. D. C.	Assistant Secretary.
Bt.	Baronet.
C. B.	Companion of the Order of the Bath.
C. B. E.	Commander of the Order of the British Empire.
C. I. E.	Companion of the Order of the Indian Empire.
C. M. G.	Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George.
C. S. I.	Companion of the Order of the Star of India.
D. S. C.	Distinguished Service Cross.
D. S. O.	Decorations of the Distinguished Service Order.
G. B. E.	Grand Cross of the Order of the British Empire.
G. C. B.	Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath.
G. C. I. E.	Knight Grand Commander of the Order of the Indian Empire.
G. C. M. G.	Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Michael and St. George.
G. C. S. I.	Knight Grand Commander of the Order of the Star of India.
G. C. V. O.	Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order.
K. B. E.	Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire.
K. C.	King's Counsel.
K. C. B.	Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath.
K. C. M. G.	Knight Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George.
K. C. S. I.	Knight Commander of the Order of the Star of India.
K. C. V. O.	Knight Commander of the Royal Victorian Order.
K. G.	Knight of the Order of the Garter.
M. B. E.	Member of the Order of the British Empire.
M. C.	Military Cross.
M. P.	Member of Parliament.
M. V. O.	Member of the Royal Victorian Order.
O. B. E.	Officer of the Order of the British Empire.
O. M.	Order of Merit.
R. E.	Royal Engineers.
R. M.	Royal Marines.
R. N.	Royal Navy.
R. N. V. R.	Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve.
V. C.	Victoria Cross.

AUSTRALIA (2 Places).

The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes, Prime Minister;

The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Cook, G. C. M. G., Minister of the Navy.

SOUTH AFRICA (2 Places).

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Lieut. General the Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts, K. C., Minister of Defense.

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The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Ward, Bt., K. C. M. G., Minister of Finance.

NEWFOUNDLAND.

The Rt. Hon. Sir William F. Lloyd, K. C. M. G., Prime Minister;

Alternate:

Sir William Goode, K. B. E., Secretary of the Food Ministry.

India (2 Places)

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Major General His Highness the Maharajah of Bikaner, G. C. S. I.,
G. C. I. E., G. C. V. O., K. C. B., A. D. C.;

The Rt. Hon. the Lord Sinha, K. C., Parliamentary Under Secretary
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II. DELEGATES AND TECHNICAL ADVISERS**THE BRITISH EMPIRE****POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS**

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Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

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Mr. C. J. B. Hurst, C. B., K. C., Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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- Mr. H. A. Payne, C. B., Comptroller of Companies Department of the Board of Trade.
- Mr. M. L. Kershaw, C. S. I., C. I. E.

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- Mr. R. Vansittart, M. V. O., Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Orient);
- Mr. M. Palairet, Second Secretary of Embassy (Roumania and Greece);
- Mr. H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Africa);
- Mr. Eric Forbes Adams, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Orient);
- Lieut. Colonel T. E. Lawrence (Orient);
- Major the Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, M. P. (Orient);
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- Mr. E. H. Carr, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (North-eastern Europe);
- Sir Valentine Chirol (Orient);
- Mr. H. J. Toynbee, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Orient).

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- Lieut. Colonel J. H. Morgan (Military Questions).

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- Major J. R. M. Butler.

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 Lieut. Colonel R. C. M. Pink (Operations);
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 Commander H. Spencer-Cooper, M. V. O., R. N., Assistant to the Deputy First Sea Lord;
 Captain C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G., D. S. O., R. N. (General Questions):

- Captain A. G. Hotham, R. N. (Commerce, Maritime Transport, Economic Questions);
 Captain R. M. Colvin, R. N. (General Questions);
 Captain K. G. B. Dewar, R. N. (League of Nations, Maritime Law, General Questions);
 Captain G. B. Spicer-Simpson, D. S. O., R. N. (Non-European Questions);
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 Commander A. H. Taylor, R. N. (League of Nations, Maritime Law, General Questions);
 Lieut. Commander L. McCormick-Goodhart, O. B. E., R. N. V. R. (Commerce, Navigation, Economic Questions);
 Dr. A. Pearce Higgins (Maritime Law).

LABOR QUESTIONS

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 Mr. H. B. Butler, C. B., of the Ministry of Labor;
 Mr. G. Bellhouse, C. B. E., of the Home Office.

FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

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 Mr. H. E. Fass, of the Ministry of Finance (Debts of Invaded Countries);
 Mr. Dudley Ward, of the Ministry of Finance (Reparations in General);
 Mr. O. T. Falk, of the Ministry of Finance (General Questions);
 Lieut. Colonel the Hon. Sidney Peel, D. S. O., M. P., of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (General Questions).

ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

SECTION A. *Commerce and Industry*

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 Mr. A. W. Flux, Assistant Secretary of the Board of Trade;
 Mr. J. W. Verrier, O. B. E., of the Board of Trade;
 Mr. T. G. Gibson, of the Board of Trade;
 Mr. A. J. Martin, O. B. E., of the Board of Trade;
 Mr. J. F. Ronca, M. B. E., of the Board of Trade;
 Mr. W. T. Turner, of the Board of Trade;
 Mr. W. Carter, of the Board of Trade;

Mr. H. J. Hutchinson, of the Board of Trade;
Lieut. Commander J. G. Latham.

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Sir Thomas Royden, Bt., M. P., Assistant Secretary of the Ministry
of Shipping;
Sir Osborn Holmden, K. B. E., Assistant Secretary of the Ministry
of Shipping;
Paymaster-Commander W. H. Eves, R. N.

Technical Experts on Economic Questions:

Mr. S. J. Chapman, C. B. E., Assistant Secretary of the Board of
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Mr. H. F. Carlill, Assistant Secretary of the Board of Trade;
The Hon. C. H. Tufton, C. M. G., of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Philip Hanson, of the Ministry of Munitions;
Mr. H. W. Garrod, C. B. E., of the Ministry of Reconstruction;
Sir John Cadman, K. B. E., Member of the Petroleum Executive
Committee;
Mr. P. F. Swain, C. B. E., of the Public Trustee's Office.

FOOD AND RELIEF QUESTIONS

Sir William Goode, K. B. E., Secretary of the Food Ministry.

HISTORICAL QUESTIONS

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COLONIAL QUESTIONS

Sir Herbert J. Read, K.C.M.G., Assistant Under Secretary of State
for the Colonies (General Questions);
Mr. C. Strachey, Principal Secretary of the Ministry of the Colonies
(African Colonies);
Mr. J. F. N. Green, Principal Secretary of the Ministry of the Colonies
(Colonies, Except African Colonies).

THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA

Canada

LEGAL QUESTIONS

Mr. L. Christie, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs.

MILITARY QUESTIONS

Lieut. General Sir Arthur Currie, Commander of the Canadian Army;
Lieut. Colonel O. M. Biggar, K. C., Judge Advocate General.

FINANCIAL, ECONOMIC AND LABOR QUESTIONS

Mr. Lloyd Harris, Head of the Canadian Mission in London;
Mr. F. P. Jones, Vice President of the War Trade Board;
Mr. P. M. Draper, Secretary of the Canadian Trades and Labor Congress;
Mr. W. Warne, Statistician of the Department of Commerce.

Australia

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Mr. P. E. Deane, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister.

LEGAL QUESTIONS

Sir Robert Garran, C.M.G., Solicitor General;
Lieutenant F. W. Eggleston, Legal Adviser.

South Africa

COMMERCIAL QUESTIONS

Sir David de Villiers Graaf, Bt., former Minister of Finance of South Africa.

New Zealand

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Mr. R. Riley.

India

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Sir Arthur Hirtzel, K.C.B., Assistant Under Secretary of State for India;
Lieut. Colonel Sir J. Dunlop Smith, K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., C.I.E.,
Political Officer of the Indian Service, Aide to the Secretary of State for India.

ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

Mr. L. Kershaw, C.S.I., C.I.E., Secretary of the Financial and Statistical Section of the India Office.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General:

Lieut. Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B., Secretary of the Imperial War Cabinet.

Secretaries of the War Cabinet:

Captain Clement Jones, C.B., Assistant Secretary of the War Cabinet;
 Captain Edgar Abraham, Assistant Secretary of the War Cabinet;
 Major A. M. Caccia, M.V.O., Secretary of the British Section of the
 Supreme War Council.

*A. British Secretariat of the Conference**Secretaries:*

Mr. H. Norman, Counselor of Embassy;
 Mr. Eric Phipps, First Secretary of Embassy;
 Sir Percy Loraine, Bt., First Secretary of Embassy;
 Hon. T. A. Spring-Rice, Second Secretary of Embassy.

B. Secretariat of the Delegation

Mr. J. T. Davies, Secretary to Mr. Lloyd George;
 Mr. Philip Kerr, Secretary to Mr. Lloyd George;
 The Hon. Sir Eric Drummond, K.C.M.G., C.B., Minister Plenipotentiary, Secretary to Mr. Arthur James Balfour;
 Mr. Ian Malcolm, M.P., Secretary to Mr. Arthur James Balfour;
 Mr. Alwyn Parker, C.B., C.M.G., Counselor of Embassy, Secretary to Lord Hardinge;
 Mr. R. H. Campbell, C.M.G., Second Secretary of Embassy. Secretary to Lord Hardinge;
 Mr. J. C. Davidson, C.B., Secretary to Mr. A. Bonar Law;
 Mr. Hodgson, Secretary to Mr. G. N. Barnes;
 Major H. C. Thornton, Secretary to Lord Milner;
 Mr. Edward Marsh, C.B., Secretary to Mr. Winston Churchill;
 Mr. G. F. Buskard, Secretary to Sir Robert Borden;
 Mr. J. F. Boyce, Secretary to Sir Robert Borden;
 Mr. C. H. Payne, Secretary to Sir George Forster;
 Mr. P. T. Ahern, Secretary to Mr. C. J. Doherty;
 Mr. T. W. Quayle, Secretary to Mr. A. L. Sifton;
 Mr. P. E. Deane, Secretary to Mr. W. M. Hughes;
 Mr. R. Mungovan, Secretary to Sir Joseph Cook;
 Captain Brebner, Secretary to General Louis Botha;
 Captain Lane, Secretary to General J. C. Smuts;
 Mr. F. D. Thomson, Secretary to Mr. W. F. Massey;
 Miss A. M. Saunders, Secretary to Sir Joseph Ward;
 Mr. W. J. Carew, Secretary to Sir William F. Lloyd;
 Mr. C. H. Kisch, C.B., Secretary to Mr. E. S. Montagu;
 Mr. W. R. Gourlay, C.I.E., Secretary to Lord Sinha;
 Mr. A. J. Sylvester, O.B.E., Secretary to Sir Maurice Hankey.

FRANCE

I. PLINIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (5 Places)

M. Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council, Minister of War;
M. Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
M. L. L. Klotz, Minister of Finance;
M. André Tardieu, Commissioner General for Franco-American Affairs of War;
M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador;
Marshal Foch, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies.

II. DELEGATES AND TECHNICAL ADVISERS

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

M. Noulens, Ambassador of France at Petrograd, Chief of the French Mission in Poland;
M. Berthelot, Minister Plenipotentiary, Acting Director of Political and Commercial Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Gout, Minister Plenipotentiary, Chief of the Asiatic Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Laroche, Minister Plenipotentiary, Chief of the European Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. de Peretti de la Rocca, Minister Plenipotentiary, Chief of the African Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
General Le Rond, Adjutant General to the Marshal Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies.

LEGAL QUESTIONS

M. F. Larnaude, Dean of the Faculty of Law of the University of Paris;
M. André Weiss, Professor of the Faculty of Law of the University of Paris, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Frémageot, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

M. Léon Bourgeois, Senator, former President of the Council of Ministers, former Minister of Foreign Affairs.

MILITARY QUESTIONS

General Alby, Chief of the General Staff of the Army;
General Belin, French Military Representative on the Supreme War Council;
General Degoutte, Commander of the French Sixth Army;
General Duval, Adjutant General, Inspector General of Aviation;
General Niessel, Member of the Interallied Commission to Poland.

AVIATION QUESTIONS

Colonel Dhé, Director of Aviation in the Ministry of War;
Post Captain Chauvin, Chief of the Military and Aviation Service
and Aerial Patrols.

NAVAL QUESTIONS

Vice Admiral de Bon, Chief of the Naval General Staff.

LABOR QUESTIONS

M. Colliard, Minister of Labor and Social Security;
M. Loucheur, Minister of Industrial Reconstruction.

FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

M. Sergent, Under Secretary of State for Finance;
M. Bolley, Director General in the Ministry of Finance;
M. Celier, Director in the Ministry of Finance;
M. Luquet, Vice Governor of the Bank of France.

ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

M. Clémentel, Minister of Commerce, Industry, Posts and Telegraph,
of Maritime Transport and of the Merchant Marine;
M. Albert Lebrun, Minister for the Liberated Areas;
M. Bouisson, Commissioner for Maritime Transport and the Merchant
Marine;
M. Jean Morel, Senator, former Minister, President of the Tariff
Committee of the Senate;
M. Herbette, Director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
M. Ch. Lyon-Caen, Professor of the Faculty of Law of the University
of Paris;
M. Seydoux, Counselor of Embassy, Chief of Blockade Section in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
M. Kammerer, Consul General, Chief of the Financial Section in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Pila, Consul General, Chief of the Economic Section in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

COMMUNICATIONS QUESTIONS

M. Claveille, Minister of Public Works and of Transport.

COLONIAL QUESTIONS

M. Henry Simon, Minister for the Colonies.

III. TECHNICAL EXPERTS

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

- M. Hermitte, Secretary of Embassy of the First Class, Chief of the Chancellery and of the Claims Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- M. Grenard, Consul General, Chairman of the Interallied Commission on Teschen;
- M. Degrand, Consul of the Second Class;
- M. Émile Bourgeois, Professor of the Faculty of Letters of the University of Paris;
- M. Robert de Caix Saint-Aymour, Director of *Asie française* and *Afrique française*.

LEGAL QUESTIONS

- M. Basdevant, Assistant Professor of the Faculty of Law of the University of Paris;
- M. A. de Lapradelle, Professor of the Faculty of Law of the University of Paris, Assistant Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

- M. de Sillac, Counselor of Embassy;
- M. Clauzel, Secretary of Embassy of the First Class.

MILITARY QUESTIONS

- Lieut. Colonel Réquin, of the General Staff of the Army, Attached to the Commission on Franco-American Affairs of War;
- Commandant de Montal, of the General Staff of the Army.

AVIATION QUESTIONS

- Commandant d'Aiguillon, Member of the French Advisory Commission on Aeronautical Questions at the Peace Conference;
- M. d'Aubigny, Deputy, Chairman of the French Advisory Commission for Aeronautical Questions at the Peace Conference;
- M. Branet, Counselor of State, former Director General of Customs;
- M. Fighiera, Director in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry;
- M. Pierre-Étienne Flandin, Deputy;
- Captain L'Escaille, of the Naval Aviation;
- M. Lallemand, Inspector General of Mines;
- Captain Leroy, of the Service of Aeronautical Manufacture;
- M. de Navailles, Chief of Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- Commandant Poli-Marchetti, of the General Staff of the Marshal Commander in Chief of the Allied Army;

Lieut. Colonel Pujo, Assistant to the Director of Aviation in the Ministry of War;
Lieutenant Sablé, of the Naval Aviation;
Lieut. Colonel Saconney, Chief of the Section of the Anti-Aircraft Defense in the Ministry of War;
M. Soreau, Engineer, Vice President of the Aéro-Club de France;
Commandant Vuillemin, Aviation Squadron Commander;
M. Wahl, Naval Engineer Attached to the Ministry for the Colonies.

NAVAL QUESTIONS

Captain Levavasseur;
Lieutenant Odend'hal.

LABOR QUESTIONS

M. Arthur Fontaine, Director in the Ministry of Labor and Social Security;
M. Jouhaux, Secretary General of the Confédération générale du Travail.

FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

Commandant Aron, of the Ministry of Industrial Reconstruction;
M. Bavière, Secretary of the Exchange Commission;
M. Bexon, former Inspector of Finance;
M. Bloch-Laroque, Advocate General in the Court of Appeals of Paris;
M. Bouniols, Representative of Titleholders at Belgrade;
M. de la Chaume, former Inspector of Finance;
M. Chevalier, Director of the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas;
M. Cheysson, Inspector of Finance;
M. Dayras, Inspector of Finance;
M. de Fabry, Inspector of Finance;
M. François-Marsal, Member of the Exchange Commission;
M. Gilbert Gidel, Professor of the Faculty of Law of the University of Rennes;
M. G. Homberg, President of the Exchange Commission;
M. Jouasset, Inspector of Finance;
M. de Lasteyrie, former Inspector of Finance;
M. Lefèvre, Secretary General of the Crédit Lyonnais;
M. Raphaël-Georges Lévy, Member of the Institute;
M. Lyon, Advocate in the Court of Appeals of Paris;
Captain Masson;
M. Mercier, Principal Naval Engineer;
M. Neymarck, Economist;
M. Nicou, Engineer of the Corps des Mines;

M. Petit, Inspector of Finance;
M. Poisson, Inspector of Finance;
M. Sallandrouze de Lamornaix, Inspector General of Finance;
M. Théry, Economist;
M. de Verneuil, former Syndic of the Exchange Agents of the Paris Bourse;
Colonel Weyl, of the Ministry of Industrial Reconstruction.

ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

M. Alphan, Consul of the Second Class, Chief of Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Bignon, Deputy;
M. Charmeil, Director in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry;
M. Drouets, Director of the Office of Industrial Property;
M. Fighiera, Director in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry;
M. Guillet, Director in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry;
M. Hauser, Professor of the Faculty of Letters of the University of Dijon, Chief of Mission of the Ministry of Commerce;
M. Laurent-Vibert, Chief of Mission of the Commission on Maritime Transport and the Merchant Marine;
M. de Navailles, Chief of Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Petit, President of the Commercial Tribunal of the Seine;
M. Serruys, Director in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry;
M. Albert Tissier, Counselor to the Court of Cassation.

COMMUNICATIONS QUESTIONS

M. Charguéraud, Counselor of State, Vice Chairman of the Superior Council of Public Works;
M. Colson, Counselor of State;
M. Charles Loiseau, Chief of the French Mission in Italy;
Lt. Colonel Rey, Secretary General of the European Commission of the Danube;
M. Rousseau, Counselor of State.
M. Tirman, Counselor of State.

ETHNOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS

M. Emmanuel de Martonne, Professor of the Faculty of Letters of the University of Paris;
M. Krajewski, Consul of the First Class;
M. L. Aubert, Director of the Service of Research and Information in the Commission on Franco-American Affairs of War;
M. Haumant, Professor of the Faculty of Letters of the University of Paris.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General:

M. P. Dutasta, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic at Berne, Secretary General of the Conference.

A. French Secretariat of the Conference

M. Paul Gauthier, Minister Plenipotentiary;
M. de Béarn, Secretary of Embassy of the Second Class.

B. Secretariat of the Delegation

M. de Montille, Secretary of Embassy of the First Class;
Baron Pieyre, Secretary of Embassy of the Second Class;
Captain de Saint-Quentin, Secretary of Embassy of the Second Class;
M. Tetreau, Consul of the Second Class;
Lieutenant de Percin, Secretary of Embassy of the Second Class;
Captain Carteron, Vice Consul of the First Class;
M. Lavondès, Vice Consul of the First Class;
Captain Escoffier, Professor in the École libre des Sciences politiques;
Viscount Emmery, Attaché;
Lieutenant Duboin;
M. de Curzon, Attaché;
Captain Portier, Secretary of the French Section of the Supreme War Council.

ITALY

Hotel Édouard VII
(Tel. Gut.: 14-26)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (5 Places)

M. V. E. Orlando, President of the Council of Ministers;
Baron S. Sonnino, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
Marquis G. F. Salvago Raggi, Senator, former Ambassador of His Majesty the King of Italy at Paris;
M. A. Salandra, Deputy, former President of the Council of Ministers;
M. S. Barzilai, Deputy, former Minister.

II. DELEGATES AND TECHNICAL ADVISERS

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Count V. Macchi di Cellere, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Italy at Washington;

- M. G. de Martino, Minister Plenipotentiary, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. A. Ricci-Busatti, Minister Plenipotentiary, Chief of the Claims Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. G. C. Montagna, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Italy at Christiania;
Marquis P. della Torretta, Minister Plenipotentiary.

LEGAL QUESTIONS

- M. A. Scialoja, Senator, former Minister;
M. M. d'Amelio, Counselor to the Court of Cassation;
M. A. Ricci-Busatti, Minister Plenipotentiary, Chief of the Claims Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

MILITARY QUESTIONS

- General A. Diaz, Chief of the General Staff of the Army;
General U. Cavallero, Italian Military Representative on the Supreme War Council.

AVIATION QUESTIONS

- M. E. Chiesa, Deputy;
General M. Moris;
M. M. d'Amelio, Counselor to the Court of Cassation;
Rear Admiral P. Orsini;
M. G. C. Buzzati, Professor of International Law at the University of Pavia.

NAVAL QUESTIONS

- Admiral P. Thaon di Revel, Chief of the Naval General Staff;
Rear Admiral M. Grassi;
Captain U. Konz.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

- M. Stringher, Minister of the Treasury (Economic and Financial Questions);
M. Ciuffelli, Minister of Industry and Commerce (Economic and Financial Questions);
M. S. Crespi, Minister of Supply (Economic and Financial Questions);
Baron E. Mayor des Planches, Senator, Honorary Ambassador, Commissioner General of Emigration (Labor and Emigration);
M. L. della Torre, Senator (Financial Questions);
M. G. Paratore, Deputy, Under Secretary of State in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry;

- M. A. Cabrini, Deputy (Labor and Emigration);
 M. E. Chiesa, Deputy (Reparations);
 M. M. d'Amelio, Counselor to the Court of Cassation (Reparations and Emigration);
 M. L'Ingénieur Dante Ferraris, Industrialist (Economic and Financial Questions).

COLONIAL QUESTIONS

- M. G. Agnesa, Minister Plenipotentiary, Director General of Political Affairs in the Ministry for the Colonies (possibly coming to Paris).

III. TECHNICAL EXPERTS

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

- M. Gustavo Tosti, Consul General;
 M. A. Stranieri, Consul General;
 Marquis C. Durazzo, Counselor of Legation;
 M. G. Brambilla, Counselor of Legation;
 Count Vannutelli-Rey, Counselor of Legation;
 M. Marchetti Ferrante, Counselor of Legation;
 M. C. Galli, Consul;
 M. V. Bianchi, Consul;
 M. R. Piacentini, Consul;
 Marquis G. Paterno, Secretary of Legation;
 Colonel Castoldi.

LEGAL QUESTIONS

- M. J. Cammeo, Professor of Administrative Law at the University of Bologna;
 M. M. Pilotti, Judge;
 M. F. Salata, Prefect;
 M. Gustavo Tosti, Consul General.

MILITARY QUESTIONS

- General Levi;
 General Romei Longhena;
 Colonel of the General Staff A. Pariani;
 Lieut. Colonel of the General Staff G. Pellicelli;
 Lieut. Colonel Tissi;
 Commandant M. Pergolani;
 Commandant G. Mazzolini;
 Commandant G. Rugiu;
 Captain E. Romagnoli.

AVIATION QUESTIONS

M. E. Delmati, Director General in the Ministry of Posts and Telegraph;
Colonel A. de Siebert;
Lieut. Colonel G. Costanzi;
Lieut. Colonel P. R. Piccio;
Lieut. Colonel C. Berlin-Zoppi;
Captain G. Finzi.

NAVAL QUESTIONS

Lieut. Colonel G. Laghezza;
Naval Engineer L. Fea.

LABOR QUESTIONS

M. M. Abbiate, former Deputy;
M. G. Canepa, Deputy;
M. G. Longinotti, Deputy;
M. S. Coletti, Inspector of Emigration.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

M. B. Attolico, Director General in the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labor (Economic and Financial Questions);
M. Brofferio, Counselor of State, Italian Treasury Commissioner in France (Financial);
M. G. B. Ceccato, Commercial Attaché at Washington (Economic Questions);
M. P. Conte, Inspector in the Ministry of the Treasury (Financial Questions);
M. C. Dragoni, Secretary General of the International Institute of Agriculture (Economic Questions);
M. A. Dell'Abbadessa, Director General in the Ministry of Finance (Economic and Financial Questions);
M. V. Giuffrida, Counselor of State, Director General in the Ministry of Supply (Economic and Financial Questions);
M. L. Luccioli, Director General in the Ministry of Finance (Finance);
M. G. Mariani, Commercial Attaché (Economic Questions);
M. A. Pirelli, Industrialist, Head of the Mission of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Economic and Financial Questions);
M. F. Quartieri, Industrialist (Economic and Financial Questions);
M. E. Venezian, Inspector General in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Economic Questions).

COMMUNICATIONS QUESTIONS

M. Sinigaglia, Assistant Chief of the Service of the State Railways;
 M. Fiori, Chief of the Division of the State Railways;
 M. Baldassarre, Chief of Division in the Ministry of Public Works;
 Commandant Centa, Director General of the Merchant Marine;
 M. Ingianni, Port Captain;
 M. Moscheni, Director of Warehouses, Trieste.

COLONIAL QUESTIONS

M. R. Piacentini, Consul;
 M. V. Catastini, Colonial Director in the Ministry for the Colonies;
 M. de Nobili Massuero, Secretary in the Ministry for the Colonies.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General:

Count L. Aldrovandi, Minister Plenipotentiary.

*A. Italian Secretariat of the Conference**Secretaries:*

Marquis C. Durazzo, Counselor of Legation;
 M. G. Brambilla, Counselor of Legation;
 M. T. Bertelé, Secretary of Legation;
 Major A. Jones;
 Lieutenant A. Zanchi.

*B. Offices of the Ministers and Plenipotentiary Delegates**Office of the President of the Council of Ministers:*

M. Battioni, Inspector General, Secretary to the President of the
 Council of Ministers;
 Prince G. di Scordia, Secretary of Legation;
 M. A. Protani, Secretary;
 M. U. Lucchini, Secretary;
 Sub-Lieutenant F. Flores.

Assistants to the President of the Council:

M. F. Salata, Prefect;
 Professor G. Gallavresi.

Press Commissioner:

Prince G. Lanza di Scalea.

*Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs:**Chief of the Office:*

Count L. Aldrovandi, Minister Plenipotentiary.

Secretaries:

Count D. Rogeri, Secretary of Legation;
 M. A. Trombetti, Secretary of Legation;
 M. T. Bertelé, Secretary of Legation;
 Count L. O. Vinci, Secretary of Legation;

Press Commissioner:

M. P. Aloisi, Counselor of Legation.

C. *Secretariat of the Delegation**Secretaries for Political Questions:*

Count D. Rogeri, Secretary of Legation;
 M. T. Bertelé, Secretary of Legation;
 Count L. O. Vinci, Secretary of Legation.

Secretary for Legal Questions:

M. F. Foberti, Chief of Section in the Ministry of the Interior.

Secretaries for Aviation Questions:

Commandant A. Guidoni;
 Lieutenant U. Sauda.

Secretary for Military Questions:

Captain V. Fracchia.

Secretary for Naval Questions:

Lieutenant A. Giuganino.

Secretaries for Economic and Financial Questions:

M. F. Giannini (Economic Questions);
 M. L. Ceccato (Economic Questions);
 M. V. Tasco (Economic Questions);
 Captain Guido Jung (Financial Questions).

Secretary for Transport Questions:

M. M. Mosca, Engineer in the Ministry of Transport.

Secretary for Labor and Emigration Questions:

M. di Palma Castiglione, Inspector of Emigration.

JAPAN

Hotel Bristol
 (Tel. Central: 41-77)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (5 Places)

Marquis Saionji, former President of the Council of Ministers;
 Baron Makino, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Member of Diplomatic Council;

- Viscount Chinda, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at London;
 M. K. Matsui, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at Paris;
 M. H. Ijuin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at Rome.

II. DELEGATES AND TECHNICAL ADVISERS

POLITICAL AND LEGAL QUESTIONS

- M. Akidzuki, former Ambassador;
 M. Adatci, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at Brussels;
 M. Otchiai, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at The Hague;
 M. Sakutaro Tachi, Professor of the Faculty of Law of the University of Tokyo;
 M. H. Nagachika, Counselor of Embassy;
 M. Kato, Member of the House of Peers.

MILITARY QUESTIONS

- Lieut. General Nara, of the General Staff of the Army;
 Brigadier General Tanaka, Military Attaché at the Japanese Embassy at London;
 Colonel Sato, Military Attaché at the Japanese Legation at Berne.

AVIATION QUESTIONS

- M. Tanakadate, Honorary Professor of the Faculty of Science of the University of Tokyo;
 Captain Osumi, of the Naval General Staff.

NAVAL QUESTIONS

- Vice Admiral Takeshita, Assistant Chief of the Naval General Staff;
 M. Yamakawa, Counselor in the Ministry of Marine;
 Rear Admiral Iida, Naval Attaché at the Japanese Embassy at London.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

- M. Kengo Mori, Financial Agent of the Japanese Embassies at London and at Paris;
 Baron Kondo;
 M. Okubo, Member of the House of Peers;
 M. Oka, former Director of Commercial and Industrial Affairs in the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce;

M. E. Fukai;
M. M. Fukui;
M. M. Kita;
M. K. Kikuchi;
M. Kurokawa;
M. Tatsumi.

III. TECHNICAL EXPERTS

MILITARY QUESTIONS

Colonel Nagai, Military Attaché at the Japanese Embassy at Paris;
Lieut. Colonel Ninomiya, of the General Staff of the Army;
Lieut. Colonel Hata, of the General Staff of the Army;
Captain Fujioka, of the General Staff of the Army;
Captain K. Nishihara, of the General Staff of the Army.

AVIATION QUESTIONS

Naval Lieutenant Takata.

NAVAL QUESTIONS

Captain Matsumura, Naval Attaché at the Japanese Embassy at Paris;
Captain Nomura, of the Naval General Staff;
Captain Yamamoto, of the Naval General Staff;
Captain Funakoshi, of the Naval General Staff;
Captain Anno, of the Naval General Staff.

LABOR QUESTIONS

M. B. Suzuki;
M. Yoshizaka, Factory Inspector in the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General:

M. Otchiai, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at The Hague.

Secretaries:

M. Matsuoka, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Sadao Saburi, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Yoshida, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Kimura, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Kawai, Secretary of Legation;
M. Arita, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

M. Saito, Secretary of Embassy;
M. Shigenitsu, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. K. Horiuchi, Secretary of Embassy;
M. H. Ashida, Secretary of Embassy;
M. Kato, Secretary of Embassy;
M. K. Kuriyama, Secretary of Embassy;
M. Tani, Secretary of Embassy;
M. Sawada, Attaché to Embassy;
M. Harada, Attaché to Embassy;
M. Koshida, Attaché to Embassy;
M. Yokoyama, Attaché to Embassy;
M. Matsumiya, Attaché to Embassy;
M. Mori, Vice Consul;
M. Sato, Vice Consul.

BELGIUM

Hotel Lotti

(Tel. Central: 13-00; 71-85; 43-66)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (3 Places)

M. Hymans, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of State;
M. van den Heuvel, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Belgians, Minister of State;
M. Vandervelde, Minister of Justice, Minister of State.

II. DELEGATES AND TECHNICAL ADVISERS

LEGAL QUESTIONS

M. Rolin-Jaequemyns, Secretary General of the Delegation.

MILITARY QUESTIONS

Lieut. Colonel of the General Staff Galet, Honorary Aide-de-Camp to the King.

AVIATION QUESTIONS

Colonel van Crombrughe, Commander of Belgian Military Aviation.

LABOR QUESTIONS

M. Mahaim, Professor at the University of Liège, Secretary of the Belgian Section of the International Association for the Legal Protection of Workers.

ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

- M. Jaspar, Minister of Economic Affairs;
M. Brunet, Director General of Commerce and of Consulates in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Lepreux, Vice Governor of the National Bank of Belgium;
M. Despret, Advocate in the Court of Cassation, Administrator of the Bank of Brussels.

COMMUNICATIONS QUESTIONS

- M. Segers, Minister of State.

COLONIAL QUESTIONS

- M. Orts, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Acting Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

III. TECHNICAL EXPERTS

LEGAL QUESTIONS

- M. van Iseghem, President of the Court of Cassation;
M. Remy, Counselor to the Court of Cassation;
M. Dejace, Professor at the University of Liège;
Baron Descamps, Senator, Professor at the University of Louvain;
M. Errera, Professor at the University of Brussels;
M. Lafontaine, Senator;
M. Nys, Professor at the University of Brussels, Counselor to the Court of Appeals;
M. Prins, Professor at the University of Brussels;
M. Albéric Rolin, Professor Emeritus at the University of Ghent, Director of the Library of the Palace of Peace at The Hague;
M. Varlez, Professor at the University of Ghent.

MILITARY QUESTIONS

- Captain Commandant G. van Egroo, of the General Staff;
Captain Commandant Derousseaux, of the General Staff.

LABOR QUESTIONS

- M. de Brouckère, Counselor to the Ministry of Economic Affairs;
M. C. van Overberghe, Honorary Secretary General of the Department of Sciences and Arts;
R. P. Rutten, President of the Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens;
M. Mertens, Secretary General of the Executive Committee of the Labor Party and of the Independent Syndicates;
M. Lombard, Vice Deputy, Secretary General of the Miners Federation;

- M. Hénin, Counselor to the Ministry of Economic Affairs;
 M. van der Stegen, Industrialist, Ghent;
 M. Fraipont, Director General of the Cristalleries du Val Saint-Lambert.

FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

- M. E. Carton de Wiart, Director of the Société générale de Belgique;
 M. Hautain, Director of the National Bank of Belgium;
 M. Rombouts, Director General in the Ministry of Finance.

ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL QUESTIONS

- M. Trasenster, Administrator of the Société d'Cuillère-Marihaye;
 M. Canon-Legrand, President of the Chamber of Commerce of Mons;
 M. Galopin, Deputy Administrator of the National Arms Factory of Herstal;
 M. Jean de Hemptinne, Industrialist, Ghent;
 M. Begault, Actuary;
 M. Thomas Braun, Advocate at the Court of Appeals in Brussels;
 M. Capitaine, Advocate in the Court of Appeals in Liège.

AGRICULTURAL QUESTIONS

- M. E. Tibbaut, Vice President of the Chamber of Representatives, President of the Conseil Supérieur de l'Agriculture and of the Agricultural Section of the Comité National;
 M. G. Dumont de Chassart, Member of the Conseil Supérieur de l'Agriculture;
 M. Boël;
 M. Crahay, Director General of Waters and Forests;
 M. Frateur, Professor of Biology at the University of Louvain.

COMMUNICATIONS QUESTIONS

- M. van Gansberghe, Director General of Bridges and Highways;
 M. Coppieters, Senator, Technical Adviser on Public Works;
 M. van Mierlo, Honorary Engineer of Bridges and Highways, former Engineer of the State Marine;
 M. Pierrard, Director General of the Marine;
 M. Hostie, Legal Adviser in the Administration of the Marine;
 M. Rotsaert, Lieutenant of Engineers.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General:

M. Rolin-Jaequemyns.

Secretaries:

Count de Romrée de Vichenet, Secretary of Legation;
 Viscount Jacques Davignon, Secretary of Legation, Attaché in the
 Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
 Count Guillaume de Hemricourt de Grunne, Secretary of Legation;
 Baron Capelle, Chief of Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
 Baron Jules Guillaume, Attaché of Legation, Sub-Lieutenant of
 Artillery;
 Lieutenant of Artillery Henri Rolin, Attaché in the Office of the
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Chief of the Chancery of the Secretariat General:

M. van Eycken, Chief of Bureau, Chief of the Chancery of the
 Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Commander of Military Personnel Attached to the Delegation:

Captain Commandant Nypels.

Assistants to the Delegation:

M. Charles Terlinden, Professor at the University of Louvain;
 M. de Visscher, Professor at the University of Ghent;
 M. Maurice Bourquin, Professor at the University of Brussels;
 M. van den Ven, Professor at the University of Louvain, Special
 Delegate of the Ministry of Finance;
 M. de l'Escaille, Counselor of Legation;
 M. Louwers, Secretary of the Colonial Council;
 Commandant Maury, Chief of the Cartographic Service of the Min-
 istry for the Colonies;
 M. Ganshof, Licencié ès lettres, with rank of subaltern.

BOLIVIA

Avenue de Malakoff, 104
 (Tel. Passy: 74-63)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATE (1 Place)

M. Ismael Montes, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten-
 tiary of Bolivia at Paris.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL*Secretary:*

M. I. Montes h., Secretary of Legation.

BRAZIL

Hotel Plaza Athénée
(Tel. Passy: 62-37)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (3 Places)

- M. Epitacio Pessoa, former Minister of State, former Member of the Supreme Court of Justice, Federal Senator;
M. Olyntho de Magalhães, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of Brazil at Paris, former Minister of Foreign Affairs;
M. Pandiá Calogeras, Deputy, former Minister of Finance;
M. Raoul Fernandes, Deputy.

II. DELEGATES AND TECHNICAL ADVISERS

LEGAL QUESTIONS

- M. Rodrigo Octavio, Professor of International Law of the Faculty of Rio de Janeiro, Legal Counselor of the Republic.

MILITARY QUESTIONS

- Commandant Malan d'Angrogne, Military Attaché at the Legation of Brazil at Paris.

NAVAL QUESTIONS

- Captain Armando Burlamaqui.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General:

- M. Helio Lobo, Secretary General of the Presidency of the Republic.

First Secretaries:

- M. J. J. Moniz de Aragão, Counselor of Embassy at Rome;
M. F. Pessoa de Queiroz, Consul General of Brazil in Roumania, of the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs;
M. P. Leão Velloso Netto, Counselor of the Legation of Brazil at Paris.

Second Secretaries:

- M. F. de Souza Dantas, Secretary of the First Class of the Legation of Brazil at The Hague;
M. Carlos C. de Ouro Preto, Secretary of the Second Class of the Legation of Brazil at London;
M. Mauricio Nabuco, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. L. de Andrade Muller, Secretary of the Second Class of the Legation of Brazil at Havana.

Attachés:

M. Gustavo Barroso, former Deputy;
 M. Luiz Silveira, of the Ministry of Agriculture;
 M. A.-A. Carneiro da Cunha, Advocate;
 M. F. Mendes de Almeida, Jr., Advocate;
 M. Eugenio G. Catta-Preta, Advocate;
 M. P. de Castro Maya, Engineer;
 M. Paulo Bittencourt, Advocate;
 M. Raphael de Hollanda, Engineer;

Press:

M. O. de Carvalho Azevedo.

CHINA

Hotel Lutetia
 (Tel. Fleurus: 16-61)

I. PLÉNIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (2 Places)

M. Lou Tseng-tsiang, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
 M. Cheng-ting Thomas Wang, former Minister of Agriculture and Commerce;
 M. Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of China at Washington;
 M. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of China at London;
 M. Sunthou Wei, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of China at Brussels.

II. DELEGATES AND TECHNICAL ADVISERS

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

M. Hawking L. Yen, Counselor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

LEGAL QUESTIONS

M. Liu Chung-cheh, Counselor of the Cabinet and Counselor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
 M. Tsien Tai, Counselor of the Ministry of Justice.

MILITARY QUESTIONS

Lieut. General Tang Tsai-li;
 Major General Han Lin-chun;
 Major General Dan Pao-tchao;
 Major General Liang Shang-tung;
 Colonel Tcheng-hung.

Attachés:

M. Gustavo Barroso, former Deputy;
 M. Luiz Silveira, of the Ministry of Agriculture;
 M. A.-A. Carneiro da Cunha, Advocate;
 M. F. Mendes de Almeida, Jr., Advocate;
 M. Eugenio G. Catta-Preta, Advocate;
 M. P. de Castro Maya, Engineer;
 M. Paulo Bittencourt, Advocate;
 M. Raphael de Hollanda, Engineer;

Press:

M. O. de Carvalho Azevedo.

 CHINA

Hotel Lutetia
 (Tel. Fleurus: 16-61)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (2 Places)

M. Lou Tseng-tsiang, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
 M. Cheng-ting Thomas Wang, former Minister of Agriculture and Commerce;
 M. Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of China at Washington;
 M. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of China at London;
 M. Sunthou Wei, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of China at Brussels.

II. DELEGATES AND TECHNICAL ADVISERS

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

M. Hawkling L. Yen, Counselor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

LEGAL QUESTIONS

M. Liu Chung-cheh, Counselor of the Cabinet and Counselor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
 M. Tsien Tai, Counselor of the Ministry of Justice.

MILITARY QUESTIONS

Lieut. General Tang Tsai-li;
 Major General Han Lin-chun;
 Major General Dan Pao-tchao;
 Major General Liang Shang-tung;
 Colonel Tcheng-hung.

NAVAL QUESTIONS

Rear Admiral Woo Tsen-nan;
Captain Chen Shau Kwan.

ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL QUESTIONS

M. Tai-chi Quo, former Secretary of the Presidency of the Republic and former Counselor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Wang Chin-chun, Director of the Peking-Hankow Railway;
M. Tsang Ou, Engineer Attached to the Ministry of Communications and Director of the Chinese State Railway (Lung-Hai line);
M. Pehan B. Sze, Technical Expert of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce;
M. C. C. Wang, Counselor of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce;
M. V. K. Ting, Director of the Geological Service of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce;
M. Fong Tching-koué.

III. TECHNICAL EXPERTS

Sir John Mac Leavy Brown, C. M. G., Counselor of the Legation of China at London;
Dr. S. E. Morrison, Political Counselor of the Presidency of the Republic of China;
M. Henri de Codt, Legal Consultant of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. G. Padoux, Counselor of the Court of Accounts;
M. Georges Bouillard, Engineer-Counselor of the Peking-Hankow Railway.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General:

M. Yo Tsao-yeu, Counselor of the Legation of China at Paris.

Secretaries:

M. Tchou Tsong-han, Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Chang-hsuan Sun, Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Chaohsiung Zee, Assistant Secretary of the Presidency of the Council, Assigned to the Minister of Foreign Affairs;
M. Shen Tchong-huin, Secretary of the First Class of the Legation of China at The Hague;
M. Chang Yuén-chi, Secretary of the Second Class of the Legation of China at Paris;

- M. Sze-ping, Secretary of the Second Class of the Legation of China at London;
 M. Tchao Itao, Consul of China at Padang;
 M. Wen Pin Wei, Secretary of the Third Class of the Legation of China at Washington;
 M. Tai Mingfou, Secretary of the Third Class of the Legation of China at Paris;
 M. Tchen Hio-lan, Secretary of the Third Class of the Legation of China at Paris;
 M. Tchéou-wei, Assistant Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
 M. Shu-tze, Secretary of the Third Class of the Legation of China at Berne.
 M. L. V. Pan, Attaché of the Legation of China at London;
 M. Yang Ngan-chan, Secretary of the Third Class of the Legation of China at Washington;
 M. Li Tehuin, Vice Consul of China at Paris;
 M. Pih Min-yu, Attaché of the Legation of China at London;
 M. Fianghiang Li, former Secretary of the First Class of the Legation of China at Rome;
 M. King Pouzong, former Secretary of the Third Class of the Legation of China at Paris;
 Commandant Tcheng Tse-li;
 Commandant Tao Shou-mou.

Assistant Secretaries:

- M. Hoo Chi-tsai, Doctor of Law;
 M. Tsiao-ling C.-L. Soong;
 M. Wunsz King;
 M. Yun-kuan Kuo;
 M. Chao Chuan;
 M. Linson Edward Dzau;
 M. Hsu Gnietseng;
 M. Tcheng Kyd;
 M. William Hsieh;
 Captain Ou-tsing;
 Captain Wang Jou-kiou;
 Captain Wang Ken;
 Lieutenant Chu Tsu-sien;
 M. Chu Nei-chu.

CUBA

Avenue Marceau, 51
(Tel. Passy: 18-42)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATE (1 Place)

M. Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante, Dean of the Faculty of Law of the University of Havana, President of the Cuban Society of International Law.

III. TECHNICAL EXPERTS

LEGAL QUESTIONS

M. Rafael M. Angulo, Under Secretary of the Ministry of Public Education and Fine Arts.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General:

M. Guillermo de Blanck, Minister Plenipotentiary.

Assistant Secretaries:

M. Miguel Angel Campa, Secretary of Legation of the First Class;

M. Manuel Tejedor, Secretary of Legation of the First Class.

Attachés:

M. Pedro Martinez Fraga;

M. Luis Machado;

M. Gustavo S. de Bustamante.

ECUADOR

Rue de la Bienfaisance, 9

I. DELEGATE PLENIPOTENTIARY (1 Place)

M. Dorn y de Alsua, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Ecuador at Paris;

Dr. Carlos R. Tobar, former Minister of Foreign Affairs.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General:

M. G. Zaldumbide, Secretary of Legation of the First Class.

GREECE

Hotel Mercédès
(Tel. Passy: 72-67; 72-84)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (2 Places)

M. Eleftherios Veniselos, President of the Council of Ministers;
M. Nicolas Politis, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
M. A. Romanos, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes at Paris.

II. DELEGATES AND TECHNICAL ADVISERS

M. A. Michalakopoulos, Minister of State;
M. L. Coromilas, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes at Rome.

III. TECHNICAL EXPERTS

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

M. C. Rentis, Chief of Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. R. Raphaël, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. S. Marchetti, Secretary of Legation;
M. A. Negropontis, Attaché of Legation.

LEGAL QUESTIONS

M. M. Kebedgy, former Counselor to the Mixed Court of Appeals of
Egypt;
M. Th. Jon, former Professor of International Law at Boston
University.

MILITARY QUESTIONS

Colonel A. Mazarakis.

NAVAL QUESTIONS

Captain N. Botassis, Naval Attaché in the Legation of Greece at
Paris.

LABOR QUESTIONS

M. I. Sophianopoulos, Secretary General of the Ministry of National
Economy.

FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

M. Andreades, Professor at the University of Athens;
M. A. Mylonas, Secretary General in the Ministry of Agriculture.

COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

M. N. Speranza, Director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
 M. K. Varvaressos, Director in the Ministry of National Economy.

INDUSTRIAL QUESTIONS AND PUBLIC WORKS

M. A. Politis, Director of the Hellenic Railways;
 M. M. Caramanos, Commercial Counselor of the Hellenic Government.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretaries General:

M. N. Speranza, Director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
 M. C. Rentis, Chief of Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A. *Greek Secretariat of the Conference**Secretaries:*

M. R. Raphaël, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
 M. S. Marchetti, Secretary of Legation;
 M. K. Veniselos, Secretary of Legation.

Attachés:

M. C. Papadiamantopoulos, Attaché in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
 M. A. Negropontis, Attaché of Legation.

B. *Offices of the Ministers and Plenipotentiary Delegates**Office of the President of the Council of Ministers, Minister of War*
Chief of the Office:

M. Jean Politis, Secretary of Legation.

Office of Ordinance:

Captain S. Veniselos.

S. C. S.:

M. A. Lianopoulos, Vice Consul.

*Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:**Chief of the Office:*

M. Georges Melas, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Secretary:

Lieutenant Ath. Politis, Attaché in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

GUATEMALA

Avenue Kléber, 44
(Tel. Passy: 54-35)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATE (1 Place)

M. Joaquín Mendéz, former Minister of State for Public Works and Public Education, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Guatemala at Washington, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on Special Mission at Paris.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General:

M. Guillermo Matos Pacheco, Chargé d'Affaires of Guatemala at Paris.

Assistant Secretary:

Dr. Rodolfo Robles.

Military Attaché:

Captain Miguel Idigoras, of the Military Academy of Guatemala,
Personal Attaché of the President of Republic of Guatemala.

HAITI

Boulevard de Courcelles, 104
(Tel. Wagram: 55-80)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATE (1 Place)

M. Tertullien Guilbaud, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Haiti at Paris.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretaries:

M. Clément Dartiguenave, Secretary of the Legation of Haiti at Paris;

Dr. Auguste Casseus, former Counselor of Legation.

HEDJAZ

Avenue du Bois-de-Boulogne, 72
(Tel. Passy: 56-04)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (2 Places)

His Royal Highness Emir Feisal;
M. Rustem Haidar.

II. DELEGATES AND TECHNICAL ADVISERS

General Noury;
Dr. Ahmed Kadry;
Farès Khoury;
Emine Arslan;
Captain Tahsine Kadry.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General:
Aouni Abdul-Hadi.

Secretary:
Kisbani.

HONDURAS

Hotel du Bon LaFontaine, Rue des Saints-Pères, 64 and 66
(Tel. Saxe: 18-80)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATE (1 Place)

Dr. Policarpo Bonilla, on Special Mission at Washington, former President of the Republic of Honduras; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

LIBERIA

Hotel Scribe
(Tel. Central: 39-46)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (1 Place)

Hon. C. D. B. King, Secretary of State;
M. C. B. Dunbar;
M. H. F. Worley.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary:

M. H. A. Miller.

NICARAGUA

Boulevard de Magenta, 28

I. PLÉNIPOTENTIARY DELEGATE (1 Place)

M. Salvador Chamorro, President of the Chamber of Deputies.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

First Secretary:

M. Guerrero-Montalvan, Advocate.

Second Secretary:

M. C. Chamorro-Bénard, Consul General of Nicaragua at Paris.

Counselors:

M. Pedro Cabrera;

M. Luis Jiménez.

PANAMA

Quai de Passy, 16

(Tel. Passy: 82-47)

I. PLÉNIPOTENTIARY DELEGATE (1 Place)

M. Antonio Burgos, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Panama at Madrid.

III. DELEGATES AND TECHNICAL ADVISERS

M. Walter S. Penfield, Legal Counselor of the Legation of Panama at Washington;

Lieut. Colonel Arthur Dryhurst Budd, of the American Army.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Rue Cardinet, 70

(Tel. Wagram: 04-15)

Secretary:

M. Ernest Heurtematte, Consul of Panama at Paris, Attaché in the Legation.

Assistant Attaché:

M. Raul A. Amador, Chargé d'Affaires of Panama at Paris.

PERU

Rue Chateaubriand, 14
(Tel. Élysées: 49-93)

I. PLÉNIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (1 Place)

- M. Carlos G. Candamo, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Peru at Paris;
 M. Francisco Garcia Calderon, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Peru at Brussels;
 M. V. M. Maurtua, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Peru at The Hague, former Minister of Finance, former Deputy.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretaries:

- M. Juan B. de Lavalle;
 M. Enrique Goytisolo.
-

POLAND

Hotel des Champs-Élysées, 3, 5, Rue Balzac
(Tel. Élysées. 06-87; 19-86; 19-87; and 19-88)

I. PLÉNIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (2 Places)

- M. Roman Dmowski, President of the Polish National Committee;
 M. Ignace Paderewski, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Alternate:

- M. Casimir Dluski, Member of the Polish National Committee.

II. DELEGATES AND TECHNICAL ADVISERS

LEGAL QUESTIONS

- M. Stanislas Kutrzeba, Professor of History of Law at the University of Cracow and Member of the Polish Academy at Warsaw and of the Czech Academy at Prague.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR

- M. Constantin Skirmunt, Member of the Polish National Committee, Delegate to the Italian Government;
 M. Léon Lubienski, Member of the Polish National Committee;
 M. Casimir Rybinski, Delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

LABOR QUESTIONS

- M. Stanislas Patek, Member of the Polish National Committee;
M. Jean Zoltowski, Member of the Polish National Committee.

FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

- M. Sigismond Chamiec, Secretary General of the Polish Economic Delegation, Director of the National Bank of Loans (Bank of Poland).

ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

- Dr. Arthur Benis, Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce of Cracow.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO REPARATION OF DAMAGE QUESTIONS

- M. Sigismond Chamiec, Director of National Bank of Loans;
M. Ladislas Grabski, President of the Office of the Liquidation of War;
M. Casimir Olszowski, Director of the Department of Damages in the Ministry of Finances of Poland;
M. Roman Rybarski, Professor at the University of Cracow.

ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL QUESTIONS

- M. André Wierzbicki, President of the Polish Economic Delegation, former Minister of Industry and Commerce, Director of the Society of Industrialists of Poland.

COMMUNICATION QUESTIONS

- M. Casimir Kasperski, Economist, Professor at the School of Higher Studies of Commerce of Warsaw.

III. TECHNICAL EXPERTS

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

- M. Joachim Bartoszewicz, Member of the Polish National Committee;
M. Casimir Downarowicz, Member of the Polish National Committee;
M. Erasme Piltz, Member of the Polish National Committee, Delegate to the French Government;
M. Nicolas Rey, Member of the Polish National Committee;
M. Marjan Seyda, Member of the Polish National Committee;
M. Ladislas Sobanski, Member of the Polish National Committee, Delegate to the British Government;
M. Gustave Szura, Delegate of the National Council from the Duchy of Teschen;
M. Vladimir Tetmajer, Member of the Polish National Committee;
M. Stanislas Thugutt, Member of the Polish National Committee, former Minister of the Interior;

- M. Joseph Wielowieyski, Member of the Polish National Committee,
Secretary General of the Committee;
M. Maurice Zamoyski, Member of the Polish National Committee.

HISTORICAL AND LEGAL QUESTIONS

- M. François Pulaski, President of the Polish Commission of Preparatory Work for the Peace Conference, former President of the Council of State, Secretary General of the Society of Sciences of Warsaw;
M. Oscar Halecki, Professor of the History of Eastern Europe at the University of Warsaw;
M. Ladislas Konopczynski, Professor of the History of Poland at the University of Cracow, Member of the Society of Sciences of Warsaw;
M. Léon Valerian Nalecz d'Ostrorog, former Legal Counselor of the Ottoman Empire, former First Legal Counselor and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Sublime Porte;
M. Czeslas Prusrynski, Counselor of Legation;
M. Venceslas Sobieski, Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Cracow, Member of the Society of Sciences of Warsaw;
M. Bohdan Winiarski, Lecturer of Constitutional and Administrative Law at the School of Political Science of Cracow.

NAVAL QUESTIONS

Colonel George Zwierkowski.

LABOR QUESTIONS

- M. François Sokal, Engineer, of the Ministry of Labor.

ECONOMIC, INDUSTRIAL, AGRICULTURAL, FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL QUESTIONS

- M. Venceslas Babinski, Economist;
M. François Bujak, Economist, Professor at the University of Cracow, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of Cracow;
M. Joseph Buzek, Economist, Professor at the University of Cracow, Director of the Central Statistical Office of Warsaw;
M. Sigismond Chrzanowski, Vice President of the Central Agricultural Society of Poland;
M. Antoine Doerman, Economist, Under Secretary of State for Commerce and Industry of Galicia;
M. Boguslaw Herse, President of the Society of Polish Merchants;
M. Stanislas Karlowski, Director of the Bank of Commerce at Warsaw;

- M. Stefan Laturysiewicz, Vice President of the Society of Polish Merchants;
- M. André Lubomirski, President of the Society of Industrialists of Galicia;
- M. Étienne Markowski, former Director of the Russian Asiatic Bank at London and New York;
- M. Edouard Natanson, Industrialist, Member of the Council of the Society of Industrialists of Poland;
- M. Maurice Poznanski, Industrialist, Member of the Council of the Society of Industrialists of Poland;
- M. Edouard Rose, of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce;
- M. Alexandre Szczepanski, Economist, Director of the Economic Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Warsaw;
- M. Henri Tennenbaum, Economist, Professor at the School of Higher Studies of Commerce of Warsaw;
- M. Gustave Wertheim, Economist, Professor at the School of Higher Studies of Commerce of Warsaw.

REPARATION OF DAMAGE QUESTIONS

- M. Venceslas Kawinski, Director of the Central Industrial Commission of the Evaluation of Damages.

GEOGRAPHICAL AND ETHNOGRAPHICAL QUESTIONS

- M. Jean Czekanowski, Professor at the University of Lwow;
- M. Casimir Nitsch, Professor at the University of Lwow, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of Cracow;
- M. Eugène Romer, Professor at the University of Lwow, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of Cracow;
- M. Jean Rozwadowski, Member of the Polish National Committee;
- M. Antoine Sujkowski, Professor of Geography at the University of Warsaw.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General:

- M. Stanislas Kozicki, Member of the Polish National Committee.

Assistant Secretaries:

- M. Michel Sokolnicki, Member of the Polish National Committee;
- M. Sigismond Chamiec, Secretary General of the Economic Delegation.

Chief of the Office of the Secretariat General:

- M. Georges Tomaszewski, former Secretary of Legation.

Chief of the Press Service:

- M. Louis Wlodek.

PORTUGAL

Hotel Campbell
(Tel. Élysées: 08-69, 08-70)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (2 Places)

Dr. Affonso Costa, former President of the Council of Ministers;
M. Augusto Soares, former Minister of Foreign Affairs;
Colonel Norton de Mattos, former Minister of War;
M. Alfredo Freire d'Andrade, Professor on the Faculty of Sciences,
former Minister of Foreign Affairs;
M. Jayme Batalha Reis, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Portugal at Petrograd.

II. DELEGATES AND TECHNICAL ADVISERS

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

M. João Chagas, Minister Plenipotentiary, former President of the Council of Ministers;
M. Manuel Teixeira-Gomes, Minister Plenipotentiary;
M. Augusto de Vasconcellos, Minister Plenipotentiary, former President of the Council and former Minister of Foreign Affairs.

LEGAL QUESTIONS

M. Augusto Soares, former Minister of Foreign Affairs.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

M. Jayme Batalha Reis, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Portugal at Petrograd.

FINANCIAL AND COMMUNICATION QUESTIONS

M. A. Santos Viegas, former Minister of Finances, Subdirector of the Portugal Railways Company.

MILITARY AND AVIATION QUESTIONS

Colonel Norton de Mattos, former Minister of War.

NAVAL QUESTIONS

Captain A. Botelho de Sousa, Professor at the Naval School, former Senator.

ECONOMIC AND LABOR QUESTIONS

Dr. Albino Vieira da Rocha, Professor of Economics at the University of Lisbon.

COLONIAL QUESTIONS

M. Alfredo Freire d'Andrade, Professor on the Faculty of Sciences, former Minister of Foreign Affairs.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General:

M. Augusto de Vasconcellos, Minister Plenipotentiary, former President of the Council and former Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Assistant Secretary General:

M. A. de S. Santos Bandeira, Minister Plenipotentiary.

Secretaries:

M. João A. de Bianchi, First Secretary of the Delegation, Secretary of the Legation of Portugal at London;

M. José de Abreu, Chief of the Office of the President of the Delegation;

Captain T. W. Fernandes, Assistant Military Attaché in the Legation of Portugal at London;

Lieutenant Sebastião de Barros Abreu e Costa, Private Secretary of the President of the Delegation;

Second Lieutenant Alfredo da Cruz Nordeste, Assistant in the Secretariat;

Second Lieutenant Luiz Leote do Rego, Assistant in the Secretariat.

ROUMANIA

Avenue des Champs-Élysées, 77

(Tel. Passy : 53-16)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (2 Places)

M. Jean J. C. Bratiano, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister of Foreign Affairs;

General Constantin Coanda, General of the Army Corps, Royal Aide-de-Camp, former President of the Council of Ministers;

Dr. Vaida-Voevod, Minister of State;

M. Nicolas Misu, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Roumania at London;

M. Victor Antonesco, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Roumania at Paris, former Minister of Finance;

M. Constantin Diamandy, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Roumania at Petrograd;

M. Georges Danielopol, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Roumania at Washington.

II. DELEGATES AND TECHNICAL ADVISERS

M. P. Zahariade, Engineer Inspector General, former Subdirector of the State Railways;

M. S. Rosental, Legal Consultant.

III. TECHNICAL EXPERTS

LEGAL QUESTIONS

M. Ef. Antonesco, Counselor of the Court of Appeal of Bucharest, Secretary General of the Roumanian Delegation;

M. C. Antoniadé, Counselor of the Court of Appeal of Bucharest;

M. M. Djuvara, Doctor of Law.

MILITARY QUESTIONS

Staff-Colonel Thomas Dimitresco.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

M. G. Caracostea, Engineer Inspector General, Director of the Commercial Service on the Railways;

Dr. Creanga, Professor at the University, former Secretary General of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce;

M. C. Crishan (Banat);

M. N. Flondor, Secretary General of the Ministry for Bukovina;

M. D. Gheorghio, Director General of Customs;

M. D. Marinesco, Engineer Inspector General of Post and Telegraphs;

M. Jean Mocsoni (Banat);

Dr. Moroiano, Commercial Attaché (Transylvania);

Dr. Mrazec, Professor at the University of Bucharest, Member of the Roumanian Academy;

M. Eugène Neguicea, Professor of the University, former Director General of Customs;

M. Michel Serban, Lecturer at the University, Agricultural Inspector (Transylvania);

M. Georges Popesco, Engineer Inspector General, Director of River Hydraulic Service;

M. Nicolas Stefanescu, Engineer Inspector General, former Director of River Navigation of the Roumanian State;

M. Jean Tanasesco, Engineer, Subdirector of Biological Institute of Bucharest;

M. Jean Pellivan, Director of Justice in Bessarabia.

ETHNOGRAPHICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL QUESTIONS

- M. Caius Brediceano, Special Counselor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Banat);
 Professor Doctor Coltor (Transylvania);
 M. Lepadato, Member of the Roumanian Academy (Transylvania);
 M. Arhip Roshca (Bukovina);
 M. Basile Vitenco (Bukovina);
 M. Trajan Vuia (Banat).

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General:

- M. Constantin Bratiano, former Director of the Political Office of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

Assistants to the President of the Delegation:

- M. Aurel Vassilio, Secretary of the First Class of the Legation of Roumania at Paris;
 M. J.-J. Plessia, Chief of the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

SERBIA

Hotel Beau-Site, Rue de Presbourg, 4
 (Tel. Passy: 55-47)

I. PLÉNIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (3 Places)

- M. N. P. Pachitch, former President of the Council of Ministers;
 M. Ante Trumbić, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
 M. Milenko R. Vesnitch, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Serbia at Paris;
 M. M. Ivan Zolger, Professor of the University;
 M. Mathias Boshkovitch, Minister Plenipotentiary in retirement;
 M. Otokar Rybar, Deputy;
 M. Josip Smodlaka, Deputy.

II. DELEGATES AND TECHNICAL ADVISERS

- M. Andrey Radovitch, former President of the Council of Ministers;
 M. Costa Stoyanovitch, former Minister;
 M. Miloche Savtchitch, former Minister;
 M. Velizar Yankovitch, former Minister;
 M. Andra Stanitch, former Minister.

LEGAL QUESTIONS

M. Slobodan Yovanovitch, Professor at the University of Belgrade;
 M. Rodolphe A. Reiss, Professor of the University;
 M. Dragoljoub Arandjelovitch, former Minister, Professor at the University of Belgrade;
 M. Koumanoudi, Professor at the University of Belgrade;
 M. M. A. Novakovitch, Lecturer at the University of Belgrade;
 M. Léonide Pitamić, Professor of the University;
 M. Iovan Voutchkovitch, Consul General.

MILITARY QUESTIONS

General Pierre Péchitch, Deputy Chief of the Supreme General Staff;
 Colonel of the General Staff D. Calafatovitch.

ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL, AND COMMUNICATION QUESTIONS

M. Dragoljoub Yoksimovitch, Deputy;
 M. B. Voukovitch, Secretary General to the Board of Directors of the State Railways.

MERCHANT MARINE QUESTIONS

M. Melko Cingrija, Deputy;
 M. Bozo Banac, Shipowner;
 M. Bogdan Durbesić, Shipowner;
 M. Filip Wolf Vuković, former Secretary of the Association of Shipowners at Trieste.

ETHNOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL QUESTIONS

M. Iovan Cvijić, former Rector of the University of Belgrade;
 M. Andreja Radovitch, former President of the Council of Ministers;
 Count L. de Vojnovitch, former Minister;
 M. Tih. Djordjévitch, Lecturer at the University of Belgrade;
 M. Alexandre Bélitch, Professor at the University of Belgrade;
 M. Boza Marković, Professor at the University of Belgrade;
 M. Iovan Radonitch, Professor at the University of Belgrade;
 M. Stanoyé Stanoyevitch, Professor at the University of Belgrade;
 M. Niko Zupanić, Vice Director of the Ethnographical Museum of Belgrade.

III. TECHNICAL EXPERTS

MILITARY QUESTIONS

Captain V. Sustersié;
 Commandant Mirko Marinkovitch;
 Commandant K. Stoyanovitch;

Lieutenant V. Boudissavlievitch;
 Lieutenant Mil. Andritch, Secretary of the Mission;
 Lieutenant S. Tobolar.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

M. Velimir Bačkitch, Director of the State School of Commerce;
 M. Franc Barac, Professor at the University of Zagreb;
 M. Albert Bonetić;
 M. Milko Brezigar, Economist;
 M. Dragoutine Douthitch, Chief of Section in the Administration
 of State Monopolies;
 M. V. Jelavić, Secretary in the Chamber of Commerce of Sarajevo;
 M. Ivan Ierman, Economist;
 M. Vekoslav Kisovec, Advocate;
 M. Svetomir Korporić, Advocate;
 M. Milko Kramer, Industrialist;
 M. Iosip Lakatos, Publicist;
 M. Bogdan Markovitch, Director of Land Credit;
 M. Ivo Politeo, Publicist;
 M. Dragoutine Protitch, Advocate;
 M. Nicolas Stanarevitch, Bank Director;
 M. Nicolas Stoyanovitch, Deputy;
 M. Milan Todorovitch, Inspector in the Ministry of Commerce and
 Industry;
 M. Costa Yovanovitch, Secretary General of the Chamber of Com-
 merce of Belgrade.

COMMUNICATION QUESTIONS

M. Ranslav Avramovitch, Engineer in Chief of the State Railways;
 M. Dragoutine Dimitrievitch, Chief of Section in the Ministry of
 Post and Telegraphs;
 M. R. Lenac, Governor of the City and District of Rieka (Fiume);
 M. Bora Paiévitch, Engineer of the State Railways;
 M. Milan Pouitch, Inspector of the State Railways;
 M. Milan Senoa, Professor at the University of Zagreb.

ETHNOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL QUESTIONS

M. Ivan Maria Cok, Advocate;
 M. Franjo Kovacić, Professor;
 M. J. Mackovsek, Engineer;
 M. Stévan Mihaldjitch, Archpriest;
 M. Ianko Pretnar, Professor;
 M. Iosip Ribarić, Professor;
 M. Rudolf Signjar, Director of the Statistical Bureau of Zagreb;

M. M. Slavić, Professor;
M. Milan Senoa, Professor at the University of Zagreb;
M. Ferdo de Sisić, Professor at the University of Zagreb;
M. Thomas Sorli, Notary;
M. André Tresic-Pavicic, Deputy;
Mgr. Hiralion Zeremsky, Bishop;
M. Nikola Zic, Professor.

Press Section:

M. Pavle Popovitch, Professor at the University of Belgrade;
M. Franjo Cvetisa, Publicist;
M. Milan Grol, Director of the National Theater of Belgrade;
M. Grégoire Jakchitch, Consul;
M. Lazar Markovitch, Professor at the University of Belgrade;
M. Ivan Shvegel, Doctor of Law;
M. Janko Spassoyévitch, former Minister;
M. Vassa Stayitch, Professor;
M. Pavle Stéfanovitch, Professor;
M. Jovan Tanovitch, Publicist;
M. D. Tomitch, Journalist.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretaries General:

M. Bogumil Vosnjak;
M. Jovan T. Markovitch, Minister Plenipotentiary.

Secretaries:

M. Stévan Pavlovitch, Chief of the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of Legation of the First Class;
M. Brana Markovitch, Secretary of Legation of the First Class;
M. Lioubomir Néchitch, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Dragoutine Koyitch, Secretary of Legation;
M. Pavle Karovitch, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Ninko Péritch, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Pierre M. Yovanovitch, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Dragomir Kossidolatz, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Vassilyié Protitch, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Alexandre Tzintzar Markovitch, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
M. Constantin Fotitch, Attaché of Legation;
M. Radomir N. Pachitch, Attaché of Legation.

Attachés:

- M. M. Pétroniévitch, former Chief of the Office of His Majesty the King;
 M. Jivko Barlovatz, former Honorary Consul General;
 M. Frédéric Juvancić, Professor in the Marine Academy;
 M. Drago Marusić, Advocate;
 M. Bruno-Hugo Stare, Secretary;
 M. Marcel Guieysse, Subprefect unattached.

SIAM

8, Rue Greuze
 (Tel. Passy: 85-22)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (2 Places)

- Prince Charoon, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Siam at Paris;
 Prince Traidos Prabandhu, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
 Phya Bibadh Kosha, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Siam at Rome.

II. TECHNICAL DELEGATES

MILITARY QUESTIONS

- Lieut. Colonel Amoradhat, Aide-de-Camp of His Majesty the King of Siam, Military Attaché of the Siamese Legation at Paris.

NAVAL QUESTIONS

- Captain Phra Pradiyat Navayuth, Aide-de-Camp of His Majesty the King of Siam, Member of the Siamese Military Mission at Paris.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General:

- M. C. Kejara, Judge of the International Court of Bangkok.

Secretary:

- Prince Vaidyakara, Secretary of the Legation of Siam at Paris.

Attachés:

- Phra Ratanayapti, Attaché of Legation;
 Luang Manja Vadi, Attaché in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
 Luang Mitra Karma, Attaché in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
 M. Choo Li, Attaché of Legation.

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA (REPUBLIC)

Hotel Lutetia
(Tel. Fleurus: 16-75)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (2 Places)

M. Charles Kramar, President of the Council of Ministers;
M. Edouard Benes, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

III. TECHNICAL EXPERTS

LEGAL QUESTIONS

M. Jaroslav Kallab, Professor of International Law in the University of Prague;
M. Jean Kramar, Professor of Civil Law in the University of Prague.

MILITARY QUESTIONS

Lieut. Colonel Rodolphe Kalhous, of the Ministry of National Defense.

LABOR QUESTIONS

M. Rudolph Broz, Advocate at Prerov (Moravia);
M. Charles Brozek, Secretary of the Syndicate of Workers of Czecho-Slovak Mine Fields at Most (Brux);
M. Charles Folber, Secretary of the Syndicate of Tailors at Prague;
M. Joseph Hudec, Deputy in the Parliament of Prague;
M. Rodolphe Laube, Deputy in the Parliament of Prague;
M. Joseph Macek, Counselor in the Ministry of Agriculture at Prague;
M. V. Rambousek, Deputy in Parliament.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

M. Théodore Houdek, Slovak Deputy in the Parliament of Prague;
M. Jean Kolousek, Professor of Political Economy in the Polytechnic School of Prague;
M. Jaroslav Preiss, Director in Chief of the Zivnostenska Bank at Prague.

INDUSTRIAL, COMMERCIAL, COLONIAL, AND NAVAL QUESTIONS

M. J. J. Dienelt, Director of the Export Office of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry at Prague;
M. Jean Havlasa, Explorer;
M. Igor Hrusovsky, Expert on Statistics of Industrial Work in Slovakia;
M. Vladimir List, Professor at the Polytechnic School of Brno (Moravia);
M. Hugo Vavrecka, Engineer, Naval Officer.

COMMUNICATION QUESTIONS

- M. Antoine Klir, Professor at the Polytechnic School of Prague;
M. Eustache Moelzer, Engineer and Counselor in the Ministry of Public Works;
M. Vladimir Ibl, Engineer and Counselor of the Czecho-Slovak State Railways;
M. Vilém Cerno, Engineer of the Czecho-Slovak State Railways.

GEOLOGICAL AND MINING INDUSTRY QUESTIONS

- M. Joseph Voldrich, Professor of Geology at the Polytechnic School of Prague.

GEOGRAPHICAL, ETHNOGRAPHICAL AND STATISTICAL QUESTIONS

- M. Antoine Bohac, Professor at Prague;
M. Adolphe Cerny, Professor of the University of Prague;
M. Jean Chotek, Professor of the University of Prague;
M. Victor Dvorsky, Professor of the University of Prague;
M. Joseph Malir, Professor at the Gymnasium of Zabreh (Moravia);
M. Lubos Niederle, Professor of the University of Prague;
M. Joseph Skultety, Slovak Deputy in the Parliament of Prague;
M. Thomas Stypa, Professor at Prague.

HISTORICAL QUESTIONS OF CZECH LAW

- M. Jean Kapras, Professor at the University of Prague.

CARTOGRAPHICAL QUESTIONS

- M. Jean Hocke, Professor at Prague;
M. Jaroslav Pantoficek, Professor at the Polytechnic School of Prague;
M. Jaroslav Salac, Professor at Prague.

ECCLESIASTICAL QUESTIONS

- Mgr. Marian Blaha, Doctor of Theology, Dean at Trnava in Slovakia.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO AFFAIRS OF TESCHEN AND OF THE RECTIFICATION OF THE FRONTIERS OF CZECH SILESIA

- M. Joseph Lukes, Agrarian Deputy for Silesia in the Parliament of Prague, Counselor of the Court of Assizes of Teschen.

LUSATIAN AFFAIRS

- M. Ernest Bart, Deputy in the Chamber of Saxony;
M. Jean Serbin, Professor and Delegate of Lusatia.

RUTHENIAN AFFAIRS IN EASTERN SLOVAKIA

M. Antoine Bezkyd, Advocate at Presov.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General:

M. Stephen Osusky, Chargé d'Affaires at the Czecho-Slovakian Legation at London.

Secretaries:

M. Miro P. Bozinov, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

M. Vladimir Slavik, Advocate at Jindr. Hradec;

M. Cyril Dusek, Deputy in the Parliament of Prague.

URUGUAY

Avenue Kléber, 78

(Tel Passy: 64-38)

I. PLENIPOTENTIARY DELEGATES (1 Place)

M. Juan Antonio Buero, Minister of Foreign Affairs, former Minister of Industry, former Deputy;

M. Jacobo Varela Acevedo, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, former Senator;

M. Juan Carlos Blanco, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Uruguay at Paris, former Minister of Public Works, former Deputy.

II. DELEGATES AND TECHNICAL ADVISERS

Colonel Julio Nunez Brian;

Lieut. Colonel Hector Marfetan.

IV. SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General:

M. Julian Nogueira.

Secretaries:

M. Rafael Capurro;

M. Adolfo Vaeza Belgrano;

M. Jorge B. Hardoy.

PART II. Organization of the Conference

A. Bureau of the Conference

President: M. Georges Clemenceau (France)

Vice Presidents: Hon. Robert Lansing (United States of America);
The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George (British Empire);
M. V. E. Orlando (Italy);
Marquis Saionji (Japan).

SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Secretary General: M. P. Dutasta

Secretaries:

United States of America:	Mr. Joseph Clark Grew; Mr. Leland Harrison; Colonel U. S. Grant, 3rd.
British Empire:	Lt. Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey; Mr. H. Norman; Mr. Eric Phipps.
France:	M. Paul Gauthier; M. de Béarn.
Italy:	Count L. Aldrovandi; Marquis C. Durazzo; M. G. Brambilla.
Japan:	M. Sadao Saburi; M. E. Kawai; M. H. Ashida.

FUNCTIONS OF THE SECRETARIAT

Office of the Secretariat General:

M. Arnavon, Secretary of Embassy of the First Class, *Chief of Office*.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

M. de Montille;
Baron Pieyre;
Captain de Saint-Quentin;
M. Tetreau;
Lieutenant de Percin;
Captain Carteron;
M. Lavondès;
Captain Escoffier;
Viscount Emmery;
Lieutenant Duboin;
M. de Curzon.

Translators:

M. Mantoux, Translating Officer of the Third Class;
M. Bergery, Translating Officer of the Third Class;
M. Camerlynck, Fellow of the University;
M. Coulet, Fellow of the University;
M. Demolon, Translating Officer of the Second Class;
M. Digeon, Fellow of the University;
M. Fanni re, Translating Officer of the Second Class;
M. Gauthier, Fellow of the University;
M. Letorey, Translating Officer of the Second Class;
M. Meyer, Translating Officer of the Second Class;
M. de Pomereu, Assistant Translator;
M. Talamon, Lieutenant of Infantry.

PROTOCOL AND ARCHIVES

Lieut. Colonel Rey, *Chief of Office*.

Protocol:

Captain L bre;
Lieutenant Bedel;
M. E. Bordier;
M. Duchat;
M. Varnoux.

Stenography:

Captain Arsandaux, Revising Stenographer of the Senate;
M. Bara, Stenographer of the Senate;
M. Buchet, Stenographer of the Senate;
M. Clavel, Stenographer of the Chamber of Deputies;
Captain Detot, Revising Stenographer of the Chamber of Deputies;
M. Duploy , Stenographer of the Council of State;
M. Gavelle, Stenographer of the Chamber of Deputies;
M. Gu rie, Stenographer of the Senate;
M. Gu rin, Revising Stenographer of the Senate;
M. Hellouin, Stenographer of the Senate;
M. Roger Heymann, Stenographer of the Senate;
M. Raymond Heymann;
M. Lef vre, Stenographer of the Senate;
M. Lelioux, Stenographer of the Council of State;
M. Lenglet, Revising Stenographer of the Chamber of Deputies;
M. L vy, Revising Stenographer of the Senate;
M. May ras, Revising Stenographer of the Senate;
Captain Meyer, Stenographer of the Chamber of Deputies;
M. de la Morandi re, Stenographer of the Senate;
M. Pillon, Revising Stenographer of the Senate;

DIRECTORIES OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

M. Raynaud, Chief of the Stenographic Office of the Chamber of Deputies;
M. Reddé, Assistant Stenographer of the Senate;
M. Robert, Revising Stenographer of the Chamber of Deputies;
M. Sarradin, Revising Stenographer of the Chamber of Deputies;
M. Vaudequin, Stenographer of the Algerian Financial Delegations;
M. Vincent, Stenographer of the Algerian Financial Delegations.

Archives.

Captain Carteron;
M. de Curzon.

COMMITTEE ON THE VERIFICATION OF POWERS

Hon. Henry White (United States of America);
The Rt. Hon. Arthur James Balfour (British Empire);
M. Jules Cambon (France);
Marquis G. F. Salvago Raggi (Italy);
M. K. Matsui (Japan).

DRAFTING COMMITTEE

Mr. James Brown Scott (United States of America);
Mr. C. J. B. Hurst (British Empire);
M. Fromageot (France);
M. A. Ricci-Busatti (Italy);
M. H. Nagaoka (Japan).

B. The Conference in Plenary Session

United States of America

(5 places):

The President of the United States;
Hon. Robert Lansing;
Hon. Henry White;
Hon. Edward M. House;
General Tasker H. Bliss.

British Empire:

Great Britain (5 places): The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George;
The Rt. Hon. Arthur James Balfour;
The Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law;
The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes;
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner;
The Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill.

Dominions and India:

Canada (2 places): The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden;
The Rt. Hon. Sir George Foster;
The Hon. C. J. Doherty;
The Hon. A. L. Sifton.

Australia (2 places):	The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes; The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Cook.
South Africa (2 places):	General the Rt. Hon. Louis Botha; Lieut. General the Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts.
New Zealand (1 place):	The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey; The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Ward.
Newfoundland:	The Rt. Hon. Sir William F. Lloyd;
	<i>Alternate:</i> Sir William Goode.
India (2 places):	The Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu; Major General His Highness the Maharajah of Bikaner; The Rt. Hon. the Lord Sinha.
France (5 places):	M. Georges Clemenceau; M. Pichon; M. L.-L. Klotz; M. André Tardieu; M. Jules Cambon; Marshal Foch.
Italy (5 places):	M. V. E. Orlando; Baron S. Sonnino; Marquis G. F. Salvago Raggi; M. A. Salandra; M. S. Barzilai.
Japan (5 places):	Marquis Saionji; Baron Makino; Viscount Chinda; M. K. Matsui; M. H. Ijuin.
Belgium (3 places):	M. Hymans; M. van den Heuvel; M. Vandervelde.
Bolivia (1 place):	M. Ismaël Montes.
Brazil (3 places):	M. Epitacio Pessoa; M. Olyntho de Magalhaes; M. Pandiá Calogeras; M. Raoul Fernandes.
China (2 places):	M. Lou Tseng-tsiang; M. Cheng-ting Thomas Wang; M. Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo; M. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze; M. Suntschou Wei.
Cuba (1 place):	M. Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante.
Ecuador (1 place):	M. Dorn y de Alsua; Dr. Carlos R. Tobar.

Greece (2 places):	M. Eleftherios Veniselos; M. Nicolas Politis; M. A. Romanos.
Guatemala (1 place):	M. Joaquín Méndez.
Haiti (1 place):	M. Tertullien Guilbaud.
Hedjaz (2 places):	His Royal Highness Emir Feisal; M. Rustem Haidar.
Honduras (1 place):	Dr. Policarpo Bonilla.
Liberia (1 place):	Hon. C. D. B. King; M. C. B. Dunbar; M. H. F. Worley.
Nicaragua (1 place):	M. Salvador Chamorro.
Panama (1 place):	M. Antonio Burgos.
Peru (1 place):	M. Carlos G. Candamo; M. Francisco Garcia Calderon; M. V. M. Maurtua.
Poland (2 places):	M. Roman Dmowski; M. Ignace Paderewski, <i>Alternate:</i> M. Casimir Dluski.
Portugal (2 places):	Dr. Affonso Costa; M. Augusto Soares; Colonel Norton de Mattos; M. Alfredo Freire de Andrade; M. Jayme Batalha-Reis.
Roumania (2 places):	M. Jean J. C. Bratiano; General Constantin Coanda; Dr. Vaida-Voevod; M. Nicolas Misu; M. Victor Antonesco; M. Constantin Diamandy; M. Georges Danielopol.
Serbia (3 places):	M. N. P. Pachitch; M. Ante Trumbić; M. Milenko R. Vesnitch; M. M. Ivan Zolger; M. Mathias Boshkovitch; M. Otokar Rybar; M. Josip Smodlaka.
Siam (2 places):	Prince Charoon; Prince Traidos Prabandhu; Phya Bibadh Kosha.
Czecho-Slovak Republic (2 places):	M. Charles Kramar; M. Edouard Benes.

Uruguay (1 place)	M. Juan Antonio Buero; M. Jacobo Varela Acevedo; M. Juan Carlos Blanco.
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C. Supreme Council of the Allies

Meeting Place: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Office of the Minister)

President: M. Georges Clemenceau

United States of America:	The President of the United States; Hon. Robert Lansing.
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British Empire:	The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George; The Rt. Hon. Arthur James Balfour.
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France:	M. Georges Clemenceau; M. Pichon.
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Italy:	M. V. E. Orlando; Baron S. Sonnino.
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Japan:	Marquis Saionji; Baron Makino.
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SECRETARIAT

France:	M. P. Dutasta.
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United States of America:	Mr. Joseph Clark Grew.
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British Empire:	Lieut. Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey.
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Italy:	Count L. Aldrovandi.
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Japan:	M. Sadao Saburi.
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D. Commissions

I. League of Nations.

II. Responsibility of the Authors of the War and the Enforcement of Penalties.

III. Reparation of Damage.

IV. International Labor Legislation.

V. International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways.

VI. Financial Questions.

VII. Economic Questions.

VIII. Aeronautical.

IX. Territorial Questions.

X. Interallied Military and Naval Committee.

XI. Control of the Production of Materials of War in Germany and the Disarmament of the German Army.

XII. Specification of Materials of War Which May Be Demanded From Germany.

XIII. Study of the Means of Imposing the Armistice Conditions on Germany.

XIV. Committee for Drafting of the Military, Naval, and Aerial Clauses in the Treaty with Germany.

XV. Morocco.

XVI. Submarine Cables.

XVII. Supreme Economic Council.

I. LEAGUE OF NATIONS

(Plenary Session of the Conference of January 25, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Hotel de Crillon

President: The President of the United StatesUnited States of America: The President of the United States;
Hon. Edward M. House.British Empire: The Rt. Hon. the Lord Robert Cecil;
Lieut. General the Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts.France: M. Léon Bourgeois;
M. F. Larnaude.Italy: M. V. E. Orlando;
M. A. Scialoja.Japan: Baron Makino;
Viscount Chinda.

Belgium: M. Hymans.

Brazil: M. Epitacio Pessoa.

China: M. Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo.

Greece: M. Eleftherios Veniselos.

Poland: M. Roman Dmowski.

Portugal: M. Jayme Batalha Reis.

Roumania: M. Constantin Diamandy.

Serbia: M. Milenko R. Vesnitch.

Czecho-Slovakia (Rep.): M. Charles Kramar.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America: Mr. Whitney Shepardson.

British Empire: Mr. Philip Baker.

France: M. Clauzel.

Italy: M. A. Ricci-Busatti.

Japan: M. Sadao Saburi.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: M. de Sillac.II. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE WAR AND THE
ENFORCEMENT OF PENALTIES

(Plenary Session of the Conference of January 25, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of the Interior (Grand Dining Room)

President: Hon. Robert Lansing (United States of America)*Vice Presidents:* The Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon Hewart (British Empire);
or Sir Ernest Pollock (British Empire);
M. A. Scialoja (Italy)

United States of America:	Hon. Robert Lansing; Mr. James Brown Scott.
British Empire:	The Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon Hewart; <i>Alternates:</i> Sir Ernest Pollock; The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey.
France:	M. André Tardieu; <i>Alternates:</i> Captain Masson; M. F. Larnaude.
Italy:	M. A. Scialoja; <i>Alternates:</i> M. A. Ricci-Busatti; M. Gustavo Tosti; M. M. d'Amelio.
Japan:	M. Adatci; M. H. Nagaoka; <i>Alternate:</i> M. Sakutaro Tachi.
Belgium:	M. Rolin-Jaequemyns.
Greece:	M. Nicolas Politis.
Poland:	M. Constantin Skirmunt; <i>Alternate:</i> M. Léon Lubienski.
Roumania:	M. S. Rosental.
Serbia:	M. Slobodan Yovanovitch; <i>Alternates:</i> M. Koumanoudi; M. A. Novacovitch.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary General: M. A. de Lapradelle (France)

Secretaries:

United States of America:	Mr. Alexander C. Kirk.
British Empire:	Lieut. Colonel O. M. Biggar.
Italy:	M. Gustavo Tosti.
Japan:	M. K. Kuriyama.
Belgium:	Baron Jules Guillaume.
Greece:	M. S. Marchetti.
Poland:	M. Casimir Rybinski.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: Captain M. Escoffier.

SUBCOMMISSIONS

FIRST SUBCOMMISSION.—*Criminal Acts*

President: The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey (British Empire)

United States of America: Mr. James Brown Scott.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey.

France: M. André Tardieu;

Alternate:

Captain Masson.

Greece: M. Nicolas Politis.

Japan: M. Adatci.

SECOND SUBCOMMISSION.—*Responsibility of the Authors of the War*

President: Sir Ernest Pollock (British Empire)

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon Hewart;

or

Sir Ernest Pollock.

France: M. F. Larnaude.

Italy: M. A. Scialoja;

Alternates:

M. A. Ricci-Busatti;

M. Gustavo Tosti.

Belgium: M. Rolin-Jaequemyns.

Serbia: M. Slobodan Yovanovitch;

Alternates:

M. Koumanoudi;

M. A. Novacovitch.

THIRD SUBCOMMISSION.—*Violation of the Laws and Customs of War*

President: Hon. Robert Lansing (United States of America)

United States of America: Hon. Robert Lansing.

Italy: M. M. d'Amelio.

Japan: M. H. Nagaoka;

Alternate:

M. Sakutaro Tachi.

Poland: M. Constantin Skirmunt;

Alternate:

M. Léon Lubienski.

Roumania: M. S. Rosental.

III. REPARATION OF DAMAGE

(Plenary Session of the Conference of January 25, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Finance, Hôtel du Ministre, Rue de Rivoli, Porte D.

President: M. L.-L. Klotz (France)

Vice Presidents: The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes (British Empire);
M. van den Heuvel (Belgium).

United States of America: Mr. Bernard M. Baruch;
Mr. Norman H. Davis;
Mr. Vance McCormick.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes;

Alternates:

Sir Robert Garran;
The Rt. Hon. the Lord Sumner of Ibstone;
The Rt. Hon. the Lord Cunliffe.

France: M. L.-L. Klotz;
M. Loucheur;
M. Albert Lebrun.

Italy: M. A. Salandra;

Alternates:

M. S. Crespi;
M. E. Chiesa;
M. M. d'Amelio.

Japan: M. Kengo Mori;
M. H. Nagaoka;
M. Tatsumi.

Belgium: M. van den Heuvel;
M. Despret.

Greece: M. A. Romanos;
M. A. Michalakopoulos.

Poland: M. Sigismond Chamiec;
M. Casimir Olszowski.

Portugal: Dr. Affonso Costa;
M. Alfredo Freire d'Andrade.

Roumania: M. Georges Danielopol;
M. P. Zahariade.

Serbia: M. Costa Stoyanovitch;

Alternates:

M. Dragoutine Protitch;
M. Velimir Baikitch;
M. Miloche Savtchitch.

Czecho-Slovak Republic: M. Edouard Benes;

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America: Mr. Jerome D. Greene.
 British Empire: Lieut. Colonel the Hon. Sidney Peel.
 France: M. de Lasteyrie.
 Italy: M. F. Foberti.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: Baron M. Pieyre.

FIRST SUBCOMMISSION.—*Evaluation of Damage*

President: The Rt. Hon. the Lord Sumner of Ibstone (British Empire)

Vice President: M. E. Chiesa (Italy)

United States of America: Mr. Vance McCormick.
 British Empire: The Rt. Hon. the Lord Sumner of Ibstone.
 France: M. Albert Lebrun.
 Italy: M. E. Chiesa.
 Japan: M. Kengo Mori.
 Belgium: M. van den Heuvel.
 Greece: M. A. Michalakopoulos.
 Poland: M. Casimir Olszowski.
 Portugal: M. A. Santos Viegas.
 Roumania: M. Georges Danielopol.
 Serbia: M. Miloche Savtchitch.
 Czecho-Slovak Republic: M. Edouard Benes.

Secretary: M. E. Minost (France)

SECOND SUBCOMMISSION.—*Study of Financial Capacity of Enemy States, Their Means of Payment and Reparation*

President: The Rt. Hon. the Lord Cunliffe (British Empire)

Vice President: M. Loucheur (France)

United States of America: Mr. Norman H. Davis.
 British Empire: The Rt. Hon. the Lord Cunliffe.
 France: M. Loucheur.
 Italy: M. A. Salandra;

Alternate:

M. M. d'Amelio.

Japan: M. Tatsumi.
 Poland: M. Sigismond Chamiec.
 Portugal: M. Alfredo Freire d'Andrade.
 Roumania: M. Georges Danielopol.
 Serbia: M. Costa Stoyanovitch.

Secretary: M. F. Foberti (Italy)

THIRD SUBCOMMISSION.—*Measures of Control and Guarantees**President:* The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes (British Empire)*Vice President:* Mr. Bernard M. Baruch (United States of America)

United States of America: Mr. Bernard M. Baruch.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes.

France: M. L.-L. Klotz.

Italy: M. M. d'Amelio.

Japan: M. H. Nagaoka.

Belgium: M. Despret.

Greece: M. A. Romanos.

Poland: M. Casimir Olszowski.

Secretary: Lieutenant James (United States of America)

IV. INTERNATIONAL LABOR LEGISLATION

(Plenary Session of the Conference of January 25, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Labor, Hôtel du Ministre, Dining Room

President: Mr. Samuel Gompers (United States of America).*Vice Presidents:* Mr. G. N. Barnes (British Empire);
M. Colliard (France).United States of America: Mr. Samuel Gompers;
Mr. Edward N. Hurley;*Alternate:*

Mr. Henry M. Robinson.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes,

Alternates:

Mr. H. B. Butler;

Sir Malcolm Delevingne.

France: M. Colliard;

M. Loucheur.

Italy: Baron B. Mayor des Planches;
M. A. Cabrini;*Alternate:*

M. S. Coletti.

Japan: M. Otchiai;

M. Oka.

Belgium: M. Vandervelde;

M. Mahaim.

Cuba: M. Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante.

Poland: M. Stanislas Patek;

Alternate:

M. François Sokal.

Czecho-Slovak Republic: M. Rudolph Broz.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary General: M. Arthur Fontaine (France)*Assistant Secretary General:* Mr. H. B. Butler (British Empire)*Secretaries:*

United States of America: Mr. Guy H. Oyster.

Italy: M. di Palma Castiglione.

Japan: M. Yoshisaka.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: Lieutenant Duboin.

V. INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF PORTS, WATERWAYS, AND RAILWAY

(Plenary Session of the Conference of January 25, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Public Works, Room 39

President: M. S. Crespi (Italy)*Vice President:* The Hon. A. L. Sifton (British Empire)United States of America: Hon. Henry White;
Mr. David Hunter Miller;*Alternate:*

Mr. Manley O. Hudson.

British Empire: The Hon. A. L. Sifton;
Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith;*Alternate:*

Brigadier General H. O. Mance.

France: M. Claveille;
M. André Weiss.Italy: M. S. Crespi;
M. G. de Martino.Japan: M. Adatci;
Colonel Sato.

Belgium: M. Segers;

Alternates:

M. de Visscher;

M. Jean Hostie.

China: M. Cheng-ting Thomas Wang;

Alternate:

M. Wang Chin-chun.

Greece:

M. L. Coromilas.

Poland:

M. Casimir Kasperski.

Portugal:

Count de Penha Garcia;

Succeeded by:

M. Augusto de Vasconcellos;

Then by:

Colonel Norton de Mattos.

Roumania:

M. Nicolas Misu;

Alternate:

M. Nicolas Stefanescu.

Serbia:

M. Ante Trumbić.

Czecho-Slovak Republic:

M. Charles Kramar.

Uruguay:

M. Juan Carlos Blanco.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary General: M. Charguéraud (France)*Secretaries:*

United States of America: Mr. Christian A. Herter.

British Empire:

Mr. W. T. Turner.

Italy:

M. M. Mosca.

Japan:

M. K. Horiuchi.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: Captain LèbreFIRST SUBCOMMISSION.—*Questions Relating to Freedom of Transit**President:* Hon. Henry White (United States of America)*Vice President:* Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith (British Empire)

United States of America: Hon. Henry White.

British Empire:

Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith;

Alternate:

Brigadier General H. O. Mance.

France:

M. Claveille.

Italy:

M. S. Crespi.

Japan:

M. Adatci.

China:

M. Cheng-ting Thomas Wang;

Alternate:

M. Wang Chin-chun.

Greece:

M. L. Coromilas.

Poland:

M. Casimir Kasperski.

Portugal:

Count de Penha Garcia;

Succeeded by:

M. Augusto de Vasconcellos;

Then by:

Colonel Norton de Mattos.

Uruguay:

M. Juan Carlos Blanco.

SECOND SUBCOMMISSION.—*Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways*

President: M. André Weiss (France)

United States of America: Mr. David Hunter Miller;

Alternate:

Mr. Manley O. Hudson.

British Empire:

The Hon. A. L. Sifton.

France:

M. André Weiss.

Italy:

M. G. de Martino.

Japan:

Colonel Sato.

Belgium:

M. Segers;

Alternates:

M. de Visscher;

M. Jean Hostie.

Roumania:

M. Nicolas Misu;

Alternate:

M. Nicolas Stefanescu.

Serbia:

M. Ante Trumbić.

Czecho-Slovak Republic: M. Charles Kramar.

VI. FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of January 23 and March 1, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Finance (Hôtel du Ministre)

President: The Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu (British Empire)

Vice Presidents: M. S. Crespi (Italy);

Viscount S. Chinda (Japan).

United States of America: Mr. Albert Strauss;

(2 members from the following)

Mr. Thomas W. Lamont;

Mr. Norman H. Davis;

Captain Jeremiah Smith, Jr.;

Mr. George Whitney.

British Empire:

(2 members from the following)

The Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu;

Mr. J. M. Keynes;

Mr. S. Armitage Smith;

Mr. O. T. Falk.

France:	M. L.-L. Klotz; M. Sergeant.
Italy: (2 members from the following)	M. A. Salandra; M. S. Crespi; M. Stringher; M. L. della Torre.
Japan: (2 members from the following)	Viscount S. Chinda; M. Kengo Mori; M. Tatsumi; M. E. Fukai; M. M. Kikuchi.
Belgium:	M. Jaspar; <i>Alternate:</i> M. Despret.
Greece:	M. A. Michalakopoulos.
Poland:	M. Sigismond Chamiec.
Roumania:	M. Victor Antonesco.
Serbia:	M. Velizar Yankovitch.
Czecho-Slovak Republic:	M. Edouard Benes.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America:	Mr. George Whitney.
British Empire:	Mr. Michael Sadler.
France:	M. Petit.
Italy:	Captain Guido Jung.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: Lieutenant Duboin.

SUBCOMMISSIONS

FIRST SUBCOMMISSION

(a) Urgent Problems Relating to the Preliminaries of Peace

President: M. S. Crespi (Italy)

United States of America: (2 members from the following)	Mr. Albert Strauss; Mr. Thomas W. Lamont; Mr. Norman H. Davis; Captain Jeremiah Smith, Jr.; Mr. George Whitney.
British Empire: (2 members from the following)	The Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu; Mr. J. M. Keynes; Mr. S. Armitage Smith; Mr. O. T. Falk.

France:	M. L.-L. Klotz; M. Sergent.
Italy: (2 members from the following)	M. A. Salandra; M. S. Crespi; M. Stringher; M. L. della Torre.
Japan: (2 members from the following)	Viscount S. Chinda; M. Kengo Mori; M. Tatsumi; M. E. Fukai; M. M. Kikuchi.
Belgium:	M. Jaspar; <i>Alternate:</i> M. Despret.
Greece:	M. A. Michalakopoulos.
Poland:	M. Sigismond Chamiec.
Roumania:	M. Victor Antonesco.
Serbia:	M. Velizar Yankovitch.
Czecho-Slovak Republic:	M. Edouard Benes.

(b) Special Subcommittee on Monetary Questions

(In Liaison with the Commission on Reparation)

President: M. Lepreux (Belgium)

France:	M. Sergent; <i>Alternate:</i> M. Jouasset.
Italy:	M. P. Conte.
Poland:	M. Sigismond Chamiec.
Roumania:	M. Victor Antonesco.
Czecho-Slovak Republic:	M. Edouard Benes.

SECOND SUBCOMMISSION.—*Monetary Questions*THIRD SUBCOMMISSION.—*Enemy Debts*

(In Liaison with the Economic Commission)

The members of the Second and Third Subcommissions have not yet been appointed.

FOURTH SUBCOMMISSION.—*Interallied Problems and Project of
Financial Section of the League of Nations*

President: M. L.-L. Klotz (France)

United States of America: Mr. Thomas W. Lamont;
Captain Jeremiah Smith, Jr.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu;
Mr. O. T. Falk.

France: M. L.-L. Klotz.

Italy: Captain Guido Jung;
M. Brofferio.

Japan: M. Kengo Mori;
M. K. Kikuchi.

Belgium: M. Despret.

Greece: M. A. Michalakopoulos.

Poland: M. Sigismond Chamiec.

Roumania: M. Victor Antonesco.

Serbia: M. Vélimar Baikitch.

Czecho-Slovak Republic: M. Edouard Benes.

FIFTH SUBCOMMISSION.—*Payment of Austro-Hungarian Coupons*

President: M. Edouard Benes (Czecho-Slovak Republic)

France: M. Sergent.

Italy: Captain Guido Jung.

Poland: M. Sigismond Chamiec.

Roumania: M. Victor Antonesco.

Serbia: M. Velizar Yankovitch.

Czecho-Slovak Republic: M. Edouard Benes.

VII. ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of January 27 and
March 1, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Commerce (Hôtel du Ministre)

President: M. Clémentel (France)

United States of America: Mr. Bernard M. Baruch;
Mr. Thomas W. Lamont.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. Sir George Foster;
Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith.

France: M. Clémentel;
M. Jean Morel.

Italy: M. S. Crespi;
M. A. Ciuffelli;

Alternate:

M. G. Paratore.

Japan:	M. K. Matsui; M. Fukui.
Belgium:	M. Jaspar.
Brazil:	M. Pandiá Calogeras.
China:	M. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze.
Poland:	M. Jean Rozwadowski.
Portugal:	M. Affonso Costa.
Roumania:	M. Constantin Diamandy.
Serbia:	M. Andra Stanitch.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary General: M. Serruys (France)*Secretaries:*

United States of America: Colonel L. P. Ayres.

British Empire: Mr. W. Carter.

Italy: M. F. Giannini.

Japan: M. H. Ashida.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: Lieutenant Duboin.

FIRST SECTION: PERMANENT COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

President: Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith (British Empire)United States of America: Mr. Bernard M. Baruch;
Mr. Thomas W. Lamont.British Empire: The Rt. Hon. Sir George Foster;
Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith.France: M. Clémentel;
M. Jean Morel.Italy: M. A. Pirelli;
M. L. Lucioli;*Alternates:*M. A. Dell'Abbadessa;
M. C. Bresciani Turrorio.Japan: M. K. Matsui;
M. Fukui.

China: M. Tai-chi Quo.

Roumania: M. Eugène Neguicea.

Secretary: Mr. W. Carter (British Empire)

FIRST SUBCOMMISSION.—*Customs Regulations, Duties, and Restrictions**President:* Dr. A. A. Young (United States of America)

United States of America: Dr. A. A. Young.

British Empire: Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith;

Alternate:

Mr. Henry Fountain.

France: M. Jean Morel.

Italy: M. L. Luciolli;

Alternate:

M. A. Dell'Abbadessa.

Japan: M. Fukui.

Belgium: M. Brunet.

Roumania: M. Eugène Neguicea.

Serbia: M. Tomitch.

Secretary: Mr. W. Carter (British Empire)SECOND SUBCOMMISSION.—*Treatment of Shipping**President:* M. Bouisson (France)

United States of America: Mr. Henry M. Robinson.

British Empire: Mr. Charles Hipwood.

France: M. Bouisson.

Italy: Commandant Genta;

Alternate:

M. G. Ingianni.

Japan: M. Kurokawa.

Belgium: M. Brunet.

Brazil: Captain Armando Burlamaqui.

Poland: M. Joseph Buzek.

Roumania: M. Nicolas Stefanescu.

Serbia: M. Milan Todorovitch.

Secretary: Paymaster-Commander W. H. Eves (British Empire)THIRD SUBCOMMISSION.—*Unfair Methods of Competition**President:* Mr. W. Temple Franks (British Empire)

United States of America: Mr. L. L. Summers.

British Empire: Mr. W. Temple Franks.

France: M. Drouets.

Italy: M. C. Dragoni.

Japan: M. M. Kita.

Belgium: M. de Visscher.

China: M. Hawking L. Yen.
 Portugal: M. Jayme Batalha Reis.
Secretary: Mr. A. J. Martin (British Empire)

SECOND SECTION

FIRST SUBCOMMISSION.—*Industrial Property*

President: Mr. W. Temple Franks (British Empire)
 United States of America: Mr. J. E. Brown.
 British Empire: Mr. W. Temple Franks.
 France: M. Ch. Lyon-Caen.
 Italy: M. E. Venezian.
 Japan: M. M. Kita.
 Belgium: M. de Visscher.
 Brazil: M. Rodrigo Octavio.
 Roumania: M. Jean Pellivan.
Secretary: Mr. A. J. Martin (British Empire)

SECOND SUBCOMMISSION.—*Pre-War Contracts*

President: The Hon. C. J. Doherty (British Empire)
 United States of America: Mr. Bradley W. Palmer.
 British Empire: The Hon. C. J. Doherty.
 France: M. Albert Tissier.
 Italy: M. C. Dragoni.
 Japan: M. M. Kita.
 Belgium: M. Charles Terlinden.
 China: M. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze.
 Poland: Dr. Arthur Benis.
 Portugal: M. Augusto Soares.
Secretary: M. Tessayre (France)

THIRD SUBCOMMISSION.—*Liquidation of Enemy Property*

President: M. Petit (France)
 United States of America: Mr. Bradley W. Palmer.
 British Empire: Mr. H. A. Payne.
 France: M. Petit.
 Italy: M. M. d'Amelio.
 Japan: M. Fukui.
 Brazil: M. Raoul Fernandes.
 Roumania: M. Ef. Antonesco.
 Serbia: M. Lazar Markovitch.
Secretary: Mr. W. W. Cumberland (United States of America)

THIRD SECTION: EX-ENEMY ALIENS

President: M. A. Ricci-Busatti (Italy)

United States of America: Mr. George Louis Beer.

British Empire: Mr. L. Kershaw.

France: M. Charmeil.

Italy: M. A. Ricci-Busatti;

Alternates:

M. V. Bianchi;

M. M. Pilotti.

Japan: M. Okubo.

Belgium: M. Charles Terlinden.

Poland: M. Bohdan Winiarski.

Portugal: M. Alfredo Freire d'Andrade.

Secretary: Mr. Bertram F. Willcox (United States of America)

FOURTH SECTION: ECONOMIC TREATIES

President: M. C. Dragoni (Italy)

United States of America: Dr. A. A. Young.

British Empire: Mr. C. J. B. Hurst.

France: M. Herbette.

Italy: M. C. Dragoni.

Japan: M. Oka.

Belgium: M. Rolin-Jaequemyns.

Brazil: M. Pandiá Calógeras.

Poland: M. Henri Tennenbaum.

Secretary: M. Teyssaire (France)

VIII. AERONAUTICAL COMMISSION

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of March 12, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Boulevard Saint-Germain, No. 282

President: Colonel Dhé (France)

United States of America: Rear Admiral H. S. Knapp;

Major General Mason N. Patrick.

British Empire: Major General the Rt. Hon. J. E. B. Seely;

Major General Sir Frederic Sykes.

France: Colonel Dhé;

Captain Chauvin.

Italy: M. E. Chiesa;

General M. Moris.

Japan: General Tanaka;

M. Yamakawa.

Belgium:	Colonel van Crombrughe.
Brazil:	Captain Armando Burlamaqui.
Cuba:	M. Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante.
Greece:	Colonel A. Mazarakis.
Portugal:	Colonel Norton de Mattos.
Roumania:	Staff-Colonel Thomas Dimitresco.
Serbia:	Commandant Mirko Marinkovitch.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary General: Lieut. Colonel Pujo (France)

Secretaries:

United States of America:	Captain C. E. Morton; Lieutenant Kiely.
British Empire:	Captain E. H. Tindal Atkinson; Major D. C. James.
France:	Commandant Poli-Marchetti.
Italy:	Commandant A. Guidoni; Lieutenant U. Sauda.
Japan:	Captain K. Nishihara.

SUBCOMMISSIONS

1. Military Subcommission

Place of Meeting: Boulevard Saint-Germain, No. 199 bis

President: Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves (British Empire)

Vice President: Brigadier General Tanaka (Japan)

United States of America:	Brigadier General B. D. Foulois; Captain L. McNamee.
British Empire:	Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves.
France:	General Duval; Lieut. Colonel Saconney; Commandant Poli-Marchetti; Commandant Vuillemin; Captain Leroy; Lieutenant Sablé.
Italy:	General M. Moris; Rear Admiral P. Orsini; Colonel A. de Siebert; Lieut. Colonel P. R. Piccio.
Japan:	Brigadier General Tanaka; Captain Osumi.

2. Technical Subcommission

Place of Meeting: Boulevard Saint-Germain, No. 199 bis.

President: Lieut. Colonel A. D. Butterfield (United States of America)

Vice President: Captain S. Finzi (Italy)

United States of America: Lieut. Colonel A. D. Butterfield;
Lieut. Commander J. L. Callan;
Lieutenant Kiely.

British Empire: Colonel L. F. Blandy.

France: Captain l'Escaille;
M. Lallemand;
Captain Leroy;
Lieutenant Sablé;
Lieut. Colonel Sacconey;
M. Soreau.

Italy: Rear Admiral P. Orsini;
Lieut. Colonel G. Costanzi;
Lieut. Colonel C. Berliri-Zoppi;
Commandant A. Guidoni;
Captain G. Finzi.

Japan: M. Tanakadate;
Lieutenant Takata.

3. Judicial, Commercial, and Financial Subcommission

Place of Meeting: Boulevard Saint-Germain, No. 199 bis.

President: M. d'Aubigny (France)

Vice President: Mr. H. White Smith (British Empire)

United States of America: Commander Pollock;
Captain Bacon.

British Empire: Mr. White Smith;
Captain E. H. Tindal Atkinson.

France: Commandant d'Aiguillon;
M. Bolley;
M. Branet;
M. Fighiera;
M. Pierre-Étienne Flandin;
M. de Navailles;
M. A. de Lapradelle;
M. Wahl.

Italy: M. E. Chiesa;
M. M. d'Ameho;
Rear Admiral M. Grassi;

M. E. Delmati;
 M. G. C. Buzzati;
 Lieut. Colonel C. Berliri-Zoppi.
 Japan: M. Yamakawa;
 Captain Funakoshi.

IX. TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS

Central Territorial Committee

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 27, 1919)

President: M. André Tardieu (France)

Vice President: Marquis G. F. Salvago Raggi (Italy)

United States of America: Dr. S. E. Mezes.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe.

France: M. André Tardieu.

Italy: Marquis G. F. Salvago Raggi,

Assisted by:

M. G. de Martino.

Japan: M. Otchiai.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

France: M. de Montille (Chargé of the Secretariat General)

United States of America: Mr. Parker Thomas Moon.

British Empire: Mr. H. Norman.

Italy: Marquis C. Durazzo.

A. Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 5, 1919)

President: M. Jules Cambon (France)

Vice President: Marquis G. F. Salvago Raggi (Italy)

United States: Dr. Charles Seymour;

Mr. Allen W. Dulles.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Cook;

The Hon. Harold Nicolson.

France: M. Jules Cambon;

M. Laroche.

Italy: Marquis G. F. Salvago Raggi;

M. A. Stranieri.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America: Captain Lester W. Perrin.
British Empire: Lieut. Commander J. G. Latham.
France: M. Lavondès.
Italy: Count D. Rogeri.

B. Polish Affairs

1. Interallied Mission to Poland

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of January 29, 1919)

President: M. Noulens (France)

United States of America: Major General F. J. Kernan;
Dr. R. H. Lord.
British Empire: Sir Esme Howard;
Brigadier General A. Carton de Wiart.
France: M. Noulens;
General Niessel.
Italy: M. G. C. Montagna;
General Romei Longhena.

2. Permanent Interallied Teschen Commission

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of January 31, 1919)

President: M. Grenard (France)

United States of America: Mr. Marcus A. Coolidge.
British Empire: Lieut. Colonel B. J. B. Coulson.
France: M. Grenard.
Italy: Lieut. Colonel Tissi.

3. Commission on Polish Affairs

(Permanently at Paris)

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of the Evening of
February 12, and of February 26, 1919)

President: M. Jules Cambon (France)

United States of America: Dr. Isaiah Bowman.
British Empire: Sir William Tyrrell.
France: M. Jules Cambon.
Italy: Marquis P. della Torretta.
Japan: M. Otchiai.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America: Captain Stewart Montgomery.
 British Empire: Lieut. Colonel F. H. Kisch.
 France: Lieutenant de Percin.
 Italy: M. G. Brambilla.

C. Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs

(With the exception of frontier questions common to the Yugo-Slav State and Italy)

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 1 and 18, 1919)

President: M. André Tardieu (France)

Vice President: M. G. de Martino (Italy)

United States of America: Dr. Clive Day;
 Dr. Charles Seymour.
 British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe;
 Mr. A. Leeper.
 France: M. André Tardieu;
 M. Laroche.
 Italy: M. G. de Martino;
 Count Vannutelli-Rey.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

France: Captain de Saint-Quentin (Chargé of the Secretariat General)
 United States of America: Lieutenant Reuben Horschow.
 British Empire: Mr. M. Palairet.
 Italy: Count L. O. Vinci.

D. Commission on Greek and Albanian Affairs

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 4 and 24, 1919)

President: M. Jules Cambon (France)

Vice President: The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden

United States of America: Dr. W. L. Westermann;
 Dr. Clive Day.
 British Empire: The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden;
 Sir Eyre Crowe.

France: M. Jules Cambon;
M. Gout.
Italy: M. G. de Martino;
Colonel Castoldi;

Alternate:
M. C. Galli.

Technical Advisers:

British Empire: The Hon. Harold Nicolson.
France: M. Laroche;
M. Krajewski.
Italy: M. C. Galli;
Captain U. Konz.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America: Mr. George Redington Montgomery.
British Empire: Mr. M. Palairet.
France: M. de Montille.
Italy: Count L. O. Vinci.

E. Commission on Belgian and Danish Affairs

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 12 and
21, 1919)

President: M. André Tardieu (France)

Vice President: Sir Eyre Crowe (British Empire)

United States of America: Dr. Charles H. Haskins;
Colonel S. D. Embick.
British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe;
Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley.
France: M. André Tardieu;
M. Laroche.
Italy: M. Gustavo Tosti;
Count Vannutelli-Rey.
Japan: M. H. Nagaoka;
M. Sakutaro Tachi.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America: Mr. Frank L. Warrin, Jr.
British Empire: Mr. E. Fullerton-Carnegie.
France: Lieutenant de Percin.
Italy: Count D. Rogeri.
Japan: M. Kawai.

X. INTERALLIED MILITARY AND NAVAL COMMITTEE

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 12, 1919)

President: Marshal Foch

United States of America: General Tasker H. Bliss;
Admiral W. S. Benson;
Major General Mason N. Patrick.

British Empire: General Sir Henry Wilson;
Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss;
Major General Sir Frederic Sykes.

France: General Degoutte;
General Duval;
Vice Admiral de Bon.

Italy: General A. Diaz;
Rear Admiral M. Grassi;
General U. Cavallero.

Japan: Vice Admiral Takeshita;
Lieut. General Nara;
Colonel Nagai.

XI. CONTROL OF THE PRODUCTION OF MATERIALS OF WAR IN GERMANY AND THE DISARMAMENT OF THE GERMAN ARMY

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of January 24, 1919)

United States of America: General John J. Pershing.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill.

France: Marshal Foch;
M. Loucheur.

Italy: General A. Diaz.

XII. SPECIFICATION OF MATERIALS OF WAR WHICH MAY BE DEMANDED FROM GERMANY

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 7, 1919)

United States of America: Hon. Robert Lansing.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner.

France: M. André Tardieu.

Italy: General U. Cavallero.

XIII. STUDY OF THE MEANS OF IMPOSING THE ARMISTICE CONDITIONS ON GERMANY

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 10, 1919)

President: Marshal Foch

United States of America: General Tasker H. Bliss;
Mr. Norman H. Davis.

British Empire:	The Rt. Hon. the Lord Robert Cecil; Major General W. Thwaites.
France:	M. Clémentel; General Degoutte.
Italy:	M. S. Crespi; General U. Cavallero.
Japan:	Colonel Nagai; M. Kengo Mori.

MEMBERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE COMMISSION AS A CONSEQUENCE OF
THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ALLIES

United States of America:	General McAndrew (Representing General Pershing); Admiral W. S. Benson.
British Empire:	Rear Admiral George P. Hope.
France:	Marshal Pétain; Vice Admiral de Bon.
Italy:	General A. Diaz; Rear Admiral M. Grassi.

XIV. COMMITTEE FOR DRAFTING OF THE MILITARY, NAVAL, AND
AERIAL CLAUSES IN THE TREATY WITH GERMANY

President: General Degoutte (France)

United States of America:	Major General Mason N. Patrick; Colonel W. S. Browning; Colonel Gorrell; Captain F. H. Schofield; Mr. James Brown Scott.
British Empire:	Major General W. Thwaites; Rear Admiral George P. Hope; Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves; Captain C. T. M. Fuller; Paymaster-Captain C. F. Pollard; Mr. C. J. B. Hurst.
France:	G . . . D . . . General Duval; Captain Levavasseur; M. Fromageot.
Italy:	General U. Cavallero; Rear Admiral M. Grassi; M. Gustavo Tosti; Captain V. Fracchia.

Japan: Captain Fugioaka;
 Captain Yamamoto;
 M. H. Nagaoka.

XV. MOROCCO

(Council of Foreign Ministers March 28, 1919)

President: M. de Peretti de la Rocca (France)

United States of America: Mr. George Louis Beer.
 British Empire: The Hon. A. Akers-Douglas.
 France: M. de Peretti de la Rocca.
 Italy: M. R. Piacentini.
 Belgium: M. Louwers.
 Portugal: M. Augusto Soares.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America: Mr. Bertram F. Wilcox.
 British Empire: Mr. Palairet.
 France: Captain de Saint-Quentin.
 Italy: Count L. O. Vinci.

XVI. SUBMARINE CABLES

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of March 7, 1919)

President: M. Fromageot (France)

United States of America: Mr. James Brown Scott.
 British Empire: Dr. A. Pearce Higgins.
 France: M. Fromageot.
 Italy: M. Gustavo Tosti.
 Japan: M. Yamakawa.

XVII. SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 10, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Commerce (Hôtel du Ministre)

President: (The Different Members in Succession)

United States of America: Mr. Bernard M. Baruch (Raw Materials);
 Mr. Norman H. Davis (Finance);
 Mr. Herbert Hoover (Food);
 Mr. Vance McCormick (Blockade);
 Mr. Edward N. Hurley;

Succeeded temporarily by:

Mr. Henry M. Robinson (Maritime
 Transport).

British Empire (5 members from the following):

Great Britain:

The Rt. Hon. the Lord Robert Cecil;
Mr. Austen Chamberlain (Finance);

Alternates:

Mr. J. M. Keynes;
Sir Joseph Maclay (Shipping);

Alternates:

Sir Thomas Royden;
Mr. G. H. Roberts (Food);

Alternates:

Mr. E. F. Wise;
Sir William Goode;
Mr. Cecil Harmsworth (Blockade);

Alternates:

Sir William Mitchell Thomson;
Sir Albert Stanley;

Alternates:

Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith;
The Rt. Hon. the Lord Inverforth (Commerce and Raw Materials);

Alternate:

Mr. W. T. Layton.

Dominions and India:

Canada:

The Rt. Hon. Sir George Foster;

Alternates:

The Hon. A. L. Sifton;
The Hon. C. J. Doherty.

Australia:

The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes.

South Africa:

General the Rt. Hon. Louis Botha.

New Zealand:

The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey.

India:

The Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu.

France:

M. Clémentel;
M. L.-L. Klotz;
M. Loucheur;
M. Boret;
M. Vilgrain.

Italy:

M. Stringher;
M. Ciuffelli;
M. S. Crespi;
M. G. Paratore;.

Alternates:

Count Macchi di Celere;
 M. E. Chiesa;
 M. l'Ingénieur Dante Ferraris.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America: Captain E. H. Hart.
 British Empire: Dr. Gertrude Dixon.
 France: M. J. M. Charpentier.
 Italy: Count Zucchini.

SECTIONS

BLOCKADE SECTION

President: Mr. Vance McCormick (United States of America)

United States of America: Mr. Vance McCormick.
 British Empire: Sir William Mitchell Thomson.
 France: M. Vilgrain.
 Italy: M. S. Crespi.

Secretary: Mr. Clarence C. Stetson (United States of America)

FINANCE SECTION

President: Mr. Norman H. Davis (United States of America)

United States of America: Mr. Norman H. Davis.
 British Empire: Mr. J. M. Keynes.
 France: M. de Lasteyrie.
 Italy: Captain Guido Jung.

Secretary: Mr. H. A. Siepmann (United States of America)

RAW MATERIALS SECTION

President: Mr. Bernard M. Baruch (United States of America)

United States of America: Mr. Bernard M. Baruch;
 Mr. L. P. Summers.
 British Empire: The Rt. Hon. the Lord Robert Cecil;
 Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith.
 France: M. Loucheur;
 M. Clémentel.
 Italy: M. B. Attolico;
 M. A. Pirelli.

Secretary: M. Simiand (France)

MARITIME TRANSPORT SECTION

President: Mr. Henry M. Robinson (United States of America)

United States of America: Mr. Henry M. Robinson.

British Empire: Mr. Thomas Lodge.

France: M. de Lubersac.

Italy: M. B. Attolico.

Secretary: M. de Lubersac (France)

FOOD SECTION

President: Mr. Herbert Hoover (United States of America)

United States of America: Mr. Herbert Hoover;

Colonel J. A. Logan;

Mr. R. A. Taft.

British Empire: Mr. E. F. Wise;

Sir William Goode.

France: M. Jean Monnet;

Commandant Fillioux.

Italy: M. B. Attolico.

Secretary: Dr. Gertrude C. Dixon (British Empire)

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

President: Brigadier General H. O. Mance (British Empire)

United States of America: Colonel Atwood.

British Empire: Brigadier General H. O. Mance.

France: General Gassouin.

Italy: General Levi.

Secretary: Captain Thornton (British Empire)

Organization of the Conference, October 1, 1919¹

A

1. SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ALLIES

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Office of the Minister)

President: M. Georges Clemenceau (France)

United States of America: Hon. Frank L. Polk

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe

France: M. S. Pichon

Italy: M. T. Tittoni

Japan: M. K. Matsui

SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE

Secretary General: M. P. Dutasta (France)

United States of America: Mr. Joseph Clark Grew

British Empire: Mr. H. Norman

France: M. P. Gauthier

Italy: Marquis G. Paterno

Alternate:

M. G. Barone Russo

Japan: M. H. Ashida.

SECRETARIAT OF THE ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL

United States of America: Mr. L. Harrison

British Empire: Mr. H. Norman

France: M. R. de Saint-Quentin

Italy: M. G. Barone Russo

Japan: M. E. Kawai.

COLLECTIVE SECRETARIAT (IN CHARGE OF THE MINUTES)

United States of America: Mr. C. Russell

Succeeded by:

Mr. G. A. Gordon;

¹ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

The information given in this directory, especially as regards membership of certain commissions, does not appear to have been revised to represent the situation as of its given date, i.e., October 1, 1919.

Then by:

Mr. Bertram Winthrop.

British Empire:

Lieut. Commander A. Bell

Captain W. E. Hinchley Cooke;

Alternate:

Captain G. Lothian Small.

France:

M. R. Massigli

Italy:

Lieutenant A. Zanchi.

2. COMMITTEE ON THE VERIFICATION OF POWERS

United States of America: Hon. Henry White.

British Empire:

The Rt. Hon. Arthur James Balfour;

Alternates:

The Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law;

The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes;

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hardinge of Penshurst;

Sir Eyre Crowe.

France:

M. Jules Cambon.

Italy:

M. G. Marconi.

Japan:

M. K. Matsui.

3. DRAFTING COMMITTEE

President: M. Henri Fromageot (France)

United States of America: Mr. James Brown Scott.

British Empire:

Mr. H. W. Malkin;

Succeeded provisionally by:

Mr. M. Shearman.

France:

M. Henri Fromageot.

Italy:

M. A. Ricci-Busatti;

Alternate:

M. M. Pilotti.

Japan:

M. H. Nagaoka.

B. COMMISSIONS AND COMMITTEES

I. Renewal of the Armistice With Germany

1. CONTROL OF THE PRODUCTION OF MATERIALS OF WAR IN GERMANY AND THE DISARMAMENT OF THE GERMAN ARMY

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of January 24, 1919)

United States of America: General John J. Pershing.

France: Marshal Foch;
M. Loucheur.
Italy: General A. Diaz.

2. SPECIFICATION OF THE MATERIALS OF WAR WHICH MAY BE DEMANDED FROM GERMANY

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 7, 1919)

United States of America: Hon. Robert Lansing.
British Empire: The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner.
France: M. André Tardieu.
Italy: General U. Cavallero.

3. STUDY OF THE MEANS OF IMPOSING THE ARMISTICE CONDITIONS ON GERMANY

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 10, 1919)

President: Marshal Foch

United States of America: General Tasker H. Bliss;
Mr. Norman H. Davis.
British Empire: The Rt. Hon. the Lord Robert Cecil;
Major General Sir W. Thwaites.
France: M. Clémentel;
General Degoutte.
Italy: M. S. Crespi;
General U. Cavallero.
Japan: Colonel Nagai;
M. Kengo Mori.

MEMBERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE COMMISSION AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ALLIES

United States of America: General McAndrew (Representing Gen-
eral Pershing);
Admiral W. S. Benson.
British Empire: Rear Admiral Sir George P. Hope.
France: Marshal Pétain;
Vice Admiral de Bon.
Italy: General A. Diaz;
Rear Admiral M. Grassi.

4. DETERMINATION OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE DISARMAMENT OF GERMANY

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 12, 1919)

President: Marshal Foch

United States of America:	General Tasker H. Bliss; Admiral W. S. Benson; Major General Mason N. Patrick.
British Empire:	Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson; Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss; Major General Sir Frederic Sykes.
France:	General Degoutte; General Duval; Vice Admiral de Bon.
Italy:	General A. Diaz; Rear Admiral M. Grassi; General U. Cavallero.
Japan:	Vice Admiral Takeshita; Lieut. General Nara; Colonel Nagai.

II. Questions Common to All the Treaties of Peace

I. LEAGUE OF NATIONS

(Plenary Session of the Conference of January 25, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Hotel de Crillon

President: The President of the United States of America

United States of America: The President of the United States;
Hon. Edward M. House.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. the Lord Robert Cecil;
Lieut. General the Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts.

France: M. Léon Bourgeois;
M. F. Larnaude.

Italy: M. T. Tittoni;
M. V. Scialoja.

Japan: Baron Makino;
Viscount Chinda.

Belgium: M. Hymans.

Brazil: M. Epitacio Pessoa.

China: M. Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo.

Greece: M. Eleftherios Veniselos;

Alternates:

M. L. Coromilas;

M. A. Romanos.

Poland: M. Roman Dmowski.

Portugal: M. Jayme Batalha Reis.

Roumania:	M. Constantin Diamandy.
Serb-Croat-Slovene:	M. Milenko R. Vesnitch.
Czecho-Slovakia:	M. Charles Kramar.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America:	Mr. Whitney Shepardson.
British Empire:	Mr. Philip Baker.
France:	Count Clauzel.
Italy:	M. A. Ricci-Busatti.
Japan:	M. Sadao Saburi.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: M. de Sillac.

II. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE WAR AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF PENALTIES

(Plenary Session of the Conference of January 25, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. V. Scialoja (Italy)

Vice President: The Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon Hewart (British Empire) or
Sir Ernest Pollock (British Empire).

United States of America:	Mr. James Brown Scott; Mr. Henry G. Crocker.
British Empire:	The Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon Hewart;

Alternates:

Sir Ernest Pollock;
The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey.

France:	M. André Tardieu;
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Alternates:

Captain Masson;
M. F. Larnaude.

Italy:	M. V. Scialoja;
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Alternates:

M. A. Ricci-Busatti;
M. Gustavo Tosti;
M. M. d'Amelio.

Japan:	M. M. Adatci; M. H. Nagaoka.
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Belgium:	M. Roisin-Jaequemyns.
Greece:	M. Nicolas Politis.
Poland:	M. Léon Lubienski.
Roumania:	M. S. Rosental,

Alternate:

M. C. Antoniadé.

Serb-Croat-Slovene:

M. Costa Koumanoudi.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary General: M. A. de Lapradelle (France)*Secretaries:*

United States of America: Mr. Charles Russell.

British Empire: Lieut. Colonel O. M. Biggar.

Italy: M. Gustavo Tosti.

Japan: M. S. Kuriyama.

Belgium: Baron Jules Guillaume.

Greece: M. S. Marchetti.

Poland: M. Casimir Rybinski.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: Commandant
M. Escoffier.

SUBCOMMISSIONS

FIRST SUBCOMMISSION.—*Criminal Acts**President:* The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey (British Empire)

United States of America: Mr. James Brown Scott.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey.

France: M. André Tardieu;

Alternate:

Captain Masson.

Greece: M. Nicolas Politis.

Japan: M. M. Adatci.

SECOND SUBCOMMISSION.—*Responsibility of the Authors of the War**President:* Sir Ernest Pollock (British Empire)

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon Hewart;

or

Sir Ernest Pollock.

France: M. F. Larnaude.

Italy: M. V. Scialoja;

Alternates:

M. A. Ricci-Busatti;

M. Gustavo Tosti.

Belgium: M. Rolin-Jaequemyns.

Serb-Croat-Slovene: M. Costa Koumanoudi.

THIRD SUBCOMMISSION.—*Violation of the Laws and Customs of War**President:* Hon. Robert Lansing (United States of America)

United States of America: Hon. Robert Lansing.

Italy: M. M. d'Amelio.

Japan: M. H. Nagaoka.

Poland: M. Léon Lubienski.

Roumania: M. S. Rosental.

III. REPARATION OF DAMAGE

(Plenary Session of the Conference of January 25, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Finance, Hôtel du Ministre, Rue de Rivoli, Porte D.

President: M. L. L. Klotz (France)*Vice Presidents:* The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes (British Empire);
M. J. van den Heuvel (Belgium).United States of America: Mr. Bernard M. Baruch;
Mr. Norman H. Davis;
Mr. Vance McCormick;*Alternate:*

Mr. Ellis Loring Dresel.

British Empire: Sir Robert Garran;
Lieut. Colonel the Hon. Sidney Peel;
Mr. S. D. Waley;*Alternate:*

Mr. MacFadyean.

France: M. L. L. Klotz;
M. Loucheur;
M. Albert Lebrun;*Alternate:*

M. Jouasset.

Italy: M. Maggiorino Ferraris;
Count San Martino di Valperga;
M. S. Orlando;
M. M. d'Amelio.

Japan: M. Kengo Mori;

Alternates:

M. T. Aoki;

M. H. Nagaoka;

M. Tatsumi.

Belgium: M. J. van den Heuvel;
M. Despret.

Greece:	M. A. Romanos; M. A. Michalakopoulos; <i>Alternate:</i> M. N. Speranza.
Poland	M. Joseph Wielowieyski; M. L. Grabski; M. J. Mrozowski.
Portugal:	Dr. Affonso Costa; M. Alfredo Freire d'Andrade; <i>Alternate:</i> M. Teixeira Gomez.
Roumania:	M. Georges Danielopol; M. P. Zahariade.
Serb-Croat-Slovene:	M. Costa Stoyanovitch; <i>Alternates:</i> M. Vélimir Baikitch; M. Dragoutine Douthitch.
Czecho-Slovakia:	M. Edouard Benes, <i>Alternates:</i> M. Milos Kobr; M. Stephen Osusky.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America:	Mr. Jerome D. Greene.
British Empire:	Lieut. Colonel the Hon. Sidney Peel; <i>Alternate:</i> Mr. H. MacKinnon Wood.
France:	M. Cheysson.
Italy:	M. F. Foberti.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: Baron J. Pieyre

FIRST SUBCOMMISSION.—*Evaluation of Damage*

President: The Rt. Hon. the Lord Sumner of Ibstone (British Empire)

Vice President: M. E. Chiesa (Italy)

United States of America: Mr. Vance McCormick.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. the Lord Sumner of Ibstone.

France: M. Albert Lebrun;

Alternate:

M. Jouasset.

Italy: M. Maggiorino Ferraris.

Alternate:

M. T. Aoki.

Belgium: M. J. van den Heuvel.

Greece: M. A. Michalakopoulos;

Alternate:

M. N. Speranza.

Poland: M. J. Mrozowski.

Portugal: M. Victorino Guimaraès.

Roumania: M. Georges Danielopol.

Serb-Croat-Slovene: M. Vélimir Baikitch.

Czecho-Slovakia: M. Edouard Benes;

Alternate:

M. Milos Kobr.

Secretary: M. E. Minost (France)SECOND SUBCOMMISSION.—*Study of Financial Capacity of Enemy States, Their Means of Payment and Reparation**President:* The Rt. Hon. the Lord Cunliffe (British Empire)*Vice President:* M. Loucheur (France)

United States of America: Mr. Norman H. Davis.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. the Lord Cunliffe.

France: M. Loucheur.

Italy: M. Maggiorino Ferraris;

Alternate:

M. M. d'Amelio.

Japan: M. Tatsumi.

Poland: M. Sigismond Chamiec.

Portugal: M. Alfredo Freire d'Andrade,

Alternate:

M. Victorino Guimaraès.

Roumania: M. Georges Danielopol.

Serb-Croat-Slovene: M. Costa Stoyanovitch.

Secretary: M. F. Foberti (Italy)THIRD SUBCOMMISSION.—*Measures of Control and Guarantees**President:* The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes (British Empire)*Vice President:* Mr. Bernard M. Baruch (United States of America)

United States of America: Mr. Bernard M. Baruch.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes.

France:	M. L. L. Klotz; <i>Alternate:</i> M. de la Chaume.
Italy:	M. M. d'Amelio.
Japan:	M. H. Nagaoka.
Belgium:	M. Despret.
Greece:	M. A. Romanos. <i>Alternate:</i> M. N. Speranza.
Poland:	M. J. Mrozowski.
<i>Secretary:</i>	Lieutenant James (United States of America)

IV. INTERNATIONAL LABOR LEGISLATION

(Plenary Session of the Conference of January 25, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Labor, Hôtel du Ministre, Dining Room

President: Mr. Samuel Gompers (United States of America)*Vice Presidents:* The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes (British Empire);
M. Colliard (France).

United States of America:	Mr. Samuel Gompers; Mr. Edward N. Hurley; <i>Alternates:</i> Mr. Henry M. Robinson; Mr. James T. Shotwell.
British Empire:	The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes; <i>Alternates:</i> Mr. H. B. Butler; Sir Malcolm Delevingne.

France:	M. Colliard, <i>Alternates:</i> M. Arthur Fontaine; M. Loucheur; M. Léon Jouhaux.
Italy:	Baron B. Mayor des Planches; M. A. Cabrini; <i>Alternate:</i> M. S. Coletti.
Japan:	M. Otchiai; M. Oka; <i>Alternate:</i>

Belgium:	M. Vandervelde; <i>Alternates:</i> M. Lafontaine; M. Mahaim.
Cuba:	M. Rafaël Martinez Ortiz; <i>Alternates:</i> M. Guillermo de Blanck; M. Miguel Angel Campa.
Poland:	M. Stanislas Patek.
Czecho-Slovakia:	M. Stephen Osusky; M. Victor Braf.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary General: M. Arthur Fontaine (France)

Assistant Secretary General: Mr. H. B. Butler (British Empire)

Secretaries:

United States of America: Mr. Guy H. Oyster.

Italy: M. G. E. di Palma Castiglione.

Japan: M. Yoshisaka.

Belgium: Count G. de Hemricourt de Grunne.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: M. J. Duboin.

V. INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF PORTS, WATERWAYS, AND RAILWAYS

(Plenary Session of the Conference of January 25, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Public Works, Room 39

President: M. Coromilas (Greece)

United States of America: Hon. Henry White;

Colonel U. S. Grant, 3d.

British Empire: Brigadier General H. O. Mance;

Colonel A. M. Henniker.

France: M. Claveille;

M. André Weiss.

Italy: M. Maggiorino Ferraris;

M. G. de Martino,

Alternates:

M. G. Sinigaglia;

M. F. Fiori.

Japan: M. M. Adatci;

General Y. Sato.

Belgium: M. Jean Hostie.

China:	M. Cheng-ting Thomas Wang, <i>Alternate:</i> M. Tsang Ou.
Greece:	M. L. Coromilas, <i>Alternate:</i> M. A. Politis.
Poland:	M. K. Tyszynski.
Portugal:	Colonel Norton de Mattos; <i>Alternate:</i> M. A. Vieira da Rocha.
Roumania:	M. Nicolas Misu; <i>Alternate:</i> M. G. Caracostea.
Serb-Croat-Slovene:	M. Ante Trumbić; <i>Alternate:</i> M. Dragolyoub Yoksimovitch.
Czecho-Slovakia:	M. Jaroslav Novak.
Uruguay:	M. Juan Carlos Blanco.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary General: M. Chaguéraud (France);

Alternate:
M. Robert Haas.

Secretaries:

United States of America:	Lieutenant R. Emmet Condon.
British Empire:	Mr. W. T. Turner.
France:	M. J. Garnier-Coignet.
Italy:	M. M. Mosca.
Japan:	M. K. Horiuchi.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: M. G. Lebre.

FIRST SUBCOMMISSION.—*Questions Relating to Freedom of Transit*

President: Hon. Henry White (United States of America)

Vice President: Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith (British Empire)

United States of America: Hon. Henry White.

British Empire: Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith;

Alternate:
Brigadier General H. O. Mance.

France: M. Claveille,

Italy:	M. Maggiorino Ferraris; <i>Alternate:</i> M. G. Sinigaglia.
Japan:	M. M. Adatei.
China:	M. Cheng-ting Thomas Wang; <i>Alternate:</i> M. Tsang Ou.
Greece:	M. L. Coromilas.
Poland:	M. Casimir Kasperski.
Portugal:	Colonel Norton de Mattos; <i>Alternate:</i> M. A. Vieira da Rocha.
Uruguay:	M. Juan Carlos Blanco.

SECOND SUBCOMMISSION.—*Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways*

President: M. André Weiss (France)

United States of America: Mr. David Hunter Miller;

	<i>Alternate:</i> Dr. Manley O. Hudson.
British Empire:	Brigadier General H. O. Mance.
France:	M. André Weiss.
Italy:	M. G. de Martino;

	<i>Alternate:</i> M. F. Fiori.
Japan:	General Y. Sato.
Belgium:	M. Segers;

	<i>Alternates:</i> M. de Visscher; M. Jean Hostie.
Roumania:	M. Nicolas Misu;

	<i>Alternate:</i> M. Nicolas Stefanescu.
Serb-Croat-Slovene:	M. Ante Trumbić.
Czecho-Slovakia:	M. Stephen Osusky;
	<i>Alternate:</i> M. Jaroslav Novak.

SUBCOMMISSION ON THE KIEL CANAL

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of March 6 and April 16, 1919)

President: Hon. A. L. Sifton (British Empire)

- United States of America: Hon. Henry White;
Mr. David Hunter Miller;
Alternates:
Dr. Manley O. Hudson;
Admiral W. S. Benson.
- British Empire: Hon. A. L. Sifton;
Alternates:
Brigadier General H. O. Mance;
Sir H. Llewellyn Smith;
Colonel A. M. Henniker;
Rear Admiral Sir G. P. Hope.
- France: M. Claveille;
M. André Weiss;
Vice Admiral de Bon;
Alternate:
Captain Le Vavasseur.
- Italy: M. Maggiorino Ferraris;
M. G. de Martino;
Rear Admiral M. Grassi.
- Japan: M. M. Adatci;
General Y. Sato;
Captain Nomura.

VI. FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of January 23 and
March 1, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Finance (Hôtel du Ministre)

President: The Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu (British Empire)

Vice Presidents: M. S. Crespi (Italy);
Viscount S. Chinda (Japan).

United States of America: Mr. Albert Strauss;
(2 members from the Mr. Thomas W. Lamont;
following) Mr. Norman H. Davis;
Captain Jeremiah Smith, Jr.;
Mr. George Whitney,

Alternate:
Mr. Ell's Loring Dresel.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu;
(2 members from the Mr. J. M. Keynes;
following) Mr. S. Armitage Smith;
Mr. O. T. Falk;

	<i>Alternate:</i> Mr. MacFadyean.
France:	M. L. L. Klotz; M. Sergent;
	<i>Alternate:</i> M. Cheysson.
Italy:	M. G. Marconi;
(2 members from the following)	M. Maggiorino Ferraris; M. S. Crespi; M. G. Volpi; M. L. della Torre; M. B. Nogara; M. Manciola.
Japan:	Viscount S. Chinda; M. Kengo Mori;
	<i>Alternate:</i> M. T. Aoki.
Belgium:	M. Jaspar;
	<i>Alternates:</i> M. Despret; M. Lepreux.
Greece:	M. A. Michalakopoulos;
	<i>Alternate:</i> M. N. Speranza.
Poland:	M. L. Grabski;
	<i>Alternate:</i> M. J. Mrozowski.
Roumania:	M. Victor Antonesco.
Serb-Croat-Slovene:	M. Voislav Bessarovitch.
Czecho-Slovakia:	M. Stephen Osusky.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America:	Mr. George Whitney.
British Empire:	Mr. Michael Sadler.
France:	M. Petit.
Italy:	M. G. Manciola.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: M. J. Duboin.

SUBCOMMISSIONS

FIRST SUBCOMMISSION

*(a) Urgent Problems Relating to the Preliminaries of Peace**President:* M. S. Crespi (Italy)

United States of America: Mr. Albert Strauss;

(2 members from the following) Mr. Thomas W. Lamont;
Mr. Norman H. Davis;Captain Jeremiah Smith, Jr.;
Mr. George Whitney.

British Empire:

(2 members from the following)

The Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu;

Mr. J. M. Keynes;

Mr. S. Armitage Smith;

Mr. O. T. Falk;

Lieut. Colonel the Hon. Sidney Peel;

Mr. S. D. Waley.

France:

M. L. L. Klotz;

M. Sergeant.

Italy:

(2 members from the following)

M. Maggiorino Ferraris;

M. G. Marconi;

M. B. Nogara.

Japan:

Viscount S. Chinda;

M. Kengo Mori;

Alternate:

M. T. Aoki.

Belgium:

M. Jaspar;

Alternate:

M. Despret.

Greece:

M. A. Michalakopoulos;

Alternate:

M. N. Speranza.

Poland:

M. L. Grabski;

Alternate:

M. J. Mrozowski.

Roumania:

M. Victor Antonesco.

Serb-Croat-Slovene:

M. Voislav Bessarovitch.

Czecho-Slovakia:

M. Stephen Osusky.

(b) Special Subcommission on Monetary Questions

(In Liaison with the Commission on Reparation)

President: M. Kengo Mori (Japan)

France:	M. Sergent; <i>Alternate:</i> M. G. Jouasset.
Italy:	M. B. Nogara.
Japan:	M. Kengo Mori; <i>Alternate:</i> M. T. Aoki.
Belgium:	M. Lepreux.
Poland:	M. L. Grabski; <i>Alternate:</i> M. J. Mrozowski.
Roumania:	M. Victor Antonesco.
Czecho-Slovakia:	M. Stephen Osusky.

SECOND SUBCOMMISSION.—*Monetary Questions*THIRD SUBCOMMISSION.—*Enemy Debts*

(In Liaison with the Economic Commission)

The members of the Second and Third Subcommissions have not been designated.

FOURTH SUBCOMMISSION.—*Interallied Problems and Project of Financial Section of the League of Nations*

President: M. L. L. Klotz (France)

United States of America:	Mr. Thomas W. Lamont; Captain Jeremiah Smith, Jr.
British Empire:	The Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu; Mr. O. T. Falk.
France:	M. L. L. Klotz; <i>Alternate:</i> M. de Verneuil.
Italy:	M. Brofferio; M. G. Manciola.
Japan:	M. Kengo Mori; <i>Alternate:</i> M. T. Aoki.
Belgium:	M. Despret.
Greece:	M. A. Michalakopoulos. <i>Alternate:</i> M. N. Speranza.

Poland:	M. L. Grabski;
	<i>Alternate:</i>
	M. J. Mrozowski.
Roumania:	M. Victor Antonesco.
Serb-Croat-Slovene:	M. Vélimir Baikitch.
Czecho-Slovakia:	M. Stephen Osusky.

FIFTH SUBCOMMISSION.—*Payment of Austro-Hungarian Coupons*

President: M. Édouard Benes (Czecho-Slovakia)

France:	M. Sergent.
Italy:	M. G. Manciola.
Poland:	M. L. Grabski;
	<i>Alternate:</i>
	M. J. Mrozowski.
Roumania:	M. Victor Antonesco.
Serb-Croat-Slovene:	M. Drago Marusic.
Czecho-Slovakia:	M. Stephen Osusky.

VII. ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of January 27 and March 1, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Commerce (Hôtel du Ministre)

President: M. Clementel (France)

United States of America:	Mr. Bernard M. Baruch;
	Mr. Thomas W. Lamont.
British Empire:	The Rt. Hon. Sir George Foster;
	Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith.
France:	M. Clémentel;
	M. Jean Morel.
Italy:	M. Maggiorino Ferraris;
	M. Giuseppe Volpi.
Japan:	M. K. Matsui;
	M. Fukui;
	<i>Alternate:</i>
	M. H. Ashida.
Belgium:	M. Jaspar;
	<i>Alternates:</i>
	M. Brunet;
	M. Rolin-Jacquemyns.
Brazil:	M. Pandiá Calogeras.
China:	M. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze.

Greece:	M. L. Coromilas; <i>Alternates:</i> M. Metaxas; M. Kebedgy; M. Ion.
Poland:	M. Ladislas Grabski; <i>Alternate:</i> M. Jean Rozwadowski.
Portugal:	M. Affonso Costa.
Roumania:	M. E. Pangrati.
Serb-Croat-Slovene:	M. Costa Koumanoudi.
Czecho-Slovakia:	M. Charles Kramar. <i>Alternate:</i> M. Vanicetr.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary General: M. Serruys (France)

Secretaries:

United States of America:	Mr. W. W. Cumberland.
British Empire:	Mr. Hutchinson.
Italy:	M. Tesi.
Japan:	M. H. Ashida.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: M. J. Duboin.

FIRST SECTION: PERMANENT COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

President: Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith (British Empire)

United States of America:	Mr. Bernard M. Baruch; Mr. Thomas W. Lamont; <i>Alternates:</i> Mr. Summers; Mr. A. A. Young.
British Empire:	Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith; The Rt. Hon. Sir George Foster.
France:	M. Clémentel; M. Jean Morel.
Italy:	M. A. Dell'Abbadessa; M. C. Bresciani Turrorio; Professor Dragoni.
Japan:	M. K. Matsui; M. Fukui; <i>Alternate:</i> M. H. Ashida.

China: M. Singloh Hsu.
 Portugal: M. Affonso Costa.
 Roumania: M. Eugène Neguicea.

Secretary: Mr. W. Carter (British Empire)

FIRST SUBCOMMISSION.—*Customs Regulations, Duties, and Restrictions*

President: Dr. Taussig (United States of America)

United States of America: Dr. Taussig.
 British Empire: Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith;

Alternate:

Mr. Henry Fountain.

France: M. Jean Morel.
 Italy: M. A. Dell'Abbadessa.
 Japan: M. T. Aoki.
 Belgium: M. Brunet.
 Portugal: M. A. Vieira da Rocha.
 Roumania: M. Eugène Neguicea.
 Serb-Croat-Slovene: M. Janko Hacin.

Secretary: Mr. W. Carter (British Empire)

SECOND SUBCOMMISSION.—*Treatment of Shipping*

President: M. Bouisson (France);

Alternate:

M. Bignon (France).

United States of America: Mr. Henry M. Robinson.
 British Empire: Mr. Charles Hipwood.
 France: M. Bouisson;

Alternates:

M. Bignon;
 M. Laurent-Vibert;
 M. Lattez.

Italy: M. G. Ingianni.
 Japan: M. H. Ashida.
 Belgium: M. Brunet.
 Brazil: Captain Armando Burlamaqui.
 Poland: M. K. Tyszyński.
 Portugal: M. A. Vieira da Rocha.
 Roumania: M. Pangrati.
 Serb-Croat-Slovene: M. Bora Paievitch.

Secretary: Commander Thring, R. N.

THIRD SUBCOMMISSION.—*Unfair Methods of Competition*

President: Mr. W. Temple Franks (British Empire)

United States of America: Mr. L. L. Summers.

British Empire: Mr. W. Temple Franks.

France: M. Drouets.

Italy: M. A. Dell'Abbadessa;

Alternate:

M. L. Tesi.

Japan: M. H. Ashida.

Belgium: M. de Visscher.

China: M. Singloh Hsu.

Portugal: M. Jayme Batalha Reis.

Secretary: Mr. A. J. Martin (British Empire)

SECOND SECTION

FIRST SUBCOMMISSION.—*Industrial Property*

President: Mr. W. Temple Franks (British Empire)

United States of America: Mr. Joseph Bailey Brown.

British Empire: Mr. W. Temple Franks.

France: M. Charles Lyon-Caen;

Alternate:

M. Drouets.

Italy: M. M. Pilotti.

Japan: M. H. Ashida.

Belgium: M. de Visscher.

Brazil: M. Rodrigo Octavio.

Portugal: M. A. Vieira da Rocha.

Roumania: M. Antoniadé.

Secretary: Mr. A. J. Martin (British Empire)

SECOND SUBCOMMISSION.—*Pre-War Contracts*

President: The Hon. C. J. Doherty (British Empire)

United States of America: Mr. Bradley W. Palmer.

British Empire: The Hon. C. J. Doherty.

France: M. Albert Tissier.

Italy: M. M. d'Amelio;

Alternate:

M. M. Pilotti.

Japan: M. K. Horiuchi.

Belgium.	M. Charles Terlinden.
China:	M. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze.
Poland:	M. J. Mrozowski.
Portugal:	M. Teixeira Gomez.

Secretary: Mr. W. W. Cumberland (United States of America)

THIRD SUBCOMMISSION.—*Liquidation of Enemy Property*

President: M. Petit (France)

United States of America:	Mr. Bradley W. Palmer.
British Empire:	Mr. H. A. Payne.
France:	M. Petit;

Alternates:

M. Jandon;
M. Alphand.

Italy:	M. M. d'Amelio.
Japan:	M. H. Ashida.
Brazil:	M. Rodrigo Octavio.
Portugal:	M. Augusto Soares.
Roumania:	M. Ef. Antonesco.
Serb-Croat-Slovene:	M. Janko Hacin.

Secretary: Mr. W. W. Cumberland (United States of America)

THIRD SECTION.—EX-ENEMY ALIENS

President: M. A. Ricci-Busatti (Italy)

United States of America:	Mr. Fred K. Nielsen.
British Empire:	Mr. L. Kershaw.
France:	M. Charmeil;

Alternate:

M. Alphand.

Italy:	M. A. Ricci-Busatti;
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Alternates:

M. V. Bianchi;
M. M. Pilotti.

Japan:	M. K. Horiuchi.
Belgium:	M. Charles Terlinden.
Poland:	M. Bohdan Winiarski.
Portugal:	M. Alfredo Freire d'Andrade;

Alternate:

M. A. de Vasconcellos.

Secretary: Mr. Bertram F. Willcox (United States of America)

FOURTH SECTION: ECONOMIC TREATIES

President: M. C. Dragoni (Italy)

United States of America: Dr. A. A. Young.

British Empire: Mr. C. J. B. Hurst;

Alternate:

Mr. Henry Fountain.

France: M. Herbette.

Italy: M. M. d'Amelio;

Alternate:

M. Tesi.

Japan: M. K. Horiuchi.

Belgium: M. Rolin-Jaequemyns.

Brazil: M. Pandiá Calogeras.

Poland: M. Henri Tennenbaum.

Portugal: M. A. Vieira da Rocha.

Secretary: M. Teyssaire (France)

VIII. AERONAUTICAL COMMISSION

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of March 12, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Boulevard Saint-Germain, No. 282

President: General Duval (France)

United States of America: Rear Admiral N. A. McCully.

British Empire: Major General the Rt. Hon. J. E. B. Seely;
Major General Sir Frederic Sykes;

Alternate:

Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves.

France: General Duval;

Captain Valdenaire.

Italy: M. Marconi;

(2 members from the M. M. d'Amelio.

following) Rear Admiral P. Orsini.

Japan: Brigadier General Tanaka;
Captain Osumi.

Belgium: Colonel van Crombrughe.

Brazil: Colonel Malan d'Angrogne.

Cuba: M. Rafaël Martínez Ortiz;

Alternates:

M. Guillermo de Blanck;

M. Miguel Angel Campa.

Greece: Captain N. Botassis.

Portugal:	Colonel Norton de Mattos; <i>Alternate:</i> Commandant N. Guimaraës.
Roumania:	Colonel of the General Staff Thomas Dimitresco.
Serb-Croat-Slovene:	Commandant Mirko Marinkovitch.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary General: Lieut. Colonel Pujo (France)

Secretaries:

United States of America:	Captain C. E. Morton; Lieutenant Kiely.
British Empire:	Major D. C. James.
France:	Commandant Poli-Marchetti.
Italy:	Lieut. Colonel A. Guidoni.
Japan:	Captain K. Nishihara.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: Captain Roper.

SUBCOMMISSIONS

1. Military Subcommission

Place of Meeting: Boulevard Saint-Germain, No. 199 bis

President: Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves (British Empire)

Vice President: Brigadier General Tanaka (Japan)

United States of America: Captain L. McNamee.

British Empire: Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves.

France: General Duval;
Lieut. Colonel Saconney;
Commandant Poli-Marchetti;
Commandant Vuillemin;
Captain Leroy.

Italy: Rear Admiral P. Orsini;
Lieut. Colonel P. R. Piccio.

Japan: Brigadier General Tanaka;
Captain Osumi.

2. Technical Subcommission

Place of Meeting: Boulevard Saint-Germain, No. 199 bis

President: Lieut. Colonel A. D. Butterfield (United States of America)

Vice President: Captain G. Finzi (Italy)

United States of America:	Lieut. Colonel A. D. Butterfield; Lieut. Commander J. L. Callan; Lieutenant Kiely.
British Empire:	Colonel L. F. Blandy; Major D. C. James.
France:	Captain l'Escaille; M. Lallemand; Captain Leroy; Lieut. Colonel Saconney; M. Soreau.
Italy:	Rear Admiral P. Orsini; Lieut. Colonel A. Guidoni.
Japan:	M. Tanakadate; Lieutenant Takata.

3. Judicial, Commercial, and Financial Subcommittee

Place of Meeting: Rue de l'Université, No. 106

President: M. d'Aubigny (France)

Vice Presidents: M. G. C. Buzzati (Italy);
Mr. H. White Smith (British Empire).

United States of America:	Commander Pollock; Major Bacon.
British Empire:	Mr. White Smith.
France:	Commandant d'Aiguillon; M. Bolley; M. Branet; M. Fighiera; M. Pierre-Étienne Flandin; M. de Navailles; M. A. de Lapradelle; M. Wahl.
Italy:	M. M. d'Amelio; Rear Admiral P. Orsini.
Japan:	Captain Funakoshi.
Belgium:	M. Rolin-Jaequemyns.

IX. GEOGRAPHY

Place of Meeting: Geographic Service of the Army, 140, Rue de Grenelle

President: General Bourgeois (France)

United States of America: Colonel Jones.

British Empire:	Colonel Walter Cook Hedley; Major Owen Evelyn Wynne; <i>Alternates:</i> Captain C. L. Y. Parker; Captain Alan Grant Ogilvie.
France:	General Bourgeois; Colonel Bellot.
Italy:	Captain Edoardo Romagnoli.
Japan:	Commandant Kobayashi.
Belgium:	Commandant Maury.
Serb-Croat-Slovene:	Commandant Costa Stoyanovitch.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: Captain Le Maître (France)

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: M. E. Pépin.

X. PRISONERS OF WAR

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of April 19, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. Georges Cahen (France)

United States of America:	General C. H. McKinstry; Rear Admiral N. A. McCully.
British Empire:	Rear Admiral Sir George P. Hope; Lieut. Colonel H. C. Brinsmead.
France:	M. Georges Cahen; Captain Fabre.
Italy:	General Riccardo Calcagno; Rear Admiral M. Grassi; Lieut. Colonel Toni; Commandant Mazzolini.
Japan:	Lieut. Colonel Hata.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

France:	M. L. de Montille.
Italy:	Commandant Sprega.
Japan:	Captain K. Nishihara.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: M. L. de Montille.

III. Territorial Questions

CENTRAL TERRITORIAL COMMITTEE

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 27, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. André Tardieu (France)

United States of America: Mr. Archibald Cary Coolidge;

Assisted by:

Mr. Johnson (for Bulgarian boundaries)

British Empire:

Sir Eyre Crowe;

Assisted by:

The Hon. H. Nicolson (for Bulgarian boundaries)

France:

M. André Tardieu;

Succeeded by:

M. L. Aubert.

Italy:

M. G. de Martino;

Assisted by:

Colonel Pariani (for the boundary between Italy and Austria)

and:

Colonel Castoldi.

Japan:

M. M. Adatci.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

France:

M. de Montille (Chargé of the Secretariat General)

United States of America: Mr. Parker Thomas Moon.

British Empire:

Mr. M. Palairet.

Italy:

Marquis G. Paterno.

Subcommission on Territorial Question

(Appointed by the Central Territorial Committee)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

President: General Le Rond (France)

United States of America: Mr. D. W. Johnson.

British Empire:

The Hon. H. Nicolson;

Assisted by:

Major Temperley.

France: General Le Rond;
Assisted by:
 Commandant de Montal.

Italy: Colonel Castoldi.

Japan: M. Kato.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. de Montille (France)

1. CZECHO-SLOVAK AFFAIRS

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 5, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

President: M. Jules Cambon (France)

United States of America: Mr. Archibald Cary Coolidge;
 Mr. Allen W. Dulles.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Cook;
 The Hon. Harold Nicolson.

France: M. Jules Cambon;
 M. Laroche.

Italy: M. G. Marconi;
 M. A. Stranieri.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America: Captain Lester W. Perrin.

British Empire: Mr. M. Palairat.

France: M. R. de Saint-Quentin.

Italy: M. G. Barone Russo.

Subcommission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs

(Session of the Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs of February 28, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: General Le Rond (France)

United States of America: Mr. Allen W. Dulles;
Assisted by:
 Major D. W. Johnson.

British Empire: The Hon. Harold Nicolson;
Assisted by:
 Lieut. Colonel J. H. M. Cornwall.

Italy: M. A. Stranieri;
Assisted by:
 Commandant M. Pergolani;
 Captain E. Romagnoli.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. Lavondès (France)

2. POLISH AFFAIRS

1. Interallied Mission to Poland

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of January 22 and 29, 1919)

President: M. Noulens (France)

United States of America: Major General F. J. Kernan;
 Dr. R. H. Lord.

British Empire: Sir Esme Howard;
 Brigadier General A. Carton de Wiart.

France: M. Noulens;
 General Niessel.

Italy: M. G. C. Montagna;
 General Romei Longhena.

2. Permanent Interallied Teschen Commission

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of January 31, 1919)

President: M. Grenard (France)

United States of America: Mr. Marcus A. Coolidge;

Succeeded by:
 Mr. George Howe.

British Empire: Lieut. Colonel R. P. Pakenham Walsh.

France: M. Grenard.

Italy: Lieut. Colonel Tissi.

3. Commission on Polish Affairs

(Permanently at Paris)

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of the Evening of February 12 and of February 26, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. Jules Cambon (France)

United States of America: Dr. F. H. Lord.

British Empire: Lieut. Colonel F. H. Kisch.

France:	M. Jules Cambon.
Italy:	M. G. Brambilla.
Japan:	M. Otchiai;

Alternate:
M. S. Kuriyama.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America:	Captain Stewart Montgomery.
British Empire:	Mr. M. Palairet.
France:	M. G. de Percin.
Italy:	M. G. Barone Russo.

Subcommissions

Subcommission for the Study of Eastern Frontiers

(Session of the Commission on Polish Affairs of March 20, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: General Le Rond (France)

United States of America:	Dr. F. H. Lord.
British Empire:	Mr. F. B. Bourdillon.
France:	General Le Rond.
Italy:	M. G. Brambilla.
Japan:	M. Otchiai;

Alternate:
M. S. Kuriyama.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. G. de Percin (France)

Subcommission for the Study of Western Frontiers

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of March 1, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: General Le Rond (France)

United States of America:	Dr. R. H. Lord.
British Empire:	Lieut. Colonel F. H. Kisch.
France:	General Le Rond.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. G. de Percin (France)

Subcommission on Teschen and Orava

(Appointed by the Commission on Polish Affairs and the Commission
on Czecho-Slovak Affairs)

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of July 12 and August
7, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: General Le Rond (France)

United States of America: Dr. F. H. Lord;
Mr. Allen W. Dulles.

British Empire: The Hon. Harold Nicolson;
Lieut. Colonel F. H. Kisch.

France: General Le Rond.

Italy: M. G. Brambilla;
M. A. Stranieri;

Assisted by:

Commandant Pergolani.

Japan: M. Otchiai;

Alternate:

M. S. Kuriyama.

4. Negotiation of an Armistice Between Poland and the Ukraine

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of April 16, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President:

United States of America: Dr. R. H. Lord;
Colonel S. D. Embick.

British Empire: Lieut. Colonel F. H. Kisch.

France: General Le Rond;
M. Degrand.

Italy: M. G. Brambilla;
Lieut. Colonel Pellicelli;

Alternate:

Commandant M. Pergolani.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

France: Commandant Escoffier (Chargé of the
Secretariat General);
Captain de la Touche.

British Empire: Captain G. Brebner;
Mr. Engelenburg.
Italy: Captain Origo.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: Commandant
Escoffier.

Subcommission on Drafting

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: General Le Rond (France)

United States of America: Colonel S. D. Embick.
British Empire: Lieut. Colonel F. H. Kisch.
France: General Le Rond.
Italy: Lieut. Colonel Pellicelli;

Alternate:
Commandant M. P. . . .

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

France: Commandant Escoffier;
Captain de la Touche.
Italy: Captain Origo.

3. EASTERN FRONTIERS OF GERMANY

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of June 4, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: General Le Rond (France)

United States of America: Dr. R. H. Lord.
British Empire: Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley.
France: General Le Rond.
Italy: M. G. Brambilla.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. G. de Percin (France)

4. ROUMANIAN AND YUGO-SLAV AFFAIRS

(With the exception of frontier questions common to the Yugo-Slav
State and Italy)

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 1 and 18,
1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. André Tardieu (France)

Vice President: M. G. de Martino (Italy)

United States of America: Professor Archibald Cary Coolidge;
Mr. D. W. Johnson.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe;

Mr. A. Leeper.

France: M. André Tardieu;

M. Laroche.

Italy: M. G. de Martino;

Count Vannutelli-Rey;

Assisted by:

Commandant Rugiu.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

France: Mr. R. de Saint-Quentin (Chargé of the
Secretariat General)

United States of America: Lieutenant Reuben Horschow.

British Empire: Mr. M. Palairet.

Italy: Count L. O. Vinci.

Subcommission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs

(Decision of the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs
of March 2, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: General Le Rond (France)

United States of America: Dr. Charles Seymour;

Assisted and succeeded by:

Major D. W. Johnson.

British Empire: Mr. A. Leeper;

Assisted by:

Lieut. Colonel T. G. Heywood;

Lieut. Colonel J. H. M. Cornwall.

France: General Le Rond;

Assisted by:

M. de Martonne;

M. Haumant.

Italy: Count Vannutelli-Rey;

Assisted by:

Colonel Castoldi;

Commandant G. Rugiu;

Commandant G. Mazzolini.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. R. de Saint-Quentin (France)

5. GREEK AND ALBANIAN AFFAIRS

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 4 and 24, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. Jules Cambon (France)

Vice President: The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden (British Empire)

United States of America: Professor Archibald Cary Coolidge;
Mr. W. H. Buckler.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden;
Sir Eyre Crowe;

Assisted by:
The Hon. Harold Nicolson.

France: M. Jules Cambon;
M. Gout;

Assisted by:
M. Laroche;
M. Krajewski.

Italy: M. G. de Martino;
Colonel Castoldi;

Alternate:
M. C. Galli;

Assisted by:
Captain U. Conz;
Commandant Mazzolini.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America: Mr. George Redington Montgomery.

British Empire: Mr. M. Palairet.

France: M. de Montille.

Italy: Count L. O. Vinci.

6. BELGIAN AND DANISH AFFAIRS

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 12 and 21, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. André Tardieu (France)

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. R. de Saint-Quentin (France)

5. GREEK AND ALBANIAN AFFAIRS

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 4 and 24, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. Jules Cambon (France)

Vice President: The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden (British Empire)

United States of America: Professor Archibald Cary Coolidge;
Mr. W. H. Buckler.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden;
Sir Eyre Crowe;

Assisted by:
The Hon. Harold Nicolson.

France: M. Jules Cambon;
M. Gout;

Assisted by:
M. Laroche;
M. Krajewski.

Italy: M. G. de Martino;
Colonel Castoldi;

Alternate:
M. C. Galli;

Assisted by:
Captain U. Conz;
Commandant Mazzolini.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America: Mr. George Redington Montgomery.

British Empire: Mr. M. Palaret.

France: M. de Montille.

Italy: Count L. O. Vinci.

6. BELGIAN AND DANISH AFFAIRS

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 12 and 21, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

<i>Vice President:</i>	Sir Eyre Crowe (British Empire)
United States of America.	Colonel S. D. Embick.
British Empire:	Sir Eyre Crowe; Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley.
France:	M. André Tardieu; M. Laroche.
Italy:	M. Gustavo Tosti; Count Vannutelli-Rey.
Japan.	M. H. Nagaoka; M. Sakutaro Tachi.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America.	Mr. Frank L. Warrin, Jr.
British Empire:	Mr. E. Fullerton-Carnegie.
France.	M. G. de Percin.
Italy:	M. A. Trombetti.
Japan:	M. Kawai.

7. BALTIC AFFAIRS

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of April 16, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: Sir Esme Howard (British Empire)

United States of America:	Dr. S. E. Morison.
British Empire:	Sir Esme Howard;

Alternate:

Mr. E. H. Carr.

France:	M. Kammerer.
Italy:	M. Giuseppe Brambilla.
Japan:	M. Otchiai;

Alternate:

M. S. Kuriyama.

NAVAL EXPERTS

(Assistants to the Commission for the Question of Access to the
Baltic Sea and the North Sea)

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of August 2, 1919)

United States of America:	Rear Admiral N. A. McCully.
British Empire:	Captain C. T. M. Fuller.
France:	Captain Le Vavasseur.
Italy:	Captain Ruspoli.
Japan:	Captain Osumi

Secretary: M. de Montille (France)

IV. Special Questions in the Treaty With Germany

1. DRAFTING OF THE MILITARY, NAVAL, AND AERIAL CLAUSES IN THE TREATY WITH GERMANY

President: General Degoutte (France)

United States of America: Major General Mason N. Patrick;
Colonel W. S. Browning;
Colonel Gorrell;
Captain F. H. Schofield;
Mr. James Brown Scott.

British Empire: Major General Sir W. Thwaites;
Rear Admiral Sir George P. Hope;
Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves;
Captain C. T. M. Fuller;
Paymaster-Captain C. F. Pollard;
Mr. C. J. B. Hurst.

France: General Degoutte;
General Duval;
Captain Le Vasseur;
M. Henri Fromageot.

Italy: General U. Cavallero;
Rear Admiral M. Grassi;
M. Gustavo Tosti;
Captain F. Ruspoli.

Japan: Captain Fugioka;
Captain Yamamoto;
M. H. Nagaoka. ‡

Secretary: M. E. Carteron (France)

2. SUBMARINE CABLES

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of March 7, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. Henri Fromageot (France)

United States of America: Mr. James Brown Scott.

British Empire: Dr. A. Pearce Higgins.

France: M. Henri Fromageot.

Italy: M. Gustavo Tosti.

Japan: M. Yamakawa.

3. MOROCCO

(Council of Foreign Ministers of March 28, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. de Peretti de la Rocca (France)

United States of America: Mr. George Louis Beer.
 British Empire: The Hon. A. Akers-Douglas.
 France: M. de Peretti de la Rocca.
 Italy: M. C. Galli.
 Belgium: M. Louwers.
 Portugal: M. Augusto Soares.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America: Mr. Bertram F. Willcox.
 British Empire: Mr. M. Palairet.
 France: M. R. de Saint-Quentin.
 Italy: Count L. O. Vinci.

4. LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of May 29, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry for Foreign Affairs

President: M. Loucheur (France)

United States of America: Honorable John W. Davis;
 General Tasker H. Bliss.
 British Empire: The Rt. Hon. the Lord Robert Cecil;
 Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson.
 France: M. Loucheur;
 Marshal Foch;

Assisted by:

General Weygand.
 Italy: Marquis Imperiali;
 General A. Diaz.
 Belgium: Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

France: Commandant Escoffier (Chargé of the
 Secretariat General)
 United States of America: Mr. W. H. Buckler.
 British Empire: Mr. S. P. Waterlow;
 Mr. E. F. Wise.
 Italy: M. Trombetti.

5. COLONIES

(Colonial Compensation Demanded by Italy from France and Great Britain)

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of May 7, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Colonies.

President: The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner (British Empire)

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner;

Assisted by:

Sir Herbert J. Read;

Mr. R. Vansittart;

Mr. R. Speeling.

France: M. Henry Simon;

Assisted by:

M. Duchêne;

M. Merlin;

M. Fournol;

M. de Peretti de la Rocca.

Italy: M. G. Marconi;

Assisted by:

M. G. de Martino;

M. C. Galli.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary General: M. Duchêne (France)

6. GERMAN COLONIES

(Council of Foreign Ministers of April 23, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. de Peretti de la Rocca (France)

United States of America: Mr. George Louis Beer.

British Empire: Sir Herbert J. Read.

France: M. de Peretti de la Rocca.

Italy: M. C. Galli;

Alternate:

M. F. Nobili-Massuero.

Japan: M. Yamakawa.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America: Mr. Slosson.

France: M. R. de Saint-Quentin.

7. COLONIAL MANDATES

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies, June 27, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Colonial Office at London or Ministry of Colonies
at Paris*President:* The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner (British Empire); or M. H.
Simon (France).

United States of America: Colonel E. M. House;

Alternates:

Mr. G. L. Beer;

Mr. Gray.

Belgium: Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy;

M. Louwers;

Count de Hemricourt de Grunne.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner;

Alternate:

Colonel Amery.

France: M. Henri Simon.

Italy: M. S. Crespi;

Alternates:

M. G. Marconi;

M. Catastini.

Japan: Viscount Chinda;

Alternate:

Baron Makino.

Secretary: Mr. Philip Baker (British Empire)

8. INTERALLIED COMMISSION ON THE RHINE TERRITORY

(Which Succeeds the "Interallied High Commission on the Rhine
Territory")

Place of Meeting: Paris and Coblenz

President: M. Tirard (France)

United States of America: Mr. Pierrepont B. Noyes.

British Empire: Sir Harold Stuart.

France: M. P. Tirard.

Belgium: M. Digneffe.

V. Special Questions in the Treaty With Austria

1. MOROCCO

See Special Questions in the Treaty with Germany.

2. NEW STATES

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies, May 1, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. Berthelot (France)

United States of America: Mr. Allen W. Dulles.

British Empire: Mr. E. H. Carr.

France: M. P. Berthelot.

Italy: M. G. de Martino.

Japan: M. M. Adatci.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

France: M. Kammerer.

Italy: Count L. O. Vinci.

Japan: M. S. Kato.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: M. de Montille

3. POLITICAL CLAUSES

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of July 11, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. Laroche (France)

United States of America: Mr. Fred K. Nielsen.

British Empire: Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley.

France: M. Laroche.

Italy: M. M. d'Amelio;

Alternates:

M. A. Dell'Abbadessa;

M. M. Pilotti.

Japan: M. M. Adatci.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. J. Pieyre (France)

4. ITALIAN POLITICAL CLAUSES

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of June 6, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. S. Pichon (France)

United States of America: Mr. Fred K. Nielsen.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe.

France: M. S. Pichon.

Italy: M. G. de Martino.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. R. de Saint-Quentin (France)

5. REPARATION CLAUSES IN THE TREATIES WITH AUSTRIA, HUNGARY
AND BULGARIA

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of May 23, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Finance

United States of America: Mr. Norman H. Davis;

Mr. B. M. Baruch;

Mr. T. W. Lamont;

Mr. J. F. Dulles;

Mr. Vance McCormick.

British Empire:

The Rt. Hon. the Lord Cunliffe;

The Rt. Hon. the Lord Sumner of Ibstone;

Lieut. General the Hon. J. C. H. Smuts;

Mr. J. M. Keynes.

France:

M. L. L. Klotz;

M. Loucheur;

M. A. Tardieu;

M. Jouasset.

Italy:

M. S. Crespi;

M. M. d'Amelio;

Assisted by:

M. E. Modigliani.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. Foberti (Italy)

6. TIENTSIN

Request for Cession to Italy of the Austrian Concession

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of July 12, 1919)

President: M. J. Gout (France)

United States of America:	Captain Hornbeck.
British Empire:	Hon. Charles Tufton.
France:	M. J. Gout.
Italy:	M. Marchetti Ferrante.
Japan:	M. Yosuke Matsuoka.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. R. de Saint-Quentin (France)

VI. Examination of the Observations of the Delegations of Enemy Powers on Conditions of Peace

1. COMMITTEES FOR THE STUDY OF THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE GERMAN DELEGATION ON THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of April 30 and May 10, 1919)

1. League of Nations

United States of America:	Hon. Edward M. House;
	<i>or</i>
	Mr. David Hunter Miller.
British Empire:	The Rt. Hon. the Lord Robert Cecil.
France:	M. Léon Bourgeois.
Italy:	M. A. D'Adda.
Japan:	Baron Makino.

2. Geographical Frontiers of Germany

United States of America:	Dr. S. E. Mezes.
British Empire:	Sir Eyre Crowe.
France:	M. André Tardieu.
Italy:	Count Vannutelli-Rey.
Japan:	M. H. Ijuin.

3. Political Clauses Concerning Europe

United States of America:	Dr. Charles H. Haskins;
	<i>or</i>
	Mr. Allen W. Dulles.
British Empire:	Sir Eyre Crowe.
France:	M. Berthelot;
	<i>or</i>
	M. Laroche.
Italy:	M. G. Brambilla.
Japan:	M. H. Ijuin.

France:	M. Georges-Cahen.
Italy:	Lieut. Colonel Toni.
Japan:	Lieut. Colonel Ninomiya.

9. Responsibilities for the War and Penalties

United States of America:	Hon. Robert Lansing;
	<i>or</i>
	Mr. James Brown Scott.
British Empire:	Sir Ernest Pollock.
France:	M. F. Larnaude.
Italy:	M. Gustavo Tosti.
Japan:	M. Sakutaro Tachi.

10. Reparations and Restitutions

United States of America:	Mr. Vance McCormick;
	<i>or</i>
	Mr. Norman H. Davis.
British Empire:	The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes;
	<i>Alternate:</i>
	The Rt. Hon. the Lord Sumner of Ibstone.
France:	M. L. L. Klotz.
Italy:	M. Maggiorino Ferraris;
	M. M. d'Amelio.
Japan:	M. Kengo Mori.

11. Financial Clauses

United States of America:	Mr. Norman H. Davis;
	<i>or</i>
	Mr. Thomas W. Lamont.
British Empire:	Mr. J. M. Keynes;
	<i>or</i>
	Mr. S. Armitage Smith.
France:	M. Sergeant.
Italy:	M. G. Manciola;
	<i>or</i>
	Captain Guido Jung.
Japan:	M. Kengo Mori.

12. Economic Clauses

United States of America:	Mr. Bernard M. Baruch;
	<i>or</i>
	Mr. Thomas W. Lamont.

British Empire:	Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith.
France:	M. Clémentel;
	<i>or</i>
	M. Bolley.
Italy:	M. S. Crespi;
	M. Maggiorino Ferraris.
Japan:	M. K. Matsui.

13. Ports, Waterways, and Railways

United States of America:	Hon. Henry White;
	<i>or</i>
	Dr. Manley O. Hudson.
British Empire:	The Hon. A. L. Sifton.
France:	M. Claveille.
Italy:	M. Maggiorino Ferraris.
Japan:	M. M. Adatci.

14. Labor

United States of America.	Mr. Henry M. Robinson;
	<i>or</i>
	Dr. James T. Shotwell.
British Empire:	The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes.
France:	M. Colliard;
	<i>or</i>
	M. Arthur Fontaine.
Italy:	M. Gustavo Tosti;
	<i>or</i>
	M. G. E. di Palma Castiglione.
Japan:	M. Otchiai.

2. COMMITTEES FOR THE STUDY OF THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE AUSTRIAN DELEGATION ON THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of June 17, 1919)

1. League of Nations

United States of America:	Mr. M. O. Hudson.
British Empire:	Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley (replacing Lord Robert Cecil).
France:	M. Larnaude.
Italy:	M. V. Scialoja.
Japan:	Viscount Chinda.

Secretary: M. A. Portier (France)

2. Political Clauses Concerning Europe

President: M. A. Tardieu (France)

United States of America: Mr. Archibald Cary Coolidge.

British Empire: Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley.

France: M. A. Tardieu.

Italy: M. Stranieri (For the boundary between Austria and Czecho-Slovakia);
Count Vannutelli-Rey (For the other Austrian boundaries).

Japan: M. M. Adatci.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. R. de Saint-Quentin (France)

- (a) Subcommission in Charge of the Question Relating to the Fixation of Frontiers Between Austria and Czecho-Slovakia and Between Austria and Hungary.

President: General Le Rond (France)

United States of America: Mr. Allen W. Dulles;
Major Martin.

British Empire: The Hon. Harold Nicolson;
Major Temperley.

France: General Le Rond;
Commandant de Montal.

Italy: Count Vannutelli-Rey;
Major Pergolani.

Japan: M. Kawai.

3. Political Clauses Relating to Countries Outside of Europe

President: M. J. Gout (France)

United States of America: Mr. Ellis Loring Dresel.

British Empire: The Hon. Charles Tufton.

France: M. J. Gout.

Italy: M. C. Galli.

Japan: M. S. Yoshida.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. R. de Saint-Quentin (France)

4. Military Clauses

United States of America: General Tasker H. Bliss:

or

British Empire:	Major General the Hon. Sir C. Sackville-West.
France:	General Desticker.
Italy:	General U. Cavallero.
Japan:	General Tanaka.

5. Naval Clauses

United States of America:	Rear Admiral H. S. Knapp.
British Empire:	Captain C. T. M. Fuller.
France:	Captain Le Vavasseur.
Italy:	Rear Admiral M. Grassi;
	<i>Assisted by:</i>
	Captain Ruspoli.
Japan:	Captain Osumi.

6. Aerial Clauses

<i>President:</i>	General Duval (France)
United States of America:	Rear Admiral H. S. Knapp.
British Empire:	Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves.
France:	General Duval.
Italy:	Lieut. Colonel Piccio.
Japan:	General Tanaka.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: Captain Roper (France)

7. Prisoners of War and Interments

United States of America:	Mr. Ellis Loring Dresel.
British Empire:	Mr. R. Vansittart; Brigadier General J. H. Morgan.
France:	M. Alphand; Colonel Jouvin.
Italy:	M. A. Stranieri; Lieut. Colonel Toni.
Japan:	Colonel Nagai.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. de Montille (France)

8. Responsibilities for the War and Penalties

United States of America:	Mr. James Brown Scott.
British Empire:	Sir E. Pollock.
France:	M. J. Basdevant (replacing M. F. Larnaude).

Italy: M. V. Scialoja.
 Japan: M. S. Kuriyama (replacing M. Adatci).

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: Commandant M. Escoffier (France)

9. Reparations and Restitutions

United States of America: Mr. John Foster Dulles.
 British Empire: Lieut. Colonel the Hon. Sidney Peel.
 France: M. Lyon.
 Italy: M. M. d'Amelio.
 Japan: M. T. Aoki.

10. Financial Clauses

United States of America: Mr. Cumberland.
 British Empire: Lieut. Colonel the Hon. Sidney Peel.
 France: M. Sergeant;
 Alternate:
 M. Cheysson.
 Italy: M. Nogara,
 Alternate:
 M. Manciola.
 Japan: M. T. Aoki.

11. Economic Clauses

United States of America: Mr. Fred K. Nielsen.
 British Empire: Mr. H. J. Hutchinson.
 France: M. Alphand.
 Italy: M. A. Dell'Abbadessa;
 or
 M. M. Pilotti.
 Japan: M. H. Ashida.

12. Ports, Waterways, and Railways

United States of America: Dr. Manley O. Hudson.
 British Empire: Brigadier General H. O. Mance.
 France: M. Claveille.
 Italy: M. Maggiorino Ferraris;
 Alternates:
 M. G. Sinigalia;
 M. F. Fiori.
 Japan: M. M. Adatci.

13. Labor

United States of America: Mr. Henry M. Robinson;

or

Dr. James T. Shotwell.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes.

France: M. A. Fontaine.

Italy: M. Gustavo Tosti;

or

M. G. E. di Palma Castiglione.

Japan: M. K. Otchiai.

3. COMMITTEES FOR THE COORDINATION OF REPLIES TO THE COUNTER PROPOSITIONS

1. Committee for the Coordination of the Replies to the German Counter Propositions

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of June 12, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

President: M. André Tardieu (France)

United States of America: Mr. M. O. Hudson.

British Empire: Mr. Philip Kerr;

Assisted by:

Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley.

France: M. André Tardieu.

Italy: Count Vannutelli-Rey.

Japan: M. Sadao Saburi.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. A. Portier (France)

2. Committee for the Coordination of the Replies to the Austrian Counter Propositions

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of July 29, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. Jules Cambon (France)

United States of America: Mr. Lester H. Woolsey.

British Empire: Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley.

France: M. Jules Cambon.

Italy: Count Vannutelli-Rey.

Japan: M. M. Adatci.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. A. Portier (France)

VII. Execution of the Treaty of Peace With Germany

1. EXECUTION OF THE CLAUSES OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY*

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of June 26, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. André Tardieu (France)

United States of America: Mr. Ellis Loring Dresel.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe;

Alternate:

The Hon. Charles Tufton.

France: M. André Tardieu;

Succeeded by:

M. L. Aubert.

Italy: M. V. Scialoja.

Japan: M. Otchiai;

Alternate:

M. K. Horiuchi.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. A. Portier (France)

(a) Subcommission on the Organization of Commissions of Delimitation

President: General Le Rond (France)

United States of America: Mr. Ellis Loring Dresel;

Mr. W. Picard;

Colonel J. A. Logan;

Colonel D. C. Jones.

British Empire: Mr. E. H. Carr;

Major O. P. Wynne;

Alternate:

C. L. Y. Parker.

France: General Le Rond;

Colonel Bellot.

Italy: Count Vannutelli-Rey;

M. G. Brambilla;

Captain Romagnoli.

*The other Commissions appointed by the Supreme Council of the Allies to assure the execution of the various clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Germany and the functioning of which is arranged only for a date after the putting into force of this Treaty will be made the subject matter of a separate part. [Footnote in

Japan: Commandant Kobayashi;
M. K. Horiuchi.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. de Percin (France)

2. RHINE TERRITORY

(Letter from the President of the Conference of Peace of June 7, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Industrial Reconstruction

President: M. Loucheur (France)

United States of America: Mr. Ellis Loring Dresel.

British Empire: Mr E. F. Wise;

Alternate:

Mr. S. P. Waterlow.

France: M. Loucheur;

Alternate:

M. Tirard.

Belgium: M. Rolin-Jaequemyns.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America: Mr. Wallace H. Day.

British Empire: Mr. E. Ibbetson James.

France: M. A. Aron.

3. DESTRUCTION OF THE GERMAN FLEET AT SCAPA FLOW

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of June 28, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

United States of America: Mr. Bradley W. Palmer.

British Empire: Captain Hardy.

France: M. Monnet.

Japan: S. Kurokawa.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: M. J. Duboin.

4. REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

(Commission Appointed August 27, 1919)

President: M. Alphand (France)

United States of America: Mr. Ellis Loring Dresel;

Brigadier General W. D. Connor.

British Empire: Mr. R. G. Vansittart;

Lieut. General Sir H. E. Belfield.

France:	M. Alphand; Colonel Jouvin.
Italy:	Colonel Toni.
Japan:	M. Shigemitsu; Colonel Nagai.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. L. de Montille (France)

5. REPATRIATION OF GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND HUNGARIAN PRISONERS
OF WAR IN SIBERIA

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of September 27 and
October 20, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: Colonel A. J. Logan (United States of America)

United States of America: Colonel A. J. Logan.

British Empire: Lieut. Colonel C. H. G. Black;

Alternate:

Lieut. Colonel F. H. Kisch.

France: Captain Fabre.

Italy: Commandant Scanagatta.

Japan: Commandant Katsuki.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. P. Bressy (France)

VIII. Revision of International Acts

1. REVISION OF THE GENERAL ACTS OF BERLIN OF 1885 AND OF
BRUSSELS OF 1890

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of June 25, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Colonies

President: M. de Peretti de la Rocca (France)

United States of America: Mr. George Louis Beer.

British Empire: Mr. C. Strachey.

France: M. de Peretti de la Rocca;

M. A. Merlin;

M. Duchêne.

Italy: M. A. Dell'Abbadessa;

M. D. Anzilotti.

Japan:	General Y. Sato; Captain Osumi.
Belgium:	Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy; M. Louwers.
Portugal:	Colonel Norton de Mattos; Commandant T. W. Fernandes.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America:	Mr. Gray.
France:	M. Budin.
Italy:	M. F. Nobili Massuero.
Japan:	M. Yokoyama.
Belgium:	Commandant Maury.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: M. Massigli.

2. REVISION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE CONTROL OF SPIRITUOUS LIQUORS IN AFRICA

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of June 25, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Colonies

President: M. de Peretti de la Rocca (France)

United States of America:	Mr. George Louis Beer.
British Empire:	Mr. C. Strachey.
France:	M. Merlin; M. de Peretti de la Rocca; M. Duchêne.
Italy:	M. A. Dell'Abbadessa.
Japan:	General Y. Sato. Captain Osumi.
Belgium:	Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy; M. Louwers.
Portugal:	Colonel Norton de Mattos; Commandant T. W. Fernandes.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America:	Mr. Gray.
France:	M. Budin.
Italy:	M. F. Nobili Massuero.
Japan:	M. Sawada.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: M. Massigli.

3. REVISION OF THE CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE COMMERCE OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of June 25, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Colonies

President: M. de Peretti de la Rocca (France)

United States of America: Mr. George Louis Beer;
Captain S. K. Hornbeck.

British Empire: Sir Herbert J. Read;
Mr. C. Strachey;
Commander P. Macnamara.

France: M. Merlin;
M. Duchêne;

Alternates:

M. Budin;
M. de Peretti de la Rocca.

Italy: M. F. Nobili Massuero.

Japan: General Y. Sato;
Captain Osumi.

Belgium: Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy;
Commandant Maury;
M. Louwers;
M. Galopin.

Portugal: Colonel Norton de Mattos;
Commandant Thomas W. Fernandes.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America: Mr. Gray.

Italy: M. F. Nobili Massuero.

Japan: M. Sawada.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: M. Massigli.

IX. Questions of Different Kinds

1. SPITSBERGEN

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of July 7, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. Laroche (France)

United States of America: Mr. Fred K. Nielsen.

British Empire: The Hon. C. H. Tufton.

France: M. Laroche;
M. de Celigny.
Italy: M. G. Brambilla.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. de Montille (France)

2. REVISION OF THE TREATIES OF 1839

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of July 4, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. Laroche (France)

United States of America: Mr. Fred K. Nielsen.

Assisted by:

Rear Admiral N. A. McCully.

British Empire: The Hon. Charles Tufton;
Brigadier General H. O. Mance;
Colonel A. M. Henniker.

France: M. Laroche;
M. Tirman;

Alternate:

M. Francis Rey.

Italy: M. Gustavo Tosti;
M. Dionisio Anzilotti.

Japan: General Y. Sato;

Alternates:

Colonel Nagai;

M. K. Hayashi.

Belgium: M. Segers;

M. Orts.

The Netherlands: Jonkheer R. de Marees van Swinderen;
M. A. Struycken.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

France: M. R. de Saint-Quentin (Chargé of the
Secretariat General).

British Empire: Mr. O. G. Sargent.

Japan: M. Tani.

Subcommission on Military and Naval Questions

President: Captain Le Vavasseur (France).

United States of America: Colonel S. D. Embick.
Captain Capehart.

British Empire:	Captain C. T. M. Fuller; <i>Alternates:</i> Commander P. Macnamara; Lieut. Colonel F. H. Kisch.
France:	Captain Le Vavasseur; Lieut. Colonel Réquin.
Italy:	Captain Ruspoli; Commandant Pergolani.
Japan:	Colonel Nagai.
Belgium:	Lieut. Colonel Gallet; Major van Egroo.
The Netherlands:	Colonel van Tuinen; Captain Surie.

X. Economic Questions of Interest to the Allied and Enemy Countries

SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 10, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Commerce (Hôtel du Ministre)

President: (The Different Members in Succession)

United States of America: Mr. Bernard M. Baruch (Raw Materials);
Mr. Norman H. Davis (Finance);
Mr. Herbert Hoover (Food);
Mr. Vance McCormick (Blockade);
Mr. Edward N. Hurley;
Succeeded temporarily by:
Mr. Henry M. Robinson (Shipping).

British Empire:
(5 members from the
following)

Great Britain: The Rt. Hon. Austen Chamberlain
(Finance);
Alternates:
Mr. J. M. Keynes;
The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Maclay (Ship-
ping);
Alternates:
Sir Thomas Royden;
Mr. G. H. Roberts (Food);
Alternates:
Mr. E. F. Wise;
Sir William Goode;

Mr. Cecil Harmsworth (Blockade);

Alternates:

Sir William Mitchell Thomson;

The Rt. Hon. Sir Albert Stanley;

Alternates:

Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith;

The Rt. Hon. the Lord Inverforth (Commerce and Blockade);

Alternate:

Mr. W. T. Layton.

Dominions and India:

Dominions:

Canada:

The Rt. Hon. Sir George Foster;

Alternates:

The Hon. A. L. Sifton;

The Hon. C. J. Doherty.

Australia:

The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes.

New Zealand:

The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey.

India:

The Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu.

France:

M. Clémentel;

(5 members from the following)

M. L. L. Klotz;

M. Claveille;

M. Loucheur;

M. Noulens;

M. Vilgrain;

M. Seydoux;

M. Celier;

General Payot.

Italy:

M. Maggiorino Ferraris;

M. S. Crespi.

(and 3 members from the following)

Count San Martino di Valprega;

M. S. Orlando;

M. Giuseppe Volpi;

M. B. Nogara.

Belgium:

M. Jaspar;

Alternates:

Baron de Cartier de Marchienne;

M. Lepreux;

Lieut. Colonel Theunis.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America: Captain E. H. Hart.

British Empire:	Mr. E. F. Wise;
	<i>Alternate:</i>
	Major Monfries.
France:	M. J. M. Charpentier.
Italy:	M. F. Nobili Massuero.
Belgium:	Major Bemelmans;
	Baron Capelle.

1. Finance Section

Place of Meeting:	Ministry of Finance at Paris
<i>President:</i>	Mr. Norman H. Davis (United States of America)
United States of America:	Mr. Norman H. Davis;
	<i>or</i>
	Mr. Ellis Loring Dresel.
British Empire:	M. S. D. Waley.
France:	M. Celier.
Italy:	M. G. Manciola.
Belgium:	Lieut. Colonel Theunis;
	M. van den Ven.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: Mr. H. A. Siepmann (British Empire)

2. Raw Materials Section

Place of Meeting:	Ministry of Commerce at Paris
<i>President:</i>	Mr. Bernard M. Baruch (United States of America)
United States of America:	Mr. Bernard M. Baruch;
	Mr. L. L. Summers.
British Empire:	The Rt. Hon. the Lord Robert Cecil;
	Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith.
France:	M. Loucheur;
	M. Clémentel;
	<i>Alternate:</i>
	M. Serruys.
Italy:	M. B. Attolico.
Belgium:	Major Bemelmans.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. Simiand (France)

3. Maritime Transport Section

(Allied Maritime Transport Executive)

President: Mr. J. A. Salter (British Empire);*Succeeded by:*

Mr. Kemball Cook (British Empire).

United States of America Mr. Gordon;

Succeeded by:

Mr. Anderson.

British Empire Mr. J. A. Salter;

Succeeded by:

Mr. Kemball Cook.

France: M. T. Seitert;

Succeeded by:

M. de Lagrange.

Belgium: M. de Kerchove.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: Mr. Guthrie (British Empire)*4. Relief Section**President:* Mr. Herbert Hoover (United States of America)

United States of America Mr. Herbert Hoover;

Colonel J. A. Logan;

Mr. R. A. Taft.

British Empire: Mr. E. F. Wise;

Sir William Goode.

France: M. Seydoux;

Commandant Fillioux.

Italy: M. B. Attolico.

Belgium: Baron de Cartier de Marchienne.

*5. Communications Section*Place of Meeting: Alternately, Ministry of Public Works, Paris,
Board of Trade, London*President:* Brigadier General H. O. Mancé (British Empire)

United States of America: Colonel Atwood.

Brigadier General H. O. Mance;

Alternate:

Colonel G. A. P. Maxwell.

France:	General Gassouin.
Italy:	General Levi.
Belgium:	M. J. Hostie; Baron Capelle.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: Major N. H. Thornton (British Empire)

6. *Permanent Committee*

(Meeting at London: Trafalgar House, Waterloo Place)

United States of America:	(None designated.)
British Empire:	Mr. E. F. Wise.
France:	M. J. Avenol.
Italy:	M. Giannini.
Belgium:	M. de Kerchove.

SECRETARIAT

United States of America:	(None designated.)
British Empire:	Mr. E. Ibbetson James.
France:	M. P. Frederix.
Italy:	M. Bertelli.
Belgium:	M. Herry.

7. *Committee on Statistics*

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Commerce, at Paris, or Board of Trade, at London

United States of America:
British Empire:	Mr. Flux.
France:	M. Serruys.
Italy:	M. Giannini.
Belgium:	M. Bemelmans.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON COAL

(Session of the Supreme Council of Allies of August 5, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Industrial Reconstruction

President: M. Loucheur (France)

United States of America:	Colonel James A. Logan.
British Empire:	Mr. E. F. Wise.
France:	M. Loucheur.
Italy:	M. Giuseppe Volpi;

Alternate:

M. Lazzerini.

Belgium:	M. Jaspar; <i>Alternate:</i> M. Delmer.
Poland:	M. L. Grabski.
Czecho-Slovakia:	M. Stephen Osusky.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America:	Mr. Greer.
British Empire:	Mr. E. Ibbetson James.
France:	M. A. Aron.
Italy:	M. Cortese.
Belgium:	M. Frere.
Poland:	M. H. Tennenbaum.
Czecho-Slovakia:	M. Victor Bráf.

XI. Committees on the Organization of Conferences, Commissions and Organizations Provided for in the Treaty of Peace

1. COMMITTEE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of April 28, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Hotel de Crillon

President: M. S. Pichon (France)

United States of America:	Hon. Edward M. House.
British Empire:	The Rt. Hon. the Lord Robert Cecil.
France:	M. S. Pichon.
Italy:	M. V. Scialoja.
Japan:	Viscount Chinda.
Greece:	M. Eleftherios Veniselos,

Alternates:

M. L. Coromilas;
M. A. Romanos.

Brazil: X.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: M. A. Portier.

2. COMMITTEE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of April 11, 1919)

Place of Meeting: London

President: M. Arthur Fontaine (France)

United States of America:	Mr. J. T. Shotwell.
British Empire:	Sir Malcolm Delevingne.

France:	M. Arthur Fontaine.
Italy:	M. G. E. di Palma Castiglione.
Japan:	M. Oka.
Switzerland:	M. Rappard.

Liaison with the Secretariat General of the Conference: Baron J. Pieyre.

3. COMMITTEE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE REPARATIONS COMMISSION

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of July 2, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Industrial Reconstruction, 136, Avenue
des Champs-Élysées, Telephone Élysées 48-64

President: M. Loucheur (France)

United States of America: Mr. Ellis Loring Dresel.

British Empire: Sir John Bradbury;

Alternates:

Mr. MacFadyean;

Major Monfries.

France: M. Loucheur;

Alternate:

Comptroller General Maucière.

Italy: M. P. Bertolini;

M. M. d'Amelio.

Belgium: Lieut. Colonel Georges Theunis;

Alternate:

Major Arthur Bemelmans.

SECRETARIAT

Rue Pierre-Charron, 59, Telephone Élysées 24-64

Secretaries:

United States of America: Major Tyler;

Captain Morris.

British Empire: Mr. E. Ibbetson James;

Captain Thompson;

Captain Brown.

France: M. A. Aron;

M. J. F. Herbert;

Lieutenant Bergery;

Lieutenant Michau.

Italy: Commander F. Foberti.

Belgium: M. Guttenstein;
Captain Périer;
Lieutenant Denis;
Lieutenant du Roy de Blicquy.

XII. Commissions of Inquiry

1. ISSUES OF LAIBACH

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of March 8, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Laibach

United States of America: General C. G. Treat.
British Empire: Brigadier General H. Gordon.
France: General Savy.
Italy: General Segré.

2. FIUME INCIDENTS

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of July 7, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Fiume

President: Major General Sir H. E. Watts (British Empire)

United States of America: General C. P. Summerall.
British Empire: Major General Sir H. E. Watts.
France: General Naulin.
Italy: General di Robilant.

3. ISSUES OF SMYRNA

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of July 21, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Constantinople

United States of America: Admiral Bristol.
British Empire: General Hart.
France: General Bunoust.
Italy: General Dall' Olio.
Greece: Colonel A. Mazarakis.

THE PRELIMINARY PEACE CONFERENCE:
MINUTES OF THE PLENARY SESSIONS

THE PRELIMINARY PEACE CONFERENCE: MINUTES OF THE PLENARY SESSIONS

Paris Peace Conf 180 0201/1

Preliminary Peace Conference, Protocol No. 1, Session of January 18, 1919

A meeting of the Inter-Allied Conference for the preliminaries of peace having been decided on by the governments of the United States of America and the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, the allied and associated belligerent powers, as well as the powers which have broken diplomatic relations with the enemy powers, were invited to send representatives thereto.

The session is opened under the Presidency of Mr. Raymond Poincaré, President of the French Republic, at 15 o'clock (3 p. m.), in the Peace Rooms at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

PRESENT

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The President of the United States
Honorable Robert Lansing, Secretary of State.

Honorable Henry White, Former
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the United
States at Paris and Rome.

General Tasker H. Bliss, Military
Representative of the United
States on the Supreme War
Council.

FOR THE BRITISH EMPIRE

GREAT BRITAIN

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.,
Prime Minister, First Lord of
the Treasury.

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M.,
M. P., Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs.

The Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law, M. P.,
Lord Privy Seal and Leader of
the House of Commons.

The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes, Minister
without Portfolio.

The Rt. Hon. Sir W. F. Lloyd,
K. C. M. G., Prime Minister of
Newfoundland.

Dominions and India

CANADA

The Rt. Hon. Sir George Eulas Foster,
G. C. M. G., Minister of Trade
and Commerce.

The Hon. Arthur Lewis Sifton, Minister
of Customs and Inland Revenue.

AUSTRALIA

The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes, Prime
Minister.

The Rt. Hon. Sir J. Cook, K. C.
M. G., Minister for the Navy.

SOUTH AFRICA

General the Rt. Hon. Louis Botha,
Prime Minister of the Union of
South Africa.

Lt. General the Rt. Hon. J. C.
Smuts, K. C., Minister of Defense.

INDIA

Major General His Highness Sir
Ganga Singh Bahadur, Maharaja
of Bikaner, G. C. S. I., G. C. I. E.,
G. C. V. O., K. C. B.

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Sinha, K. C.,
Under Secretary of State for
India (Representing the Secretary
of State for India).

FRANCE

Mr. Clemenceau, President of the
Council, Minister of War.

Mr. Pichon, Minister of Foreign
Affairs.

Mr. L. L. Klotz, Minister of Finance.
Mr. André Tardieu, Commissioner-
General for Franco-American War
Affairs.

Mr. Jules Cambon, Former Amba-
sador Extraordinary and Pleni-
potentiary of France.

Mr. Foch, Commander-in-Chief
of the Allied Armies.

ITALY

Baron Sonnino, Minister of Foreign
Affairs.

Viscount Salazar Raggi, Senator of
the Kingdom, former Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipoten-
tiary of His Majesty the King of
Italy at Paris.

JAPAN

Viscount Sute-mi Chinda, Ambassa-
dor Extraordinary and Pleni-
potentiary of His Majesty the Em-
peror of Japan at London.

Mr. K. Matsui, Ambassador Extra-
ordinary and Plenipotenentiary of
His Majesty the Emperor of Ja-
pan at Paris.

BELGIUM

Mr. Hymans, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Minister of State.

Mr. Van den Heuvel, Minister of
State, Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary of His
Majesty the King of the Belgians.

Mr. Rolin-Jaequemyns, Secretary
General of the Belgian Delegation
and its former President.

BOLIVIA

Mr. Ismael Montes, Envoy Extraor-
dinary and Minister Plenipoten-
tiary of Bolivia at Paris.

BRAZIL

Mr. Olyntho de Magalhaes, Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Pleni-
potentiary of the United States of
Brazil at Paris, Former Minister
of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Pandia Calogeras, Deputy, For-
mer Minister of Finance.

CHINA

Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang, Minister of
Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Cheng-tsing Thomas Wang, For-
mer Temporary Minister of Agri-
culture and Commerce.

CUBA

Mr. Rafael Martinez, Envoy Extraor-
dinary and Minister Plenipoten-
tiary of Cuba at Paris (Temporari-
ly representing Mr. Antonio Sanchez
[de la Guardia], President of the
Cuban Society of International
Law, Professor at the University
of Habana).

ECUADOR

Mr. Dorn y de Alsua, Envoy Extraor-
dinary and Minister Plenipoten-
tiary of Ecuador at Paris.

GREECE

Mr. Nicolas Politis, Minister of For-
eign Affairs.

THE HEDJAZ

His Highness the Emir Feisal.
Mr. Rustem Haidar.

PERU

Mr. Francisco Garcia Calderon, En-
voy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of Peru at Brus-
sels.

POLAND

Mr. Roman Dmowski, President of
the Polish National Committee.

PORTUGAL

Dr. Egas Moniz, Deputy, Minister of
Foreign Affairs.

Dr. Alvaro Villela, Professor of In-
ternational Law at the University
of Coimbra.

ROUMANIA

Mr. Jean C. Bratiano, President of
the Council of Ministers, Minister
of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Nicolas Misu, Envoy Extraor-
dinary and Minister Plenipoten-
tiary of His Majesty the King of
Roumania at London.

SERBIA

Mr. Pachitch, President of the Council of Ministers.

Mr. Trumbitch, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Vesnitch, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Serbia at Paris.

SIAM

Prince Charoon, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Siam at Paris.

Mr. Phya Bibadh Kosha, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Siam at Rome.

THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Mr. Edouard Benes, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

URUGUAY

Mr. Juan Carlos Blanco, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Uruguay at Paris.

The PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC (speaking in French) delivers the following speech:

"Gentlemen:—

"France greets and welcomes you, and thanks you for having unanimously chosen, as the seat of your labors, the city which, for over four years, the enemy has made his principal military objective, and which the valor of the Allied armies has victoriously defended against unceasingly renewed offensives.

"Allow me to see in your decision the homage of all the nations that you represent towards a country which, still more than any others, has endured the sufferings of war, of which entire provinces, transformed into vast battlefields, have been systematically wasted by the invader, and which has paid the heaviest tribute to death.

"France has borne these enormous sacrifices without having incurred the slightest responsibility for the frightful cataclysm which has overwhelmed the universe; and, at the moment when this cycle of horror is ending, all the powers whose delegates are assembled here may acquit themselves of any share in the crime which has resulted in so unprecedented a disaster. What gives you authority to establish a peace of justice, is the fact that none of the peoples of whom you are the delegates has had any part in injustice. Humanity can place confidence in you, because you are not among those who have outraged the rights of humanity.

"There is no need of further information or of special inquiries into the origin of the drama which has just shaken the world. The truth, bathed in blood, has already escaped from the Imperial archives. The premeditated character of the trap is today clearly proved. In the hope of conquering, first, the hegemony of Europe, and next the mastery of the world, the Central Empires, bound together by a secret plot found the most abominable pretexts for trying to crush Serbia and force their way to the East. At the same time, they disowned the most solemn undertakings in order to

crush Belgium and force their way into the heart of France. These are the two unforgettable outrages which opened the way to aggression. The combined efforts of Great Britain, France and Russia broke themselves against that mad arrogance.

"If, after long vicissitudes, those who wished to reign by the sword have perished by the sword, they have but themselves to blame. They have been destroyed by their own blindness. What could be more significant than the shameful bargains they attempted to offer to Great Britain and France, at the end of July, 1914, when to Great Britain they suggested: 'Allow us to attack France on land, and we will not enter the channel,' and when they instructed their Ambassador to say to France: 'We will only accept a declaration of neutrality on your part if you surrender to us Briey, Toul and Verdun.' It is in the light of these memories, gentlemen, that all the conclusions which you will have to draw from the war will take shape.

"Your nations entered the war successively but came one and all to the help of threatened right.

"Like Germany, Great Britain and France had guaranteed the independence of Belgium. Germany sought to crush Belgium. Great Britain and France both swore to save her. Thus, from the very beginning of hostilities, came into conflict the two ideas which, for fifty months, were to struggle for the dominion of the world; the idea of sovereign force, which accepts neither control nor check, and the idea of justice, which depends on the sword only to prevent or repress the abuse of strength.

"Faithfully supported by her Dominions and Colonies, Great Britain decided that she could not remain aloof from a struggle in which the fate of every country was involved. She has made, and her Dominions and Colonies have made with her, prodigious efforts to prevent the war from ending in the triumph of the spirit of conquest and the destruction of Right.

"Japan, in her turn, only decided to take up arms out of loyalty to Great Britain, her great Ally, and from the consciousness of the danger in which both Asia and Europe would have stood from the hegemony of which the Germanic Empires had dreamt.

"Italy, who, from the first, had refused to lend a helping hand to German ambition, rose against an age-long foe, only to answer the call of oppressed populations, and to destroy, at the cost of her blood, artificial political combinations, which took no account of human liberty.

"Roumania resolved to fight only to realize that national unity which was opposed by the same powers of arbitrary force. Abandoned, betrayed and deceived, she had to submit to an abominable treaty, the revision of which you will exact.

"Greece, whom the enemy, for many months, tried to turn from her traditions and destinies, raised an army only to escape attempts at domination of which she felt the growing threat.

"Portugal, China and Siam abandoned neutrality only to escape the strangling pressure of the Central Powers. Thus it was the extent of German ambitions that brought so many peoples, great and small, to form a league against the same adversary.

"And what shall I say of the solemn resolution taken by the United States in the Spring of 1917, under the auspices of their illustrious President, Mr. Wilson, whom I am happy to greet here, in the name of faithful France, and, if you will allow me to say so, Gentlemen, in the name of all the nations represented in this room? What shall I say of the many other American Powers which either declared themselves against Germany—Brazil, Cuba, Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Haiti, Honduras,—or at least broke off diplomatic relations—Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Uruguay? From North to South the New World rose with indignation when it saw the Empires of Central Europe, after having let loose the war without provocation and without excuse, carried it on with fire, pillage and the massacre of inoffensive beings.

"The intervention of the United States was something more, something greater than a great political and military event. It was a supreme judgment passed at the bar of history, by the lofty conscience of a free people and their chief, on the enormous responsibilities incurred in the frightful conflict which was lacerating humanity.

"It was not only to protect themselves from the audacious aims of German megalomania that the United States equipped fleets and created immense armies, but also, and above all, to defend an ideal of liberty over which they saw the huge shadow of the Imperial Eagle encroaching further every day.

"America, the daughter of Europe, crossed the ocean to wrest her mother from the humiliation of thralldom and to save civilization.

"The American people wished to put an end to the greatest scandal that has ever sullied the annals of mankind; autocratic governments prepared, in the secrecy of the chancellories and the general staff, a mad programme of universal domination, and, at the moment fixed by their genius for intrigue, let loose their packs and sounded the horns for the chase, ordering science, at the very time when it was beginning to abolish distances, to bring men closer and make life sweeter, to leave the bright sky towards which it was soaring, and to place itself submissively at the service of violence; lowering the religious idea to the extent of making God the complacent auxiliary of their passions and the accomplice of their crimes; in short, counting

as naught the traditions and wills of peoples, the lives of citizens, the honor of women, and all those principles of public and private morality which we, for our part, have endeavored to keep unaltered through the war, and which neither nations nor individuals can repudiate or disregard with impunity.

"While the conflict was gradually extending over the entire surface of the earth, the clanking of chains was heard here and there, and captive nationalities from the depths of their agonizing jails cried out to us for help. Yet more, they escaped to come to our aid. Poland, come to life again, sent us troops. The Czecho-Slovaks won their right to independence in Siberia, in France, and in Italy. The Yugo-Slavs, the Armenians, the Syrians and Lebanese, the Arabs, all the oppressed peoples, all the victims, long helpless or resigned, of great historic deeds of injustice, all martyrs of the past, all the outraged consciences, all the strangled liberties, revived at the clash of our arms and turned towards us as their natural defenders.

"Thus, the war gradually attained the fulness of its first significance, and became, in the truest sense of the term, a crusade of humanity for Right; and, if anything can console us, in part at least, for the losses we have suffered, it is assuredly the thought that our victory is also the victory of Right.

"This victory is complete, for the enemy only asked for the armistice to escape an irretrievable military disaster. In the interest of justice and peace, it now rests with you to reap from this victory its full fruits.

"In order to carry out this immense task, you have decided to admit, at first, only the Allied or Associated Powers, and, in so far as their interests are involved in the debates, the nations which remained neutral. You have thought that the terms of peace ought to be settled among ourselves before they are communicated to those against whom we have together fought the good fight. The solidarity which has united us during the war and has enabled us to win military success ought to remain unimpaired during the negotiations and after the signature of the treaty. It is not only governments, but free peoples, who are represented here. Through the test of danger, they have learnt to know and help one another. They want their intimacy of yesterday to assure the peace of tomorrow. Vainly would our enemies seek to divide us. If they have not yet renounced their customary manoeuvres, they will soon find that they are meeting, today as during the hostilities, a homogenous block which nothing will be able to disintegrate.

"Even before the armistice, you placed that necessary unity under the aegis of the lofty moral and political truths of which President

Wilson has nobly made himself the interpreter, and in the light of these truths you intend to accomplish your mission.

"You will therefore seek nothing but justice, 'justice that has no favorites,' justice in territorial problems, justice in financial problems, justice in economic problems.

"But justice is not inert, it does not submit to injustice. What it first demands, when it has been violated, are restitution and reparation for the peoples and individuals who have been despoiled or maltreated. In formulating this lawful claim, it obeys neither hatred nor an instinctive or thoughtless desire for reprisals; it pursues a two-fold object: to render to each his due and not to encourage crime through leaving it unpunished.

"What justice also demands, inspired by the same feeling, is the punishment of the guilty and effective guarantees against an active return of the spirit by which they were tempted. And it is logical to demand that these guarantees should be given above all to the nations that have been, and might again be, most exposed to aggressions or threats, to those who have many times stood in danger of being submerged by the periodic tide of the same invasions.

"What justice banishes is the dream of conquest and imperialism, contempt for national will, the arbitrary exchange of provinces between States, as though peoples 'were but articles of furniture or pawns in a game.' The time is no more when diplomatists could meet to redraw, with authority, the map of the Empires on the corner of a table. If you are to remake the map of the world, it is in the name of the peoples and on condition that you shall faithfully interpret their thoughts and respect the right of nations, small and great, to dispose of themselves, and to reconcile it with the right, equally sacred, of ethnical and religious minorities—a formidable task, which science and history, your two advisers will contribute to illumine and facilitate.

"You will naturally strive to secure the material and moral means of subsistence for all those peoples who are constituted or reconstituted into States, for those who wish to unite themselves to their neighbors, for those who divide themselves into separate units, for those who reorganize themselves according to their regained traditions, and, lastly, for all those whose freedom you have already sanctioned or are about to sanction; you will not call them into existence only to sentence them to death immediately; you would wish your work, in this and in all other matters, to be fruitful and lasting.

"While thus introducing into the world as much harmony as possible, you will, in conformity with the fourteenth of the propositions unanimously adopted by the Allied Great Powers, establish a Gen-

eral League of Nations which will be a supreme guarantee against any fresh assaults upon the right of peoples.

"You do not intend this International Association to be directed against any nation in future; it will not of set purpose shut out anybody; but, having been organized by the nations that have sacrificed themselves in defense of right, it will receive from them its statutes and fundamental rules; it will lay down conditions to which its present or future adherents will submit, and, as it is to have for its essential aim, to prevent, as far as possible, the renewal of wars, it will, above all, seek to gain respect for the peace which you will have established and will find it the less difficult to maintain in proportion as this peace will in itself imply greater realities of justice and safer guarantees of stability.

"By establishing this new order of things, you will meet the aspirations of humanity, which, after the frightful convulsions of these bloodstained years, ardently wishes to feel itself protected by a union of free peoples against the ever-possible revivals of primitive savagery.

"An immortal glory will attach to the names of the nations and the men who have desired to co-operate in this grand work in faith and brotherhood, and who have taken pains to eliminate from the future peace causes of disturbances and instability.

"This very day, forty-eight years ago, on the 18th of January, 1871, the German Empire was proclaimed by an army of invasion in the Chateau at Versailles. It was consecrated by the theft of two French provinces. It was thus vitiated from its origin and by the fault of its founders. It contained at its birth the germ of decay and of death.

"Born in injustice, it has ended in opprobrium. You are assembled in order to repair the evil that it has done and to prevent a recurrence of it. You hold in your hands the future of the world. I leave you gentlemen, to your grave deliberations and I declare the Conference of Paris open."

An English translation for this speech is read by Mr. Mantoux, officer-interpreter.

The President of the French Republic withdraws after shaking hands with all the Delegates.

MR. CLEMENCEAU, President of the French Council of Ministers, and Minister of War, takes his place in the Presidential chair as temporary President of the Conference. Mr. Clemenceau proposes the nomination of a permanent president.

The PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (speaking in English), proposes the name of M. Clemenceau as President of the Conference, as follows:

"Mr. Chairman: It gives me great pleasure to propose, as permanent Chairman of the Conference, Monsieur Clemenceau, the President of the Council. I would do this as a matter of custom. I would do it as a tribute to the French Republic; but I wish to do it as something more than that. I wish to do it as a tribute to the man, and you will certainly join with me in wishing it. France deserves the precedence, not only because we are meeting in her capital and because she has undergone some of the most tragic sufferings of the war, but also because her capital—her ancient and beautiful capital—has so often been the center of conferences of this sort, upon which the fortunes of large parts of the world turned. It is a very delightful thought that the history of the world, which has so often centered here, will now be crowned by the achievements of this Conference, because there is a sense in which this is the supreme conference in the history of mankind. More nations are represented here than were ever represented at such a conference before; the fortunes of all peoples are involved. A great war is ended which seemed about to bring a universal cataclysm. The danger is past. A victory has been won for mankind and it is delightful that we should be able to record these great results in this place. But it is the more delightful to honor France, because we can honor her in the person of so distinguished a servant. We have all felt in our participation in the struggles of this war the fine steadfastness which characterized the leadership of the French people in the hands of Monsieur Clemenceau. We have learnt to admire him and those of us who have been associated with him have acquired a genuine affection for him. Moreover, those of us who have been in these recent days in constant consultation with him know how warmly his purpose is set towards the goal of achievement to which all our faces are turned. He feels, as we feel, as I have no doubt everybody in this room feels, that we are trusted to do a great thing; to do it in the highest spirit of friendship and accommodation and to do it as promptly as possible in order that the hearts of men may have fear lifted from them and that they may return to those pursuits of life which will bring them this happiness, contentment and prosperity. Knowing his brotherhood of heart in these great matters it affords me a personal pleasure to propose not only that the President of the Council of Ministers, but Monsieur Clemenceau, shall be the permanent Chairman of this Conference."

His words are immediately translated into French.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE (Great Britain), speaking in English, seconds the proposal of the President of the United States, as follows:

"Gentlemen: I count it not merely a pleasure but a great privilege that I should be expected, on behalf of the British Empire Delegates,

to support the motion of President Wilson. I do so for the reasons which he has so eloquently expressed—as a tribute to the man. When I was a schoolboy Monsieur Clemenceau was a compelling and conspicuous figure in the politics of his native land and his fame had extended far beyond the bounds of France. Were it not for that undoubted fact, Mr. President, I should have treated as a legend the common report of your age. I have attended many conferences with Monsieur Clemenceau and in them all the most vigorous, the most untiring and the most youthful figure there has always been that of Monsieur Clemenceau. He has had the hopefulness and the tirelessness of youth. He is indeed the ‘Grand Young Man of France,’ and I am proud to stand here and propose that he should take the chair of this Conference which is to settle the peace of the world. I know none better qualified or as well qualified to occupy this chair as Monsieur Clemenceau. I speak of him from my experience of him in the chair. He and I have not always agreed. We very often agree. We have sometimes disagreed, and we have always expressed our disagreements very emphatically, because we are two Celts. But although there will be delays, and inevitable delays, in the signing of peace, due to the inherent difficulties of what we have to settle, I will guarantee from my knowledge of Monsieur Clemenceau there will be no waste of time, and that is important. The world is thirsting and hungering for peace. There are millions of people who want to get back to the ordinary work of peace, and the fact that Monsieur Clemenceau is in the chair will be a proof that they will get there without any delays which are due to anything except difficulties essential to what we have to transact. He is one of the great speakers of the world, but nobody knows better than he that the best speaking is that which promotes business, and the worst speaking is that which impedes beneficent action. I have another reason. During the dark days we have passed through, his courage—his full courage—his full courage and his inspiration helped the Allies through their trials, and I know no man to whom victory is more attributable than to the man who sits in his chair. In his own person more than any living man he represents the heroism, he represents the genius of the indomitable people of this land, and for these reasons I count it a privilege that I should be expected to second this motion.”

His words are immediately translated into French.

BARON SONNINO (Italy), associates himself with the words just spoken, and expresses himself thus:

“In the name of the Italian Delegation, I cordially associate myself with the proposal of President Wilson, seconded by Mr. Lloyd

George, to nominate Mr. Clemenceau as President of the Peace Conference. In these circumstances I am happy to be able to pay a tribute of sympathy and admiration to France and to the eminent statesman who is at the head of her Government."

The proposal of President Wilson, seconded by Mr. Lloyd George and Baron Sonnino, is put to the vote and unanimously adopted.

Mr. Clemenceau is declared President of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT proposes that the Conference should proceed to the election of Vice Presidents to the number of four, chosen from the Plenipotentiaries of each of the four Great Powers not yet represented in the Bureau, namely (in alphabetical order) : United States of America, the British Empire, Italy and Japan.

This proposal is unanimously accepted.

The PRESIDENT announces that the Japanese Plenipotentiaries have proposed, for their part, Marquis Saionji.

The Conference then proceeds to the nomination of a Secretary General.

The PRESIDENT proposes M. Dutasta, Ambassador of France.

This proposal is also unanimously adopted.

The PRESIDENT then proposes to complete the Secretariat by the nomination of one secretary for each Great Power, with the right of substitution.

This proposal is accepted.

The PRESIDENT adds that it is necessary to proceed to the appointment of a Drafting Committee composed of one representative of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan.

This proposal is accepted.

Finally, the PRESIDENT observes that a Committee on Credentials should be formed to include a Plenipotentiary of each of the five Great Powers.

This proposal is adopted. (Annex 1.)

The PRESIDENT, passing to the order of the day of the Session, delivers (speaking in French), the following speech :

"Gentlemen :—

"You would not understand if, after hearing the words of the eminent statesmen who have just spoken, I kept silence. I cannot avoid the necessity of expressing my lively and deep gratitude for them,—to the illustrious President of the United States, and to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, as well as to Baron Sonnino, for the words which they have spoken.

"Formerly, in my youth, a long time ago, as Mr. Lloyd George has recalled, when I was traveling in America and England, I always

heard the French reproached for allowing an excessive politeness to lead them to go beyond the truth. While listening to the American and English statesmen, I wondered whether, during their stay in Paris, they had not acquired our national vice of flattery.

"Gentlemen, I must nevertheless say that my election is necessarily due to the high international tradition of time honored courtesy towards the country which has the honor of greeting the Peace Conference in its capital. The proof of friendship (they will permit me to use the English word 'friendship' employed by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George) has deeply touched me, because I see in it a new strength for all three of us, which will allow us to carry through, with the help of the whole Conference, the arduous work entrusted to us. I derive from it new confidence in the success of our efforts. President Wilson has special authority for saying that this is the first occasion on which a delegation of all civilized peoples of the world has been seen assembled. The greater the bloody catastrophe which has devastated and ruined one of the richest parts of France, the ampler and more complete should be the reparation,—not only the reparation for acts committed, material reparation, if I may say so, which is due to all of us, but the nobler and higher reparation which we shall try to make, so that the peoples may be able at last to escape from this fatal embrace, which piling up ruin and grief, terrorizes populations and prevents them from devoting themselves freely to their work for fear of enemies who may arise against them at any moment. Ours is a great and noble ambition. We must hope that success will crown our efforts. This can only be if we have clear and well defined ideas. A few days ago I said in the Chamber of Deputies, and I wish to repeat here, that 'success is only possible if we all remain firmly united.' We have come here as friends; we must leave this room as brothers. That is the first thought which I wish to express. Everything must yield to the necessity of a closer and closer union among the peoples who have taken part in this great war. The League of Nations is here. It is in yourselves; it is for you to make it live; and for that it must be in our hearts. As I have said to President Wilson, there must be no sacrifice which we are not ready to accept.

"I doubt not that you are ready for it.

"We shall arrive at this result only if we try impartially to reconcile interests apparently opposite; by looking above them at a greater and happier humanity. That, gentlemen, is what I have to say to you.

"I am touched beyond expression at the mark of confidence and friendship which you are good enough to give me. The programme of this Conference has been laid down by President Wilson; we

have no longer to make peace for territories more or less large; we have no longer to make peace for continents; we have to make it for peoples. This programme is self-sufficing. There is no word to be added to it. Gentlemen, let us try to act quickly and well."

The President lays on the table the rules of the conference, for distribution among the delegates. (Annex 2).

Passing, then, to the last part of the order of the day of the Session, the President announces that the questions contained in it are the following:

- (1) The responsibility of the authors of the war;
- (2) The penalty for the crimes committed during the war;
- (3) International legislation on labor.

The President declares that the Delegates of all powers represented are invited to hand in memoranda on these three questions. He also begs the representatives of the powers who have special interests to deliver to the Secretariat General memoranda on questions of every kind—territorial, financial, or economic—which particularly interest them. This method is somewhat new, but it has not seemed right to impose upon the Conference a particular order of work. To gain time, powers are invited first to make known their claims. All the peoples represented at the Conference can put forward, not only demands which concern themselves, but also demands of a general character. The Delegations are begged to present these memoranda as soon as possible.

On these memoranda a comprehensive work will be compiled for submission to the Conference. The third question, relative to international legislation on labor, can even be treated from the point of view of the organization of labor; it therefore covers a very wide field.

The President draws the attention of the Conference to the urgency of the first question, concerning the responsibility of the authors of the war. It is unnecessary to state the reason for this; if it is wished to establish law in the world, penalties for the breach thereof can be applied at once, since the allied and associated powers are victorious. These penalties will be demanded against the authors of the abominable crimes committed during the war. This first question is, indeed, the subject of a memorandum by Mr. Larnaude, Dean of the Faculty of Law of Paris, and Mr. de Lapradelle, Professor of International Law of the same Faculty, published under the following title: "Examen de la Responsabilité Pénale de l'Empereur Guillaume II." This memorandum will be distributed by the Secretariat-General to all the Delegations.

In England and in America works have also been published on this point.

This program of work having met with general approval, the President informs the Conference that at the head of the order of the day of the next Session stands the question of the League of Nations.

Finally, the President thinks right to add that as the different Delegations are to work in complete agreement, each member of the Conference is invited to present such observations as he may consider necessary. The Bureau will welcome the expression of any opinion which may be manifested and will reply to all questions asked of it.

As nobody wishes to speak, the session is adjourned at 16:35 o'clock (4:35 p. m.).

The President,
G. CLEMENCEAU.

The Secretary General,
P. DUTASTA.

The Secretaries,
J. C. GREW,
M. P. A. HANKEY,
PAUL GAUTHIER,
ALDROVANDI,
SADAO SABURI.

Annex I

Bureau of the Conference

President:

Mr. Georges Clémenceau (France)

Vice Presidents:

Hon. Robert Lansing (United States of America)

The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George (British Empire)

Mr. V. E. Orlando (Italy)

Marquis Saionji (Japan)

Secretary General:

Mr. Dutasta (France)

Secretaries:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mr. Joseph Clark Grew, Minister Plenipotentiary.

Mr. Leland Harrison, Counsellor of Embassy.

Colonel U. S. Grant 3d, General Staff.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the War Cabinet.

Mr. H. Norman, Counsellor of Embassy.

Mr. Eric Phipps, First Secretary of Embassy.

FRANCE

Mr. P. Gauthier, Minister Plenipotentiary.

Mr. de Bearn, Secretary of Embassy.

ITALY

Count Aldrovandi, Minister Plenipotentiary.

Marquis C. Durazzo, Counsellor of Legation.

Mr. G. Brambilla, Counsellor of Legation.

JAPAN

Mr. Sadao Saburi, Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. E. Kimura, First Secretary of Embassy.

Mr. H. Ashida, Secretary of Embassy.

Committee on Credentials:

Hon. Henry White (United States of America)

The Rt. Hon. Arthur Balfour (British Empire)

Mr. Jules Cambon (France)

Marquis Salvago Raggi (Italy)

Mr. K. Matsui (Japan)

Committee on Drafting:

Mr. James Brown Scott.

Mr. Hurst, C. B., K. C., Counsellor of Embassy, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office (British Empire)

Mr. Fromageot, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (France)

Mr. Ricci-Busatti, Minister Plenipotentiary, Chief of the Legal Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Italy)

Mr. H. Nagaoka, Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy at Paris (Japan)

Annex II

Rules of the Conference

I

The Conference summoned with a view to lay down the conditions of peace, in the first place by peace preliminaries and later by a definite Treaty of Peace, shall include the representatives of the Allied or Associated belligerent Powers.

The belligerent Powers with general interests (the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan) shall attend all sessions and commissions.

The belligerent Powers with special interests (Belgium, Brazil, the British Dominions and India, China, Cuba, Greece, Guatemala, Hayti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, Siam, the Czecho-Slovak Republic) shall attend the sessions at which questions concerning them are discussed.

Powers having broken off diplomatic relations with the enemy Powers (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay) shall attend sessions at which questions interesting them will be discussed.

Neutral Powers and States in process of formation shall, on being summoned by the Powers with general interests, be heard, either orally or in writing, at sessions devoted especially to the examination of questions in which they are directly concerned, and only in so far as those questions are concerned.

II

The Powers shall be represented by Plenipotentiary Delegates to the number of:—

Five for the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan;

Three for Belgium, Brazil, Serbia;

Two for China, Greece, the Hedjaz, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Siam, the Czecho-Slovak Republic;

One for Cuba, Guatemala, Hayti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama;

One for Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay.

The British Dominions and India shall be represented as follows:—

Two delegates each for Canada, Australia, South Africa, India (including the native States);

One Delegate for New Zealand.

Each Delegation shall be entitled to set up a panel, but the number of Plenipotentiaries shall not exceed the figures given above.

The representatives of the Dominions (including Newfoundland) and of India can, moreover, be included in the representation of the British Empire by means of the panel system.

Montenegro shall be represented by one Delegate, but the manner of his appointment shall not be decided until the present political situation of that country becomes clear.

The conditions governing the representation of Russia shall be settled by the Conference when Russian affairs come up for discussion.

III

Each Delegation of Plenipotentiaries may be accompanied by duly accredited Technical Delegates and by two shorthand writers.

The Technical Delegates may attend sessions in order to supply information when called upon. They may be asked to speak in order to give necessary explanations.

IV

The order of precedence shall follow the alphabetical order of the Powers in French.

V

The Conference shall be opened by the President of the French Republic. The President of the French Council of Ministers shall thereupon provisionally take the chair.

The credentials of members present shall at once be examined by a Committee composed of one Plenipotentiary for each of the Allied or Associated Powers.

VI

At the first meeting the permanent President and four Vice-Presidents shall be elected from among the Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers in alphabetical order.

VII

A Secretariat chosen outside the ranks of the Plenipotentiaries, consisting of one representative each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, shall be submitted for the approval of the Conference by the President, who shall be in control of and responsible for it.

The Secretariat shall draw up the protocols of the sessions, classify the archives, provide for the administrative organization of the Con-

ference and, generally, ensure the regular and punctual working of the services entrusted to it.

The head of the Secretariat shall be responsible for the safe custody of the protocols and archives.

The archives shall be accessible at all times to members of the Conference.

VIII

Publicity shall be given to the proceedings by means of official communiqués prepared by the Secretariat and made public. In case of disagreement as to the wording of such communiqués, the matter shall be referred to the chief Plenipotentiaries or their representatives.

IX

All documents to be incorporated in the protocols must be supplied in writing by the Plenipotentiaries originally responsible for them.

No document or proposal may be so supplied except by a Plenipotentiary or in his name.

X

With a view to facilitate discussion, any Plenipotentiary wishing to propose a resolution must give the President twenty-four hours' notice thereof, except in the case of proposals connected with the order of the day and arising from the actual discussion.

Exceptions may, however, be made to this rule in the case of amendments or secondary questions which do not constitute actual proposals.

XI

All petitions, memoranda, observations and documents addressed to the Conference by any persons other than the Plenipotentiaries must be received and classified by the Secretariat.

Such of these communications as are of any political interest shall be briefly summarized in a list circulated to all the Plenipotentiaries. Supplementary editions of this list shall be issued as such communications are received.

All these documents shall be deposited in the archives.

XII

All questions to be decided shall be discussed at a first and second reading; the former shall afford occasion for a general discussion for the purpose of arriving at an agreement on points of principle; the second reading shall provide an opportunity of discussing details.

XIII

The Plenipotentiaries shall be entitled, subject to the approval of the Conference, to authorize their Technical Delegates to submit direct any technical explanations considered desirable regarding any particular question.

If the Conference shall think fit, the study of any particular question from the technical point of view may be entrusted to a Committee composed of Technical Delegates, who shall be instructed to present a report and suggest solutions.

XVI

The protocols drawn up by the Secretariat shall be printed and circulated in proof to the Delegates with the least possible delay.

To save time, this circulation of the protocols in advance shall take the place of reading them at the beginning of the sessions. Should no alterations be demanded by the Plenipotentiaries, the text shall be considered as approved and deposited in the archives.

Should any alteration be called for, it shall be read aloud by the President at the beginning of the following session.

The whole of the protocol shall, however, be read if one of the Plenipotentiary members shall so request.

XV

A committee shall be formed to draft the motions adopted.

This Committee shall deal only with questions which have been decided; its sole task shall be to draw up the text of the decisions adopted and to present them to the Conference for approval.

It shall consist of five members who shall not be Plenipotentiary Delegates and shall comprise one representative each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan.

Preliminary Peace Conference, Protocol No. 2, Plenary Session of January 25, 1919

The Session is opened at 15 o'clock (3 p. m.) under the presidency of Mr. Clemenceau, President.

PRESENT

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The President of the United States.
Honorable Robert Lansing.
Honorable Henry White.
Honorable Edward M. House.
General Tasker H. Bliss.

FOR THE BRITISH EMPIRE

GREAT BRITAIN

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes.
The Hon. C. J. Doherty, Minister of
Justice of Canada.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Ward,
Bart., K. C. M. G., Minister of Fi-
nance and Posts of New Zealand.
The Rt. Hon. The Lord Robert Cecil,
K. C., M. P., Technical Delegate
for the League of Nations.

Dominions and India

CANADA

The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden,
G. C. M. G., K. C., Prime Minister.
The Rt. Hon. Sir George Eulas
Foster.

AUSTRALIA

The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Cook.

SOUTH AFRICA

General The Rt. Hon. Louis Botha.
Lieut.-General The Rt. Hon. J. C.
Smuts.

NEW ZEALAND

The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey, Prime
Minister.

INDIA

The Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu, M. P.,
Secretary of State for India.
Major-General His Highness The
Maharaja of Bikaner.

FOR FRANCE

Mr. Clemenceau.
Mr. Pichon.
Mr. L. L. Klotz.
Mr. André Tardieu.
Mr. Jules Cambon.
Mr. Léon Bourgeois, Former Presi-
dent of the Council of Ministers,
Former Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, Technical Delegate for the
League of Nations.
Marshal Foch.

FOR ITALY

Mr. V. E. Orlando, President of the
Council of Ministers.
The Baron S. Sonnino.
The Marquis Salvago Raggi.
Mr. Antonio Salandra, Deputy,
former President of the Council
of Ministers.
Mr. Salvatore Barzilai, C. B., Dep-
uty, former Minister.
Mr. Scialoja, Senator of the King-
dom. Technical Delegate for the
League of Nations.

FOR JAPAN

The Baron Makino, Former Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, Member
of the Diplomatic Advisory Coun-
cil.
The Viscount Chinda.
Mr. K. Matsui.
Mr. H. Ijuin, Ambassador Extra-
ordinary and Plenipotentiary of
His Majesty The Emperor of
Japan at Rome.

FOR BELGIUM

Mr. Hymans.
 Mr. Van den Heuvel.
 Mr. Vandervelde, Minister of Jus-
 tice, Minister of State.

FOR BOLIVIA

Mr. Ismael Montes.

FOR BRAZIL

Mr. Olyntho de Magalhaes
 Mr. Pandia Calogeras.

FOR CHINA

Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang.
 Mr. Cheng-tung Thomas Wang

FOR CUBA

Mr. Rafael Martinez Ortiz

FOR ECUADOR

Mr. Dorn y de Alsua.

FOR GREECE

Mr. Eleftherios Veniselos, President
 of the Council of Ministers.
 Mr. Nicolas Politis.

FOR THE HEDJAZ

His Highness The Emir Feisal.
 Mr. Rustem Haidar.

FOR PERU

Mr. Francisco Garcia Calderon.

FOR POLAND

Mr. Roman Dmowski.

FOR PORTUGAL

The Count Penha Garcia, Former
 President of the Chamber of Deputies,
 Former Minister of Finance
 Mr. Jayme Batalha Reis, Envoy Extra-
 ordinary and Minister Plenipo-
 tentiary of Portugal at Petrograd.

FOR ROUMANIA

Mr. Jean J C Bratiano.
 Mr. Nicolas Misu

FOR SERBIA

Mr. Pachitch.
 Mr. Trumbitch.
 Mr. Vesnitch.

FOR SIAM

The Prince Charoon.
 Phya Bibadh Kosha.

FOR THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Mr. Charles Kramar, President of
 the Council of Ministers
 Mr. Edouard Benes.

FOR URUGUAY

Mr. Juan Carlos Blanco.

The PRESIDENT informs the Conference that, at the request of the Delegation of the United States, the approval of the Protocol of the first Session is postponed to the next Session, as that Delegation has not yet received the English text of Protocol No. 1 which it reserves the right to present to the Conference.

The order of the day calls for the appointment of five Commissions charged with the duty of examining the following questions:—

1. League of Nations.
2. Responsibility of the authors of the War and enforcement of penalties.
3. Reparation for damage.
4. International Legislation on Labor.
5. International Control of Ports, Waterways and Railways.

The first Commission to be nominated concerns the League of Nations, upon which subject the Bureau presents a draft resolution (Annex I) which has been distributed in English and French to all the members of the Conference.

The discussion is opened on the question of the League of Nations. The PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES delivers the following speech:

"I consider it a distinguished privilege to open the discussion in this Conference on the League of Nations. We have assembled for two purposes—to make the present settlements which have been rendered necessary by this War, and also to secure the Peace of the world not only by the present settlements but by the arrangements we shall make in this Conference for its maintenance. The League of Nations seems to me to be necessary for both of these purposes. There are many complicated questions connected with the present settlements which, perhaps, cannot be successfully worked out to an ultimate issue by the decisions we shall arrive at here. I can easily conceive that many of these settlements will need subsequent reconsideration; that many of the decisions we shall make will need subsequent alteration in some degree, for if I may judge by my own study of some of these questions they are not susceptible of confident judgments at present.

"It is, therefore, necessary that we should set up some machinery by which the work of this Conference should be rendered complete. We have assembled here for the purpose of doing very much more than making the present settlement. We are assembled under very peculiar conditions of world opinion. I may say without straining the point that we are not representatives of Governments, but representatives of peoples. It will not suffice to satisfy Governmental circles anywhere. It is necessary that we should satisfy the opinion of mankind. The burdens of this War have fallen in an unusual degree upon the whole population of the countries involved. I do not need to draw for you the picture of how the burden has been thrown back from the front upon the older men, upon the women, upon the children, upon the homes of the civilized world, and how the real strain of the War has come where the eye of Government could not reach, but where the heart of humanity beats. We are bidden by these people to make a peace which will make them secure. We are bidden by these people to see to it that this strain does not come upon them again, and I venture to say that it has been possible for them to bear this strain because they hope that those who represented them could get together after this war, and make such another sacrifice unnecessary.

"It is a solemn obligation on our part, therefore, to make permanent arrangements that justice shall be rendered and peace maintained. This is the central object of our meeting. Settlements may be temporary, but the actions of the nations in the interests of peace and justice must be permanent. We can set up permanent processes.

We may not be able to set up permanent decisions, and therefore, it seems to me that we must take, so far as we can, a picture of the world into our minds. Is it not a startling circumstance for one thing that the great discoveries of science, that the quiet study of men in laboratories, that the thoughtful developments which have taken place in quiet lecture-rooms, have now been turned to the destruction of civilization? The powers of destruction have not so much multiplied as gained facility. The enemy whom we have just overcome had at its seats of learning some of the principal centres of scientific study and discovery, and used them in order to make destruction sudden and complete; and only the watchful, continuous co-operation of men can see to it that science, as well as armed men, is kept within the harness of civilization.

"In a sense, the United States is less interested in this subject than the other nations here assembled. With her great territory and her extensive sea borders, it is less likely that the United States should suffer from the attack of enemies than that many of the other nations here should suffer; and the ardor of the United States,—for it is a very deep and genuine ardor—for the Society of Nations is not an ardor springing out of fear and apprehension, but an ardor springing out of the ideals which have come to consciousness in the War. In coming into this war the United States never thought for a moment that she was intervening in the politics of Europe, or the politics of Asia, or the politics of any part of the world. Her thought was that all the world had now become conscious that there was a single cause which turned upon the issues of this war. That was the cause of justice and liberty for men of every kind and place. Therefore, the United States would feel that her part in this war had been played in vain if there ensued upon it merely a body of European settlements. She would feel that she could not take part in guaranteeing those European settlements unless that guarantee involved the continuous superintendence of the peace of the world by the Associated Nations of the World.

"Therefore, it seems to me that we must concert our best judgment in order to make this League of Nations a vital thing—not merely a formal thing, not an occasional thing, not a thing sometimes called into life to meet an exigency, but always functioning in watchful attendance upon the interests of the Nations, and that its continuity should be a vital continuity; that it should have functions that are continuing functions and that do not permit an intermission of its watchfulness and of its labor; that it should be the eye of the Nation to keep watch upon the common interest, an eye that does not slumber, an eye that is everywhere watchful and attentive.

"And if we do not make it vital, what shall we do? We shall disappoint the expectations of the peoples. This is what their thought centres upon. I have had the very delightful experience of visiting several nations since I came to this side of the water, and every time the voice of the body of the people reached me through any representative, at the front of its plea stood the hope for the League of Nations. Gentlemen, select classes of mankind are no longer the governors of mankind. The fortunes of mankind are now in the hands of the plain peoples of the whole world. Satisfy them, and you have justified their confidence not only, but established peace. Fail to satisfy them, and no arrangement that you can make would either set up or steady the peace of the world.

"You can imagine, Gentlemen, I dare say, the sentiments and the purpose with which representatives of the United States support this great project for a League of Nations. We regard it as the keystone of the whole program which expressed our purpose and our ideal in this war and which the Associated Nations have accepted as the basis of the settlement. If we return to the United States without having made every effort in our power to realise this program, we should return to meet the merited scorn of our fellow-citizens. For they are a body that constitutes a great democracy. They expect their leaders to speak their thoughts and no private purpose of their own. They expect their representatives to be their servants. We have no choice but to obey their mandate. But it is with the greatest enthusiasm and pleasure that we accept that mandate; and because this is the keystone of the whole fabric, we have pledged our every purpose to it, as we have to every item of the fabric. We would not dare abate a single part of the program which constitutes our instructions. We would not dare compromise upon any matter as the champion of this thing—this peace of the world, this attitude of justice, this principle that we are masters of no people but are here to see that every people in the world shall choose its own master and govern its own destinies, not as we wish but as it wishes. We are here to see, in short, that the very foundations of this war are swept away. Those foundations were the private choice of small coteries of civil rulers and military staffs. Those foundations were the aggression of great Powers upon small. Those foundations were the holding together of Empires of unwilling subjects by the duress of arms. Those foundations were the power of small bodies of men to work their will upon mankind and use them as pawns in a game. And nothing less than the emancipation of the world from these things will accomplish peace. You can see that the Representatives of the United States are, therefore, never put to the embarrassment of choosing a way of expediency, because they have laid down for them their unalterable

lines of principle. And, thank God, those lines have been accepted as the lines of settlement by all the high-minded men who have had to do with the beginnings of this great business.

"I hope, Mr. Chairman, that when it is known, as I feel confident that it will be known, that we have adopted the principle of the League of Nations and mean to work out that principle in effective action, we shall by that single thing have lifted a great part of the load of anxiety from the hearts of men everywhere. We stand in a peculiar case. As I go about the streets here I see everywhere the American uniform. Those men came into the War after we had uttered our purposes. They came as crusaders, not merely to win the war, but to win a cause; and I am responsible to them, for it fell to me to formulate the purposes for which I asked them to fight, and I, like them, must be a crusader for these things, whatever it costs and whatever it may be necessary to do, in honor, to accomplish the objects for which they fought. I have been glad to find from day to day that there is no question of our standing alone in this matter, for there are champions of this cause upon every hand. I am merely avowing this in order that you may understand why, perhaps, it fell to us, who are disengaged from the politics of this great Continent and of the Orient, to suggest that this was the keystone of the arch and why it occurs to the generous mind of our President to call upon me to open this debate. It is not because we alone represent this idea, but because it is our privilege to associate ourselves with you in representing it.

"I have only tried in what I have said to give you the fountains of the enthusiasm which is within us for this thing, for those fountains spring, it seems to me, from all the ancient wrongs and sympathies of mankind, and the very pulse of the world seems to beat."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE (Great Britain) delivers the following speech:

"I arise to second this resolution. After the noble speech of the President of the United States I feel that no observations are needed in order to commend this resolution to the Conference, and I should not have intervened at all had it not been that I wished to state how emphatically the people of the British Empire are behind this proposal. And if the National leaders have not been able during the last five years to devote as much time as they would like to its advocacy, it is because their time and their energies have been absorbed in the exigencies of a terrible struggle.

"Had I the slightest doubt in my own mind as to the wisdom of this scheme it would have vanished before the irresistible appeal made to me by the spectacle I witnessed last Sunday. I visited a region which but a few years ago was one of the fairest in an excep-

tionally fair land. I found it a ruin and a desolation. I drove for hours through a country which did not appear like the habitation of living men and women and children, but like the excavation of a buried province—shattered, torn, rent. I went to one city where I witnessed a scene of devastation that no indemnity can ever repair—one of the beautiful things of the world, disfigured and defaced beyond repair. And one of the cruellest features, to my mind, was what I could see had happened,—that Frenchmen, who love their land almost beyond any nation, in order to establish the justice of their cause, had to assist a cruel enemy in demolishing their own homes, and I felt: these are the results—only part of the results. Had I been there months ago I would have witnessed something that I dare not describe. But I saw acres of graves of the fallen. And these were the results of the only method, the only organized method,—the only organized method that civilized nations have ever attempted or established to settle disputes amongst each other. And my feeling was: surely it is time, surely it is time that a saner plan for settling disputes between peoples should be established than this organized savagery.

"I do not know whether this will succeed. But if we attempt it the attempt will be a success, and for that reason I second the proposal."

MR. ORLANDO (Italy), having asked leave to speak, delivered the speech of which the following is a translation:

"Allow me to express my warmest adhesion to the great principle which we are called upon to proclaim today. I think that we are thus accomplishing the first and the most solemn of the pledges which we gave to our people when we asked them to make immense efforts in this immense war; pledges of which the counterpart was death, nameless sacrifices and boundless grief. We are, therefore . . . our duty in honoring this sacred pledge. That is much, but it is not all. We must bring to the task a spontaneous spirit and, if I may be allowed the mystic expression, purity of intention. It is not in any spirit of petty national vanity that I allow myself to recall the great juridical traditions of my people and its aptitude for law. I only do so the better to prove to you that the mind of the Italian people is well fitted to accept this principle spontaneously and wholly. Now, law is not only the defense of order, founded on justice, against all violence, it is also the necessary outward form, guaranteed by the State, of that essential principle which forms the very foundation of the existence of human society, that is to say, the principle of social co-operation. I think then that the formula

proposed to us offers not only guarantees against war, but also that co-operation among nations which is the true essence of right.

"Mr. President, Gentlemen, today is a great moment, a great historical date, because it is only from today that the law of peoples begins and is born, and the fact that this birth has taken place in the generous and glorious land of France, which has proclaimed and won acceptance for the rights of man by its genius and its blood appears to me to be a happy omen. *Quod bonum felix faustumque sit.*"

MR. LÉON BOURGEOIS (France) speaks in French in these terms:

"I am deeply grateful to the President of the French Council of Ministers for having done me the distinguished honor of entrusting to me the task of speaking in the name of France. Recollections of the Conference of the Hague have probably led him to this choice; the honor therefore belongs to the very numerous colleagues present here with whom I collaborated in 1899 and 1907.

"President Wilson has just eloquently and finally said that we do not, that you, Gentlemen, do not represent Governments alone, but peoples. What do the peoples wish today and what, therefore, do the Governments wish who are really free, really representative, really democratic, that is to say, those whose wishes are necessarily in agreement with those of their peoples? They wish that what we have seen during these four horrible years shall never be repeated in this world. Their wishes are the wishes of all the victims of this war, of all those who have breathed their last for liberty and for right. Those men fought not only to defend their country, but came together from all parts of the world for this crusade of which President Wilson so rightly spoke, and they knew that they died not only for France but for universal freedom and universal peace. For universal peace: the Premier of England has just described with striking eloquence the picture of ruin and desolation which he has seen. That ruin, that desolation we ourselves have witnessed and you have seen them very far from the spot where hostilities began. For in fact, henceforth, no local conflict can be confined to some one part of the world; whatever may be the State where the difficulty arose, believe me, it is the whole world that is in danger. There is such an interdependence in all the relations between nations in the economic, financial, moral and intellectual spheres that, I repeat, every wound inflicted at some point threatens to poison the whole organs.

"There is another reason why it is impossible that Humanity should again witness such spectacles. President Wilson has just alluded to the alarming progress of science, turned from its proper object, which

is continually to give to mankind greater well-being, a surer moral, more hope for the future, and which was used for the most terrible and miserable of purposes, the purpose of destruction. Now science daily makes fresh progress and fresh conquest; daily it perfects its means of action and in the light of what we have seen during these last five years in the way of terrible and destructive improvements in machinery and gunnery, think of the fresh destruction with which we might be threatened in a few years.

"We have then the duty of facing a problem of conscience which thrills us all, that is what we are to do to reconcile the special interests of our peoples, which we cannot forget, with those of our common country, all Humanity.

"We must take counsel with ourselves and ponder that saying which I deem as a sublime truth, that among all the vital interests which we can consider, there is one which is above, and includes all others, one without the defence and protection of which all the others are in danger—the interest of the common country.

"~~Speaking~~ of tragedy of conscience, I remember the scruples which, at the Conference of the Hague, held back the Representatives of even the freest peoples, the peoples most imbued with the sense of democracy and most resolved to prepare the way of peace. They said to themselves: 'We must nevertheless reserve questions of our honor and our vital interests'. Perhaps it was this which delayed the creation of that bond which will unite us from to-day. We know now that there is one vital interest which we have before all to consider and defend. That is the interest of universal peace founded on Right, without which none of the most vital interests of our several countries, great or small, would be free from menace and destruction.

"How can we succeed in making a reality of that which but a few years ago was still thought to be a dream? How is it that this dream now appears as an imminent fact in the mind of the statesmen present here, realists whose right and duty it is not to let themselves be carried away by ideals of generosity, however attractive they may be? Why is it that to-day these statesmen are sitting round this table inspired with a common thought? For doubtless you will presently adopt unanimously the proposals which will be made to you. How is it that these statesmen, these realists, can come to consider as a tangible thing realisable in a short time, that which formerly appeared a dream? Looking back at the history of the last thirty years, particularly to that Conference at the Hague, for reverting to which I beg your pardon, we see that if it did not produce all the results expected from it, it nevertheless produced a certain number. Members of the different Governments will remember that the institutions set up by the Hague Conference thrice proved defective [*ef-*

fective] and that in differences—I will not use a stronger term—which might have disturbed the relation between the different States, the judgments of the Hague succeeded in smoothing away difficulties and re-establishing harmony. I may even recall that between France and Germany there was a conflict—the Affair of Casablanca—which might have been very serious and not for those two countries alone, for,—as I was saying, local conflicts sometimes become general,—where recourse to arbitration completely safeguarded the honor of France and made it possible for Germany not to draw the sword.

“Why is it that this could not last, or rather, why is it that the institutions of the Hague failed to prevent the terrible conflicts from which we are just emerging? There are two reasons and within the next few days you will sweep away one of them. The Conferences at the Hague were attended by the Representatives of many States, but even those who were inspired by real good will were forced to recognize that on the map of the world the frontiers of different countries were not what they should have been. While we were deliberating there, we Frenchmen could not forget that there was a part of France which was not free and you, Representatives of the Kingdom of Italy, could not forget that there were still Italian Provinces outside Italian law. How could you expect an international organization, however perfect, to prove really effective if, when it began to work, it met this terrible question of irredentism as our Italian friends call it, national claims, as we say, just as one’s foot meets an obstacle on the road?

“You will bring about the situation in which the facts conform to the principles of Right. You will draw frontiers which correspond to the wishes of the peoples themselves, and you will give to each country the limits which Right itself would give it. You will also impose obligations which it was beyond our power to impose, for, as you will remember,—it was historically a very significant fact—how the different states grouped themselves, and we have now seen those who voted against us then join against us on the field of battle. The foes of Right were already leagued together against us.

“You who have fought for Right are about to set up an organization, to impose penalties and to insure their enforcement. Having established compulsory arbitration, having fixed—methodically, progressively and surely—the penalties to be imposed for disobedience to the common will of civilized nations you will be able to make your work solid and lasting and enter with confidence and tranquility the Temple of Peace.

“This is not the moment to discuss ways and means, but I hasten to say, in the name of the Government of the French Republic, that to do all that can be done to lead the free peoples as far as possible on

the road to agreement must be our aim and wish. In addition to juridical methods designed to establish the reign of Right and to ensure the freedom of all, we shall certainly adopt—and here I turn toward the Italian Prime Minister who just said: ‘It is co-operation in the work of peace’—all the measures required for co-operation between States in relation to those numberless interests the interdependence of which I mentioned just now. This interdependence becomes daily closer. It will not only be a question of checking nascent conflicts but of preventing their birth.

“I think that, even without any further statement, I have thus correctly interpreted the general feeling. It is enough for me to have shown with what deep enthusiasm France joins those who but lately proposed the creation of the League of Nations. President Wilson said that this question was at the very heart of mankind. That is true. He said we must constantly have an eye open on humanity, a watchful eye that never shuts. Well, I will end by recalling another memory of the Hague. It has been said that we heard there the first heart-beats of Humanity. Now it lives indeed. Thanks to you. May it live for ever!”

MR. HUGHES (Australia) having asked whether it will be possible to discuss the scheme when it is complete, the President replied that the members of the Conference would be quite at liberty to do so.

The President calls successively on the Delegates of various Powers who, speaking in French, support the draft resolution in these terms:

MR. LOU (China): In the name of the Chinese Government I have the honor to support whole-heartedly the proposed resolution. China, always faithful to her obligations and deeply interested in the maintenance of the Peace of the World, associates herself entirely with the lofty ideal embodied in the resolution, which is that of creating an international cooperation which would insure the accomplishment of obligations contracted and will give safeguards against war. I am glad to give an assurance to this Conference that the Chinese Republic will always have the keenest desire to consult with the other States in the establishment of a League which will give all nations, both small and great, an effective guarantee of their territorial integrity, of their political sovereignty, and of their economic independence founded upon an impartial justice.

MR. DMOWSKI (Poland): I rise not only to support the draft resolution but to express deep gratitude for this noble initiative. I do so not only as representing a part of mankind which has suffered no less than those who have suffered most and which cherishes the hope that such sufferings will never be repeated and that what this war

has not destroyed will be preserved for the peaceful generations of the future.

I do so also as representing a country placed in that part of the world where sources of danger to future peace are greater than elsewhere, where today after the conclusion of the armistice, war continues, as representing the country which at this moment is exposed on three sides to danger and is forced to make war on three fronts. If we have [*had*] an institution like that which is proposed today, such as would give international guarantees of peace, we should not be in this dangerous situation.

I express my gratitude in the name of a country which, perhaps more than all others, needs international guarantees of peace and which will greet a League of Nations with the greatest enthusiasm.

MR. HYMANS (Belgium): Gentlemen, I have not asked leave to speak in order to discuss the ideas expressed in the draft resolution, which the Belgian Delegation of course accepts whole-heartedly, and which have been so nobly set forth in this Assembly. I have asked to speak only on a practical question which is, I think, of general interest.

The Conference to-day is organizing its methods of work and procedure. I should like to ask for an explanation of the last sentence of the draft resolution relative to the representation of the Powers on the Commission appointed to examine the draft constitution of the League of Nations. The draft says that the Conference appoints a Commission representing the Associated Governments to work out the constitution in detail and to settle the functions of the League.

The PRESIDENT replies to Mr. Hymans that the explanation which he is about to furnish will doubtless give him satisfaction.

As nobody asks leave to speak on the subject of a resolution of the League of Nations, which has been submitted to the Conference by the Bureau, that resolution is unanimously adopted.

The PRESIDENT then replies to the question raised by the Hon. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, on the method of appointment of the Commission charged with the duty of working out the draft constitution of the League of Nations:

The Great Powers, in accordance with the motion, have designated two delegates each to serve on the Commission. It has been decided that five delegates to be chosen in common by the other Powers should represent those Powers on the Commission. That is to say that you are asked to meet here say, on January 27th, if that day suits you, at 2 or 3 o'clock, to come to an agreement among yourselves and appoint the 5 delegates of the other powers.

I ought to tell you that we shall ask you to agree to the same course as regards the appointment of other commissions. You will therefore have several elections to hold at the same time.

On this question of the appointment of the commission, the delegates of a certain number of Powers ask leave to speak and explain in turn the views of their respective countries: (All speak in French except Sir Robert Borden (Canada) and M. Phya Bibadh Kosha (Siam)).

MR. HYMANS (Belgium): The reply which the Hon. President has been so good as to make to me raises the question of the constitution of all the conditions [*commissions*] which will be appointed to-day. That will allow me, I think, to define my views on the whole question, which I will do very quickly.

Excepting the case of the Commission appointed to examine the question of reparation for the damage of the war, the general system, according to the President, is to give two delegates to each of the great Powers, which allows them 10 delegates, and five delegates in all to a group or collection formed of 19 Powers who have been classed among the Powers ingeniously termed "Powers with special interests."

I do not wish to speak in the name of the Delegates of other countries, but I will speak only in that of my own and in that of the Belgian Delegation.

As an exceptional measure we, like Serbia, Greece, Poland and Roumania, have been given 2 delegates—2 to each of these Powers that [*sic*] on the Commission appointed to examine the question of reparation for the damage of the war. Apart from this Commission, the 19 Powers "With special interests" have to appoint in common by a system hitherto unexplained, which they will have to discover, 5 delegates. It is not stated whether this will be done by proportional representation or otherwise.

We Belgians will beg leave to present to the Conference the following request:

First, as regards the Commission to examine the constitution of the League of Nations and next, the Commission appointed to examine international legislation on labor. We should wish the Conference to be so good as to grant to Belgium 2 delegates on each of these 2 Commissions.

As regards the Commission for the establishment of the League of Nations, we think that we have a right to this on account of our international, political and even geographic position, which has exposed us, and may again expose us in the future to serious danger.

As regards the question of international labor legislation there is nothing that could interest us more. Belgium, small in extent, counts among the great commercial producing and industrial powers of the world—she counted among them and I hope she will again count among them in a short time, after her reconstruction.

I will not tire the Conference by quoting figures, but we are in that respect among the 5 or 6 foremost Powers; we have a large industrial population. In certain departments we are among the very first. I will mention only the coal and zinc industries and the production and casting of iron. I will not labor the points.

I think it would be just to give to Belgium a double representation on the 2 Commissions I have mentioned, that is, two delegates.

There remain 3 Commissions: One dealing with the control of ports and ways of communication, another which will deal with crimes committed during the war and with the penalty to be inflicted for those crimes and the third dealing with reparation. But in this last named Commission we think we are fairly well represented. There remain therefore only two: that on ports, waterways and railways and that on crimes committed during the war and the penalties which those crimes deserve.

I ask that it should at once be recognized that Belgium shall have a delegate on each of these two Commissions and in doing so I do not think that I am asking more than is reasonable. Belgium possesses one of the three most important ports on the European Continent. She has a network of railways which is the densest in Europe. Owing to the needs of her production and trades she is directly interested in the whole system of international communications. It is certainly not exaggerated to ask that for the examination of so grave a problem Belgium should have a Delegate, and I ask the Conference to decide in this sense.

As regards the question of crimes committed during the war and the penalties to be exacted for them, who could deny that we have an absolute right to be represented on the Commission, when our country was the first to be invaded, the first to be submerged by invasion, when her neutrality was violated in spite of the treaty signed by the enemy, and when some of the most abominable crimes with which the enemy can be reproached were committed on our soil as also on Serbian soil? I think then there is nothing excessive in our demand.

I speak only for ourselves. I do not wish to prejudice the rights and interests of any other country. I do not think I shall arouse their susceptibilities when I state this claim in the name of the Belgian Delegation alone.

To sum up, I ask that, as in the case of the Commission on damage caused during the war, Belgium should have two delegates on the Commission for the establishment of the League of Nations, two delegates on the Commission on international labor legislation, one delegate on the Commission relative to the control of ports, and one delegate on the Commission for the examination of crimes committed by the enemy and of the penalties to be exacted for them.

I appeal to the sense of justice of the Great Powers and to that of the President of the Conference.

MR. CALOGERAS (Brazil): It is with some surprise that I constantly hear it said: "This has been decided, that has been decided." Who has taken a decision? We are a sovereign assembly, a sovereign court. It seems to me that the proper body to take a decision is the Conference itself.

Now, it appears from what has been said that functions have been allotted and that representation on the Commissions is contemplated without certain very important interests having been able to obtain a hearing. It is unnecessary to say that I cordially adhere to the principle of a League of Nations. I have the honor to represent a country which in its constitution absolutely forbids, in express terms, the waging of a war of conquest. This is an idea of long standing with us, firmly rooted in our traditions. I am therefore heartily in favor of the idea of a League of Nations.

But if, on the other hand, I consider the proposed organization of the conditions and the manner in which the interests of my country may be represented thereon, I must point out that we have laws, I may even say texts, of a constitutional character, which do not permit us to give to anybody powers to represent us.

I therefore appeal to the sense of justice of the President and of the members of the Bureau of this Conference. I ask them that, at least on the Commission which will deal with the League of Nations as well as on those which are to examine international control of railways and ports and reparation for damage, Brazil should enjoy the representation to which she considers herself entitled.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN (Canada): I have a great deal of sympathy with the point of view of the smaller nations, because possibly the constitution of the League affects them even more closely than it affects the status of the Great Powers of the world. On the other hand, I realize that there must be a reasonable limitation of the membership of the Committee; otherwise, it would be very difficult to carry on the work in an effective way. And I remember, also, that after this Committee has made its report, its conclusions must be submitted to this Conference, and must be approved by it before they can go into effect, but I do feel that the matter has been placed before this Conference in perhaps not the most appropriate way. We are told that certain decisions have been reached. The result of that is that everyone of us asks: "By whom have those decisions been reached, and by what authority?"

I should have thought it more appropriate to submit a recommendation to this Conference, and to have the Conference itself settle the number to be appointed and who they are to be. If that course

had been taken, it seems probable that most of the difficulty which had arisen would not have presented itself. And I should like to suggest, with all due respect, that perhaps that would be a more appropriate method of dealing with such matters in the future. Certain regulations have been formulated and passed by which, as I understand, two Conferences were established—one a Conference of the 5 Great Powers, and another which may be called the full or plenary Conference. I do not understand that, up to the present time, there has been any Conference of the five great Powers in accordance with the regulations thus adopted. It may be that there has and I have no doubt that there is, and with the best intention; but nevertheless, as we are acting under regulations adopted by the representatives of the 5 Great Powers, it seems highly desirable that we should abide by them. Therefore, I again suggest, with all respect, that the proceedings in the future should be guided by those regulations.

M. TRUMBITCH (Serbia): I have the honor to declare, in the name of the Delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, that we support the entirely just proposal of my honorable friend Mr. Hymans. At the same time, I have the honor to ask that the same representation may be given to the delegation to which I belong as to the Belgian delegation.

It is not necessary for me long to retain the attention of this high assembly to justify the desire which I have expressed, for the reasons just now put forward by M. Hymans are almost the same as those which justify our proposal.

M. VENISELOS (Greece): As regards the League of Nations, I associate myself with the request put forward by the Belgian Delegation, without, however, asking that Greece should receive the same treatment. I recognize that all small countries are deeply interested in the study of this question, but I must admit also that the situation of Belgium is entirely a special one by reason of her proximity to the German Empire, which started this War, and for the other reasons given by Mr. Hymans.

I therefore do not ask that my country should be specially represented on this Commission, and confine myself to declaring that I hold myself at the disposal of the Commission when it is appointed in order to make known my ideas on the subject.

As regards reparation for damage, I must thank the representatives of the Great Powers for the representation which they have granted to my country.

As regards the responsibility of the authors of the war, I ask that Greece may also be given a representative, in view of the fact that we have to deplore the loss of between three and four hundred-

thousand people of Greek race in the Ottoman Empire. It would, therefore, appear to be just that we should be represented in order that we may be able to submit to the Commission and then to the Conference our special point of view on this question.

I do not ask that my country should be specially represented on the Commission relating to international legislation on labor, for other nations are perhaps more interested than ourselves in this question.

It would be well, finally, that we should be granted a representative on the Commission for the international control of ports, not only on account of the maritime importance of my country, and of the special interest which it has in this question, but also because of the fact that even in the present territory of Greece there are certain places which might come within the purview of this part of the program of the Conference. It would, therefore, be just that Greece should in this respect be authorized to make known her wishes.

I think it right to remind the assembly in conclusion that in the report that I have the honor to submit to the Conference concerning the territorial claims of my country, I declared myself ready to agree that countries bordering on the sea should give all possible facilities to countries placed behind them which have not such easy access to the sea.

COUNT PENHA GARCIA (Portugal) : You will allow me to make some observations on a question which interests small and great Powers alike. First, I draw your attention to an essential fact which is more-over the corollary of all the noble speeches which this assembly has just heard.

It is certain that the League of Nations, a question of such great importance raised by the Great Powers and interesting the weaker countries in so high a degree, must inspire confidence as regards the future, particularly among the latter. It is likewise certain that respect for our rights, the decisions which we shall be called upon to take and the cordiality of our relations within this Assembly will constitute a kind of foretaste of that League of Nations which we have just been invited to join. I feel certain that this consideration will guide the proposals of the Great Powers and that our decisions will be inspired by the lofty view and the spirit of high justice which should preside over the League of Nations.

We must not, however, exaggerate the importance of the question of representation on the Commissions, for that, after all, only concerns a method of work, and those who propose this method meant well in doing so, because it offers indisputable advantages.

It is true that large Commissions are more difficult to direct and that their work is sometimes rather slow, but we must not forget that

the work of these Commissions must be of such importance to each of the countries interested that perhaps in reality it is worth running the risk which we are now seeking to avoid. Perhaps it would be better so to arrange that in each Commission all interests should be represented and made known so that we may attain, doubtless more slowly, a surer result, which will enable us to come with more precise ideas and less unprepared to the plenary sessions.

I will especially draw the attention of the President, whose qualities of heart and whose fairness constitute for us a two-fold guarantee, to this point, of the importance of which for my country he has certainly not lost sight.

As regards the Commission on Reparation, the non-representation of Portugal is certainly due to an oversight, since other countries having special interests in this respect are all represented thereon, a fact which, I may say, affords me great satisfaction. I pay homage to the sufferings and endurance of so many countries which have been the victims of an aggression, the brutality of which has excited universal indignation.

I beg leave, however, to point out that the position of Portugal is absolutely the same, that we have shed our blood in France for the cause of Right and Justice, that our territories in Africa have been invaded, that we are half, I might indeed say completely, ruined by our efforts in the war. We do not regret this. But why, then, should we not be heard, why should we not also be represented on the Commission appointed to consider the question of Reparation. Once again I must observe this seems to me to be an oversight.

As regards the other Commissions, those relating to the control of ports, to the League of Nations, to Labor questions and to penalties for responsibility for the war, are also of unquestionable interest to Portugal, but, generally speaking, I request the Bureau to be so good as to accede to the legitimate desire of all countries represented at the Conference to be able to make their voices heard whenever they have a special interest to defend, and to be represented on the Commissions. I ask that all these countries may be placed on the same footing as the others where their rights are affected.

MR. BENES (Czecho-Slovak Republic): Without entering into detail in regard to the question of the nomination of representatives on the Commissions, I beg leave to submit the following considerations to the Conference:

The Czecho-Slovak delegation ask to be represented on the Commissions appointed to examine the questions of Reparation and of the Responsibility of the Central Empires. We base this proposal on the following grounds:

The Czecho-Slovak Republic is especially interested in all questions concerning the financial and economic liquidation of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire; for its territory formed the most industrial region of that monarchy. It would therefore be impossible to settle these questions without asking us to bring forward such information on the subject as we possess.

Our delegation also has a special interest in the question of International railways and waterways. Our country has in fact no access to the sea, and it is extremely important for our future international position to know how these great channels of communication will be controlled, and especially to take part in the discussion relating to the control of international railways, waterways and ports. Therefore we ask to be represented on the Commission instructed to examine these questions.

The question of the League of Nations being also of the highest interest to countries surrounded, like ours, by Powers who have always been hostile to them, we ask that we may be granted a representative on the Commission concerned.

To sum up, we beg the Conference to grant us a representative on each one of the three Commissions called upon to discuss questions of special interest to our Republic.

MR. BRATIANO (Roumania): The Belgian Representative, although professing only to speak on behalf of the special interests of Belgium, has raised a question of principle which Roumania has far too much at heart to allow her to refrain from expressing agreement with his point of view.

I wish for the moment to confine myself to drawing attention to the importance of these principles to States like Roumania without entering into the details of each of the questions which, I hope, will be treated fully in a subsequent discussion. I will, however, point out, in passing, with regard to one of these questions (that of international ways of communications), that Roumania is at the mouth of the Danube, a great river which affects the communication of a great part of Europe, and that she has therefore very special interests in it.

I do not, however, wish to lose sight of the fact that at this moment the League of Nations is in question, and that it would be poor evidence of the interest felt by Roumania in the formation of this League if I did not contribute to the explanations made by those representatives of other countries who have already spoken. It is certain that, in the representation of such a league, the relative strength of each state has been kept in view, and it would be just to consider at the same time the interests which lead each state

to favor the formation of this league, when it might perhaps be found that small states have more interest in it than great ones.

In settling the representation of the League both of these points of view must be kept in mind.

It is to express the interest which Roumania feels in the principles of this League that she asks to be represented on this commission.

PHYA BIBADH KOSHA (Siam): May I be permitted, in the name of the Siamese Delegation, to ask whether representation may be afforded to those countries who have the misfortune to be without it, and, as a delegate of one of those nations, to ask whether we have the right and opportunity to attend the proceedings of each commission dealing with matters directly of interest to the country which they represent, such as a League of Nations and the International Control of ports, railways and waterways?

MR. LOU (China): I also desire to appeal to the spirit of equity of the members of the Conference, so that technical delegates may largely participate in the different work on the Commissions.

The desire has already been expressed, as to representation by delegates, that the principle of equality among States be the basis of the League of Nations. I also express the desire to see the delegation of China represented in the Commissions on Labor Legislation and on the Means of Communication. In fact, China, during the war has sent to France nearly 150,000 Chinese laborers, of whom nearly 120,000 were in the British camps. All these laborers have indirectly contributed to the happy issue of the present war.

On the other hand, China has a very large coast line, and her railways, which connect her with the three big neighboring Powers will have considerable development after the war.

It is for these reasons that I ask for the representation of the Chinese delegation on the two Commissions I have indicated.

I may perhaps make a suggestion. I have heard my honorable colleague, who represents Brazil, saying: "The Conference decided this, the Conference decided that." I personally have had the experience of two Peace Conferences, as Mr. Léon Bourgeois kindly remarked a moment ago: I think that the present Conference will make its work much more interesting if it will concentrate the efforts of the two former ones, which have established a panel of delegates from which each delegation interested in any one particular question could select one or two members for the working of the Commission. That is a suggestion I beg to propose to this Conference.

MR. DMOWSKI (Poland): In view of the extent of the territory of Poland, the size of the population, and the economic development of

the country, and in view also of her political interests and her very important geographical position, I am of opinion that she should have the right to send a delegate to all such Commissions as she may think fit.

I rise to associate myself with those members present who have opposed the method whereby it is proposed to choose these five delegates for Powers with special interests. The large number of voices which have been raised shows that the task of assembling the delegates of the Secondary Powers would be very difficult, that the discussion between them would, firstly, involve much loss of time and, secondly, would not tend towards harmony among them. I beg leave to propose that each delegation should draw up a written statement of its case in making a demand for the number of representatives whom it wishes to send to each Commission. I would likewise propose that there should be a Commission above all the others to decide finally on the composition of each of them. We would accept its decisions in advance, being convinced that it would seriously consider the interests of all the Powers whatever they may be.

The PRESIDENT, speaking in French, replies to the observations and suggestions of the delegates, in a speech of which the following is a translation :

"As nobody else wishes to speak, I shall speak in my turn in order to try to justify the Bureau. It requires this, for if it had ever flattered itself that it could satisfy everybody, it would by now be thoroughly disillusioned.

"Sir Robert Borden has reproached us, though in a very friendly way, for having come to a decision. Well, we have decided, as regards the Commissions, in the same way as we decided to summon the present Conference. With your permission I will remind you that it was we who decided that there should be a Conference at Paris, and that the representatives of the countries interested should be summoned to attend it. I make no mystery of it—there is a Conference of the Great Powers going on in the next room. Sir Robert Borden has the less reason to be unaware of it since he yesterday did us the signal honor of making a statement before us on questions concerning the British Colonies.

"The Five Great Powers whose action has to be justified before you today are in a position to justify it. The British Prime Minister just now reminded me that, on the day when the war ceased, the Allies had 12,000,000 men fighting on various fronts. This entitles them to consideration.

"We have had dead, we have wounded in millions, and if we had not kept before us the great question of the League of Nations we

might perhaps have been selfish enough to consult only each other. It was our right.

"We did not wish to do this, and we summoned all the nations interested. We summoned them, not to impose our will upon them, not to make them do what they do not wish, but to ask them for their help. That is why we invited them to come here. But we still have to see how this help can best be used.

"A few days ago Mr. Lloyd George was cruel enough to remind me that I was no longer very young. I entered Parliament for the first time in 1871. I have seen many Committees and Commissions and attended many meetings, and I have noticed—as most of you perhaps have also noticed—that the larger the Committees are the less chance they have of doing any work.

"Now, Gentlemen, let me tell you that behind us is something very great, very august and at times very imperious, something which is called public opinion. It will not ask us whether such and such a State was represented on such and such a Commission. That interests nobody. It will ask us for results, ask us what we have done for the League of Nations so eloquently championed today by President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Bourgeois and Mr. Orlando.

"What crime have we committed? We have decided that, for our part, we would appoint two delegates each on the Commission on the League of Nations. I would beg Mr. Hymans and all those who followed him to let me keep to the point. As soon as I indulgently allowed him to wander from it, as soon as the door was opened, everybody rushed in and discussed everything except the subject under discussion. It is my duty to guide the Conference in its work in order to obtain a result.

"We have therefore decided to appoint two delegates each, and then—may I be pardoned for it—we have decided to ask you to appoint five delegates in common.

"If you do not think this enough, I will not take the responsibility of choosing from among you all, since each asks for more representation, but I will make a proposal: Choose all of us, so that everybody will at least have his rights.

"What is the complaint? Has any right been denied to any Power? You all know how Committees work and you have the right to go before any Committee you like. Mr. Bourgeois, who is here, is not a plenipotentiary. He spoke with the authority to which he is entitled, and you were glad to hear him. I have heard Mr. Veniselos and many of you say: 'Our voice will not be heard.' How can you level such a reproach at us? Your voice will be all the better heard, because we are now arranging a means by which we

can listen to each other. You can be heard on all the Commissions and Committees, and, after all, are you not sure that your voice will reach the Conference since you yourselves will be present and able to speak there?

"Think, Gentlemen, of the consequences of the proposals now made to us. As Mr. Dmowski said just now, requests will be made in writing and we shall collect these papers and then spend an hour or two in our Committee trying to find the best way out of these difficulties. But that is of no use either, for what we want is tangible results. The armistice still keeps many millions of men at the front. It is not questions of procedure, but essential ones, that have to be decided. I ask all of you to consider the consequences of the proposals which come to us from all parts of this Assembly. If today we leave aside the essential question to indulge in debates in procedure, I think I am safe in saying that at the end of a week or even of a fortnight nothing will have been settled and the essential question will not even have been examined.

"Now, the public is waiting. This state of things appears to me impossible. I join Mr. Dmowski in asking anybody having observations to make to send them to the Bureau. But I do not ask for a special Committee to decide the matter.

"Why should I not say what I think? I do not see that the Committee has the right to impose its will upon these five Powers. At least I say what I think. I want to get on, and I should very much like you to make up your minds today.

"Let me make a suggestion which might suit everybody for the time. You might vote on all the proposals which we put before you today, reserving the right, which all Assemblies have, to insert amendments. But, Gentlemen, do not let us go home today without having voted decisively, so that President Wilson, Mr. Bourgeois, Lord Robert Cecil and all of them may be able to get to work this evening and the Commissions to start from tomorrow. My aim and that of my colleagues of the other Powers is to organize Commissions as soon as possible, so as to give them work. All those of you who wish to appear before them will do so. Anybody who wants changes will ask for them. As proposed by Mr. Dmowski, they will be examined and reported on. In this way we shall at least have the advantage of beginning work at once.

"We propose to you to appoint a certain number of Commissions. There will be two—one economic and the other financial—to be appointed at the next Session, after which all the Commissions will be working, the order of the day can be satisfactorily dealt with, and effective discussion begun.

"I beg your pardon, Gentlemen, for having spoken at such length, but all that I have said appeared to me necessary. Think of the immense work awaiting us. Just think of it! As President Wilson just now said, in an admirable sentence which sums up the whole question: 'We, like our Armies, wish to win not only the war, but a cause.' We have the burden and responsibility of this cause in our hands. Of course, questions of procedure have their importance, too. They will be settled in due course. If the number of Commissions proves insufficient it can be increased—we leave you quite free in that respect—but remember, Gentlemen, the larger the Commissions, the less gets done.

"Gentlemen, since I began to take part in these discussions I have sacrificed a certain number of personal opinions. I have done this cheerfully, feeling that I was doing something good and useful for the Common Cause. That was what I said to myself just now on hearing the noble words of President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George.

"Let all of us, Gentlemen, be animated by the same spirit. The Bureau never wished to hurt anybody at all. On the contrary, it would like to unite you all in one group. Let us, then, start work at once and in the meantime claims will be presented and your Bureau able to start work."

MR. HYMANS (Belgium) declares that he will say no more for fear of justifying the reproaches of the President of the Conference, and confines himself to the following observation:

"I simply propose that the Conference should vote on the resolutions which have been submitted to it. The Bureau has heard the observations which have been made in this Assembly. As I said just now, I have confidence in its justice, and I ask it to pay attention to those observations, to revise the composition of the Commissions and decide thereon."

MR. KLOTZ (France) lays on the table of the Conference, for reference to the Commission which has just been appointed, a draft proposal for a financial Section of the League of Nations.

The PRESIDENT submits to the Conference resolutions relative to the appointment of the four other Commissions for which provision is made in the order of the day, and for which the Powers with special interests have to name their delegates.

He recalls the fact that the second Commission has to examine the responsibility of the authors of the war and the enforcement of penalties (Annex 2) and that the small Powers have to choose five representatives on this Commission.

In reply to an observation made by Mr. Calogeras (Brazil) on the subject of the number of representatives allotted to his country, the

President points out that Brazil has no reason to complain of the number of Delegates allowed to her, and that it does not follow that because a country is not represented on a Commission, it has not the same rights as those who are.

On the third Commission, which will consider the question of reparation for damages (Annex 3), Belgium, Greece, Poland, Roumania and Serbia are asked to appoint two representatives each.

With regard to the text of the resolution relative to this Commission, Mr. KLOTZ (France) observes that there appears to be an important omission in it. It says that this Commission will have to examine various questions: (1) the amount of reparation which the enemy Powers ought to pay; (2) their capacity for payment; (3) by what method, in what form, and within what time this payment must be made. To this last paragraph it will be well to add: "And the guarantees necessary to insure its payment."

The amendment proposed by Mr. Klotz is referred to the Bureau for examination.

On the fourth (International Legislation on Labor—Annex 4) and fifth (International Control of Ports, Waterways and Railways—Annex 5) Commissions, the Powers with special interests will for the time appoint five Delegates.

The PRESIDENT proposes that these appointments should be made on January 27.

Mr. HYMANS (Belgium) having asked that the Secretariat should examine the question and arrive at a decision regarding the number of representatives to be appointed, the PRESIDENT replies that the question is one for the Bureau, and not for the Secretariat. He adds:

I ask that the Bureau should retain its liberty of action. If you do not wish to name your Delegates now, but would rather wait, so be it, but, let me tell you, at this moment we are occupied with serious questions. The Polish question is among the foremost. On Monday we have to hear Delegates. If you ask for the postponement of the election, it will be postponed, but I must tell you that the Delegates of the Great Powers, for their part, will not consider themselves to have been postponed and nobody will gain anything.

As for us, we think that our work is urgent, and we ask the help of the whole Conference to assist us to get through it.

Mr. HYMANS (Belgium) expresses agreement, and asks for the judgment of the Bureau, whose decision will be awaited.

Mr. BRATIANO (Roumania) recognizes that everybody is willing to meet on the 27th of January for the purpose of naming Delegates, who will be able to begin work at once now that it is possible to examine questions of principle.

The PRESIDENT puts to the vote the proposal of the Bureau:—That the Delegates of the Powers with special interest[s] should meet on the 27th of January at 15 o'clock (3 p. m.) to elect representatives.

This proposal is adopted.

(See Annex 6 for the minutes of the Session of January 27, and Annex 7 for the list of the members of the five Commissions.)¹

The President asks those members of the Conference who have declarations to make regarding the Delegates to be so good as to present them to the Bureau.

The Session is adjourned at 18.10 o'clock (6.10 p. m.).

President

G. CLEMENCEAU

Secretary General

P. DUTASTA

Secretaries

J. C. GREW

M. P. A. HANKEY

PAUL GAUTHIER

ALDROVANDI

SADAO SABURI

Annex 1

Draft Resolution Relative to the League of Nations

The Conference, having considered the proposals for the creation of a League of Nations, resolves that:

(1) It is essential to the maintenance of the world settlement, which the Associated Nations are now met to establish, that a League of Nations be created to promote international co-operation, to insure the fulfilment of accepted international obligations and to provide safeguards against war.

(2) This League should be treated as an integral part of the general Treaty of Peace, and should be open to every civilized nation which can be relied on to promote its objects.

(3) The members of the League should periodically meet in international conference, and should have a permanent organization and secretariat to carry on the business of the League in the intervals between the conferences.

The Conference therefore appoints a Committee representative of the Associated Governments to work out the details of the Constitution and functions of the League.

JANUARY 25, 1919.

¹ Annex 6 is printed as "Minutes of the Session of January 27, 1919, of the Powers with Special Interests," p. 447.

Annex 2

Draft Resolution Relative to the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and the Enforcement of Penalties

That a Commission, composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers, be appointed to inquire into and report upon the following:

- (1) The responsibility of the authors of the war.
- (2) The facts as to breaches of the customs of law committed by the forces of the German Empire and their Allies on land, on sea and in the air during the present war.
- (3) The degree of responsibility for these offences attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, to members of the General Staffs and other individuals, however highly placed.
- (4) The Constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate to the trial of these offences.
- (5) Any other matters cognate or ancillary to the above which may arise in the course of the inquiry and which the Commission finds it useful and relevant to take into consideration.

JANUARY 25, 1919.

Annex 3

Draft Resolution Relative to Reparation for Damage

That a Commission be appointed with not more than three representatives apiece from each of the five Great Powers and not more than two representatives apiece from Belgium, Greece, Poland, Roumania and Serbia, to examine and report:

- (1) On the amount which the enemy countries ought to pay by way of reparation.
- (2) On what they are capable of paying; and
- (3) By what method, in what form and within what time payment should be made.

JANUARY 25, 1919.

Annex 4

Draft Resolution on International Legislation on Labor

That a Commission, composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers represented at the Peace Conference, be appointed to inquire into the conditions of employment from the international

aspect and to consider the international means necessary to secure common action on matters affecting conditions of employment, and to recommend the form of a permanent agency to continue such inquiry and consideration in co-operation with, and under the direction of the League of Nations.

JANUARY 25, 1919.

Annex 5

Draft Resolution Relative to International Control of Ports, Waterways, and Railways

That a Commission, composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers, be appointed to inquire into and report on:

International control of ports, waterways and railways.

JANUARY 25, 1919.

Annex 6

Minutes of the Meeting Held by the Representatives of Powers With Special Interests, January 27, 1919

[Here follows text of the minutes printed on page 447.]

Annex 7

List of Members of Commissions

1. COMMISSION ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

United States of America:

President Wilson,
Honorable Edward M. House.

British Empire:

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Robert Cecil,
Lieutenant-General The Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts.

France:

Mr. Léon Bourgeois,
Mr. Larnaude, Dean of the Faculty of Law of Paris.

Italy:

Mr. Orlando,
Mr. Scialoja.

Japan:

The Baron Makino,
The Viscount Chinda.

Belgium:

Mr. Hymans.

Brazil:

Mr. Epitacio Pessoa, Senator, former Minister of Justice.

China:

Mr. Wellington Koo, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of China at Washington.

Portugal:

Mr. Jayme Batalha Reis.

Serbia:

Mr. Vesnitch.

2. COMMISSION ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE WAR
AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF PENALTIES

United States of America:

Honorable Robert Lansing,
Mr. James Brown Scott.

British Empire:

The Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon Hewart, K. C., M. P., Attorney-General,
with the right of substituting.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Ernest Pollock, K. B. E., K. C., M. P., Solicitor-General,
The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey.

France:

Mr. André Tardieu,
Mr. Larnaude.

Italy:

Mr. Scialoja,
Mr. Raimondo, Deputy.

Japan:

Mr. Adatci, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at Brussels.
Mr. H. Nagaoka.

Belgium:

Mr. Rolin-Jacquemyns, Secretary-General of the Belgian Delegation.

Greece:

Mr. Politis.

Poland:

Mr. Constantin Skirmunt, Member of the Polish National Committee, Representative of the Committee at Rome.

Roumania:

Mr. S. Rosental, Jurist.

Serbia:

Mr. Slobodan Yovanovitch, Rector of the University of Belgrade, with the right of substituting.

Mr. M. K. Koumanoudi, Professor of the University of Belgrade, or

Mr. M. M. Novacovitch, Professor of the University of Belgrade.

3. COMMISSION ON REPARATION OF DAMAGE

United States of America:

Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, President of the War Industries Board.

Mr. Norman H. Davis, Commission of Finance.

Mr. Vance McCormick, President of the War Trade Board.

Great Britain:

The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes,

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Sumner of Ibstone, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary,

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Cunliffe, former Governor of the Bank of England.

France:

Mr. L. L. Klotz,

Mr. Loucheur, Minister of Industrial Reconstruction,

Mr. Albert Lebrun, Minister of the Liberated Territories.

Italy:

Mr. Salandra,

Mr. D'Amelio, Councillor to the Court of Cassation,

Mr. E. Chiesa, Deputy.

Japan:

Mr. Kengo Mori, Financial Agent to the Embassy at London,

Mr. H. Nagaoka,

Mr. Tatsumi, Administrator of the Yokohama Specie Bank.

Belgium:

Mr. Van den Heuvel,

Mr. Despret, Advocate at the Court of Cassation, Administrator of the Bank of Brussels.

Greece:

Mr. Romanos,

Mr. Michalakopoulos, Minister of State.

Poland:

Mr. Sigismond Chamiec, Director of the National Loan Bank,

Mr. Casimir Olszowski, Director of the Department of War Damage at the Ministry of Finance.

Roumania:

Mr. Georges Danielopol, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Roumania at Washington, former Director of the National Bank of Roumania,

Mr. P. Zahariade, Engineer, Inspector-General, former Director of the Railways.

Serbia:

Mr. C. Stoyanovitch, Deputy,

Mr. Miloche Savtchitch, former Minister, with the Right to be Replaced by:

M. Dragoutine Protitch, Lawyer.

Dr. Vel Baikitch, Bank Director.

4. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION ON LABOR

United States of America:

Honorable Edward N. Hurley, President of the Shipping Board,
Mr. Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor.

Great Britain:

The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes,

Sir Malcolm Delevingne, K. C. B., Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department.

France:

Mr. Colliard, Minister of Labor and Social Insurance,

Mr. Loucheur.

Italy:

Baron Mayor des Planches, Honorary Ambassador, Commissioner-General of Emigration,

Mr. Cabrini, Deputy.

Japan:

Mr. Otchiai, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at The Hague;

Mr. Oka, former Director of Commercial and Industrial Affairs at the Ministry of Commerce.

Belgium:

Mr. Vandervelde,

Mr. Mahaim, Professor of the University of Liège, Secretary of the Belgian Section of the International Association for the Legal Protection of Workers.

Cuba:

Mr. Antonio Sánchez [de] Bustamante.

Poland:

Mr. Jean Zoltowski, Member of the Polish National Committee
(temporary Delegate).

Czecho-Slovak Republic:

Mr. Benes.

5. COMMISSION ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF PORTS, WATERWAYS,
AND RAILWAYS

United States of America:

Honorable Henry White,
Honorable David Hunter Miller.

Great Britain:

The Hon. A. L. Sifton,
Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith, K. C. B., Permanent Secretary to
the Board of Trade.

France:

Mr. Claveille, Minister of Public Works and Transport,
Mr. André Weiss, Professor at the Faculty of Law of Paris,
Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Italy:

Mr. Crespi, Minister of Food,
Mr. de Martino, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.

Japan:

Mr. K. Matsui,
Colonel Sato.

Belgium:

Mr. Paul Segers, Minister of State.

China:

Mr. Cheng-ting Thomas Wang.

Greece:

Mr. Coromilas, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten-
tiary of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes at Rome.

Serbia:

Mr. Trumbitch.

Uruguay:

Mr. Juan Carlos Blanco.

Preliminary Peace Conference, Protocol No. 3, Plenary Session of February 14, 1919

The session is opened under the presidency of M. Clemenceau, President, at 15:30 o'clock (3:30 p. m.).

PRESENT

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The President of the United States.
Honorable Robert Lansing.
Honorable Henry White.
Honorable Edward M. House.
General Tasker H. Bliss.

FOR THE BRITISH EMPIRE

GREAT BRITAIN

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
The Rt. Hon. the Viscount Milner,
G. C. B., G. C. M. G., Secretary of
State for the Colonies.
The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes.
The Rt. Hon. Arthur Lewis Sifton.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Ward
(Bart.).
The Rt. Hon. the Lord Robert Cecil,
Technical Delegate for the League
of Nations.

Dominions and India

CANADA

The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden.
The Rt. Hon. Sir George Eulas
Foster.

AUSTRALIA

The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Cook.

SOUTH AFRICA

Lt. General the Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts.

NEW ZEALAND

The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey.

INDIA

Major-General His Highness the
Maharaja of Bikaner.

FRANCE

Mr. Clemenceau.
Mr. Pichon.
Mr. L. L. Klotz.
Mr. André Tardieu.
Mr. Jules Cambon.
Mr. Léon Bourgeois, Technical Dele-
gate for the League of Nations.

ITALY

Mr. V. E. Orlando.
Baron S. Sonnino.
The Marquis Salvago Raggi.
Mr. Crespi, Minister of Food (replac-
ing Mr. Antonio Salandra.)
Mr. Scialoja, Technical Delegate for
the League of Nations.

JAPAN

The Baron Makino.
The Viscount Chinda.
Mr. K. Matsui.
Mr. H. Ijuin.

BELGIUM

Mr. Hymans.
Mr. Van den Heuvel.

BOLIVIA

Mr. Ismael Montes.

BRAZIL

Mr. Epitacio Pessoa, Former Min-
ister of State, Former Minister
of the Supreme Court of Justice,
Federal Senator.
Mr. Olyntho de Magalhaes.
Mr. Raoul Fernandes, Deputy.

CHINA

Mr. Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo, Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plen-
ipotentiary of China at Washing-
ton.

Mr. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of China at London.

CUBA

Mr. Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante.

ECUADOR

Mr. Dorn y de Alsua.

GREECE

Mr. Eleftherios Veniselos.
Mr. Nicolas Politis.

HAITI

Mr. Tertullien Guilbaud, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Haiti at Paris.

THE HEDJAZ

His Highness the Emir Feisal.
Mr. Rustem Haidar.

LIBERIA

Hon. C. D. B. King, Secretary of State.

PANAMA

Mr. Antonio Burgos, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Panama at Madrid.

POLAND

Mr. Roman Dmowski.
Dr. Casimir Dluski.

PORTUGAL

Dr. Egas Moniz.
Mr. Jayme Batalha Reis.

ROUMANIA

Mr. Jean C. Bratiano.
Mr. Nicholas Misu.

SERBIA

Mr. Trumbitch.
Mr. Vesnitch.
Mr. Ivan Zolger, Professor of the Faculty of Law at the University of Zagreb.

SIAM

Prince Traidos Prabandhu, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Phya Bibadh Kosha.

THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Mr. Charles Kramar.
Mr. Edouard Benes, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

URUGUAY

Mr. Juan Carlos Blanco, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Uruguay at Paris.

The Minutes of the Sessions of 18th and 25th of January, 1919 (Protocols Nos. 1 and 2) are passed.

The Agenda Paper provides for the submission to the Conference of the Report of the League of Nations Commission on its labors.

The PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES delivers the following speech:

"Mr. Chairman:

"I have the honor, and, as I esteem it, the very great privilege of reporting, in the name of the Commission constituted by this Conference, on the formulation of a plan for the League of Nations. I am happy to say that it is a unanimous report, a unanimous report from the Representatives of fourteen nations—the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Brazil, China, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, and Serbia. I think it will be serviceable and interesting if, with your permission, I read the document as the only report which we have to make." (See Annex A).

President Wilson then reads out the draft Covenant, and comments on Articles 15 and 19 in the following terms.

After reading Article 15, President Wilson adds:

"I pause to point out that a misconception might arise in connection with one of the sentences which I have just read: 'If any party shall refuse to so comply, the Council shall propose the measures necessary to give effect to the recommendation'. A case in point, a purely hypothetical case, is this: suppose that there is in the possession of a particular Power a piece of territory or some other substantial thing in dispute to which it is claimed that the Power in question is not entitled; suppose that the matter is submitted to the Executive Council for a recommendation as to the settlement of the dispute, diplomacy having failed; and suppose that the decision is in favor of the party which claims the subject matter of dispute as against the party which has the subject matter in dispute. Then, if the party in possession of the subject matter in dispute merely sits still and does nothing, it has accepted the decision of the Council, in the sense that it makes no resistance; but something must be done to see that it surrenders the subject matter in dispute. In such a case, the only case contemplated, it is provided that the Executive Council may then consider what steps may be necessary to oblige the party against whom judgment has gone to comply with the decisions of the Council."

President Wilson makes the following observations in regard to Article 19:

"Let me say before reading Article 19, that before being embodied in this document it was the subject matter of a very careful discussion by Representatives of the five greater parties, and that their unanimous conclusion in the matter is embodied in this Article."

After reading the entire document, President Wilson says:

"It gives me pleasure to add to this formal reading of the result of our labors that the character of the discussion which occurred at the sittings of the Commission was not only of the most constructive but of the most encouraging sort. It was obvious throughout our discussions that, although there were subjects upon which there were individual differences of judgment, with regard to the method by which our objects should be attained, there was practically at no point any serious difference of opinion or motive as to the objects which we were seeking. Indeed, while these debates were not made the opportunity for the expression of enthusiasms and sentiments, I think the other members of the commission will agree with me that there was an undertone of high resolve and of enthusiasm for the

thing we were trying to do, which was heartening throughout every meeting, because we felt that in a way this Conference had entrusted to us the expression of one of its highest and most important purposes, to see to it that the concord of the world in the future with regard to the objects of justice should not be subject to doubt or uncertainty; that the cooperation of the great body of nations should be assured from the first in the maintenance of peace upon the terms of honor and of strict regard for international obligation. The compulsion of that task was constantly upon us, and at no point was there shown the slightest desire to do anything but suggest the best means to accomplish that great object. There is very great significance, therefore, in the fact that the result was reached unanimously. Fourteen nations were represented, among them all of those Powers which for convenience we have called the great Powers, and among the rest a representation of the greatest variety of circumstance and interest. So that I think we are justified in saying that it was a representative group of the Members of this great Conference. The significance of the result, therefore, has that deepest of all meanings, the union of wills in a common purpose, a union of wills which cannot be resisted, and which I dare say no nation will run the risk of attempting to resist.

“Now as to the character of the Covenant. While it has consumed some time to read this document, I think you will see at once that it is, after all, very simple, and in nothing so simple as in the structure which it suggests for the League of Nations—a Body of Delegates, an Executive Council, and a Permanent Secretariat. When it came to the question of determining the character of the representation in the Body of Delegates, we were all aware of a feeling which is current throughout the world. Inasmuch as I am stating it in the presence of official Representatives of the various Governments here present, including myself, I may say that there is a universal feeling that the world cannot rest satisfied with merely official guidance. There reached us through many channels the feeling that if the deliberative body of the League was merely to be a body of officials representing the various Governments, the peoples of the world would not be sure that some of the mistakes which preoccupied officials had admittedly made might not be repeated. It was impossible to conceive a method or an assembly so large and various as to be really representative of the great body of the peoples of the world, because, as I roughly reckon it, we represent as we sit around this table more than twelve hundred million people. You cannot have a representative assembly of twelve hundred million people; but if you leave it to each Government to have, if it pleases, one or two or three representatives, though only a single vote, it may vary its representation

from time to time; not only that, but it may originate the choice of its several representatives, if it should have several, in different ways. Therefore, we thought that this was a proper and a very prudent concession to the practically universal opinion of plain men everywhere, in that they wanted the door left open to a variety of representation instead of being confined to a single official body with which they might or might not find themselves in sympathy.

"You will notice also that this body has unlimited rights of discussion,—I mean of discussion of anything that falls within the field of international relationship,—and that it is specially agreed that war or international misunderstandings or anything that may lead to friction and trouble is everybody's business, because it may affect the peace of the world. In order to safeguard, so far as we could, the popular power of this representative body, it is provided, you will notice, that when a subject is submitted, not to arbitration, but to discussion by the Executive Council, it can upon the initiative of either one of the parties to the dispute be drawn out of the Executive Council into the larger forum of the General Body of Delegates; because throughout this instrument we are depending primarily and chiefly upon one great force, and that is the moral force of the public opinion of the world,—the cleansing and clarifying and compelling influences of publicity; so that intrigues can no longer have their coverts, so that designs that are sinister can at any time be drawn into the open, so that those things that are destroyed by the light may be promptly destroyed by the overwhelming light of the universal expression of the condemnation of the world.

"Armed force is in the background in this programme, but it is in the background, and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall. But that is the last resort, because this is intended as a constitution of peace, not as a League of War.

"The simplicity of the document seems to me to be one of its chief virtues, because, speaking for myself, I was unable to foresee the variety of circumstances with which this League would have to deal. I was unable, therefore, to plan all the machinery that might be necessary to meet differing and unexpected contingencies. Therefore, I should say of this document that it is not a straitjacket, but a vehicle of life. A living thing is born, and we must see to it that the clothes we put upon it do not hamper it,—a vehicle of power, but a vehicle in which power may be varied at the discretion of those who exercise it and in accordance with the changing circumstances of the time. And yet, while it is elastic, while it is general in its terms, it is definite in the one thing that we were called upon to make definite. It is a definite guarantee of peace. It is a definite

guarantee by word against aggression. It is a definite guarantee against the things which have just come near bringing the whole structure of civilization into ruin. Its purposes do not for a moment lie vague. Its purposes are declared and its powers made unmistakable.

"It is not in contemplation that this should be merely a League to secure the peace of the world. It is a League which can be used for cooperation in any international matter. That is the significance of the provision introduced concerning labor. There are many ameliorations of labor conditions which can be effected by conference and discussion. I anticipate that there will be a very great usefulness in the Bureau of Labor which it is contemplated shall be set up by the League. While men and women and children who work have been in the background through long ages, and sometimes seemed to be forgotten, while Governments have had their watchful and suspicious eyes upon the maneuvers of one another, while the thought of statesmen has been about structural action and the large transactions of commerce and of finance, now, if I may believe the picture which I see, there comes into the foreground the great body of the laboring people of the world, the men and women and children upon whom the great burden of sustaining the world must from day to day fall, whether we wish it to do so or not; people who go to bed tired and wake up without the stimulation of lively hope. These people will be drawn into the field of international consultation and help, and will be among the wards of the combined Governments of the world. There is, I take leave to say, a very great step in advance in the mere conception of that.

"Then, as you will notice, there is an imperative article concerning the publicity of all international agreements. Henceforth no member of the League can claim any agreement as valid which it has not registered with the Secretary General, in whose office, of course, it will be subject to the examination of anybody representing a member of the League; and the duty is laid upon the Secretary General to publish every document of that sort at the earliest possible time. I suppose most persons who have not been conversant with the business of Foreign Offices do not realize how many hundreds of these agreements are made in a single year, and how difficult it might be to publish the more unimportant of them immediately—how uninteresting it would be to most of the world to publish them immediately—but even they must be published just so soon as it is possible for the Secretary General to publish them.

"Then there is a feature about this Covenant which to my mind is one of the greatest and most satisfactory advances that have been made. We are done with annexations of helpless people, meant in some

instances by some Powers to be used merely for exploitation. We recognize in the most solemn manner that the helpless and undeveloped peoples of the world, being in that condition, put an obligation upon us to look after their interests primarily before we use them for our interest; and that in all cases of this sort hereafter it shall be the duty of the League to see that the nations which are assigned as the tutors and advisers and directors of those peoples, shall look to their interest and to their development before they look to the interests and material desires of the mandatory nation itself. There has been no greater advance than this, gentlemen. If you look back upon the history of the world you will see how helpless peoples have too often been a prey to Powers that had no conscience in the matter. It has been one of the many distressing revelations of recent years that the great Power which has just been happily defeated put intolerable burdens and injustices upon the helpless people of some of the Colonies which it annexed to itself; that its interest was rather their extermination than their development; that the desire was to possess their land for European purposes, and not to enjoy their confidence in order that mankind might be lifted in those places to the next higher level. Now, the world, expressing its conscience in law, says there is an end of that. Our consciences shall be applied to this thing. States will be picked out which have already shown that they can exercise a conscience in this matter, and under their tutelage the helpless peoples of the world will come into a new light and into a new hope.

"So I think I can say of this document that it is at one and the same time, a practical document and a humane document. There is a pulse of sympathy in it. There is a compulsion of conscience throughout it. It is practical, and yet it is intended to purify, to rectify, to elevate. And I want to say that, so far as my observation instructs me, this is in one sense a belated document. I believe that the conscience of the world has long been prepared to express itself in some such way. We are not just now discovering our sympathy for these people and our interest in them. We are simply expressing it, for it has long been felt, and in the administration of the affairs of more than one of the great States represented here,—so far as I know of all the great States that are represented here,—that humane impulse has already expressed itself in their dealings with their Colonies, whose peoples were yet at a low stage of civilization. We have had many instances of Colonies lifted into the sphere of complete self-government. This is not the discovery of a principle. It is the universal application of a principle. It is the agreement of the great nations which have tried to live by these standards in their separate administrations to unite in seeing that their common force and their common thought and intelligence are lent to this great and

humane enterprise. I think it is an occasion, therefore, for the most profound satisfaction that this humane decision should have been reached in a matter for which the world has long been waiting, and until a very recent period thought that it was still too early to hope.

"Many terrible things have come out of this war, gentlemen, but some very beautiful things have come out of it. Wrong has been defeated, but the rest of the world has been more conscious than it ever was before of the majesty of Right. People who were suspicious of one another can now live as friends and comrades in a single family, and desire to do so. The miasma of distrust, of intrigue, is cleared away. Men are looking eye to eye and saying: 'We are brothers and have a common purpose. We did not realize it before, but now we do realize it, and this is our Covenant of fraternity and of friendship'."

LORD ROBERT CECIL (Great Britain) expressing the views of the British Empire Delegation, delivers the following speech:

"Mr. President and Gentlemen:

"I rejoice very much that the course which has been taken this afternoon has been pursued. It seems to me a good omen for the great project in which we are engaged, that before its final completion it should have been published to the world and laid before all its people for their advice and for their criticism. The President spoke of the spirit which animated the Commission over which he presided with such distinction. I gladly bear my testimony to the complete accuracy, both in letter and in spirit, of everything which he said about it. It was indeed a pleasure to serve with such colleagues, and but for the common purpose and the common devotion to that purpose, it would have been impossible for us to have accomplished the task set before us within the time which was given to us. For, after all, the problem which we were engaged in solving was one of great difficulty. As I see it, it was to devise some really effective means of preserving the peace of the world consistently with the least possible interference with national sovereignty. You have heard the Covenant, and it is unnecessary for me to dwell on it in detail. It is enough to say that we have sought to safeguard the peace of the world by establishing certain principles. The first and chiefest of them is that no nation shall go to war with any other nation until every other possible means of settling the dispute shall have been fully and fairly tried.

"Secondly, we lay down that, under no circumstances, shall any nation seek forcibly to disturb the territorial settlement to be arrived at as the consequence of this peace or to interfere with the political independence of any of the States in the world.

"Those are the two great precepts which we seek to lay down for the government of international relations, and we have recognized

that if those principles are really to be acted upon, we must go one step further and lay it down that no nation must retain armaments on a scale fitted only for aggressive purposes. I do not doubt that the working out of that principle will be difficult, but it is laid down clearly in this document, and the organs of the League are entrusted with the duties of producing for the consideration and support of the Governments of the world a workable scheme for carrying it into effect. And, finally, we have thought that if the world is to be at peace, it is not enough to forbid war. We must do something more than that. We must try to substitute for the principle of international competition, that of international co-operation, and you will find at the end of this document a number of clauses which point out some of the various respects in which the world can better discharge its duties by the co-operation of each nation for purposes which are beneficial to the whole of them. They are examples of what may be done. There are many omissions. There is one clause which points out that future efforts at international co-operation shall all be made subject to and connected with the League of Nations. Certainly, I should hope that there are many questions, such as the opium trade, the white slave traffic and, in another order of ideas, the regulation of the rules of the air, which, besides those mentioned in this document, call earnestly for effective international co-operation. Certainly it is that if we can once get the nations of the world into the habit of co-operating with one another, you will have struck a great blow at the source and origin of all or almost all the world wars which have defaced the history of the world. Those, I believe, are the principles on which we have relied for the safeguarding of peace, and as to national sovereignty we have thought, in the first place, that the League should not in any respect interfere with the internal affairs of any nation. I do not regard the clause which deals with labor as any such interference. For this is quite certain, that no real progress in ameliorating the conditions of labor can be hopeful except by international agreement. Therefore, although in a sense the conditions of labor in a country are a matter of internal concern, yet, under the conditions under which we now live, that is not so in truth, and bad conditions of labor in one country operate with fatal effect in depressing conditions of labor in another.

"Secondly, we have laid down—and this is the great principle in all action, whether of the Executive Council, or of the Body of Delegates, except in very special cases and for very special reasons which are set out in the Covenant—all action must be unanimously agreed to in accordance with the general rule that governs international relations. That that will, to some extent, in appearance at any rate, militate

against the rapidity of action of the organs of the League, is undoubted but, in my judgment, that defect is far more than compensated by the confidence that it will inspire that no nation, whether small or great, need fear oppression from the organs of the League.

"Gentlemen, I have little more to say. The President has pointed out that the frame of the organization suggested is very simple. He has alluded to some respects in which some may think it might have been more elaborate, but I agree with him that simplicity is the essence of our plans. We are not seeking to produce for the world a building finished and complete in all respects. To have attempted such a thing would have been an arrogant piece of folly. All we have tried to do—all we have hoped to do—is to lay soundly and truly, the foundations upon which our successors may build. I believe those foundations have been well laid and it depends upon those who come after us what will be the character and stability of the building erected upon them. If it is merely a repetition of the old experiments of alliance, if we are merely to have a new version of the Holy Alliance, designed for however good a purpose, believe me, Gentlemen, our attempt is doomed to failure. Nor must it be merely an unpractical effort in international dialectics. It must be a practical thing—instinct, and this is the real point—instinct with a genuine purpose to achieve the main objects we have in view. And if those who build on these foundations really believe that the interest of one is the interest of all, and that the prosperity of the world is bound up with the prosperity of each nation that makes it up—that goes to compose the family—then and then only will the finished structure of the League of Nations be what it ought to be—a safety and a glory for the humanity of the world."

MR. ORLANDO (Italy), speaking in French, expresses the views of the Italian Delegation in the following speech:

"If I had only intended to take part in this debate in order to express my deep satisfaction at having been able to collaborate in the first draft of the document which has been laid before you, I venture to hope that my feelings would nevertheless have seemed justified, seeing that we all await, with fervent faith, as a result of this act, a rebirth of the whole world the like of which history has never seen. But the object of this debate is to submit to examination by the public opinion of the world a new international order. I should like, then, to make my modest contribution to its discussion by supplementing the explanations made by my colleagues by a few remarks not relating to the general spirit of the act, for that has been explained by the man who has the highest and noblest title for the task, a title before which we all bow; nor even relating to funda-

mental principles, which Lord Robert Cecil set forth both forcibly and clearly. I will rather say a few words on the general method by which we have pursued our work. The task was incomparably difficult. We started from two absolute principles which a priori it might seem dialectically impossible to reconcile with one another. On the other hand the principle of the sovereignty of States, which is supreme and brooks no comparison or relation, and on the other the necessity of imposing from above a restraint on the conduct of States so that the sphere of their rights should harmonize with that of the rights of all the others, in order that their liberty should not include the liberty to do evil. We were able to effect a reconciliation between these two principles on the basis of 'self-constraint,' a spontaneous coercion, so that states will in future be brought, under the control of the public opinion of the whole world, voluntarily to recognize the restraint imposed on them for the sake of universal peace. I know that even the possibility of such a transformation is the object of attacks by sceptics, who are by turns sad or ironical, according to their temperament. Towards these sceptics I will act like a Greek philosopher who, when a Sophist told him that he could not move, answered by getting up and walking. The possibility of this spontaneous and collective admission of a higher interest has been proved to us in effect by the work on the Commission in which I have had the honor to take part. Itself—it was a Committee of a League of Nations; eminent statesmen represented there the views and interests of the most different peoples, living on all the continents of the globe, and found themselves face to face with the gravest problems, the solution of which might have made the boldest revolutionary hesitate.

"Nevertheless, agreement has been reached, and that in a relatively rapid and simple manner. This agreement has come into existence as the result of loyal discussion which has brought out the difficulties of the different solutions and pointed to the wisest, sometimes in the direction of the greatest good and sometimes in that of the least evil. But occasionally, in the most thorny and difficult cases, it has been possible to reach an agreement by an adjournment during which a solution of the doubt which appeared to us impossible ripened in our consciences, just as in the course of time the seed ripens in the deep soil. So it has been in such cases and so it will always be in the future. We offer to the world to-day not only a great idea, but the proof of a tangible reality.

"Allow me to add that this miracle has been rendered possible by the subtle and mysterious action of that generous blood which has bathed the earth in streams, of that infinite mourning which all humanity has borne.

"After wars, monuments have been set up on which have been inscribed the names of the fallen brave. Alas, the most gigantic buildings, the ancient Pyramids of Egypt themselves, could not give room enough for the names of the millions of mortals who have given their lives for the freedom of the world. I think that a more lasting monument will be set up to their memory through the acts performed today by the peoples called by a great and mournful destiny to fight for so great a cause. This charter of freedom and life was born of grief and proclaims a redemption hallowed by sacrifice."

MR. LEON BOURGEOIS (France) speaking in French, expresses the views of the French Delegation in the following speech :

"Gentlemen, you will permit me, as the representative of the French Delegation, to express in my turn the deep satisfaction which we all feel—and France perhaps yet more deeply than other nations, because she is one of those that has suffered most,—at the union of our minds and wills in the act of mutual faith by which we pledge our enthusiastic adhesion to the principle and the constitution of the League of Nations. We perform this act of mutual faith and we thank the Commission of which we have been members for the care, the zeal and the spirit of good understanding and cordiality with which it has undertaken and completed its labors under the distinguished impulse which President Wilson has given.

"Our colleague, Lord Robert Cecil, said just now that the Commission was laying this document before you not so much as a final result but rather as a work conscientiously prepared and carefully submitted to all of you for examination; more especially is it submitted as from today, since the Draft is about to become public, to the judgment, the comment and perhaps even the criticism of public opinion throughout the world. We have been unanimous in adopting the principles which are embodied in this Draft.

"It stands to reason that we reserve a complete liberty of comment and of amending if necessary points which, when the final discussion takes place, it may appear to us should be subjected to a fresh examination.

"There is, therefore, unanimity in regard to the principles. Signor Orlando, in reminding us of these, said with unusual eloquence that there was something in the nature of a contradiction in the problem which confronted us. How were we to reconcile the principle of the sovereignty of States with the obligation by which they were to bind themselves to limit their political and military action to the precise point where Justice and Right summoned them to stop? This reconciliation has been effected, if I may say so, automatically and, to pursue the metaphor of our distinguished colleague, we have proved the existence of motion by moving.

"Among these principles is it necessary to recall those which constitute the very foundation of every international organization of law? In response to the appeal of the millions of dead whose memory has been invoked, of all those who have fallen and of those who mourn them, of all those who by their personal sacrifice have sought to avert for their descendants sacrifices the like of which they themselves have borne, we have risen up against the possible renewal of war. Together we have banded ourselves in order to obviate, by every possible human means, the renewal of the war, in the conviction that henceforth no private war will be possible in the world and that the complete and close interdependence in which all nations are today united, by the community of their financial, economic, intellectual and moral interests, renders impossible a fresh conflict at any point on the globe's surface without the entire world being dragged into it by reason of the inevitable community of interest of the peoples of the world.

"We are laying it down that Right and Justice must be the basis of settlement for all conflicts and all international differences, and that the door of the Tribunal is open to every State; in that Tribunal each State will be certain of finding judges who will not even know whether they themselves belong to a great or a small Power, because they will sit there, not as the representatives of that Power, but as the representatives of Right.

"There is another principle to which we are especially attached because it really constitutes the kernel of international obligation; for all States now consent to bow before a common justice, and agree at the same time mutually to guarantee to each other their territorial integrity and their political independence on any occasion when one or other of these higher interests may be threatened by violence or some disturbance.

"Such is the group of obligations which we accept, and such is the object at which the Covenant now laid before you aims; and I hope, as you do all, that the means which have been proposed may enable us to attain our end in fact.

"The purpose of one part of the Covenant is to group round legal institutions a number of factors of real activity which shall actually facilitate the settlement of disputes. We consider it necessary to develop all international institutions which increase the degree of interdependence of the interests of all States, and thereby strengthen the ties which unite us. A certain number of international institutions exist already: we must complete and develop them in such a manner as to make them comprise the majority of the purposes of human activity.

"It is hardly necessary for me to say in regard to all these principles that we have been unanimous, not only in proclaiming them, but in

insuring that they should be heard and understood throughout the world and that, even among those States which have the greatest difficulty in conceiving this idea of justice, the light should shine at last and illuminate men's consciences.

"If, however, we wish these principles to triumph, if we wish them to be guarded by effective guarantees, it is not enough to proclaim them—we must further organize a system of jurisdiction and action alike in order to defend them.

"This organization—it was alluded to just now—is quite clear and quite simple. The International Council of Delegates represents precisely the principle of the equality of States; all States alike are represented, I mean all the Associated States, and each of them has but one vote. The idea of equality before the Law of Right thus expressed here is, therefore, realized in the clearest possible manner in the organization of the International Council.

"The Executive Committee has another task. In it it is necessary to give a larger and even a preponderant place to those who have the custody of great general interests; but considerable room is likewise given to the small States. In deciding that the Great Powers should have five votes and the small Powers four votes, our Commission showed its desire to respect the interests of small States.

"All conflicts are to be submitted either to arbitration or to examination by the Executive Committee. Respect for sentences pronounced and decisions taken is insured by precise rules, the contravention of which would be regarded as an act of war against all the States. There you find the true idea of mutual support assuming a definite shape; when one of the members of the League, however small and however distant, finds itself attacked by a violence which is recognised as unjust, it is the whole League of Nations which regards itself as attacked; thenceforward the State responsible for this act of violence must regard itself as being in a state of war, not merely with the State which has been the victim of the aggression, but with the whole world.

"We must, however, go yet further. In order definitely to secure the respect due to international sentences and decisions, there must be a limitation of armaments.

"This limitation of armaments has long been one of the objects of our desires. Those among you, Gentlemen, who in former times were present at the discussions at The Hague, will remember this. Today, thanks to the victory which has rendered possible the almost complete disarmament of the vanquished and barbarous enemy, the possibility of limiting armaments exists, and it is open to us to effect it in practice. This limitation must be of such a character that no State shall be strong enough to make its own strength prevail against that of the

League of Nations. Each State, however, must maintain sufficient forces in order that the League of Nations, by assembling the forces of the different Associated States, may be certain of its ability to make its will prevail.

"Need I say that these rules have been set up unanimously and with the ardent support of the French Delegation? However, and this is a point in regard to which I desire to keep your attention for a few minutes, the danger is not the same for all. We can state this freely because none of the words which I am about to pronounce can be regarded as a criticism of the Plan, but merely as an expression of the desire which we have to see it completed. Special dangers exist for certain countries, for France, for Belgium, for Serbia and for the States which have just been created or reconstituted in Central Europe. These States will need to prepare and elaborate effective guarantees.

"The Commission has unanimously recognized and has taken into account in a formal text 'the geographical situation and the circumstances of each country' in the determination which has to be made of the armaments of each State. It follows from this that in cases where some frontiers are exposed to greater dangers than others, it will be permissible for a State thus placed at a dangerous spot to fortify itself more strongly and to increase its army strength and its armaments.

"That is well; but it must not be forgotten that such a State, if it be permitted to increase the strength of its army and its armaments, accepts thereby an increase of the charges which it has to bear and that, therefore, in the general peaceful struggle between nations those which have voluntarily borne such charges will naturally find themselves in a more difficult situation than the others. It is necessary to take the situation of such States into serious consideration and to see that it shall not be aggravated.

"Two practical questions arise in this connection. In order to attain this necessary safety, armaments must be strictly controlled. It is quite right to bear in mind, and President Wilson indeed reminded us of it latterly with remarkable eloquence, that in modern war the question of material has attained immense importance, for the developments of what has been called scientific barbarity have rendered terribly dangerous the progress which is effected each day in industries of a military character.

"It is, therefore, necessary for the control of munition factories and industries utilisable for war purposes to be guaranteed.

"The Commission has recognized this necessity, for 'the High Contracting Parties undertake in no way to conceal from each other the condition of such of their industries as are capable of being adapted to warlike purposes or the scale of their armaments, and

agree that there shall be full and frank interchange of information as to their military and naval programmes'.

"I am very grateful to the Commission for this new drafting, which has very appreciably approached the solution of the problem.

"It is permissible, however, for us to remark that it would be necessary for a permanent control and statistical organization to be set up, and we ask that a Commission for that purpose should be constituted. That did not prevent us from accepting the Draft as a whole, but we believe that when public opinion is on the point of being placed in a position to study the question it was necessary for us to explain our views.

"There is a second point.

"The State which violates the international Covenant is at war against the remainder. Thus, all the Allied forces will necessarily act in this war which the law of right has sanctioned. One cannot, however, improvise war, especially when it becomes necessary to assemble the forces of numerous distant and different States, the fields of action of which are scattered all over the surface of the world. In each people the determination exists not to risk the lives of its sons in military operations until the sovereign powers of the State have examined the question as to whether the conditions of the Covenant require intervention and whether a case has genuinely arisen in which a moral obligation has become an obligation to act.

"The need for consulting the legal organs of national representation, and of obtaining a parliamentary vote before undertaking any action, involves delays. Time is needed for these deliberations, which will indeed be even impossible unless there exists a previously prepared plan in prevision of the appeal which the League of Nations may address to each member, showing where and how the national contingents can be and should be despatched.

"Finally, in the case of a threat or of aggression—and I beg leave to hold your attention to this point, knowing as I do that your feeling is no less unanimous than was that of the Commission,—we shall be obliged to find a way of fortifying the guarantees of which we stand in need. Measures must have been laid down, submitted for consideration and concerted beforehand in order that in the first place a kind of brake may be put on ill-will or evil intention on the part of enemies: if these know what has been prepared and what will be prepared in order to resist aggression, they will not attempt an aggression. In any other case they will be encouraged to risk one and it will be impossible to achieve the purpose at which we aim.

"It ought to be impossible for a sudden aggression to take place on one of the danger points of the world without the certainty of its being immediately put down. That is the reason for which, although we

have no desire to see a renewal of the spectacle to which President Wilson alluded just now, nor of those terrible disasters which seemed to be an indication of the enemy's will to exterminate, we have asked for the creation of a permanent organism which shall endow the League of Nations with the necessary guarantee. This organism should 'foresee and prepare the military means destined to insure the fulfilment of the obligations which the Covenant lays on States and to guarantee their immediate efficacy in all urgent cases'.

"In regard to this point our Colleagues told us that difficulties of a constitutional and legal character were to be anticipated before it became possible to institute a permanent organization of this character. We have, however, thought it permissible, at a time when this problem is about to be submitted to public opinion, to state it as freely before that opinion as among ourselves.

"Gentlemen, I will conclude my remarks. Nobody can have misunderstood my words; nobody thinks, I feel sure, that I have said one word likely to weaken the power of the unanimity which has been shown here since the opening of the session and will continue to be evident until its close.

"We are most deeply and whole-heartedly united for the triumph of the cause which, from the first moment, inspired the assembly of this Conference, that is for the prevalence of Right over violence and barbarity. We firmly believe that the Plan now laid before you comprises, in the general aspect of its clauses, the measures which are necessary for the attainment of our purposes; in our opinion, however, and we have expressed it in all sincerity, the Plan is as yet only the foundation on which we shall have to work.

"In concluding my address to you, I wish to express my gratitude to the colleague with whom we have collaborated in this great work, and to President Wilson, who has presided over our labors; and I beg leave to utter a very sincere wish, in the name of France, that this text, completed in respect of the points which I have brought to your notice, may soon become the Law of Nations."

FEBRUARY 14, 1919.

BARON MAKINO (Japan) expresses the views of the Japanese Delegation in the following speech:

"I beg to add another voice to echo the congratulatory speeches that have been made on the completion of what is, perhaps, the most important document ever compiled by the hand of man. The great leaders who, with staunch purpose, have identified themselves with a movement involving the most intricate political problems of many and diverse nations, deserve the gratitude of all mankind for having successfully piloted to this stage the most effective instrument for the

maintenance of peace. (Their names will be indelibly written on the pages of history in grateful acknowledgment of the great indebtedness which the present and future generations owe to them as benefactors.)

"I understand there is to be no discussion today on the contents of the draft, and I therefore confine myself to the few remarks I have made, reserving until a later stage of the discussion of this project a certain proposition, which I will have the privilege of submitting to this Conference and for which I shall have to ask favorable and careful consideration by the distinguished representatives of the nations assembled here today."

MR. BARNES (Great Britain) expresses the views of the British working classes in the following speech:

"Mr. President and Gentlemen: As one whose privilege it is to represent specially the working folk of Great Britain, I want just to make a very few observations. I think I know the mind of the British people on this question of the League of Nations, and I can assure you that it is one of eager expectancy. The people of Great Britain have shouldered their burden during the war, but through all its struggles and sacrifices they have looked eagerly forward for the day when aggressive war shall be no more. That day is dawning, and I believe has been hastened by the work of the last month. To my mind, Mr. President, there are three outstanding principles in this document, which, I believe, will stand out conspicuously as landmarks in the history of mankind.

"First of all, the substitution of an altruistic principle for imperialism and violence in the adjustment of international affairs. Nations which have suffered and sacrificed in the acquisition of territory have agreed to the overseership of the League of Nations in the administration of that territory. They have further agreed to the principle that the welfare and assent of the peoples shall be the determining considerations in its administration. There is in this agreement, Mr. President, to my mind a great advance in the application of the principle of moral idealism, and I can only say that I believe that that will strike the imagination of the world.

"Second, they have agreed on the principle of reduction of armaments, to a point of national safety, as prescribed by the League of Nations. This, I believe, to be the essential feature of the condition of permanent peace. If there be excess of guns, there will always be a chance of them getting fired off. Moreover, the nations in the future will be unable in any case to bear the burdens of armaments which have been the feature of our sad history during the last two or three decades. I am, therefore, glad that in this document provision is

made for reduction of armaments, thereby, I believe, lessening the risk of war and easing the economic burden upon the people.

"The third principle to which I wish to call attention is that the signatories to this document have agreed on a recognition of the evils of private profit in the manufacture of armaments, although, for my part, I should like to have seen a more robust declaration in favor of the abolition of private profit in armaments. Abolition I believe to be a step which will ultimately be found necessary, and I further hope that the Executive may be able to devise ways and means by which private profit may be eliminated, and I am perfectly sure that nothing would be more welcome to the mind of working folk.

"There are just one or two things, Mr. President, which, to my mind, might have been more explicit, and which, I believe, will have to be grafted on to a League of Nations as the idea of world unity becomes more widely accepted. Let me mention one. I am afraid that when the time comes for the enforcement of decrees—if ever it does come, which God forbid—there may be delay and confusion on the part of the League. What I am afraid of is, that an aggressive nation might again try to break through, and win its way to its object, before the forces of mankind can be mobilized against it. Therefore, I should have been glad to have seen some provision for the nucleus of an international force which would be ready to strike against an aggressive nation. This, I know, cuts into the idea of the sovereignty of nations, but I hope that there may be future discussion on the part of the affiliated states as to how they can adjust their national life so as to admit of a greater degree of cooperation than is in this document.

"Finally, I gladly note the insertion of a clause providing for the formation of international charters of labor. Hitherto, nations have endeavored to protect themselves against low-paid labor by the imposition of tariff barriers. I hope we shall in the future, under the authority of the League of Nations, seek and find a better way by abolishing low-paid labor altogether. We hope to raise life and labor from the mere struggle for bread on to higher levels of justice and humanity. The Commission, Mr. Chairman, which was appointed a few weeks ago to go into this matter is now busily engaged in formulating its detailed plan, and we hope to report in a few weeks' time. I can only say now, on behalf of that Commission, that we shall endeavor to bring ourselves into contact with the League of Nations on as many points as we possibly can, and to bring ourselves in line with this epoch-making document which President Wilson has submitted to us today, and, through us, to a war-weary world."

Several Delegates thereupon state certain general considerations in regard to the Draft Covenant, or offer remarks on special points.

MR. VENISELOS (Greece), speaking in French, delivers the following speech:

"The President of the Conference does me a great honor in allowing me to speak, but at the same time he puts me in a position of great embarrassment. I really ask myself what I can add to the words uttered by the voices of authority to which the Conference has just listened. I will speak as an idealist—for I am one—in order to express the enthusiasm which the work today laid before the Peace Conference inspires in me. I think, indeed, that idealism, if it excludes materialism, in no wise excludes realism.

"I am sure that humanity never made, by a single stroke of the pen, greater progress towards the assurance of a better future for the world. I know that our plan will not escape criticism—indeed, it has been placed today on the table of the Conference precisely in order to give the critics an opportunity of making themselves heard.

"I ask Mr. Léon Bourgeois' permission to say a word about the uneasiness which he has shown. There is no question of discussing the draft today. Discussion will come in a few days, perhaps in a month, but I should not like the uneasiness—which is indeed very natural—of Mr. Léon Bourgeois to influence public opinion, which might perhaps think that our work is not sufficiently sound, and does not safeguard sufficiently what we wish to obtain.

"Certain Powers object to the establishment not only of a maximum, but also to that of a minimum armed force. For instance, what Mr. Léon Bourgeois asks is the creation of an armed force ready to intervene.

"We have received the answer that constitutional considerations prevented the realization of this wish.

"I should be glad if this constitutional opposition could be removed and if a contingent could be fixed, which each State would be obliged to keep up with a view to intervention, if necessary.

"But, if we cannot get satisfaction on this point, it must not be thought that this omission would leave the League of Nations without the necessary force to make its will obeyed. Anyone who wishes to disturb the peace of the world will always know that there exists a great force composed of all the armies and of all the resources at the disposal of the States which form the League.

"All the Powers represented here, even those which had not in time of peace sufficient forces, have proved what they were able to do in a relatively short time. Thus, the Power which might have thought that it could by a sudden attack obtain a passing success, will know henceforward that it is doomed to failure, so that, I hope, such an attack will never again take place. However, in order that

public opinion may not become too uneasy I express once more, with Mr. Léon Bourgeois, the hope that it will be possible to arrive at the establishment of a minimum force which each State shall be obliged to maintain.

"The Japanese Representative has indeed well expressed the idea which lies behind our thought. Men have seldom drafted a document of such great importance.

"The Italian Prime Minister has very properly reminded us that we owe this great result to the blood of all of those who have offered up their lives to suppress once for all this attempt at universal domination and to assure the freedom of the world.

"I may add that we owe this to the intimate collaboration of peoples who have come from all the ends of the earth to defend the right and who have given us the idea of human solidarity, no longer confined to a single continent, but stretching over the whole world.

"Allow me, Gentlemen, in conclusion to express once more my deep conviction that seldom has humanity taken so great a step towards a better future."

MR. WELLINGTON KOO (China) delivers the following speech:

"Mr. President and Gentlemen. I have no lengthy eulogy to deliver, but I just want to express a very warm sentiment in my heart and to express it very briefly. I have listened with deep pleasure and profound satisfaction to the words of my esteemed colleagues here in commendation of the spirit of the draft constitution which has just been put before us. Just as no people are more anxious than we are to see the League of Nations established, so no people are more gratified than the people of China to see and note the completion of another stage in advance in the movement for the founding of a League of Nations. Representing, as I have the honor to represent, at least one-third of the population represented here in this distinguished assemblage, I believe it is only fitting that I should add a word of satisfaction to those which have already been so eloquently uttered to us; for not only the character of the conditions in this draft, but the spirit permeating all the provisions is of the most inspiring kind to us. We realize there is room for improvement perhaps, but we also realize that we are making a beginning now, and therefore I cannot help expressing the satisfaction of the Chinese Delegation with the spirit underlying this instrument, the spirit of fair-mindedness and friendship, the spirit of concord and conciliation. It is but the natural result of the spirit which has animated the entire membership of the Commission on the League of Nations, and I say this, gentlemen, from my very pleasant experience at the sittings of that Commission, of which I have the honor to be a member. Thanks to

the able leadership of President Wilson and also to the mutual cooperation of all members of the Commission, we are now at last in possession of an instrument which, as my distinguished colleague from Japan has already stated, is to be a memorable document in history, a document which will, when finally adopted, serve as a bulwark against international lawlessness and a guarantee of universal peace. Therefore, gentlemen, the rapid and successful completion of the work of the Commission on the League of Nations marks, to my mind, a very distinct milestone on the road upon which mankind has ever been toiling forward from time immemorial, in order to attain the goal of a durable peace. It is my privilege and duty, therefore, to assure the Conference that China will always be ready to cooperate with those who will be members of the League, not only for the organization, but also for the development, of this League of Nations, which will be the greatest institution that mankind will ever have seen."

MR. RUSTEM HAIDAR (Hedjaz), speaking in French, delivers the following speech:

"I know very well, Gentlemen, that the shortest speeches are the most welcome and I will therefore compress my observations into a few words.

"I have nothing to add to what has been said by the speakers who preceded me; it is not my place to apportion praise to those who guarantee justice to small nations. What I wish to say concerns Article 19 regarding nationalities which till now have been under the domination of the Turks. There is a word in the text which seems to me rather vague—the word 'Mandate'. What does it mean? We do not exactly know. And yet on the interpretation of what [*that*] word will depend the future of all the nations which, till today, have been oppressed by tyrants. We, therefore, reserve all our liberty of discussing this text when we come to examine it article by article. For the present I only wish to say that the nations in whose name I speak intend to remain free to choose the Power whose advice they will ask. Their right to decide their fate in the future has been recognized in principle. Very well! But you will allow me to say, Gentlemen, that a secret agreement to dispose of these nations has been prepared about which they have not been consulted. I ask the Assembly whether this state of things ought to exist or not. Seeing that this article has been accepted by all the Powers, I express the wish that the Powers interested in this question should declare on the first opportunity that this agreement concluded without their assent should of full right be pronounced null and void."

MR. HUGHES (Australia), enquired whether the Delegates would have an opportunity of discussing the text laid before the Conference and on which date that be held.

The PRESIDENT, MR. CLEMENCEAU (France), replied that the Report presented and commented on by the President of the United States had been deposited with the Bureau of the Conference for examination and discussion by all the interested Powers. The date on which the discussion could take place would depend on the completion of the preliminary examination of the scheme. The Bureau would lose no time in the Conference as soon as it was in a position to bring the Report up for a discussion.

The Session is adjourned at 18.55 o'clock (6:55 p. m.).

The President,

G. CLEMENCEAU

The Secretary-General,

P. DUTASTA.

The Secretaries,

J. C. GREW,

M. P. A. HANKEY,

PAUL GAUTHIER,

ALDROVANDI,

SADAO SABURI.

Annex A

*League of Nations Covenant*¹

PREAMBLE

In order to promote international co-operation and to secure international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another, the Powers signatory to this Covenant adopt this constitution of the League of Nations.

¹The draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations which was laid before the Plenary Session of February 14, 1919, does not accompany the Department's file copy of the American print of Protocol No. 3. The text here given is taken from the annex attached to the British print.

ARTICLE 1

The action of the High Contracting Parties under the terms of this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of meetings of a Body of Delegates representing the High Contracting Parties, of meetings at more frequent intervals of an Executive Council, and of a permanent international Secretariat to be established at the Seat of the League.

ARTICLE 2

Meetings of the Body of Delegates shall be held at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require for the purpose of dealing with matters within the sphere of action of the League. Meetings of the Body of Delegates shall be held at the Seat of the League or at such other place as may be found convenient, and shall consist of representatives of the High Contracting Parties. Each of the High Contracting Parties shall have one vote, but may not have more than three representatives.

ARTICLE 3

The Executive Council shall consist of representatives of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, together with representatives of four other States, members of the League. The selection of these four States shall be made by the Body of Delegates on such principles and in such manner as they think fit. Pending the appointment of these representatives of the other States, representatives of shall be members of the Executive Council.

Meetings of the Council shall be held from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at whatever place may be decided on, or failing any such decision, at the Seat of the League, and any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world may be dealt with at such meetings.

Invitations shall be sent to any Power to attend a meeting of the Council at which matters directly affecting its interests are to be discussed, and no decision taken at any meeting will be binding on such Power unless so invited.

ARTICLE 4

All matters of procedure at meetings of the body of Delegates of the Executive Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the Body of Delegates or the Executive Council, and may be decided by a majority of the States represented at the meeting.

The first meeting of the Body of Delegates and of the Executive Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.

ARTICLE 5

The permanent Secretariat of the League shall be established at which shall constitute the Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall comprise such Secretaries and staff as may be required, under the general direction and control of a Secretary-General of the League who shall be chosen by the Executive Council: the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary-General, subject to confirmation by the Executive Council.

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity at all times of the Body of Delegates or the Executive Council.

The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the States members of the League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.

ARTICLE 6

Representatives of the High Contracting Parties and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, and the buildings occupied by the League or its officials or by representatives attending its meetings shall enjoy the benefits of extra-territoriality.

ARTICLE 7

Admission to the League of States not signatories to the Covenant and not named in the Protocol hereto as States to be invited to adhere to the Covenant requires the assent of not less than two-thirds of the States represented in the Body of Delegates, and shall be limited to fully self-governing countries, including Dominions and Colonies.

No State shall be admitted to the League unless it is able to give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and unless it shall conform to such principles as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its naval and military forces and armaments.

ARTICLE 8

The High Contracting Parties recognise the principle that the maintenance of peace will require the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations, having special regard to the geographical situation and circumstances of

each State; and the Executive Council shall formulate plans for effecting such reduction. The Executive Council shall also determine for the consideration and action of the several Governments what military equipment and armament is fair and reasonable in proportion to the scale of forces laid down in the programme of disarmament; and these limits, when adopted, shall not be exceeded without the permission of the Executive Council.

The High Contracting Parties agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war lends itself to grave objections, and direct the Executive Council to advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those countries which are not able to manufacture for themselves the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

The High Contracting Parties undertake in no way to conceal from each other the condition of such of their industries as are capable of being adapted to warlike purposes or the scale of their armaments, and agree that there shall be full and frank interchange of information as to their military and naval programmes.

ARTICLE 9

A Permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the League on the execution of the provisions of Article 8 and on military and naval questions generally.

ARTICLE 10

The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all States members of the League. In case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Executive Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

ARTICLE 11

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the High Contracting Parties or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the League, and the High Contracting Parties reserve the right to take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.

It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly right of each of the High Contracting Parties to draw the attention of the Body of Delegates, or of the Executive Council, to any circumstances

affecting international intercourse which threaten to disturb international peace, or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

ARTICLE 12

The High Contracting Parties agree that should disputes arise between them which cannot be adjusted by the ordinary processes of diplomacy, they will in no case resort to war without previously submitting the questions and matters involved, either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Executive Council, and until three months after the award by the arbitrators or a recommendation by the Executive Council; and that they will not even then resort to war as against a member of the League which complies with the award of the arbitrators or the recommendation of the Executive Council.

In any case under this Article, the award of the arbitrators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the recommendation of the Executive Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

ARTICLE 13

The High Contracting Parties agree that whenever any dispute or difficulty shall arise between them which they recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration. For this purpose the Court of Arbitration to which the case is referred shall be the Court agreed on by the parties or stipulated in any Convention existing between them. The High Contracting Parties agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered. In the event of any failure to carry out the award, the Executive Council shall propose what steps can best be taken to give effect thereto.

ARTICLE 14

The Executive Council shall formulate plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice, and this Court shall, when established, be competent to hear and determine any matter which the parties recognise as suitable for submission to it for arbitration under the foregoing Article.

ARTICLE 15

If there should arise between States members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture which is not submitted to arbitration as above, the High Contracting Parties agree that they will refer the

matter to the Executive Council. Either party to the dispute may give notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof. For this purpose the parties agree to communicate to the Secretary-General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Executive Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.

Where the efforts of the Council lead to the settlement of the dispute, a statement shall be published indicating the nature of the dispute and the terms of settlement, together with such explanations as may be appropriate. If the dispute has not been settled, a report by the Council shall be published, setting forth with all necessary facts and explanations the recommendation which the Council think just and proper for the settlement of the dispute. If the report is unanimously agreed to by the members of the Council other than the parties to the dispute, the High Contracting Parties agree that they will not go to war with any party which complies with the recommendation, and that if any party shall refuse so to comply, the Council shall propose the measures necessary to give effect to the recommendation. If no such unanimous report can be made, it shall be the duty of the majority and the privilege of the minority to issue statements indicating what they believe to be the facts, and containing the recommendations which they consider to be just and proper.

The Executive Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Body of Delegates. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request must be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute. In any case referred to the Body of Delegates, all the provisions of this Article and of Article 12, relating to the action and powers of the Executive Council, shall apply to the action and powers of the Body of Delegates.

ARTICLE 16

Should any of the High Contracting Parties break or disregard its covenants under Article 12, it shall thereby *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all the other members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the League or not.

It shall be the duty of the Executive Council in such case to recommend what effective military or naval force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

The High Contracting Parties agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the High Contracting Parties who are acting to protect the covenants of the League.

ARTICLE 17

In the event of disputes between one State member of the League and another State which is not a member of the League, or between States not members of the League, the High Contracting Parties agree that the State or States not members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Executive Council may deem just, and upon acceptance of any such invitation, the above provisions shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the League.

Upon such invitation being given the Executive Council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances and merits of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

In the event of a Power so invited refusing to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and taking any action against a State member of the League which in the case of a State member of the League would constitute a breach of Article 12, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.

If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Executive Council may take such action and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

ARTICLE 18

The High Contracting Parties agree that the League shall be entrusted with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest.

ARTICLE 19

To those Colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory Power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory Power.

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory subject to conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League.

There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the mandatory State, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory State as integral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

In every case of mandate, the mandatory State shall render to the League an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the mandatory State shall, if not previously agreed upon by the High Contracting Parties in each case, be explicitly defined by the Executive Council in a special Act or Charter.

The High Contracting Parties further agree to establish at the seat of the League a Mandatory Commission to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatory Powers, and to assist the League in ensuring the observance of the terms of all Mandates.

ARTICLE 20

The High Contracting Parties will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women and children both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend; and to that end agree to establish as part of the organisation of the League a permanent Bureau of Labour.

ARTICLE 21

The High Contracting Parties agree that provision shall be made through the instrumentality of the League to secure and maintain freedom of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all States members of the League, having in mind, among other things, special arrangements with regard to the necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918.

ARTICLE 22

The High Contracting Parties agree to place under the control of the League all international bureaux already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. Furthermore, they agree that all such international bureaux to be constituted in future shall be placed under the control of the League.

ARTICLE 23

The High Contracting Parties agree that every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any State member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretary-General and as soon as possible published by him, and that no such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

ARTICLE 24

It shall be the right of the Body of Delegates from time to time to advise the reconsideration by States members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and of international conditions of which the continuance may endanger the peace of the world.

ARTICLE 25

The High Contracting Parties severally agree that the present Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly engage that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.

In case any of the Powers signatory hereto or subsequently admitted to the League shall, before becoming a party to this Covenant, have undertaken any obligations which are inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Power to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

ARTICLE 26

Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the States whose representatives compose the Executive Council and by three-fourths of the States whose representatives compose the Body of Delegates.

Preliminary Peace Conference, Protocol No. 4, Plenary Session of April 11, 1919

The Session is opened at 15 o'clock (3 p. m.) under the presidency of Mr. Clemenceau, President.

PRESENT

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

The President of the United States.
Honorable Robert Lansing.
Honorable Henry White.
Honorable Edward M. House.
General Tasker H. Bliss.

FOR THE BRITISH EMPIRE:

GREAT BRITAIN:

The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
The Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law.
The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes.
The Hon. C. J. Doherty.

Dominions and India:

CANADA:

The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden.
The Hon. Arthur L. Sifton.

AUSTRALIA:

The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Cook.

SOUTH AFRICA:

General The Rt. Hon. Louis Botha.

NEW ZEALAND:

The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey.

INDIA:

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Sinha.
Major-General His Highness The
Maharaja of Bikaner.

FOR FRANCE:

Mr. Clemenceau.
Mr. Pichon.
Mr. L. L. Klotz.
Mr. Jules Cambon.
Marshal Foch.

FOR ITALY:

Mr. V. E. Orlando.
The Baron S. Sonnino.
The Marquis Salvago Raggi.
Mr. Crespi (replacing Mr. Antonio
Salandra).
Mr. S. Barzilai.

FOR JAPAN:

The Marquis Saionji, former Presi-
dent of the Council of Ministers.
The Baron Makino.
Mr. K. Matsui.
Mr. H. Ijuin.

FOR BELGIUM:

Mr. Hymans.
Mr. van den Heuvel.
Mr. Vandervelde.

FOR BOLIVIA:

Mr. Ismael Montes.

FOR CHINA:

Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang.
Mr. Cheng-ting Thomas Wang.

FOR CUBA:

Mr. Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante.

FOR ECUADOR:

Mr. Dorn y de Alsua.

FOR GREECE:

Mr. Nicolas Politis.
Mr. A. Romanos, Envoy Extraordi-
nary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of His Majesty the King of the
Hellenes at Paris.

FOR GUATEMALA :

Mr. Joaquín Mendéz, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Guatemala at Washington, former Minister of State for Public Works and Public Instruction.

FOR HAITI :

Mr. Tertullien Guilbaud.

FOR THE HEDJAZ :

His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal
Mr. Rustem Haidar.

FOR HONDURAS :

Dr. Policarpo Bonilla, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Honduras at Paris.

FOR LIBERIA :

Hon. C. D. B. King.

FOR NICARAGUA :

Mr. Salvador Chamorro, President of the Chamber of Deputies.

FOR PANAMA :

Mr. Antonio Burgos.

FOR PERU :

Mr. Francisco García Calderón.

FOR POLAND :

Mr. Roman Dmowski.
Mr. Ignace Paderewski, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

FOR PORTUGAL

Dr. Affonso Costa, former President of the Council of Ministers.
Mr. Augusto Soares, former Minister for Foreign Affairs.

FOR ROUMANIA :

Mr. Jean J. C. Brătianu.
Mr. Vaida-Voevod, Minister of State.

FOR SERBIA :

Mr. N. P. Pachitch.
Mr. Trumbitch.
Mr. Ivan Zolger.

FOR SIAM :

The Prince Charoon.
The Prince Traidos Prabandhu.

FOR THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC :

Mr. Charles Kramar.
Mr. Edouard Benes.

FOR URUGUAY :

Mr. Jacobo Varela Acevedo, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, former Senator.

The Minutes of the Session of the 14th February, 1919 (Protocol No. 3), are passed.

The Agenda Paper provides for the submission to the Conference of the Report of the Commission on International Labor Legislation (Annex 1).

MR. BARNES (British Empire) delivers the following speech :

"Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen.

"It falls to my lot to-day to present to you the Report and recommendations of the Commission on International Labor Legislation. We have issued with our Report two separate and distinct documents, one being the text of a scheme for an organization embracing States, employers, and workmen (Annex II); the other, nine resolutions which have been adopted by the Commission and are suggested for insertion in the Peace Treaty, or issue therewith (Annex III). Before, however, dealing with the documents which have been issued, I might be allowed to offer a few observations of a general character as to our conception of the duty which was entrusted to us. And, first of all,

I want to say that we approached our work, as I am sure you would have had us do, in a sympathetic spirit, and from a humane point of view. Some of us knew our labor world at first hand, and we knew that there were many in it condemned to lives of penurious toil, relieved only by spells of compulsory idleness. In normal days, before the war, labor conditions were largely the result of blind chance. Age and want, that ill-matched pair, too often haunted the mind of the worker during his working life, and we must remember that the worker to-day still lives very largely in pre-war memories; he dreads return and is determined not to return to those pre-war conditions. Mr. Chairman, those pre-war experiences of labor have laid upon the world a heavy burden and a great danger. They have produced a workman who is class-centered, who regards work as a blessing, and has been deluded into the belief that the less work he does the more is left for his workmates. That feeling, and the practice based upon it, is demoralizing to the individual, and harmful to the community. But it can be eradicated only by security against unemployment and improved conditions of employment. In saying that, Mr. President, I am not casting stones at any class in regard to existing conditions. It has not been conscious cruelty, but rather the long arm of circumstances that has cast the devil's chain around the workmen of some countries. Nor do I deny that there is room for some to rise and to share in the pleasure of life, but, nevertheless, it is true to say that the mass remain a misfit in their present conditions, a source of concern to all lovers of their kind and a menace to the peace of the world. It is that latter aspect of it that makes labor regulation, and I should say labor improvement, an integral and an urgent part in the work of a Peace Conference. And the question, therefore, which we had to consider, Mr. Chairman, was not only how to improve material conditions, but how to provide the means whereby to produce a better mental atmosphere.

"Hitherto it has sometimes happened that efforts at improvements in a country have been checked by the fear or the plea of competition with other lower-wage countries. I do not enter into the question of the validity of the plea, although it may here be said, in parenthesis, that the highest wage countries, such as America, are not the least successful in world competition. I merely mention it as a factor which has often prevented improvements taking place; and international co-operation has hitherto been but fitful and sectional, sometimes on the part of some States and some workmen and some employers, sometimes on the part of workmen alone, sometimes on the part of employers alone.

"We are seeking now, for the first time in history, so far as I know, to get the willing co-operation of all concerned—States, employers,

and workmen—engaged in a common task and animated by a common desire to improve the workingman's conditions in all countries.

"But, Sir, at the threshold of our proceedings we came across two very real obstacles. First of all there were the different degrees of industrial development in the different countries and, second, there were the limitations imposed on States against accepting the decrees of any super-authority. And therefore we had perforce to give up ideas of uniformity or coercion, and to rely mainly upon the goodwill of States to accept advice and guidance which might be given to them. I freely admit that at one time I had a good deal more faith in penalties; but, Sir, closer inspection led me to the conclusion that penalties must be kept well in the background and can be applied only through the League of Nations and under the authority of the League of Nations.

"That provision is now embodied in our draft.

"But, Sir, while our minds were driven from one channel, our minds were at the same time attracted to the possibilities of another one. Publicity and agreement presented themselves in stronger and clearer colors. After all, it is not coercion so much that is wanted in most things; it is more, I think, knowledge and goodwill. And we have therefore provided in our scheme for meetings of States, employers, and workmen to be held in the light of day, to be representative of all concerned, and to be armed with the fullest possible information. It will be the duty of the organization which we propose to collect and distribute information, to promote healthy public opinion and, generally speaking, to diffuse light in dark places, wherever such may be found.

"That, then, may be said to be the fundamental and, as we believe, the effective idea in our scheme—the creation and mobilization of healthy public opinion.

"Mr. Chairman, having, I hope, conveyed the right impression as to the character of our proposals, let me just say a few words, without, I hope, any unnecessary detail, about our scheme of organization.

"First, let me say that the scheme was drafted in Paris and was submitted first of all to the British Delegation and British employers and Labor representatives, then presented to the Commission which you set up, and, after it had emerged from the Commission, again submitted in an altered and expanded form to British representatives. I do not want to pose as the champion of Britain in this matter. I do not want to take undue credit for anything; we can only take credit for the initiation. I am speaking now for the British Delegation. This document as it now appears before you is the product of many minds; it is the unanimous finding of the Commission which you yourselves set up. It puts into concrete form

what has been asked for and seen as a vision in France above all countries for many years.

"Now, let me say a few words about its main provisions. First of all, its boundaries are made to coincide with those of the League of Nations. We have two reasons for this: firstly, because in doing that the League of Nations is thereby invested with duties of a positive nature and associated with the everyday life of the community; and secondly, because all the nations in the League are brought into world cooperation for industrial improvement and thereby a favorable impression will be created on Labor in all countries because the impression will be created that the Peace Conference is seriously regarding this Labor problem.

"In the second place we provide for annual Conferences. These annual Conferences will consist of four members from each State; two members being directly representative of the State, and the others being representative of Labor and employers respectively. In so far as is possible and, in fact unless otherwise provided, the annual meetings will be held at the capital of the League of Nations, and we propose a new and novel form of voting at the Conferences. Each delegate will vote separately and independently, our object being to promote a spirit of internationality and moreover to enable Labor, as a whole, to take a due part in the deliberations. We propose that there should be a permanent office also constituted at the seat of the League of Nations, the duty of which would be to collect and distribute the information, as I have before mentioned; that that body should be under the control of what we call the Governing Body, and that the constitution of that Governing Body should be in the same proportion as the Conference itself, that is to say, one-half of States representatives and one-half of non-Government delegates.

"Now, Mr. Chairman, I come to procedure, and the most important article in that part of the document is No. 19. That article cost us a great deal of trouble. It was the article upon which it was most difficult to agree, but I am glad to say that agreement was ultimately reached—agreement being reached upon it by compromise, as most agreements are. It now provides that if proposals are endorsed by an annual Conference, they are cast into the form of a Convention, or, alternatively, into the form of a Recommendation, and that if either one or the other gets two-thirds of the votes passed at a Conference, it then becomes the finding of the Conference, and is deposited with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. Each High Contracting Party then comes under obligation to submit the Recommendation or Convention, as the case may be, to its appropriate competent authority; and, unless the Recommenda-

tion or Convention is accepted by such authority, that is the only obligation resting upon an affiliated State. But if the competent authority of this State accepts the Convention or the Recommendation, then, subject to a proviso in the next clause, about which I will say a word in a moment, subject to that proviso, then, it is under obligation to give it effect. But here we came upon the difficulty of the Federal State. There are some states which have no authority to make labor agreements in the form of Treaties. There are some States, such as the United States of America, that embrace many competent authorities in the sense in which the words are used in our document; and each of these competent authorities has a right, and must be left to decide for itself. It was because of this that we had to give the right to the Conference—to impose an obligation upon the Conference rather—to cast their finding in certain cases in the form of a Recommendation instead of a Convention, and we also had to provide, even if it were cast in the form of a Convention, that it would still be open for a Federal State to adopt it as a Recommendation to put before its own competent authorities and give effect to it, if at all, in its own time and in its own way. The net result of this—I want to be perfectly candid with the Conference—the net result of all this is, that a less degree of obligation falls upon a Federal State than upon other States signatory to our document. That is bad; it is regrettable, but, as we found, unavoidable. The difficulty was there. We did not make it, but we had to get over it in the best way open to us.

“I want to introduce two slight additions and, if you will allow me, Mr. Chairman, when the time comes for proposing the adoption of our scheme of organization, it will be understood that these have been made with the concurrence of all the countries with whom I have got into touch—France, United States of America, Italy (as far as she was able to say this morning), Japan, and India and the British Delegation. It will be remembered that I said a State was under obligation to put a Convention or Recommendation to its competent authorities within twelve months’ time from the end of the Conference. It has been pointed out to us that there might be unforeseen and exceptional circumstances and, in fact, a general election was mentioned as one which might occupy several months. It does in some countries, I believe; and we must provide against that particular contingency. It is therefore proposed that after the words ‘twelve months after the meeting of the Conference’ there should be inserted ‘or if it is impossible owing to exceptional circumstances to do so within a period of one year, then at the earliest possible moment and in no case later than eighteen months from the end of the Conference.’ This, as I have ascertained, is generally agreed to by the signatories. Then we pro-

pose to add a protocol to Article 19 to cover another point. You will remember that I said we ought to give up ideas of uniformity, at all events in some respects. There are some things in regard to which uniformity is impossible. That is implied by the document itself, because each nation has a right to accept or reject the findings of a Conference and therefore the Conference will always work under the knowledge that if they try the impossible—in the way of imposing upon an Eastern country for instance what was altogether out of the question for our day and generation—that country would simply reject the finding. However, in case there should be any misunderstanding, a form of words has been put forward as follows:—

“In framing any recommendation or draft Convention of general application the Conference shall have due regard to those countries in which climatic conditions, the imperfect development of industrial organization or other special circumstances make the industrial conditions substantially different, and shall suggest modifications, if any, which it considers may be required to meet the case of such countries.”

“Then the words in Clause 20 to which I have referred, if a State adopts a Convention it shall not be obliged to accept that Convention because there might be words in the Convention—what we have in mind is this: that the Convention might not be enforceable, to use a word which is in the document—it might not be applicable unless it was found that a certain number of States or a certain proportion of States had also adopted it. That is the proviso that I mentioned a while ago. Now only a word on the enforcement clauses from Number 23. It will be noted that although the machinery of organization is brought into play, reliance is placed on inquiry and publicity. The persons making the inquiry have to be selected from a panel by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. It will also be noted that the Court of the League of Nations may reverse, vary or affirm any decision. Then I pass over a lot of comparatively unimportant articles and I want to say that we have decided—subject to approval and subject to the United States agreeing to convene the Conference and co-operate—we have decided on a Conference being held this year. And we are most anxious to get authority to go on with that Conference as soon as possible.

“I now come to the resolutions. It was felt by the Commission that it was not sufficient to deal only with machinery. Great hope has been expressed—has been raised in different countries. We were told that something of a direct nature would be done here in Paris by the Peace-makers to make industrial as well as military peace. Of course it was not within our competence to deal specifically or in detail with anything of that kind, nor should I say, Mr. Chairman, is

it within the competence even of this Conference to lay down industrial changes for adoption by affiliated States. Still the Commissioners were so much impressed with the need for giving expression to some fundamental principles that they have adopted nine resolutions, each one of them having been adopted by a majority of two-thirds. Those are now before you for adoption or otherwise.

"That, Mr. Chairman, completed our work; the record is now before you in print and, providing you give us the necessary authority, we are quite ready to proceed forthwith to arrange for our first Conference. It is proposed that the first Conference should be held at Washington next October. That of course is subject to the co-operation of the Government of the United States and other arrangements being satisfactorily made by a Committee which we suggest should consist of seven, one of them being a representative of Switzerland, thereby bringing in the neutral countries.

"Well, Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, I need scarcely remind you of the urgency of this work of labor amelioration because it is known to all of us that new thoughts are surging up all around and among us, and as a result the world is at present in a ferment. Nor need I remind you of its importance, an importance, I should venture to say, second only to the preservation of peace, to which we have already given our hand and seal in the Covenant of the League of Nations. We believe that our scheme will give life and strength and vitality to the League of Nations by bringing it in contact with the daily life of the people. We believe that our scheme gives hope and will bring help to those whose lives are seared and scarred by toil and sorrow.

"Therefore, on behalf of the Commission, and subject of course to the modifications which may have to be made under your rules by the Drafting Committee or Commission, I have much satisfaction in commending it to your favorable consideration." (Applause.)

PRESIDENT WILSON expresses his opinion on the meeting of the first Conference in the following terms:—

"I rise not to add anything to what Mr. Barnes has said. I have admired what he has said altogether and concur in the conclusion with the greatest heartiness. I rise merely to say that no detail of the document is more welcome to my ears than the suggestion that the first Conference should be held in Washington in the United States, and I can assure the Conference that a most cordial invitation will be extended to the Conference to meet there." (Applause.)

MR. COLLIARD (France), speaking in French, expresses the views of the French Delegation on the Report of the Commission in the following speech:—

"Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen:

"As Mr. Barnes has just explained to us, the Commission on International Labor Legislation has used every endeavor to attain the objects for which it had been created.

"The Commission has paved the way for the establishment of a new and permanent organization which will render it possible to translate into deeds those feelings of humanity and justice which the democracies of the world regard as one of the necessary guarantees of peace.

"The results sought have been attained because a single principle has governed all our discussions, while the Delegates have always been in agreement with it.

"This principle is that, in the interests of the working men themselves, and in order that humane legislation may develop smoothly and without suffering by economic competition, it is necessary, at frequent intervals and by means of International Conventions, for the working men of all countries to be assured of certain minimum guarantees.

"These are the only conditions in which they will be able to see their lot improve day by day, and whereby they may find amid the riches and power of modern society the ease and leisure to which the development of civilization enables them legitimately to aspire.

"Thanks to the draft which is laid before you, the International Conventions will be drawn up with a facility which has not hitherto been attained. They will, moreover, acquire the breadth and importance which they ought to possess because adhesion to the permanent organization which will be charged with their preparation will be one of the necessary conditions of admission to the League of Nations.

"During the preparation of the draft, and while the details of the organization now adopted were being examined, divergent opinions were able to make themselves heard both in regard to determining the number of Delegates allotted to each constituent part of the Nations represented, and as regards reconciling the sovereignty of State rights in the matter of Labor legislation with the authority that the permanent organization ought to possess. In particular, certain Delegations wished to give more power to the decisions of that organization, and to invest it to some extent with a more direct legislative authority.

"No doubt these Delegations already foresaw the constitution of an International Parliament, which may be the solution of the future. Other Delegations were more careful of the sovereignty of the people which they represented, and were apprehensive lest, by the pursuit of premature settlements, they might hamper the initial action of a

work which must grow, strengthen itself and, by the fact of its own development, lead to lasting peace.

"However, all the Delegations were inspired by the same desire to achieve the task which had been entrusted to them, and they were able to make the necessary sacrifices in order to obtain the important result. So far as we are concerned we regret none of these sacrifices, certain as we are that the future will bring with it the settlement most favorable to a progressive and continuous improvement in Labor legislation.

"The British Delegation has submitted three draft amendments to the text which is laid before you. These amendments do not appear to us to touch fundamental principles, but the Commission was obliged to submit its Report before examining them, as a certain number of important Delegates had already left. The examination of these few amendments, therefore, now falls to the lot of the Plenipotentiary Delegates to the Conference.

"Whatever may happen, Gentlemen, I think we may congratulate ourselves on the results which the Commission on International Labor Legislation has attained, not only with respect to what it contributes to the present, but also to what it contains in embryo for the future; moreover, the solemn affirmation of its scope is recorded in the clauses which you are asked to introduce into the Treaty of Peace."

MR. VANDERVELDE (Belgium), speaking in French, sets forth his reasons for concurring in this Report of the Commission in the following speech:—

"Gentlemen,

"I am present at this session in a dual capacity. I represent Belgium, and I belong to the Commission on Labor. There may, however, be yet another motive for my having been honored by a request to speak, namely, that for many years past I have been among those who have striven for the institution of International Labor legislation, and I am no doubt qualified on that score to welcome the results which are about to be achieved: in the first place, the creation of a permanent organization of international legislation; secondly, the fact that in the Conferences which are to be held from this year onwards, members of the working-classes will sit for the first time as Plenipotentiaries; and, lastly, that, as we have every reason to hope, there will be inserted this very day in the Treaty of Peace the reforms which are laid down in our draft Labor Charter, especially those which the working-classes hold so dear, namely, a minimum wage and an 8-hour day.

"Hardly 48 hours ago I was present at a meeting of the Belgian Labor party at the 'Maison du Peuple' in Brussels. We were awaiting

on the following day the grant of the vote by universal suffrage for which we had been striving for more than a quarter of a century. We have won it. It was, moreover, known that this Assembly would have laid before it a proposal intended to proclaim the principle of an 8-hour day and, quite spontaneously, the working men present there said:—

“We only await a telegram from Paris in order to organize a double festival and a great manifestation in honor of the equality which we have acquired and of the 8-hour day.”

“This will show you, Gentlemen, the great importance which the Belgian working classes, like the British working classes, attach to the resolution which they await from you, and my reason for making this statement—I say so quite frankly—is that in other countries people are less optimistic in regard to the results which the Conference may be able to secure in this respect, and are less satisfied with the resolutions formulated by the Labor Commission.

“I should like to sum up briefly the objections which have been made to the proposals which my honorable friend Mr. Barnes, explained to us so fully just now.

“In the first place there is a complaint that Labor representation in the future Conference is inadequate.

“You are aware that, according to our draft resolution, the labor organizations are to have one representative, the employers’ organizations another one and States are each to be represented by two delegates. It is objected that this means giving Government Delegations an excessive preponderance and that it would be more rational for working men to be represented by one of their own number, the employers likewise, and the State by a single delegate who would act more or less in the capacity of an umpire.

“Personally, I was inclined at first sight to support this idea; however, after mature reflection, and after seeking the opinion of the Belgian technical delegates, both workmen and employers, I became firmly convinced that the proposal made by the British Delegation for one workman, one employer, and two Government Delegates, was more favorable than the other proposal to the interests of the working classes. You will at once grasp my reasons.

“By the terms of the draft a Convention, if it is to be submitted by the Governments to their Legislatures for ratification, must obtain a two-thirds majority of votes. Very well, in an assembly where employers, workmen and Governments each commanded one-third of the votes, it would suffice for one State representative to vote with the employers’ third in order to secure the rejection of a proposal; on the other hand, by the system which we propose, Governments and states have a preponderant influence and, in these cir-

umstances, if they incline to the side of the working classes it is they who will form, with the Labor representatives, the indispensable two-thirds majority.

"It will be argued that the State, however, will not incline to the side of the working classes, that the State today is the Capitalist State and will be on the side of the employers.

"You will not expect me, Gentlemen, as a Socialist, to maintain that the Governments of today are not Capitalist Governments, and undoubtedly if an interest of a vital character for the propertied and ruling classes were involved, the State, in its present form, would undoubtedly range itself on the side of the capitalists. The experience of the last few years has, however, shown that in matters of labor legislation and when there is a question of protecting the weak against the strong, the weak have acquired through their organizations sufficient strength to induce the State to incline towards them rather than towards their masters, and I am convinced that Mr. Lloyd George at any rate, who has just solved so successfully one of the gravest conflicts between Capital and Labor that has ever arisen in the world, will not dream of contradicting me on this point.

"Wherever democracy has become powerful and the working classes, by their syndicalistic efforts, have already acquired sufficient influence to oblige the State to take their wishes into account, those classes need not fear to find the Government Delegates against them; that is the reason for which, without further hesitation, I have energetically defended and voted for the proposal of the British Delegation.

"Another objection has been made to the Draft Resolution of the Commission, for the Italian Delegates considered that the powers given to the future Labor Legislation Conferences were insufficient. In point of fact these Conferences will be, in spite of everything, Conferences of Plenipotentiaries; they will not be able to vote for anything except recommendations or Conventions which must necessarily be submitted for ratification to the different Legislatures. Many, indeed, would have wished the creation of a Super-Parliament, the decisions of which would have bound the Parliaments and Governments of the various States represented.

"I do not hesitate to say, Gentlemen, that I regard the creation of such an International Super-Parliament as an ideal towards which we should strive. I hope that one day the League of Nations may be sufficiently developed to be able to dictate laws to the world. Politics, however, are the science of what is possible, and it is precisely because I expect great things from the International Labor Conference that I have been among those who did not wish to demand from

the Peace Conference the national abdications to which the nations themselves would not have consented. We must deal tenderly with the sovereignties which are beginning to draw closer to each other, and one day will federate, and it is in order to spare them that I have accepted the present text.

"Further objections have been made with regard to the Labor Charter which it is proposed to include in the Treaty of Peace. Some would have wished to make it more abundant in promises, and compared its text, which one must admit is somewhat meagre, to that of the resolutions recently adopted by the Labor Conference at Berne. But need I point out that 'comparison is not reason'? The Berne Conference gave expression to the wishes of the working classes and defined their aspirations. What we require of the Conference is something more, and also something less; it is to translate into declarations of principle by Governments a portion of the aspirations of the working classes. It will, too, be a great step forward if the Governments of the whole world declare as a point of principle that they regard a minimum wage, equality of wages as between the sexes, the protection of night work, the protection of child labor, freedom of trades-unions, and, lastly, the 8-hour day, as essential conditions of a just peace.

"Lastly, Gentlemen, there is one final objection to which I beg leave to draw your attention: it is proposed that the International Labor Conference and the International Labor Bureau should be dependencies of the League of Nations. In my opinion that is not merely desirable, but actually necessary, and as advantageous to the League of Nations as it is to the International Labor Conference. It has this result, however, that when, a few months hence, the first Labor Conference is assembled at Washington, we risk seeing a certain number of empty seats and some nations absent; there will be representatives of the working classes or employers of the Entente and of neutrals, but there will probably not be by then any representatives of the Powers which are still enemy Powers.

"Now, if that is conceivable, if it can even be maintained that it is inevitable at the present stage when the League of Nations is involved, who does not see how difficult, if not impossible, it will be to legislate in matters of International Labor Legislation without the presence of all the great industrial nations and without the representation of all the proletariats? Moreover, if such a situation were to be other than a merely transitory one, two things would come about: firstly, we should run the risk of seeing our Conference confronted by another Conference at which the proletariats would perhaps be more powerful and more influential; and secondly, that if such a situation became protracted, our International Legislation would risk being partially

inefficacious, because it would only be applied to a certain number of the great industrial countries. That was the reason for which the Commission was unanimous, not in demanding in the organic Statute of the Conference the immediate admission of all the industrial nations, but in voting the expression of a wish in favor of their incorporation as quickly as possible in the organization which we are about to establish.

"I must further express my conviction that the needs in regard to the protection of labor and to industrial legislation will be among the most powerful factors in the complete reconciliation of peoples to which I aspire with all the strength of my soul and my heart.

"That, Gentlemen, is what I wished to say to you. To sum up, I consider that the work of the Labor Commission has been one of fairness and moderation, one of 'give and take,' and, if I may say so, one of transition between the absolutism of the employers, which was the rule of yesterday, and the sovereignty of labor, which, I am ardently convinced will be the rule of tomorrow. For passing from the one to the other there are many roads: some are beset with violence and insurrection; others, on the contrary, give just as quick a journey, but without clashes and shocks. If I dared to express my thoughts in a tangible way, I should say that there are two methods of making the revolution which we feel is happening throughout the world, the Russian and the British method. It is the British method which has triumphed in the Labor Commission; it is the one which I greatly prefer, and it is for that reason that with all my heart I support the conclusions of my friend, Mr. Barnes, in expressing the hope that they may be accepted by the Conference, and that the events of today will show that the working classes, having been one of the decisive factors in winning the war, shall receive their due recompense at the moment in which we are about to make peace."

MR. BARZILAI (Italy), speaking French, expresses the views of the Italian Delegation in the following speech:—

"Gentlemen,

"It will be the honor of the Peace Conference to have established as one of its principal aims the drawing up of a Charter for Labor, and it will be a source of great satisfaction for the Italian Delegation to have used all its endeavors in the direction of a wider and more liberal comprehension of the principles which should animate this Charter in accordance with the proposals of Mr. Barnes, which it accepts in their entirety.

"For we feel, and I am sure of here reflecting faithfully the thoughts of us all, that there is no question of concessions to be granted but rather of rules to be fixed in the interests of the working-

men who are, together with their fellow-citizens, those who have given us our mandate to attend this Peace Conference.

"It has for long been the rule in Italy to treat Labor questions in a spirit of courageous foresight; and even quite recently, it might almost be said by the anticipated influence of the collective organization which is about to be set up, a free agreement between workmen and employers accepting the eight-hours day, to which Mr. Vandervelde, with all the weight of his authority, has just directly alluded, has marked a solemn stage on the road towards a better welfare and peace between the classes.

"I, therefore, feel it to be a special subject of congratulation that all the questions put down on the Agenda for the forthcoming meeting of the International Labor Conference, which is to be held at Washington, correspond to those formulated in the proposal for a Labor Charter made by the Italian Delegation during the early sessions.

"It is also a matter of satisfaction that Italy, in agreement with the great American Republic, should have laid before the Commission a proposal recognizing the necessity of social legislation in regard to the workers on the soil. This proposal did not command the two-thirds majority of votes, and could not therefore be inserted in the Labor Charter. But it commanded unanimity among the voters as regards the recognition of its great importance, for those who voted against it explained that they had done so solely because they considered agricultural laborers to be sufficiently protected by the general measures relating to all working-men.

"One question which is of especial interest to the Italian representatives is that of Labor emigration. The Italian Government during the last quarter of a century has paid the closest attention to this great social phenomenon which brings peoples closer together, which links up with each other the interests of different nations, and creates new affinities and fresh reasons for peace. I myself, as a member of the Italian Delegation to the Peace Conference, feel that I must state here that the sympathies by which my country is now surrounded are certainly due to a great extent to the spirit of work, sobriety, economy and enlightened patriotism which the Italian working-man has shewn abroad. It will therefore appear to you perfectly natural that questions concerned with emigration should be the subject of our especial attention; the Italian Delegation has only withdrawn certain proposals in regard to this argument in order not to retard the drawing up of the Labor Charter and because of the hope which it firmly entertained of being enabled to renew those proposals whenever circumstances might permit.

"You will allow me, Gentlemen, in conclusion, to express two wishes:

"The first one is that in the Labor Charter room should soon be found for the application of constitutional forms in the relations between Capital and Labor in order to enable Labor to have a say, not only in the drafting of Labor regulations, but also in the control of the economic life of industrial or agricultural enterprise. Italy has, moreover, quite recently set her footsteps courageously in this path.

"My second wish is, I am sure, shared by you all: it is that employers and employees may feel, as we feel, that the peace which we are forging here will not be in vain if each citizen contributes to the maximum his own efforts for the preservation of social peace."

LORD SINHA (India) expresses the views of British India in the following speech:—

"Mr. Chairman,

"I desire, with your permission, to offer a few observations on behalf of India which I and my friend, the Maharaja of Bikaner, have the privilege of representing. We have, in India, an industrial population fairly large in number, but relatively small as compared with our immense population. The reason is that, unfortunately for ourselves, our country is, from an industrial point of view, in an extremely backward condition, though it is our hope and our belief that, in the near future, a great impetus will be given to the development of indigenous industries. If, in bringing about that development, we are to build on safe and secure foundations, I, for one, feel convinced that the efficiency of our labor must be increased, and to that end we must devise measures to improve the conditions of labor and to provide facilities for the education and general well-being of our workers. Something has already been done in India in these directions. Eight years ago, after an elaborate investigation by an influential and representative Commission, the Indian Legislature passed a Factory Act, the result of which has been a considerable improvement already in the previous law and practice. But having regard to our climatic, social, and other conditions, so radically different from those existing in Western countries, that Factory Commission recommended, in the best interests of the country, that progress must necessarily be slow, and that, in the interests of the workmen, they must not lay down standards prevailing in Western countries. I admit that there is room for much improvement, but still, so far as India is concerned, I must confess that we who are here to watch over and to protect, so far as we can, the interests of India, watched the building up of this Convention with some misgiving. We feared

that the special conditions of Eastern countries might not be sufficiently realized. We apprehended danger that the international regulation of labor might, under the pressure of public opinion, tend to make backward countries adopt, contrary to their best interests, and possibly against their will, measures which were not adapted to their conditions. Happily these differences of conditions have now been fully recognized by the slight addition which Mr. Barnes commended to your attention to-day—the addition in the form of a protocol to Article 19, which runs as follows:—

“In framing any recommendation or draft Convention of general application, the Conference shall have due regard to those countries in which climatic conditions, the imperfect development of industrial organizations, or other special circumstances make the industrial conditions substantially different, and shall suggest modifications, if any, which it considers may be required to meet the case of such countries.”

“With this safeguard, to which we in India attach the highest importance, we gladly and whole-heartedly accept this Convention, and I am sufficient of an optimist to believe that the International Labor Convention will prove, not an instrument to compel India and other countries in the same situation, against their will and contrary to their best interests, to accept impracticable standards, but a body on which India and other countries in the same situation will rely for advice and counsel for the steady and progressive amelioration of labor.”

The MAHARAJA OF BIKANER (India) expresses the views of the States of India in the following speech:—

“Mr. President and Gentlemen,

“In endorsing generally the remarks made by my Right Honorable colleague, Lord Sinha, I should like also to give expression to my warm sympathy in regard to ameliorating the conditions of labor wherever the necessity is apparent. In view, however, of the conditions and circumstances—economic, industrial and otherwise which prevail in India, it would have been impossible for me, as one who has the honor of representing the ruling Princes of India, to bind the Indian States to proposals which, however suitable they may be for Western countries, would have proved prejudicial both to the interests of the people of India as well as to the labor and industries of the country. I am, therefore, very glad that due regard has been paid to the special conditions of India and that a provision has been inserted to which Lord Sinha has already referred. It therefore remains for me only to make one point quite clear.

“As the territories of the ruling Princes lie outside British India, and as legislation enacted for British India by the British Government cannot apply to the Indian States, and as furthermore the only

competent authority to legislate for an Indian State is the Government of the State concerned, it should be clearly understood, with reference to Article 19 of the draft Convention, that 'the authority or the authorities within whose competence the matter lies for the enactment of legislation or other action' shall be the constituted authorities of the various Indian States concerned."

MR. BARNES (British Empire) : I now beg to move, Mr. Chairman, the following resolution:—

"That the Conference approves the Draft Convention creating a permanent organization for the promotion of international regulation of labor conditions which has been submitted by the Labor Commission, with the amendments proposed by the British Delegation; instructs the Secretariat to request the Governments concerned to nominate forthwith their representatives on the organizing committee for the October Conference, and authorizes that committee to proceed at once with its work."

You will remember I said our work was divided into two parts. A scheme for the organization of State employers, and workers, which is covered by this resolution. I move this resolution for the adoption of the scheme of organization. That still leaves the road open for the consideration of the second part, namely, the nine resolutions at the end, which are separate and distinct, and have still to be dealt with.

MR. DE BUSTAMANTE (Cuba), speaking in French, makes, in the name of the Cuban Delegation, the following reservations regarding the draft Convention:—

"The Delegation of the Cuban Republic will vote with pleasure for the draft Convention which has been submitted to us, and the clauses for the Treaty of Peace. However, I must make a reservation in regard to Article 37, respecting the amendments to the Convention, because it is incompatible with the constitutional law of the Republic. I request the insertion of this reservation in the Minutes of the proceedings.

"After making this clear, it only remains to me to express my concurrence in the words which have been spoken this afternoon and with the desires expressed for an improvement in the condition of labor throughout the whole world."

SIR ROBERT BORDEN (Canada), moves in the following terms an addition to the motion proposed by Mr. Barnes:—

"Mr. Chairman: It would be both presumptuous and unnecessary for me to attempt to add anything to the very eloquent speeches which have been made this afternoon upon the all-important subject which has engaged the attention of the Labor Commission for several

weeks past. It is possible that some of us would have framed the dispositions of the proposed Conventions somewhat differently, but the main purpose, and after all, the great purpose, in respect of this Convention, as in respect of the League of Nations, is to secure the adhesion of the different States to an arrangement which will tend to the welfare of humanity in the future. That purpose, I think, has been accomplished in the draft Convention which has been laid before us; and I desire to offer my congratulations to the Labor Commission on the good work which it has done in that regard.

"I have just one word to add. This Convention is linked in many ways by its terms to the Covenant of the League of Nations, and I think it desirable to make it perfectly plain that the character of its membership and the method of adherence should be the same in the one case as in the other. Probably, after all, in view of the dispositions of the Convention, that is only a matter of drafting; but in order to prevent any misapprehension and to make the matter perfectly clear, I move the following words be added to the motion which has been proposed by Mr. Barnes:—

"The Conference authorizes the Drafting Committee to make such amendments as may be necessary to have the Convention conform to the Covenant of the League of Nations in the character of its membership and in the method of adherence.'"

The Delegates of Bolivia, Ecuador and Panama make reservations in regard to Article 37 of the Draft Convention in view of the provisions of the Constitution of their Countries.

MR. MONTES (Bolivia): For reasons connected with the constitutional law of Bolivia, which is unable to accept emendations of the Acts passed by the legislative power, except such as may originate from that power, I am compelled to make, and do therefore make, the same reservations as the Cuban Delegation in regard to Article 37. If, indeed, as a result of ratification by the majority of States, the amendments became binding even on those which had not ratified them, the power to legislate would in point of fact have been thereby delegated, a thing which is forbidden by the Bolivian Constitution.

Having made these reservations, I hasten to add that I will cordially vote for the acceptance of the Draft which has been submitted at to-day's session to the Conference.

MR. DORN Y DE ALSUA (Ecuador).

"The Ecuadorean Delegation will have every pleasure in voting for the Draft which has been presented, but entirely associates itself with the reservations made by the Delegations of the Cuban and Bolivian Republics on the subject of Article 37."

MR. BURGOS (Panama).

"Gentlemen: If a society is to make progress, it is indispensable that its members should not be benumbed by indifference or inertia. Each one of them must use all his energy, must bring his contribution to the common task, and share according to his means in the complex organization of the social edifice.

"But if a definite result is to be obtained, communion with one's own thoughts is not enough; we must live in the world and with the world; and by that I mean that each one must take up his share of the common burdens, must reach an understanding of the conditions of labor, and must follow the trend of prevailing ideas, for that is the only way of contributing to general progress by a more accurate knowledge of the worth of each social class. Thence arises the necessity of watching over the usefulness of our acts, of shunning all methods of constraint whether moral or physical, of respecting every category of workers, for each category contributes in its own way to social harmony. That is the way to apply the principle of relativity so as to ensure general cohesion.

"The time has passed when people could rest satisfied with the enunciation of a few utopian ideas from which the happiness of the world should spring. The hour has now struck for carrying into effect the changes recognized as indispensable in order to enable the working-classes to hold the place in modern society to which they are entitled, and to take their great share of the welfare of humanity. Without that, the inventions of the brain, progress in technical methods and economic laws, would be of no avail, for the working-classes make for all progress and their interests may not be hampered by anything which is old, or seems old.

"Such are the considerations which confer its importance on the scheme for International Labor Legislation which has been submitted for your deliberation. The Panama Delegation gives its enthusiastic adhesion and likewise reserves the right to point out to its Government the scope of Article 37."

MR. VARELA ACEVEDO (Uruguay), speaking in French, declares in the following terms that he unreservedly concurs in the draft Convention.

"The Uruguayan Delegation accepts forthwith and unrestrictedly not only the Convention which has been laid before you for examination, but also the social principles which are to be embodied in the Treaty of Peace. The most important of these principles, viz., the 8-hour day, the weekly rest, the protection of children, stand already on our Statute Book. They have contributed to the economic development of our country, and to social pacification.

"We wish that the success of our experience, however modest, may encourage other countries to enter on this path, which is the one of justice, and even a safeguard for democratic institutions.

"We should therefore be proud to see our policy shared by the great men present here."

PRESIDENT WILSON expresses in the following terms his deep regret at the absence of Mr. Gompers:—

"Mr. Chairman: No one could have desired a more adequate exposition of this report than that which Mr. Barnes has given. But I cannot let this occasion pass without expressing my personal regret that my fellow countryman, Mr. Samuel Gompers, is not here. Mr. Gompers, as you know, was the Chairman of this Commission. He went home only under the compulsion of imperative duties there. I know how thoroughly and truly he represents the sentiment of the working-men of America. I wish very heartily that he were here to do what I am not qualified to do—express their sentiments and their entire concurrence in what I regard as this admirable document."

The PRESIDENT calls upon Sir Robert Borden to read his amendment.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN reads his amendment, which runs as follows:—

"The Conference authorizes the Drafting Committee to make such amendments as may be necessary to have the Convention conform to the Covenant of the League of Nations in the character of its membership and in the method of adherence."

This amendment is added, with the assent of the Conference, to Mr. Barnes' resolution.

Mr. Barnes' resolution, thus completed, is put to the vote and unanimously adopted.

The session is adjourned at 17.30 o'clock (5.30 P. M.).

The President,

G. CLEMENCEAU

The Secretary-General,

P. DUTASTA.

The Secretaries,

J. C. GREW

M. P. A. HANKEY

PAUL GAUTHIER

ALDROVANDI

SADAO SABURI

Annex I

Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission on International Labor Legislation

The Commission has held thirty-five meetings, and has drawn up its conclusions in two parts. The first is a draft convention containing provisions for the establishment of a permanent organization for international labor legislation. (See Annex II.) This convention, which was based on a draft presented by the British Delegation, has been the subject of the most careful examination and discussion. The first part of this report may conveniently take the form of a commentary thereon. The second part of the Commission's conclusions is in the form of clauses (see Annex III) containing declarations of principle in regard to a number of matters which are of vital importance to the labor world. At the opening sittings, the various Delegations agreed on the need for such declarations, which the Commission suggests should be included in the Treaty of Peace, in order that it may mark not only the close of the period which culminated in the world-war, but also the beginning of a better social order and the birth of a new civilization.

PART I.—*Permanent Organization*

PREAMBLE

The main idea underlying the scheme embodied in the Convention is that the constitution of the League of Nations will not provide a real solution of the troubles which have beset the world in the past, and will not even be able to eliminate the seeds of international strife, unless it provides a remedy for the industrial evils and injustices which mar the present state of society. In proposing, therefore, to establish a permanent organization in order to adjust labor conditions by international action, the Commission felt that it was taking an indispensable step towards the achievement of the objects of the League of Nations and has given expression to this idea in the Preamble, which defines the objects and scope of the proposed organization.

CHAPTER I

Chapter I provides the machinery of the permanent organization proposed. In the first place, it is stipulated (Article I) that participation in this organization shall be a condition of membership of the League of Nations, since every State Member of the League is morally bound to accept the principles set forth in the Preamble,

if it has really at heart the promotion of the cause of justice and humanity.

The organization itself is divided into two parts: (1) The International Labor Conference; (2) The International Labor Office controlled by a Governing Body. (Article 2.)

1. International Labor Conference.

This Conference will meet at least annually and will consist of delegates nominated by each of the High Contracting Parties, two of whom will be directly appointed by the Governments, and the other two will be chosen in agreement with the industrial organizations representative of their employers and workpeople respectively. (Article 3.)

Each delegate will vote individually (Article 4.) It was strongly felt by the Commission that if the Conference was really to be representative of all those concerned with industry and to command their confidence, the employers and workpeople must be allowed to express their views with complete frankness and freedom, and that a departure from the traditional procedure of voting by national units was therefore necessary. It was accordingly thought that the employers' and workpeople's delegates should be entitled to speak and vote independently of their Governments.

Some difference of opinion made itself felt on the Commission as to the relative numbers of the delegates representing the Governments, the employers and the workpeople respectively. The French, American, Italian and Cuban Delegations contended that each of these three parties should have equal voting power. They maintained that the working classes would never be satisfied with a representation which left the Government and the employers combined in a majority of three to their one. In other words, the proposal amounted to giving the States a veto on the proceedings of the Conference which would create so much distrust of it among the workers that its influence would be seriously prejudiced from the start. This view was contested by the British, Belgian and other Delegations, who pointed out that as the Conference was not simply an assembly for the purpose of passing resolutions, but would draw up draft conventions which the States would have to present to their legislative authorities, it was essential that the Governments should have at least an equal voice. Otherwise, it might often happen that conventions adopted by a two-thirds majority of the Conference would be rejected by the legislatures of the various States, which would have the effect of rendering the proceedings of the Conference nugatory and would quickly destroy its influence and prestige. The adoption of a proposal to which the majority of the Governments were opposed would not lead to any practical result,

as the legislative authorities of the Governments whose delegates were in the minority would in all probability refuse to accept it. Moreover, it was likely, especially in the future, that the Government delegates would vote more often with the workers than against them. If this were so, it was obviously to the advantage of the latter that the Governments should have two votes instead of one, as it would render it easier for them to obtain a two-thirds majority, which under the Franco-American proposal would be practically impossible, if the employers voted in a body against them.

The Commission finally decided by a narrow majority to maintain the proposal that each Government should have two delegates.

The Italian Delegation, which united with the French Delegation in urging the importance of securing representation for agricultural interests, were to some extent reconciled to the above decision by the consideration that, as the Governments would have two delegates, it would be easier to secure such representation. It should also be observed that, as different technical advisers may be appointed for each subject of discussion, agricultural advisers may be selected, when necessary.

2. International Labor Office (Articles 6 to 13).

This Office will be established at the seat of the League of Nations, as part of its administrative organization. It will be controlled by a Governing Body of 24 members, the composition of which is provided for in the Protocol to Article 7. Like the Conference, the Governing Body will consist of representatives of the Governments, employers and workpeople. It will include 12 representatives of the Governments, 8 of whom will be nominated by the States of chief industrial importance, and the remaining 12 will consist of six members nominated by the employers' delegates to the Conference, and six nominated by the workers' delegates. The objects and functions of the Office are sufficiently explained in the articles referred to.

CHAPTER II

1. Procedure (Articles 14 to 21).

This portion of the Convention contains one article of vital importance, namely, Article 19, which treats of the obligations of the States concerned in regard to the adoption and ratification of draft conventions agreed upon by the International Conference.

The original draft proposed that any draft convention adopted by the Conference by a two-thirds majority must be ratified by every State participating, unless within one year the national legislature should have expressed its disapproval of the draft convention. This implied an obligation on every State to submit any draft convention

approved by the Conference to its national legislature within one year, whether its own Government representatives had voted in favor of its adoption or not. This provision was inspired by the belief that, although the time had not yet come when anything in the nature of an international legislature, whose decisions should be binding on the different States was possible, yet it was essential for the progress of international labor legislation to require the Governments to give their national legislatures the opportunity of expressing their opinion on the measures favored by a two-thirds majority of the Labor Conference.

The French and Italian Delegations, on the other hand, desired that States should be under an obligation to ratify conventions so adopted, whether their legislative authorities approved them or not, subject to a right of appeal to the Executive Council of the League of Nations. The Council might invite the Conference to reconsider its decision, and in the event of its being reaffirmed there would be no further right of appeal.

Other Delegations, though not unsympathetic to the hope expressed in the first resolution printed at the end of the draft convention, that in course of time the Labor Conference might, through the growth of the spirit of internationality, acquire the powers of a truly legislative international assembly, felt that the time for such a development was not yet ripe. If an attempt were made at this stage to deprive States of a large measure of their sovereignty in regard to labor legislation, the result would be that a considerable number of States would either refuse to accept the present convention altogether, or, if they accepted it, would subsequently denounce it, and might even prefer to resign their membership of the League of Nations rather than jeopardise their national economic position by being obliged to carry out the decisions of the International Labor Conference. The majority of the Commission therefore decided in favor of making ratification of a convention subject to the approval of the national legislatures or other competent authorities.

The American Delegation, however, found themselves unable to accept the obligations implied in the British draft on account of the limitations imposed on the central executive and legislative powers by the constitution of certain federal States, and notably of the United States themselves. They pointed out that the Federal Government could not accept the obligation to ratify conventions dealing with matters within the competence of the forty-eight States of the Union, with which the power of Labor legislation for the most part rested. Further, the Federal Government could not guarantee that the constituent States, even if they passed the necessary legislation to give effect to the convention, would put it into effective operation, nor could

it provide against the possibility of such legislation being declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Judicial Authorities. The Government could not therefore engage to do something which was not within their power to perform, and the non-performance of which would render them liable to complaint.

The Commission felt that they were here faced by a serious dilemma, which threatened to make the establishment of any real system of international labor legislation impossible. On the one hand, its range and effectiveness would be almost fatally limited if a country of such industrial importance as the United States did not participate. On the other hand, if the scheme were so weakened as to impose no obligation on States to give effect to, or even to bring before their legislative authorities, the decisions of the Labor Conference, it was clear that its work would tend to be confined to the mere passage of resolutions instead of resulting in the promotion of social reforms with the sanction of law behind them.

The Commission spent a considerable amount of time in attempting to devise a way out of this dilemma, and is glad to be able to record that it ultimately succeeded in doing so. Article 19 as now drafted represents a solution found by a Sub-Commission consisting of representatives of the American, British and Belgian Delegations specially appointed to consider the question. It provides that the decisions of the Labor Conference may take the form either of recommendations or of draft conventions. Either must be deposited with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations and each State undertakes to bring it within one year before its competent authorities for the enactment of legislation or other action. If no legislation or other action to make a recommendation effective follows, or if a draft convention fails to obtain the consent of the competent authorities concerned, no further obligation will rest on the State in question. In the case of a Federal State, however, whose power to enter into conventions on labor matters is subject to limitations, its Government may treat a draft convention to which such limitations apply as a recommendation only.

The Commission felt that there might in any event be instances in which the form of a recommendation affirming a principle would be more suitable than that of a draft convention, which must necessarily provide for the detailed application of principles in a form which would be generally applicable by every State concerned. Subjects will probably come before the Conference which, owing to their complexity and the wide differences in the circumstances of different countries, will be incapable of being reduced to any universal and uniform mode of application. In such cases a convention might prove impossible, but a recommendation of principles in more or less

detail which left the individual States freedom to apply them in the manner best suited to their conditions would undoubtedly have considerable value.

The exception in the case of Federal States is of greater importance. It places the United States and States which are in a similar position under a less degree of obligation than other States in regard to draft conventions. But it will be observed that the exception extends only to those Federal States which are subject to limitations in respect to their treaty-making powers on labor matters, and further that it only extends in so far as those limitations apply in any particular case. It will not apply in the case of a convention to which the limitations do not apply, or after any such limitations as may at present exist have been removed. Though reluctant to contemplate an arrangement under which all States would not be under identical obligations, the Commission felt that it was impossible not to recognize the constitutional difficulties which undoubtedly existed in the case of certain Federal States, and therefore proposed the above solution as the best possible in the circumstances.

Attention should be drawn to the protocol to Article 19. The fear was expressed that the article might be interpreted as implying that a State would be required to diminish the protection already afforded to the workers by its legislation as a result of the adoption of a recommendation or draft convention by the Conference; and in consequence, the protocol was added in order to make it quite clear that such an interpretation was inadmissible.

It should be added that the Japanese Delegation abstained from voting on Article 19, as they had not yet received instructions from their Government in the matter. The Italian Delegation also abstained on the ground of the inadequacy of the powers given to the Conference.

2. *Enforcement* (Articles 22 to 34).

These articles provide machinery whereby a State which fails to carry out its obligations arising under Article 19, or which fails to enforce a convention which it has ratified, may be made subject to economic measures. This machinery is briefly as follows:—

An industrial association of employers and workpeople may make representations to the International Labor Office which the Governing Body may at its discretion communicate to the State complained of for its observations. (Article 23.) If no satisfactory reply is received, the Governing Body may publish the correspondence (Article 24), which in most cases will probably create sufficient pressure by public opinion to cause the complaint to be remedied.

The Governing Body also has the power, either on its own motion or on receipt of a complaint from a Government or from a Delegate

to the Conference, to apply to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to nominate a commission of enquiry. For the purpose of such enquiries, each High Contracting Party undertakes to nominate one employer, one workman and one person of independent standing, and each commission shall consist of one person drawn from each of these three categories. (Articles 25 and 26.) The Commission will report on the facts, recommend the steps which should be taken to meet the complaint, and indicate the economic measures, if any, which it considers would be appropriate in the event of the condition complained of not being remedied. (Article 28.)

Appeal may be made to the Permanent Court of International Justice of the League of Nations, which shall have power to review the findings of the Commission. (Articles 29 to 32.) If the defaulting State fails to carry out the recommendations of the Commission or the Permanent Court, as the case may be, within the specified time, it will then be open to the other States to take the economic measures indicated against it. (Article 33.)

It will be seen that the above procedure has been carefully devised in order to avoid the imposition of penalties, except in the last resort, when a State has flagrantly and persistently refused to carry out its obligations under a convention. It can hardly be doubted that it will seldom, if ever, be necessary to bring these powers into operation, but the Commission consider that the fact of their existence is nevertheless a matter of almost vital importance to the success of the scheme.

The representatives of the working classes in some countries have pressed their delegates to urge more drastic provisions in regard to penalties. The Commission, while taking the view that it will in the long run be preferable as well as more effective to rely on the pressure of international public opinion rather than on economic measures, nevertheless considers it necessary to retain the possibility of the latter in the background. If all forms of sanction were removed, the effectiveness of the scheme, and, what is almost equally important, the belief in its effectiveness, would be in a great measure destroyed.

CHAPTER III

General.

This chapter does not call for much comment, but attention should perhaps be drawn to the provisions of Article 35, which provide that the British Dominions and India and any colonies or possessions of any State which may hereafter be recognized as fully self-governing by the Executive Council of the League of Nations, shall have the same rights and obligations under the convention as if they were separate High Contracting Parties. It seemed evident to the Commission that colonies which were fully self-governing,

not only as regards labor legislation but generally, must be regarded as separate entities for the purposes of the Labor Conference, but it was decided that a State and its self-governing colonies should not have more than one seat in the Governing Body. In the case of colonies which are not fully self-governing, the mother country undertakes the obligation to apply labor conventions to them, unless local conditions render it impossible to apply them either wholly or in part.

CHAPTER IV

Transitory Provisions.

This chapter provides, *inter alia*, for the holding of the first Conference in October 1919.

The Commission felt it was essential that the Conference should meet at the earliest possible moment, but that, if it was to do its work effectively, some time must be allowed for the collection of information and for the different countries to prepare their views on the various subjects for discussion. The Conference could, therefore, hardly meet earlier than October. In the schedule to Article 39, it is proposed that the arrangements for this Conference should be made by an international committee consisting of representatives of the States named, with power to invite other States to send representatives, if necessary. It is suggested that the United States Government might be willing to convene the Conference at Washington, and the Commission much hopes that they will be willing to undertake this task. It is also suggested that the Peace Conference should approve the agenda set out in the same schedule.

The Italian Delegation proposed that all Nations should be admitted to the Conference immediately after the signature of the Peace Treaty, but the Commission confined itself to passing the second resolution attached to the draft convention.

In conclusion, it should be remarked that after a long discussion on the question of adopting certain measures in the interest of seamen, the Commission thought that "the very special questions concerning the minimum conditions to be accorded to seamen might be dealt with at a special meeting of the International Labor Conference devoted exclusively to the affairs of seamen," at which the Delegates and technical advisers could accordingly be chosen from the shipping community. (See resolution attached to the Convention.)

PART II.—*Labor Clauses*

The Commission were unanimous in thinking that their work would not be complete if it were simply confined to setting up a permanent machinery for International Labor Legislation. It was not within

their competence or within their terms of reference to deal with specific questions relating to industrial conditions and to work them out with the detail necessary for the framing of proposals which could be accepted in a binding form. So impressed were they, however, with the urgent need for recognizing explicitly certain fundamental principles as necessary to social progress, that they decided to submit a series of declarations for insertion in the Peace Treaty. They did not feel called upon, however, to draw up a Charter containing all the reforms which may be hoped for in a more or less distant future, but confined themselves to principles the realization of which may be contemplated in the near future.

It will be seen that the High Contracting Parties are not asked to give immediate effect to them, but only to endorse them generally. It will be the duty of the International Labor Conference to examine them thoroughly and to put them in the form of recommendations or draft conventions elaborated with the detail necessary for their practical application.

Proposals were placed before the Commission by the Italian, French, American, Belgian and British Delegations as to the declarations which should be made. The Commission decided that no declaration should be submitted to the Peace Conference, unless it were adopted by a two-thirds majority, and it now has the honor of submitting nine declarations, all of which obtained such a majority and some of which were adopted unanimously.

It should be added, in conclusion, that a majority, but not a two-thirds majority, was obtained for a proposal couched in very general terms which suggested the application to agriculture of the general principles of labor legislation, and which arose out of an Italian proposal in regard to the limitation of the hours of work in agriculture. The delegates who voted against this proposal were, as they explained, by no means hostile to its general idea, but they thought that a proposal in such wide terms was not suitable for inclusion among the declarations to be put forward.

SAMUEL GOMPERS,
President.

ARTHUR FONTAINE,
General Secretary.

HAROLD BUTLER,
Assistant General Secretary.

PARIS, March 24, 1919.

Annex II

COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL LABOR LEGISLATION

DRAFT CONVENTION

A Draft Convention Creating a Permanent Organization for the Promotion of the International Regulation of Labor Conditions

PREAMBLE

WHEREAS the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal peace, and such a peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice;

And whereas conditions of labor exist involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled; and an improvement of those conditions is urgently required: as, for example, by the regulation of the hours of work, including the establishment of a maximum working day and week, the regulation of the labor supply, the prevention of unemployment, the provision of an adequate living wage, the protection of the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising out of his employment, the protection of children, young persons and women, provision for old age and injury, protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own, recognition of the principle of freedom of association, the organization of technical and vocational education and other measures;

Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labor is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries;

The High Contracting Parties, moved by sentiments of justice and humanity, as well as by the desire to secure the permanent peace of the world, agree to the following convention:—

CHAPTER I.—*Organization*

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties, being the States members of the League of Nations, hereby decide to establish a permanent organization for the promotion of the objects set forth in the Preamble, and for this purpose hereby accept the provisions contained in the following Articles.

Article 2

The permanent organization shall consist of (i) a General Conference of Representatives of the High Contracting Parties and (ii) an

International Labor Office controlled by the Governing Body described in Article 7.

Article 3

The meetings of the General Conference of Representatives of the High Contracting Parties shall be held from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once in every year. It shall be composed of four Representatives of each of the High Contracting Parties, of whom two shall be Government Delegates and the two others shall be Delegates representing respectively the employers and the workpeople of each of the High Contracting Parties.

Each Delegate may be accompanied by advisers, who shall not exceed two in number for each item on the agenda of the meeting. When questions specially affecting women are to be considered by the Conference, one at least of the advisers should be a woman.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to nominate non-Government Delegates and advisers chosen in agreement with the industrial organizations, if such organizations exist, which are most representative of employers or workpeople, as the case may be, in their respective countries.

Each Delegate may be accompanied at each sitting of the Conference by not more than two advisers. The advisers shall not speak except on a request made by the Delegate whom they accompany and by the special authorization of the President of the Conference, and may not vote.

A Delegate may in writing addressed to the President appoint one of his advisers to act as his deputy, and the adviser, while so acting, shall be allowed to speak and vote.

The names of the Delegates and their advisers will be communicated to the International Labor Office by the Government of each of the High Contracting Parties.

The credentials of Delegates and their advisers shall be subject to scrutiny by the Conference, which may, by two-thirds of the votes cast by the Delegates present, refuse to admit any Delegate or adviser whom it deems not to have been nominated in accordance with the undertaking contained in this Article.

Article 4

Every Delegate shall be entitled to vote individually on all matters which are taken into consideration by the Conference.

If one of the High Contracting Parties fails to nominate one of the non-Government Delegates whom it is entitled to nominate, the other non-Government Delegate shall be allowed to sit and speak at the Conference, but not to vote.

If in accordance with Article 3 the Conference refuses admission to a Delegate of one of the High Contracting Parties, the provisions of the present Article shall apply as if that Delegate had not been nominated.

Article 5

The meetings of the Conference shall be held at the seat of the League of Nations, or at such other place as may be decided by the Conference at a previous meeting by two-thirds of the votes cast by the Delegates present.

Article 6

The International Labor Office shall be established at the seat of the League of Nations as part of the organization of the League.

Article 7

The International Labor Office shall be under the control of a Governing Body consisting of 24 members, appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol hereto.

The Governing Body shall, from time to time, elect one of its members to act as its Chairman, shall regulate its own procedure and shall fix its own times of meeting. A special meeting shall be held if a written request to that effect is made by at least 10 members.

Article 8

There shall be a Director of the International Labor Office, appointed by the Governing Body, who shall, subject to the instructions of the Governing Body, be responsible for the efficient conduct of the International Labor Office and for such other duties as may be assigned to him.

The Director or his deputy shall attend all meetings of the Governing Body.

Article 9

The staff of the International Labor Office shall be appointed by the Director, who shall, so far as is possible with due regard to the efficiency of the work of the Office, select persons of different nationalities. A certain number of these persons shall be women.

Article 10

The functions of the International Labor Office shall include the collection and distribution of information on all subjects relating to

the international adjustment of conditions of industrial life and labor and particularly the examination of subjects which it is proposed to bring before the Conference with a view to the conclusion of international conventions, and the conduct of such special investigations as may be ordered by the Conference.

It will prepare the agenda for the meetings of the Conference.

It will carry out the duties required of it by the provisions of this Convention in connection with international disputes.

It will edit and publish a periodical paper in the French and English languages, and in such other languages as the Governing Body may think desirable, dealing with problems of industry and employment of international interest.

Generally, in addition to the functions set out in this article it shall have such other functions, powers and duties as may be assigned to it by the Conference.

Article 11

The Government Departments of any of the High Contracting Parties which deal with questions of industry and employment may communicate directly with the Director through the Representative of their State on the Governing Body of the International Labor Office, or failing any such Representative, through such other qualified official as the Government may nominate for the purpose.

Article 12

The International Labor Office shall be entitled to the assistance of the Secretary-General of the League of Nations in any matter in which it can be given.

Article 13

Each of the High Contracting Parties will pay the travelling and subsistence expenses of its Delegates and their advisers and of its Representatives attending the meetings of the Conference or Governing Body, as the case may be.

All the other expenses of the International Labor Office and of the meetings of the Conference or Governing Body shall be paid to the Director by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations out of the general funds of the League.

The Director shall be responsible to the Secretary-General of the League for the proper expenditure of all moneys paid to him in pursuance of this Article.

CHAPTER II.—*Procedure*

Article 14

The agenda for all meetings of the Conference will be settled by the Governing Body, who shall consider any suggestion as to the agenda that may be made by the Government of any of the High Contracting Parties or by any representative organization recognized for the purpose of Article 3.

Article 15

The Director shall act as the Secretary of the Conference, and shall circulate the agenda to reach the High Contracting Parties, and through them the non-Government Delegates when appointed, four months before the meeting of the Conference.

Article 16

Any of the Governments of the High Contracting Parties may formally object to the inclusion of any item or items in the agenda. The grounds for such objection shall be set forth in a reasoned statement addressed to the Director, who shall circulate it to all the High Contracting Parties. Items to which such objection has been made shall not, however, be excluded from the agenda, if at the Conference a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast by the Delegates present is in favor of considering them.

If the Conference decides (otherwise than under the preceding paragraph) by two-thirds of the votes cast by the Delegates present that any subject shall be considered by the Conference, that subject shall be included in the agenda for the following meeting.

Article 17

The Conference shall regulate its own procedure, shall elect its own President, and may appoint committees to consider and report on any matter.

Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Convention, all matters shall be decided by a simple majority of the votes cast by the Delegates present.

A vote shall be void unless the total number of votes cast is equal to half the number of the Delegates attending the Conference.

Article 18

The Conference may add to any committees which it appoints technical experts, who shall be assessors without power to vote.

Article 19

When the Conference has decided on the adoption of proposals with regard to an item in the agenda, it will rest with the Conference to determine whether these proposals should take the form: (a) of a recommendation to be submitted to the High Contracting Parties for consideration with a view to its being given effect by national legislation or otherwise, or (b) of a draft international convention for ratification by the High Contracting Parties.

In either case a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast by the Delegates present shall be necessary on the final vote for the adoption of the recommendation or draft convention, as the case may be, by the Conference.

A copy of the recommendation or draft convention shall be authenticated by the signature of the President of the Conference and of the Director and shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. The Secretary-General will communicate a certified copy of the recommendation or draft convention to each of the High Contracting Parties.

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes that it will, within the period of one year at most from the end of the meeting of the Conference, bring the recommendation or draft convention before the authority or authorities within whose competence the matter lies for the enactment of legislation or other action.

In the case of a recommendation, the High Contracting Parties will inform the Secretary General of the action taken.

In the case of a draft convention, the High Contracting Party will, if it obtains the consent of the authority or authorities within whose competence the matter lies, communicate the formal ratification of the convention to the Secretary-General and will take such action as may be necessary to make effective the provisions of such convention.

If on a recommendation no legislative or other action to make such recommendation effective is taken, or if the draft convention fails to obtain the consent of the authority or authorities within whose competence the matter lies, no further obligation shall rest upon the High Contracting Party.

In the case of a federal State, the power of which to enter into conventions on labor matters is subject to limitations, it shall be in the discretion of the Government of such State to treat a draft convention to which such limitations apply as a recommendation only, and the provisions of this article with respect to recommendations shall apply in such case.

(In regard to the interpretation of this Article, reference should be made to the Protocol.)

Article 20

Any convention so ratified shall be registered by the Secretary General of the League of Nations, but shall only be binding upon the States which ratify it, subject to any conditions which may be contained in the convention itself.

Article 21

If any convention laid before the Conference for final consideration fails to secure the support of two-thirds of the votes cast by the Delegates present, it shall nevertheless be within the right of any of the High Contracting Parties to agree to such convention among themselves.

Any convention so agreed to shall be communicated by the Governments of the States concerned to the Secretary General of the League of Nations, who shall register it.

Article 22

Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees to make an annual report to the International Labor Office on the measures which it has taken to give effect to the provisions of conventions to which it is a party. These reports shall be made in such form and shall contain such particulars as the Governing Body may request. The Director shall lay a summary of these reports before the next meeting of the Conference.

Article 23

In the event of any representation being made to the International Labor Office by an industrial association of employers or of workpeople that any of the High Contracting Parties has failed to secure in any respect the effective observance within its jurisdiction of any convention to which it is a party, the Governing Body may communicate this representation to the State against which it is made and may invite that State to make such statement on the subject as it may think fit.

Article 24

If no statement is received within a reasonable time from the State against which the representation is made, or if the statement when received is not deemed to be satisfactory by the Governing Body, the latter shall have the right to publish the representation and the statement, if any, made in reply to it.

Article 25

Any of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to file a complaint with the International Labor Office if it is not satisfied that any other of the High Contracting Parties is securing the effective observance of any convention which both have ratified in accordance with the foregoing articles.

The Governing Body may, if it thinks fit, before referring such a complaint to a Commission of Enquiry, as hereinafter provided for, communicate with the State against which the complaint is made in the manner described in Article 23.

If the Governing Body do not think it necessary to communicate the complaint to the State against which it is made, or if, when they have made such communication, no statement in reply has been received within a reasonable time which the Governing Body considers to be satisfactory, the Governing Body may apply for the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry to consider the complaint and to report thereon.

The Governing Body may adopt the same procedure either of its own motion or on receipt of a complaint from a Delegate to the Conference.

When any matter arising out of Article 24 and 25 is being considered by the Governing Body, the State against which the representation or complaint is made shall, if not already represented thereon, be entitled to send a representative to take part in the proceedings of the Governing Body while the matter is under consideration. Adequate notice of the date on which the matter will be considered shall be given to the State against which the representation or complaint is made.

Article 26

The Commission of Enquiry shall be constituted in accordance with the following provisions:—

Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees to nominate within six months of the date on which this Convention comes into force three persons of industrial experience, of whom one shall be a representative of employers, one a representative of workpeople, and one a person of independent standing, who shall together form a panel from which the members of the Commission of Enquiry shall be drawn.

The qualifications of the persons so nominated shall be subject to scrutiny by the Governing Body, which may by two-thirds of the votes cast by the Members present refuse to accept the nomination of any person whose qualifications do not in its opinion comply with the requirements of the present article.

Upon the application of the Governing Body, the Secretary General of the League of Nations shall nominate three persons, one from each section of this panel, to constitute the Commission of Enquiry, and shall designate one of them as the President of the Commission. None of these three persons shall be a person nominated to the panel by any State directly concerned in the complaint.

Article 27

The High Contracting Parties agree that, in the event of the reference of a complaint to a Commission of Enquiry under Article 25, they will each, whether directly concerned in the complaint or not, place at the disposal of the Commission all the information in their possession which bears upon the subject-matter of the complaint.

Article 28

When the Commission of Enquiry has fully considered the complaint, it shall prepare a report embodying its findings on all questions of fact relevant to determining the issue between the parties and containing such recommendations as it may think proper as to the steps which should be taken to meet the complaint and the time within which they should be taken.

It shall also indicate in this report the measures, if any, of an economic character against a defaulting State which it considers to be appropriate, and which it considers other States would be justified in adopting.

Article 29

The Secretary-General of the League of Nations shall communicate the report of the Commission of Enquiry to each of the States concerned in the complaint, and shall cause it to be published.

Each of these States shall within one month inform the Secretary General of the League of Nations whether or not it accepts the recommendations contained in the report of the Commission; and if not, whether it proposes to refer the complaint to the Permanent Court of International Justice of the League of Nations.

Article 30

In the event of any of the High Contracting Parties failing to take within the specified period the action required by Article 19, any other of the High Contracting Parties shall be entitled to refer the matter to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Article 31

The decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice to which a complaint has been referred shall be final.

Article 32

The Permanent Court of International Justice may affirm, vary or reverse any of the findings or recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry, if any, and shall in its decision indicate the measures, if any, of an economic character against a defaulting State which it considers to be appropriate, and which other States would be justified in adopting.

Article 33

In the event of any State failing to carry out within the time specified the recommendations, if any, contained in the report of the Commission of Enquiry, or in the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice, as the case may be, any other State may take against that State the measures of an economic character indicated in the report of the Commission or in the decision of the Court as appropriate to the case.

Article 34

The defaulting State may at any time inform the Governing Body that it has taken the steps necessary to comply with the recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry or in the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice, as the case may be, and may request it to apply to the Secretary-General of the League to constitute a Commission of Enquiry to verify its contention. In this case the provisions of Articles 26, 27, 28, 29, 31 and 32 shall apply, and if the report of the Commission of Enquiry or decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice is in favor of the defaulting State, the other States shall forthwith discontinue the measures of an economic character that they have taken against the defaulting State.

CHAPTER III.—*General*

Article 35

The British Dominions and India shall have the same rights and obligations under this Convention as if they were separate High Contracting Parties.

The same shall apply to any colony or possession of any of the High Contracting Parties which on the application of such High Contracting Party is recognized as fully self-governing by the Executive Council of the League of Nations.

The High Contracting Parties engage to apply conventions which they have ratified in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention to their colonies, protectorates and possessions, which are not fully self-governing:

1. Except where owing to the local conditions the convention is inapplicable, or
2. Subject to such modifications as may be necessary to adapt the convention to local conditions.

And each of the High Contracting Parties shall notify to the International Labor Office the action taken in respect to each of its colonies, protectorates and possessions which are not fully self-governing.

Article 36

Any State, not a party to this Convention, which may hereafter become a member of the League of Nations, shall be deemed *ipso facto* to have adhered to this Convention.

Article 37

Amendments to this Convention which are adopted by the Conference by a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast by the Delegates present shall take effect when ratified by the States whose representatives compose the Executive Council of the League of Nations and by three-fourths of the States whose representatives compose the body of Delegates of the League.

Article 38

Any question or dispute relating to the interpretation of this Convention or of any subsequent Convention concluded by the High Contracting Parties in pursuance of the provisions of this Convention shall be referred for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

CHAPTER IV.—*Transitory Provisions*

Article 39

The first meeting of the Conference shall take place in October, 1919. The place and agenda for this meeting shall be as specified in the Schedule annexed hereto.

Arrangements for the convening and the organization of the first meeting of the Conference will be made by the Government designated for the purpose in the said Schedule. That Government shall be assisted in the preparation of the documents for submission to the Conference by an International Committee constituted as provided in the said Schedule.

The expenses of the first meeting and of all subsequent meetings held before the League of Nations has been able to establish a general fund, other than the expenses of Delegates and their advisers, will be borne by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.

Article 40

Until the League of Nations has been constituted all communications which under the provisions of the foregoing articles should be addressed to the Secretary-General of the League will be preserved by the Director of the International Labor Office, who will transmit them to the Secretary-General of the League when appointed.

Article 41

Pending the creation of a Permanent Court of International Justice, disputes which in accordance with this Convention would be submitted to it for decision will be referred to a tribunal of three persons appointed by the Executive Council of the League of Nations.

PROTOCOL TO ARTICLE 7

The Governing Body of the International Labor Office shall be constituted as follows:—

Twelve representatives of the Government.

Six members elected by the Delegates to the Conference representing the employers.

Six members elected by the Delegates to the Conference representing the workpeople.

Of the twelve members representing the Governments eight shall be nominated by the High Contracting Parties which are of the chief industrial importance, and four shall be nominated by the High Contracting Parties selected for the purpose by the Government Delegates to the Conference, excluding the Delegates of the eight States mentioned above. No High Contracting Party, together with its Dominions and Colonies, whether self-governing or not, shall be entitled to nominate more than one member.

Any question as to which are the High Contracting Parties of the chief industrial importance shall be decided by the Executive Council of the League of Nations.

The period of office of members of the Governing Body will be three years. The method of filling vacancies and other similar questions may be determined by the Governing Body subject to the approval of the Conference.

PROTOCOL TO ARTICLE 19

In no case shall any of the High Contracting Parties be asked or required, as a result of the adoption of any recommendation or draft convention by the Conference, to diminish the protection afforded by its existing legislation to the workers concerned.

SCHEDULE REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 39

First Meeting of Annual Labor Conference, 1919.

The place of meeting will be Washington.

The Government of the United States of America is requested to convene the Conference.

The International Organizing Committee will consist of seven members, appointed by the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium and Switzerland. The Committee may, if it thinks necessary, invite other States to appoint representatives.

Agenda—

1. Application of principle of the 8-hours day or of the 48 hours week.
2. Question of preventing or providing against unemployment.
3. Women's employment—
 - (a) Before and after child-birth, including the question of maternity benefit.
 - (b) During the night.
 - (c) In unhealthy processes.
4. Employment of children—
 - (a) Minimum age of employment.
 - (b) During the night.
 - (c) In unhealthy processes.
5. Extension and application of the International Conventions adopted at Berne in 1906 on the prohibition of night work for women employed in industry and the prohibition of the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches.

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION

I.—Resolution proposed by the Belgian, French and Italian Delegations.

The Commission expresses the hope that as soon as it may be possible an agreement will be arrived at between the High Contracting Parties with a view to endowing the International Labor Conference under the auspices of the League of Nations with power to take, under conditions to be determined, resolutions possessing the force of international law.

II.—Resolution proposed by the Belgian, French and Italian Delegations.

The Commission, being of opinion that an international code of Labor legislation which will be really effective cannot be secured without the co-operation of all industrial countries, expresses the wish that pending the signature of the Treaty of Peace, which will permit all such countries to be approached, the Peace Conference will communicate the present draft Convention to the neutral Powers for their information before finally adopting it.

III.—Resolution proposed by the French Delegation.

The Commission considers that the very special questions concerning the minimum conditions to be accorded to seamen might be dealt with at a special meeting of the International Labor Conference devoted exclusively to the affairs of seamen.

Annex III

COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL LABOR LEGISLATION

Clauses Proposed for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace

The High Contracting Parties declare their acceptance of the following principles and engage to take all necessary steps to secure their realization in accordance with the recommendation to be made by the International Labor Conference as to their practical application:—

1. In right and in fact the labor of a human being should not be treated as merchandise or an article of commerce.
2. Employers and workers should be allowed the right of association for all lawful purposes.
3. No child should be permitted to be employed in industry or commerce before the age of fourteen years, in order that every child may be ensured reasonable opportunities for mental and physical education.

Between the years of fourteen and eighteen, young persons of either sex may only be employed on work which is not harmful to their physical development and on condition that the continuation of their technical or general education is ensured.

4. Every worker has a right to a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life having regard to the civilization of his time and country.

5. Equal pay should be given to women and to men for work of equal value in quantity and quality.

6. A weekly rest, including Sunday, or its equivalent for all workers.

7. Limitation of the hours of work in industry on the basis of eight hours a day or forty-eight hours a week, subject to an exception for countries in which climatic conditions, the imperfect development of industrial organization or other special circumstances render the industrial efficiency of the workers substantially different.

The International Labor Conference will recommend a basis approximately equivalent to the above for adoption in such countries.

8. In all matters concerning their status as workers and social insurance foreign workmen lawfully admitted to any country and their families should be ensured the same treatment as the nationals of that country.

9. All States should institute a system of inspection in which women should take part, in order to ensure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the workers.

Preliminary Peace Conference, Protocol No. 5, Plenary Session of April 28, 1919

The Session is opened at 15 o'clock (3 p. m.) under the presidency of Mr. Clemenceau, President.

PRESENT

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

The President of the United States.
Honorable Robert Lansing.
Honorable Henry White.
Honorable Edward M. House.
General Tasker H. Bliss.

FOR THE BRITISH EMPIRE :

GREAT BRITAIN :

The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Ward, Bt.
The Hon. Arthur L. Sifton.
The Rt. Hon. Lord Robert Cecil,
Technical Delegate.

Dominions and India :

CANADA :

The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden.
The Rt. Hon. Sir George Foster.

AUSTRALIA :

The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Cook.

SOUTH AFRICA :

General The Rt. Hon. Louis Botha.
Lt. Gen. The Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts.

NEW ZEALAND :

The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey.

INDIA :

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Sinha.
Major-General His Highness the
Maharaja of Bikaner.

FOR FRANCE :

Mr. Clemenceau.
Mr. Pichon.
Mr. L. L. Klotz
Mr. André Tardieu.
Mr. Jules Cambon.
Mr. Léon Bourgeois, Technical Dele-
gate.

FOR JAPAN :

The Marquis Saionji.
The Baron Makino.
Viscount Chinda.
Mr. K. Matsui.
Mr. H. Ijuin.

FOR BELGIUM :

Mr. Hymans.
Mr. van den Heuvel.
Mr. Vandervelde.

FOR BOLIVIA :

Mr. Ismael Montes.

FOR BRAZIL :

Mr. Epitácio Pessoa
Mr. Paulo de Carvalho
Mr. Rodrigo Octavio, Professor of
International Law at the Faculty
of Rio de Janeiro, Legal Adviser
of the Republic, Technical Dele-
gate.

FOR CHINA :

Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang.
Mr. Vi Kiuin Wellington Koo.

FOR CUBA :

Mr. Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante.

FOR ECUADOR :

Mr. Dorn y de Alsua.

FOR GREECE :

Mr. Eleftherios Veniselos.
Mr. Nicolas Politis.

FOR GUATEMALA :

Mr. Joaquín Méndez.

FOR THE HEDJAZ :

Mr. Rustem Haidar.

FOR HONDURAS :

Dr. Policarpo Bonilla.

FOR LIBERIA :

Hon. C. D. B. King.

FOR NICARAGUA :

Mr. Salvador Chamorro.

FOR PANAMA :

Mr. Antonio Burgos.

FOR PERU :

Mr. V. M. Maurtua, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Peru at the Hague, Former Minister of Finance, Former Deputy.

Also present at the Session :—

The members of the Commission on the League of Nations and the Members of the Commission on International Labor Legislation.

The Minutes of the Session of April 11th, 1919 (Protocol No. 4) are passed.

Discussion of the
Report of the
Commission on
the League of
Nations

The Agenda Paper provides for the discussion of the Report of the Commission on the League of Nations (Annex I).

The PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES explains the alterations made in the Covenant by the Commission in the following speech :—

Alterations Intro-
duced Into the
Covenant

“Mr. President, when the text of the Covenant of the League of Nations was last laid before you, I had the honor of reading the Covenant *in extenso*. I will not detain you to-day to re-read the Covenant as it has been now altered, but will merely take the liberty of explaining to you some of the alterations that have been made.

FOR POLAND :

Mr. Roman Dmowski.
Mr. Ignace Paderewski.

FOR PORTUGAL :

Dr. Affonso Costa.
Col. Norton de Mattos, Former Minister of War.

FOR ROUMANIA :

Mr. Jean J. C. Bratiano.
Mr. Victor Antonesco, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of H. M. The King of Roumania at Paris, Former Minister of Finance.

FOR SERBIA :

Mr. Trumbitch.
Mr. Vesnitch.

FOR SIAM :

The Prince Charoon.
Phya Bibadh Kosha.

FOR THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC :

Mr. Charles Kramar.
Mr. Edouard Benes.

FOR URUGUAY :

Mr. Juan Antonio Buero, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Former Minister of Industry, Former Deputy.

"The Report of the Commission has been circulated; you yourselves have in your hands the text of the Covenant, and you will no doubt have noticed that most of the changes that have been made are mere changes of phraseology, not changes of substance, and that besides that, most of the changes are intended to clarify the document, or rather to make explicit what we all had assumed was explicit in the document as it was originally presented to you.

"But I shall take the liberty of calling your attention, for fear that you may not have had time to examine the document carefully, to the new features, such as they are; some of them considerable, the rest, trivial.

"The first paragraph of Article I is new. In view of the insertion of the Covenant in the Peace Treaty specific provision as to the signatories of the Treaty, who would become members of the League, and also as to the neutral States to be invited to accede to the Covenant, was obviously necessary.

"The paragraph also provides for the method by which a neutral State may accede to the Covenant.

"The third paragraph of Article I is new, providing for the withdrawal of any member of the League on a notice given of two years.

"The second paragraph of Article IV is new, providing for a possible increase in the Council, should other Powers be added to the League of Nations, whose present accession is not anticipated.

"The last paragraph of Article IV is new, providing specifically for one vote for each Member of the League in the Council, which was understood before, and providing also for one representative of each Member of the League.

"The first paragraph of Article V is new, expressly incorporating the provision as to unanimity of voting, which was at first taken for granted.

"The second paragraph of Article VI has had added to it, that a majority of the Assembly must approve the appointment of the Secretary General.

"The first paragraph of Article VII, names Geneva as the Seat of the League, and is followed by a second paragraph which gives the Council power to establish the Seat of the League elsewhere should it subsequently deem it necessary.

"The third paragraph of Article VII is new, establishing an equality of employment of men and women, that is to say, by the League. The second paragraph of Article XIII is new, inasmuch as it undertakes to give instances of disputes which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration, instances of what have latterly been called "justiciable" questions. The eighth paragraph of Article XV is new. This is an amendment regarding domestic jurisdiction; where the

Council finds that a question arising out of an international dispute affects matters which are clearly under the domestic jurisdiction of one or other of the parties, it is to report to that effect, and make no recommendation. The last paragraph of Article XVI is new, providing for an expulsion from the League in certain extraordinary circumstances. Article XXI is new. The second paragraph of Article XXII inserts the words, with regard to mandatories, 'and who are willing to accept it,' thus explicitly introducing the principle that a mandate cannot be forced upon a nation unwilling to accept it. Article XXIII is a combination of several former articles, and also contains the following:—a clause providing for the just treatment of aborigines, a clause looking towards the prevention of the White Slave traffic and the traffic in opium, and a clause in regard to the international prevention and control of disease. Article XXV specifically mentions the Red Cross as one of the international organizations which is to connect its work with the work of the League. Article XXVI permits amendment of the Covenant by a majority of States composing the Assembly instead of three-fourths of the States, though it does not change the requirement in that matter with regard to the vote in the Council. The second paragraph of Article XXVI is also new, and was added at the request of the Brazilian Delegation in order to avoid certain constitutional difficulties. It permits any Member of the League to dissent from an amendment, the effect of such dissent, however, being withdrawal from the League. An Annex is added giving the names of the signatories of the Treaty who will become Members, and the names of the States invited to accede to the Covenant.

"These are all the changes, I believe, which are of moment. Mr. President, I take the opportunity to move the following resolutions in order to carry out the provisions of the Covenant. You will notice that the Covenant provides that the first Secretary General shall be chosen by this Conference. It also provides that the first choice of the four Member States which are to be added to the Five Great Powers on the Council is left to this Conference. I move, therefore:

Amendments
Presented by
the American
Delegation

"First:—

That the first Secretary General of the League shall be the Honorable Sir James Eric Drummond, K. C. M. G., C. B.

"Second:—

That until such time as the Assembly shall have selected the first four Members of the League to be represented on the Council in accordance with Article IV of the Covenant, representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Greece, and Spain, shall be Members of the Council; and

"Third:—

That the Powers to be represented on the Council of the League of Nations are requested to name representatives who shall form a Committee of Nine to prepare plans for the organization of the League and for the establishment of the Seat of the League, and to make arrangements and to prepare the Agenda for the first meeting of the Assembly. This Committee shall report both to the Council and to the Assembly of the League.

"I think it is not necessary to call your attention to other matters we have previously discussed, the capital significance of this Covenant, the hopes which are entertained as to the effect it will have upon steadying the affairs of the world, and the obvious necessity that there should be a concert of the free nations of the world to maintain justice in international relations and peace between the nations of the world."

The President was calling on Baron Makino to speak when the President of the United States begged leave to add the few following remarks:

"If Baron Makino will pardon me for introducing a matter which I absent-mindedly overlooked, it is necessary for me to propose the alteration of several words in the first line of Article V. Let me say that in several parts of the Treaty, of which this Covenant will form a part, certain duties are assigned to the Council of the League of Nations. In some instances, it is provided that the action they shall take shall be by a majority vote. It is, therefore, necessary to make the Covenant conform with the other portions of the Treaty by adding these words. I will read the first line, and add the words:

"'Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant, or by the terms of this Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council, shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting.'"

"'Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant,' is the present reading, and I move the addition of 'or by the terms of this Treaty.' With that addition, I move the adoption of the Covenant."

BARON MAKINO (Japan) explains the grounds for the amendment proposed by the Japanese Delegation to the Commission with a view to secure recognition in the Covenant for the equality of all nations and of their subjects:

Amendment of
the Japanese
Delegation for
the Equality of
All Nations

"I had first on the 13th of February an opportunity of submitting to the Commission of the League of Nations our amendment to the Covenant, embodying the principle of equal and just treatment to be accorded to all aliens who happen to be the nationals of the States which are deemed advanced enough and fully qualified to become Members of the League, making no distinction on account of race or nationality.

"On that occasion I called the attention of the Commission to the fact that the race question being a standing grievance which might become acute and dangerous at any moment, it was desirous that a provision dealing with the subject should be made in this Covenant. We did not lose sight of the many and varied difficulties standing in the way of a full realization of this principle. But they were not insurmountable, I said, if sufficient importance were attached to the consideration of serious misunderstandings between different peoples which might grow to an uncontrollable degree, and it was hoped that the matter would be taken in hand on such opportunity as the present, when what was deemed impossible before was about to be accomplished. Further, I made it unmistakably clear that, the question being of a very delicate and complicated nature, involving the play of a deep human passion, the immediate realization of the ideal equality was not proposed, but that the clause presented enunciated the principle only, and left the actual working of it in the hands of the different Governments concerned; that, in other words, the clause was intended as an invitation to the Governments and peoples concerned to examine the question more closely and seriously, and to devise in a fair and accommodating spirit means to meet it.

"Attention was also called to the fact that the League being, as it were, a world organization of insurance against war; that in cases of aggression nations suitably placed must be prepared to defend the territorial integrity and political independence of a fellow member; that this meant that a national of a State Member must be ready to share military expenditure for the common cause and, if needs be, sacrifice his own person. In view of these new duties, I remarked, arising before him as a result of his country entering the League, each national would naturally feel, and in fact demand, that he be placed on an equal footing with the people whom he undertakes to defend even with his own life. The proposed amendment, however, was not adopted by the Commission.

"On the next day, that is, on the 14th February, when the draft Covenant was reported at a Plenary Session of the Conference without the insertion of our amendment, I had the privilege of expressing our whole-hearted sympathy and readiness to contribute our utmost to any and every attempt to found and secure an enduring peace of the world. At the same time, I made a reservation that we would again submit our proposal for the consideration of the Conference at an early opportunity.

"At the meeting of the Commission on the 11th of April, I proposed the insertion, in the Preamble of the Covenant, of a phrase endorsing the principles of the equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals. But this proposal again failed to be adopted by unanimity,

although it obtained, may I be permitted to say, a clear majority in its favor.

"This modified form of amendment did not, as I had occasion already to state at the Commission, fully meet our wishes, but it was the outcome of an attempt to conciliate the view points of different nations.

"Now that it has been decided by the Commission that our amendment, even in its modified form, would not be included in the draft Covenant, I feel constrained to revert to our original proposal and to avail myself of this occasion to declare clearly our position in regard to this matter.

"The principle which we desire to see acted upon in the future relationship between nations was set forth in our original amendment as follows:—

"The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all aliens nationals of States Members of the League equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality."

"It is our firm conviction that the enduring success of this great undertaking will depend much more on the hearty espousal and loyal adherence that the various peoples concerned would give to the noble ideals underlying the organization, than on the acts of the respective governments that may change from time to time. In an age of democracy, peoples themselves must feel that they are the trustees of this work, and to feel so, they must first have a sure basis of close harmony and mutual confidence.

"If just and equal treatment is denied to certain nationals, it would have the significance of a certain reflection on their quality and status. Their faith in the justice and righteousness which are to be the guiding spirit of the future international intercourse between the Members of the League may be shaken, and such a frame of mind, I am afraid, would be most detrimental to that harmony and co-operation, upon which foundation alone can the League now contemplated be securely built. It was solely and purely from our desire to see the League established on a sound and firm basis of good-will, justice, and reason that we have been compelled to make our proposal. We will not, however, press for the adoption of our proposal at this moment.

"In closing, I feel it my duty to declare clearly on this occasion that the Japanese Government and people feel poignant regret at the failure of the Commission to approve of their just demand for laying down a principle aiming at the adjustment of this long standing grievance, a demand that is based upon a deep-rooted national conviction. They will continue in their insistence for the adoption of this principle by the League in future."

Mr. HYMANS (Belgium), speaking in French, makes the following observations on the choice of a Seat for the League of Nations, and on the Covenant as a whole:—

Seat of the League
of Nations

“The Conference is aware that in the Commission which has drawn up the Covenant now submitted to you for consideration, I had requested the choice of Brussels as the Seat of the League of Nations.

“The Conference is likewise aware that this proposal was not adopted, and I am unable to conceal from you the deep disappointment which the decision in this respect has created in Belgium and in Belgian public opinion.

“I am glad, however, on behalf of Belgium which, if the proposal of President Wilson be adopted by the Conference, is to be represented on the Executive Council, and in her name, to welcome today this new institution of general solidarity, the Covenant of which, as now laid before us for discussion, represents to some extent its birth-certificate.

Approval of
the Belgian
Delegation of
the Covenant

“No doubt the work is not perfect: how, indeed, could it be otherwise, seeing that it was necessary, in order to reach a conclusion, to reconcile the customs, the temperament and the political institutions of a number of nations with the international obligations which the Covenant imposes on all the contracting parties?

“There are, therefore, necessarily certain gaps and certain defects, but these must not be used to nourish easy skepticism or futile disparagement. We are initiating a great experiment and, if it is to succeed, that experiment must be helped by the good-will of all nations, by their confidence, and by the loyal and sincere co-operation of both Governments and Peoples.

“Belgium knows well—and events have proved it—that neither the isolated military effort of a people for its own defense, nor the sanctity of a Treaty, constitute adequate protection against the ambitions and cupidity of a State which stakes everything on force. Nevertheless, peoples cannot detach themselves from all feeling of anxiety for their own security; they may, however, rely on the guarantees to be offered to them by the League of Nations, which will be a factor tending to ensure respect for their independence, the service of Right, and the preservation of Peace.”

MR. JUAN ANTONIO BUERO (Uruguay), speaking in French, explains the reasons for which the Covenant meets with the complete approval of the Uruguayan Delegation, in the following terms:

Approval of
the Uruguayan
Delegation

“I have the honor to express, on behalf of the Government of Uruguay, our adhesion to the principles set forth in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

"Uruguay, no less than the other countries of America, sees in the consolidation of Peace the means of pursuing her commercial and industrial development, and of turning to account her great natural wealth. Peace is indispensable for carrying out the projects which we must bring to a successful issue in our Continent, such as the creation of railway lines between the two Americas, and the development of the shipping lines which handle the daily increasing traffic between Latin America and the countries of Europe.

I state positively that the forces of Uruguay will always be used in the service of a Peace which is based on Justice. The Treaties providing for obligatory and unlimited arbitration which my country has concluded with England, France, Italy, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and Paraguay, are the very basis of our international policy.

"In thus expressing our views, we are glad to show that we are following a tradition already consecrated among us, and one which we announced at the second Peace Conference, which held its meetings at the Hague in 1907. On that occasion, the first Uruguayan Delegate, Mr. Batlle Ordonez, former President of the Republic, expressed his adhesion to the principles which are on the point of being adopted today, principles which, by organizing international co-operation, guarantee to the nations of the world safety, independence, and the respect of Treaties.

"The scheme of President Wilson has been greatly appreciated by all the citizens of my country, and they have already expressed their gratitude to him; I therefore beg leave today to renew the expression of that gratitude. The Uruguayan Delegation voices the wish that the Representatives of the Powers assembled in the capital of glorious France, which Uruguay both loves and admires, may give their unanimous adhesion to the principles of the League of Nations. Uruguay has adopted for her international policy the principle of American solidarity; the Government stated on June 18, 1917, that an attack on the rights of one of the nations of the continent ought to be regarded as an attack on the other nations of that continent, and that common action should therefore ensue. Furthermore, Uruguay stated at the same time that she would not regard as belligerents any American nations which, in defense of their own rights, might be in a state of war with the nations of another Continent.

"These declarations have as their aim the guarantee of Peace, and the observance of the principles of international law, and that is the reason for which Uruguay does not consider that regional Ententes which are animated by the same ideas, and have the same aims in view, are incompatible with the principles of the League of Nations."

MR. LÉON BOURGEOIS (France), speaking in French, proposes amendments to Articles 8 and 9 of the Covenant; in so doing, he explains the principles on which the amendments are based and develops the reasons for which the French Delegation recommend their adoption by the Conference:

Amendments of
the French Dele-
gation to Articles
8 and 9

"The French Delegation has presented to the League of Nations Commission two amendments to Articles 8 and 9 of the Draft Covenant, but, as these amendments were not accepted, the Delegation reserved its vote on the two Articles in question, and also its right to lay before the Plenary Session of the Conference the two texts, which I have the honor to remind you are as follows:—

Article 8.

"The High Contracting Parties, being determined to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of armaments, their military and naval programmes, and the conditions of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes, have appointed a Committee for the purpose of ascertaining as far as possible the above information."

Article 9.

"A permanent organization shall be constituted for the purpose of providing for naval and military measures to enforce the Covenant incumbent on the High Contracting Parties under this Covenant, and of making them immediately operative in all cases of emergency."

"It is only because we attached really great importance to these amendments that we thought it essential to bring them up for public discussion. The amendments, indeed, are not merely concerned with a detail of the application of the principles of the League of Nations, but rather with the interpretation of those very principles, and, on their adoption or rejection, may depend very far reaching consequences for the future of this international institution.

"At the moment when world-wide opinion, on the distinguished initiative of President Wilson, was first acquainted with the problem which we are discussing today, three distinct conceptions appear to have emerged from the controversies which arose in this connection. Some people dreamed of the creation of a veritable international sovereignty; a common Parliament, and a common Executive Power were to be instituted and would be invested with the right of enacting a whole body of international legislation. This meant nothing less than the abdication by each State of its sovereignty. Others, on the other hand, asked that the most complete liberty should be left to each nation; according to them the settlement of conflicts by pacific methods did not become obligatory, nor was any operative penalty to be imposed on a State which failed in the obligations which it had undertaken; they relied essentially on the moral influence which opin-

ion throughout the world would exercise, thanks to the public deliberations of the International Council, in order to insure the free consent of each State to the execution of the measures recommended on behalf of them all. There were grounds for fearing that a conception of this kind could only lead to ineffective results, and that relief from the crushing charges with which an armed peace burdened the world might be indefinitely postponed.

"France had studied a scheme whereby it was sought to take into account the practical and realizable elements in the two extreme tendencies which I have just outlined. In our view the sovereignty of each State is not an absolute idea, for, as President Wilson himself said: 'There can be no peace without concessions and sacrifices.' In the same way as is the case with individual liberty within a State, the sovereignty of a State is, in the eye of the law, limited by the like sovereignty of other States, and an international institution ought to have as its aim the task of defining that limit, of establishing it equitably on a basis of mutual reciprocity and of securing the acceptance by all parties concerned of certain guarantees and certain penalties in order that the Covenant which all had freely accepted might be faithfully fulfilled by all.

"As the League of Nations Commission had taken as the basis of its discussions the Draft Covenant put forward by President Wilson, the French Delegation could only work by means of amendments in its attempt to enable the principles, of which it had undertaken both the initiative and the responsibility, to be more completely diffused throughout the various Articles of the Covenant. The French Delegation is glad to be able to record the fact that unanimous agreement was reached in regard to the majority of the points.

"Article 10 guarantees against all external aggression the territorial integrity and the political independence of each Member of the League, and the Council is bound to consider the means required for guaranteeing the fulfilment of that obligation.

"Article 12 imposes on all Members of the League the obligation of submitting any difference which may arise between them either to arbitration or to the Council for examination. If a State desired to have recourse to war before following this procedure or desired, after following it, to take up arms before the expiration of the period of delay fixed by the arbitral award or by the decision of the Council, that is to say, within three months following the delivery of that award or decision, that State, in accordance with Article 16, would *ipso facto* be regarded as having committed an act of war against all the other States. All the States adhering to the Covenant bind themselves immediately to break off all commercial or financial relations with such a State, and to forbid all intercourse between their

own nationals and those of the State which has broken the Covenant; it would, furthermore, be the duty of the Council to notify the various Governments concerned of the military or naval contingents which they should respectively furnish in order to form the international force.

"Moreover, the Draft Convention (Article 23) most happily attaches to the political and juridical system of the League of Nations a whole set of Rules framed with a view to ensure the development of international interests, either as regards the protection of human labor, the suppression of the sale of women or children, the traffic in opium, the freedom of communication and transit, or the struggle against social evils. Mutual and constant relations, if once established between the different peoples, cannot fail to be a most powerful factor in developing, in the midst of their material and moral interests, the consciousness of solidarity, which is one of the best guarantees of peace.

"Having regard to this set of provisions, we are sincerely anxious to be able to give our adhesion to the Draft Covenant. It is, however, the duty of the French Delegation to indicate the points in regard to which the Covenant appears to it to show serious gaps.

"One general observation is necessary. The essential aim of the League of Nations is to ensure the preservation of peace. Now, even in the cases provided for by Articles 10 and 12, which I have quoted, where penalties are recognized as necessary, there is no tangible obligation on States to furnish their military contingents; there is nothing but a moral obligation which cannot itself be enforced by any penalty. In all the other cases it is not possible to say that recourse to arms is condemned; for, once a State has followed the obligatory procedure and has submitted to all the periods of delay, it may take military measures against the State with which it is in conflict.

"Finally, in the case of differences which have been submitted, not to arbitration but to the Council—and it is evident that this will be the most frequent case since arbitration is not obligatory, and even in a case of a juridical nature, it will be sufficient for one of the parties to the dispute to choose the recourse to the Council in order that the latter should take and retain cognizance of it,—the prohibition to have recourse to arms only exists if there is unanimity in the Council. In every case in which there is only a majority, however large it may be, the Covenant does not come into operation and, according to one of the paragraphs of Article 15, each of the States thereupon resumes its liberty of action and may assist by force of arms the State or States which it intends to uphold; that is to say, the whole system of alliances will thenceforward continue in operation with the assent of the League of Nations. An amendment has, it is true, been pre-

sented today which attenuates the effects of this Article, for by its terms a majority would be sufficient to ensure the application of certain clauses which are contemplated in the Treaty of Peace. That is a step forward which we eagerly welcome.

"The French Delegation, inspired by the keenest desire that the creation of the League of Nations should at last be secured, and being resolved to go as far as its conscience will permit in order to attain that end, has not hesitated, in spite of gaps in them, to accept the foregoing provisions of the Draft which is submitted to the Conference. The French Delegation is conscious of the fact that what is being done now is only one stage towards a complete and definite organization and, in point of fact, the inadequacies of the Covenant are only to be feared if the States which may seek to draw advantage therefrom possess sufficient force to resist the common will. One condition is enough, but that one is indispensable; it is that recalcitrants must be deficient in military force.

"Effective limitation of armaments is the supreme condition of Peace. It is precisely because it was not yet possible to insert in the Statutes of the League a general and absolute prohibition to have recourse to war that we took into consideration the means of rendering such recourse in practice well-nigh impossible. France was obliged to concentrate her efforts on the question of a rigorous limitation of armaments; she desired to translate into deed the thought expressed by President Wilson:—

"It is necessary to create a force of such superiority that no nation, or probable combination of nations, can withstand it."¹

"We must withdraw from States which might be tempted to break the law and the peace the means of persevering in their schemes, and debar them from all hope of success therein. In order that the international force may make its weight felt by its mere presence, and without the need of setting it in motion, in order that the world may be really rid of war, two conditions are necessary, and those are the conditions which our two amendments propose to lay down.

"By the first amendment we mean to ensure the real, effective, and permanent reduction of armaments. Article VIII of the Draft admits that the maintenance of peace requires this reduction, but it does not make that reduction a binding obligation on all Members of the League; each Government remains free to accept or refuse, without any threat of penalty, the plan of reduction proposed by the Council. Moreover, if a Government, while accepting this reduction in principle, evades it in practice and secretly, no means are proposed whereby the League may verify such an infringement of its Rules. Yet, if this

¹ This retranslation differs somewhat from the original English text; see President Wilson's address to the Senate, *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 1, pp. 24, 28.

limitation is to be real and effective, the possibility of verification must exist. In a spirit of compromise, to which we render tribute, it has, indeed, been proposed to admit the possibility, in cases which give rise to suspicion, of conducting an inquiry on the spot; but in the very fact of declaring that suspicions exist, while no proof can be adduced, there lies a serious danger and a cause of conflict; if you formulate a suspicion against the loyalty of one of the Associated States, that is an act which the State in question will consider as unfriendly; thereupon a point of honor will be raised and there will be a risk of rupture within the League itself. A system of mutual verification which does not call in question the good faith of any member in particular, would be a common rule accepted by all in the interests of all, and alone would render it possible to ascertain the truth in regard to facts without wounding people's feelings and without vexatiousness. Nobody can make an accusation until the facts have enabled him to justify it; moreover, the proposed compromise which was suggested to us as regards Article VIII was conditional on the simultaneous withdrawal of the French amendment to Article IX; it is clear, however, that we could not thus abandon one of the essential points in our ideas.

"By our second amendment we do not request, as has been said, the creation of an international General Staff to plan on its own initiative possible future operations. Article IX contemplates the existence of a permanent Commission with the task of giving the Council its views in regard to the carrying out of Articles I and VIII and, generally speaking, in regard to military and naval questions. What we ask is that that Commission should be invested with the competence without which it will always run the risk of playing an ineffective part. The Commission set up by Article IX will necessarily be composed of military experts; it will receive information from all the Associated States in regard to their effectives, armaments, etc., and will therefore have in its hands, and kept up to date, all the necessary statistical records in the event of the Council admitting the necessity of a military operation. We request that the Commission should be entrusted with the task of foreseeing and planning the measures which the Council may prescribe; and we ask that it should, after examining beforehand the risk of possible conflicts, lay forthwith before the Council, thus enabling it to propose them to the Governments, the urgently needed measures in the absence of which the security of weak and pacific States will always be imperilled. This Commission cannot, I repeat, do its work except on the instructions of the Council, and its labors will always have a purely defensive tendency.

"People have gone so far as to say that the Commission would constitute an organ of war which is inadmissible in a League created for peace, and that it might preserve and develop the spirit of strife and

conquest. If such a spirit is destined to revive with fresh vigor, that would be much more likely to happen in the individual General Staffs of certain States and in the restless atmosphere of rival factions. It is quite another spirit which will prevail at the Seat of the League of Nations, and the collaboration of the military representatives of the Members of the League, their mutual relations, their common work on problems of which the essential purpose will always be the maintenance of peace—all this will contribute towards the development among them of the spirit of concord, which must be that of the international force, and towards the diffusion by their agency of the spirit of the Armies of that same spirit and of the same mutual feeling of esteem and solidarity. There is, therefore, nothing in these two amendments which can hurt the dignity of a State, or be a menace to the spirit of peace which should animate the League of Nations.

“Though we have been unable to secure the acceptance of these Articles by the Commission, we can nevertheless say that we did not present them solely on behalf of our own country. Great Associations have been formed among all the Allied Peoples to defend and diffuse the principles of the League of Nations. At the two meetings which these Associations have held in Paris and London, all of them, whether English, American, Italian, Belgian, Roumanian, Jugo-Slav or Chinese, have unanimously and formally adopted our proposals. Several of the Neutral States whose delegates have been summoned to Paris for unofficial consultation either supported the French proposals or presented similar amendments. Numerous English groups, the Labor Party, and the Trades Unions, in the special Conference which they held at the beginning of April in order to examine the scheme of the League of Nations, demanded the control of armaments. Finally, Mr. Elihu Root, that great American jurist, proposed the following addition to Article IX:—

“The Commission shall have the power of inspecting and verifying all the armaments, equipments, munitions and war industries determined by Article VIII.”

“We would gladly concur in this text, and would even agree to join this first amendment to our second amendment in Article IX.

“The question of form and drafting is, of course, quite a matter of indifference as far as we are concerned; it is at the triumph of the idea itself that we aim.

“We believe that we possess, in the public opinion which holds essentially to the elimination of the risk of war, the support of innumerable adherents. It has been rightly said that the greatest force on which the League of Nations can rely is that of public opinion. How can the League be warned, how can it act, if measures of control and preparation are not laid down in advance, if the ill-will or bad

faith of a State is able to make a sudden inroad on the security of nations which respect the common law, and if there is a risk that the international power will only intervene tardily? In asking for these supplementary guarantees, we believe that we are adding one more to all the conditions which the Draft Covenant has so fortunately assembled in order to ensure the peace of the world. What we should fear the most, for the international institution, is that it might one day be shown to be ineffective and impotent. The present moment is not one in which it is possible to judge of that.

"That international institution is desired by all generous spirits; the horror of the spectacle offered by the unprecedented and merciless war which draws to a close, sets the hearts of all beating with indignation. It is fair to say that the human soul, everywhere in the world, longs for the certainty that horrors of this kind cannot recur henceforward, and the moment is therefore a favorable one for granting powerful arms to the guardian institution to which it is proposed to entrust the defense of civilization. However, the generations to come, which will not have seen at first hand the atrocious sufferings which a large portion of humanity has undergone, will be less sensitive than we are, and maybe the idea of war will not appear in such abominable colors to those who, not having experienced its frightful disasters may again permit themselves to be lured on by dreams of ambition, of conquest, and of glory; then, indeed, dangers may arise and a new catastrophe be let loose.

"Now, we must not forget that any conflict between two States at any point on the globe is destined henceforward to become general, as did the last war, and to endanger the whole world. How great would be the responsibility of the authors of the great Charter if, by some defect of foresight, by the absence of some guarantees, which it is easy to secure, by the refusal of some sacrifices, they had increased, even in the slightest degree, the risks of such a catastrophe. Let us recall the eloquent words pronounced by President Wilson on May 26th [22d], 1917.² He said, when speaking of the hour of victory:

"Now, no less than then, we cannot allow ourselves to be weak, or omit even one of the guarantees which are necessary for justice and security."

"And what was the guarantee which he required above all others?"

"The question of armaments", he said on January 27th [22d], 1917, "is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind."³

² In his message to the Russian Provisional Government; for text of the message, see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. 1, p. 72. The retranslation appearing here differs slightly from the original English text.

³ This quotation and the one which follows are from the President's address to the Senate, *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 1, p. 24.

"Mere agreements may not make peace secure; it will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement, so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged, or any alliance hitherto formed or projected, that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it."

"Our amendments have no object other than the practical realization of the same idea.

"We are speaking on behalf of all pacific States and especially of all the small States which will never have the strength to resist by themselves a first aggression; and also on behalf of those whose future will always remain uncertain by reason of their geographical situation and the character of their frontiers, unless some superior system is there to protect them powerfully.

"People have thought and said that France, in defending these amendments, was defending above all, indeed almost exclusively, her own cause and, indeed, we have not hesitated to point out, as an example, the danger to which may be exposed the frontier of our country, which President Wilson described himself as the frontier of the liberty of the world. But that is only an example, and France, even if she were protected by the strongest ring of mountains, protected by the whole ocean, protected by the most solid alliances, would nevertheless, in her thought not for herself alone but for all, hold the same language and formulate the same proposals. We speak not only on behalf of our invaded and devastated regions, which must not again be exposed to such ruin, and which it will take so many years to restore and revive, for there are many others in Belgium, in Serbia and in Italy which have suffered a like fate, and yet many more which might undergo it in the States which have been restored to liberty by the victory of Right and whose nascent strength desires effective protection. We Frenchmen do not speak merely in the name of our 1,700,000 dead, but in the name of the innumerable dead who have fallen in the cause of Right on all the fronts of Europe, and have wished to see their children, and their children's children, made secure from a like slaughter by all the means available to the human will. Is there then in the guarantees for which we ask any sacrifice which the Members of the League of Nations can consider excessive?

"France," said President Wilson to our Chamber of Deputies, 'sees in the League of Nations not only a necessity for herself, but also a necessity for mankind, and she knows that the sacrifices which may be necessary for the establishment of the League of Nations are nothing in comparison with the sacrifices which would become necessary if she did not have the League of Nations; a little abatement of independence is not to be compared with the constant dread of

another catastrophe.'⁴ It is not France which will decline the necessary sacrifices, and I should wish to see us all unanimous in accepting them. As for the work which we have undertaken, it will not be judged in the last resort by the Governments represented here but by the peoples themselves.

"Gentlemen, let us reflect on this problem and only take our decision when we have probed the uttermost depths of our consciences."

MR. KLOTZ (France), speaking in French, requests that the draft of a Financial Section for the League of Nations may be referred to the League, expressing himself in the following terms:

"I had the honor, at the Plenary Session of the Peace Conference, held on January 25th, of depositing with the Bureau of the Conference the Draft of a Financial Section for the League of Nations. That Draft was referred for study to the Financial Commission, which unanimously accepted its principles and, at its meeting of February 28th, entrusted it for examination to the Sub-Commission charged with the study of Inter-Allied problems.

"The Report of Mr. Montagu, the representative of the British Empire, which was unanimously accepted by the Sub-Commission on March 26th, has been submitted to the Financial Commission at a Plenary Meeting. That Commission, at its meeting of April 5th, unanimously adopted the Report, which it has since sent to the Supreme Inter-Allied Council.

"The Special Committee entrusted with the task of revising the Report of the Commission and of laying its conclusions before the Council of Heads of Governments, annexed to its General Report, which was of a favorable character, the text adopted by the Financial Commission.

"In accordance with the decision of the Council of Heads of Governments, taken at their meeting of April 26th, 1919, I request you to give directions for its reference to the League of Nations."

MR. BURGOS (Panama), speaking in French, explains in the following terms the reasons for which the Delegation of Panama grants its cordial approval to the Covenant:

Approval of
the Panama
Delegation

"I have the great honor of representing at this Conference the Republic of Panama. It is a small State, but its people, steeped in ideas of justice and liberty, was the first one in America, after the Republic of the United States, to adhere to the cause of the Allies. This people, at a moment when others stood silent and trembling before the injustice of the strong, in the hope of avert-

⁴ This retranslation differs slightly from the original English text; see Baker and Dodd (eds.), *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace*, vol. I, pp. 405, 407.

ing a yet greater evil, and were abandoning an inalienable right for fear of losing all other rights, and thus, by their attachment to life, seemed resigned to slavery worse than death itself,—this people of Panama, I repeat, has always had confidence in the strength of the spirit which no human power can conquer, which no force, however powerful, should dare to challenge: by that I mean Right, fighting literally to the death, but never yielding.

"That is why I come forward on behalf of my Government with head erect, for I am certain of finding among you the consideration which we deserve for the noble convictions to which we have always subordinated our actions. My satisfaction in being present at such important discussions is even greater when I remember that Simon Bolivar was the first (namely, at the historical Congress of Panama) to suggest the idea of an institution which should group together the American Republics in a juridical organization, destined, as the great liberator said, 'to form the most immense, the most extraordinary, and the strongest League which has yet appeared on the earth. The Holy Alliance would be inferior in power to this Confederation. Mankind would bless this League of salvation, and America would reap its benefits. Political Societies would receive at its hands a code of public law which would become the law of the world.'

"I also remember these phrases which I read a long time ago in the history of George Washington, and whose noble meaning I have never forgotten: 'Oh, my people! keep good faith and justice towards all nations. Cultivate peace and kindly harmony. Both morality and religion command you to do so, and also wise policy. It will be very splendid to see a free people give to the world an example of the highest justice.'"

"Do we not find in these remembrances something of the thought of President Wilson? This man, however, has given them an even wider interpretation, and he suggests the formation of a League of Nations, thanks to which troubles between States will disappear, democratic institutions will develop on normal lines, peoples will abandon all ideas of conquest and, being certain that their rights will be respected, will no longer have cause to fear the domination of a formidably organized military power.

"Now, in what circumstances has it become possible for questions like these, which hitherto have only been studied and discussed by a

*The original English text reads as follows: "Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct. And can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period a great nation to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence" Washington's Farewell Address, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897*, vol. I, pp. 213, 221.

few minds, to be put on the program of the nations? It has needed the terrible war and flagration which, during more than four years, has desolated the world and burdened humanity with irreparable sacrifices to bring about this result. We must ask for the creation of a League founded on the immutable bases of Right and Justice, as President Wilson has so fitly said. This work will form, moreover, the line of demarcation between two epochs of humanity: that of wars of ambition and conquest, and that of the triumph of international justice.

"The Covenant of the League of Nations lays down first and foremost that Governments must really shape their line of conduct in accordance with the precepts of international law; this is certainly a new thing, for international law before the war pointed out in theory the rules of conduct for States as between each other, but its precepts remained without effect. They were indeed lacking in two qualities: one was that of their being binding through the freely granted adhesion of the States; the other thing lacking was the establishment of penalties and punishments against any State which might transgress accepted agreements.

"The Draft which is presented to us lays down these two conditions and, for the first time in history, we shall see the birth of a positive international law, sufficiently strong to see its precepts both accepted and executed. The opponents of this splendid Draft tell us that international law is a theoretical science which does not admit of enforcement by penalties, because the integrity of a territory, the honor and sovereignty of a people may only be discussed by the nation concerned, and may not be submitted to the control of a foreign Power; that to abandon in favor of a tribunal the power to settle questions which affect the existence or independence of a nation, implies for that nation a diminution of its attributions, a weakening of its sovereignty, and a position of dependence on foreign elements.

"It must, however, be pointed out that the Covenant of the League of Nations does not threaten the existence or independence of any of these nations. Its exact purpose is to guarantee the existence and independence of each one of them, to avert all wars and to submit to arbitration or to the Executive Council, as the parties may decide, any conflict which is capable of bringing about a rupture.

"John Chamberlain in his book 'The Suppression of War,' says that it is necessary to reject the idea that States cannot abandon the right of themselves interpreting agreements concluded with other nations. Independence is not diminished thereby, but there is created an entity, an organization which is superior to all others so far as concerns the relations of peoples with one another.

"It has further been said that it would never be possible to avert wars, as it was difficult to make a universal code of international law because of the differences of jurisdiction. Chamberlain replies to this objection when he asserts 'that the juridical sense of nations in regard to relations between States is fairly uniform. It is true that juridical conceptions are liable to change and evolution, but the fundamental basis of law does not change since, each in their own sphere of action, individual persons and social entities can exist concurrently. Its essence is immutable. Its method of application and accidental circumstances change in accordance with periods of time, countries and dominant ideas; but the right of concurrent existence which all peoples possess does not change, and international relations conform to this fundamental theory.'

"That is why the League of Nations is about to be formed in order that this principle may be the basis of international law.

"Finally, it has been said that wars are necessary, and that it is impossible to avert them. The whole history of humanity has concentrated on this perpetual struggle between juridical rules of social justice conceived by the human conscience and the anxieties, errors, interests and passions which throughout the centuries, have resisted the establishment of social forms. I beg those who today may regard it as impossible to put in practice the rules of the League of Nations in order to assure justice and peace among peoples, to reflect on the stages through which humanity has had to pass in order to reach the guiding principles of social justice which today prevail among civilized peoples. In antiquity, Aristotle, the most illustrious of all the Greek philosophers, regarded slavery as a natural circumstance necessary to the social order; could the men of the Middle Ages imagine that one day slavery would be regarded as an iniquitous and unnatural state? How many wars and struggles in all countries have not been waged for the liberty of conscience which all Constitutions now recognize? The same is the case with every reform which has deeply perturbed social and political forms in by-gone times.

"The conscience of humanity therefore regards order and permanent peace between peoples as an end realizable by international law, and believes that Nature herself has not deprived mankind of effective means for attaining so noble a purpose. What has happened is that humanity has delivered a pre-conceived judgment, as it did at the periods when equality before the law, representative systems and liberty of conscience were at stake, and believes that war is alone able to put an end to international disputes, because any other procedure is a constraint, and all constraints are contrary to the sovereign will of a country. No, no such constraint exists, nor should it exist, any more than a man has a right himself to settle his affairs with another man

without that man's participation; therefore, no such restriction must be imposed by the Covenant of the League of Nations on a country which does not wish to adhere to it, unless that country's attitude be a manifest international danger. Such a country must be persuaded that a sovereignty which may lead it into armed strife and to its own ruin is a dangerous sovereignty and should be voluntarily regulated or held in abeyance in the circumstances provided for by the Constitution of the League of Nations. Chamberlain is right in saying in this connection: 'All the nations of the world met in assembly are not qualified to control the life and internal affairs of another nation, however small it may be; however, an assembly of nations is qualified to draw up rules and to make laws to govern the international relations of the peoples of the world, in order that they may submit to law and avoid the crimes which war carries with it.' Therefore recognition is refused to the sovereignty of a country which arrogates to itself the right to settle exclusively its disputes, without paying heed to the guiding juridical principles laid down by the League of Nations, and without having exhausted all the recourses of procedure which the new organization can and should impose. Reason is unable to admit that an individual or an entity should be both judge and party in a dispute. Would such a maxim, which common sense itself rejects, be equitable if applied either to peace, that is, to the greatest good, or to war which is the greatest evil?

"The means laid down by the League of Nations in order to ensure the peace of the world and to assert the effective and objective reality of international law, is arbitration. Human wisdom has discovered no more effective procedure, and the very numerous pacifists before the war, especially in France, the United States, England and Italy, had faith only in this solution. But to that end arbitration must be obligatory and universal, without restriction or exclusion of subject, with one exception; that is, national existence and independence, the guarantees for which are the precise object of the Constitution of the League of Nations. All other questions, whether of interests, territorial sovereignty, or honor, must be submitted to an arbitral tribunal. Questions of honor, indeed, should be submitted to a special tribunal, because in those matters it is a contradiction that one individual should be both judge and party, because questions of honor are subject to the criticisms of others and, finally, because any conflict may become a question of honor. Nor should questions of sovereignty be excluded from arbitration, for this juridical procedure is implied in matters of individual property, and the idea of sovereignty is no more than an amplification of the idea of property. Arbitration has already been applied to questions of territorial integrity, because it is the best means of

showing the value of titles to possession, while the mere act of refusing to discuss a title to possession would arouse suspicions in regard to its legality. It is the best means of avoiding international disputes.

"In the formation of nationalities it sometimes happens that a small State borders on a greater Power; how would that small State have the certainty of securing a hearing for its rights unless assured of the possibility of submitting to an arbitral tribunal such questions as might arise from its state of neighborhood?

"Let us admit that the independence or sovereignty of a people should alone be withheld from the control of the League of Nations. The independence and sovereignty of a people are, as a general rule, assets which are not willingly renounced, any more than an individual can abandon his existence and his liberty as a human and reasonable being; nevertheless, the possession of such independence and liberty is not meant to entitle anyone to break his agreements.

"But, it will be said, arbitration has existed and has not secured the looked for results. Thus the Tribunal of the Hague was unable to prevent the greatest and most terrible of wars; moreover its sentences only acquire executive force when the parties submit to its decisions. But the parties did not accept its decisions.*

"Count Goblet d'Aviella, Minister of State, Vice President of the Belgian Senate, and Professor at the University of Brussels, said that up till 1913 one could count 112 arbitral awards; he added, however, that most of them concerned conflicts which did not affect vital interests either of independence or honor.†

*According to the statement made by the Bureau at Berne in 1901, recourse has been made during the last century to arbitration in respect to international questions in the following proportion:—

From 1850-59, number of questions settled by arbitration	15
From 1860-69, number of questions settled by arbitration	22
From 1870-79, number of questions settled by arbitration	24
From 1880-89, number of questions settled by arbitration	42
From 1890-99, number of questions settled by arbitration	63
Total cases settled by arbitration	166

In the history of arbitration the case of the steamship "Alabama" between the United States and England was a famous one and England was condemned to pay 15½ million dollars by a sentence which was delivered against her. [Foot-note in the original.]

†Among these Treaties for restricted arbitration special mention should be made of the one quoted in the book for the years 1913-1914, of the 'Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.' It was signed between the United States and England and was concerned with the sense in which should be interpreted the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of November 18th, 1901, in regard to certain dues payable by vessels passing through the Panama Canal. The Treaty states that 'differences which may arise of a legal nature or relating to the interpretation of Treaties existing between two contracting parties and which it may not have been possible to settle by diplomacy, shall be referred to the permanent Court of

"A certain number of documents, of which you are certainly aware, enable us to see the distinct growth of a tendency towards the idea of obligatory obedience to the awards given by an arbitral tribunal. I repeat that, in my opinion, the only restriction in matters of arbitration is that concerned with existence, in respect of independence and sovereignty, for independence and sovereignty either are synonymous terms or become synonymous; the League of Nations is being created in order to ensure their preservation. Any other restriction would render inoperative the arbitration set up by the League of Nations, as was the case with the Hague arbitration; for what distinguishes the future tribunal from all previous ones which have been imagined, will be the penalty imposed on any party which presumes to infringe the arbitral sentence.

"Pascal said that 'Right without Force is Impotence.' 'The peace which is to follow the war,' so M. Briand stated, 'must not be an empty formula; it must be based on international law and guaranteed by penalties from which no country can rid itself. Such a peace

Arbitration established at the Hague by the Convention of the 19th [29th] July, 1899, provided, nevertheless, that they do not affect the vital interests, the independence, or the honor of the two contracting States, and do not concern the interests of third parties.' [Arbitration convention signed Apr. 4, 1908, Article I, *Foreign Relations*, 1908, p. 332.]

It will be seen that this is a Treaty which contains restrictions. The Carnegie Institute for Peace had 1,200,000 copies of it printed in order to acquaint the world with this arbitration agreement.

This idea of a Treaty of Arbitration with restrictions was again taken up at the two Conferences at the Hague, and the Republic of Panama was represented at the second one. On that occasion the theories set forth in the *Progress of Peace*, quoted above were again brought up.

Mr. Taft in the United States took the initiative in propounding the idea of submitting to international arbitration any question incapable of solution by diplomatic means, before an appeal to arms. This was the dominant idea in the Pan-American Congresses assembled at Washington and at that held in Mexico, to which numerous American States had given their adhesion. Even in the Constitutions of some of those States arbitration is laid down as a means for settling disputes with other countries.

It may therefore be said that arbitration is a principle of international law which had its birth in America.

A few European States have accepted the elimination of restrictions from arbitration Treaties. Italy, Denmark and the Netherlands have acted in the same way as the Argentine Republic.

The Inter-Parliamentary Union for the Maintenance of International Peace, at its session of 1908, expressed the wish that, in the case of disputes concerning questions which were not submitted to arbitration, the contracting parties should abstain from committing hostile acts until they had sought, either jointly or separately, the mediation of one or several friendly Powers. The aspiration thus voiced was first applied when the United States, under the presidency of Mr. Taft, introduced arbitration covenants for the progress of peace (*Treaties for the Progress of Peace*) which have been negotiated since 1911 by the great American Republic with France, England, and, immediately afterwards, with a dozen other States, among which were Italy, Russia, Holland, Spain, the Scandinavian States and many South American nations. (C. H. [L.] Lange, *The American Peace Treaties*, Christiania, 1915.)

Arbitration Treaties in regard to boundaries which have been settled between various American countries are very numerous. Arbitration is the rule of conduct for the solution of such questions. [Footnote in the original.]

will reign over humanity and will grant security to the peoples so that they may work and develop according to their peculiar genius.'

"We are familiar with the numerous declarations made in this connection by the illustrious President of the United States.

"It may perhaps be objected that the League of Nations forms a group against which another group or League may be formed, thus giving birth to a state of antagonism liable to stir up war. The Statutes which are suggested for our acceptance do not indicate the purpose of the League to be that of forming a group or coalition of Powers; however, in order to forestall any misleading interpretation and to set aside any possible ground of suspicion, would it not be suitable to make an explicit declaration to the effect that no nation is excluded from the League? Add to that the provisions laid down in the Statutes in regard to the procedure to be followed against States which are not Members of the League in the event of a conflict arising which might degenerate into armed strife. Would it not be, in fact, an employment of force against States which are neither Members of the League nor have been invited to become Members, if the decision of a Society to which they do not belong were imposed on them? It has been said, in this connection, among those who favor Treaties, that the League of Nations, founded for the purpose of peace, ought to be universal. If it is not suitable that the League should be universal now, why not add a precise declaration to the effect that it may become so? Moreover, if any doubt arose in regard to the precise meaning of the text of the Rules of the League, would it not be desirable to create an organization for the purpose of setting at rest any possible doubts in regard to the interpretation of the text of the Statutes of the League, and even [to deal with questions as to whether the Covenant of the League] ⁷ has been violated or not? Is that not indeed the proper task of the Assembly of Delegates, as they constitute the Supreme International Tribunal, and are the Assembly which gives the Covenant its life?

"Gentlemen, you have come from all the corners of the world with a mission from your Governments to accomplish this work to which so many great minds have already devoted the best that is in them. You are assembled here to create this future League which is to ensure the triumph of Right and Justice, as was so finely said by President Wilson, the strength and beauty of whose thought has penetrated the consciences of millions of mankind.

"Peoples like the one which I have the honor to represent, which is small in respect of its territory but great by the nobility of its aspirations and its confidence in a prosperous future, can only live

⁷ These words appear in the British print but were omitted, apparently by typographical error, from the American print.

through justice. Therefore all your labors to ensure the triumph of justice are followed with interest and enthusiasm. It is at your hands that those peoples await the realization of their hopes, and you will have merited their eternal gratitude."

DR. BONILLA (Honduras), speaking in Spanish, proposes an amendment, the purpose of which is to determine the sense of the Monroe Doctrine referred to in Article XXI of the Covenant, in the following terms:

"The Delegation of Honduras proposes that in any safeguarding or mention of the Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the following should be added:

"This doctrine, which has been supported by the United States of America since 1823, when it was proclaimed by President Monroe, means that all the Republics of America have the right to an independent existence, and that no nation can there acquire by conquest any portion of their territory nor intervene in their internal government or administration, nor perform there any act which can diminish their autonomy or wound their national dignity. The Monroe Doctrine does not hinder the countries of Latin America from confederating or otherwise uniting themselves in the search for the best way of fulfilling their destiny."

"At the informal meeting held on April 16th, to which were invited the Delegates of the Nations which had not taken part in drawing up the Preliminary Treaty of Peace, we were informed that a general Conference would be summoned for the 25th of the present month, with a view to the communication of those bases of peace, before they were laid before the representatives of Germany, who had been invited to Versailles for the following day.

"In view of the short period of time available it was pointed out that it would not be possible to read out the whole of the Draft and that the communication would therefore be limited to the most important points. I do not think that this limitation will present any disadvantages for the Delegates among us who are not acquainted with the Draft, so far as concerns the territorial settlements and other points in which the countries which we represent are not directly interested. I have the fullest confidence that the stipulations in that connection must be in harmony with justice, which is the only secure basis for a stable peace; and that at the same time, the necessary precautions will have been taken to prevent a repetition of the world-wide catastrophe brought about by the war which has just ended.

"According to notices in the press, the Covenant of the League of Nations has been embodied in the Preliminary Treaty of Peace, as

that Covenant is regarded as the best means for securing the stability of the peace. All the nations represented at the Conference are directly interested in this Covenant, the small nations, like the one which I represent, perhaps even more so, if that is possible. The bases drafted by the Commission are known to us; but it has been stated in the press that modifications have been introduced, and among them an amendment proposed by the North American Delegation, to the effect that 'Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.'

"The Monroe Doctrine directly affects the Latin American Republics; but since it has never been alluded to in any international document, nor been expressly accepted by the nations, either of the old or new continent, and as it has been defined and applied in different ways by the statesmen and Presidents of the United States of America, I think it is necessary that it should be defined with absolute clearness in the Treaty which is about to be signed, in order that henceforward it may be embodied in written international law.

"The North American Delegation is presided over by the most Honorable Mr. Woodrow Wilson; and if the Monroe Doctrine has been mentioned, it is certain that, in the absence of any definition thereof in the same document, the definition present in the minds of the drafters has been that which Mr. Wilson, as President of the United States, gave to it in his various speeches since the one which he made at Mobile in 1918 [1913],⁸ up to the concluding ones of the present year. In those speeches he laid it down that the Doctrine is not a menace but a guarantee for the weaker States of America, and he expressly disavowed the interpretations which had been given to it in the sense that it implies a kind of tutelage which the United States have the right to exercise over the remaining American Republics; more especially, in his speech to the Mexican journalists on June 7th, 1918,⁹ he stated that the guarantee implied by the Doctrine for the benefit of the weaker countries, not only applies to the nations of the Old World, but also to the United States; and he spoke of the possibility of concluding a Pan-American Pact in this sense, which may find its accomplishment through its inclusion in the Covenant which is now before us for discussion. It is through declarations such as these that President Wilson has become the best exponent of the ideals of the peoples of the American Continent.

⁸ Baker and Dodd (eds.), *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: The New Democracy*, vol. I, p. 64

⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, p. 577.

"All the foregoing considerations lead me to bring forward the accompanying proposal which will, I hope, deserve a kindly welcome on the part of the United States Delegation, and be supported by the Latin-American Republics, which will thereby render a tribute of admiration and respect to the First Magistrate of the North American nation, who has given so many proofs of his love of justice.

"I likewise lay before you a few paragraphs from his eloquent speech to the Mexican journalists,* to which allusion has already been made.

"If the American amendment which I just mentioned is drafted in the terms which have been published, or in other similar terms, the Covenant of the League of Nations will not be an obstacle to the possibility of the peoples of Latin America confederating or uniting

**Paragraphs of the President's Speech at the White House to Mexican Editors, June 7, 1918.*

"You know your own personal reception. You know how gladly we have opened to you the doors of every establishment that you wanted to see and have shown you just what we were doing and I hope you have gained the right impression as to why we were doing it. We are doing it, Gentlemen, so that the world may never hereafter have to fear the only thing that any nation has to dread, the unjust and selfish aggression of another nation. Some time ago, as you probably all know, I proposed a sort of Pan-American agreement. I had perceived that one of the difficulties of our relationship with Latin America was this: the famous Monroe Doctrine was adopted without your consent, without the consent of any of the Central or South American States.

"If I may express it in the terms that we so often use in this country, we said: 'We are going to be your big brother whether you want us to be or not.' We did not ask whether it was agreeable to you that we should be your big brother. We said we were going to be. Now, that was all very well so far as protecting you from aggression from the other side of the water was concerned, but there was nothing in it that protected you from aggression from us, and I have repeatedly seen the uneasy feeling on the part of representatives of the States of Central and South America that our self-appointed protection might be for our own benefit and our own interests and not for the interest of our neighbors. So I said: 'Very well, let us make an arrangement by which we will give bond. Let us have a common guarantee, that all of us will sign, of political and territorial integrity. Let us agree that if any of us, the United States, violates the political independence or the territorial integrity of any of the others, all the others will jump on her.' I pointed out to some of the gentlemen who were less inclined to enter into this arrangement than others that that was in effect giving bonds on the part of the United States that we would enter into an arrangement by which you would be protected from us.

"Now, that is the kind of agreement that will have to be the foundation of the future life of the nations of the world, Gentlemen. The whole family of nations will have to guarantee to each nation that no nation shall violate its political independence or its territorial integrity. That is the basis, the only conceivable basis, for the future peace of the world, and I must admit that I was ambitious to have the States of the two continents of America show the way to the rest of the world as to how to make a basis of peace. Peace can come only by trust. As long as there is suspicion there is going to be misunderstanding, and as long as there is misunderstanding there is going to be trouble. If you can once get a situation of trust then you have got a situation of permanent peace. Therefore, every one of us, it seems to me, owes it as a patriotic duty to his own country to plant the seeds of trust and confidence instead of the seeds of suspicion and variety of interest. That is the reason that I began by saying to you that I have not had the pleasure of meeting a group of men who were more welcome than you are, because you are our near neighbors. Suspicion on your part or misunderstanding on your part distresses us more than we would be distressed by similar feelings on the part of those less near by." [Footnote in the original.]

together in some other form which will approach the realization of the dream of Bolivar.

"While adhering on behalf of Honduras to the Covenant in its draft form, I desire to make one last statement, and that is to make express reservation beforehand on behalf of my country of the right which it derives from its Constitution of uniting with one or more of the nations of the Central American Isthmus, for the purpose of reconstituting what was formerly the Republic of Central America; and I make this express reservation because such a union constitutes the finest ideal of patriotism in that part of the world, and no doubt can possibly exist in regard to the legitimacy of its realization.

MR. PICHON (France), speaking in French makes the following declaration in regard to the two amendments moved by Mr. Léon Bourgeois:

"Before a decision is taken on the Covenant which has been submitted to the Conference for deliberation, I beg leave, on behalf of the French Delegation, to make a statement in connection with the two amendments which were just now explained by Mr. Léon Bourgeois.

"The Government of the French Republic expresses the satisfaction which it feels at finding, in the draft Covenant of the League of Nations, the crowning point of its constant endeavor, since the Conferences at the Hague, to ensure the organization of Right and Peace.

"It records its confident conviction that the League of Nations will become in an ever-increasing degree the necessary instrument in relations between peoples.

"It reminds the Assembly that, with a view to strengthening that instrument, its Delegates have presented two amendments, which appeared to them necessary, in regard to the control of armaments and the enforcement of penalties.

"It accepts in the spirit of solidarity which has prevailed in the preparation of the Covenant, the draft which is submitted to the Conference, and confidently hopes that the exercise of the right of amendment provided for in Article XXVI will enable it to be strengthened. I should like to make at the same time a proposal in connection with Annex I, which contains the list of States invited to adhere to the Covenant."

Mr. Pichon adds:

French Motion to
Add Monaco to
States Invited to
Adhere to the
Covenant

"The French Delegation requests the inclusion of the Principality of Monaco in the list of neutral States which are to be invited to adhere to the Covenant of the League of Nations.

"The Prince of Monaco has been one of the most faithful and most devoted servants of the cause which the League of Nations is summoned to represent and to bring to a triumphant issue. He has intermittently shared in the international labors of arbitration and peace. It would, therefore, only be justice to accept the adhesion and assistance of his Principality, as has been done in the case of the other neutral States mentioned on the list.

"If there is no opposition, I request the addition of the Principality of Monaco to the list."

After an exchange of views between Mr. Pichon and the President, it is decided to refer the proposal to the Council of the League of Nations.

DR. AFFONSO COSTA (Portugal), speaking in French, makes the following observations on the proposal of the President of the United States to carry out the provisions of Article IV of the Covenant by the selection of four Members of the Council of the League:

Observations of
the Portuguese
Delegation to the
American Propo-
sition Relative to
Article 4

"I was somewhat surprised to find, just as our labors were to begin, that a proposal had been presented today by President Wilson for the nomination of the four members of the Executive Council of the League of Nations. We are not yet in a position to appoint any representative of a neutral country to a seat on the Executive Council of the League of Nations, for Article IV of the Covenant says:—

"The Council shall consist of Representatives of the United States, of the British Empire, of France, of Italy, and of Japan, together with Representatives of four other Members of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the [Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by the Assembly,]¹⁰ Representatives of and of shall be Members of the Council."

"If tomorrow the Assembly of the League of Nations may only select Members of the League of Nations to sit on the Executive Council, we, the Peace Conference, are likewise debarred today from appointing any but Members of the League of Nations, and I ask the Conference whether it regards as Members of the League the neutral countries which we have invited to enter it. I consider that the proposal which has been made is a premature one and that we are only empowered today to appoint four Delegates who belong to the Peace

¹⁰ These words appear in the text of the Covenant of the League of Nations, *post*, p. 322 (first paragraph of Article IV), but were omitted here apparently by typographical error.

Conference, that is to say, to the Allied and Associated Belligerent States and not to the States which are not yet Members of the League of Nations.

"If some time hence we think it possible to give this satisfaction to one of the neutral countries which have merely received our invitation, but will tomorrow be our partners, one of the Representatives chosen today will yield his place or we shall take advantage of the right given us by Article IV to increase the number of the Members of the Executive Council.

"The question is one of competence, and, in my capacity as head of the Portuguese Delegation, and also as a Professor of Law, I should be unwilling to sign my name and that of the Delegation to an appointment which I regard at this moment as altogether illegitimate.

"The Portuguese Delegation makes every possible reservation in regard to the appointment by the Peace Conference of representatives of any neutral country whatsoever as members of the Executive Council of the League of Nations. That may come about later on; today it is too soon."

DR. AFFONSO COSTA therefore deposits with the Bureau of the Conference the following statement:

"The Portuguese Delegation makes every possible reservation in regard to the appointment by the Peace Conference of a representative of any neutral country whatsoever as a member of the Executive Council of the League of Nations."

The President informs Dr. Costa that due note has been taken of the reservation made by the Portuguese Delegation.

The proposal made by the President of the United States for the adoption of the Covenant of the League of Nations, together with the amendments moved in the course of the session, is put to vote and carried unanimously.

The Agenda Paper provides for the discussion of the clauses on the conditions of labor to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace, and for the presentation of Sir Robert Borden's amendment.

MR. BARNES (British Empire) explains in the following terms the grounds of the alterations in the clauses to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace:

"I rise to revive the resolutions of which mention was made on the occasion of our last meeting,—I mean the resolutions connected with the report of the Labor Commission. (Annex II (A).) It will be remembered that there was embodied in that report a reference to

Discussion of the
Clauses on the
Condition of Labor

nine resolutions which had been adopted by the Labor Commission, each one of which was accorded two-thirds of a majority vote; and it was intended that we should have dealt with them on that day. They were unfortunately not reached. Difficulties had arisen even then, and developed later on with regard to the drafting.

"I endeavored, on behalf of the Labor Commission to get an agreement on a re-draft. I am sorry to say that I was not altogether successful, but Sir Robert Borden was more successful than I had been in getting agreement upon a re-draft, which he is going to submit to this meeting, and which, I have to say, so far as I can see, does embody the spirit of the nine resolutions which were adopted by the Labor Commission. It is my duty, however, just as a matter of form, to revive the resolutions as they came from the Labor Commission, and to submit those resolutions to you in their original form."

SIR ROBERT BORDEN (Canada), proposes in the following terms the amended draft of the nine Resolutions (Annex II (B)).

Amendment of
the Clauses to
insert in the
Treaty

"It is proper that, in the first instance, I should read the amended text which I move as an amendment to that originally proposed:

"The High Contracting Parties, recognizing that the well-being, physical, moral and intellectual, of industrial wage-earners is of supreme international importance, have framed a permanent machinery associated with that of the League of Nations to further this great end.

"They recognize that differences of climate, habits and customs, of economic opportunity and industrial tradition, make strict uniformity in the conditions of labor difficult of immediate attainment. But, holding as they do, that labor should not be regarded merely as an article of commerce, they think that there are methods and principles for regulating labor conditions which all industrial communities should endeavor to apply, so far as their special circumstances will permit.

"Among these methods and principles, the following seem to the High Contracting Parties to be of special and urgent importance:—

"First.—The guiding principle above enunciated that labor should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce.

"Second.—The right of association for all lawful purposes by the employed as well as by the employers.

"Third.—The payment to the employed of a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in their time and country.

"Fourth.—The adoption of an eight hours day or a forty-eight hours week as the standard to be aimed at where it has not already been attained.

"Fifth.—The adoption of a weekly rest of at least twenty-four hours, which should include Sunday wherever practicable.

"Sixth.—The abolition of child labor and the imposition of such limitations on the labor of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their proper physical development.

"Seventh.—The principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value.

"Eighth.—The standard set by law in each country with respect to the conditions of labor should have due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein.

"Ninth.—Each State should make provision for a system of inspection in which women should take part, in order to ensure the [en]forcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the employed.

"Without claiming that these methods and principles are either complete or final, the High Contracting Parties are of opinion that they are well fitted to guide the policy of the League of Nations; and that, if adopted by the industrial communities who are members of the League, and safe-guarded in practice by an adequate system of such inspection, they will confer lasting benefits upon the wage-earners of the world."

"I may say, in the first instance, of this, as President Wilson said of the new draft of the League of Nations, that there are no alterations in substance, as I understand it. There is, however, a new arrangement, and the phraseology has been somewhat altered. For example, the difference of conditions among different nations which was alluded to in paragraph 7 of the Articles as originally drafted is now recognized as a consideration which must apply to all the principles here laid down. Further, as it is manifestly impossible to establish at once a code which shall be permanent or enduring, emphasis is laid in the new draft upon the view that these Articles are to be regarded as an enunciation of the principles upon which from time to time, if need be, a code may be built up. In the concluding paragraph, emphasis is also laid upon the consideration that these methods and principles are not to be regarded as complete or final. It is quite impossible for us to foresee all developments and all ideals which may arise in the future and, therefore, this is put forward as no more than a tentative enunciation of principles which, if they are observed and carried out as they should be, will result in a vast improvement of labor conditions throughout the world. I desire to explain, also, that the amended Articles are not presented here as embodying merely my own language and my own ideas. The suggested changes in phraseology and arrangements have come from the different Delegations which are

represented in the Conference. They have received, I believe, the approval and endorsement of all the important industrial communities.

"I am glad to say that I am to be supported in making this proposal by Mr. Vandervelde, whose eloquent and inspiring speech on the subject at a previous session of the Conference still dwells in our memory. Therefore, with some confidence and for these reasons, I venture to present the amended draft as one which should command the support of this Conference."

M. VANDERVELDE (Belgium), speaking in French, expresses his approval of the proposed amendment in the following terms:

"As Sir Robert Borden has just said, a mere comparison of the two texts suffices to show that there is no essential difference between them. The text proposed by the Commission was more precise, and I may say that my personal preferences were for such precision. However, in the course of the exchange of views which preceded this meeting, we have convinced ourselves that in order to secure unanimity between the representatives of the 32 nations, situated in every corner of the globe, a little scumbling, if I may use the phrase, was indispensable.

"We have, therefore, slightly scumbled the text, and I give my complete adhesion to the final text proposed by Sir Robert Borden. I do so all the more gladly because, as regards the questions to which European working-men are more especially attached, that is, syndical liberty, a minimum wage and the eight-hours day, the two texts are practically identic. Having placed on record the foregoing observations, I beg your leave to propose three amendments to the drafting.

"The French text, line 2, speaks of 'industrial wage-earners.' In agreement with Mr. Fontaine, Director of the French Labor Bureau, I propose to say, 'paid workers,' for it has always been understood, during the labors of the Conference, that international labor legislation ought to be applied no less to agricultural wage-earners than to the wage-earners of industry. That is, moreover, the sense of the English text.

"Furthermore, in line 3, instead of saying, 'a permanent machinery,' we have thought that the words, 'a permanent organization' should be substituted. That will point out the possibility for growth of the institution which we are about to create.

"Finally, at the end of the page (of the French text), instead of 'Commission des Nations,' I think it would be more accurate to say 'League of Nations.'"

The President puts to the vote Sir Robert Borden's amendment together with the alterations suggested by Mr. Vandervelde.

The amendment and the alterations are unanimously adopted.
The Session is adjourned at 17.45 o'clock (5.45 p. m.).

The President,
G. CLEMENCEAU.

The Secretary-General,

P. DUTASTA.

The Secretaries,

J. C. GREW,

M. P. A. HANKEY,

PAUL GAUTHIER,

ALDROVANDI,

SADAO SABURI.

Annex I

Report of the Commission on the League of Nations

1. TERMS OF REFERENCE

The Preliminary Peace Conference, at the Plenary Session of the 25th January, 1919 (Protocol No. 2), decided to nominate a Commission to work out in detail the Constitution and functions of a League of Nations.

The terms of reference of this Commission were as follows:—

“The Conference, having considered the proposals for the creation of a League of Nations, resolved that—

“1. It is essential to the maintenance of the world settlement, which the Associated Nations are now met to establish, that a League of Nations be created to promote international co-operation, to ensure the fulfilment of accepted international obligations, and to provide safeguard against war.

“2. This league should be treated as an integral part of the general Treaty of Peace, and should be open to every civilized nation which can be relied on to promote its objects.

“3. The members of the League should periodically meet in international conference, and should have a permanent organization and secretariat to carry on the business of the League in the intervals between the conferences.”

“The Conference therefore appoints a Committee representative of the Associated Governments to work out the details of the constitution and functions of the League.”

This Commission was to be composed of fifteen members, *i. e.*, two members representing each of the Great Powers (United States of America, British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan), and five mem-

bers to represent all the Powers with special interests. At a meeting of these latter Powers on the 27th January, 1919, Belgium, Brazil, China, Portugal, and Serbia were chosen to designate one representative each. (See Annex 6 of Protocol No. 2).¹¹

2. CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMISSION

The Commission was therefore originally composed as follows:

For the United States of America:

The President of the United States of America.

Honorable Edward M. House.

For the British Empire:

The Rt. Hon. the Lord Robert Cecil, K. C., M. P.

Lieutenant-General the Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts, K. C., Minister of Defence of the Union of South Africa.

For France:

Mr. Léon Bourgeois, former President of the Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Larnaude, Dean of the Faculty of Law of Paris.

For Italy:

Mr. Orlando, President of the Council.

Mr. Scialoja, Senator of the Kingdom.

For Japan:

Baron Makino, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Member of the Diplomatic Council.

Viscount Chinda, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of H. I. M. the Emperor of Japan at London.

For Belgium:

Mr. Hymans, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of State.

For Brazil:

Mr. Epitacio Pessoa, Senator, former Minister of Justice.

For China:

Mr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of China at Washington.

For Portugal:

Mr. Jayme Batalha Reis, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Portugal at Petrograd.

For Serbia:

Mr. Vesnitch, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of H. M. the King of Serbia at Paris.

A request of four other Powers—Greece, Poland, Roumania, and the Czecho-Slovak Republic—to be represented on the Commission was referred by the Conference to the Commission for consideration. Upon the recommendation of the Commission the four following members took their seats on the 6th February:—

¹¹ Printed as "Minutes of the Meeting of January 27, 1919, of the Powers with Special Interests," p. 447.

For Greece:

Mr. Eleftherios Veniselos, President of the Council of Ministers.

For Poland:

Mr. Roman Dmowski, President of the Polish National Committee.

For Roumania:

Mr. Diamandy, Roumanian Minister Plenipotentiary.

For the Czecho-Slovak Republic:

Mr. Charles Kramar, President of the Council of Ministers.

3. FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

Between the date of its appointment and the 14th February, the Commission met ten times. As a result of these meetings the following Draft Covenant of the League of Nations was adopted, and read as a preliminary report by the Chairman at a Plenary Session of the Conference on the latter date. (Protocol No. 3) :—

[Here follows draft covenant printed as Annex A to Protocol No. 3, page 230.]

4. SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS OF THE COMMISSION

The Draft Covenant of the 14th February was made public in order that discussion of its terms might be provoked. A great deal of constructive criticism followed upon its publication. Further suggestions resulted from hearings of Representatives of thirteen neutral States before a Committee of the Commission on the 20th and 21st March.

These various recommendations were taken under advisement by the Commission, which held meetings on the 22nd, 24th, and 26th March, and on the 10th and 11th April. At the meeting of the 10th April a delegation representing the International Council of Women and the Suffragist Conference of the Allied countries and the United States were received by the Commission.

5. FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

At the meetings of the 10th and 11th April the Commission agreed definitively on the following text of the Covenant to be presented to the Conference :—

Covenant of the League of Nations

In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations by the

firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, the High Contracting Parties agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE I

The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant, and also such of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other Members of the League.

Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military and naval forces and armaments.

Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.

ARTICLE II

The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat.

ARTICLE III

The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of the League.

The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon.

The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have one vote, and may have not more than three Representatives.

ARTICLE IV

The Council shall consist of Representatives of the United States of America, of the British Empire, of France, of Italy, and of Japan, together with Representatives of four other Members of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by the Assembly, Representatives of shall be members of the Council.

With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name additional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always be members of the Council; the Council with like approval may increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council.

The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon.

The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member of the League.

At meetings of the Council each Member of the League represented on the Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one Representative.

ARTICLE V

Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council, and may be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.

ARTICLE VI

The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such secretaries and staff as may be required.

The first Secretary-General shall be the person named in the Annex; thereafter the Secretary-General shall be appointed by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly.

The secretaries and the staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary-General, with the approval of the Council.

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Assembly and of the Council.

The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the Members of the League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.

ARTICLE VII

The Seat of the League is established at Geneva.

The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall be established elsewhere.

All positions under or in connection with the League, including the Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women.

Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable.

ARTICLE VIII

The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military and naval programmes, and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes.

ARTICLE IX

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles I and VIII, and on military and naval questions generally.

ARTICLE X

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

ARTICLE XI

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall, on the request of any Member of the League, forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

ARTICLE XII

The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitra-

tion or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council.

In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

ARTICLE XIII

The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration, and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration.

Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration.

For the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitration to which the case is referred shall be the court agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.

The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

ARTICLE XIV

The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

ARTICLE XV

If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration as above, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof.

For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary-General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.

The Council shall endeavor to effect a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.

If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.

Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.

If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.

If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.

If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.

In any case referred to the Assembly all the provisions of this Article and of Article XII relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assembly if concurred in by the Representatives of those Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute.

ARTICLE XVI

Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles XII, XIII or XV, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military or naval force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.

Any member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the

Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.

ARTICLE XVII

In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles XII to XVI inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council.

Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article XVI shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.

If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

ARTICLE XVIII

Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

ARTICLE XIX

The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

ARTICLE XX

The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.

In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

ARTICLE XXI

Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace.

ARTICLE XXII

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases, and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.

There are territories, such as Southwest Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centers of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

In every case of mandate, the mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

ARTICLE XXIII

Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League

(a.) will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women and children both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organizations;

(b.) undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control;

(c.) will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs;

(d.) will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest;

(e.) will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall be borne in mind;

(f.) will endeavor to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease

ARTICLE XXIV

There shall be placed under the direction of the League all international bureaux already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaux and all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League.

In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general conventions, but which are not placed under the control of international bureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to the consent of the Council, and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute all relevant information, and shall render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable.

The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the League.

ARTICLE XXV

The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment and cooperation of duly authorized voluntary national Red Cross organizations having as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease, and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world.

ARTICLE XXVI

Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Assembly.

No such amendment shall bind any Member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League.

Annex to the Covenant

1. ORIGINAL MEMBERS OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Signatories of the Treaty of Peace.

United States of America	Guatemala
Belgium	Haiti
Bolivia	Hedjaz
Brazil	Honduras
British Empire	Italy
Canada	Japan
Australia	Liberia
South Africa	Nicaragua
New Zealand	Panama
India	Peru
China	Poland
Cuba	Portugal
Czecho-Slovakia	Roumania
Ecuador	Serbia
France	Siam
Greece	Uruguay

States Invited to Accede to the Covenant.

Argentine Republic	Persia
Chile	Salvador
Colombia	Spain
Denmark	Sweden
Netherlands	Switzerland
Norway	Venezuela
Paraguay	

2. FIRST SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

6. RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMISSION

At the last meeting of the Commission, the following resolution was adopted:—

“Resolved, that in the opinion of the Commission, the President of the Commission should be requested by the Conference to invite seven Powers, including two neutrals, to name Representatives on a Committee

- A. to prepare plans for the organization of the League,
- B. to prepare plans for the establishment of the Seat of the League,
- C. to prepare plans and the Agenda for the first meeting of the Assembly.

This Committee shall report both to the Council and to the Assembly.”

Annex II

Draft Clauses for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace in Regard to the Conditions of Labor(A.) TEXT PROPOSED BY THE COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL LABOR
LEGISLATION

The High Contracting Parties declare their acceptance of the following principles and engage to take all necessary steps to secure their realization in accordance with the recommendation to be made by the International Labor Conference as to their practical application:—

1. In right and in fact the labor of a human being should not be treated as merchandise or an article of commerce.

2. Employers and workers should be allowed the right of association for all lawful purposes.

3. No child should be permitted to be employed in industry or commerce before the age of fourteen years, in order that every child may be ensured reasonable opportunities for mental and physical education.

Between the years of fourteen and eighteen young persons of either sex may only be employed on work which is not harmful to their physical development and on condition that the continuation of their technical or general education is ensured.

4. Every worker has a right to a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life, having regard to the civilization of his time and country.

5. Equal pay should be given to women and to men for work of equal value in quantity and quality.

6. A weekly rest, including Sunday, or its equivalent for all workers.

7. Limitation of the hours of work in industry on the basis of eight hours a day or forty-eight hours a week, subject to an exception for countries in which climatic conditions, the imperfect development of industrial organization or other special circumstances render the industrial efficiency of the workers substantially different.

The International Labor Conference will recommend a basis approximately equivalent to the above for adoption in such countries.

8. In all matters concerning their status as workers and social insurance foreign workmen lawfully admitted to any country and their families should be ensured the same treatment as the nationals of that country.

9. All States should institute a system of inspection in which women should take part, in order to ensure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the workers.

(B.) AMENDED TEXT TO BE MOVED BY SIR ROBERT BORDEN

The High Contracting Parties, recognizing that the well-being, physical, moral and intellectual, of industrial wage-earners is of supreme international importance, have framed a permanent ma-

chinery associated with that of the League of Nations to further this great end.

They recognize that differences of climate, habits and customs, of economic opportunity and industrial tradition, make strict uniformity in the conditions of labor difficult of immediate attainment. But, holding as they do, that labor should not be regarded merely as an article of commerce, they think that there are methods and principles for regulating labor conditions which all industrial communities should endeavor to apply, so far as their special circumstances will permit.

Among these methods and principles, the following seem to the High Contracting Parties to be of special and urgent importance:—

First.—The guiding principle above enunciated that labor should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce.

Second.—The right of association for all lawful purposes by the employed as well as by the employers.

Third.—The payment to the employed of a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in their time and country.

Fourth.—The adoption of an eight-hour day or a forty-eight hours week as the standard to be aimed at where it has not already been attained.

Fifth.—The adoption of a weekly rest of at least twenty-four hours, which should include Sunday wherever practicable.

Sixth.—The abolition of child labor and the imposition of such limitations on the labor of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their proper physical development.

Seventh.—The principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value.

Eighth.—The standard set by law in each country with respect to the conditions of labor should have due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein.

Ninth.—Each State should make provision for a system of inspection in which women should take part, in order to ensure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the employed.

Without claiming that these methods and principles are either complete or final, the High Contracting Parties are of opinion that they are well fitted to guide the policy of the League of Nations; and that, if adopted by the industrial communities who are members of the League, and safeguarded in practice by an adequate system of such inspection, they will confer lasting benefits upon the wage-earners of the world.

Preliminary Peace Conference, Protocol No. 6, Plenary Session of May 6, 1919

The Session is opened at 15 o'clock (3 p. m.) under the presidency of Mr. Clemenceau, President.*

PRESENT

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

The President of the United States.
Honorable Robert Lansing
Honorable Henry White.
Honorable Edward M. House.
General Tasker H. Bliss.

FOR THE BRITISH EMPIRE:

GREAT BRITAIN:

The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
The Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law.
The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes
The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Ward, Bt.

Dominions and India:

CANADA:

The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden.
The Rt. Hon. Sir George Foster.

AUSTRALIA:

The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Cook.

SOUTH AFRICA:

General The Rt. Hon. Louis Botha.
Lieut-General The Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts.

NEW ZEALAND:

The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey.

INDIA:

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Sinha.
Major-General His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner.

FOR FRANCE:

Mr. Clemenceau.
Mr. Pichon.
Mr. L. L. Klotz.
Mr. André Tardieu.
Mr. Jules Cambon.
Marshal Foch.

FOR ITALY:

Mr. Crespi.

FOR JAPAN:

The Marquis Saionji.
The Baron Makino.
Viscount Chinda.
Mr. K. Matsui.

FOR BELGIUM:

Mr. Hymans.
Mr. van den Heuvel.
Mr. Vandervelde.

FOR BOLIVIA:

Mr. Ismael Montes.

FOR BRAZIL:

Mr. Epitacio Pessoa.
Mr. Pandia Calogeras.
Mr. Rodrigo Octavio.

FOR CHINA:

Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang.
Mr. Cheng-ting Thomas Wang.

FOR CUBA:

Mr. Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante.

* Contrary to the practice followed at the previous Plenary Session[s], the representatives of the Press were not admitted to be present at this Session. [Foot-note in the original.]

FOR ECUADOR :	FOR POLAND :
Mr. Dorn y de Alsua.	Mr. Roman Dmowski.
FOR GREECE :	Mr. Ignace Paderewski.
Mr. Eleftherios Veniselos.	FOR PORTUGAL :
Mr. Nicolas Politis.	Dr. Affonso Costa.
FOR GUATEMALA :	Mr. Augusto Soares.
Mr. Joaquin Mendéz.	FOR ROUMANIA :
FOR THE HEDJAZ :	Mr. Jean J. C. Bratiano.
Mr. Rustem Haidar.	Dr. Vaida-Voevod.
FOR HONDURAS :	FOR SERBIA :
Dr. Policarpo Bonilla.	Mr. N. P. Pachitch.
FOR LIBERIA :	Mr. Trumbitch.
Hon. C. D. B. King.	Mr. Ivan Zolger.
FOR NICARAGUA :	FOR SIAM :
Mr. Salvador Chamorro.	The Prince Charoon.
FOR PANAMA :	The Prince Traidos Prabandhu.
Mr. Antonio Burgos.	FOR THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC :
FOR PERU :	Mr. Charles Kramar.
Mr. Carlos G. Candamo, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Peru at Paris.	Mr. Edouard Benes.
	FOR URUGUAY :
	Mr. Juan Antonio Buero.

As the question of responsibility for the war had not been brought up for discussion at the previous Session, although placed on the Agenda paper,

The PRESIDENT inquires whether any of the Delegates desire to offer observations in that connection.

DR. BONILLA (Honduras) draws the attention of the Conference to the wish expressed by the Honduran Delegation in regard to the question of responsibility for the war, the text of which had been deposited with the Secretariat-General. (See Annex.)

As no other Delegate asks leave to speak, the President states that the Agenda paper calls for the discussion of the Conditions of Peace with Germany, and requests Mr. Tardieu (France) to make an explanatory statement of those conditions to the Conference.

MR. TARDIEU (France): Gentlemen, the text of the Preliminaries of Peace with Germany comprises 15 Parts; I will give their titles in advance, in order to throw light on the rest of my statement:—

- 1st Part: League of Nations.
- 2nd Part: Frontiers of Germany.
- 3rd Part: European political clauses.
- 4th Part: Political clauses outside Germany and outside Europe.
- 5th Part: Military, naval, and aerial clauses.

- 6th Part: Prisoners of war.
- 7th Part: Responsibility and enforcement of penalties.
- 8th Part: Reparation.
- 9th Part: Financial clauses.
- 10th Part: Economic clauses.
- 11th Part: Clauses regarding aerial navigation.
- 12th Part: Ports, railways, and waterways.
- 13th Part: Labor legislation.
- 14th Part: Guarantees.
- 15th Part: Miscellaneous clauses.

The first Part, which relates to the League of Nations, was adopted at the last Plenary Session of the Conference, and I am therefore inclined, in order to save the time of the Conference, not to give to-day an analysis of a text with which you are completely acquainted.

I will therefore pass on to the other Parts of my explanatory statement and will read them to you.

PART II.—*Boundaries of Germany*

(A.)—BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY EXCEPT EASTERN RUSSIA [EAST PRUSSIA]

1. *With Belgium:*

The north-eastern boundary of the territory of Moresnet, east of the Kreis of Eupen, west of the Kreis of Montjoie (former frontier), north-east and east of the Kreis of Malmédy as far as Luxemburg.

2. *With Luxemburg:*

The frontier of 1914.

3. *With France:*

The frontier of July, 1870, from Luxemburg to Switzerland (the Customs frontier being that of the territory of the Saar Basin).

4. *With Switzerland:*

The present frontier.

5. *With Austria:*

The frontier of 1914, up to Czecho-Slovakia.

6. *With Czecho-Slovakia:*

The frontier of 1914, with Bohemia and Silesia, so far as the salient to the east of Neustadt.

7. *With Poland:*

From the point defined above; east of Falkenberg, the boundary between Upper and Middle Silesia, west of Posenania, the course of the Bartsch, the boundary between (the Kreis of) Guhrau and Glogau, the boundary between Lissa and Fraustadt, southwest of

Kopnitz, west of Bentschen, the northern point of Lake Chlop, the boundary between Schwerin and Birnbaum, the boundary between Filehne and Czarnikau, west and north of Schneidemühl, a line 8 kilometers to the west of the railway Schneidemühl-Konitz, west-north-west of Konitz, the boundary between Konitz and Schlochau, the boundary of West Prussia to 8 kilometers south-east of Lauenburg, east of Hohenfelde and of Chottschow, the coast of the Baltic Sea to the north-north-west of Chottschow.

8. *With Denmark:*

The frontier as fixed by special Articles.

(B.)—BOUNDARIES WITH EAST PRUSSIA

The coast of the Baltic Sea to the north of Proebbernau, the bend of the Elbinger Channel, the course of the Nogat, of the Vistula, the southern boundary (of the Kreis) of Marienwerder, of Rosenberg, the boundary between West Prussia and East Prussia, the boundary between Osterode and Neidenburg, the course of the Skottau, of the Neide, north of Bialutten, the former Russian frontier up to the east of Schmalhagen, the course of the Niemen, the Skierwieth arm of the delta to the Kurisches Haff; the frontier cuts the Kurische Nehrung 4 kilometers to the south-west of Nidden.

PART III.—*Political Clauses for Europe*

SECTION I.—BELGIUM

The Treaties of 1839 will be abrogated and may be replaced by Conventions between Belgium, the Netherlands and the Allied and Associated Powers; Germany binds herself to recognize these Conventions.

Germany recognizes the sovereignty of Belgium over the contested territory of Moresnet. She renounces Prussian Moresnet to the west of the road from Liège to Aix-la-Chapelle. She cedes to Belgium the Kreise of Eupen and Malmédy. Under the Belgian authorities, the inhabitants will have six months within which to express their desire to remain, wholly or in part, under German sovereignty. Belgium will thereupon accept the decision of the League of Nations.

SECTION II.—LUXEMBURG

Germany renounces the benefit of all the treaties relating to Luxemburg, recognizes that the Grand Duchy has ceased to form part of the German Zollverein, renounces all rights to the exploitation of the railways, adheres to the termination of the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, and accepts in advance all international arrangements which may be

concluded in regard to that country by the Allied and Associated Powers.

SECTION III.—LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE

Germany will neither maintain nor construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or at a distance of less than 50 kilometers from the east bank of the Rhine. In the area thus defined, Germany will not maintain any armed force, will undertake no military maneuvers and will preserve no material facilities for mobilization.

SECTION IV.—SAAR BASIN

The Section relating to the Saar Basin :

1. Fixes the boundaries of the territory to which the stipulations of the Treaty apply;
2. Records the cession to France of the complete and absolute ownership, unencumbered and free from all debts or charges (with exclusive rights of exploitation) of the coal mines of the Saar Basin, as compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the north of France, and as part payment towards the total reparation due from Germany;
3. Assures to France, as owner of the mines, all the economic and juridical guarantees requisite for their exploitation;
4. Determines the rights of the population and the status of workmen;
5. Fixes for a period of 15 years the political and administrative régime of the territory of the Saar Basin, as Germany renounces in favor of the League of Nations the government of the said territory during that period;
6. Determines the rules of voting, whereby, at the expiration of the period of 15 years, the population of the territory of the Saar Basin will freely make known under which sovereignty it desires to be placed.

BOUNDARIES

The territory of the Saar Basin comprises the Kreise of Sarrelouis, Sarrebrück, Ottweiler, Saint-Ingbert, part of the Kreise of Mersig, of Saint-Wendel, of Homburg and of Deux-Ponts.

It is bounded :

To the south and west by the new frontier of France.

To the north by the administrative boundaries of the Kreise or cantons incorporated in the said territory, following a general line leaving the Saar at 5 kilometres to the north of Mettlach and rejoining to the south-east of Mettnich the southern frontier of the Principality of Birkenfeld.

To the east by a line passing about 4 kilometres north-east of Saint-Wendel, leaving Breitenbach and Waldmohr outside the territory of the Saar, encircling Homburg, following the line of the crest

of the east bank of the Blies and rejoining the French frontier to the south of Hornbach.

This area comprises 161,000 hectares.

Its population is 647,000 inhabitants.

CESSION OF MINES

The complete and absolute cession applies to all deposits of coal, whether concessions have been granted for them or not, to all their accessories and plant both on and below the surface, especially their electric power stations, stocks, employees' and workmen's dwellings, &c., and in general to everything of which those who own or exploit the mines have the possession or enjoyment.

GUARANTEES FOR EXPLOITATION

These guarantees apply to railway and canal tariffs, to transport material required for the personnel or products of the mines, to subsidiary works on the ways of communication or to purchases of land which France may regard as necessary for purposes of exploitation, to hospitals, schools of French language, &c., created by France for the personnel of the mines and their dependencies, to the distribution, despatch and determination of the sale prices of products.

All measures of forfeiture, forced sale, expropriation or requisition are forbidden so far as the mines and their dependencies are concerned. The same guarantee against requisition is established so far as concerns the personnel. No impediment shall be placed in the way of the introduction of any labor which the French State may deem necessary. France shall always be entitled to demand the application for purposes of exploitation of the provisions of German mining legislation in force on November 11th, 1918.

The amount contributed by the mines either to the budget of the territory or to the communal funds shall be fixed with due regard to the ratio of the value of the mines to the total taxable wealth of the territory.

Every person whom the French State may substitute for itself in respect of the whole or part of its rights shall enjoy the same prerogatives.

GUARANTEES FOR THE POPULATION

The workmen retain all the rights assured to them by German legislation in force on the 11th November, 1918. Those who are of French nationality shall have the right to belong to French Labor Unions.

The French State will guarantee for the local consumption of the territory a quantity of coal equal to the proportion existing in 1913 between the amount consumed locally and the total output of the Saar Basin.

POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE RÉGIME

The Government of the territory of the Saar Basin will be entrusted to a Commission of five members, appointed by the Council of the League of Nations and comprising one French member, one native inhabitant of the Saar Basin not a citizen of France, and three belonging to countries other than France or Germany. The Chairman of the Commission, selected from among these five members by the Council of the League of Nations, is the executive agent of the Commission. His powers, in the same way as those of the members, run for one year, and are renewable.

This Commission shall possess within the territory all the powers formerly belonging to Germany, Prussia, or Bavaria, especially for the appointment and dismissal of officials, the administration and operation of all public services, including railways and canals, the protection abroad of the interests of the inhabitants, the modification of laws in case of need, the organization of justice, which will be rendered in its name, the levying of taxes and dues; also the power to decide all questions arising from the interpretation of the Treaty.

The inhabitants will retain their nationality. However, those who desire to acquire a different nationality may do so without any loss of their rights. They will be entitled to vote, without distinction of sex, for the local assemblies. There will be no military service and no fortifications. A local *gendarmérie* will be organized. The conditions of labor shall only be modified after consultation with the workmen and in accordance with the principles adopted by the League of Nations.

No modification may be made in the régime for the exploitation of the mines without the French State being previously consulted.

The territory shall be subjected to the French Customs régime.

During five years, from the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, products which originate in or pass from the Basin shall enjoy freedom from import duties in Germany, and, during the same period, the importation from Germany into the territory of the Basin of articles destined for local consumption shall likewise be free of import duties.

During these five years the French Government reserves to itself the right of limiting to the annual average of the quantities imported into Alsace-Lorraine and France during the years 1911-13, the quantities which may be sent of all articles coming from the Basin which

include raw materials or semi-manufactured goods imported duty free from Germany; such average shall be determined after reference to all available official information and statistics.

No prohibition or restriction shall be imposed on the circulation of French money.

PLEBISCITE

At the end of fifteen years, all persons resident in the territory at the date of the signature of the Treaty will have the right to vote on the definite régime. There are three alternatives:—

Maintenance of the régime described above; union with France; union with Germany. The vote will be taken by communes or districts. The League of Nations will determine the definite régime, taking into account the vote given by the inhabitants.

If a portion of the mines is situated in a district united with Germany, the latter, except in the case of a direct agreement between herself and France, must repurchase that portion at a price payable in gold and fixed by experts. If, within a period of six months following the decision of the experts, the price fixed has not been paid, France will acquire definite sovereignty over the territory in question. If Germany repurchases the mines in question, she is bound thenceforward to sell to the French State or French nationals such quantity of coal of the Saar Basin as may be warranted by their needs at that time.

SECTION V.—ALSACE-LORRAINE

RESTORATION

The High Contracting Parties recognize the moral obligation to redress the wrong done by Germany in 1871, both to the rights of France and to the wishes of the population of Alsace and Lorraine, which were separated from their country in spite of the solemn protest of their representatives at the Assembly of Bordeaux.

Therefore:

The territories seized from France in 1871 are restored to French sovereignty as from the 11th November, 1918.

Germany shall hand over to France all the administrative documents, archives, &c., relating to these territories.

PUBLIC DEBT AND STATE PROPERTIES

In consideration of the fact that Germany, in 1871, refused either to assume a portion of the French debt or to pay for the properties and estates of the French State, the territories of Alsace-Lorraine shall return to France unencumbered and free from all charges. All the

properties of the Empire, of the German States, of the Crown, and of former sovereigns, &c., are transferred to France without compensation.

France will collect all taxes leviable since the 11th November, 1918.

NATIONALITY

The nationality of the inhabitants shall be settled by a separate agreement between France and Germany on the following general bases:—

A distinction is made between the inhabitants who are reinstated in French nationality as of right (Alsace-Lorrainers who lost French nationality in 1871 and their descendants), and those who are entitled to claim French nationality within a year.

France will be solely responsible for the diplomatic and consular protection of all persons who have formulated a demand to this effect.

Germans who may remain domiciled in Alsace-Lorraine can only acquire French nationality by naturalization on special conditions.

PRIVATE PROPERTY

As regards private property, France reserves the right to liquidate the property of German nationals, Germany being liable to pay them compensation. However, the property of German nationals who may be authorized to reside in Alsace-Lorraine without acquiring French nationality shall not be liquidated.

Germany shall reinstate Alsace-Lorrainers in possession of all their properties and interests situated in Germany.

In accordance with the stipulations in the Part concerning Reparation, Germany shall grant compensation for all exactions imposed on the civil population in the form of fines.

PENSIONS

The German Government undertakes to bear the expense of civil and military pensions which had been acquired in Alsace-Lorraine on the 11th November, 1918, and whose maintenance was a charge on the German Empire.

PRIVATE DEBTS AND CONTRACTS

The mutual settlement of credits and private debts, of contracts concluded between Alsace-Lorrainers and Germans, of social insurances, of questions of literary or artistic property, form the subject of special stipulations.

JUDGMENTS

All civil and commercial judgments given subsequently to the 3rd August, 1914, as between Alsace-Lorrainers on the one hand, and Germans or subjects of a Power allied to Germany on the other hand, shall only be capable of execution after the issue of an exequatur by the corresponding new Court of Alsace-Lorraine.

All judgments given against Alsace-Lorrainers for political crimes or misdemeanors are annulled.

All appeals to the Imperial Court shall be suspended.

WAYS OF COMMUNICATION

As regards Ways of Communication:—

(a.) The régime for the Rhine is fixed by the Part entitled Ports, Waterways and Railways.

(b.) The bridges over the Rhine become French property.

(c.) The Port of Kehl and the Port of Strasbourg shall be constituted a single unit with a French manager, subject to the supervision of the Central Rhine Commission, during a period of seven years, which may be extended, for a further period of three years by the aforesaid Commission.

(d.) All rights and railway concessions belonging to the Empire (that is to say as regards the Alsace-Lorraine system) are transferred to France, without payment.

ECONOMIC CLAUSES

As regards economic matters:—

(a.) For a period of five years, the products of Alsace-Lorraine shall be imported into Germany duty free, up to an amount of the average quantities sent annually in the years 1911-13.

(b.) During the same period yarns, tissues, &c., which have completed a finishing process in Alsace, shall be exported freely from Germany, exempt from all customs, dues or other charges, and shall be re-imported similarly.

(c.) The supply of electric power from the power stations on the right bank shall continue for a period of ten years, up to the amount of the consumption on the 11th November, 1918.

(d.) Germany renounces all stipulations providing for an intervention in the trade in potash salts, and the benefit of all agreements or laws affecting other products of Alsace-Lorraine.

(e.) France retains the right to prohibit in future all fresh German participation, in Alsace-Lorraine, in all exploitations or public services, in mines or quarries, and in metallurgical establishments.

SECTION VI.—GERMAN AUSTRIA

Germany acknowledges and will strictly respect the independence of Austria within the frontiers which may be fixed in a Treaty between that State and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence will remain inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.

SECTION VII.—CZECHO-SLOVAK STATE

Germany recognizes the complete independence of this State, which will include the autonomous territory of the Ruthenians to the south of the Carpathians. She recognizes the frontiers of this State as determined by the Allies.

Czecho-Slovak nationality is recognized as acquired by all German nationals habitually resident in Czecho-Slovak territory.

Within a period of two years these German nationals will be entitled to opt. The same provisions apply to Czecho-Slovaks who are German nationals, and are habitually resident in Germany or living abroad.

SECTION VIII.—POLAND

Germany renounces in favor of Poland the territories bounded by the Baltic, the western frontier of Poland, the former frontiers between Austria and Germany, and Russia and Germany, as far as the Niemen (this does not apply to East Prussia and the Free City of Danzig), those boundaries being defined in Part II.

A Commission, consisting of seven members (five being nominated by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, one by Germany and one by Poland) shall delimit on the spot the frontier line between Poland and Germany.

Poland will grant to persons and to means of transport coming from or destined for East Prussia the same rights as she gives to her own nationals.

German nationals habitually resident on Polish territory will acquire Polish nationality. A special authorization from the Polish State will be necessary for those who became resident subsequently to April 26th, 1886.

Within a period of two years these German nationals will be entitled to opt. The same provisions apply to Poles who are German nationals and habitually resident in Germany, or living abroad.

Poland consents to embody in a Treaty with the principal Powers:—

(i.) Such provisions as those Powers may deem necessary to protect the interests of inhabitants of Poland who differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion.

(ii.) Provisions destined to protect freedom of transit and to secure equitable treatment for the commerce of other nations.

SECTION IX.—EAST PRUSSIA

In a stated area along the southern frontier the inhabitants will indicate by a vote the State to which they wish to belong.

Within a period of fifteen days the German troops and authorities will be withdrawn from this area, and will abstain from making any requisitions therein. The said area will thereupon be placed under the authority of a Commission of five members appointed by the Allies. This Commission will be charged with the administration and will arrange for the vote of the inhabitants, the result of which will be determined by communes. Thereafter the Commission will propose a frontier line. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers will fix the frontier. The German and Polish authorities will then be entrusted with the administration of their respective territories, and the powers of the Commission will terminate.

Like provisions will apply to the Kreise of Stuhm and Rosenberg, and to the Kreise of Marienburg and Marienwerder to the east of the Vistula.

The Principal Powers will fix the terms of a convention between Poland, Germany, East Prussia, and Danzig in regard to facilities for railway communication on the right bank of the Vistula, between Poland and Danzig.

SECTION X.—MEMEL

Germany renounces the territories comprised between the Baltic, the frontier of East Prussia (defined in Part II), and the former Russo-German frontier.

SECTION XI.—FREE CITY OF DANZIG

Germany renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers the territory defined as follows:

From the Baltic Sea, the western frontier of East Prussia (as above defined) to the meeting of the Vistula with the Nogat; downstream, the Vistula as far as a point 6.5 kilometres to the north of Dirschau; thence, westwards, a point 8.5 kilometres to the north-east of Schoneck; then by the median lines of the Lonkener See and the Pollen-ziner See, to a point on the coast 1 kilometre south of Koliebkén.

A Commission composed of three members, including a High Commissioner appointed by the Principal Powers, one member appointed by Germany and one member appointed by Poland, shall be constituted

within 15 days of the coming into force of the present Treaty, for the purpose of delimiting on the spot the frontier.

The City of Danzig, together with the territory defined above, is established as a Free City.

The constitution of the Free City shall be drawn up, in agreement with a High Commissioner of the League of Nations, by representatives of the City, and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations.

The High Commissioner, resident in Danzig, shall deal in the first instance with all differences arising between Poland and the Free City.

A Convention, the terms of which shall be fixed by the Principal Powers, shall be concluded between Poland and Danzig with the following objects:—

1. To place Danzig within the limits of the Polish customs frontiers, with a free area in the port;

2. To ensure to Poland the free use of all waterways, docks, basins, wharves, etc., necessary for her imports and exports;

3. To ensure to Poland the administration of the Vistula and of the railway system of Danzig (except ways of purely local interest) and of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communication between Poland and Danzig;

4. To provide against any discrimination to the detriment of Poles within the Free City;

5. To provide that the Polish Government shall undertake the conduct of the foreign relations of the Free City and the protection of its citizens abroad.

German nationals ordinarily resident in Danzig will become citizens of the Free City. During two years these residents will be entitled to opt for German nationality.

All property belonging to the Empire or to any German State situated within the territory of the Free City shall pass to the Principal Powers for transfer to Danzig or to Poland according to the decision of those Powers.

SECTION XII.—SCHLESWIG

The frontier between Germany and Denmark shall be fixed in conformity with the wishes of the population.

A vote will be taken by the inhabitants of the territories of the former German Empire situated to the north of the following line: south bank of the Schlei to the south of Schleswig, the River Reider Au as far as Hollingstedt and including it, the road leading to Husum, which is included, and to the south of the islands of Nordstrand, Sudfall, and Suderoog.

Conditions relating to the vote:

The withdrawal, within a period of ten days, of the German authorities and troops, the dissolution of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils in that area, which shall be placed immediately under the authority of an International Commission of five members, of whom three will be designated by the Principal Powers. The Norwegian and Swedish Governments will each be requested to designate a member.

In one defined section, which forms the northern part of the above-mentioned area, the vote shall be taken within three weeks after the German evacuation. If the vote is in favor of the restoration of this section to Denmark, she will be entitled to occupy it immediately.

In the second defined section, situated to the south of the first one, the vote shall be taken within a period of five weeks after the plebiscite in the first section. The result will be determined by communes.

In the third section, the vote will be taken within a period of two weeks after the plebiscite in the second section, and in the same conditions.

A Commission composed of seven members, five of whom shall be nominated by the Principal Powers, one by Denmark and one by Germany, shall fix the frontier line on the spot.

Pending this final delimitation, the principal Powers will fix a frontier line according to the result of the votes and the proposals of the International Commission. From that time, Denmark and Germany will be entitled to occupy the territories situated to the north and south of that frontier line respectively.

All the inhabitants of the territory which is returned to Denmark thus acquire the right to Danish citizenship. An authorization from the Danish Government will be necessary for persons who had become habitually resident after the 1st October, 1918.

Within a period of two years, any person born on the territory which is restored to Denmark, not habitually resident in that region, and possessing German nationality, will be entitled to opt for Denmark. Any person habitually resident in that territory will be entitled to opt for Germany.

Special stipulations will determine the proportion of the obligations of Germany which are to be assumed by Denmark.

SECTION XIII.—HELGOLAND

The fortifications, military establishments and harbors shall be destroyed under the supervision of the Allies by the agency and at the expense of the German Government. Germany will not be entitled to reconstruct them.

SECTION XIV.—RUSSIA AND RUSSIAN STATES

Germany acknowledges and will fully respect the inalienable independence of all the territories which were part of the former Russian Empire.

Germany definitely accepts the annulment of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and of all treaties or agreements, whatever they might have been, which Germany concluded with the Maximalist Government.

The Allied and Associated Powers formally reserve all the rights of Russia to obtain from Germany a restitution and a reparation based on the principles of the present Treaty.

PART IV.—*German Rights and Interests Outside Germany*

In territory outside her European frontiers, Germany renounces all rights concerning all territories belonging to her, as well as all rights which may have belonged to her as against the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Germany undertakes to recognize the measures which may be taken now or in the future in order to carry the above stipulations into effect.

In particular Germany declares her acceptance of the following stipulations:—

SECTION I.—GERMAN COLONIES

Germany renounces in favor of the principal Powers all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions.

All movable and immovable rights in those territories which belonged to the German Empire or to a German State shall pass to the Government exercising authority over such territories.

The latter Government may make such provisions as it thinks fit for the repatriation of German nationals, and for authorizing German subjects of European origin to reside, trade, etc., in those territories.

The provisions of Part X (Commercial Relations) of the present Treaty shall apply in the case of those territories. The provisions of Part IX (Financial Clauses) shall apply in the case of all agreements concluded with German nationals for the construction or exploitation of public works.

Germany undertakes to pay, in accordance with the estimate to be presented by the French Government and approved by the permanent Reparation Commission, reparation for damage suffered by French nationals in the colony of the Cameroons or the frontier zone by reason of the acts of the German civil or military authorities and of

German private individuals during the period from the 1st January, 1900, to the 1st August, 1914.

Germany renounces all rights arising out of the Conventions concluded with France on the 4th November, 1911,¹ and the 28th September, 1912.²

Germany undertakes to accept and observe the agreements made or to be made by the Allied and Associated Powers, or some of them, with any other Power, with regard to the trade in arms and spirits, and to the matters dealt with in the General Act of Berlin of the 26th February, 1885,³ and the General Act of Brussels of the 2nd July, 1890.⁴

The inhabitants of the former German oversea possessions shall be entitled to the diplomatic protection of the Governments exercising authority over these territories.

SECTION II.—SPECIAL PROVISIONS AS REGARDS CHINA

Germany renounces in favor of China all benefits and privileges resulting from the Protocol of Peking of the 7th September, 1901,⁵ as well as all claims to indemnities accruing thereunder subsequent to the 14th March, 1917.

There shall be applied:

(1) The arrangements of the 29th August, 1902, regarding the new Chinese customs tariff.⁶

(2) The arrangements of the 27th September, 1905,⁷ and of the 4th [9th] April, 1912 (Whang-Poo).⁸ China, therefore, will no longer be bound to grant to Germany the advantages ceded, but annulled at the time of the rupture of diplomatic relations.

Germany cedes to China all the vessels, buildings, installations, arms, munitions, and other Government property situated in the German concessions on Chinese territory. An exception is, however, made in the case of diplomatic and consular residences and offices.

Germany will restore to China all the astronomical instruments carried off in 1900–1901.

Germany agrees to the abrogation of the lease contracts relating to the concessions at Hankow and Tientsin. China declares her intention of opening these areas to international residence and trade.

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. civ, p. 956.

² *Ibid.*, vol. cvi, p. 974.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. lxxvi, p. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. lxxxii, p. 55.

⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1901, appendix, "Affairs in China," p. 312.

⁶ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xcvi, p. 695.

⁷ William M. Malloy (ed.), *Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776–1909* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1910), vol. ii p. 2013.

⁸ Malloy, *Treaties*, 1910–1923, vol. iii, p. 3043.

Germany waives all claims arising out of the internment of German nationals in China and their repatriation, out of the seizure of ships, of the disposal of German properties or rights in China since the 14th August, 1917.

Germany renounces the German State property in the British Concession at Shameen (Canton) and the property of the German school situated in the French Concession at Shanghai.

SECTION III.—SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO SIAM

Germany recognizes that all Treaties, Conventions, and Agreements concluded between her and Siam terminate as from the 22nd July, 1917.

All goods and property in Siam belonging to the Empire or to any German State pass as of right and without compensation to the Siamese Government.

The goods, property, and private rights of German nationals in Siam shall be liquidated in accordance with the provisions of the general Economic Clauses.

Germany waives all claims against the Siamese Government on behalf of herself or her nationals arising out of the seizure of vessels, the liquidation of German property or the internment of German nationals. The rights of the parties interested in these liquidations shall be governed by the Economic Clauses (Part X) of the present Treaty.

SECTION IV.—SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO LIBERIA

Germany renounces all rights and privileges arising from the arrangements of 1911-12 regarding Liberia, and particularly the right to nominate a German receiver, and regards all her treaties and arrangements with Liberia as terminated.

The property, rights, and interests of Germans in Liberia shall be dealt with in accordance with the Economic Clauses (Part X) of the present Treaty.

SECTION V.—SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO MOROCCO

1. Germany renounces all rights, titles, and privileges conferred on her by the Act of Algeciras, of the 7th April, 1906,⁹ and by the Franco-German Agreements, of the 9th February, 1909,¹⁰ and the 4th

⁹ *Foreign Relations*. 1906. pt 2. p 1495.

¹⁰ Great Britain, Cd. 6010, Morocco No. 4 (1911) : *Franco-German Declaration Respecting Morocco, Signed at Berlin, February 8, 1909.*

November, 1911.¹¹ All treaties and arrangements concluded by her with the Sherifian Empire are regarded as abrogated as from the 3rd August, 1914. In no case can Germany take advantage of these instruments, and she undertakes not to intervene in any way in negotiations relating to Morocco which may take place between France and the other Powers.

2. Germany, having recognized the French Protectorate in Morocco, hereby accepts all the consequences of its establishment, and renounces the régime of the capitulations therein. This renunciation shall take effect as from the 3rd August, 1914.

3. The Sherifian Government shall have complete liberty of action in regulating the status of German nationals in Morocco and the conditions in which they may establish themselves there. German protected persons, German semsars and "associés agricoles" shall be considered as having ceased, as from the 3rd August, 1914, to enjoy the privileges attached to their status, and shall be subject to the ordinary law.

4. All movable and immovable rights belonging to the German State in the Sherifian Empire pass as of right to the Maghzen without compensation. All rights belonging to Germans shall be sold by public auction; the proceeds of the sale shall be paid to the Sherifian Government and credited against the sums payable by Germany for reparation of war damages. Germany shall indemnify the German owners. Mining rights which may be recognized as belonging to German nationals by the Court of Arbitration set up under the Morocco Mining Regulations shall form the subject of a valuation, which the arbitrators shall be requested to make; these rights shall then be treated in the same way as property in Morocco belonging to German nationals.

5. The German Government shall ensure the transfer to persons nominated by the French Government of the shares representing Germany's portion of the capital of the State Bank of Morocco. The value of these shares shall be reimbursed by Germany to the rightful owners; these sums shall be credited against the amounts payable by Germany in reparation for war damages.

6. Moroccan goods entering Germany shall enjoy the terms accorded to French goods.

SECTION VI.—SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO EGYPT

1. Germany recognizes the British Protectorate claimed on the 18th December, 1914, and renounces the régime of the capitulations as from the 4th August, 1914.

¹¹ Great Britain, Cd. 6010, Morocco No. 4 (1911): *Franco-German Convention and Exchange of Notes Respecting Morocco, Signed at Berlin, November 4, 1911.*

2. The abrogation, as from the 4th August, 1914, of all treaties and arrangements concluded between Germany and Egypt.

3. Temporarily, provision shall be made for the exercise of jurisdiction over German nationals and property by the British Consular Tribunals.

4. The Anglo-Egyptian Government shall have liberty of action as regards the status of German nationals.

5. Germany consents to the abrogation, or modification, of the Decree of the 28th November, 1904 (Commission of the Egyptian Public Debt).

6. Germany consents to the transfer to the British Government of the powers conferred on His Imperial Majesty the Sultan by the Convention signed at Constantinople on the 29th October, 1888 (free navigation of the Suez Canal).¹²

7. The rights of the German State and German nationals in Egypt (provisions similar to those made in respect of Morocco).

8. Anglo-Egyptian goods entering Germany shall enjoy the same treatment as British goods.

SECTION VII.—TURKEY AND BULGARIA

Germany undertakes to recognize all arrangements which the Allied and Associated Powers may make with Turkey and Bulgaria with reference to any rights which might be claimed by Germany or her nationals in Turkey and Bulgaria, and which are not dealt with in the provisions of the present Treaty.

SECTION VIII.—SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE PROVINCE OF SHANTUNG

Germany renounces, in favor of Japan, all the rights which she acquired by her Treaty with China of the 6th March, 1898, and other instruments relating to the Province of Shantung, especially as regards the territory of Kiaochow, railways, mines, and submarine cables.

All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway are acquired by Japan, as well as the German State submarine cables from Tsingtao to Shanghai and Tsingtao to Chefoo.

Movable and immovable rights owned by the German State at Kiaochow, as well as those which Germany might claim in connection with this territory, are acquired by Japan.

¹² *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXIX, p. 18.

PART V.—*Military, Naval, and Aerial Clauses*

MILITARY CLAUSES

Section I (Military Clauses) reduces the German Army to a permanent police force and deprives Germany of the right and the means of reconstituting a great national army:—

1. By the limitation of effectives, of cadres, of armament, and of the manufacture of war material to the needs, as strictly determined by the Allied and Associated Powers, of a police force of 100,000 men, including officers.

2. By the abolition of universal compulsory military service, by the institution of recruitment by means of volunteer enlistments for a period of twelve consecutive years and the abolition of all organizations for the preparation of war, the abolition of command, training or mobilization.

3. By a prohibition, covering the territories situated both on the left bank of the Rhine and to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the east of the river to maintain or construct fortifications, to preserve any permanent works, such as would facilitate a mobilization, or to maintain troops there.

1. Limitation of Effectives, Cadres, and Armament.

Within two months of the coming into force of the present Treaty, the German Army shall be demobilized and reduced to a maximum strength of seven divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry, the composition of which is fixed, forming a total of 100,000 men (including a maximum number of 4,000 officers, and establishments of depots), with the right to create only two army corps headquarters, the composition of which is likewise fixed.

The personnel of the Army administrative services, that of the *employés* or officials of the German State, and that of the *gendarmerie* and the local or municipal police forces, is limited and may not be assembled for any military training.

The Great German General Staff and all similar organizations are dissolved.

All war material, whether of German or foreign origin, in excess of the amounts fixed by the Allied and Associated Powers, shall be handed over to these Powers. The manufacture of war material shall in future only be carried out in the factories authorized by the five Allied and Associated Governments and within the limitations laid down in the present Treaty. Germany is forbidden to undertake the manufacture, export or import of any other war material, of gas or prohibited materials, of armoured cars, tanks and all similar constructions.

2. Recruitment and Military Training.

Universal compulsory military service is abolished in Germany.

The German Army may only be recruited by voluntary enlistments for a period of twelve consecutive years for the rank and file, and of twenty-five consecutive years for officers, and the latter must undertake the obligation to serve up to the age of forty-five years at least.

The only military schools which are permitted are those which are indispensable for the recruitment of the officers of the units allowed, and the number of students in them will be in proportion to the vacancies to be filled.

Educational establishments and associations of every description are forbidden to occupy themselves with military questions or to have any connection with any military authority.

All measures of mobilization or appertaining to mobilization are forbidden.

3. Prohibited zone as regards German fortifications, military establishments and troops.

Any fortifications, whatever their nature or importance, and any permanent works such as would facilitate mobilization, are forbidden in the German territories situated to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the east of the Rhine. The existing fortifications shall be disarmed and dismantled, and the permanent works referred to above shall be demolished within a period of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

Germany will not maintain any armed force within the zone defined above, either permanently or temporarily; nor will she undertake any military manoeuvres therein.

Any violation of the foregoing provisions shall be regarded as a hostile act against the Powers signatories of the present Treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.

NAVAL CLAUSES

Section II (Naval Clauses) considerably reduces the navy of Germany and deprives her of the right and means of reconstituting a great war fleet by:

1. The restriction of the fleet to a number of surface vessels of fixed type, and the effectiveness of her war navy, and the prohibition to possess any submarine vessel.

2. The surrender to the five Allied and Associated Governments of all submarines and of all warships in excess of those authorized by the present Treaty.

The breaking up of all warships at present in course of construction. The disarmament of all auxiliary cruisers and fleet auxiliaries.

3. Freedom of access to the Baltic Sea for all nations.

4. The demolition of the fortifications which forbid access from the North Sea to the Baltic and the restriction of fortifications on the

rest of the German coast to a fixed zone subject to conditions laid down by the Allied and Associated Governments.

5. The restriction and supervision by the said Governments during a period of three months of the great wireless telegraphy stations.

1. Limitations of the Fleet and effectives of the German Navy.

After the expiration of a period of two months, the German naval forces in commission must not exceed:

- 6 battleships of the Deutschland or Lothringen type,
- 6 light cruisers,
- 12 destroyers,
- 12 torpedo-boats,

and may not include any submarine, even a commercial submarine. The personnel must not exceed 15,000 men, including officers, recruited by voluntary enlistment for a period of twenty-five consecutive years for the officers and fifteen consecutive years for the men.

2. Surrender, demolition, or disarmament of warships and fleet auxiliaries in excess of the numbers laid down in paragraph 1.

All surface warships, all war material in excess of the number and quantities determined by the Allied and Associated Powers, and all submarines, submarine salvage vessels and docks, shall be handed over to those Powers by Germany. All those in course of construction shall be broken up.

Germany is forbidden to construct or acquire any warships other than those intended to replace the authorized units, of which the type, period of service, and the armament are fixed by the Allied and Associated Governments.

All auxiliary cruisers and fleet auxiliaries shall be disarmed and restored to commercial uses.

3. Freedom of access to the Baltic.

Complete freedom of access to the Baltic shall be ensured to all nations in a fixed area by mine-sweeping and by the demolition of the fortifications which command the maritime routes from the North Sea to the Baltic.

4. Restriction of Fortifications on German Coast.

Independently of the demolition of the fortifications above referred to, Germany is not entitled to strengthen the defences of her coasts or to alter their armament, the particulars of which she is obliged to communicate to all the European Governments.

5. Restriction and Supervision of Wireless Telegraphy.

During the three months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, the wireless telegraphy stations at Nauen, Hanover

and Berlin are only permitted to transmit commercial telegrams, and then under the supervision of the Allied and Associated Governments.

AERIAL CLAUSES

Section III deprives Germany of the right of possessing any military or naval air forces (except 100 seaplanes up till October 1st, 1919, to be exclusively employed in searching for mines) or any dirigible, by:

- (1.) The demobilization of her flying personnel;
- (2.) Freedom of passage and landing and the surrender of material.

1. The whole of the flying personnel shall be demobilized within a period of two months (except 1,000 men to be retained up till 1st October, 1919).

2. All Allied aircraft shall enjoy in Germany freedom of passage through the air, freedom of landing and of transit. During the six months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, the manufacture and importation of aircraft, or parts of aircraft, shall be forbidden in German territory.

All military and naval aeronautical material shall be delivered to the Allied and Associated Governments, including material of any nature whatsoever used or designed for warlike purposes, with the exception of the 100 seaplanes mentioned above.

SUPERVISION OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

Section IV (Inter-Allied Commissions of Control) organizes, through Inter-Allied Commissions working in Germany, the supervision of the execution of the Clauses the purpose of which is to disarm Germany within the time limits fixed by the Treaty.

GENERAL CLAUSES

Section V (General Clauses) grants Germany a period of three months within which to modify her legislation in conformity with the foregoing Clauses and to take all the administrative measures relating to their execution.

RIGHT OF INVESTIGATION

The Treaty lays on Germany the obligation of giving in future every facility for any investigation which the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority vote, may consider necessary.

PART VI.—*Prisoners of War*

The German prisoners of war will be repatriated as rapidly as possible after the signature of the Treaty of Peace, and the details for carrying into effect the repatriation shall be regulated by a Sub-Commission on behalf of each of the Allied and Associated Powers.

The German prisoners of war and civilians set free shall be transported by the agency and at the expense of the German Government to their domiciles, even if that be in occupied territory, and their repatriation is in that case subject to the approval and supervision of the military authorities of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Prisoners awaiting trial or undergoing sentence for offences against discipline shall likewise be repatriated, with the exception of those who may be condemned for such offences subsequently to May 1st, 1919.

Prisoners guilty of other offences are liable to be kept under detention.

Those who may refuse to be repatriated cannot be sent back. However, the Allied and Associated Governments reserve the right to repatriate them or to send them to a neutral country or to allow them to reside in their own territories.

Repatriation may, moreover, be made conditional on that of prisoners or nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers who may still be in Germany.

The Allied and Associated Governments, as well as the German Government, will communicate to each other a complete list of those who have died and information in regard to the graves of those who have not yet been identified.

SPECIAL CLAUSES

MILITARY GRAVES

The Allied and Associated Governments and the German Government undertake to cause to be respected and maintained the graves of soldiers and sailors buried in their respective territories, and to give all facilities to the Commissions appointed by them for the purpose of registering, caring for or erecting suitable memorials over the said graves and to meet requests that the bodies of their soldiers may be transferred to their own country.

PART VII.—*Responsibilities for the War and Penalties*

William II is publicly arraigned for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of Treaties. He will be tried

by a special tribunal composed of five judges, appointed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

A request for his extradition shall be addressed to the Netherland Government.

Persons accused of acts in violation of the laws and customs of war shall be brought before the military tribunals of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Germany undertakes to hand over the persons accused.

In cases where the incriminating acts have been committed against the nationals of several Powers, the military tribunals shall be composed of members of the military tribunals of all the Powers concerned.

Germany undertakes to furnish all necessary documents and information.

PART VIII.—*Reparation*

The provisions of this heading:—

(i.) Establish the principle of reparation.

(ii.) Define the categories of damage for which compensation is due.

(iii.) Determine the methods of reparation which, in principle, shall extend over a period of 30 years, unless this period be further extended in the event of its being insufficient to enable Germany completely to discharge her debt.

PRINCIPLES

Germany and her allies recognize their responsibility for all the loss and damage suffered by the Allied and Associated Governments, in whatever place, and Germany binds herself to repair all damage done to the civilian populations and their property, in proportion to the intensity of her military and naval operations on each of the battle fronts. She undertakes, by means of a special issue of bearer bonds, to repay, by 1st May 1926, at latest, to the Allied and Associated Governments all the sums which Belgium was obliged to borrow from them up to the 11th November, 1918, as a consequence of the violation of the Treaty of 1839.¹³

CATEGORIES OF DAMAGE

Compensation is due for the following categories of damage:

Damage caused by acts of war to civilians or their surviving dependents by personal injury or loss of life.

Damage caused to civilian victims of acts of cruelty, violence, or maltreatment.

¹³ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XLVII, p. 1000.

Damage caused to civilian victims of all acts of the enemy in territory whether occupied or enemy (which has been injurious to health, capacity to work, or honor), and to the surviving dependents of such victims.

Damage caused by any kind of maltreatment to prisoners of war.

In respect of damage caused to the peoples of the Allied and Associated Powers, all pensions and compensations in the nature of pensions to the military victims of the war and to the dependents of such victims (on the basis of the scales in force in France).

The cost of assistance granted by the Governments of the Allied and Associated States to prisoners of war and to their families and dependents.

Allowances granted by the Governments of the Allied and Associated States to the families and dependents of mobilized persons (on the basis of the scales in force in France).

Damage caused to civilians through being forced by the enemy to labor without just remuneration.

Damage in respect of property, wherever situated, which has been carried off, seized, injured, or destroyed by the acts of the enemy, or damage directly in consequence of hostilities or of any operations of war.

Damage in the form of levies, fines and other similar exactions imposed by Germany on the civil population.

An Inter-Allied Commission, called "The Reparation Commission," shall acquaint Germany, before the 1st May, 1921, with the amount of the reparation thus chargeable to her, an amount which it is impossible to determine at the present time.

The expenses incurred in respect of repairing and rebuilding shall be calculated according to the cost of reconstruction at the moment when the works are carried out.

The Commission, in fixing on the 1st May, 1921, the total amount of the debt of Germany, may take account of interest due on sums arising out of the reparation of material damage as from the 11th November, 1918, up to the 1st May, 1921.

From the 1st May, 1921, onwards the debt of Germany shall bear interest at 5 per cent. However, the Commission shall have powers to determine at some future time whether the circumstances justify a variation of this rate.

METHODS OF REPARATION

DUTIES OF THE REPARATION COMMISSION

The Reparation Commission, composed of one Representative of each of the following Powers: United States of America, British

Empire, France, Italy, and of one Representative, entitled to a seat in accordance with a settled rotation, of Japan, of Belgium, and of Serbia, shall from time to time consider the capacity of Germany for paying, and shall determine the proportion and methods of the payments to be effected by her.

The seat of the Commission's permanent bureau is fixed in Paris.

The Commission will possess, generally speaking, the widest powers of supervision and execution as regards the problem of reparation. The Commission is constituted as the exclusive representative of the Allied and Associated Governments for the purpose of receiving, holding, and distributing payments effected by Germany in respect of reparation.

The Commission shall satisfy itself:—

1. That the sums due in respect of reparation shall be a charge upon all the revenues of Germany prior to that for the service of any domestic loan.

2. That the burden supported by the German taxpayer is at least as heavy as that borne by the most heavily taxed taxpayer of any Allied or Associated country.

Any decisions regarding postponements for payment to be granted to the Debtor, or questions involving the sovereignty of the Allied and Associated Powers, must be taken unanimously. In the event of Germany failing to fulfill the engagements which she has undertaken the Commission will propose to the Allied and Associated Powers the necessary measures, which may include economic and financial prohibitions and reprisals, or any other measures deemed necessary. Germany undertakes not to regard such measures as hostile acts.

RESTITUTION

All animals, objects and securities, etc., carried off by Germany and identified, as well as cash, shall be restored.

INSTALMENTS

A sum of 20,000,000,000 gold marks (25,000,000,000 francs) shall be payable between the coming into force of the Treaty and the 1st May, 1921. It shall be paid in gold, commodities, ships, securities, or otherwise, in accordance with the decisions of the Reparation Commission. Out of this sum, but in accordance with the conditions defined in the paragraph below, shall be met the expenses of occupation and the value of such supplies of food and raw materials as may be judged by the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligation to make reparation.

PAYMENTS ON ACCOUNT

Germany shall hand over forthwith, as a payment on account to be credited against payments in respect of reparation :—

20,000,000,000 marks gold bearer bonds (25,000,000,000 francs), payable not later than the 1st May, 1921, without interest. The payments which Germany is obliged to make in respect of the delivery of the 20,000,000,000 of gold marks mentioned above shall be applied to the amortization of these bonds after deduction of the sums used for the reimbursement of the maintenance expenses of the armies of occupation and for the payment of food stuffs and raw materials. Such bonds as have not been redeemed by the 1st May, 1921, shall then be exchanged for new bonds of the same type of those provided for below.

40,000,000,000 marks gold bearer bonds (50,000,000,000 francs), bearing interest at $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. from 1921 to 1926, and thereafter 5 per cent., with an additional 1 per cent. for amortization.

40,000,000,000 marks gold (50,000,000,000 francs), with an undertaking in writing to issue later, when the Reparation Commission shall so decide, a like amount of bonds bearing interest at 5 per cent., with an additional 1 per cent. for amortization.

These bonds shall be held by the Reparation Commission on behalf of each of the interested Powers in respect of its share, and the Commission shall deliver nominative certificates for them which may be transferred by endorsement.

Any fraction of the total amount of ascertained liabilities shall be represented, as regards any yet unpaid portion thereof, by the issue of a bond or other title.

SPECIAL METHODS OF PAYMENT

From now onwards the following objects will or may serve as means of payment :—

(1.) Merchant Shipping.—Germany recognizes the principle of compensation, ton for ton, as regards losses of merchant shipping and fishing boats.

Out of her merchant fleet, she will hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers, in full ownership, the following vessels, both constructed and in course of construction :—

- all merchant ships of 1,600 tons and upwards;
- one-half of those between 1,000 and 1,600 tons;
- one-quarter of the steam trawlers;
- one-quarter of the other fishing boats.

The river boats (in addition to those which are to be restored in the condition in which they were removed) necessary to make good

the "equivalent" of the losses sustained by the Allied and Associated Powers up to a maximum cession of 20 per cent. of the German river fleet.

Moreover, the Allied and Associated Powers may cause to be constructed in the German shipping yards during a period of five years a maximum of 200,000 tons per annum.

(2.) Animals, Machinery, Equipment, Tools and like articles of a commercial character for the purpose of meeting immediate needs and as an equivalent for the animals or objects of a similar character which have been removed or destroyed (subject to certain restrictions and limitations).

(3.) Dyestuffs and chemical drugs.—The Allied and Associated Powers have the right to an option to require the delivery of these commodities, up to a total of 50 per cent. of the existing German stocks and thereafter of 25 per cent. of the annual production during a period of five years.

(4.) Coal and its derivatives.—Germany undertakes to make the following deliveries:—

To France: A fixed quantity of 7,000,000 tons per annum for 10 years, plus a diminishing quantity (varying between 20,000,000 and 8,000,000 tons per annum during 10 years), corresponding to the diminution in productivity of the devastated French collieries.

To Belgium: "..... per annum for 10 years.

To Luxembourg: A quantity equal to the pre-war annual consumption of German coal in that country.

To Italy: An increasing quantity (varying between 4,500,000 and 8,500,000 tons) per annum for 10 years.

The coal intended to replace coal from destroyed mines shall receive priority over all other deliveries.

Finally, during three years Germany will deliver to France annually at her request:

35,000 tons of benzol;
50,000 tons of coal tar;
30,000 tons of sulphate of ammonia.

All or part of the coal tar may be replaced by corresponding quantities of products of distillation.

The prices of these deliveries are fixed by special stipulations; an equivalent amount shall be charged to the credit account of Reparation.

There shall likewise be credited to the Reparation account, in certain circumstances, the proceeds of liquidation of German properties abroad. (See the Financial Clauses.)

Submarine Cables.—The submarine cables, belonging to Germany, which connected that country with foreign countries, are ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers; their equivalent value, in so far as they

are privately owned, shall be credited to Germany in the Reparation account.

PART IX.—*Financial Clauses*

FIRST CHARGES

The first charge upon all the assets and revenues of the German Empire and its constituent States is the settlement:—

1. Of the expenses connected with the maintenance of the troops of occupation, whether during the Armistice or after the Treaty of Peace.

2. Of the reparation resulting from the Treaty or from subsequent Treaties.

3. Of all other charges imposed on Germany by virtue of these Treaties.

Germany undertakes not to dispose of her gold before the 1st May, 1921, without the express authorization of the Allied and Associated Governments.

Moreover, each of the Allied and Associated Powers retains the rights to dispose of enemy assets and property within its jurisdiction at the date of the signature of the Treaty of Peace.

RENUNCIATION OF TREATIES

The German Government renounces:—

The benefit conferred by any stipulations inserted in the Treaties of Bucharest¹⁴ and Brest-Litovsk,¹⁵ and in the Treaties concluded since the 1st August, 1914, with Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States.

All rights to representation on, or participation in the control or administration of international, financial, or economic organizations in any of the Allied or Associated States, or in Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey, or in the former Russian Empire.

TRANSFER OF GERMAN PROPERTY ABROAD

The Reparation Commission may, within one year from the signature of the Treaty, demand that the German Government become possessed of and transfer to it within six months all the rights and interests of German nationals in any public utility undertaking or concessions in Russia, China, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria, and in the former or present dependencies of those States. The German Government shall bear the expense of compensating its nationals so dispossessed.

¹⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 771.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 442.

The German Government undertakes to transfer to the Allied and Associated Powers:—

Any claims which it may have for payment or repayment by the States of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey.

Any deposits of gold made in German banks by the States allied with Germany, under the head of pledges for loans, security for note issues, provision for payments to be made, etc.

CURRENCIES ALLOWED FOR PAYMENT

Any monetary obligation due by the German Government expressed in terms of gold marks shall be payable at the option of the creditors in £ sterling payable in London, gold dollars of the United States of America payable in New York, gold francs payable in Paris, or gold lire payable in Rome.

The expenses of maintenance of the Armies of Occupation representing purchases or requisitions by the Allied and Associated Governments in the occupied territories shall alone be repaid by the German Government in marks at the current or agreed rate of exchange.

All other costs of the Armies of Occupation shall be paid in gold marks.

CESSION OF STATE PROPERTY

The States to which German territory is ceded shall enter into possession of all property and possessions of the German Empire or the German States and their former Sovereigns situated therein. The value of this property, fixed by the Reparation Commission, shall be paid to the credit of the German Government on account of the sums due for reparation (except as regards property in Alsace-Lorraine in respect of which, in view of the terms on which Germany took back public property in 1871, France shall be exempt from making any payment or credit). (On this subject see the Clauses relative to Alsace-Lorraine, Part III).

On the other hand, the Powers to which German territory is ceded shall, in principle, undertake to pay a portion to be fixed of the debt of the Empire and of the debt of the German State to which the ceded territory belonged. Such portions shall be determined by the Reparation Commission on the total debt as it stood on the 1st August, 1914. As regards Alsace-Lorraine, however, of which Germany in 1871 took possession "free from all debt," France is exempt from the obligation of assuming any portion of the German debt.

Similarly, Poland shall not undertake to pay any portion of the debt which, in the opinion of the Commission on Reparation, is attributable to the measures taken by the German and Prussian Governments for the German colonization of Poland.

In the case of the former German territories, including colonies, administered by a Mandatory under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, neither the territory nor the Mandatory Power shall be charged with any portion of the German debt.

FLAGS OF 1870

Germany shall restore the French flags taken in 1870 and 1871.

PART X.—*Economic Clauses*

The Economic Clauses, divided into seven sections, include:—

(a.) Stipulations relative to the future regulation of commercial relations, whether connected with customs, shipping, methods of competition, or the rights of establishment in Germany which nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy.

(b.) Stipulations relative to Treaties, Conventions, and Agreements of an economic character, whether Treaties to which one or more of the Allied and Associated Powers were parties with Germany or Treaties concluded by Germany with her Allies.

(c.) Finally, stipulations relative to the regulation of private interests, whether pre-war debts and contracts, or measures for the liquidation and disposal of private property, rights and interests, or the control of industrial property (patents, trade marks, licenses, &c.).

COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

CUSTOMS

The first section, which regulates commercial relations, begins with the clauses relating to customs.

The principle of these clauses is that every favor, immunity, or privilege, direct or indirect, granted by Germany to any Allied or Associated Power, or to any other foreign country, shall *ipso facto* be extended to all the other Allied and Associated Powers. This principle applies to all forms of import, export, or transit, to all kinds of duties or payments, facilities, or favors affecting not only the goods themselves, but also the means of transport, the place of export or origin, the immediate or final destination of the goods, &c.

Alsace-Lorraine.—Departures from this principle are provided for in the case of the disannexed countries. Notably, for five years products which both originate in and come from the territories of Alsace-Lorraine reunited to France may enter German customs territory free of all duty, and, during the same period, free export from and free reimport into Germany shall be assured to all textile products, in any

condition, which Alsatian industry worked up or caused to be worked up in normal times.

Poland.—A similar provision is made as regards the import of the products both originating in and coming from the disannexed Polish provinces, which will enjoy the same freedom from duty for three years.

Luxemburg.—Finally, the Allied and Associated Powers can demand for five years similar treatment for the products of Luxemburg, which has been detached from the Zollverein, and may set up a special customs régime for the occupied German territories, if the economic protection of those districts demands it.

As regards her import tariff, which, according to the above clauses, must be the same for all the Allied and Associated States, Germany can, during the first six months after the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace, impose only the most favorable customs duties which were in force in July, 1914, and this provision shall afterwards remain in force for a further period of thirty months for certain specified products (wines, vegetable oils, &c.).

SHIPPING RÉGIME

The shipping régime is based on the following principle: The same treatment for Allied and Associated vessels in German ports as for German boats; most-favored-nation treatment for coasting trade, fisheries, and towage, even in German territorial waters; supervision of the fisheries of the Allied and Associated Powers in the North Sea by vessels belonging to those States, without German participation; recognition by Germany of ships' papers issued by the Allied and Associated States and of the flags of the vessels of the new States registered at a specified place in those States, even if they have no sea coast.

UNFAIR COMPETITION

Two detailed provisions aim at the repression of unfair methods of competition. The German Government binds itself to take all legislative and administrative measures for the protection of the products and trade-marks of the Allied and Associated Powers, and undertakes, on condition of reciprocity, to observe all the laws and administrative and judicial decisions in force in the Allied and Associated countries as regards the appellations of origin of wines and spirits.

RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT IN GERMANY

The right of Allied and Associated nationals to establish themselves in Germany, which is the subject of a special chapter, is based on

the principle of the most favored nation as regards the exercise of occupations and professions, trade and industry, and on the principle of national treatment as regards any charges, taxes, imposts, or restrictions applicable to persons, property, rights, or interests.

Special stipulations provide for the protection which these persons, this property, these rights and these interests shall enjoy, for free access to the Law Courts and for the establishment of Consulates.

Finally, precautions are taken against the double nationality with which the Delbrück Law endowed Germans in foreign countries.

In the absence of special stipulations regarding their duration, the clauses grouped in the first section are permanent. Some of them are limited to five years, subject to eventual prolongation by decision of the Council of the League of Nations; others, on the other hand, will remain in force after that period, with or without amendment, and with or without reciprocity, according to the nature of the case.

ECONOMIC TREATIES

Section II first deals with the replacement in force or the abrogation of the Economic Treaties formerly concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, and enumerates those of the multilateral Treaties which alone shall henceforth be applied by those Powers in their relations with Germany. Certain special stipulations define, complete, or modify some of these Treaties or certain of their clauses.

Thus, Germany binds herself, as regards postal and telegraphic Conventions, not to withhold her consent from the conclusion of special arrangements by the New States, and undertakes to adhere to any new Convention which may be concluded on the subject of wireless telegraphy.

Treaties concluded between one of the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany are, moreover, the subject of a special Article which leaves to each of the Allied and Associated Powers, under clearly defined conditions, the initiative in putting these Treaties again into force, and lays down the procedure to be followed.

The Allied and Associated Powers make Germany recognize the abrogation of all the Treaties, Conventions, and Agreements which she has concluded with Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Turkey since the 1st August, 1914, and secure for themselves the advantage of the Treaties, Conventions, or Agreements concluded between the same enemy Powers and Germany before the 1st August, 1914, as well as of those which have been concluded between Germany and neutral Powers since the 1st August, 1914.

Finally, all Treaties, Conventions, and Agreements are abrogated which were concluded by Germany before or since the 1st August,

1914, with Russia or any State or Government the territory of which previously formed part of Russia, as well as with Roumania.

Concessions, privileges, and favors, of whatever nature, are also annulled which Germany or German nationals by force or in the course of military occupation may have obtained since the 1st August, 1914, from an Allied or Associated Power, from Russia, or from any State or Government the territory of which previously formed part of Russia, either by Treaty, Convention, or Agreement, or by the act of any public authority.

Charges or indemnities which may result from this annulment shall be payable by Germany.

INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF RIGHTS OF PROPERTY

A special class of private interests is that of rights in industrial, literary, or artistic property. The Convention of Paris (1883)¹⁶ and the Convention of Berne (1886)¹⁷ are the fundamental charters of these. These Conventions are again put into force.

Rights in industrial property from which belligerent States have permitted departures during the war are re-established and restored. This re-establishment or recognition of rights is, however, subject to certain reservations as regards the rights of German nationals.

Exceptions.

1. Measures taken with regard to these by virtue of the Laws of War by the Allied and Associated countries remain valid, and can give rise to no action on their part.

2. Each Government of an Allied or Associated country remains free to impose on the rights of Germans in industrial, literary, and artistic property, with the exception of factory or trade-marks, the limitations and restrictions which it may think necessary for national defense or in the public interest, or to secure the fulfilment by Germany of obligations which she will have undertaken by the Treaty of Peace. With this object each Government may either itself use those rights or grant licenses for their use, or reserve to itself the control of their use.

3. It is understood that the rights of Germans interested in stocks-in-trade or industrial or commercial undertakings which have been, or will be, liquidated, will receive the same treatment as those stocks or undertakings.

¹⁶ Malloy, *Treaties*, 1776-1909, vol. II, p. 1935.

¹⁷ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXVII, p. 22.

TIME ALLOWED FOR COMPLIANCE, ETC.

A minimum period of one year after the coming into force of the Treaty shall be allowed in all the Allied countries for the fulfilment of formalities, payment of taxes, &c., in accordance with the laws of each country, with a view to preserve rights in industrial property which had already been acquired on the 1st August, 1914, or to obtain those which have been demanded during the war.

The period between August 1, 1914, and the coming into force of the Treaty shall be excluded in considering the time within which patents should be worked or trade-marks used, and in cases where the time allowed had not expired on August 1, 1914, it shall be extended for a period of six months after the coming into force of the Treaty, with the reservation of the rights of bonafide third parties.

No action on either side shall lie as regards industrial, literary, or artistic property for infringement during the period between the declaration of war and the coming into force of the Treaty.

CONTRACTS

Licences concluded before the war between nationals of Allied and Associated countries and German nationals shall be considered as cancelled as from the date of the declaration of war, but the beneficiaries of contracts of this kind shall have the right within six months to demand a new licence. In default of agreement the conditions of this shall be fixed by the competent Courts of the Allied or Associated countries, if the case is one of rights acquired under the legislation of those countries, or by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal if it is one of rights acquired under German legislation.

Sums paid during the war in virtue of contracts or agreements concluded before the war shall be dealt with in the same manner as other debts or credits of Germans.

Inhabitants of territories separated from Germany shall throughout the rest of German territory continue to enjoy the rights which they possessed under German legislation at the time of the separation.

POSSIBILITY OF EVENTUAL NATIONALIZATION

The Economic Clauses which are to regulate the liquidation of the past and at the same time establish the conditions of exchange and the status of persons and of their property, rights and interests for the future, could not be complete without one preventing Germany from evading her obligations on the ground of nationalization or any similar measure. It has therefore been stipulated that, if the German Government engages in international trade, it shall not in re-

spect thereof have, or be deemed to have, any rights, privileges or immunities of sovereignty.

PRIVATE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS

Three sections of the Economic Clauses are devoted to the settlement of the question of private property and interests in enemy countries.

1. Pre-war Debts.—Direct relations as regards the payment of pre-war debts between French creditors residing in France and Germans residing in Germany shall be forbidden.

In the expression “pre-war debts” are included not only debts payable before the war, but also those which have fallen due through the war or have arisen out of contracts concluded before the war, or represent sums payable on the coupons of Government securities.

These payments shall be made through the intervention of clearing offices established in each of the countries, which shall collect the sums owed by its nationals to former enemies and pay those owed by the latter to its nationals.

The Governments shall respectively be responsible for the payment of the acknowledged debts of their nationals and, in the case of payments made to their nationals, take any measures which they may think necessary to provide for risks, expenses, or commissions.

The payments provided for above shall be made in the currency of the Allied or Associated Power concerned. If the debt is payable in some other currency, the transaction shall be completed at the pre-war rate of exchange, that is to say, either at the rate of exchange stipulated in the contract or at a rate equal to the average cable transfer rate prevailing during the month of July, 1914, between the Allied or Associated Power concerned and Germany.

In principle, the debts in question shall be paid with interest at 5 per cent per annum, unless the contract stipulates, or the law or local custom provides otherwise. Interest shall, however, not be payable on sums due by way of dividend, interest, or other periodical payments which themselves represent interest on capital. Difficulties relating to the acknowledgment of debts shall be jointly examined by the clearing offices of the two countries which shall endeavor to bring the parties to an agreement. If they are unable to agree, the case shall be referred to a mixed arbitral tribunal whose decision shall be final.

The provisions laid down for the settlement of pre-war debts are not, it should be noted, binding on all the Allied or Associated States which may declare, within six months from the coming into force of the Treaty, that they wish the procedure in question to be applied to the settlement of pre-war debts between their nationals and Germans.

2. *Property, Rights, and Interests.*—This section of the Treaty first provides for immediate discontinuance of all the exceptional war measures and the stay of the measures of transfer in force concerning the property, rights and interests of Allied or Associated nationals in Germany.

On the other hand, the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to retain and liquidate the property, rights and interests of German nationals or companies controlled by them within their territories, colonies, possessions and protectorates. The German nationals shall be compensated by Germany on account of their liquidation or retention.

In principle, the exceptional war measures and measures of transfer taken by both parties in relation to enemy goods are considered as final and binding upon all persons. Allied or Associated nationals have, however, the right to compensation for damage or injury to their property caused by the said measures, and the reparation in question shall, if the Allied former owner demands it, be made, if possible, by the restitution to him of his property. Germany must thus restore his property free from all encumbrances or burdens with which it may have been charged after the liquidation, and indemnify all third parties injured by the restitution. In case restitution is not made in kind the proceeds of the sales and all cash assets are restored to the persons entitled thereto or to their Government. This restitution takes place in conformity with the procedure laid down for the payment of debts as regards the countries which follow that procedure.

The property, rights and interests restored in accordance with the Treaties shall be restored and maintained in Germany in the legal position obtaining in respect of the property, rights and interests of German nationals under the laws in force before the war.

No measure in derogation of property rights may be taken in the case of this property which does not equally affect the property of the Germans, and, in that case, adequate compensation must be paid to the Allied or Associated owner.

3. *Contracts.*—The Treaty lays down as a principle the dissolution of contracts between persons trade between whom was afterwards forbidden.

Important exceptions are, however, made to this rule. Notably it does not apply to contracts concluded between United States citizens, Brazilians, and Japanese, on the one hand, and Germans on the other. Some classes of contracts are excepted from the application of this rule; and lastly, the Allied and Associated Governments may claim, in the general interest, fulfillment of contracts concluded between one of their nationals and a German; but, in that case, the mixed Arbitral Tribunal may award compensation to the party which would suffer

a considerable loss in consequence of the change in the conditions of the deal.

The Treaty contains, besides, special provisions for different classes of contracts, notably stock exchange and commercial exchange contracts, security contracts, negotiable instruments, and contracts of insurance.

4. *Prescriptions*.—The Treaty provides for the suspension, as regards relations between enemies, of all periods of prescription or limitation of right of action, which shall begin to run again three months after the coming into force of the Treaty.

If, on account of failure to perform any act or comply with any formality, prejudice has been caused to an Allied or Associated national, reparation shall be granted to him by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. This reparation shall consist, wherever possible or equitable, in the restoration of the rights which have been prejudiced by the measure of execution taken.

5. *Judgments*.—If a judgment has been given during the war by a German Court against an Allied or Associated national in a case [in] which he was not able to make his defense, the Allied or Associated national shall be entitled to recover compensation fixed by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.

6. *Mixed Arbitral Tribunal*.—For the settlement of questions relative to private property, rights and interests, the Treaty provides for the establishment of a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. The Treaty describes the mode of forming the Tribunal, and fixes its procedure.

Besides the cases which we have mentioned above, this Tribunal is competent to try all questions, whatsoever their nature, relating to contracts concluded before the coming into force of the Treaty between Allied and Associated nationals and German nationals, always excepting questions which, under the laws of the Allied, Associated or Neutral Powers, are within the jurisdiction of the National Courts of these Powers.

PART XI.—*Aerial Navigation*

The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall have liberty of passage over the territory and territorial waters of Germany. They may have access to aerodromes open to national public traffic in Germany on a footing of equality with German aircraft.

Those in transit to a foreign country may fly over Germany and her territorial waters without landing.

Germany shall recognize as valid certificates of nationality, airworthiness, and competency, and licenses issued or recognized by any of the Allied or Associated Powers. She shall assure to their aircraft, as regards internal commercial traffic, most-favored-nation treatment.

She shall conform to the air regulations laid down by the said Powers.

These obligations shall remain in force until the 1st January, 1923, unless, before that date, Germany shall have been admitted into the League of Nations or shall have been authorized by the Allied and Associated Powers to adhere to their Convention relative to Aerial Navigation.

PART XII.—*Ports, Waterways, and Railways*

FREEDOM OF TRANSIT AND NAVIGATION

Germany grants free transit in all its forms on her railways and waterways to persons, goods, vessels, carriages, and wagons, etc., of the Allies and Associates; she grants to them the same treatment as to her own nationals, exempts them from customs and transit duties, and shall collect only reasonable taxes.

She shall abstain from all interference in the transit of emigrants, and shall not permit shipping companies or other organizations to exercise an influence on that traffic.

Neither at the places of entry into nor at those of exit from her territory shall she accord different treatment in accordance with origin, destination, nature, nationality, mode of transport, or route.

She shall take no measure (as by combined or other tariffs) to favor German ports to the detriment of Allied or Associated ports.

She will hasten the transport of goods of whatever designation of origin or destination on the same terms as German goods.

She shall facilitate the transport of perishable articles.

Except in the case of the maritime coasting trade, no difference shall be made in the ports or on the navigable waterways of Germany between Allies and Associates and nationals.

The provisions relative to customs, police, security, etc., shall be reasonable and shall not uselessly hinder traffic.

The free zones formerly existing in German ports are maintained.

No import or export duty shall be collected there, but only the taxes necessary for the maintenance and improvement of the port (and those on a footing of equality) and a statistical duty which shall not exceed one per mille ad valorem.

The facilities (warehouses, etc.) shall be in accordance with trade requirements. The goods consumed in the free zones shall be exempt from excise duty.

No discrimination shall be made between nationalities.

The import and export duties collected at the frontier between the free zones and Germany shall be the same as those collected on the other German frontiers.

Transit between the free zone and another State across Germany shall be free from any customs or transit duty, and the freedom of this transit shall be assured.

ELBE, ODER, NIEMEN

The following rivers are declared international:—

The Elbe and its tributary the Moldau (from Prague),
The Oder (from its confluence with the Oppa),
The Niemen (from Grodno),
The Danube (from Ulm),

and their lateral canals, channels, etc.

The principles of freedom of navigation apply to these rivers.

German boats may not start a regular service between two ports of an Allied or Associated Power without authority from such Power.

Charges shall be calculated so as to cover only the cost of maintenance and improvement, but the riparian States may collect customs, octroi, and port dues.

Pending the establishment, with the approval of the League of Nations, of a general régime by a general Convention to which Germany adheres in advance, these rivers shall be placed under a temporary régime based on the following principles:—

Limitation of taxes to the amount required to meet the expense of maintenance and improvement.

Maintenance at the expense of the riparian States.

An appeal to the League of Nations in case of negligence on their part or of works which appear hurtful to navigation.

The Elbe shall be administered by an International Commission composed of ten members (four German, two Czecho-Slovak, one British, one French, one Italian, one Belgian).

The Oder shall be administered by an International Commission composed of seven members (one Polish, one Prussian, one Czecho-Slovak, one British, one French, one Dane, one Swede).

An International Commission shall be created for the Niemen (one representative of each riparian State, and three representatives of other States specified by the League of Nations) at the demand of any one of the riparian States.

The existing agreements or regulations are provisionally maintained in force in so far as they do not conflict with the above provisions.

DANUBE

The European Commission of the Danube is re-established but, as a provisional measure, shall include only representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Roumania.

Above the stretch under the jurisdiction of that Commission an International Commission is established, including two representatives of the German riparian States, one of each of the other riparian States, and one of each non-riparian State to be represented in the future on the European Commission of the Danube.

Special provisions regulate the question of works, notably at the Iron Gates.

Germany shall cede to the Allied and Associated Powers concerned, in the case of the Danube, Elbe, Oder, and Niemen, tugs, boats and material necessary for the use of the river (distribution to be fixed by arbitrators appointed by the United States of America).

RHINE AND MOSELLE

Pending the conclusion of the general Convention above mentioned, the Rhine remains administered by the Convention of Mannheim of 1868,¹⁸ subject to the following modifications (the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to come to an agreement on this subject with the Netherlands, and Germany undertakes to adhere to any Convention which may result).

The Commission provided for by this Convention shall henceforth include 19 members (1 President appointed by France, 2 Netherlands, 2 Swiss, 4 German, 4 French, 2 British, 2 Italian, 2 Belgian).

Boats of all nationalities shall have equal rights.

Germany shall cede to France:—

1. Tugs and boats or shares in German Rhine Navigation Companies (distribution to be fixed by arbitrators appointed by the United States of America).

2. Establishments, docks, etc., possessed by Germans in the port of Rotterdam and their shares in these establishments (same procedure for arbitration as above).

France shall have the right to take water from the Rhine for her canals, irrigation, etc., and to execute the necessary works on the German bank.

Belgium shall have the same rights, in order to feed the deep-draught Rhine-Meuse Canal which she is planning, and the eventual construction of which Germany must ensure so far as her own territory is concerned.

France shall, besides, possess the exclusive right to utilize the water-power of the Rhine in the part of the river which forms the Franco-German frontier.

Germany accepts the eventual extension of the powers of the Rhine Commission to the Moselle, and to the part of the Rhine between Basle

¹⁸ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LIX, p. 470.

and the Lake of Constance (subject to the approval of Luxemburg and Switzerland respectively).

USE OF PORTS BY THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Germany shall lease to the Czecho-Slovak Republic for 99 years at Hamburg and Stettin areas which shall be made into free zones. The details will be settled by a Commission of three members, one German, one Czecho-Slovak, one British.

RAILWAY TRANSPORT

Pending the conclusion of the new Convention destined to take the place of the Convention of Berne of the 14th October, 1890,¹⁹ Germany shall conform to the prescriptions of the latter.

Transport coming from or going to Allied and Associated countries shall enjoy in Germany the most favorable treatment applied to transport of the same nature.

Germany shall co-operate in the establishment of direct tariffs.

She shall eventually fit her carriages and wagons with apparatus allowing the application of the system of continuous brakes adopted by the Allies.

VARIOUS PROVISIONS

Special stipulations guarantee that, in case of a cession of territory, the railways in it shall be handed over in good condition, with the normal material.

Germany shall permit the Allied and Associated powers for 25 years to construct or improve at their own expense on her territory the connections which they may require.

She accepts in advance the eventual denunciation of the Saint-Gothard Convention of the 30th [13th] October, 1909.²⁰ For a period of 25 years the body of Allied and Associated Powers represented on the Rhine and Danube Commissions may insist on the construction by Germany of a deep-draught navigable waterway from the Rhine to the Danube.

Questions which may arise on the subject of all these provisions will be settled by the League of Nations.

The League of Nations may revise certain of the clauses of this chapter during a period of five years.

During the same period any general Convention concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers on the subject of ports, waterways

¹⁹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXXII, p. 771.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. CV, p. 639.

and railways, which has been approved by the League of Nations, will be binding on Germany.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS

KIEL CANAL

The Kiel Canal shall be maintained free and open to all vessels of war and commerce alike of all nations at peace with Germany.

The nationals, property and vessels of all Powers shall be treated on a footing of perfect equality in the use of the Canal.

Movement shall be free, except as regards reasonable and uniform regulations relative to police, customs, sanitation, emigration or immigration, and the import and export of prohibited goods.

Only such charges shall be levied on vessels using the Canal as are intended to cover the cost of its upkeep or improvement.

Loading and unloading, and embarkation and disembarkation shall only take place in the ports specified by Germany.

Germany has to ensure the maintenance of good conditions of navigation.

In the event of violation of these provisions, or of disputes as to their interpretation, appeal may be made to the jurisdiction of the League of Nations.

A local German Authority established at Kiel shall be qualified to deal with disputes in the first instance.

PART XIII.—*Labor*

The question of Labor, which forms the subject of this part of the Treaty, having given rise to an exhaustive discussion in the Conference, it is unnecessary for me to analyze it.

PART XIV.—*Guarantees*

Guarantees are divided between two parts of the Treaty, Parts V and XIV.

These guarantees can be classed under six [*sic*] heads:—

1. Reduction of the German military, naval and air forces to the level fixed by the Treaty.

2. Maintenance of the German military forces at the said level.

3. Complete demilitarization of the left bank of the Rhine and of a zone of 50 kilometers on the right bank.

4. Right of investigation by the Council of the League of Nations, recognized by Germany, as regards the military status of Germany.

5. Cooperation by the Allied and Associated forces of the left bank and the bridgeheads under the conditions of time fixed by the Treaty.

REDUCTION OF GERMAN FORCES

The figures fixed for this reduction have been set forth in Part V.

This operation must be carried out within two months under the control of Inter-Allied Commissions.

PERMANENT MILITARY STATUS OF GERMANY

The conditions of this status also appear in Part V. Germany must limit her army to 100,000 men recruited by voluntary enlistment for 12 years, must have no air service, tanks nor poison gas, must confine her manufacture of war material to a fixed level and to definite factories, etc.

Similar clauses are applicable to the fleet.

DEMILITARIZATION ON THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE AND 50
KILOMETERS ON THE RIGHT BANK

Besides the general clauses limiting her armaments, the Treaty imposes on Germany special obligations relative to the left bank of the Rhine and to a zone of 50 kilometers on the right bank.

It is forbidden to her, either on the left bank of the river or in the zone of 50 kilometres on the right bank:—

1. To maintain or construct fortifications.
2. To keep or collect armed forces, either permanently or temporarily.
3. To hold military manoeuvres of whatever nature.
4. To retain any material facilities for mobilization.

RIGHT OF INVESTIGATION

So long as the Treaty remains in force Germany undertakes to co-operate in any investigation on the subject of any of the clauses relative to her military status which may be judged necessary by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations, on the demand of a Member of the League.

OCCUPATION OF THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE AND THE BRIDGEHEADS

The right of occupation, as a guarantee for the execution of the Treaty, is regulated as follows:—

1. For a period of 15 years from signature the left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads on the right bank shall be occupied by Allied and Associated forces.
2. If Germany faithfully carries out the clauses of the Treaty, a progressive evacuation is provided for; namely:—

(a.) At the end of five years the bridgehead at Cologne and the territory on the left bank to the north of a line starting from the Dutch frontier on the river Roer and ending on the Rhine at the mouth of the Ahr.

(b.) At the end of 10 years the bridgehead at Coblenz and the territory on the left bank to the north of a line starting from the intersection of the German, Dutch and Belgian frontiers, and ending on the Rhine at Bacharach.

(c.) At the end of 15 years the bridgeheads at Mayence and Kehl and the rest of the territories on the left bank.

3. The Allied and Associated Powers reserve, however, the following rights:—

(a.) If at the end of fifteen years the guarantees against unprovoked aggression by Germany do not seem to them sufficient evacuation may be delayed.

(b.) If during or after the fifteen years Germany, in the opinion of the Inter-Allied Commission on Reparations, is ceasing faithfully to carry out her engagements, all or part of the above zones may be reoccupied by the Allied and Associated forces.

4. It is admitted, on the contrary, that if Germany carried out all her engagements before the end of fifteen years the withdrawal of the Allied and Associated troops would follow.

REGULATION OF THE OCCUPATION

All clauses relative to the occupation which are not provided for by the present Treaty shall be regulated subsequently by a Convention or Conventions having the same force and effect as if it or they were incorporated in the present Treaty.

PART XV.—*Miscellaneous Provisions*

Germany undertakes to recognize the Treaties of Peace and additional Conventions which may be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with the Powers which fought on the side of Germany, to recognize whatever dispositions may be made concerning the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Kingdom of Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire, and to recognize the new States within their frontiers as there laid down.

The High Contracting Parties declare and place on record that they have taken note of the Treaty signed by France and His Serene Highness the Prince of Monaco on the 17th July, 1918.²¹

They agree that, in the absence of a subsequent agreement to the contrary, the Chairman of any Commission established by the present

²¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxi, p. 727.

Treaty shall, in the event of an equality of votes, be entitled to a second vote.

A special Clause specifies the conditions in which the property of German Christian religious missions in territory belonging or entrusted to the Allied and Associated Governments shall continue to be devoted to missionary purposes without prejudicing the control or authority of the said Governments as to the directors of these missions.

Without prejudice to the provisions of the present Treaty, Germany undertakes not to put forward any pecuniary claim based on events which occurred at any time before its coming into force against the Allied and Associated Powers or against those which have simply broken off diplomatic relations with her.

She accepts all decisions concerning German goods and ships made by any Prize Courts of the Allied or Associated Powers, which, on the other hand, reserve the right to examine all decisions of German Prize Courts.

The deposit of ratifications shall be made at Paris, extra-European Powers having the right to announce their ratifications through their diplomatic representatives at Paris.

As soon as it has been ratified by Germany on the one hand, and by three of the principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other hand, the Treaty shall come into force between the High Contracting Parties who have ratified it, and that date shall serve as the basis for the determination of all periods of time provided for by the Treaty.

In all other respects the Treaty shall come into force for each Power at the date of the deposit of its ratification.

Apart from the Treaty, which I have just analysed, it is my duty to acquaint the Conference with the following Note:

"In addition to the guarantees furnished by the Treaty of Peace, the President of the United States of America binds himself to propose to the United States Senate, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain binds himself to propose to the Parliament of Great Britain an engagement, subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations, according to the terms of which the United States and Great Britain will immediately come to the aid of France in the case of an unprovoked aggression by Germany on France.

After M. Tardieu has finished speaking, the President declares that, although his statement is only a mere communication, any Delegates who wish to offer observations in regard thereto will have an opportunity of doing so.

DR. AFFONSO COSTA (Portugal) makes the following declaration in regard to the part concerned with Reparation, and invites the Supreme Council to take it into consideration.

"1. The Portuguese Delegation is unable to accept the clauses of the Treaty of Peace in regard to Reparation until there be included therein:—

"(a.) The repayment of the economic damage directly inflicted by Germany on the countries which she rendered unable to supply themselves in bearable conditions or to continue their export trade, as was the case with Portugal.

"(b.) The repayment of war costs. As Germany declared war on Portugal that country has only been concerned with the defence of its existence and integrity, and has not cherished any ideas of territorial aggrandisement or any ambitions of expansion either in commercial or other directions.

"2. The Portuguese Delegation further claims the insertion in the Treaty of Peace of a special clause requiring the 'Commission on Reparation' to devote the sums recovered from Germany, in the first place and with priority, to the small countries which, having been ruined by the war, are unable to reconstitute themselves by their own resources. Such is the case of Portugal, which is in the position of being the only country among the belligerent Allies to have reaped no fruits from the victory, for Portugal has had no fresh territory assigned to her and has received no compensations in kind, either commercial or otherwise.

"3. The Portuguese Delegation finally claims for its Delegate the right of voting on the 'Commission on Reparation' on the same conditions as any other Allied or Associated nation, on each occasion when subjects concerning Portugal's interests may be under discussion."

"I likewise make the following declaration in regard to submarine cables:—

"The Portuguese Delegation claims the recognition of the rights of Portugal over the former German submarine cables which pass by the Azores."

"Mr. President, I desire to say a few words in order to defend my point of view in regard to the indemnities or Reparation—as you may please to call them—which are to be imposed on the enemy.

"Portugal finds herself, at the end of this war, really ruined. The debt incurred merely by war expenditure amounts to nearly two milliards. Her economic situation is extremely difficult and the fall in her exports considerable. Portugal has lost the Central European market and has been unable to replace it; some of her industries are completely paralyzed. The Treaty of Peace entirely ignores the situation of Portugal; her sacrifices have not been acknowledged; she has not even been called into consultation in the different groupings created by the Conference, and she has witnessed with surprise the

grant of certain rights to neutral countries which are prejudicial to the nations which have shed their blood for the common cause.

"The Government of the Republic, in faithful observance of the national pledges and urged by the pressing needs of the Allies, seized the German ships lying in Portuguese ports; thereupon Germany declared war on Portugal. The declaration of war obliged Portugal to intervene militarily, for it would have been inadmissible for the country to confess its impotence by abstaining from any share in the war into which it had been dragged. If the war costs and the economic damage are not repaid, the financial situation of Portugal will be seriously impaired thereby and the financial and economic reconstruction of the country will become impossible by the country's own resources.

"The extraordinary expenditure borne by the Portuguese State on account of its military participation in the war on land and at sea, in Europe and in Africa, amounted up to 28th February last to £77,220,000, that is, 1,930,500,000 francs. To this sum must be added, henceforward, £1,787,000, being the amount of the expenditure which has been met since the 28th February; thus the costs of the war amount to £79,007,000, or 1,975,175,000 francs.

"The Portuguese economic loss occasioned by the war, in accordance with the calculations of financial experts, amounts to £225,550,000, or 5,638,750,000 francs, which represents 37 to 47½ per cent. of the Portuguese public wealth, which is estimated at between £480,000,000 and £600,000,000, sterling.

"Having regard to these figures and to the economic situation in Portugal before the war, it will easily be seen that the reconstruction of the country will be impossible unless the war costs and the economic damage be repaid. Expenditure did not exceed revenue in the Budgets of 1912-13 and 1913-14, yet the situation of Portugal will certainly be more difficult than that of the conquered enemies, since the fact that she is essentially an agricultural country does not enable her to use the means of industry which are indispensable for the recovery of an economic situation which would enable her to be self-supporting.

"Nearly all the belligerent Allies will see their territory increased, as is right. That will not only augment their national wealth, but will enable them to distribute war taxation over a more numerous population. The population of Portugal, both in view of the number of its inhabitants and the scale of income which these enjoy, offers far less scope for taxation than that of the majority of the other Allied countries. Portugal will see her obligations doubled and her people will see the springs of progress drying up.

"Confronted by these incontrovertible facts, what is it that we demand? Territory, humiliations to be imposed on the enemy, money wherewith to enrich ourselves? No! We ask that Germany, as it has not been thought fit to punish that country as a criminal, should at least pay us as our debtor what she had made us spend in defending ourselves against her attacks.

"We were quiet in our homes; we were enjoying the benefits of peace; we were honest and progressive. Of a sudden Germany attacks us, and Germany has made us spend on guns and munitions the funds which we had to live on. She compelled us to equip our children and send them to the infernal slaughter, the tragedy of which has, it would seem, already been forgotten. Do you then desire that she should not pay? Do you not consider as a reparation due the repayment, in the budgets which she has ruined, at least of the expenses which she has compelled us to incur? You say that Germany has no more money, and because it is said that she has no more money no lesson is drawn from the greatest crime committed since humanity exists. Is it really admissible that in 1919 a country which has been acting criminally for four years should not be forced to bear the costs of the monstrous conflict which it stirred up? What lesson then may we draw from this war? What am I to say to my fellow-countrymen when I return home?

"Is Portugal, who defended Justice, to emerge from the war even more ruined than Germany who attacked her? I am told that we are striving for a philosophic peace; very well, but how can you expect any philosophy to be drawn from a peace unless it be laid down therein, at least in principle, that a country which lets war loose must at least suffer its consequences?

"No one has practiced better than we have, since 1914, the ideas of Right of which President Wilson has made himself the champion. We stated our willingness to enter the war and range ourselves on the side of the Allies where, we believed, Justice had found her place. We did not enter the war with any selfish ends, but it would be too much to ask us to fight for Justice and to emerge as ruined as if we had been beaten. We agree with President Wilson, that a league based on justice must be created, but I must state before you and before the world that this Treaty of Peace, so far as what is called Reparation is concerned, is the most tremendous model of injustice which has ever been produced.

"The criminals are less punished than some of their victims, and among the victims some are favored and some are not. No lesson of sound morality emerges from these provisions, which are sometimes hard and sometimes arbitrary. As between the countries which have fought and those which have not had the opportunity of doing so, the Treaty not only permits but actually decrees that the former should

remain ruined. As between the small nations which have hurled themselves into the fire in the defence of Right and the countries which have remained neutral, the Treaty ruins the former and grants the latter the opportunity of taking advantage of the wealth which they have amassed while the others were getting killed, and also the honor of belonging to the first Government of the League of Nations.

"If it is thus, by a document like this one, that you believe you are able to impose yourselves on humanity as judges, you are mistaken! You have yet time; I beg you to reflect. Communicate to the enemy the broad lines or the sections of the Treaty which deserve the unanimous approval of the Assembly, but believe me, in spite of what may be said, that it is indispensable for the Treaty to be once more reconsidered, especially in connection with Reparation.

"Do not think that I have lost sight of all sense of proportion. I have no intention of claiming for my country reparation similar to that which is due to France, Belgium, Serbia and Roumania; but I am charged with the defense of my country's rights and I must see that they obtain recognition, and I therefore ask of those who have drawn up this Charter that my country, which has fought, should at least be compared with the neutrals, and that Portugal, who has sent her soldiers to France, should at least be treated like the countries which have merely sent their commercial travellers to France."

MR. LOU TSENG-TSIANG (China), speaking on behalf of the Chinese Delegation, makes a protest against the settlement of the Shantung question in the following terms:—

"The Chinese Delegation is constrained to express the deep disappointment which it feels at the settlement proposed by the Council of Prime Ministers for the settlement of the questions of Kiao-chow and Shantung. For that settlement seems to have been taken as the sole basis for the clauses in the draft Treaty of Peace with Germany just read to us which are concerned with the disposal of German rights in that Chinese province. The Delegation is convinced that its disappointment will be felt just as keenly by the Chinese nation as a whole. The proposed settlement seems to have been adopted without sufficient account having been held of the considerations in regard to Right, Justice, and the national security of China which the Chinese Delegation has continuously urged on the occasions on which it was heard, firstly by the Council of Prime Ministers and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, and later on by the Council of Prime Ministers. The Chinese Delegation communicated to the latter Council a formal protest against the proposed settlement in the hope of securing its revision, and in the event of such a revision not appearing possible, it regards it as its duty to make here and now reservations in regard to the above-mentioned clauses.

"I beg the President to be so good as to cause my statement to be recorded in the Minutes of the proceedings."

MR. CRESPI (Italy) expresses certain reservations made by the Italian Delegation in the following terms:—

"In view of the possibility that during the temporary absence of the Italian Delegation certain of the clauses already adopted with the assent of that Delegation may have been modified, I am obliged, for all necessary purposes, to make such reservations as may be warranted by the circumstances."

MARSHAL FOCH expresses in the following terms the observations suggested to him by the Treaty of Peace:—

"Gentlemen, I think I should have some observations to make if I had in my hands the text of the draft Treaty, but I must confess that I have not yet received it. From a military point of view there are certain clauses with which I am only acquainted at present by rumors, which would call for observations, and I shall endeavor to state them.

"In Section 14 provision is made, as a guarantee for Reparation, for the occupation during 5, 10 and 15 years of the country on the left bank of the Rhine. If this question could be discussed calmly it would be easy to prove that such guarantee is worthless from a military point of view, and that it will involve increasing burdens for the Allied occupation. Before proceeding further, I must therefore say that this Chapter 14 or Section 14, I am not certain which, contains a guarantee which I regard as equivalent to nothing at all, while it involves us in increasing military burdens. That is the first reservation which I make.

"According to what I have further understood, we are to hold the Rhine for five years 'as a military guarantee and a means of securing Reparation'; after five years and up to ten years we are to abandon the Rhine from the Dutch frontier to below Cologne, that is to say, for a distance of 200 kilometres out of the 500 which we hold. I should like to point out forthwith, from the point of view of Reparation, that this represents the abandonment of the most industrially developed portion of the occupied territory, and the abandonment of the bridgehead which gives access to the Ruhr basin, the principal source of Germany's wealth, which we shall therefore cease from threatening and abstain from seizing.

"After ten years we abandon another 80 kilometres of the line of the Rhine, from Cologne to below Coblenz. Finally, after fifteen years, the barrier of the Rhine is abandoned along the whole length of the occupied territories, and France finds herself back again on

her frontiers of 1870, that is to say, without any military guarantee.

"I endeavored to understand just now the definition of the French frontier in the Saar district, but was unable to grasp it. It was stated that it was the frontier of 1870; then do we remain with the frontier which we had as the vanquished in 1815 and 1870, or is it carried back to the Saar district? I was not able to fix it.

"As you see, at the end of fifteen years we shall have no security remaining for Reparation; and I therefore say, in this respect, that Section 14 is absolutely inoperative. As payments of Reparation will go on for thirty years we shall find ourselves in possession of a more or less limited guarantee during the first fifteen years, and after that no guarantee whatever will remain. I must draw your attention to this absence of military guarantees.

"On the other hand, the reoccupation of the occupied territories is contemplated, either during or after this period of fifteen years, in the event of Germany failing to carry out the whole or part of the Treaty signed by her. Who is to judge of the desirability of such reoccupation? The Commission on Reparation. For all violations of the clauses of the Treaty, even of those which are not connected with Reparation and whether they are of a military or administrative character, it is the Commission on Reparation which will step in and say: 'There has been a violation of such and such clauses, and there is therefore a case for reoccupying the occupied territories.' And, moreover, and this is even more important, the Commission will have to state, so far as concerns Reparation, whether there has been any violation of clauses which do not appear in the Treaty, as some are only to be drawn up during the period which will follow the signature of the Treaty. This is inadequate jurisdiction.

"To sum up, the Treaty secures complete guarantees for a period of five years, during which Germany will doubtless not be in a position to do any harm; but from that moment onwards, in proportion as the strength of Germany may recover and the danger increase, the guarantees become less and less until they finally disappear after the lapse of fifteen years. Thereafter there will remain no military means of exacting payment from the enemy who has thirty years within which to pay, whereas the burdens of the Allies will augment.

"It is indeed incontestable that more troops will be necessary to hold any line which is not the line of the Rhine and to form a strong barrier this side of the river. Our charges will, therefore, increase in proportion as our guarantees diminish until they reach the zero point, while we shall still have Reparation to recover during fifteen years more.

"There is only one military means of compelling the enemy to carry out his engagements, and that is to maintain the occupation of the Rhine; for on the Rhine a comparatively slight force is sufficient to

forbid Germany any action and to keep every kind of action in hand for ourselves.

"Such are the observations which I have to offer in regard to Section 14. I ask that these provisions should be subjected to a fresh examination, especially by the military experts of the Allied nations.

"If I were asked what solution I proposed I should answer approximately as follows. The question of the Rhineland is absolutely dependent on the Rhine, for that river is the determining factor. If you are master of the Rhine you are master of the whole country. But if you are not on the Rhine you have lost everything. I will not go very far in search of a comparison; if we wish to defend ourselves in this Conference room it would be enough to hold the doors in order to forbid the passage of the enemy; inversely, once we had lost the doors the enemy could pass. Therefore, so long as we hold the barrier of the Rhine we shall be complete masters of the left bank at small cost. If, on the other hand, we abandon the Rhine, we shall require a large force to hold the country, in which we shall nevertheless be weak, as the enemy will be free to come and attack us when he chooses. From the military point of view, therefore, the only important thing is the Rhine; the rest does not count. The mere occupation of the Rhineland has no value without a hold on the Rhine. By retiring, as has been said, we are handing over securities, we are opening doors and placing ourselves in an inferior situation because we are obliged to occupy a country without any natural obstacles, and to place in it much larger forces, that is to say, at much greater expense.

"The most economic and the safest formula is to maintain the occupation of the Rhine. I may be mistaken, and that is why I have requested that other military experts should be associated with me in reconsidering this section. It may be asked, how long must the Rhine be held? The answer is, as long as you wish to retain guarantees, for there are no others. When once you find that you have been paid and that there are adequate guarantees it will only remain to withdraw the troops and go away.

"Please to note that I asked that the occupation of the Rhine should be maintained, and not that of the Rhineland; that is the point on which our opinions differ. It may be urged as an objection that I am occupying a country; that is quite untrue, for I am occupying the passages of the Rhine which requires a very small force.

"When the fulfillment of the Treaty is well advanced, when the German countries shall have given proof of an undeniable goodwill, when disarmament is actually carried out, then it will be possible to lighten the charges of everyone, both Allies and Germans, by reducing yet further the troops of occupation; and that reduction will be

brought about, as you see, not by ' ' ' ' ground, but by reducing the strength of the troops of occupation.

“Moreover, the withdrawals proposed in Section 14 will necessitate the successive establishment of troops first on one line, then on another line which will be held during five years, and finally on a third to be held for ten years. Therefore we shall have barracks to construct and installations to provide which will involve both Allies and Germans in expenditure, all the greater because it will be necessary to bring up yet more troops to occupy the new line. The result will be enormous burdens on the population, and that will be disastrous from an economic point of view.

“To sum up, I say, from the military point of view, that we must just remain on the Rhine and not abandon that line, even partially, unless we wish to incur burdens, weaken our position, and remain stripped of all guarantees at the end of a certain period of time. These remarks apply to the whole of the line of the Rhine from Cologne to Coblenz and Mavence.

"Chapter 14, I think, likewise deals with the bridgehead of Kehl; as a matter of fact that is not a regular bridgehead, the proof of which is that in this territory we have not got the protecting radius of 30 kilometres which we have everywhere else, a radius which has been calculated in accordance with the range of the guns required to enable us to deploy freely if we wished to resume the offensive. At Kehl we have occupied the Strasburg forts built on the right bank of the Rhine, and nothing else. That is called a ' ' ' ' , but it is not really one, because no deployment from it could be usefully made. The forts of the right bank of the Rhine constitute the real defence of the fortress of Strasburg; they form part of it and cannot be separated from it. If we gave them back to the Germans it would amount to returning to them half of Strasburg. Strasburg is a French fortress, and it is impossible to cut it in two and give one half to the Germans and the other to the French. The forts of Strasburg form an integral portion of the fortress, and I wonder how the idea of not retaining it in its entirety could have arisen. On this point also it would be as well to modify the Treaty.

“These are the principal remarks to which I draw your attention; I ask that they should be taken into consideration and that account should be taken of my statement, for I cannot let these provisions pass.

"I have not seen the text of the Treaty, and perhaps I am mistaken, but I request again that, if the text is so drafted, it should forthwith be referred for examination to the military experts in order to see to what extent it can be modified. In any case, I ask that due note should be taken of my statements in regard to the section on guarantees, to the occupation of the Rhineland and the Kehl bridgehead; and I

request the heads of Governments to be so good, should they think necessary, as to cause a fresh draft or a correction by the military experts to be made. The latter are assembled for any purpose and are studying at Versailles a question of secondary importance at the present moment. The importance of the question which I have just raised is great enough for it to be submitted to them for examination without delay."

As no one else asks leave to speak, the Session is adjourned at 17.5 o'clock (5.5 p. m.).

The President,
G. CLEMENCEAU.

The Secretary General,
P. DUTASTA.

The Secretaries,
J. C. GREW,
M. P. A. HANKEY,
PAUL GAUTHIER,
ALDROVANDI,
SADAO SABURI.

Annex

Responsibility for the War

Note of explanation in regard to the wish expressed by the Hondurean Delegation and read at the Plenary Session of the 6th May, 1919.

"Mr. President, Gentlemen:

"The Hondurean Delegation regret to have to express an opinion contrary to that of the eminent jurisconsults who drew up the draft Articles which determine the penalties to be applied in regard to Responsibility for the war. The Delegation, in taking up this attitude, fulfills a duty which respect for the principles of universal justice adopted by the Constitution of its country imposes.

"The written legislation of all countries has acknowledged it to be an incontestable principle of natural law that no man may be tried or punished except for an offence already and explicitly defined and made punishable by law.

"The Delegation of the country which I have the honor to represent considers that there is no case for the trial of William II. of Hohenzollern, ex-German Emperor, arraigned by Article I of the draft under discussion. There is, indeed, no international law or precedent for trying him. The head of a State is only responsible to

his own people; his people can neither try nor condemn him except in accordance with regularly established laws. In the present case it would be more logical to try and condemn the whole German people, which tolerated and abetted the acts of its governors; such condemnation could, however, only have effect in the form in which the Conference has sought to secure it; that is, by inflicting on the German people an indemnity or reparation for all the damage caused by the unjust and cruel war into which it allowed itself to be led.

"We therefore think that there is likewise no justification for requiring from the Government of the Netherlands the extradition of the former German Emperor; moreover, being unaware whether there exists between Holland and one or more of the Allied and Associated Powers an extradition Treaty which provides for the case, we are convinced that Holland would be unable to grant what is asked of her without herself infringing her own laws.

"The draft Articles now before us contemplate the trial and condemnation of any person, having been in the service of the German Government, to whom any responsibility can be imputed in respect of acts committed in violation of the laws and customs of war; the trial is to take place before military tribunals and to be conducted in accordance with the military laws of the Allied and Associated country of which the plaintiff is a subject. These tribunals, when pronouncing a condemnation, are to apply, either the law of their own country, whereas that law could not have been intentionally infringed by the accused because he was not acquainted with it, or the German law, in which case the Tribunal would be neither competent nor able to interpret it, as it would not be versed therein; or, yet again, they might apply the laws and customs of war, but these cannot be enforced by any penalty other than those provided for in the domestic legislation of each country which lays down the rights, obligations and responsibility of the personnel of the national army.

"The conclusion which we derive from the foregoing is rather that it would be desirable to insert in the Treaty an Article compelling the German Government to arraign all those of its subjects whose acts may have been liable to some kind of penalty in accordance with the respective laws and, at the same time, to exact the necessary guarantees so as to ensure strict justice in the sentences pronounced as also the effective execution of such sentences. Nevertheless, we consider admissible, as an exception, the trial by the ordinary military tribunals of the Allied and Associated Powers of crimes and offences committed on their territory against the persons and property of their subjects, if the responsible persons have already been apprehended or can be placed at the disposal of the said tribunals.

"If it were sought to establish a precedent, with a view to protecting the rights of humanity and render a tribute to absolute justice, a reciprocity clause should have been inserted laying on the Allied and Associated Governments the obligation of bringing to trial and punishing the offences and crimes which their nationals might have committed against the enemy in violation of the laws and customs of war or of the laws of their own country; for these cases, however few they might be, should not remain altogether unpenalized, and the Allied and Associated Governments could not wish that they should go unpunished.

"It is possible that our view is not agreeable to everyone at this moment, but we are confident that it is the one which will prevail when calm is reborn in men's minds amid the benefits of peace; in any case, it will be the view of the impartial historian who judges in the future the events of today.

"We reprehend most vigorously the crimes and atrocities committed by the German armies and their allies; we have not yet had an opportunity of seeing with our own eyes the devastation of which Belgium, France, Serbia, and other invaded countries have been the victims, but we hold these deeds in execration, for the world is filled with the cries of distress of these unfortunates, who have been martyred in every possible way. That is the reason for which we should wish to see inserted in the Covenant of the League of Nations, or in some other Covenant adopted by this Conference, provisions of such an effective nature as to enable us to discount the possible recurrence of these outrages against humanity, and such as would ensure the infliction of condign and exemplary punishment if ever such outrages were again committed. It is thus that you would fill the void at present existing in international law."

P. BONILLA

PARIS, April 23, 1919.

Preliminary Peace Conference, Protocol No. 7, Plenary Session of May 29, 1919

The Session is opened at 15 o'clock (3 p. m.) under the presidency of Mr. Clemenceau, President.*

PRESENT

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

The President of the United States
Honorable Robert Lansing.
Honorable Edward M. House.
General Tasker H. Bliss.

FOR THE BRITISH EMPIRE :

GREAT BRITAIN :

The Rt Hon. A. J. Balfour.
The Rt. Hon. G N Barnes.

Dominions and India :

CANADA :

The Rt. Hon. Sir George Foster.
The Hon. C. J. Doherty.

AUSTRALIA :

The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes.

SOUTH AFRICA :

Lieut-General the Rt. Hon. J. C.
Smuts.

FOR FRANCE :

Mr. G Clemenceau.
Mr. Pichon.
Mr. L. L. Klotz.
Mr. André Tardieu.
Mr. Jules Cambon.
Marshal Foch.

FOR ITALY :

Mr. V. E. Orlando.
Baron S. Sonnino.
The Marquis G. Imperiali, Senator
of the Kingdom, Ambassador of
His Majesty the King of Italy in
London.
Mr. S. Barzilai.

FOR JAPAN :

The Marquis Saionji.
The Baron Makino.
Viscount Chinda.
Mr. K. Matsui.
Mr. H Ijuin.

FOR BELGIUM :

Mr. Hymans.
Mr van den Heuvel.

FOR CHINA :

Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang.
Mr. Cheng-ting Thomas Wang.

FOR GREECE :

Mr. Eleftherios Veniselos.
Mr. Nicolas Politis.

FOR NICARAGUA :

Mr. Salvador Chamorro.

FOR PANAMA :

Mr. Antonio Burgos.

FOR POLAND :

Mr. Roman Dmowski.
Mr. Ignace Paderewski.

FOR ROUMANIA :

Mr. Jean J. C. Bratiano.
Dr. Vaida-Voevod.

FOR THE SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE :

Mr. N. P. Pachitch.
Mr Trumbitch.
Mr. M. R. Vesnitch.

* The representatives of the Press were not admitted to this Session. [Foot-note in the original.]

FOR SIAM :

The Prince Charoon.
Phya Bibadh Kosha.

FOR THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC :

Mr. Charles Kramar.
Mr. Edouard Benes.

The Minutes of the Sessions of the 28th April (Protocol No. 5) and the 6th May, 1919 (Protocol No. 6), are adopted.

The Agenda paper calls for the communication to the Allied and Associated Powers of the Conditions of Peace with Austria.

The PRESIDENT explains the objects of the Session in the following terms :—

“Today we are only going to communicate the Conditions of Peace with Austria to you, with certain exceptions: firstly, the Military Clauses, which have been reserved for further discussion in view of the effect which they may produce on the States which used to form the Austrian Empire; secondly, the Reparation Clauses, which have been referred to the competent Commission; and lastly, the Political Clauses, which concern Italy. It cannot, moreover, be very long before these three portions of the Treaty are submitted to you; most of the work has been completed already and the conditions will of course be brought to your notice before they are handed to the Austrian Plenipotentiaries.”

MR. BRATIANO (Roumania) having enquired whether the communication to be made that day is that of the actual text of the Articles, or merely a summary similar to the one which was read before the handing of the Treaty to the German Plenipotentiaries. The PRESIDENT replies that the same procedure will be followed as in the case of Germany, and that a summary will be read to the Conference, which is, moreover, very close to the text of the Treaty. When this summary has been adopted by the Conference, the Treaty will be handed to the representatives of Austria.

MR. BRATIANO (Roumania) states that he desires to present a wish, which he formulates in the following terms :—

“On behalf of the Governments of Greece, of Poland, of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, of the Czecho-Slovaks and of Roumania, I have the honor to beg the Conference to be so good as to adjourn for 48 hours the presentation of the Treaty to the Austrians, in order that we may make ourselves acquainted, from the actual text, with the conditions which it is desired to impose on Austria. We ask leave to ascertain what they are and to examine them before concurring in them, for, as in the case of the text communicated to the Germans, an oral statement necessarily cannot make everything sufficiently clear. Even now, if the text were read out, we should need time for reflection in order to be in a position to study the effects on each of our States.

"Therefore, on behalf of those Governments, I beg the President kindly to move the Conference to postpone the handing of the Treaty to the Austrians, with a view to leave us 48 hours for examining the text. If the text were handed to us now, we should only need a postponement of 24 hours, but if we only receive it tomorrow, 48 hours would be necessary."

As no one else asks leave to speak, The PRESIDENT states that he considers Mr. Bratiano's claim to be entirely justified, and that it had been hoped to communicate the actual text before the present Session, but that had not been possible. This text might be distributed to the Delegations concerned, and they, for their part, might offer in writing, as soon as possible, the observations which they wished to make. In order to give the necessary time asked for, the President proposes to adjourn the Session of the Conference to Saturday, the 31st May, at 3 p. m., and to fix Monday, the 2nd June, for handing the Conditions of peace to the Austrian Plenipotentiaries.

This is decided.

The Session is adjourned at 15.25 o'clock (3.25 p. m.).

The President,
G. CLEMENCEAU.

The Secretary-General,

P. DUTASTA.

The Secretaries,

J. C. GREW,

M. P. A. HANKEY,

PAUL GAUTHIER,

ALDROVANDI,

SADAO SABURI.

Preliminary Peace Conference, Protocol No. 8, Plenary Session of May 31, 1919

The Session is opened at 15 o'clock (3 p. m.) under the Presidency of Mr. Clemenceau, President.*

PRESENT

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

The President of the United States.
Honorable Robert Lansing.
Honorable Henry White.
General Tasker H. Bliss.

FOR THE BRITISH EMPIRE :

GREAT BRITAIN :

The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Ward, Bt.

Dominions and India :

CANADA :

The Rt. Hon. Sir George Foster.
The Hon. C. J. Doherty.

AUSTRALIA :

The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hazhoo.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Cook.

NEW ZEALAND :

The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey.

FOR FRANCE :

Mr. Clemenceau.
Mr. Pichon.
Mr. L. L. Klotz.
Mr. André Tardieu.
Mr. Jules Cambon.
Marshal Foch.

FOR ITALY :

Mr. V. E. Orlando.
The Baron S. Sonnino.
Mr. S. Crespi.
The Marquis G. Imperiali.
Mr. S. Barzilai.

FOR JAPAN :

The Marquis Saionji.
The Baron Makino.
Viscount Chinda.
Mr. K. Matsui.
Mr. H. Ijuin.

FOR BELGIUM :

Mr. Hymans.
Mr. van den Heuvel.

FOR CHINA :

Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang.
Mr. Cheng-ting Thomas Wang.

FOR CUBA :

Mr. Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante.

FOR GREECE :

Mr. Eleftherios Venizelos.
Mr. Nicolas Politis.

FOR NICARAGUA :

Mr. Salvador Chamorro.

FOR PANAMA :

Mr. Antonio Burgos.

FOR POLAND :

Mr. Roman Dmowski.
Mr. Ignace Paderewski.

FOR ROUMANIA :

Mr. Jean J. C. Bratiano.
Dr. Valda-Voevod.

FOR THE SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE :

Mr. N. P. Pachitch.
Mr. Trumbitch.
Mr. Vesnitch.

*The representatives of the Press were not admitted to this Session. [Foot-note in the original.]

FOR SIAM :

The Prince Charoon.
Phya Bibadh Kosha

FOR THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC :

Mr. Charles Kramar.
Mr. Edouard Benes.

The Agenda Paper calls for the communication to the Allied and Associated Powers of the Conditions of Peace with Austria.

The PRESIDENT, after making a statement to the above effect, points out that the document¹ which he is laying on the table of the Conference only lacks the political clauses relating to Italy, the Military and the Reparation Clauses, which are, moreover, in an advanced stage. He adds that the Secretariat-General has received a certain number of amendments, and calls on Mr. Bratiano to speak.

MR. BRATIANO (Roumania) reads the following declarations :—

A

The Roumanian Delegation considers that the conclusion of Peace with Austria leaves no doubt whatever in regard to the union of Bukovina with Roumania. In point of fact, Roumania, having become by her Treaty of Alliance of the 17th August, 1916, a belligerent Power against Austria, saw Bukovina revert to her as a result of the dissolution of the Austrian Empire and in accordance with the wishes of its population. In this manner the mutilation of 1775 is remedied in respect of the whole of the territory torn from Moldavia.

Roumania, by adhering to the Act of Union proclaimed by Bukovina, is taking in hand the reconstitution of that province, ensuring its safety and arresting on the frontier of the Dniester the spread of anarchy which threatens a large area of Europe. At the cost of military sacrifices which have not yet approached their end, Roumania is watching over Bukovina and is also asserting her solidarity with the general interests of civilization.

B

In regard to Article 5, of Part 3, Section IV, of the Draft Treaty with Austria, concerning the treatment of minorities by Roumania, the Roumanian Delegation has the honor to make the following declaration :—

The first Roumanian Delegate, on the 27th May last, addressed the following letter to M. Berthelot, Chairman of the Commission entrusted with the task of fixing the nature of the guarantees which should be provided for the protection of minorities included in the new States which are in process of formation in Europe, as well as

¹ The draft texts to which reference is made in the discussions of the Plenary Session of May 31, 1919, do not accompany Protocol No. 8.

those in other States which are about to receive accretions of territory:—

“Sir,

“In reply to the letter which you were so good as to address to me on the 23rd May last, I have the honor to inform you that Roumania has assured to all her citizens, without distinction of race or religion, complete equality both of rights and of political and religious liberties. She regards as a Roumanian citizen any individual born in Roumania, but not enjoying any foreign nationality, as well as the inhabitants of the territories newly united to Roumania, who were subjects of the States to which those territories hitherto belonged, with the exception of those who have expressed their desire to opt for a different allegiance.

“Indeed, the Royal Government, in accordance with its principles and in agreement with the representatives of Transylvania, Bessarabia, and Bukovina, have likewise decided to ensure the rights and liberties of minorities throughout the whole extent of the new kingdom by a wide administrative decentralization such as will guarantee to populations of different racial origin their free development in the matter of language, education, and the exercise of their religion.

“Generally speaking, Roumania is ready to accept any arrangements which all the States belonging to the League of Nations would admit on their own territories in this connection.

“In all other circumstances Roumania would in no case be able to admit any interference by any foreign Governments in the application of her domestic laws.”

In this letter Roumania expresses her intention to give the widest recognition to the liberties of ethnical or confessional minorities. Her Delegates, taking their stand on these principles, voted, on the occasion of the constitution of the League of Nations, in favor of the guarantees suggested for the whole group of States which compose the League; outside these general principles, however, Roumania would be unable to consent to stipulations of a nature to limit her rights as a sovereign State, and in this connection she considers the rights of States to be the same for all.

In the very interest which the founders of the League of Nations necessarily possess in avoiding any inconsistency as regards the great principles by which the League is animated, it is essential that the leading members of that institution should abstain from any attitude which would not be identic towards all States.

Foreign intervention, as a matter of fact, even if it granted no liberties beyond those which the Roumanian State is determined to guarantee to all its citizens, might compromise the work of fraternization which the Roumanian Government has taken as its aim.

On the one hand, certain minorities might consider themselves absolved from all gratitude towards the State, whereas it is pre-

cisely on the development of that sentiment that the State relies for cementing the brotherhood of the various races; on the other hand a tendency would arise towards the creation of two classes of citizens in the same kingdom: the one trusting in the care of the State for their interests, the other disposed to be hostile to the State and to seek protection outside its frontiers.

History is there to prove that the protection of minorities, regarded from this point of view, has done more to disintegrate States than to consolidate them. At the present moment the Conference of the Allies is bound to endeavor to establish, on the basis of fraternity between peoples, the countries whose development is destined to ensure peace in Central and Southern Europe. Moreover, these same Allies, when the draft of the League of Nations was under discussion, withdrew Article 21, of which the following is the tenor:—

“The High Contracting Parties agree to state that no obstacle shall be placed in the way of the free exercise of every belief, religion, or opinion, the practice of which is not incompatible with public order and morality, and that, within their respective jurisdictions, no one shall be disturbed in his life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness by reason of his adhesion to such belief, religion, or opinion.”

Because it was thought that this Article infringed State sovereignty, Roumania determined, in the interests of liberty and justice for all, as well as in that of her own internal development, to safeguard the rights of minorities; as an independent State she does not claim any exceptional treatment for herself, but she cannot, on the other hand, accept a special régime to which other sovereign States are not subjected.

For this reason she declares her readiness to insert in the draft Treaty, Article 5, Part 3, Section IV, the following text:

“Roumania grants to all minorities of language, race, and religion residing within her new frontiers rights equal to those which belong to other Roumanian citizens.”

C

As regards the second paragraph of Article 5, Part 2, Section IV of the draft Treaty with Austria, Roumania states that she is prepared to take every measure for the purpose of facilitating transit and developing trade with other nations.

She will accept all the measures of a general character adopted in this connection by the League of Nations and rendered applicable to all of the States composing the League, as well as those adopted by the various special Commissions of the Peace Conference to which the Roumanian Delegates have given their adhesion.

D

In agreeing to adhere to the stipulations set forth in the draft Treaty with Austria—subject to the reservations stated in the attached declarations—Roumania has been animated by the desire of maintaining her solidarity with the Allies. However, while giving her adhesion, she finds herself compelled to state that it must not be inferred therefrom that she will acquiesce in all similar principles which may be embodied in the Treaties with other enemy States.

E

Proposals concerning the Financial Clauses:—

1. In Article 2, last paragraph, substitute for the words “in the currency of the creditor State” the words “in crowns, gold.”

2. In Article 10, leave to each interested State the right of fixing the periods within which it will stamp or repay the currency notes, this being a matter of domestic concern. Each State, being acquainted with its own capacities, is in a better position to fix the periods of time for effecting these operations.

3. In regard to the liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, the Roumanian Delegation is of opinion that, in view of the small amount of the available assets of this Bank, if the securities deposited by the Austrian and Hungarian Governments as cover for the currency notes issued up till the 27th October, 1918, inclusive, are, as stipulated in Article 10, likewise cancelled, the cover remaining for those notes would be so reduced that the latter would scarcely have any value. Such a situation would bring about too heavy a charge from the Roumanian point of view.

The Roumanian Delegation therefore thinks it just to request that no such cancellation should take place.

4. The Roumanian Delegation states afresh that it considers neither as just nor as in conformity with the principles of international law that the cedee States of territories of the former Austrian Empire, or those formed as a result of that Empire's dismemberment, should be obliged to pay the value of the goods and properties which belonged to the Government of the former Austrian Empire and are situated on their respective territories.

The PRESIDENT explains that the Financial Clauses will be referred to the Drafting Committee for an immediate report. He then adds:—

“As far as territory properly speaking is concerned, it must of course be understood that, whether regarded as the League of Nations or as separate Governments, we are unable to guarantee any portions

of territory other than those which we have ourselves assigned, and that it is impossible for us to guarantee others.

"I am very glad to know that, as regards the rights of minorities, Mr. Bratiano's opinion coincides precisely with our own. What we have to ascertain is whether in view of the past history of several peoples it may not be necessary to give, I will not say additional guarantees, but such guarantees of a more complete nature as may be admitted to be necessary. That is a question in regard to which we have got to take a decision, and I beg Mr. Bratiano and anyone else who may have observations of a like character to offer, to rest assured that there is no intention of humiliating anyone or of encroaching on the sovereign rights of any nations whatsoever, but rather to remember that, in the matter of minorities, everyone's history has not been quite the same. Some distinctions are necessary in this connection, so much so that we desire to humiliate no one when we suggest conferring a right of control, not on foreign governments, as Mr. Bratiano states in his text, but on the League of Nations, whose control we all accept in our own territory in the circumstances to which Mr. Bratiano has alluded.

"In this matter, therefore, there is no question of humiliating anyone or of encroaching on anyone's sovereignty."

MR. KLOTZ (France) points out that the Financial Clauses and those concerned with Reparation, are altogether inter-dependent. As the Reparation Clauses have not been included in the text to be communicated to the Austrians on the following Monday, he proposes that a like decision shall be taken in respect of the Financial Clauses.

MR. BRATIANO (Roumania) points out that, according to the text distributed, the small States are to be controlled, not by the League of Nations, but by the Great Powers; the text reads: "Roumania likewise adheres to the insertion in a Treaty with the principal Allied and Associated Powers of the measures which those Powers may consider necessary for the protection in Roumania of the interests of the inhabitants, &c. . . ."

It is, therefore, the Great Powers which are to intervene in order to safeguard the rights of minorities within the Kingdom of Roumania. That is the principle against which the modification proposed by Mr. Bratiano is made, because Roumania was an independent country before the war, and he cannot believe that her attitude during the war can have warranted in the slightest degree any derogation from that political independence.

The PRESIDENT admits that Mr. Bratiano's observation in regard to control being exercised by the Governments, in the place of the League of Nations, is in accordance with the text. He does not, however,

think that it can be humiliating for Roumania to receive friendly counsel given her by States which are named, the United States of America, Great Britain, Italy, and France. No one of these States desires to exercise any improper power in Roumania. He adds that rectifications of historical traditions which have been perpetuated in certain countries have been requested for a long time past, even in other Treaties, but it has been impossible to secure them. In these circumstances the text under criticism is rather in the nature of an encouragement and support.

MR. BRATIANO (Roumania), in order to justify the statement which he has read out, expresses himself in the following terms:—

“As I do not wish to waste the time of the Conference, I will refrain from any complete explanation of Roumania’s policy in the past. I must, however, say that she does not deserve the situation which it is sought to impose on her to-day. In any case, we stand here—at least, we have always understood it in that way—before the Conference of the Allied and Associated Powers which have striven to establish the right to equality of great and small States, and to set up rules which may henceforth serve both as principles and precedents. Among those rules there are some in virtue of which it is sought to-day to establish classes of States which differ in the matter of sovereignty. On behalf of Roumania I am unable to admit this principle. There is no question here of friendly counsel, but of formal engagements. The Roumanian Government will always be willing to accept such advice, but counsels which are recorded in Treaties and in the form of precise engagements between one Government and another cease to have the character of advice.

“History supplies us with precedents in this connection: the Russians, for instance, interfered in the policy of Turkey for the protection of Christians, but the result so far as Turkey is concerned has been her dissolution. Such an attitude naturally commanded our sympathy, but it could only be logical if its final aim was to secure the independence of these peoples.

“Except with this object in view, it is not possible, in the interests either of States or of minorities, to accept a rule of this nature. As I had the honor to state in the short summary which I read to you just now, we desire, together with you, to set up a new world to take the place of the old one. This new world must be established in such manner as to enable States to find in the persons of their citizens devoted sons and a life of brotherly concord. If minorities are conscious of the fact that the liberties which they enjoy are guaranteed to them, not by the solicitude for their welfare of the State to which they belong,

but by the protection of a foreign State, whatever it may be, the basis of that State will be undermined. At the very basis of the new state of things which it is sought to establish, the seed is being sown of unrest, which is in contradiction with the aims which this conference pursues.

"Gentlemen, it is on behalf not only of the independence of the Roumanian State, but also of the two great principles which this Conference represents, that I have given expression to these remarks; one of those principles is that of peace, order and fraternity among the peoples of the same State, while the other is that of the equality of all States, both great and small, in respect of their rights of domestic legislation. Those are the reasons for which I request you, on behalf of Roumania, not to impose conditions on her which she could not accept."

As Mr. Bratiano has declared his acceptance of Mr. Klotz's proposal, the PRESIDENT states that his observations will be subjected to fresh examination by the heads of Governments, and thereupon calls on Mr. Paderewski to speak.

MR. PADEREWSKI (Poland) explains the point of view of the Polish Delegation as follows:—

"Poland has submitted her remarks in writing as regards the financial questions; but as these questions are to be considered in connection with the Reparation Clauses, I will refrain from speaking on that subject.

"On the other hand, I state, on behalf of the Polish Government, that Poland will grant to all minorities of race, language and religion, the same rights as she does to her other nationals. She will assure to those minorities all the liberties which have already been or may be granted to them by the great Nations and States of the West, and she will be ready to amplify those rights in the same degree as the League of Nations may consider desirable for the States which compose it.

"I am convinced that these guarantees when once incorporated in the fundamental laws of Poland by her Constituent Diet, will be in absolute harmony with the noble and lofty spirit which animates the great labors of the Peace Conference.

"That is all I have to say."

In reply to a question by the President, Mr. Paderewski states that his proposals as regards the property of nationals have already been made in writing, and that he has no further request to make.

MR. KRAMAR (Czecho-Slovakia) states that he is quite satisfied that the Financial Clauses should be dealt with in the same way as the Reparation Clauses; the question of the claim to State property

belongs to the Financial Clauses, and he will therefore now confine himself to presenting his remarks in writing. Mr. Kramar thereupon expresses a wish to say a few words in regard to a question concerned with the frontiers in the Czecho-Slovak State, and proceeds to do so in the following terms:—

“In the Frontier Commissions we were not in a position to discuss the question, namely, that of the Station of Gmund, which was rebuilt a few years ago and moved further to the south. In view of this there might well be misunderstandings, unless the frontier be clearly defined.

“I propose to substitute for the proposed text the words ‘by the extreme easterly point of the railway bridge.’ Such a modification would not be in any way out of accord with the ideas of the Frontier Commission, while it would avoid considerable inconvenience.”

As this question has not yet been submitted to a competent Commission, it is decided, after an exchange of remarks between the President, Mr. Kramar and Mr. Jules Cambon, that the two last named gentlemen shall come to an agreement for the Commission to draw up a report as soon as the Conference adjourns.

MR. KRAMAR (Czecho-Slovakia) resumes his statement in the following terms:

“As regards minorities, I accept the proposed text, subject to some slight modifications. I request the deletion of two words which, in my opinion, are quite useless and might, on the other hand, cause us considerable inconvenience because people would consider our situation to be quite different from that which the President has indicated. We are ready to do everything possible for minorities in order to have peace at home, and we are perfectly ready to deal with this question together with the Great Powers. However, there are three words which I consider quite useless. It is stated:—

“‘Czecho-Slovakia agrees to incorporate in the Treaty with the principal Allied and Associated Powers all measures which may be regarded as necessary for the protection in Czecho-Slovakia of the interests of the inhabitants who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion. . . .’

“I ask for the deletion of the words ‘which may be regarded as necessary,’ because they are superfluous and even rather wounding to our feeling of independence. The result will be the same if they are omitted. It goes without saying that the Great Powers possess sufficient authority to ensure our acceptance of what we may be able to concede without fear for the sovereignty of our State; but there is no advantage in saying so in the Treaty.”

The PRESIDENT: If you will kindly underline the three words which you ask should be deleted and give me the text, I will bring it to the notice of the Assembly.

MR. KRAMAR (Czecho-Slovakia): I shall have a few amendments to bring forward to the clauses submitted to us, which are very difficult for foreigners to understand. I shall not, however, press these points, because the Drafting Committee will no doubt examine the question and our amendments with the courteous attention to which we are accustomed.

We wish, for instance, to give the Germans of Bohemia the right to opt for Austrian nationality, whereas, according to the text under consideration, that would not be altogether possible.

The other modifications which we propose are of a similar character to this one, and are designed to make the text clearer.

The PRESIDENT having inquired whether the Drafting Committee would be ready to make a very early report, MR. FROMAGEOT states that the Committee has already sent a note on the subject to the Supreme Council.

The PRESIDENT points out that agreement has been reached in regard to the Financial Clauses, and calls on Mr. Trumbitch to speak.

MR. TRUMBITCH (Serb-Croat-Slovene State), expresses himself as follows:—

“The Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation has had the honor to deposit with the Bureau of the Conference proposals for the modification of certain clauses, especially in regard to the questions of minorities, of freedom of transit and commerce, of our northern frontier, and of the Financial and Economic Clauses.

“I will not concern myself with the Financial and Economic Clauses, as that is not necessary, in view of the declarations which have already been made by Mr. Klotz.

“As regards the question of minorities I must make substantially much the same observations as Mr. Kramar. We should like to delete certain words from the official draft and say that ‘the Serb-Croat-Slovene State undertakes to determine in agreement with the principal Allied and Associated Powers, the necessary measures for protecting within the territories formerly belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and ceded by the present Treaty to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, the interests of minorities.’ The difference between the two texts is clear.”

The PRESIDENT: Is that the Serbian and Czecho-Slovakian claim?

MR. TRUMBITCH (Serb-Croat-Slovene State): The Serbian claim is identical with that of the Czecho-Slovak State. I will hand you, Mr. President, the text of our new proposal. Our request is that the

principal Powers should come to an understanding with us for the insertion by common agreement of these provisions in a general Treaty.

The second question to which I should wish to call your attention is the limitation of the text as regards minorities to the territories formerly belonging to Austria-Hungary. We ask you not to extend that limitation to Serbia. The reason is clear: Serbia was an independent State; she had certain acquired rights; to-day it is not desirable to impose on former Serbian territories certain clauses which might interfere with the sovereign rights which she possessed as a State existing before the war.

I beg leave to offer you, Sir, the precise drafting which we should wish you to accept.

The second question relates to the northern frontier of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. We are under the impression that the text in regard to this frontier is not sufficiently clear or accurate. The first draft assigned the town of Radkersburg to the Yugo-Slav State; whereas in the final draft that is no longer the case. The text, therefore, lacks in clearness, as it is impossible to know whether Radkersburg will belong to the Yugo-Slav State or remain in Austria.

Carinthia was the subject of a question raised in the territorial Commission on the 21st May. In regard to Prekmurje, we have put forward a fresh draft, the substance of which is as follows.

In the Treaty of Peace with Austria we read in Part II, Frontier of Austria 30, Article 1, 2 and 3, that the frontier between Austria and Yugo-Slavia, so far as it is to be drawn between the eastern extremity of the Austro-Italian frontier (to be determined later on) and Hill 1054 at Stroina, will be fixed ultimately by the principal Allied and Associated Powers. From Stroina onwards, the frontier will be either a line to be fixed on the ground, or the Drave below its confluence with the Lavandt and passing by Hill 1522, or (as is stated in the Summary on page 2) a line passing just to the east of Bleiburg and crossing the Drave just above its confluence with the Lavandt. In Part III, paragraph 5, Section 2, Article 4, we find the remark: "Klagenfurt is reserved."

The Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State declares that these provisions do not take account either of its claims or of the minimum demands with which it acquainted the Territorial Commission. The point as regards Stroina and Bleiburg actually opens up a prospect which is in direct contradiction with the claims of the Delegation. Our Delegation is under the discouraging impression that it is sought to exclude the Serb-Croat-Slovene State from Carinthia; in fact, none of our numerous proposals have been taken into consideration. Now, even according to the Austrian statistics,

about 100,000 Slovenes reside on the territories in question; there is nothing, therefore, to prevent an equitable solution.

The Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation notices with regret that the Allied and Associated Powers have not taken this request into account, even to the extent which the Germans themselves had, as is proved by the book "*Staatsgrenze des Karntengebiets (1919)*" ("*State Frontiers of the Carinthia Territory*"). The Delegation therefore considers itself compelled to call the urgent attention of the Great Powers to the untenable situation in which the Slovene people would be placed if the loss of Slovene Carinthia were added to its sacrifices in the Adriatic. The soul of the Slovene people would never recover from this blow, while a constant ferment of irredentism would hinder the peaceful development of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and would become a perpetual source of hostile feelings towards German Austria.

The Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation must therefore make a final appeal to the Conference in order to secure the definite assignment of the territory situated above the line fixed in Annex I and traced on the map Styria-Prekmurje.

In Part II, already mentioned, the Mur may be considered as a natural frontier up to its meeting with the frontier between Austria and Hungary, whereas, according to our Delegation, that formula would involve the exclusion from the Serb-Croat-Slovene kingdom of the region of Radkersburg.

Finally, we call the attention of the Great Powers to the fact that, in Section 4 of Part II of the Treaty with Hungary, the determination of the point from which the frontier between Austria-Hungary starts is inaccurate, because it leaves out of account the fact that Prekmurje is to form part of the Serb-Croat-Slovene kingdom. The same is the case in the Summary on page 3.

I have the honor to state that our Delegation urges this proposal, and I beg this high Assembly to give the matter its favorable consideration.

MR. TARDIEU (France) offers the following explanation: As regards Radkersburg, it is an actual mistake in the text of the old proof which warrants Mr. Trumbitch's remark. The line of the frontier has been rectified as he wishes.

As regards the rest of Prekmurje, there is no need to mention it in the Treaty with Austria, because, except the little corner of Radkersburg, Prekmurje is Hungarian territory. Provisions in regard to Prekmurje will be inserted in the Treaty with Hungary.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, speaking in English, makes the following speech:—

"Mr. President, I should be very sorry to see this meeting adjourn with permanent impressions such as it is possible may have been created by some of the remarks that our friends have made. I should be very sorry to have the impression lodged in your minds that the Great Powers desire to assume or play any arbitrary rôle in these great matters, or presume, because of any pride of authority, to exercise an undue influence in these matters, and therefore I want to call your attention to one aspect of these questions which has not been dwelt upon.

"We are trying to make a peaceful settlement, that is to say, to eliminate those elements of disturbance, so far as possible, which may interfere with the peace of the world, and we are trying to make an equitable distribution of territories according to the race, the ethnographical character of the people inhabiting them.

"And back of that lies this fundamentally important fact that, when the decisions are made, the Allied and Associated Powers guarantee to maintain them. It is perfectly evident, upon a moment's reflection, that the chief burden of their maintenance will fall upon the Great Powers. The chief burden of the war fell upon the Greater Powers, and, if it had not been for their action, their military action, we would not be here to settle these questions. Therefore, we must not close our eyes to the fact that in the last analysis the military and naval strength of the Great Powers will be the final guarantee of the peace of the world.

"In those circumstances is it unreasonable and unjust that, not as dictators but as friends, the Great Powers should say to their associates: 'We cannot afford to guarantee territorial settlements which we do not believe to be right, and we cannot agree to leave elements of disturbance unremoved, which we believe will disturb the peace of the world'?

"Take the rights of minorities. Nothing, I venture to say, is more likely to disturb the peace of the world than the treatment which might in certain circumstances be meted out to minorities. And therefore, if the Great Powers are to guarantee the peace of the world in any sense, is it unjust that they should be satisfied that the proper and necessary guarantees have been given?

"I beg our friends from Roumania and from Serbia to remember that while Roumania and Serbia are ancient sovereignties the settlements of this Conference are greatly adding to their territories. You cannot in one part of our transactions treat Serbia alone and in all of the other parts treat the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes as a different entity, for they are seeking the recognition of this Conference as a single entity, and if this Conference is going to recognize these various Powers as new sovereignties within definite territories,

the chief guarantors are entitled to be satisfied that the territorial settlements are of a character to be permanent, and that the guarantees given are of a character to ensure the peace of the world.

"It is not, therefore, the intervention of those who would interfere, but the action of those who would help. I beg that our friends will take that view of it, because I see no escape from that view of it.

"How can a Power like the United States, for example—for I can speak for no other—after signing this Treaty, if it contains elements which they do not believe will be permanent, go three thousand miles away across the sea and report to its people that it has made a settlement of the peace of the world? It cannot do so. And yet there underlies all of these transactions the expectation on the part, for example, of Roumania and of Czecho-Slovakia and of Serbia, that if any covenants of this settlement are not observed, the United States will send her armies and her navies to see that they are observed.

"In those circumstances is it unreasonable that the United States should insist upon being satisfied that the settlements are correct? Mr. Bratiano—and I speak of his suggestions with the utmost respect—suggested that we could not, so to say, invade the sovereignty of Roumania, an ancient sovereignty, and make certain prescriptions with regard to the rights of minorities. But I beg him to observe that he is overlooking the fact that he is asking the sanction of the Allied and Associated Powers for great additions of territory which come to Roumania by the common victory of arms, and that, therefore, we are entitled to say: 'If we agree to these additions of territory we have the right to insist upon certain guarantees of peace.'

"I beg my friend Mr. Kramar, and my friend Mr. Trumbitch, and my friend Mr. Bratiano, to believe that if we should feel that it is best to leave the words which they have wished to omit in the Treaty, it is not because we want to insist upon unreasonable conditions, but that we want the Treaty to accord to us the right of judgment as to whether these are things which we can afford to guarantee.

"Therefore the impressions with which we should disperse ought to be these, that we are all friends—of course, that goes without saying—but that we must all be associates in a common effort, and there can be no frank and earnest association in the common effort unless there is a common agreement as to what the rights and settlements are.

"Now, if the agreement is a separate agreement among groups of us, that does not meet the object. If you should adopt the language suggested by the Czecho-Slovakian Delegation and the Serbian Delegation—the Yugo-Slav Delegation—that it should be left to negotiation between the principal Allied and Associated Powers and their several Delegates, that would mean that after this whole Conference is adjourned groups of them would determine what is to be the basis

of the peace of the world. It seems to me that that would be a most dangerous idea to entertain, and therefore I beg that we may part with a sense, not of interference with each other, but of hearty and friendly co-operation upon the only possible basis of guarantee. Where the great force lies, there must be the sanction of peace. I sometimes wish, in hearing an argument like this, that I were the representative of a small Power, so that what I said might be robbed of any mistaken significance, but I think you will agree with me that the United States has never shown any temper of aggression anywhere, and it lies in the heart of the people of the United States, as I am sure it lies in the hearts of the peoples of the other Great Powers, to form a common partnership of right, and to do service to our associates and no kind of disservice."

MR. BRATIANO (Roumania) then makes the following speech:—

"The eminent personality of President Wilson invests both his words and his advice with a specially authoritative character. I beg leave, in the name of the great principles which the President himself has proclaimed, to call his friendly attention to the apprehension lest the application in certain instances of principles, even with the best intentions, may bring about results precisely in contradiction with the end in view.

"As I said, there must emerge from the labors of this Conference results which do not admit of discussion. The Conference has accomplished a great work of justice; it has set up, not only guarantees against the enemy, but also equality of rights for all States, great and small. If principles such as those which it is sought to embody to-day in the Treaty with Austria had been inserted in the Statutes of the League of Nations, we should not have raised any objection. President Wilson will certainly admit that the Roumanian Delegation voted in favor of these principles being established once for all and as applicable to all. To act as it is proposed to act in the present Treaty means the establishment of varying degrees of sovereignty. Notwithstanding the feelings of friendship and profound admiration which I entertain for the Italian people, I am unable to conceive why, in identical circumstances, countries like Roumania or Serbia should be treated differently from Italy.

"On the other hand, as I have likewise had the honor to explain, we are seeking to establish a life of brotherhood between the peoples which are compelled by their geographical situation to form themselves into a single State. It would be a cardinal error to make these friendly relations dependent on a third party, whatever it be.

"Further, we must not lose sight of the fact, even though men imbued with these principles are at the head of the Governments

of the present Great Powers, it is quite possible that political evolutions will bring about the representation of those same States by other men, or that new interests may arise such as to make certain Governments deviate from their former attitude and involve them in actions of which the mainspring will not reside in these great principles, but rather in certain special interests.

"It is undeniable that the Great Powers, by their sacrifices, have made certain the victory of the great cause common to us all. I may be permitted to add to the words pronounced by the President—words for which I thank him on behalf of all the small States—when he asserted that we can rely henceforward on the solicitude for our welfare of the great political factors, and that he wishes to guarantee the security of all of us; but I will add that the responsibility of each State in matters of independence and security nevertheless remains just as entire, whatever be its extent.

"Thus, at the present moment, Roumania is compelled to provide with her own troops for the defence, not only of her own frontiers, but also of a cause which is a matter of concern for the whole of Central Europe. Therefore, even though the Great Powers have a more important part to play, in proportion to their size, the responsibility and duties of independent States, whatever their size, remain undiminished.

"I beg the Representatives of the Great Powers, and especially President Wilson, not to limit those responsibilities by a dangerous application of the principles which are dear to us all.

"It needs no effort to secure the recognition of the rights of minorities. There is no single State represented here which is not convinced of the necessity for respecting and developing those liberties; therefore, allow these States to develop themselves in the only atmosphere likely to render possible the consolidation of the general political state which we are here to establish to-day.

"Such are the feelings, alike of respect and gratitude for the services which they have rendered, which animate me in earnestly praying the Great Powers to examine, with all the attention demanded by such important principles, the proposals and declarations made by the Roumanian Government; it is necessary that these proposals should be accepted, for otherwise Roumania would no longer preserve in its entirety the independence which she enjoyed in the past for the settlement of her domestic concerns."

MR. VENISELOS (Greece) offers a few remarks in the following terms:—

"I beg leave to remark most respectfully that the clauses under discussion do not necessarily form an essential part of the Treaty of

Peace with Austria. I should wish, therefore, to suggest to you the desirability, after detaching those clauses, of communicating on Monday the remainder of the Conditions of Peace with Austria and referring those clauses to examination by the Heads of the Five Great Powers at a special meeting in conjunction with the Heads of the Powers with limited interests which are specially concerned. There would thus be nine or ten persons in all seated at one table, who would certainly find some means of allaying the legitimate uneasiness of the Powers with limited interests, while giving satisfaction to the Great Powers.

"If you think it necessary to embody those clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Austria, we shall have sufficient time, up till the day before the signature of the Treaty—since these clauses do not concern Austria—to formulate them and insert them in the Treaty in order to obviate the drafting of a special Treaty for matters which concern the Powers with limited interests."

The PRESIDENT: Mr. Veniselos' proposal will, of course, be examined together with those which have already been submitted.

The Agenda being disposed of, the Session is adjourned at 17 o'clock (5 p. m.).

The President,
G. CLEMENCEAU.

The Secretary-General,
P. DUTASTA.

The Secretaries,
J. C. GREW,
M. P. A. HANKEY,
PAUL GAUTHIER,
ALDROVANDI,
SADAO SABURI.

THE PEACE CONGRESS:
MINUTES OF THE PLENARY SESSIONS

THE PEACE CONGRESS: MINUTES OF THE PLENARY SESSIONS

Paris Peace Conf. 180 0201/9

Peace Congress (Versailles), Protocol No. 1, Plenary Session of May 7, 1919

The Presentation of the Conditions of Peace to the German Delegates

The German Delegates, their credentials having been verified and found to be in good and due form, were invited to go to the Trianon Palace (Versailles) on the 7th May, at 15 o'clock (3 p. m.), there to have the Conditions of Peace communicated to them.

On the appointed day, the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers, hereinafter enumerated, meet in the Conference Room, and thereupon the German Plenipotentiaries are ushered in.

The session is then opened at 15 o'clock (3 p. m.) under the presidency of Mr. Georges Clemenceau, President.

PRESENT

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

The President of the United States.
Honorable Robert Lansing, Secretary of State.

Honorable Henry White, formerly Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris and Rome.

Honorable Edward M. House.

General Tasker H. Bliss, Military Representative of the United States on the Supreme War Council.

FOR THE BRITISH EMPIRE :

GREAT BRITAIN :

The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George, M. P., First Lord of the Treasury and Prime Minister.

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law, M. P., Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons.

The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes, M. P., Minister without Portfolio.

The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Ward, Bt., K. C. M. G., Minister of Finance and Posts of New Zealand.

Dominions and India :

CANADA :

The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert L. Borden, G. C. M. G., K. C., Prime Minister.
The Hon. Arthur L. Sifton, Minister of Customs.

AUSTRALIA :

The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes, Prime Minister.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Cook, G. C. M. G., Minister for the Navy.

SOUTH AFRICA :

General the Rt. Hon. Louis Botha, Prime Minister of the Union.
Lieut.-General the Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts, K. C., Minister of Defense.

NEW ZEALAND :

The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey, Prime Minister.

INDIA:

The Rt. Hon. Lord Sinha, K. C.,
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of
State for India.
Major-General His Highness Sir
Ganga Singh Bahadur, Maharaja
of Bikaner, G. C. S. I., G. C. I. E.,
G. C. V. O., K. C. B., A. D. C.

FOR FRANCE:

Mr. Georges Clemenceau, President
of the Council, Minister of War.
Mr. Pichon, Minister for Foreign
Affairs.
Mr. L. L. Klotz, Minister of Finance.
Mr. A. Tardieu, Commissioner-
General for Franco-American Mil-
itary Affairs.
Mr. Jules Cambon, Former Amba-
sador Extraordinary and Plenipo-
tentiary of France.
Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief
of the Allied Armies.

FOR ITALY:

Mr. V. E. Orlando, President of the
Council of Ministers, Minister of
the Interior.
Baron S. Sonnino, Minister for
Foreign Affairs.
Mr. S. Crespi, Minister of Food.

FOR JAPAN:

Marquis Saionji, formerly Presi-
dent of the Council of Ministers.
Baron Makino, Member of the
Diplomatic Advisory Council,
formerly Minister for Foreign
Affairs.
Viscount Chinda, Ambassador Ex-
traordinary and Plenipotentiary of
His Majesty the Emperor of
Japan at London.
Mr. K. Matsui, Ambassador Extraor-
dinary and Plenipotentiary of
His Majesty the Emperor of
Japan at Paris.
Mr. H. Ijuin, Ambassador Extraor-
dinary and Plenipotentiary of His
Majesty the Emperor of Japan at
Rome.

FOR BELGIUM:

Mr. Hymans, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Minister of State.
Mr. Van den Heuvel, Minister of
State, Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary of His
Majesty the King of the Belgians.
Mr. Vandervelde, Minister of Justice,
Minister of State.

FOR BRAZIL:

Mr. Epitacio Pessoa, formerly Min-
ister of State, formerly Member
of the Supreme Court of Justice,
Federal Senator.
Mr. Pandia Calogeras, Deputy, for-
merly Minister of Finance.

FOR CHINA:

Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang, Minister for
Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Cheng-ting Thomas Wang, for-
merly Minister of Agriculture and
Commerce.

FOR CUBA:

Mr. Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante,
Dean of the Faculty of Law in the
University of Havana, President
of the Cuban Society of Interna-
tional Law.

FOR GREECE:

Mr. Eleftherios Venizelos, President
of the Council of Ministers.
Mr. Nicolas Politis, Minister for
Foreign Affairs.

FOR GUATEMALA:

Mr. Manuel Mendez, formerly Min-
ister of Public Works
and Public Instruction; Envoy Ex-
traordinary and Minister Plenipo-
tentiary of Guatemala at Wash-
ington; Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary on Spe-
cial Mission at Paris.

FOR HAITI:

Mr. Tertullien Guilbaud, Envoy Ex-
traordinary and Minister Plenipo-
tentiary of Haiti at Paris.

FOR THE HEDJAZ:

(Absent.)

FOR HONDURAS:

Dr. Policarpo Bonilla, on Special
mission to Washington, formerly
President of the Republic of Hon-
duras, Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary.

FOR LIBERIA:

Hon. C. D. B. King, Secretary of
State.

FOR NICARAGUA:

Mr. Salvador Chamorro, President of the Chamber of Deputies.

FOR PANAMA:

Mr. Antonio Burgos, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Panama at Madrid.

FOR POLAND:

Mr. Roman Dmowski, President of the Polish National Committee.
Mr. Ignace Paderewski, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

FOR PORTUGAL:

Dr. Affonso Costa, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.
Mr. Augusto Soares, formerly Minister for Foreign Affairs.

FOR ROUMANIA:

Mr. Jean J. C. Bratiano, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Nicolas Misu, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Roumania at London.

FOR SERBIA:

Mr. N. P. Pachitch, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.

Mr. Ante Trumbitch, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Milenko R. Vesnitch, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Serbia at Paris

FOR SIAM:

Prince Charoon, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Siam at Paris.

Prince Traidos Prabandhu, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

FOR THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC:

Mr. Charles Kramar, President of the Council of Ministers.
Mr. Edouard Benes, Minister for Foreign Affairs

FOR GERMANY:

Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Empire.
Dr. Landsberg, Minister of Justice of the Empire.
Mr. Giesberts, Minister of Posts of the Empire.

Dr. Leinert, President of the Prussian National Assembly.

Dr. Schücking
Dr. Karl Melchior.

The PRESIDENT, speaking in French, makes the following speech:—

"Gentlemen,

"This can be neither the time nor the place for superfluous words. You see before you the accredited Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, both small and great, which have waged without intermission for more than four years the pitiless war which was imposed on them. The hour has struck for the weighty settlement of our accounts. You asked us for peace. We are disposed to grant it to you. This volume, which the Secretary-General of the Conference will shortly hand to you, will tell you the conditions which we have fixed. Every facility which you may require for examining its text will be granted to you, including of course the usages of courtesy commonly practised among all civilized peoples.

"In order to acquaint you with another aspect of my thought, I am compelled to add that this Second Peace of Versailles, which is about to become the subject of our discussion, has been too dearly bought by the peoples represented here for us not to be unanimously

resolved to secure by every means in our power all the legitimate satisfactions which are our due.

"I will now make the Plenipotentiaries aware of the procedure in regard to discussions which has been adopted. If, thereupon, anyone desires to offer any remarks, he will, of course, be permitted to speak.

"There will be no oral discussions, and their observations must be furnished in writing. The German Plenipotentiaries have a period of fifteen days within which to hand in their written observations, both in French and English, on the Treaty as a whole, the headings of which are as follows:—

"League of Nations.

"Geographical boundaries of Germany.

"Political Clauses for Europe:

"Belgium, Luxembourg, Saar Basin, Alsace-Lorraine, Austria, Czecho-Slovak State, Poland, East Prussia, Denmark, Heligoland, Clauses in regard to Russia and Russian States, Recognition of new European States.

"Political Clauses for Countries outside Europe:

"General Renunciation Clause, Colonies, Siam, Liberia, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey and Bulgaria, Shantung.

"Military, Naval and Aerial Clauses.

"Prisoners of War.

"Responsibility and Penalties.

"Reparation and Restitution.

"Financial Clauses.

"Economical Clauses.

"Aerial Navigation.

"Ports, Waterways, Rivers and Railways.

"Organization of Labor.

"Guarantees and Occupation of territory.

"Final Clauses:

"Fulfilment of the Armistice; end of the war; state of peace.

"Before this period of fifteen days expires the German Delegates will be entitled to send their replies or to put questions in regard to these matters. The Supreme Council, after examining the observations which may be furnished within the period laid down, will send a written reply to the German Delegation, stating the period within which it must hand in its final reply on all questions.

"I will add that, when the Plenipotentiaries of the German Empire have given us a written reply, let us say within two, three, four, or five days, we shall of course not await the expiration of the fifteen days' delay before acquainting them in turn with our answer. In order to lose no time, the discussion will be started as soon as possible in the form which I have described.

"If anyone has remarks to make in this connection, we shall be at his disposal, as soon as this speech has been translated."

This speech is translated into English and German.

The text of the Conditions of Peace is handed to the principal German Plenipotentiary by the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference.

COUNT BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU (Germany) reads in German the following statement, which, at his request, is translated, sentence by sentence, first into French and then into English:—

“Gentlemen,

“We are deeply impressed with the lofty character of the task which has brought us together with you, namely, to give the world a speedy and enduring peace. We cherish no illusions as to the extent of our defeat—the degree of our impotence. We know that the might of German arms is broken. We know the force of the hatred which confronts us here, and we have heard the passionate demand that the victors should both make us pay as vanquished and punish us as guilty.

“We are required to admit that we alone are war-guilty; such an admission on my lips would be a lie. We are far from seeking to exonerate Germany from all responsibility for the fact that this world war broke out and was waged as it was. The attitude of the former German Government at the Hague Peace Conferences, their actions and omissions in the tragic twelve days of July, may have contributed to the calamity, but we emphatically combat the idea that Germany, whose people were convinced that they were waging a defensive war, should alone be laden with the guilt.

“None of us will wish to assert that the calamity dates only from the fateful moment when the Heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary fell a victim to the assassin’s hand. During the last fifty years the imperialism of all European States has chronically poisoned the international situation. The policy of retaliation and that of expansion as well as disregard of the rights of peoples to self-determination, contributed to the disease of Europe, which reached its crisis in the world war. The Russian mobilization deprived statesmen of the possibility of effecting a cure and placed the decision in the hands of the military authorities.

“Public opinion in all the countries of our adversaries is echoing with the crimes which Germany is alleged to have committed during the war. Here, again, we are ready to acknowledge wrong which has been done. We have not come here to belittle the responsibility of the men who conducted the war politically and economically, and to disown breaches of international law which have been actually committed. We repeat the declaration which was made in the German Reichstag at the beginning of the war: wrong has been done to Belgium and we wish to redress it.

"Moreover, as regards the methods of conducting the war, Germany was not alone at fault. Every European nation knows of deeds and persons on whose memory their best citizens are reluctant to dwell. I do not wish to answer reproaches with reproaches, but if it is from us that penance is demanded, then the Armistice must not be forgotten. Six weeks passed before we obtained it, and six months before we learnt your conditions of Peace. Crimes in war may not be excusable, but they are committed in the struggle for victory, in anxiety to preserve national existence, in a heat of passion which blunts the conscience of nations. The hundreds of thousands of non-combatants who have perished since the 11th November through the blockade were killed with cold deliberation, after victory had been won and assured to our adversaries. Think of that, when you speak of guilt and atonement.

"The measure of the guilt of all participants can only be determined by an impartial inquiry by a neutral Commission, before which all the principal actors in the tragedy should have their say, and to which all records should be disclosed. We have demanded such an inquiry and we repeat the demand.

"Though we stand alone at this Conference, without Allies, and confronted by our numerous adversaries, yet we are not defenseless. You yourselves have brought us an ally: Justice, which was guaranteed to us by the agreement relating to the bases of Peace.

"Between the 5th October and 5th November, 1918, the Allied and Associated Governments abandoned the idea of a peace of violence and inscribed the words 'Peace of Justice' on their banner. On the 5th October, 1918, the German Government put forward the principles of the President of the United States of America as a basis of Peace,¹ and was informed on the 5th November by Mr. Lansing, Secretary of State, that the Allied and Associated Powers had accepted this basis with two specific reservations.² President Wilson's principles therefore became binding upon both belligerent parties—upon you as well as upon us, and also upon our former allies.

"These principles taken individually demand of us grievous national and economic sacrifices; but the sacred and fundamental rights of all nations are protected by this agreement. The conscience of the world is behind it; no nation will be permitted to violate it with impunity.

"On this basis you will find us prepared to examine the Peace Preliminaries which you lay before us, with the fixed purpose of sharing with you the common task of rebuilding that which has been de-

¹ See note from the Swiss Chargé to President Wilson, October 6, 1918, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 337.

² See *ibid.*, p. 468.

stroyed, of righting the wrongs that have been done, first and foremost the wrong done to Belgium, and of pointing mankind to new goals of political and social progress. In view of the bewildering number of the problems which beset the fulfilment of our common purpose, we ought to refer the principal questions individually at the earliest possible moment to special Commissions of experts, for discussion on the basis of the draft presented by you. In this connection it will be our chief task to build up anew the shattered human energy of the nations concerned, by international protection of the life, health, and liberty of the working classes.

"I consider our next aim to be the restoration of the territory of Belgium and Northern France, which were occupied by us and devastated by the war. We solemnly accepted the obligation to do this, and are determined to carry it out to such extent as may be agreed upon between us. To do this we are thrown back on the co-operation of our former adversaries. We cannot complete the task without the technical and financial participation of the victors; you can only carry it through with our aid. It must be the desire of impoverished Europe that reconstruction should be carried out as successfully and economically as possible. This desire, however, can only be fulfilled by means of a clear and business-like understanding in regard to the best methods. The worst method would be to continue to have the work done by German prisoners of war. Such labor is certainly cheap. It would, however, cost the world dear, if hate and despair were aroused in the German people at the thought of their captive sons, brothers, and fathers continuing to languish in their former bondage after the Peace Preliminaries. We can attain to no enduring Peace without the immediate settlement of this question, which has dragged on far too long already.

"Our experts on both sides will have to study how the German people can best meet its obligation of financial reparation without breaking down under the heavy load. Such a collapse would deprive those entitled to compensation of the advantages to which they have a claim, and would entail irreparable confusion in European economic existence as a whole. Both victors and vanquished must be on their guard against this threatening danger and its incalculable consequences. There is only one way of warding it off: unreserved recognition of the economic and social solidarity of peoples, of a free and comprehensive League of Nations.

"Gentlemen, the lofty conception that the most terrible calamity in the history of the world should bring about the greatest advance in human progress has been formulated and will be realized. If the goal is to be attained, if the slain in this war are not to have died in vain, then the portals of the League of Nations must be thrown open to all peoples of good will.

"The German nation is earnestly prepared to accommodate itself to its hard lot, provided the foundations agreed upon for peace remain unshaken. A Peace which cannot be defended in the name of justice before the whole world would continually call forth fresh resistance. No one could sign it with a clear conscience, for it would be impossible of fulfilment. No one could undertake the guarantee of fulfilment which its signature would imply.

"We will examine the document submitted to us with all good will, and in the hope that the final result of our meeting can be subscribed by us all."

As nobody else asks leave to speak, the President declares the session adjourned at 16 o'clock (4 p. m.)

The President,
G. CLEMENCEAU.

The Secretary General,

P. DUTASTA,

The Secretaries,

J. C. GREW,

M. P. A. HANKEY,

PAUL GAUTHIER,

ALDROVANDI,

SADAO SABURI.

**Peace Congress (Versailles), Protocol No. 2, Plenary Session of
June 28, 1919**

*Signatures of the Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated
Powers and Germany*

The Plenipotentiaries of the Powers hereinafter enumerated met in the Galerie des Glaces at the Château de Versailles, in order to sign the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany. Their seals had been previously affixed to this instrument.

The Session is opened at 15 o'clock (3 p. m.) under the presidency of Mr. Georges Clemenceau, President.

PRESENT

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

The President of the United States.
Honorable Robert Lansing.
Honorable Henry White
Honorable Edward M. House.
General Tasker H. Bliss.

FOR THE BRITISH EMPIRE :

GREAT BRITAIN :

The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
The Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law.
The Rt. Hon. The Viscount Milner,
G. C. B., G. C. M. G., Secretary of
State for the Colonies.
The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes.

Dominions and India :

CANADA :

The Hon. C. J. Doherty, Minister of
Justice.
The Hon. Arthur L. Sifton.

AUSTRALIA :

The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Cook.

SOUTH AFRICA :

General the Rt. Hon. Louis Botha.
Lieut.-General the Rt. Hon. J. C.
Smuts.

NEW ZEALAND :

The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey.

INDIA :

The Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu, M. P.,
Secretary of State for India.
Major-General His Highness Sir
Ganga Singh, Bahadur, Maharaja
of Bikaner.

FOR FRANCE :

Mr. Georges Clemenceau.
Mr. Pichon.
Mr. L. L. Klotz.
Mr. A. Tardieu.
Mr. Jules Cambon.

FOR ITALY :

Baron S. Sonnino, Deputy.
The Marquis G. Imperiali, Senator,
Ambassador of His Majesty the
King of Italy at London.
Mr. S. Crespi, Deputy.

FOR JAPAN :

Marquis Saionji.
Baron Makino.
Viscount Chinda.
Mr. K. Matsui.
Mr. H. Ijuin.

FOR BELGIUM:

Mr. Hymans.
Mr. van den Heuvel.
Mr. Vandervelde.

FOR BOLIVIA:

Mr. Ismaël Montes, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia at Paris.

FOR BRAZIL:

Mr. Pandia Calogeras.
Mr. Rodrigo de Menezes, Professor of International Law at Rio de Janeiro.

FOR CUBA:

Mr. Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante.

FOR ECUADOR:

Mr. Dorn y de Alsua, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Ecuador at Paris.

FOR GREECE:

Mr. Eleftherios Venizelos.
Mr. Nicolas Politis.

FOR GUATEMALA:

Mr. Joaquín Mendéz.

FOR HAITI:

Mr. Tertullien Guilbaud.

FOR THE HEDJAZ:

Mr. Rustem Haïdar.
Mr. Abdul Hadi Aouni.

FOR HONDURAS:

Dr. Policarpo Bonilla.

FOR LIBERIA:

Hon. C. D. B. King.

FOR NICARAGUA:

Mr. Salvador Chamorro.

FOR PANAMA:

Mr. Antonio Burgos.

FOR PERU:

Mr. Carlos G. Candamo, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Peru at Paris.

FOR POLAND:

Mr. Roman Dmowski.
Mr. Ignace Paderewski.

FOR PORTUGAL:

Dr. Affonso Costa.
Mr. Augusto Soares.

FOR ROUMANIA:

Mr. Jean J. C. Brătianu.
General Constantin Coandă, Corps Commander, A. D. C. to the King, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.

FOR THE SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE:

Mr. N. P. Pachitch.
Mr. Ante Trumbitch.
Mr. Milenko R. Vesnitch.

FOR SIAM:

Prince Charoon.
Prince Traides Prabandhu.

FOR THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC:

Mr. Charles Kramar.
Mr. Edouard Benes.

FOR URUGUAY:

Mr. Jean Antonio Buero, Minister for Foreign Affairs, formerly Minister of Industry.

FOR GERMANY:

Mr. Hermann Müller, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Empire.
Dr. Bell, Minister of the Empire.

The PRESIDENT, speaking in French, explains the purpose of the meeting in the following terms:—

“Agreement has been reached in regard to the conditions of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and the German Empire.

“The text has been drawn up; the President of the Conference has certified in writing to the identity of the text to be signed with that

of the two hundred copies which were handed to the German Delegates.

"The signatures are about to be appended; they will signify an irrevocable undertaking to observe and carry out, loyally, faithfully, and integrally, all the conditions which have been laid down.

"I have therefore the honour to request the German Plenipotentiaries to be good enough to come and place their signatures on the Treaty which lies before me."

The President's speech is translated into English and German.

The Plenipotentiaries of Germany, and after them the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers, enumerated above, successively sign the Treaty of Peace, and the Protocol indicating precisely the conditions in which certain provisions of that Treaty are to be carried out.¹

The Plenipotentiaries of the United States of America, of Belgium, of the British Empire, and of France, of the one part, and of Germany of the other part, sign the Agreement with regard to the military occupation of the territories of the Rhine.

The Plenipotentiaries of the United States of America, of the British Empire, of France, of Italy, and of Japan, of the one part, and of Poland, of the other part, sign a Treaty in regard to Poland.

The PRESIDENT records the fact that these signatures have been appended in the following terms:—

"The signatures have all been given.

"The signature of the conditions of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and the German Empire is an accomplished fact."

The Agenda being disposed of, the Session is adjourned at 15.50 o'clock (3.50 p. m.)

The President,
G. CLEMENCEAU.

The Secretary General,

P. DUTASTA.

The Secretaries,

J. C. GREW,

PAUL GAUTHIER,

M. P. A. HANKEY,

G. DE MARTINO,

ASHIDA.

¹The texts of the instruments to which reference is made in this and subsequent paragraphs do not accompany the present Protocol No. 2 (Versailles). They are printed in Mallory, *Treaties, 1919-1923*, vol. III, as follows: Treaty of Peace, p. 3329; Protocol, p. 3522; Agreement With regard to the Military Occupation of the Territories of the Rhine, p. 3524; Treaty in regard to Poland, p. 3714.

**Peace Congress (Saint-Germain), Protocol No. 1, Plenary Session
of June 2, 1919**

*The Presentation of the Conditions of Peace to the Plenipotentiaries
of the Republic of Austria*

The Plenipotentiaries of the Republic of Austria, their Credentials having been verified and found to be in good and due form, were invited to come to the Château of Saint-Germain-en-Laye on the 2nd June, 1919, at noon, there to have the Conditions of Peace communicated to them.

On the appointed day, the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers, hereinafter enumerated, meet in the Congress Hall, and thereupon the Plenipotentiaries of the Republic of Austria are ushered in.

The Session is then opened at 12.30 p. m. under the presidency of Mr. Georges Clemenceau, President.

PRESENT

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

The President of the United States.
Honorable Robert Lansing, Secretary
of State.

Honorable Henry White, formerly
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the United
States at Rome and Paris.

General Tasker H. Bliss, Military
Representative of the United States
on the Supreme War Council.

FOR THE BRITISH EMPIRE :

GREAT BRITAIN :

The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George,
M. P., First Lord of the Treasury
and Prime Minister.

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M.,
M. P., Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs.

The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes, M. P.,
Minister without Portfolio.

The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Ward, Bt.,
K. C. M. G., Minister of Finance
and Posts of New Zealand.

Dominions and India :

CANADA :

The Rt. Hon. Sir George Foster,
G. C. M. G., Minister of Trade and
Commerce.

The Hon. C. J. Doherty, Minister of
Justice.

AUSTRALIA :

The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes, Prime
Minister.

The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Cook, G. C.
M. G., Minister for the Navy.

NEW ZEALAND

The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey, Prime
Minister.

INDIA :

The Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu, M. P.,
Secretary of State for India.

FOR FRANCE :

Mr. Georges Clemenceau, President
of the Council, Minister of War.

Mr. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. L. L. Klotz, Minister of Finance.
Mr. André Tardieu, Commissioner-General for Franco-American Military Affairs.

Mr. Jules Cambon, former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of France.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

FOR ITALY:

Mr. V. E. Orlando, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister of the Interior.

The Baron S. Sonnino, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Crespi, Minister of Food.

The Marquis G. Imperiali, Senator of the Kingdom, Ambassador of His Majesty the King of Italy at London.

Mr. S. Barzilai, Deputy, formerly Minister.

General A. Diaz, Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Army.

FOR JAPAN:

The Marquis Saionji, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.

The Baron Makino, formerly Minister for Foreign Affairs, Member of the Diplomatic Council.

Viscount Chinda, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at London.

Mr. K. Matsui, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at Paris.

Mr. H. Ijuin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at Rome.

FOR BELGIUM:

Mr. Hymans, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of State

Mr. Van den Heuvel, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of the Belgians, Minister of State.

Mr. Vandervelde, Minister of Justice, Minister of State.

FOR CHINA:

Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Cheng-ting Thomas Wang, formerly Minister of Agriculture and Commerce.

FOR CUBA:

Mr. Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante, Dean of the Faculty of Law in the University of Havana, President of the Cuban Society of International Law.

FOR ECUADOR:

Mr. Dorn y de Alsua, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Ecuador at Paris.

FOR GREECE:

Mr. Eleftherios Veniselos, President of the Council of Ministers.

Mr. Nicolas Politis, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

FOR GUATEMALA:

Mr. Joaquín Mendéz, formerly Minister of State for Public Works and Public Instruction; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Guatemala at Washington, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on Special Mission at Paris.

FOR THE HEDJAZ:

Mr. Rustem Haidar.

Mr. Abdul Hadi Aouni.

FOR LIBERIA:

Mr. H. F. Worley.

FOR NICARAGUA:

Mr. Salvador Chamorro, President of the Chamber of Deputies.

FOR PANAMA:

Mr. Antonio Burgos, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Panama at Madrid.

FOR POLAND:

Mr. Roman Dmowski, President of the Polish National Committee.

Mr. Ignace Paderewski, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

FOR PORTUGAL:

Dr. Affonso Costa, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.

Mr. Augusto Soares, formerly Minister for Foreign Affairs.

FOR ROUMANIA:

Mr. Jean J. C. Bratiano, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

General Constantin Coanda, Corps Commander, A. D. C. to the King, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.

FOR THE SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE KINGDOM:

Mr. N. P. Pachitch, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.

Mr. Ante Trumbitch, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Ivan Zolger, Professor of the Faculty of Law at the University of Zagreb.

FOR SIAM:

The Prince Charoon, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Siam at Paris.

Phya Bibadh Kosha, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

FOR THE CZECHO-SLOVAK STATE:

Mr. Charles Kramar, President of the Council of Ministers.

Mr. Edouard Benes, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA:

Mr. Karl Renner, Chancellor of the Austrian Republic.

Mr. Franz Auen, Permanent Representative of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Franz Peter, Director of the Legal Section of the Department for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Johann Andre Eichhoff, Political Director of the Department for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Richard Schuller, Economic Director of the Department for Foreign Affairs.

MR. CLEMENCEAU (President) makes the following speech:—

"Gentlemen,

"The Allied and Associated Powers have entrusted me with the duty of handing to you, the Plenipotentiaries of the Republic of Austria, the draft of the Treaty which has been the subject of our deliberations; not, indeed, the whole Treaty for I shall have to make some reservations in that connection, but at least its principal parts, which you will forthwith be able to consider.

"It has been decided that the discussion shall take place in writing. You will be good enough to transmit to us, in writing, such remarks as you may have to make in regard to the text laid before you. The replies thereto will similarly be sent in writing.

"You have a period of fifteen days within which to hand in your observations. It is, of course, understood that if, before that time, you are in a position to furnish documents, we shall receive them with pleasure and will immediately give our attention to any papers which you may be good enough to send us. You will understand, however, that your examination of the whole matter must take place within fifteen days time.

"Those are the conditions of procedure, and these are the documents communicated to you. They comprise the following subjects:

"Preamble.

"League of Nations.

"Frontiers of Austria.

"Political Clauses.

"Czecho-Slovak State,

"Political Clauses relating to certain European States,

"Protection of Minorities,

"General Provisions.

"Austrian Interests outside Europe.

"Naval and Aerial Clauses.

"Prisoners of War and Graves.

"Penalties.

"Economic Clauses.

"Aerial Navigation.

"Ports, Waterways and Railways.

"Labor.

"Miscellaneous Provisions.

"The text of the clauses mentioned hereafter will be handed to you later on, and as soon as possible:—

"1. Political Clauses (Italy).

"2. Financial Clauses.

"3. Reparation Clauses.

"4. Military Clauses.

"5. Clauses in regard to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom.

"The Supreme Council, after examining the observations handed in within the period which I have mentioned, will send a written reply to the Austrian Delegation, fixing the period within which it should send in a final reply in regard to the Treaty as a whole."

The Text of the Conditions of Peace is then handed to Mr. Renner by the Secretary-General.

The President's speech is translated into English, Italian and German.

MR. RENNER (Republic of Austria) reads the following statement in French:—

"The people of German Austria has awaited during a long and distressing period the advent of the day which should deliver it from uncertainty in regard to its future fate. We have been consumed with anxiety in expectation of the decisive hour; first of all because it would at last bring peace to our sorely-tried country, but also because it affords us an opportunity of explaining to this distinguished Assembly, whose authority runs throughout the whole world, who we are and what are the conditions in which we can hope to acquire the vitality necessary for an independent State.

"The Danubian Monarchy, with which the Allied and Associated Powers were at war and with which they concluded the Armistice, has ceased to exist. The 12th November, 1918 may be regarded as the date of its disappearance. From that day onwards there was no

longer a monarch, nor any Great Power for him to rule; the disastrous dualism exists no longer; there is no Government, either Austrian or Hungarian, no army, no institution whatever recognized as issuing from a public power. There only remained eight nations, bereft of all public organization, which, at a day's notice, have created their own Parliaments, Governments and armies, and thus formed States which reflect the peculiar genius of each one. Our young Republic has been constituted in the same way as all the other States; it is therefore, in no greater degree than they are, the successor of the former Monarchy. That fact is the direct origin of the fundamental contradiction which must be cleared up in the presence of this high Assembly.

"On the one hand it is impossible to dispute, from the point of view of international law, the judicious statements recently made by the President of the Congress, according to which it would be contrary to every principle of international law to seek to assert that a mere alteration of political régime or change of governors would suffice to extinguish an obligation once assumed by a nation. It follows therefore that all the territories, as well as the populations of the former Monarchy, might be held responsible for the consequences of the war into which they were forced, one and all, by their former governors. Thus both we and the other States which have arisen on the territories of the former Monarchy are heavily burdened by our respective share of the inheritance of the fallen Empire—an inheritance of war, of exhaustion and of crushing financial obligations. Now, our young Republic has rid itself of all the ambition to dominate other nations which inevitably brought about the downfall of the former Monarchy. Our Republic has likewise rid itself of all the reactionary traditions which had made that ancient Empire a prison for these peoples. It is but the unfortunate victim of the terrible crime committed in 1914, a crime of the former governors, but not of the peoples.

"On the other hand, the successor States have only been set up, from the point of view of international law, since the suspension of hostilities. The German-Austrian Republic itself has never declared war, nor made war on any one, nor found itself in the international position of a belligerent as against the Western Powers.

"Now, it cannot be maintained, from any point of view, that our young Republic has ever been in a state of war with one or other of the new National States.

"On the contrary, in our own city of Vienna, all the successor States have set up Commissions for the purpose of dividing among themselves, by common agreement, the heritage of the former Empire, and especially the rights and assets of that heritage. Their

purpose there is by no means that of making peace among themselves, but rather of liquidating the former community, under the intervention and guarantee of the Great Powers, whose support we are here to request, and of regulating in a practical manner their future relations.

"However, notwithstanding their situation, the successor States meet again here in Paris, with quite a different part to play. We hope to be able to enlighten the Peace Congress in regard to this confused situation. We can today foresee all the consequences which flow from this contradiction, and I reserve to myself the right of laying them before this High Assembly in writing. It is therefore as one of the portions of the Empire which has been vanquished and destroyed that we appear before you.

"We are even perfectly willing to assume our respective share of the responsibility towards the Great Powers arising out of the situation which I have just described, and are well aware that our fate lies in your hands.

"Nevertheless, we hope that the conscience of humanity will neither refuse us, nor restrict in our respect, the inalienable right of free self-determination proclaimed by the Allied and Associated Powers as an aim of their war against the Hapsburg and Hohenzollern Monarchies, a right which was, with our cordial and spontaneous consent, put into practice without delay in favor of our neighbors, while our own people trusting fully in the principles recognized by the Great Powers, has adopted it as the basis of its new Constitution.

"We like to believe that reason and the practical spirit of the world can neither desire nor countenance our economic collapse and the destruction of the whole economic fabric of the Monarchy, the more so since the impediments placed on the outlets for the natural resources by which our country is supplied have condemned us during the last six months to a state of distress far more terrible than the actual sufferings of the war.

"It is entirely due to the generous relief measures taken by the Allied and Associated Powers and conducted by their distinguished representative, Mr. Hoover, that our people owes its salvation from a famine which would have literally decimated it. Now, throughout these disasters our people has, in spite of all, preserved its discipline, its spirit of endurance and its good sense in an admirable manner, and its revolution has not been stained by blood.

"Encouraged by its confidence in the decisions of this Congress, it has abandoned all military action for the defence of its territories, two-fifths of which are still occupied by its neighbors. It has remained as the support of a peaceful and sensible social evolution in the middle of Europe. It will not deviate from this attitude pro-

vided that a just and democratic peace restores to us the indispensable means of economic existence.

"We are aware, Gentlemen, that it is you, the victors, who will impose on us the Conditions of Peace, and we are determined loyally to examine any proposal which you make to us and any counsel which you may offer.

"It will be our especial duty to explain to you thoroughly the true situation of our country, as well as to enlighten you in regard to the conditions of our existence. With very few exceptions you have hitherto only had the opportunity of hearing our neighbor's accounts on this subject. We beg you to give us the same degree of attention. As the arbiters of the whole world you will likewise decide the fate of our small country. It is, too, fair that an arbiter should hear both sides. We ask you for a decision which will safeguard our future and our national, political and economic existence.

"You may for your part be convinced that it is above all our desire, within uncontested frontiers and in the enjoyment of our liberty and our national civilization, to serve the cause of peace by collaborating, to the modest extent of our strength in the noble task of the League of Nations."

Mr. Renner's statement is translated into English and Italian.

As no one else asks leave to speak, the President declares the Session adjourned at 13.10 (1.10 P. M.)

The President,
G. CLEMENCEAU.

The Secretary-General,
P. DUTASTA.

The Secretaries,
J. C. GREW,
M. P. A. HANKEY,
PAUL GAUTHIER,
ALDROVANDI,
SADAO SABURI.

Peace Congress (Saint-Germain), Protocol No. 2, Plenary Session of September 10, 1919

Signature of the Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria

The Plenipotentiaries of the Powers hereinafter enumerated met in the Hall of the Stone Age, in the Château of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, in order to sign the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Republic of Austria. Their seals had been previously affixed to this instrument.

The Session is opened at 10 a. m. under the presidency of Mr. Georges Clemenceau, President.

PRESENT

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

Honorable Frank Lyon Polk, Under-Secretary of State
Honorable Henry White.
General Tasker H. Bliss.

FOR THE BRITISH EMPIRE :

GREAT BRITAIN :

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G., Secretary of State for the Colonies
The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes.

Dominions and India :

CANADA :

The Hon. Sir Albert Edward Kemp, K. C. M. G., Minister of Overseas Forces.

AUSTRALIA :

The Hon. George Foster Pearce, Minister of Defence.

SOUTH AFRICA :

The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.

NEW ZEALAND :

The Hon. Sir Thomas Mackenzie, K. C. M. G., High Commissioner for New Zealand in the United Kingdom.

INDIA :

The Rt. Hon. Baron Sinha, K. C., Under-Secretary of State for India.

FOR FRANCE :

Mr. Georges Clemenceau.
Mr. Pichon.
Mr. L. L. Klotz.
Mr. André Tardieu.
Mr. Jules Cambon.

FOR ITALY :

Mr. Tommaso Tittoni, Senator of the Kingdom, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Vittorio Scialoja, Senator of the Kingdom.
Mr. Maggiorino Ferraris, Senator of the Kingdom.
Mr. Guglielmo Marconi, Senator of the Kingdom.

FOR JAPAN :

Viscount Chinda.
Mr. K. Matsui.
Mr. H. Ijuin.

FOR BELGIUM:

Mr. Hymans.
Mr. van den Heuvel.
Mr. Vandervelde.

FOR CHINA:

Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang.
Mr. Cheng-ting Thomas Wang.

FOR CUBA:

Mr. Antonio Sánchez de Bustamante.

FOR GREECE:

Mr. Nicolas Politis.
Mr. Athos Romanos, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes at Paris.

FOR NICARAGUA:

Mr. Salvador Chamorro.

FOR PANAMA:

Mr. Antonio Burgos.

FOR POLAND:

Mr. Roman Dmowski.
Mr. Ignace Paderewski.

FOR PORTUGAL:

Dr. Affonso Costa.
Mr. Augusto Soares.

FOR SIAM:

The Prince Charoon.
Prince Traidos Prabandhu.

FOR THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC:

Mr. Charles Kramar.
Mr. Edouard Benes.

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA:

Mr. Karl Renner.

The PRESIDENT, speaking in French, explains the purpose of the meeting in the following terms:—

“Mr. Chancellor of the Republic of Austria,

“The negotiations are ended and have led to a complete agreement on all points between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Republic of Austria for the conclusion of peace. The conditions of peace have been set forth in the text which is before us. I have signed a paper certifying that this text is in every respect identic with that which was agreed.

“In the name of the Allied and Associated Powers I invite you to be good enough to sign the Treaty.”

The foregoing speech is translated into German.

The Chancellor of the Republic of Austria affixes his signature; thereupon the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers are called on, each in turn and according to the order in the Preamble of the Treaty, to place their signatures on the various diplomatic instruments.¹

The Chancellor of the Republic of Austria and the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers enumerated above sign the Treaty of Peace,² the Protocol,³ the Protocol of Signature, and the Declaration relating to the Treaty of Peace.⁴

The Chancellor of the Republic of Austria and the Plenipotentiaries

¹ Except for the Protocol of Signature, the texts of the instruments to which reference is here made do not accompany the present Protocol No. 2 (Saint-Germain).

² Malloy, *Treaties*, 1910-1923, vol. III, p. 3149.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 3295.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3297.

of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan sign a special Declaration.⁵

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers sign a Financial Agreement relative to the claims for reparation as regards Italy⁶ and a Financial Agreement in regard to the contribution towards the cost of liberating the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.⁷

The Plenipotentiaries of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, and of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, sign the Czecho-Slovak Treaty.⁸

The Plenipotentiaries of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan sign the Serb-Croat-Slovene Treaty.⁹

The Plenipotentiaries of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, and Portugal sign a Convention in regard to the liquor traffic in Africa and a Protocol Annex,¹⁰ as well as a Convention to revise the General Acts of Berlin of 1885 and of Brussels of 1890 as well as the Declaration of Brussels of 1890.¹¹

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers signatories of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, with the exception of the Plenipotentiaries of Greece, who reserved their signature, sign a Convention in regard to the sale of arms and ammunition and a Protocol Annex.¹²

The PRESIDENT records the fact that these signatures have been appended in the following terms:—

“Gentlemen, the signatures have all been given.

“By virtue of the Protocol of Signature of the Treaty of Peace the various Treaties, Conventions, Agreements, Protocols, and Declarations can be signed up to midday on September 13.”

The Agenda being disposed of, the Session is adjourned at 11.15 o'clock A. M.

G. CLEMENCEAU,
President.

P. DUTASTA, *Secretary-General.*

J. C. GREW,

M. P. A. HANKEY,

PAUL GAUTHIER,

G. DE MARTINO,

ASHIDA,

} *Secretaries.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3298.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3301.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3299.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 3699.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3731.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3746.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3739.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 3752.

Protocol of Signature

The Treaties, Conventions, Agreements, Protocol and Declarations of even date may be signed until midday on September 13, 1919.

DONE at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, the tenth day of September one thousand nine hundred and nineteen.

RENNER
FRANK L. POLK
HENRY WHITE
TASKER H. BLISS
ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR
MILNER
GEO. N. BARNES
A. E. KEMP
G. F. PEARCE
MILNER
THOS. MACKENZIE
SINHA OF RAIPUR
G. CLEMENCEAU
S. PICHON
L. L. KLOTZ
ANDRÉ TARDIEU
JULES CAMBON
TOM. TITTONI
VITTORIO SCIALOJA
MAGGIORINO FERRARIS
GUGLIELMO MARCONI

S. CHINDA
K. MATSUI
H. IJUIN
HYMANS
J. VAN DEN HEUVEL
E. VANDERVELDE
J. R. LOU TSENG-TSIANG
CHENG-TING THOMAS WANG
ANTONIO S. DE BUSTAMANTE
N. POLITIS
A. ROMANOS
SALVADOR CHAMORRO
ANTONIO BURGOS
I. J. PADEREWSKI
ROMAN DMOWSKI
AFFONSO COSTA
AUGUSTO SOARES
CHAROON
TRAIDOS PRABANDHU
D. KAREL KRAMAR
DR. EDUARD BENES

**Peace Congress (Paris), Protocol No. 1, Plenary Session of
September 19, 1919**

*Presentation of the Conditions of Peace to the Plenipotentiaries
of the Kingdom of Bulgaria*

The Plenipotentiaries of the Kingdom of Bulgaria, their credentials having been verified and found to be in good and due form, were invited to go to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 19th September, 1919, at 10 o'clock a. m., there to have the Conditions of Peace communicated to them.

On the appointed day the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers, hereinafter enumerated, meet in the Salle de l'Horloge, and thereupon the Plenipotentiaries of the Kingdom of Bulgaria are ushered in.

The Session is then opened at 10.30 o'clock a. m., under the presidency of Mr. Georges Clemenceau, President.

PRESENT

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

Honorable Frank Lyon Polk, Under-Secretary of State.

Honorable Henry White, former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris and Rome.

FOR THE BRITISH EMPIRE :

Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B., K. C. M. G., Minister Plenipotentiary, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

FOR FRANCE :

Mr. Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council, Minister for War.
Mr. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

FOR ITALY :

Mr. Vittorio Scialoja, Senator of the Kingdom
Mr. Augusto Ferraris, Senator of the Kingdom.

FOR JAPAN :

The Viscount Suteomi Chinda, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at London.

Mr. K. Matsui, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at Paris.

FOR BELGIUM :

Mr. R. Van der Smissen, Secretary-General of the Belgian Delegation.

FOR BOLIVIA :

Mr. Ismael Montes, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia at Paris.

FOR CHINA :

Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

FOR GREECE :

Mr. Eleftherios Venizelos, President of the Council of Ministers.

FOR THE HEDJAZ:

Rustem Haidar.

of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes at Paris.

FOR SIAM:

Prince Traidos Prabandhu, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

FOR PORTUGAL:

Dr. Affonso Costa, former President of the Council of Ministers.

FOR BULGARIA:

FOR ROUMANIA:

Mr. Nicolas Misu, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Roumania at London.

Mr. Theodore Theodoroff, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Public Worship.

Mr. Wencelin Ganef, Minister of Justice.

Mr. Yanko Sakyzoff, Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Labour.

Mr. Alexander Stamboliski, Minister of Public Works.

Mr. Michael K. Sarafoff, former Minister.

FOR THE SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE:

Mr. Milenko R. Vesnitch, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King

MR. CLEMENCEAU, President, delivers the following speech:—

“Gentlemen,—The text of the Conditions of Peace will be handed to you, the Plenipotentiaries of the Kingdom of Bulgaria, by the Secretary-General of the Conference.

“I have the honour to inform you that you should send in your observations in writing, and that you have a period of twenty-five days from the presentation of the Conditions of Peace in which to furnish these observations.

“The Supreme Council, after examining the observations furnished within the period laid down, will address a written reply to the Bulgarian Delegation stating the period within which the latter should send in its final reply on all questions.

“I request the Secretary-General of the Conference to hand the Treaty of Peace to the Plenipotentiaries of the Kingdom of Bulgaria.”

The text of the Conditions of Peace is handed to Mr. Theodoroff by the Secretary-General.

MR. THEODOROFF (Bulgaria) reads the following statement in French:—

“Mr. President, Gentlemen.—In speaking before this distinguished Assembly we do not seek to conceal from ourselves the critical situation in which our country is now placed. In contradiction with the feelings of her people, with the traditions of her policy, and with the manifest interests of her future, Bulgaria was plunged, under compulsion by ill-starred powers, into a senseless war. We are fully aware of the responsibilities which we incurred by this act, and, indeed, we realise to the full its extent and its gravity.

"No doubt, when time has brought about the healing effect which it is wont to exercise on past events, history will say that the policy followed by King Ferdinand and the Radislavov Cabinet was above all a violent constraint on the will of the Bulgarian people; history will say that this policy was only rendered possible by a fateful concatenation of events and errors; events, some of which were outside our control; errors, which were not all committed on our side; and the just testimony of history will greatly soften the harshness of the judgment which to-day weighs so heavily on the paths of our future.

"Nevertheless, if the Bulgarian people is, in its vast majority, innocent of the evil which has been done in its name, the Bulgarian State is responsible for it. We are here not only to defend the rights of Bulgaria, but it is likewise our desire to proclaim the faults which she has committed.

"We admit with the like sincerity that excesses were committed during the war in certain occupied regions. We have bound ourselves to punish the authors of those excesses pitilessly. Numerous prosecutions have already been initiated, some of them have reached a conclusion; the others will follow their inexorable course. Whatever be their rank, the malefactors who have tarnished the fair fame of our nation will all, without exception, receive the chastisement which they deserve.

"We feel, on the other hand, a grievous regret that our people, dominated by the compulsion exercised on it by its rulers, should have been involved in a fresh war with its neighbours, and by that fact had become an adversary of the Coalition of the Great Powers which represent Right and Democracy, Powers which the Bulgarian people by its very traditions was accustomed to regard as the natural protectors of its future.

"We are, in this connection, so deeply imbued with the sense of our responsibility, that if we had been summoned to one of the Congresses of former days where an implacable spirit of reprisals held sway and which, with no other thought but that of injuring the vanquished, sowed in each fresh Treaty the pernicious germs of former [*past?*] conflicts, we should not have had the courage to speak, for in such a case all speech would have been vain. Yet, in coming here, we are sustained by the idea that we are not appearing before enemies assembled to carry out a work of chastisement, but before a supreme Tribunal which has accepted the duty of stating and establishing the rights of peoples at the gravest and most perplexing moment in the history of humanity.

"The right of peoples is indestructible. In your exalted sense of justice you have, from the outset, placed it in an unassailable posi-

tion. It is therefore permissible for a guilty State also, even a vanquished State, to invoke it.

"And if the truth be told, we have continued to invoke this right for forty years, since the time when the Congress of Berlin, in obedience to the play of the European combinations of the time, dismembered Bulgaria. Since then a great and burdensome duty has lain on us. From all the Bulgarian regions which remain in servitude there rang in our ears cries of anguish which demanded our succour. We obeyed the call of our blood, and we imposed on ourselves the greatest sacrifices.

"We have not always taken the right path; our experience as a young people, barely delivered from a long enslavement, was inadequate to cope with the formidable complexity of the task which history had assigned to us; the Sovereign whom events had placed upon our throne was far from qualified to supplement our lack of political skill. Nevertheless, the ideal which we have pursued, at moments when our actions were free, has always been a pure and legitimate one; it was based, and is still to-day based, on all the rights which may be conferred on a nation by history, ethnography, tradition, and international treaties.

"We have had the honour to set forth these rights in special memoranda. We will merely say now in passing that the testimony of foreigners of undeniable authority confirms them, that the populations concerned demand them, that our competitors of to-day have recognised them in recent times by covenants and admissions the importance of which cannot be diminished.

"That our rights are well-founded is clearly shown by the light of historical facts, but the manner in which events have developed in the Balkans since 1913 has begotten errors with regard to our attitude during this period of which we bear the whole weight. We are regarded as guilty of having betrayed our Allies in 1913, and of having entered the war in 1915 on the side of the Central Powers. We fully recognise the seriousness of these accusations. We have thought it our first and most imperious duty to hand to this honourable Conference two special statements in regard to the unfortunate circumstances in the midst of which the Bulgarian people was plunged into the war against its will and against its most intimate feelings. All the facts bear witness that the Bulgarian people did not wish for the German alliance; that alliance was imposed on it. It was, in the history of Bulgaria, like a kind of cataclysm happening at a moment of general upheaval in Europe. Our sole hope is that the Conference, in its exalted wisdom, will use the indulgence that is innate in great souls and generous minds in judging the misfortunes of our people.

"We have been reproached with following an Imperialist policy. The fact is that we have never desired anything more than the accomplishment of our unity. The Bulgarian people, firmly attached to what it regards as its legitimate patrimony, does not aspire to the inheritance of others. In a spirit of moderation, and in its desire to live in friendship with the Christian States which were its neighbours, it has, ever since 1878, sought to forget the Bulgarian districts which the Congress of Berlin had assigned to Serbia and Roumania. For nearly half a century our efforts, seconded by the generous views of the Western Powers and of Russia, had tended to one goal alone, and that was the liberation of our kinsmen whom the Congress of Berlin had left under Ottoman domination.

"Our claims, so far from being Imperialist ambitions, were, and are, but the translation into a national programme of what the Powers have unanimously recognised in past times as a work of justice and of European interest. Our claims only concern countries which Turkey herself, by the firman of 1871, placed in accordance with the wishes of the population under the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Exarchate; which the Conference of Ambassadors held at Constantinople in 1876 included by a unanimous decision within the confines of an autonomous Bulgaria;¹ which the Treaty of San Stefano assigned to the Bulgarian principality² and the Congress of Berlin tore from Bulgaria solely for reasons in contradiction with the right of peoples.³

"The events of September and October 1918 have delivered Bulgaria from the long-drawn oppression which fettered her free will. Our democracy no longer finds obstacles placed in her path. Henceforward it is open to Bulgaria, of her free impulse, to reconstitute herself morally, to consolidate herself in the line of development which she has chosen in obedience to her true feelings, and make of herself a mainstay of peace and the instrument of civilisation in the East. In the course which thus lies open before her she has need of your indulgent support, and at this solemn moment we ask you for that support on her behalf.

"Bulgaria has not yet had the time to do all that is necessary to deserve the entire confidence of the Powers, whose verdict she awaits; but she will set herself, with all her energy and all her good faith, to justify in the future the credit which may be given to her and to make it good. To achieve this she has in herself all the necessary elements. The spirit of democracy which pervades her system of education; the equality of rights which, since the first day of her free

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXVIII, pp. 1114, 1188.

² *Foreign Relations*, 1878, p. 866.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 895.

existence, she granted throughout her territory to national minorities; the breath of regeneration which animates the new era into which she has just stepped prove that Bulgaria will be firmly attached to the system of the League of Nations, to which she would be proud and happy to find admission.

"The unceasing desire which the Bulgarian nation, since its awakening, has shown to educate itself, the hospitality which she has hastened to give to all foreigners who have come to bring her the benefits of civilisation, of commerce, and of industry, and lastly, the efforts which she has made to organise herself and develop herself in her domestic affairs, are guarantees, on the other hand, that Bulgaria will be open to all kinds of penetration, whether moral or economic, likely to aid in her recovery from all points of view.

"Our neighbours may likewise rest assured that, on the part of Bulgaria, who has regained the exercise of her free will, they have only to expect a desire for reconciliation and a spirit of concord. The Bulgarian nation itself has always been animated by feelings such as these. We may remind you that in 1912 it was the Bulgarian Government which, supported by the popular will, took the initiative in forming the Balkan Alliance. At first Serbia and Greece had no treaty with one another; each of them was separately bound to Bulgaria. This is not the least of the proofs of that sincere desire of the Bulgarian nation to live with its neighbours in good understanding and community of interest. It may be that in the past the Bulgarian nation has not always been able to fulfil its aspirations in this connection, but there is nothing to prevent their being made to triumph in the future. We state, in the name of the Bulgarian people and on behalf of those who are authorised to represent it for whatever purpose, that Bulgaria is ready to accept all the contractual or organised ties with her neighbours which may be thought desirable for insuring stable harmony in the Balkans and the peace of the world.

"Animated as we are by these intentions and ready to give proofs of them, we believe that we shall be permitted to address the following appeal to this exalted Assembly:—

"We have committed errors; we will suffer the consequences within the limits of equity. There is, however, one punishment which no crime justifies, and that is servitude. May such a servitude be spared to the Bulgarian nation and to its rights; may the victorious great nations who have undertaken to rebuild the world on the new bases which they have proclaimed grant us the means of rebuilding likewise our small State within its legitimate frontiers, for Bulgaria asks for nothing beyond them.

"The legitimate frontiers of Bulgaria have been fixed, and in a peremptory fashion, by history, ethnography, and international in-

struments. As, however, they are contested, may the populations concerned be called upon to express themselves in regard to their future by means of a plebiscite. We will submit to the result of their vote without reproaches and without bitterness.

"Right and justice have been the victors in the war, and they would gain their final triumph in the peace by a plebiscite.

"Mr. President, gentlemen, these words are our sincere thought."

Nobody wishing to speak, the President declares the Session adjourned.

The Session is adjourned at 11 A. M.

G. CLEMENCEAU,
President.

P. DUTASTA, *Secretary-General.*

J. C. GREW,

H. NORMAN,

PAUL GAUTHIER, } *Secretaries.*

P. DE MARTINO,

ASHIDA. }

**Peace Congress (Neuilly-sur-Seine), Protocol No. 2, Plenary
Session of November 27, 1919¹**

Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria

The Plenipotentiaries of the Powers hereinafter enumerated met in the Hall of Festivals in the Mairie of Neuilly-sur-Seine, for the signing of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria; their seals had been previously affixed to this instrument.

The session is opened at half-past ten o'clock, under the presidency of M. Georges Clemenceau, President.

PRESENT

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

Hon. Frank Lyon Polk;
Hon. Henry White;
General Tasker H. Bliss.

FOR THE BRITISH EMPIRE :

GREAT BRITAIN :

Mr. Cecil Harmsworth, M. P., Under
Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs;
Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B., K. C. M. G.,
Minister Plenipotentiary, Assistant
Undersecretary of State for
Foreign Affairs.

Dominions and India

CANADA :

The Honourable Sir George Halsey
Perley, K. C. M. G., High Commis-
sioner for Canada in the United
Kingdom.

AUSTRALIA :

The Right Honourable Andrew
Fisher, High Commissioner for
Australia in the United Kingdom.

NEW ZEALAND :

The Honourable Sir T. Mackenzie,
K. C. M. G., High Commissioner
for New Zealand in the United
Kingdom.

SOUTH AFRICA :

Mr. Reginald Andrew Blankenberg,
O. B. E., Acting High Commis-
sioner for the Union of South
Africa in the United Kingdom.

INDIA :

Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B., K. C. M. G.

FOR FRANCE :

M. Georges Clemenceau;
M. Stephen Pichon;
M. L. L. Klotz;
M. A. Tardieu;
M. Jules Cambon.

FOR ITALY :

M. G. Marconi, Senator of the
Kingdom;
M. G. de Martino, Minister Plenipo-
tentiary.

¹ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

FOR JAPAN :

M. K. Matsui.

FOR BELGIUM :

M. J. van den Heuvel ;
M. Rolin-Jaequemyns.

FOR CHINA :

M. Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo, Dele-
gate Plenipotentiary.

FOR CUBA :

M. Rafael Martinez Ortiz, Minister
Plenipotentiary.

FOR GREECE :

M. Elefthérios Venizelos ;
M. Nicolas Politis.

FOR THE HEDJAZ :

Rustem Haidar ;
Abdul Hadi Aouni.

FOR POLAND :

M. Ladislas Grabski, Delegate Pleni-
potentiary.
M. Stanislas Patek, Delegate Pleni-
potentiary.

FOR PORTUGAL :

Dr. Affonso Costa ;
M. Jayme Batalha Reis.

FOR SIAM :

Prince Charoon.

FOR THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC :

M. Edvard Benes ;
M. Stefan Osusky, Minister Pleni-
potentiary.

FOR BULGARIA :

M. Alexandre Stamboliiski, President
of the Council, Minister for War.

The PRESIDENT, speaking in French, explains the purpose of the meeting in the following terms:—

I have the honor to invite M. Stamboliiski, Plenipotentiary of Bulgaria, to be good enough to place his signature upon the text of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria, as well as upon the documents annexed to this Treaty.

M. Stamboliiski, Delegate of Bulgaria, affixes his signature; thereupon, each in turn, the Delegates of the Allied and Associated Powers are called on, according to the order in the Preamble of the Treaty, to place their signatures on the various diplomatic instruments.

The Plenipotentiary of Bulgaria and the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers enumerated above sign the Treaty of Peace, the Protocol,² and the Protocol of Signature of the Treaty of Peace.³ (See Annex).⁴

The Plenipotentiaries of Greece and the Plenipotentiary of Bulgaria sign a Convention relating to freedom of reciprocal emigration.⁵

At 11.5 o'clock, the signature of the Treaty being concluded, the PRESIDENT speaks in the following terms:

² For the English text of the Treaty of Peace and the Protocol, see Senate Document No. 7, 67th Cong., 1st sess., p. 47.

³ The French text of the Protocol of Signature is printed in *Jahrbuch des Völkerrechts*, Band VIII, p. 468.

⁴ This document is not accompanied by an annex in the Department's files.

⁵ For text of the Greek-Bulgarian Convention, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. I, No. 1, p. 68.

Gentlemen, all the signatures having been affixed, the signing of the Conditions of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria is an accomplished fact.

By virtue of the Protocol of Signature, the Treaty of Peace and the Protocol may be signed up to the 5th of December.

The order of the day being disposed of, the session is adjourned at 11.5 o'clock.

President:
G. CLEMENCEAU.

Secretary General:

P. DUTASTA.

Secretaries:

J. C. GREW.

H. NORMAN.

PAUL GAUTHIER.

ACHILLE TROMBETTI.

H. ASHIDA.

POWERS WITH SPECIAL INTERESTS:
MINUTES OF MEETINGS

POWERS WITH SPECIAL INTERESTS: MINUTES OF MEETINGS

Paris Peace Conf. 180 03601/1

Minutes of the Meeting Held by the Representatives of Powers With Special Interests, January 27, 1919¹

The Session is opened at 15 o'clock (3 p. m.) under the Presidency of Mr. Jules Cambon, French Delegate, President.

PRESENT

FOR BELGIUM:

Mr. Hymans,
Mr. Van den Heuvel,
Mr. Vandervelde.

FOR BOLIVIA:

Mr. Ismaël Montes.

FOR BRAZIL:

Mr. Olyntho de Magalhaes,
Mr. Pandia Calogeras

FOR CHINA:

Mr. Lou Tsung-shan
Mr. Sun Chuan-wei, Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of China at Brussels.

FOR CUBA:

Mr. Rafael Martinez Ortiz.

FOR ECUADOR:

Mr. Dorn y de Alsua.

FOR GREECE:

Mr. Nicolas Politis,
Mr. Athos Romanos, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of H. M. The King of the Hellenes at Paris, Technical Delegate.

FOR HAITI:

Mr. Tertullien Guilbaud, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Haiti at Paris.

FOR THE HEDJAZ:

Mr. Rustem Haidar.

FOR PERU:

Mr. Francisco Garcia Calderon.

FOR POLAND:

Mr. Roman Dmowski.

FOR PORTUGAL:

Dr. Egas Moniz,
The Count Penha Garcia.

FOR ROUMANIA:

Mr. Jean J. C. Bratiano,
Mr. Nicolas Misu.

FOR SERBIA:

Mr. Pachitch,
Mr. Trumbitch,
Mr. Vesnitch

FOR SIAM:

The Prince Charoon,
Phya Bibadh Kosha.

¹The minutes of the meeting held on January 27, 1919, appear in the files as Annex 6 to Protocol No. 2, Preliminary Peace Conference, Plenary Session of January 25, 1919. There is also in the files an apparently earlier mimeographed version of the minutes, not printed here, the text of which is published in David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* (New York, 1924), vol. xx, p. 196.

FOR THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC:

Mr. Charles Kramar,
Mr. Edouard Benes.

FOR URUGUAY:

Mr. Juan Carlos Blanco.

The PRESIDENT sets forth in the following terms the object of the meeting:—

The President of the Conference has done me the honor of appointing me to preside over the meeting of the Delegates of the Powers with special interests which have to settle the names of their representatives on the different Commissions, the list of which has already been drawn up. Other Commissions will be appointed later on.

Today you are summoned to express your views in regard to the composition of four Commissions.

I believe that all the members present speak or understand French; I therefore suggest that you should decide that no translation shall be made of the words pronounced here.

(The meeting, after consultation, assents to this proposal.)

So far as concerns the appointment of Delegates on the Commissions, the simplest plan appears to me to be to suspend the session in order that you may be able to come to an agreement among yourselves. We will open an examination of the lists when the session is resumed.

MR. KRAMAR (Czecho-Slovak Republic) asks leave to speak in order to propose a compromise:—

I perfectly understand the idea which guided Mr. Clemenceau at the last session,² when he said that it would be useless to have Commissions composed of too great a number of members. All those who, like him, have had experience of parliamentary affairs are convinced of this.

I hold the view, in accordance with this opinion, that the Commissions should be composed, in fact, of fifteen members. I ask, however, that an exception should be made in the case of one of them which seems to me to be of special importance. I mean the Commission on the League of Nations. I am well aware that nothing will be definitely decided in commission, but we all of us realize that, when a step has been accepted by a Commission, it is difficult for a contrary decision to be taken in plenary session.

Now, no injury could be caused to the idea of the League of Nations if the small Powers were represented on the Commission. For this reason, and since Mr. Clemenceau has publicly declared that number was not a sacred thing before which one has to bow, it has occurred to me that we might modify the number of Delegates on this important Commission. It would be possible to decide that it should be composed of twenty-five members: fifteen to represent the Great

² Plenary Session of January 25, 1919; see pp. 176, 196.

Powers and ten for the Powers with special interests. In this way it would be impossible for any kind of bitterness to remain in the minds of the Delegates of the last-named Powers.

The other Commissions would remain with their composition of fifteen members, ten for the Great Powers and five for the Powers with special interests.

Such is the arrangement which I desire to propose.

The PRESIDENT states that he takes note of the extremely interesting observations offered by Mr. Kramar, and adds:

You certainly remember that at the last plenary session, the President of the Conference was at pains to observe that all Delegates who might desire to make their voices heard in the Commissions could do so as they wished.

At the present moment, I do not think that we—for we represent here only a fraction of the Conference—can modify on our own authority that which has been decided by the Conference at its last session. The proposal which Mr. Kramar has just made can be referred to the next plenary session. To-day we could not deliberate in regard to it without exceeding the mandate which we have to fulfill. The only thing which we have to do is to keep within the rules laid down for us by the Conference and to proceed to vote.

It would, in my opinion, be best to suspend the session in order that you may agree among yourselves on the choice which you wish to make.

MR. CALOGERAS (Brazil), after seeking leave to speak, expresses himself as follows:

I desire, in the first place, to congratulate this limited assembly on having at its head as President so illustrious a statesman as Mr. Jules Cambon. May I now be permitted to define certain questions?

Unless I am mistaken, it was stated at the last plenary session of the Conference, as Mr. Kramar reminded us, that the composition of the Commissions, in respect of numbers, was a settled matter.

It was likewise stated that all claims—justified ones, naturally—relating to an increase in the number of members of these Commissions, should be reserved for a later session.

I think I remember that certain claims have already been heard; it will at least be necessary for them to be examined.

It is clear that we cannot at this moment do more than what has been decided. It should, however, be well understood and perfectly clear that this is only a temporary solution until such time as a decision shall have been taken with regard to the question of increasing the number of members of the Commissions. I apologize for speaking at some length and I will attempt to summarize my observations.

I possess a certain experience of international conferences, having sat on several occasions as the representative of Brazil in Pan-American conferences. Now, my experience does not altogether accord with what has been said here. One is aware that in great parliamentary debates, the majority, by its vote, compels the minority and, moreover, that commissions are not always models of efficiency: this we all know; I am myself a parliamentarian. However, in an Assembly like this one, which is an International Conference, where neither majority nor minority exists, votes must be obtained by unanimity, because, as a final enforcement, you have the signature of the agreements whereby conventional laws are fixed.

There clearly exist certain difficulties in connection with publicity, the very great publicity which is, moreover, necessary to our discussions. In plenary session, a question of human pride comes into play. A nation which has expressed itself in a certain sense cannot easily gainsay itself or reach a compromise; whereas, in Commissions where there is a far greater degree of intimacy, where discussions take place with greater heat but also with greater freedom, agreements are far easier and far simpler than when they are dependent on a vote to be obtained in the plenary Conference.

It is, moreover, manifest that one cannot require that, among so many representatives of different States, among so many mandatory bearers of diverse diplomatic instructions, one should obtain forthwith the agreement which is the indispensable preliminary of the needed solutions. By the very fact that publicity is much greater in plenary session, you will understand that any divergences of opinion, even those which may merely be ones of detail and devoid of really great importance, directly they appear soon acquire a much greater importance and produce an impression which might be unfavorable and, if I may say so, disastrous to the solutions which we wish to reach in harmony and by the free consent of the will of all concerned.

These are the reasons for which it seemed, and still seems to me to-day—I speak from my small experience as a member of several international conferences—that there will be every advantage, from the point of view of the rapidity of our labors and having regard to the necessary agreement which must receive the sanction of the plenary Conference, in fixing the number of members, not of all but of certain of the Commissions, at a higher figure than the one hitherto adopted. I have myself made a claim. Other Delegates have spoken more or less in the same sense; it is clear that there is something to be done in this direction.

We have come here with a great ideal which all the world supports; we desire to institute the League of Nations, that is to say, a system of equality as between all nations. The principle of the

League has already been completely established. Each nation must be given a vote; "one nation, one vote." That is the spirit in which I beg leave to bring to your attention the arguments which appear to militate in favor of an increase in the number of members of Commissions, for the phrase "League of Nations" must not merely appear in our speeches; its spirit must reign in our hearts.

The PRESIDENT points out, with the agreement of Mr. Calogeras, that the observations which have just been made cannot modify the proposals already placed before the Assembly; that, moreover, they cannot be taken into account at a meeting which has for its sole object the designation of the representatives of Powers with special interests.

The observations of the Delegate for Brazil will, however, be recorded in the Minutes of the session, and the President will communicate them to the Bureau of the Conference.

Furthermore, the Delegates of Powers which desire to see an increase in the number of their representatives on the Commission of the League of Nations may naturally go and offer their observations before that Commission. That Commission, which will be undoubtedly animated by a most liberal spirit, may, if it considers the number of representatives to be insufficient, request the plenary Conference to increase the number originally settled.

MR. VESNITCH (Serbia), offers an observation of a technical description by proposing that the vote to be given should be in the name of States, and not in the name of persons.

This proposal is adopted.

The session is suspended at 15.25 o'clock (3.25 p. m.) in order to allow the Delegates to exchange views before examining the list of the representatives to be designated.

The session is resumed at 16.05 o'clock (4.05 p. m.).

On the resumption of the session MR. HYMANS (Belgium) describes as follows the result of the exchange of views among the Delegates:—

We have sought to reach an agreement, by means of private conversations, in regard to the position of the four following Commissions: Commission on the League of Nations; Commission on Ports; Commission on International Legislation on Labor; Commission to inquire into the Responsibility for Crimes committed during the war.

As a result of the conversations which have taken place, there are two Commissions in regard to the composition of which there appears to be agreement, and we can thenceforward eliminate the two following questions from our deliberations: the Commission on the Responsibility for Crimes committed during the war, and the Commission on International Legislation on Labor.

If there were no opposition, we could consider that the Delegates have been named for the Commission to inquire into the responsibility for crimes committed during the war, and to examine the penalties attached to those crimes, that Commission being composed of the representatives of Belgium, Serbia, Roumania, Poland and Greece.

As regards the composition of the Commission to study International Legislation on Labor, we propose to put down the names of the following Powers: Belgium, Serbia, Cuba for the South American group, Poland and the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Serbian Delegates, however, have been good enough to state that they agreed to yield their place to Belgium, which, in view of the position which she holds in the industrial and commercial world, may be considered from that point of view as a Great Power. Belgium would therefore have two seats.

The question is a more delicate one as regards the composition of the Commission to inquire into the constitution of the League of Nations, and the composition of the Commission on the Control of Ports, Waterways and Railways.

In the conversations which have just taken place, there seemed to be an agreement as regards Belgium and Serbia, each having a representative on both Commissions; there are, however, besides those two, Powers which likewise demand to be represented on both Commissions and the number of the Powers which wish to sit on them exceeds the number of available seats. Brazil, China, Roumania, Poland, the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Greece, and Portugal ask to be represented on the League of Nations Commission.

With regard to the Ports Commission, in addition to Belgium and Serbia, Uruguay representing the South American group, Poland, China, Greece, Roumania, and Portugal ask to be represented on this Commission.

In our opinion it would be best, with a view to the composition of these two Commissions, to take a vote; it is our intention to request you, Mr. President, when the vote has taken place and after the nomination of the five Delegates to whom we have been told we are entitled, to make yourself the interpreter of the desire of today's meeting by begging the Bureau of the Conference to be so good as to increase eventually the number of seats on these two Commissions; we would indicate the Powers for which these seats are requested.

THE GREEK DELEGATES state that they agree with Mr. Hymans in regard to the composition of the first two Commissions for which, in default of opposition, the vote should be regarded as settled; furthermore, like Serbia, they renounce their representation on the International Labor Legislation Commission in favor of Belgium.

The PRESIDENT gives his consent to this mode of procedure and concludes, to sum up, that five Delegates will be appointed and that four will be designated in order that they may be proposed to the Bureau of the Conference so as to complete the Delegation.

The discussion is resumed on the method of voting.

The PRESIDENT states that, with regard to the Labor Legislation Commission and that on the Responsibility for Crimes, there is no need to vote, as the Delegates have agreed among themselves.

The representation of Powers with special interests on the International Labor Legislation Commission will therefore be composed as follows: Belgium, with two seats; Cuba, Poland, and the Czecho-Slovak Republic, with one seat each.

As regards the Commission to inquire into the Responsibility for Crimes committed during the War, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Roumania, and Serbia will each have one representative on that Commission.

As regards the two other Commissions—those on the League of Nations and on Ports—the President proposes to proceed by separate vote for each Commission. This having been accepted, he states that it is understood that the Delegates to be considered as elected will be the five who have received the greatest number of votes. The four names following them will be laid before the Conference, by way of suggestion, with a view to complete the Commissions.

An exchange of view takes place in order to fix the method of voting. It is decided in the first place that the voting at the first round is to be determined by absolute majority; at the second, by relative majority; further, that each Delegation shall only hand in one voting card.

The list of candidates for the League of Nations Commission is communicated to the meeting. These candidates are, in alphabetical order in French: Belgium, Brazil, China, Ecuador, Greece, Haiti, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, and Serbia and the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

The votes are collected, sorted and counted.

The PRESIDENT announces the result:

There are seventeen voters; the five nations which have received an absolute majority and the greatest number of votes are: Belgium, China, Brazil, Serbia, and Portugal. Thereafter come Roumania, Poland, Greece, the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Haiti and Ecuador.

In accordance with the decision of the Assembly, the President will communicate to the Bureau of the Conference the names of the four nations which, after the five nations appointed, have obtained the greatest number of votes, namely: Roumania, Poland, Greece, and the Czecho-Slovak Republic,

The PRESIDENT thereupon proposes to designate the members of the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission.

MR. BENES (Czecho-Slovak Republic) offers the following observation:

When we examined the question of the number of Delegates to be admitted into the Commission for Railways, Waterways, and the Internationalization of Ports, I explained to my colleagues on the Commission certain reasons for which we, the Czecho-Slovaks, were anxious to be represented among the five Powers to be designated. Those reasons are as follows: We are in the middle of Central Europe, a country surrounded on all sides by enemy powers, notably Germany and the Magyars, and we have no access to the sea. For us the question of the internationalization of railways is a vital one; on the other hand, our State is a riverain state of the Danube and we are specially interested in the question of the Adriatic; moreover, having no great ports, we shall therefore be interested in expressing our views on the subject of the special system of control of the Baltic and the Adriatic ports. These are the reasons which we have advanced in order that we may be included in the number of the five Powers which are to be represented on the Commission: I therefore propose the candidature of the Czecho-Slovaks to be among the five Powers which you are about to designate.

MR. HYMANS (Belgium) announces, but not in order of priority, the names of the Powers which ask to be represented on the Commission: They are Belgium, Serbia, Uruguay, Poland, China, Roumania, Greece, the Czecho-Slovak Republic and Portugal.

The votes are collected, sorted and counted.

The PRESIDENT announces the result:—

The five Powers which have secured an absolute majority are: Belgium, China, Greece, Uruguay and Serbia.

After them, the following have secured the greatest number of votes: Roumania, Portugal, Poland and the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

Therefore, the suggestion to be made to the Bureau is concerned with the supplementary admission of the four last-named Powers.

MR. CALOGERAS (Brazil) makes the following statement in regard to the result of the voting:

It appears to me that a great moral lesson is derived from the votes which this Assembly has just cast: on all the Commissions it is to Belgium that the greatest number, indeed almost the unanimity of votes, has been given. That is not astonishing. We have barely emerged from a struggle which will undoubtedly effect a complete transformation of modern society: now, if it has been possible to secure this victory, if we are assembled round this Conference table, it is certainly because there has been an expiatory victim, a country,

small in extent, but great of heart, which has offered itself up as a holocaust, and to which we may well apply the phrase which Joan of Arc used of her banner: "It has been dragged in the dust; it now floats in the breeze."

MR. HYMANS (Belgium) thanks him in the following terms:—

From the depths of my heart I thank the representative of noble Brazil for the words with which he has just greeted my country. We have, I think, done our duty; victory has crowned the common efforts of the Allies and all of us here will have only one purpose, together with the great Allies at whose side we were sitting yesterday; that is, to establish a just peace, and to organize an international order founded on the rights and equality of nations.

The PRESIDENT adds these words:

In the name of all the nations represented at this table I associate myself with the words just pronounced by the representative of Brazil; at the same time, however, I desire to associate with these eulogies Serbia, Roumania, and all the nations which have suffered, like ourselves and like Belgium, for the cause of Civilization and Right.

It is understood, of course, that the Delegates of countries which have been indicated will be at the same time the Delegates of all the nations, and that they may be requested to present the desiderata of nations which have not been themselves designated.

In conclusion, the President begs the Delegations to communicate as soon as possible to the General Secretariat the names of the representatives of nations designated by the vote which has just been taken, as the Commission ought to be constituted as rapidly as possible.

The members of the Secretariat take note of these names. (See Annex VII).³

The session rises at 16 50 o'clock (4.50 p. m.).

³ i. e., Annex No. 7 to Protocol No. 2, Preliminary Peace Conference, Plenary Session of January 25, 1919, p. 203

**Meeting Held by the Representatives of the Powers With Special
Interests on Monday, March 3, 1919¹**

*Minute No. 2**

The Session opened at 3.30 p. m., with Mr. Jules Cambon, French Delegate, in the Chair.

PRESENT

FOR BELGIUM:

Mr. van den Heuvel.

FOR BOLIVIA:

Mr. Ismael Montes.

FOR BRAZIL:

Mr. Epitacio Pessoa.
Mr. Olyntho de Magalhaes.
Mr. Pandia Calogeras.

FOR CHINA:

Mr. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze.
Mr. Sunthou Wei.

FOR CUBA:

Mr. Rafael Martinez Ortiz.

FOR ECUADOR:

Mr. Dorn y de Alsua.

FOR GREECE:

Mr. Nicolas Politis.

FOR HAITI:

Mr. Tertullien Guilbaud.

FOR THE HEDJAZ:

Mr. Rustem Haidar.

FOR LIBERIA:

Mr. C. Dunbar.

FOR PANAMA:

Mr. Antonio Burgos.

FOR POLAND:

Mr. Roman Dmowski.
Dr. Casimir Dluski.

FOR PORTUGAL:

Dr. Egas Moniz.
Dr. Antonio Bettencourt-Rodriguez.

FOR ROUMANIA:

General Constantin Coanda.
Mr. Constantin Diamandy.

FOR SERBIA:

Mr. Pachitch.
Mr. Vesnitch.
Mr. Stoyanovitch.

FOR SIAM:

Prince Traidos Prabandhu.
Phya Bibadh Kosha.

FOR THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC:

Mr. Edouard Benes.

¹ Reprinted from printed text in the files. A similar mimeographed text in the files, dated March 21, 1919, bears the notation: "The attached is a revised and abbreviated report of the Session of the Powers with Special Interests held Monday, March 3, 1919. Note: It should be substituted for the longer short-hand report which was circulated on March 5, 1919." The earlier text, a copy of which is in the files, is not printed here. It is published in Miller, *My Diary*, vol. xx, p. 209.

* The Minutes of the Meeting held on the 27th January, 1919, were issued as Annex 6 to Protocol No. 2. [Footnote in the original.]

The PRESIDENT explained that the purpose of the meeting was the nomination by the Representatives of the Powers with special interests of five members for the Financial Commission and five for the Economic Commission. He reminded the meeting of the precedent established for the appointment of Delegates of Powers with special interests to other Commissions and proposed that the Session should be adjourned in order to admit of an exchange of views between the members of the Assembly before a vote was taken.

MR. EPITACIO PESSOA (Brazil) stated that before complying with the invitation which had been addressed to them the Representatives of the Powers with special interests had held an informal meeting for the purpose of agreeing in advance on the choice of their Delegates, but that nothing had resulted from that meeting. In view of the number of States with special interests, of the importance, the weight and the complexity of their interests, it had been recognised that the only solution acceptable to the interested Powers was to request an increase in the number of their Representatives on the Financial and Economic Commissions.

The Brazilian Delegate read the following resolution, which had been unanimously adopted at the informal meeting:—

“The Powers with special interests assembled under the presidency of Mr. Cambon have the honour to present the following request:—

“They have tried to make a selection of Delegates for the five seats reserved to them on the Financial and Economic Commissions, but, in view of the extreme diversity and vital importance for each one of them of the questions referred to these two Commissions, and having regard to the fact that, for the safeguarding of their interest, the extra-European Powers seriously affected by the war request that they should be allowed legitimate representation concurrently with the European Powers, the said Powers, who are deeply involved both in respect of their financial and economic existence, were unanimous in considering that it was impossible to satisfy the just requirements of their situation if the number of Delegates reserved to them were not raised to ten for each of the two Commissions.

“They are convinced that the increase in the number of Delegates will not prolong to any regrettable extent the duration of the discussions, but will, on the contrary, enable a fuller and more equitable examination of the essential problems at stake to be undertaken. The undersigned Representatives of the Powers with special interests, therefore, have the honour to beg the President, Mr. Cambon, to bring this decision to the knowledge of His Excellency the President of the Conference, and to adjourn the election of Delegates to the above-mentioned Commissions until the Bureau has studied and taken into consideration this vote.”

The PRESIDENT remarked that the resolution bore a close resemblance to the resolutions put forward at a previous meeting, when it was likewise found that the number of Delegates granted to the Rep-

representatives of the Powers with special interests was insufficient. He reminded the meeting that the Representatives of the Powers with special interests, after having given a definite vote which, by appointing five Delegates to the Commissions, constituted a reply to the request which had been laid before the Assembly, had forwarded a wish recommending to the Supreme Allied Council an increase in the representation of their Delegates on Commissions by adding to the five Delegates who had been actually appointed those of the Powers which had received the greatest number of votes after the Powers which were actually represented.

The President proposed that the same procedure should be followed: five Delegates could be designated for each of the two Commissions and a wish expressed that the representation of Powers with special interests on those Commissions should be more numerous and that the Delegates which those Powers desired to have admitted to the Commissions should be thereupon designated.

This method of procedure would possess the advantage of not hindering the urgent labours of the Conference and of giving satisfaction to the interests which the wish that they were to express would have in view.

The Report drawn up on behalf of the Economic Commission explained that it would be desirable for that Commission to form Sub-Commissions to which States not possessing a seat on the Commission would be summoned.² The Commission would, furthermore necessarily summon the Representatives of Powers which had not been allotted Delegates on that Commission.

This proposal, combined with the use of the procedure employed at the first meeting, was calculated to give complete satisfaction to the desire of the Powers to have their interests defended on the Economic and Financial Commissions.

MR. EPITACIO PESSOA (Brazil) requested that a vote should be taken on the resolution which he had put forward, and remarked that it had only been adopted by the Representatives of the Powers with special interests, after deep reflection and a patient investigation of the question. The delay which would ensue from the adoption of this resolution would not be a serious one, and it would be incumbent on the Representatives of the Great Powers to judge whether that delay could be harmful to the labours of the Conference and whether the request of the Powers with special interests could be taken into consideration.

The PRESIDENT urged the adoption of the proposal which he had made to the Assembly, and thereupon MR. ROMANOS (Greece) pro-

² The text of this report may be found in the Minutes of the Council of Ten of March 1, 1919, BC-42; see vol. iv, p. 180.

posed that such Powers as had no official Representative on the two Commissions should be permitted to follow their proceedings, the precedent created on the occasion of the appointment of Delegates to other Commissions being thus observed. It would, he said, be enough to state that, in addition to the members elected by the Meeting of States with special interests, each one of those States could have a Representative to follow the proceedings of the Commissions, but without the right to vote.

MR. VAN DEN HEUVEL (Belgium) admitted that the system suggested by the President might give partial satisfaction to the Powers with special interests, but only on condition that each Delegation was kept informed of what happened on the Commissions. The Delegate for Greece had brought forward proposals which might lead to an agreement, but it would still be necessary to know what the needful arrangements were.

The Powers with special interests desired that the respective position of each one so far as concerned the defence of its rights should forthwith be clearly established.

The Representatives of all the Powers had a serious responsibility towards their respective nations for the defence of the interests which they represented. It was their duty to perform their task with precision and to keep watch over everything that was said and done in order that certain details which might, in perfect good faith, be left out by persons unacquainted with their special situation, might not be neglected.

The PRESIDENT expressed his adhesion to the proposal of the Delegate for Greece as it appeared to give satisfaction to all the different interests; the Assembly would designate the Delegates which it was invited to appoint and would at the same time express a desire that all members with interests to defend might take part in the labours of the Commissions.

MR. BENES (Czecho-Slovak Republic) did not oppose the proposal of the President but, in view of the fact that the Representatives of Powers with special interests found themselves unable to reduce below the number of ten the members to be appointed to each Commission, he wished the President in the first place to set before the Great Powers the difficulty which the members of the Assembly had encountered.

The PRESIDENT laid stress on the absolute necessity of having Commissions which comprised a limited number of members; that was the only way of ensuring useful and rapid work. By adopting the mode of procedure suggested by the Delegate for Greece, limited Commissions might be formed so far as possible while the door would be left open for such of the Delegates as had not been appointed to

MR. DORN Y DE ALSUA (Ecuador) suggested that the members of the Conference should be kept informed of the labours of all the Commissions, and expressed the hope that the proofs of the Minutes of Commissions might be communicated to the Conference.

MR. DMOWSKI (Poland) did not consider that the selection proposed by the President was possible. He therefore suggested that the list which had been prepared should be adopted in its entirety, and that the Council of the Great Powers should be left to choose the names, if it was unable to accept ten representatives from the Powers with special interests, both on the Economic and on the Financial Commission.

MR. POLITIS (Greece) said that he was in favour of the proposal of the Polish Delegate, but with a slight amendment. He would accept the procedure adopted for former appointments to Commissions. They would proceed immediately to designate five Delegates for each of the two Commissions and would draw up a supplementary list in order that, if the wish to be expressed by the Assembly were accepted by the Council of the Great Powers, the five additional Delegates might take their seats beside the others.

MR. VAN DEN HEUVEL (Belgium) considered it desirable to attach to the wish which it was proposed to express the list drawn up by the Representatives of the Powers with special interests, which would confirm the necessity felt by those Powers of having at least ten Delegates on each Commission.

MR. VESNITCH (Serbia) held the view that the Assembly should elect ten members for each Commission but should leave to the Supreme Allied Council the task of itself making the choice, if it found the number of ten Delegates too large. He hoped, however, that the Great Powers would allow themselves to be convinced that the economic and financial questions up for discussion were of interest to all countries, even to a greater degree than questions of ports, railways and territorial settlements.

Moreover, the Delegates of Latin America had yielded their places on former Commissions to the Representatives of the European nations which had major interests. On this occasion, however, the nations of America had an equal interest and they were, moreover, more numerous; it was therefore comprehensible that they should likewise wish to defend their interests.

MR. EPRITACIO PESSOA (Brazil) withdrew the portion of his resolution regarding the adjournment of the elections and agreed to address to the Supreme Allied Council a list of ten names for each Commission, on condition that the Powers with special interests retained the right themselves to elect their five Delegates in the event of the Great Powers not considering it possible to grant them ten Delegates.

This proposal was supported by MR. PANDIA CALOGERAS (Brazil), who further requested that the list of ten names for each Commission to be forwarded to the Supreme Council should be accompanied by the resolution which the Representatives of the Powers with special interests had adopted.

An exchange of views took place between the members of the Assembly on the question as to whether, in the event of the Supreme Allied Council declining to accept the number of ten Delegates, which would be proposed to it, it would be suitable to refer to the Council's decision the appointment of the five Delegates, or to leave their designation in the hands of the Powers with special interests.

It was decided to split up the proposal of Mr. Epitacio Pessoa.

The first portion of the proposal, viz., to appoint ten Delegates for each Commission, was put to the vote and adopted.

The Session was adjourned at 4.45 p. m. in order to enable the members of the Assembly to have an exchange of views before a vote was taken. The Session was resumed at 5 o'clock.

On the resumption of the Session, MR. EPITACIO PESSOA (Brazil) stated that the Delegates had come to an agreement in regard to the presentation of the two lists in alphabetical order. If the Supreme Allied Council accepted the number of ten Delegates to represent the Powers with special interests, that appointment would stand. If the Council insisted on limiting that representation to five Delegates, it would return the two lists and the Powers with special interests would themselves choose the five Delegates.

MR. POLITIS (Greece) remarked that an agreement existed for including in the lists the names as settled in the preparatory meeting.

Thereupon the PRESIDENT put to the vote the names of the following countries as proposed for each Commission:—

Economic Commission.:—Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Peru, Poland, Roumania, Serbia, Siam and the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

Financial Commission.:—Belgium, Brazil, Ecuador, Greece, Hedjaz, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia and the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

These two lists were unanimously adopted.

The PRESIDENT, in conformity with the desire expressed by the Assembly, was to hand the two lists to the Supreme Allied Council. If the Council accepted them, the matter would be ended: but if it considered the number of Delegates too great, the President would propose that the Assembly should be summoned again in order to choose itself from the list the number of Delegates which the Council might determine.

The Session was suspended at 6.10 p. m.

J. CAMBON,
Chairman.

Meeting Held by the Representatives of the Powers With Special Interests on Thursday, March 6, 1919¹

Minute No. 3

As the result of the meeting held by the Representatives of the Powers with special interests on the 3rd March, 1919, the Supreme Allied Council decided to fix the number of the Delegates of those Powers on the Financial and Economic Commissions respectively at five, and to summon a meeting of the Representatives of those Powers on the 6th March, in order that they might designate their Delegates on those Commissions.

The Session opened at 11 a. m., with Mr. Jules Cambon, French Delegate, in the Chair.

PRESENT

FOR BELGIUM:

Mr. van den Heuvel.

FOR BOLIVIA:

Mr. Ismael Montes.

FOR BRAZIL:

Mr. Epitacio Pessoa.
Mr. Olyntho de Magalhaes.
Mr. Pandia Calogeras.

FOR CHINA:

Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang.
Mr. Sao-Kc Alfred Sze.

FOR CUBA:

Mr. Rafael Martinez Ortiz.

FOR ECUADOR:

Mr. Dorn y de Alsua.

FOR GREECE:

Mr. Nicolas Politis.
Mr. A. Romanos.

FOR THE HEDJAZ:

Mr. Rustem Haidar.

FOR LIBERIA:

Mr. C. Dunbar.

FOR PANAMA:

Mr. Antonio Burgos.

FOR POLAND:

Mr. Roman Dmowski.
Dr. Casimir Dluski.

FOR PORTUGAL:

Dr. Egas Moniz.
Dr. Antonio Bettencourt-Rodriguez.

FOR ROUMANIA:

General Constantin Coanda.
Mr. Constantin Diamandy.

FOR SERBIA:

Mr. Vesnitch.

¹ Reprinted from printed text in the files. A similar mimeographed text in the files, dated March 21, 1919, bears the notation: "The attached is a revised and abbreviated report of the Session of the Powers with Special Interests held Monday [*Thursday*], March 6, 1919. Note: It should be substituted for the longer short-hand report which was circulated March 11, 1919." The earlier text has not been found in the files. It was presumably the unrevised text published in Miller, *My Diary*, vol. xx, p. 238

FOR SIAM:

Prince Traidos Prabandhu.
Phya Bibadh Kosha.

FOR THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC:

Mr. Edouard Benes.

The PRESIDENT informed the Assembly that, as a result of the report which he had made to the Supreme Allied Council, that Council had thought it necessary to uphold its point of view and it considered it suitable that the Powers with special interests should designate five Delegates for the Economic Commission and five Delegates for the Financial Commission. He therefore proposed an adjournment of the Session to enable the members of the Assembly to consult together in regard to the choice to be made.

This proposal was accepted. The Session was adjourned at 11.10 a. m. and resumed at 11.50 a. m.

On the resumption of the Session Mr. POLITIS (Greece) reported the efforts made by a large number of Delegates with a view to reach an agreement in regard to the names of the Powers to be chosen to occupy the five seats on each of the two Commissions. They had attempted to take into account, in as objective a manner as possible, the genuine interests of each country. They had, for instance, as regards the Economic Commission, suggested that only two seats should be kept for the European States, that two should be offered to the Latin American States, and one to an Asiatic State.

For the Financial Commission they had put down four European States, and had kept one seat for the Latin American States. If an agreement had been reached on these arrangements of principle, they had intended to draw up two supplementary lists with a view to renewing the wish, which had previously been formulated, to have four additional Representatives on each of these two Commissions: as for these four names, one seat was kept for an Asiatic State and one for a Latin American State on the Economic Commission, and one seat for a Latin American State on the Financial Commission.

Unfortunately these efforts had come to naught. They had encountered a tendency on the part of the Latin American Powers to acquire more seats than they could obtain through an objective distribution which took European interests likewise into account. The interests on which the American States had laid stress were perfectly serious ones and entirely worthy of respect, and it would have been desirable that all of them should have been able to secure a direct and official representation: it was not, however, in the power of the members of the Assembly to give them satisfaction. As it had not been possible to reach an agreement in regard to the order of preference to be enjoyed by the different interests, European, Asiatic, or American, Mr. POLITIS proposed to present a separate list for the European States, and to leave to the Delegates of the American

States the task and responsibility of submitting another list for their countries.

MR. RUSTEM HAIDAR (Hedjaz) expressed his regret that, in the proposals which had been brought forward one State had been left out of account, namely, the Kingdom of the Hedjaz which represented the Arab nation and, before the war, formed part of the Ottoman Empire. That State had considerable financial and economic interests, which were indeed more important than those of many other States; the territory of the Hedjaz had been invaded by the Turks and had suffered considerable damage; that Kingdom represented half of an Empire which had a very large debt, for which the Hedjaz would be responsible in the future. Yet the Hedjaz was not even included in the supplementary list, and its Delegate expressed the hope that its interests might be taken into account when the vote was taken.

MR. VAN DEN HEUVEL (Belgium) appealed to the spirit of solidarity of the members of the Assembly and particularly urged both the Representatives of the Asiatic States, and especially those of the American States, not to separate themselves from the European States, but rather, each one of them, to make their contribution to the labours of the different Commissions. It would thus be possible, instead of dividing the world up into two hemispheres, to make mixed lists which would take into account the general interests which Europe on the one hand and Asia and America on the other respectively represented.

MR. VESNITCH (Serbia) was of opinion that the method proposed by Mr. Politis possessed serious disadvantages, and might produce an unfortunate impression. He paid a tribute to the courtesy of the Representatives of the American States, and proposed that a vote should be taken for the main list, each Delegation voting freely in accordance with its opinion. A subsidiary list would then be presented, and, if the Supreme Allied Council thought that there were disadvantages in accepting the representation of Powers with special interests as determined by the main list, it would probably take into account the subsidiary list, and thus all the interests were likely to secure satisfaction.

MR. SAO-KE ALFRED SZE (China) stated that it was not the wish, nor the intention, of China to be in any way in opposition to the interests of the European Powers; in fact, on the contrary, her great desire had always been to work in unison and to co-operate with them in every way possible. He called the attention of the Meeting to the fact that Continental Asia, including Siam, was deeply interested in the questions that would be brought up in the Economic and Financial Commissions, and he also explained why China should have Representatives sitting on both of these Commissions.

An adjournment of the Session was requested in order that a ground of agreement between the divergent points of view might be sought. The Session was adjourned at 12.5 p. m. and resumed at 12.20 p. m.

On the resumption of the Session a discussion took place as to whether one list only should be drawn up, including nine names, the first five of which should be the delegates designated by the Assembly, while the four following ones should be proposed as additional Delegates in the form of a wish presented to the Supreme Allied Council; or whether, on the other hand, two separate lists should be sent in, one containing five names, that is to say, those of the Delegates appointed, and the other four names representing the Delegates suggested as additional Delegates.

MR. VAN DEN HEUVEL (Belgium) proposed that two separate votes should be taken for each Commission, one for the Delegates to be appointed and the other for the additional Delegates.

This proposal, which was supported by Mr. Politis (Greece), was put to the vote, and adopted.

A vote was then taken for the appointment of five Delegates to the Financial Commission.

The result of the voting was as follows:—

Peru.....	14 votes.
Brazil	10 “
Bolivia. . . .	9 “
Panama. . . .	9 “
Portugal	9 “

After these Greece, Poland and Serbia each obtained 7 votes, the Czecho-Slovak Republic 6 votes, Roumania 1 vote and the Hedjaz 1 vote.

Consequently, Peru, Brazil, Bolivia, Panama and Portugal were designated to represent the Powers with special interests on the Financial Commission.

MR. POLITIS (Greece) held the view that it would be preferable, having regard to the result of the voting, not to vote for the supplementary list. It seemed to him necessary that the Council of the Great Powers should have a perfectly clear view of the results obtained, and he thought it “shocking” that all the countries which had taken the most active part in the war should, with the exception of Portugal, be eliminated. If they voted for a supplementary list, the same majority would make itself felt. In those circumstances, he did not think fit to take part in the voting and thought that the minority should abstain.

MR. EPITACIO PESSOA (Brazil) requested that they should, on the other hand, proceed to vote on the supplementary list.

The PRESIDENT put it to the vote whether a supplementary list of four names should be drawn up.

The assembly gave an affirmative reply by 8 votes to 6.

The Delegates of Greece, Belgium, Poland, Roumania, Serbia and the Czecho-Slovak Republic stated that they would not take part in the voting.

The PRESIDENT opened the voting for the designation of four additional Delegates to the Financial Commission, and the following results were obtained:—

Roumania.....	8 votes.
Belgium.....	7 “
China.....	7 “
Greece.....	6 “
Poland.....	5 “

There were six abstentions.

Consequently, Roumania, Belgium, China and Greece will be proposed to the Supreme Council for representation on the Financial Commission, in addition to the five Powers already designated.

A vote was next taken for the designation of five Delegates to the Economic Commission.

The result was as follows:—

Brazil.....	16 votes.
China.....	16 “
Cuba.....	9 “
Siam.....	9 “
Ecuador.....	8 “

Consequently, Brazil, China, Cuba, Siam and Ecuador were designated to represent the Powers with special interests on the Economic Commission.

The PRESIDENT thereupon requested the Delegates to vote for the compilation of a supplementary list of four names.

MR. POLITIS (Greece) stated on behalf of Greece and of the Powers which had previously abstained that those Powers would again abstain from voting.

The result of the voting was as follows:—

Belgium.....	8 votes.
Serbia.....	8 “
Roumania.....	6 “
Greece.....	6 “

There were six abstentions.

Consequently, Belgium, Serbia, Roumania and Greece will be proposed to the Supreme Council for representation on the Economic Commission in addition to the five Powers already designated.

The Session was suspended at 1.10 p. m.

J. CAMBON,
Chairman.

THE COUNCIL OF TEN:
MINUTES OF MEETINGS JANUARY 12 TO
FEBRUARY 14, 1919

NOTE CONCERNING THE MINUTES OF THE MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL OF TEN

The minutes of meetings of the Council of Ten in the English language were prepared in mimeographed form and distributed by the British delegation. The British designation for the minutes in this series was IC (International Conference), while the American designation was BC (Bureau Conference). The copies used by the American delegation omitted the first mimeographed sheet received from the British and substituted a new first sheet with a number in the BC series. At the end of the last sheet of each set of mimeographed minutes received from the British appeared the words "Villa Majestic" (headquarters of the British secretariat) and the date. It became the practice of the American secretariat to restencil the last sheet containing these words or to efface them with a hand stamp, but this was not invariably done. In the present publication these words appear or not according to their appearance in the Department's file copy.

For the meetings of the Council of Ten from January 12 through January 22, 1919, an additional set of minutes seems to have been prepared by the American delegation. Inasmuch as this version often gives an account of the meeting in a slightly different form from, or contains some material in addition to, that contained in the version circulated jointly by the American and British delegations, these alternate versions have been published for the meetings for which they exist. They appear in the present publication immediately adjacent to the joint versions of the meetings to which they relate. The numbers of minutes in the BC series appear at the upper right at the beginning of each set of minutes. In the case of the alternate versions the numbers of the corresponding meetings of the BC series are given in brackets. In some cases the minutes in the alternate version combine in one report proceedings which are given as of two meetings in the BC series. Thus the proceedings of the first two meetings, which appear as BC-A and BC-A1 in the BC series are combined in the report given in the alternate version under the heading "Notes of a Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held at Quai d'Orsay at 2:30 on January 12, 1919," which in this publication is given the designation "[BC-A and BC-A1]", *post*, page 495.

Certain of the meetings of the Council of Ten were also meetings of the Supreme War Council, and the minutes of such meetings may be designated by both the symbols BC and SWC with the respective numbers in each series.

The BC series extends from BC-A of January 12, 1919, through BC-63 of July 5, 1919. The present volume ends with BC-32; BC-33 through BC-62 will be found in volume IV. The last of the series (BC-63) represents, however, a meeting of the Heads of Delegations on July 5 and is to be found with the minutes of that body in a later volume.

THE COUNCIL OF TEN: MINUTES OF MEETINGS JANUARY 12 TO FEBRUARY 14, 1919

Paris Peace Conf 180 03101/1

BC-A
[SWC-1]

**Procès-verbal of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held
in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Sunday,
January 12, 1919, at 2: 30 p. m.**

PRESENT

FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY	UNITED STATES
M. Clemenceau	The Rt. Hon D. Lloyd	Signor Orlando	President Wilson
M. Pichon	George	Baron Sonnino	Mr. R. Lansing
M. Clementel	The Rt. Hon A. J.	Count Aldrovandi	Gen T. H. Bliss
M. Loucheur	Balfour	Major A. Jones	Mr. A. H. Frazier
M. Leygues	Gen Sir H. H. Wilson		
Marshal Foch	Lieut.-Colonel Sir		
Gen. Weygand	Maurice Hankey		
M. Dutasta			
M. Berthelot			
M. Bearn			
Capt. A. Portier			

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux

M. PICHON proposed to begin by inviting Marshal Foch to give an account of the progress made in the execution of the Armistice by Germany.¹

¹ Marshal Foch's
Report on the
Carrying Out of
the Armistice

MARSHAL FOCH said that the Armistice, as renewed on the 13th December² and expiring on the 17th January, had been satisfied in a certain measure as regards the surrender of material; 5,000 guns and 25,000 machine guns had been handed over, with the exception of a few hundred guns which were expected shortly, and 300 trench mortars, in regard to which he had no exact information. We might be assured, therefore, that the whole of the war material involved would be in our hands within a few days.

As to railway material, on the 9th January we had 1,967 locomotives out of the 5,000 to be surrendered. Hence, important surrenders of locomotives had still to be made. There had, however, been a marked improvement in the second, as compared with the first month. In the first month the enemy had surrendered less than 500, and in the second month about 1,500. As regards trucks and wagons, on the

¹ For terms of the Armistice with Germany, signed November 11, 1918, see vol. II, p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

9th January 61,560 had been surrendered out of a total of 150,000. In regard to motor lorries the situation was better. On the 9th January we had received 4,422 out of a total of 5,000. The whole of the aircraft as provided in the Armistice had been surrendered, namely, 1,700. What we had now to press for was the completion of the railway material.

On the 8th January 458,355 French prisoners had been returned. This left 28,000 still in Germany. On the question of prisoners we had many observations to make on such points as their treatment, the miserable state in which they were found, more especially the sick, and the sufferings to which they had been exposed. A certain number had even been killed. We had asked for justifications, and received none from the German Government.

**2. Prisoners
of War**

MR. LANSING asked if they had been deliberately killed.

MARSHAL FOCH replied in the affirmative. They had been killed by firearms in camp.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had never heard of those cases. He asked if Marshal Foch meant that German guards had fired on Allied prisoners and killed them.

MARSHAL FOCH replied "Yes".

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that we must obtain justice for this.

GENERAL WEYGAND then read an extract from a Report by the French General Nudon (?) [*Nudant*], the President of the Spa Commission. The General said that every time he brought forward observations in regard to prisoners, the state of their food, and the care for them, the Germans asked for definite facts. When these were brought forward, they tried to evade their responsibility by entrenching themselves behind the state of anarchy in Germany, the lack of authority, and the excesses of the Soviets.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if there was any definite case in these reports of men being killed.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked General Weygand to turn to that part of the Report and read it.

GENERAL WEYGAND then read a long extract in French. At President Wilson's request, only a few sample cases were translated from this extract. One referred to an instance at Mannheim on the 22nd November, 1918, when, according to the German version, some French prisoners had thrown stones towards the German sentry, shouting "Dirty Boche". The German sentry had then fired, and three of the prisoners were killed. The Germans said that the sentry had suffered badly from shell shock. Another case occurred on 27th November, 1918. A number of workers had come back to one of the camps,

and it had been necessary to utilise the camp theatre as barracks. This had caused trouble among the prisoners, who had indulged in pillage and destruction. The German guards had come up from both sides of the barbed wire and fired as much in the air as anything else. Nine French, three British, two Italians, and one Russian had been killed. Thirteen French, three British, one Italian, and two Russian prisoners had been wounded, and had all died. The German report spoke of the danger of rebellion among prisoners who were badly fed.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that these cases were quite sufficient.

M. CLEMENCEAU promised to send copies of the Report to President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, and Signor Orlando.

MARSHAL FOCH said that this was the situation in which we had to renew the Armistice.

The question now arose whether we ought to include in the new terms of the Armistice other problems, such as that of Poland. He handed in a Note on Poland (Appendix I).

3. Poland and
the Armistice

M. PICHON invited any observations on Marshal Foch's Note.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that it might be unwise to discuss a proposal of this sort on its individual merits, since it formed part of the much larger question of checking the advance of Bolshevism to the Westward. There was room for great doubt as to whether this advance could be checked by arms at all. Hence he felt doubtful whether it would be wise to take the kind of action proposed by Marshal Foch until we had agreed on a general policy as to how to meet the social danger of Bolshevism.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was in general accord with President Wilson. He had serious doubts as to Marshal Foch's proposition. He was certain, however, that we could not support his proposals, having regard to our general policy towards Bolshevism. This was a question we ought to discuss at the earliest possible moment. As yet the Allies had no general policy on the subject, and Marshal Foch's proposals were subsidiary to our general reply.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, like President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George, he considered the question had certainly better be postponed until we examined the whole question of Bolshevism. It must be remembered, however, that Marshal Foch was face to face with a renewal of the Armistice. In doing this would it not be wise to reserve the right to use the route from Dantzig to Thorn if we desired it?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that all the powers required were covered by clause 16 of the Armistice, which was quoted in Marshal Foch's Memorandum.

MARSHAL FOCH agreed that the necessary powers were conveyed by clause 16.

M. PICHON summed up the opinion of those present to be that it would be better to refer to the terms of the Armistice without insisting on additional conditions. The question as to whether we should put the powers in operation was reserved until the Allies had discussed their general policy in Russia.

MARSHAL FOCH handed in a Memorandum on this subject (Appendix II).

4. Russian Prisoners Detained in Germany

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that this question formed also part of the general Russian problem. He was informed that there were still 1,200,000 Russian prisoners in Germany who had not been handed over, and that when prisoners crossed the frontier the Bolsheviks told them that they might choose between becoming Bolsheviks and starving. The question had been put to him whether we ought not to deliver these prisoners in the Ukraine to General Denikin³ or to Admiral Kolchak⁴ in Siberia or in North Russia, instead of sending them across the frontier. This was all part of the larger Russian problem. If we decided to fight Bolshevism, this would be one of the methods available. At any rate, we ought to concert our policy and act together, and act efficiently, which we had not done up to the present.

M. ORLANDO said he was in accord with Mr. Lloyd George.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he simply wished to draw attention to the condition of the Russian prisoners, and all he proposed for the moment was that the Allied Commission dealing with the question in Berlin should utilise all their resources to relieve these prisoners.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the first part of Marshal Foch's memorandum was a question of relief, which might be dealt with by the Relief Commission, and the second part was really a Red Cross matter.

MR. BALFOUR said that everyone would be in agreement in regard to this, and that there was as yet no necessity to decide on the question of repatriation.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the difficulty was that repatriation involved sending the Russians to their own country, which was ruled under conditions that we did not like. There was no question of repatriating Russians to Allied countries as part of the Armistice. Hence we must solve the question of repatriation in some other way.

M. SONNINO said that the terms of the Armistice gave us sufficient

³ Gen. Anton Ivanovich Denikin, commander in chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia.

⁴ Admiral Alexander Vasilievich Kolchak, proclaimed Supreme Governor of Russia at Omsk on November 18, 1918.

power for relieving the prisoners, but they did not give us sufficient power to enable us to send them to some other country.

MARSHAL FOCH said this was not his proposal. All that he asked was that we should allow all the means of transport at Berlin to be operated by the Allied Commission at Spa, for the relief of the Russian prisoners.

M. ORLANDO approved this proposal.

PRESIDENT WILSON also approved.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE approved, while laying stress on no condition being attached, that the Russian prisoners, when released, were to join any particular Russian force.

M. PICHON summed up by saying that Marshal Foch's proposal was agreed to, namely, that all the means of transport in the hands of the Allies at Berlin should be operated by the Allied Commission at Spa, for the relief of Russian prisoners.

MR. BALFOUR reverted to a point which had been mentioned by M. Sonnino, namely, that we ought to put some clause into the Armistice to enable us to send Russian prisoners elsewhere than across the line into Russia. If we did not reserve our rights in the terms of the Armistice we should not be able so to divert them if we wished.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he wished to limit any reserves we made to what we could do and to what did not raise controversial questions.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that Marshal Foch should be asked to formulate a clause giving to the Allies the right to lay down to which parts of Russia Russians should be sent.

This was agreed to.

M. PICHON said that he had received messages from Colonel House and the Italian Ambassador asking for American and Italian technical advisers respectively to take part in the discussions for the renewal of the Armistice.

5. Technical
Advisers in the
Armistice
Negotiations

MARSHAL FOCH said that, following the procedure adopted up to the present, technical advisers could hardly appear in the discussion with the German Representatives. His practice was to consult with technical advisers beforehand, but when he met the German Representatives he was accompanied only by Admiral Wemyss, who had been nominated by the Allied Governments to a position in regard to naval matters corresponding to his own position in regard to military matters. In fact, he acted as a plenipotentiary of the Government, and there would be no room for technical advisers in the present procedure.

M. SONNINO stated that he had received communications, first from M. Klotz and then from Colonel House, respecting the intention to add clauses to the Armistice conditions on financial questions, such as the gold supply, the printing of paper money, &c. Colonel House had told him that he had sent a note to M. Pichon saying that the United States Government intended to send four special delegates to Marshal Foch for financial and economic subjects raised in the renewal of the Armistice. As soon as he heard of this he asked to send representatives also.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if it was not a question of military technical advisers, then it was all right.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was not a question of sending additional plenipotentiaries, but only advisers.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the British had any expert advisers.

MARSHAL FOCH said they had not, with the exception of Admiral Wemyss, who had been nominated by the Governments to a position similar to his own.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that all four nations should be entitled to send technical advisers.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said there were already some experts at Spa, but that if any nations wished to send additional experts they should certainly be permitted to do so.

M. SONNINO said that there were certain military gentlemen at Spa who had been consulted, but they had not really any expert knowledge as to technical, economic, financial and commercial questions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he knew there were French economic experts.

(It was agreed that any of the Allies represented at the Supreme War Council should have the right to send technical advisory delegates to Spa.)

M. LEYGUES said that the Naval Commission established in London to supervise the execution of the naval clauses of the Armistice had, after an inspection in German ports, extending from the 3rd December to the 20th December, established the presence of—

6. Naval Con-
ditions of the
Armistice

65 submarines complete in German ports capable of being towed.
125 submarines capable of completion in German yards.
30 submarines were also estimated to be at Dantzig, and in other ports which the Commission had not had time to visit.

The Commission had accordingly made the following proposals for inclusion in the renewed Armistice:—

1. All submarines capable of being towed should be sent to England.
2. All submarines in German shipyards and on the stocks should be destroyed.
3. Construction work on all warships in German ports should cease.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if these were additional to the submarines that had already been handed over.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE explained that the figure of 160 had been chosen because the Germans had insisted that it was all they had. Now it seemed from the investigations of the Naval Commission that there were more. His personal view was that these pests ought to be disposed of.

MARSHAL FOCH read the text of a clause which he proposed to include in the Armistice, stipulating that all submarines were to be handed over.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked why we should demand their delivery in this formal manner. Why should we not demand the execution of the original agreement, namely, that all the submarines should be delivered? He asked what was the text of the original Armistice conditions.

M. PICHON read the text of clause 22, which is as follows:—

“Delivery to the Allies and United States of all the submarines (including submarine cruisers and all mine layers) which are at present in existence, with their complete armament and equipment, at the ports specified by the Allies and United States. Those that cannot put to sea will be disarmed and their crews disbanded, and must remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. The submarines which are ready to put to sea shall be prepared to leave German ports immediately on receipt of wireless orders to sail to the ports specified for their delivery, the remainder to follow as soon as possible. The terms of this Article shall be carried out within a period of fourteen days after the signature of the Armistice.”

PRESIDENT WILSON said that all we had to do was not to add additional conditions to the Armistice, but merely to insist that the terms of the original Armistice should be carried out.

M. SONNINO said he understood the view of the Commission to be that something more was required, since submarines not completed were not specifically included. Thus Germany, by this interpretation of the terms of the Armistice, could undo the intention of the Armistice. By not handing over the submarines remaining in her

ports, and by completing those that were building, she would produce a new fleet of submarines.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the question seemed to come to this: whether a submarine that was not completed was nevertheless a submarine.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that we should support the Naval Commission by insisting on a proper interpretation of the term "submarine", which should include those building.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he wanted to avoid seeming to add conditions to the Armistice. He wanted a complete fulfilment in the spirit, as well as in the letter, of the terms of the Armistice.

M. PICHON pointed out that the only difference between the original terms of the Armistice and what was not [*now*] proposed was that, in the original terms, those that could not put to sea would remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. This supervision would end with the Armistice, and the enemy would still retain their submarines. He understood now, however, that it was agreed that these should be destroyed.

(The Supreme War Council agreed that clause 22 of the original Armistice with Germany should be so interpreted as to enable the submarines under construction to be destroyed and the remainder handed over.)

M. LEYGUES said that the same Commission had established that the quantity of aircraft material in the German naval bases was very considerable, and the measures taken were insufficient.

7. Naval Aircraft

The result would be that by adding a few additional parts a large number of aircraft could be assembled within a few hours. The Commission had come unanimously to the opinion that there were no less than 800 aircraft, together with eleven Zeppelins of large size. The Commission advised the surrender of these, including the dirigibles.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE intervened at this point to say that he had not understood that this was the kind of question to be discussed to-day. From M. Clemenceau's communication he had understood that the present meeting had been summoned to discuss questions preliminary to the more formal Conferences on peace. If the formal Conference was to meet to-morrow and the present discussions were to continue, there would be absolutely no preliminary understanding on the subjects which would be raised. He did not dispute that these were very important details; but they were details,—and the present assembly had not been called together for this purpose. He had had no warning, and had brought no technical advisers, and these were questions that he could not discuss in their absence.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he agreed, but Marshal Foch had to settle the terms of the Armistice, and what was he to do?

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this was really a meeting of the Supreme War Council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there might be a very good reason for a meeting of the Supreme War Council to-morrow. Today, however, he had no technical advisers with him, and had received no warning in advance that these questions were to be raised. He suggested that, if the present Conference was sitting as the Supreme War Council, it should now adjourn until a later date, and that previous to its re-assembly the technical experts should assemble and discuss these questions, in order to clear the way for their rapid disposal at a meeting of the Supreme War Council on the morrow.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed, and suggested that the Prime Ministers, with their Foreign Secretaries, should now discuss questions connected with the Peace Conference, and before dissolving their meeting should agree as to the date and time of the meeting of the Supreme War Council.

(At the subsequent meeting it was agreed that the technical experts should meet at 10 a. m. at the Quai d'Orsay on Monday, the 13th January, to prepare the decisions for the consideration of the Supreme War Council, which should meet at 2.30 P. M. on the 13th January at the Quai d'Orsay. M. Clemenceau undertook to communicate on the same evening the subjects for discussion by the technical conference.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 12, 1919.

Appendix I

COMMANDANT EN CHEF
DES ARMÉES ALLIÉES
(Etat-Major General)
No. 555 bis

(Translation)
G. Q. G. A., January 11, 1919.

Note on the Situation in Poland

At the moment when the Armistice is about to be renewed, it is necessary to profit by the German Plenipotentiaries being assembled to ensure the settlement of a most highly important question: namely, the situation on the Eastern frontiers of Germany.

As a matter of fact, hostilities have never altogether ceased there, owing either to the Bolsheviks or to the Germans. The disturbances which exist in those regions are a danger for the whole of Europe; the situation of the Polish populations is not in bearing with the promises made by the Allies in regard to Poland.

This situation must be altered without delay.

It is therefore absolutely necessary to organize the Polish Army as quickly as possible and to ensure its transportation.

This transportation can be undertaken, under the most secure and rapid conditions, by the sea-route and by the use of the rail- and river-route of Dantzig-Thorn, of which it is therefore necessary to take possession in the first place.

The possession of this route can only be sufficiently secure if it is held by Allied troops.

To obtain these results, the practical execution of clause 16 of the Armistice should be entered upon; the said clause runs thus:—

"The Allies will be allowed free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on the Eastern frontier, either by Dantzig or by the Vistula, so as to be able to furnish supplies to the populations and also so as to be able to maintain order."

The application of these plans entails the transport to Dantzig, by Allied tonnage, of about two Allied divisions, whose duty it will be to secure the Dantzig base, the Dantzig-Thorn line, and to ensure the general protection of the line of communication.

In order to prove the disinterestedness of this occupation—until the Peace Congress takes a final decision in regard to the regions which are to be held—it would be advantageous to entrust the holding of these territories to an American command, and to give American troops a prominent part in the composition of the occupying force.

The Occupation Corps could therefore be composed as follows:—

Americans:	1 Division.
French	: 1 Regiment.
British	: 1 Regiment.
Italians	: 1 Regiment.

If the Allied Governments agreed on these fundamental lines, they could result in the insertion of the attached clause in the Convention which will have to be established for the prolongation of the Armistice.

F. FOCH

COMMANDEMENT EN CHEF

DES ARMÉES ALLIÉES

(Etat-Major Général)

AT G. Q. G. A., le 11 Janvier 1919.

(Translation)

Proposed Text of Clause for Renewal of Armistice

With a view to enable the Entente Powers to bring home the Polish troops which are at present in France and Italy, to ensure Poland's being furnished with supplies, and to help that country in the task of re-establishing order on its territory, the Allies decide to

put into immediate execution the clauses of Article XVI of the Armistice Convention, dated November 11, 1919.

To this effect, they reserve their right—

1. To occupy and operate the Dantzig Base and the Dantzig-Thorn railway and waterway;
2. To cover this line of communication by occupying with Allied troops, such territory as they will deem necessary.

Moreover, and in order to enable the operating of railway lines and inland waterways in the above-mentioned area of occupation, as well as in the part of Poland which used to be Russian territory, Germany must refit the corresponding railways and river systems with such equipment as will be decided on by the Armistice Commission, and which will be estimated according to the needs of normal operations.

Appendix II

C.-IN-C., ALLIED ARMIES

General Staff

No. 321 bis

G. Q. G. A., January 11, 1919.

Memorandum on the Russian Prisoners Detained in Germany

The Russian officers and men prisoners of war in Germany are now in true distress.

The fact is confirmed by all available information.

In the camps the situation is appalling. The prisoners are short of clothing, half-starved, and receive no attention of any kind.

Furthermore, if they are sent back to the East, they incur the risk—

Either of being shot as suspects,
Or of being incorporated by force in the Red Army.

It is for the Entente a duty of humanity to save the lives of soldiers who fought for her.

It is also her interest to keep them away from Bolshevism, and to prevent the Red Army from being reinforced with their contingents. She has two means of realising this objective:—

1. By improving the material and moral situation of Russian Prisoners.
2. By sending them back to provinces which are free from the Soviets' regime.

1. Improvement of the Prisoners' Material and Moral Situation.

The improvement can and must be looked for by immediate measures aiming at—

Supplying prisoners with food.
Giving to the sick necessary attention.
Making their accommodation satisfactory.

A first part of the food supply to be delivered by the Entente to Germany will be reserved for Russian prisoners.

Until then, Germany ought to be called upon to—

Provide for their need in food, clothing, &c.;
Give to the sick the attention they need;
Arrange the prisoners' camps so as to make them sanitary.

An Allied control of food supply and sanitary arrangements ought to be organized without delay.

2. Return of Prisoners.

This return must be considered carefully, taking into account the available transport, the previous evacuation of Serbian, Greek, and Roumanian prisoners, which is now taking place, and with due regard to the internal situation of Russia and also to the prisoners' inclinations.

It is therefore an operation which cannot be realised without delay, and which, for the time being, can be only prepared.

On account of the above-mentioned dangers, the direct return eastwards ought to be avoided.

The only provinces towards which transport of prisoners might be prepared are therefore—

On the first hand, Poland;
On the other, Southern Russia; *

and we must be content with forwarding towards these areas cases not suspect of Bolshevism and able there to reinforce parties faithful to our cause.

The organisation of these two foreseen streams of returning prisoners renders it necessary to make a selection between prisoners and to divide them between camps echeloned along the lines of communication to be used.

Thus, Allied intervention in favour of Russian prisoners implies—

Immediate measures:

Improvement of their existing conditions, making preparations for their return.

Measures to be realised later:

Carrying out the transport of repatriated prisoners.

* Siberia is too far.

Northern Russia (Archangel and Murmansk) is inaccessible during winter. The Baltic Provinces are threatened with falling soon into the hands of the Reds. [Footnote in the original.]

The essential conditions for the successful and speedy realisation of this programme is the organisation at Berlin of an Executive Committee, which might be constituted on the spot, with military representatives already detached by the Allied Powers for taking care of their own prisoners of war.

This Committee ought to be provided with the necessary means, receive additional personnel, military and civil, interpreters, medical attendance, etc., and be duly empowered to—

Direct and co-ordinate the activity of the Red Cross Societies and other charitable institutions.

Notify in the name of the Entente, to the German Services concerned, all instructions concerning camp accommodation, food supply, the grouping of prisoners and their return.

If the Allied Governments approved of the above arrangements, instructions to that effect would be forwarded to the Armistice Commission at Spa.

Foch

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay on Sunday, January 12, at 4 p. m.**

PRESENT

FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY	UNITED STATES
M. Clemenceau.	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd	Signor Orlando	President Wilson
M. Pichon.	George.	Baron Sonnino	Mr. R. Lansing
M. Dutasta.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.	Count Aldrovandi	Mr. A. H. Frazier
M. Berthelot.	Lt.-Col. Sir Maurice	Major A. Jones.	
M. Bearn.	Hankey.		
Capt. Portier.			

Interpreter: M. Mantoux.

(NOTE: This meeting was a continuation of a meeting of the Supreme War Council commenced earlier in the afternoon, procès-verbal of which has been prepared separately.)

M. PICHON said the first question to examine was the general procedure in regard to the Peace discussions. The French Government had circulated a proposal on the subject to the Associated Governments (Appendix A). If any other document on the same lines had been prepared, a decision would have to be taken as to which proposal should form the basis of discussion.

**1. The Procedure
of the Peace
Discussions**

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether this was not a question for discussion at the larger Conference to be held to-morrow.

M. PICHON said that there were many questions in regard to procedure which the larger Conference would have to decide itself. But there were certain subjects which must be discussed before the formal Conference, such as the number of Delegates, and how they were to be summoned, etc.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had studied the French document. He would have some suggestions to make when it was discussed in detail. He considered, however, that the general outlines of the proposal were well arranged, and that it formed a good basis for discussion.

M. PICHON asked whether it was agreed that there should be five Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he agreed to this. But he had something to say as regards the next proposal, that there should be three Representatives of each of the smaller belligerent Powers. If this number

was decided on, it would involve an enormous gathering. Two would seem quite enough.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that one Representative was sufficient for Siam; two for Belgium, Greece, &c.; while Brazil, as a larger country, should have three.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that at previous meetings Belgium had always been satisfied with one Representative. If there were more than one apiece, the Conference would become very unwieldly. There was a second point that he would have to press, namely, in regard to the representation of the British self-governing Dominions and India. They would not be present at all the discussions, but in matters which concerned them they ought to be properly represented.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether this could not be effected by making the members of the British Delegation interchangeable.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British Dominions were entirely autonomous, and that the British Government could not have induced them to send a single unit without their own consent. His proposal would be to reduce the representation of the smaller belligerent Powers to two apiece and place the Dominions and India on the same scale, with the sole exception of Newfoundland, which, being a small Dominion, would be content with one Representative.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this question of representation was largely one of sentiment and psychology. If the Dominions were given this additional representation, the impression amongst those who did not know the full facts would be that they were merely additional British Representatives. This impression would be especially strong among the small Powers. The Great Powers, to put the matter brutally, would appear to be running the Peace Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that they had run the war.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he wished to convey a more comfortable impression. If the British Government could form their Delegation, whatever its size, by including as many of their Dominion Representatives as they liked, they would relieve the difficulty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that one reason for which this plan would not meet the case was owing to questions like that of the Colonies. This question of the Colonies was in some cases of less importance to the British Empire as a whole than to particular Dominions, which had a point of view quite apart from the purely British one. If five of the Dominion Representatives were included in the British Delegation, Great Britain would have no representation at all. In his opinion, the smaller Powers ought to be satisfied with one Representative apiece. In this case, he asked for the same representation for

the Dominions and India. Take Australia, for example. They had sent more men to the war than Belgium or Serbia or Roumania. They had proved the most magnificent fighters, and had, he believed actually lost more dead than the United States of America. They said that they were entitled to separate representation. It was no good saying that the British Government represented them, because, in fact, on many questions they could not. He asked, therefore, that they should be on the same footing as the smaller belligerent Powers, that is to say, that they should have the same representation, and should be invited to attend on all questions in which they had a special interest.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that, if the British Delegation did not represent the Dominions, at least they were their friends. Probably they would back them up at the meetings. Consequently, in every question affecting the Dominions which might also affect the rest of the world (and he pointed out that the question of the German Colonies was of interest to the rest of the world as well as to the Dominions), Great Britain and the Dominions between them would have 10 or 12 votes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that there would be no votes.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in his view the British Delegation would ask the Representatives of the Dominions and India to present their own case on many points, particularly where they had a special point of view.

MR. LANSING suggested that there might be five technical delegates of the Dominions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that, as President Wilson had said, sentiment was of great importance, and this would rule out this proposal.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that Canada had no special interests. For example, they had no special interest in the German Colonies. When we discussed German South-West Africa, there would be, according to his plan, say, four British and one South African Representative.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that in addition to discussions on particular Colonies, there would be general discussions on the disposal of the Colonies. Canada would certainly be interested in these. Canada was also specially interested in President Wilson's third point dealing with economic questions.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that of course their views would be invited but, according to his idea, this could be done by the adoption of the panel system.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that, apart from the Dominions, India had made very great sacrifices and efforts in the war, and should also be fully represented.

M. PICHON said that if Mr. Lloyd George's proposal as to numbers were accepted, there was no doubt that there would be great disappointment amongst such Powers as Greece, Serbia, etc., who had taken a considerable part in the War and sustained great losses. But the great objection of those minor belligerent Allies would be that they were placed on the same footing as countries which had declared war without taking any part in hostilities, or had merely broken off diplomatic negotiations [*relations?*]. He suggested, therefore, that if three Representatives were too many, these Powers should, at any rate, have two Delegates.

M. SONNINO wished to know whether Montenegro was to have two Representatives or one.

M. PICHON said that at present the question as to whether certain categories of Powers were to have one or two or three Representatives, was only being discussed as one of principle.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that there was another method of distinguishing between the status given to the different Powers, namely, the frequency of the occasions on which they would be brought into the discussions. For example, on the question of the League of Nations all the smaller States ought to be consulted, but countries such as Serbia and Belgium, which were concerned in territorial adjustments, would be called in more frequently than others.

MR. LANSING asked whether the Dominions would be brought into the discussions on the European arrangements.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that they had as much right to such representation as any American or extra-European nation. They had sacrificed several hundred thousands of their men in Europe, and were entitled to some say in the arrangements for the future peace of the world.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had a sentimental feeling as regards Roumania and Serbia. He was quite willing that they should be represented out of proportion to any principle.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the part which they had taken in the struggle should have some influence on the question. The Dominions and India claimed the same representation as Powers which had made the same contribution as they to the victory. He did not mind whether this representation was by one or two members.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not see why Siam should be in the list.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed.

M. PICHON suggested that they should examine the various States one by one.

He suggested—

- 2 for Belgium
- 2 for Greece
- 2 for Serbia
- 1 for Portugal
- 1 for Siam
- 2 for Roumania

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that Portugal had employed troops in Africa as well as in France, and asked that his dissent from the proposed limitation of Portugal's representation might be recorded.

M. PICHON urged that Roumania should have two Delegates. She had had a Treaty, and after being forced out of the war had again become an Ally.

MR. BALFOUR said he had no objection to Roumania being treated on this footing for purposes of representation, but he did not wish thereby to renew every clause of the treaty which Roumania had broken by going out of the War. He did not wish to put her [in] exactly the same position as she was before she went out of the War.

M. SONNINO said there were two questions:—

1. That of representation. For what Roumania had suffered, and for the part she had taken, she should have proper representation.
2. The question of her Treaty rights. This was a distinct question, which he agreed ought to be reserved.

M. SONNINO's proposal was accepted.

M. PICHON suggested:

- 2 representatives for China
- 2 for Brazil.

These were agreed to.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, as regards the Dominions and India, the only claim which he put in was that they should be called in on questions which affected them, in the same way as Belgium, Serbia, etc. He proposed that each of the Dominions should have two Representatives and Newfoundland one.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that other States would have no backers and sponsors like the British Dominions. Great Britain had a full representation as a Great Power. Consequently, the Dominions would be supported by five Representatives in the most powerful section of the Conference. It would be open to misconstruction if the British Government insisted, in addition, on two Representa-

tives of each of the Dominions. He himself was quite willing to concede one.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if there was any reluctance to accept his proposal, he would like to suspend the discussion in order to give him an opportunity of discussing the matter with his colleagues in the Imperial War Cabinet.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed to this procedure, and said that he hoped Mr. Lloyd George would not leave on the minds of the Dominions Representatives the impression that there was the least jealousy.

(The discussion on the representation of the British Dominions was then adjourned.)

M. PICHON's proposal that Poland and the Czecho-Slovak State should each have two Representatives was agreed to, as well as the proposal for one Representative each of the small Powers, theoretically belligerent, of those that had broken off diplomatic negotiations, of neutral States, and of States in process of formation.

M. PICHON said that the French Government had received communications from Serbia to the effect that Montenegro had become

**2. Representation
of Montenegro**

a part of the State under the rule of the Kara-georgivich monarchy. At the same time a message had been received from Podgoritzza to the effect that a Constituent Assembly had agreed that Montenegro should be absorbed by Serbia. The King of Montenegro, however, stated that the decision of the Constituent Assembly was invalid and negligible; hence it would seem that a decision could not be taken before the Conference met. This was the point of view of the French Government. The question arose in consequence as to whether Montenegro was to be regarded as a separate State entitled to separate representation at the Conference or as part of the Serbian representation.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the action of Serbia in regard to Montenegro had gone somewhat towards prejudicing him against the Government of Serbia. To act with force like this was contrary to the principle of self-determination. Although he had no precise knowledge, he would not be surprised to learn that the King of Montenegro was right and that the Constituent Assembly at Podgoritzza had not been properly constituted. Serbia had had no right to send her troops into Montenegro. The events of the last few months had almost made him a partisan of Montenegro. Hence he was strongly in favour of taking no notice of the Serbian claims and of giving Montenegro separate representation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was not sure of the facts, but he felt that Montenegro ought to have the right to state her case before its being determined whether she was entitled to separate representation. He was not anti-Serbian in this matter, but he felt that we ought to ascertain the facts.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he was anti-Serbian in this case, because no country had the right to take the self-determination of another country into her own hands. He asked who was to select the Montenegrin Representatives. The *de facto* Government was clearly under Serbian control, and was not qualified to state the opposite point of view. The King, who was in Paris, could hardly present more than his personal side of the question. Hence, though he was clear that Montenegro ought to be represented, he was not clear how that representation should be settled.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had no clear idea as to when and how the invasion of Montenegro had taken place.

M. SONNINO said that it had occurred immediately after the Armistice. The Serbians had penetrated Montenegro and had opposed any contemporaneous action on Italy's part. In order to avoid fighting between Allies, the Italians had kept away from Cetinje. The movement for inclusion in Serbia was made under Serbian auspices. There was, however, a contrary party which desired to form part of the Yugo-Slav State, but as an autonomous unit in that State. For his part, he could not support a Government which had taken such action. There would always be Representatives of the opposite side in the Serbian delegation, so that if the King of Montenegro nominated Delegates, the other side would nevertheless be fully represented at the Conference. There had been considerable disturbances in Montenegro as a re-action against the Serbian action, and help was being invited. It was a very bad beginning to the new regime to follow the War.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that it should be agreed that Montenegro was to have representation, but that no decision should be taken as to how it was to be settled.

M. PICHON asked to whom the invitation to the Conference should be addressed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that Montenegro should be treated as a State in process of formation. M. Sonnino had presented the case for Montenegro.

(M. Sonnino demurred to this.)

Somebody, Mr. Lloyd George continued, must have presented the case to M. Sonnino. Montenegro ought to be given an opportunity of presenting its case, and it would not be necessary to scrutinise too closely the credentials of the person who represented it.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought it would be important to make sure that the case was represented by somebody who really was entitled to represent Montenegro.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the question ought not to be decided apart from the question of how the Yugo Slav State was to be represented. The two cases were on all fours.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that Montenegro was an older State than Serbia. She could therefore be separate from Yugo-Slavia. Some of the other units of Yugo-Slavia were saying the same thing, namely, that Serbia was trying to put them under her own domination rather than to associate them with her. Since the meetings were not going to take place at once, and events were occurring all the time which might influence the ultimate decision, he thought it would be quite unnecessary to do more than decide in principle that Montenegro was to be represented.

MR. LANSING said that America recognized the Government of the King of Montenegro.

M. SONNINO said that no one had stated the case to him. What he had said had been from his own knowledge. He pointed out that Montenegro was a very much older State than Serbia. She alone had resisted for centuries the domination of the Turks. She took part in the War in order to help Serbia and to preserve her own future independence. A good many Montenegrins had continued fighting. They had wanted the Italians to form a separate battalion of them, and some had been sent to Salonika for incorporation in Serbian units. He agreed with President Wilson's view that Montenegro should be represented. He suggested that in the meantime the United States of America should send a representative to discover how things were in that country. No news was allowed to percolate out of Montenegro and no Allied troops were allowed to go there.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that if President Wilson wishes to send someone to enquire, he could do so without any authority from the Powers associated with him.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he was quite willing to send someone, but not an official representative on behalf of this Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE entirely agreed with this view. He pointed out that it would be extremely offensive to an Ally that any nation should give expression at this Conference, formally or informally, that there ought to be any inquiry.

Conclusion:—It was decided in principle that Montenegro should be represented at the Conference, but the decision was left open as to how her Representatives should be chosen.

(The Conference then had a short adjournment.)

After the adjournment:

Renewal of the
Armistice with
Germany

M. CLEMENCEAU raised the question, which had been discussed earlier in the afternoon at the meeting of the Supreme War Council, as to when Marshal Foch was to receive his instructions as to the renewal of the Armistice.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked for a list of the questions involved in this discussion.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he could not give a complete list, but among the questions was one relating to coke, another relating to the surrender of Germany's merchant fleet, and a third relating to the Reichsbank.

After a short discussion it was agreed that technical Representatives of the various Powers should meet in conference at the Quai d'Orsay at 10 A. M. on Monday, the 13th January, in order to prepare decisions for the consideration of the Supreme War Council, which should meet at the Quai d'Orsay at 2:30 on Monday, the 13th January.

M. CLEMENCEAU undertook to give instructions for a list of the questions for consideration to be circulated on the same evening.

M. SONNINO said that the whole question of Bolshevism was involved.

M. PICHON did not agree. He pointed out that there were various representatives of Russian opinion in Paris—for example, M. Sazonoff,¹ Prince Lvoff² and others, including Socialists, who represented every shade of opinion. These asked to be represented. His opinion was that this could not be done. We should first have to acknowledge the Omsk Government, whom they came to represent. At present it seemed impossible to recognise this Government as the Government of Russia. It was not strong enough to be regarded as representative of Russia as a whole. But this was no reason why these personalities should not be allowed to put their views unofficially. His suggestion, then, was that Russia as a State should have no representation, but that the Conference should be allowed to hear such persons as he had mentioned.

The Representa-
tion of Russia at
the Conference

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this had to be dealt with in one way or another, because at present the Allies had got themselves in a fix for the reason that they had no definite policy in Russia. They ought to decide whether to withdraw their troops or to reinforce

¹ Sergel D. Sazonoff, Tsarist Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1910-1916; Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Volunteer Army of Denikin and later for Kolchak; representative of both governments at Paris.

² Prince George E. Lvoff, Russian Prime Minister from March to July 1917; at this time head of the Russian Political Bureau in Paris.

them. Unless reinforced, they were of no use whatsoever. He had nothing to say against these people, Prince Lvoff, &c. We were told they represented every shade of opinion. As a matter of fact, they represented every opinion except the prevalent opinion in Russia.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out it was prevalent in some respects.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he feared the fact that it was prevalent must be accepted. The peasants accepted Bolshevism for the same reason as the peasants had accepted it in the French Revolution, namely, that it gave them land. The Bolsheviks were the *de facto* Government. We had formally recognised the Czar's Government, although at the time we knew it to be absolutely rotten. Our reason had been that it was the *de facto* Government. We recognised the Don Government, the Archangel Government and the Omsk Government, although none of them were good, but we refused to recognise the Bolsheviks. To say that we ourselves should pick the representatives of a great people was contrary to every principle for which we had fought. It was possible that the Bolsheviks did not represent Russia. But certainly Prince Lvoff did not; neither did Savinkoff,³ although he was a good man. The British Government made exactly the same mistake when they said that the *émigrés* represented France. This led them into a war which lasted about twenty-five years. The Russian peasants probably felt towards Trotsky⁴ much as the French peasants did towards Robespierre. This question must now be settled. He hoped that the Allies would not separate and announce that they had made perpetual peace when Siberia, which formed about half Asia, and Russia, which formed about half Europe, were still at war. He, himself, would make proposals in due course, but, in the meantime, he wishes to protest against an attempt to select representatives for some hundred million people.

M. PICHON quite agreed that the persons he had named should not be admitted as representatives of Russia. He only wished to take advantage of their presence to hear what they had to bring forward.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that to do so would give the public the impression that we considered they represented Russia. The fact that they had been seen by the Conference would be known. If we wished to hear their views, we could obtain a memorandum from them or have a private conversation.

M. PICHON agreed.

Conclusion:—It was agreed that Russia should not be represented at the Conference, but that the persons named by M. Pichon and others could be interviewed personally or asked to supply memoranda.

³ Boris Savinkoff, Executive Minister of War under Kerensky, August 7 to August 25, 1918; at this time a representative of the Kolchak government at Paris.

⁴ Leon D. Trotsky, Soviet Commissar for Military Affairs.

M. PICHON then read Section II of the French Memorandum, on which no comments were offered.

M. PICHON then commenced to read Section III.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he did not see how the Allies could work on a programme such as was now proposed. He asked how the Nations could be represented as had been proposed in these discussions. Surely, they must have full representation or none at all. He quoted instances in which Powers which would only be represented part of the time would, in fact, have a great interest in general questions, to the discussion of which they would not normally be invited.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that this system had been adopted with success at the Supreme War Council, when Greece, Serbia, Japan, Belgium and other countries had been invited.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that this was only in the War. The present Conference was to settle the world for a long time to come. He did not like to give even the appearance of only consulting Nations when the Great Powers considered that they were concerned.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if this was not reality. Were not the Great Powers, in fact, settling the questions?

PRESIDENT WILSON said this was why he maintained that we ought to have no formal Conferences, but only conversations. The moment the formal Conferences were entered into these difficulties arose. He felt that this would not satisfy the smaller nations, and satisfaction was an essential part of the Peace settlement.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he did not see why they should not be satisfied. The questions to be decided in the War were just as difficult as those to be decided in the Peace.

MR. BALFOUR asked why there should not be a number of informal conversations with informal conclusions. These conclusions, labelled as informal and preliminary suggestions, would then be sent to the small Powers for their consideration and returned by them with their remarks, which would be discussed at further informal Conferences.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether he was to understand that no decision could be taken without Costa Rica and Honduras being consulted. If so, he could not agree. It was evident that in European questions the danger was not so great for Costa Rica or Nicaragua as for European Powers. But there were many questions of vital importance to the latter. He had always understood that the four Great Powers would meet and settle these questions, admitting the co-operation of the other Powers. They were not bound to decide the question that evening, but there were certain considerations which ought to be taken into account before the decision was taken. There was the great demand for publicity of the proceedings of the Con-

ference, more especially in France. But to solve the questions in private conversation would render any publicity impossible. This would create the utmost disappointment and the belief that things were not right. He insisted that public opinion should be taken into account. He quite agreed in the principle that the small countries were as much concerned as the great, and that nothing ought to be done to wound the susceptibilities of the small countries. But these countries were not in the same position towards the greater problems as the larger Powers. Already Japan had been admitted to the Conference and was to have five delegates, although Japan had not done very much in the War, and what she had done had been mainly in her own interests. He proposed, therefore, that the meeting should adjourn in order to reflect upon the proposals of President Wilson and Mr. Balfour, but that in their reflections all should remember that we must avoid doing anything likely to create distrust in public opinion.

MR. BALFOUR asked what were M. Clemenceau's ideas on the question of publicity.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that in his scheme there would be partial publicity, according as the Allied Governments may think fit.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that, apart from the Armistice, nothing had been discussed to-day but the question of representation at the Conference. He asked what he should say when approached by the Press. What was the Conference to which the discussions on representation related?

M. CLEMENCEAU said they were the preliminary Peace Conferences which all the world was awaiting. He contemplated two Conferences, a preliminary Conference of the Allied Powers, followed by the regular Peace Congress. There were altogether three kinds of Conferences:—

1. Informal conversations, about which nothing would be announced;
2. The formal preliminary Peace Conference; and
3. The Peace Congress.

(After some discussion, it was agreed that the press should be informed that after a meeting of the Supreme War Council, which had been concerned with questions relating to the renewal of the Armistice, the Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries had had an exchange of views as to the method and procedure at the Conference for formulating in a preliminary way the terms of Peace.)

M. PICHON pointed out that Technical Advisers would be necessary on many questions—for example, on financial questions. He suggested that when required they should take the place of one of the Delegates at the

Technical
Advisers

Conference.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not require Technical Delegates, but only Technical Advisers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that Technical Advisers should sit behind their Delegates without being reckoned as additional Delegates. If it was necessary for them to make an explanation on a technical point, the head of the Delegation would ask the President if this could be permitted.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that any formal process which was adopted must not exclude any informal process.

(It was agreed that Technical Advisers should not sit at the table, but should sit behind the Delegates at the Conference.)

(It was agreed that the Japanese Ambassador in Paris should be permitted to attend future conversations.)

Japanese Representation at the Informal Conversations

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 12, 1919.

Appendix (A) to IC-104 [BC-A1]

(Translation)

Plan of the Preliminary Conversations Between the Allied Ministers

[Here follows text of the plan, printed in volume I, page 386].

Notes of a Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held at Quai
d'Orsay at 2:30 on January 12, 1919

Were present:

UNITED STATES:	The President The Hon Robert Lansing General Bliss Mr Frazier
FRANCE:	M. Clemenceau M Pichon Marshal Foch General Weygand M Clementel M Leygues M Klotz M. Loucheur M Dutasta M. Berthelot Comte de Bearn
GREAT BRITAIN:	Mr. Lloyd George Mr Balfour Sir Henry Wilson Sir Maurice Hankey
ITALY:	Signor Orlando Baron Sonnino Comte Aldrovandi

M. PICHON, who was the Chairman, opened the session by calling upon Marshal Foch to give an account of the fulfilment of the terms of the armistice with Germany, an armistice which had been extended from December 17 [13] to January 17 and which was to be extended again.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the terms of the armistice had only been partially fulfilled, especially as far as the delivery of railway material was concerned. The delivery of war material was nearly complete: 5000 guns and 25,000 machine guns having already been delivered; there were still a certain number of heavy guns not yet delivered and also a number of *minenwerfer*. In general, however, he could say that the material of war would soon be delivered. Up to the 9th of January, 1967 locomotives out of 5000 had been delivered. Of 150,000 freight cars, up to January 9, 1919, only 61560 had been delivered. Nearly all of the motor trucks had been delivered, to be exact: 4422 out of 5000. All of the aeroplanes had been received, 1700 in all. On January 8th the total number of French prisoners repatriated was 458,355, the remainder still in

Germany amounted only to 28,000. Marshal Foch stated that he had many observations to make regarding the treatment of French prisoners, the state of misery in which they had been found and especially the sufferings which they had endured in the last few weeks. A number of soldiers had been deliberately killed by being shot at in the camps.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE inquired whether the sentinels had actually fired at the prisoners.

MARSHAL FOCH stated that this was the case, that they had repeatedly demanded that the guilty should be tried and suffer the penalty, but nothing had been done.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE again expressed surprise and stated that he had never heard of this matter. He asked whether evidence of specific cases existed. Marshal Foch thereupon called upon General Weygand to read out the depositions of eye-witnesses who had been present when German sentinels fired upon French prisoners. General Weygand then read out several depositions.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether there were any new conditions to be added to the extension of the armistice. Marshal Foch replied that in the extension of the armistice they should include problems relating to the Polish situation. (Annexure No. 1.)¹

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that perhaps it might be unwise to express an opinion on this subject by itself because it would form a part of a much vaster problem; there was great doubt in his mind as to whether Bolshevism could be checked by arms, therefore it seemed to him unwise to take action in a military form before the Powers were agreed upon a course of action for checking Bolshevism as a social and political danger.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE was in entire agreement with President Wilson upon this point. He thought the Polish problem could not be treated apart from the general situation; he felt that at the earliest possible moment the problem should be studied and a general policy adopted.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he believed that a decision in this case may better be postponed until the whole question of Bolshevism could be dealt with at one time.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether this contingency was not provided for in clause 16 of the armistice.

M. PICHON then read out clause 16 which, in the opinion of the meeting conferred sufficiently wide powers. M. Pichon stated that it was necessary to consider the question of the Russian prisoners of war.

¹ See Appendix I to BC-A, p. 477.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE believed that there were 1,200,000 of such prisoners in a state of liberty who were now crossing the frontier; they were asked by Bolshevists either to join their party or to have their throats cut. He thought the treatment of these prisoners was a part of the whole general problem; it was not merely a question of feeding them. The great question was whether the Allies could move them to Ukraine or to any other part of Russia. Signor Orlando was entirely in accord with Mr. Lloyd George.

MARSHAL FOCH called the attention of the Council to conditions which he proposed, namely that a Commission should be formed at Berlin, composed of Delegates of all the Powers and that they might occupy themselves with the question of the prisoners under the general supervision of the I. A. Committee at Spa.

BARON SONNINO asked whether the clauses of the armistice conferred upon the Allies the right of directing prisoners to any particular part of Russia. He wished to know whether they had sufficient powers to do this.

MARSHAL FOCH was of the opinion that there was nothing in the armistice which gave them such authority.

MR. BALFOUR thought it was unnecessary to come to any decision yet upon the question of repatriation.

The PRESIDENT felt that Russia itself was in a condition which the Allies did not like and could not control. Russia being in the condition in which she was, he did not believe it possible to introduce such a decision into the terms of an armistice.

BARON SONNINO believed that in the clauses of the armistice there was sufficient authority to provide for the feeding of the prisoners, but nothing to decide where such prisoners were to be sent to.

MARSHAL FOCH did not believe that was the question at issue. He wished to know whether the Governments were agreed that an I. A. Commission should be formed at Berlin under the general supervision of the Committee at Spa to do everything necessary for revictualling the prisoners without any conditions being attached.

M. PICHON found that the meeting agreed in approving the suggestions of Marshal Foch.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether anything should be introduced into the armistice giving the Allies the liberty to deal with the future destinies of the Russians.

The PRESIDENT believed that Marshal Foch should in the meantime be asked to formulate a decision giving the Allies the right to send the prisoners to any part of Russia which they thought fit.

M. PICHON stated that for the renewal of the armistice he had received suggestions from Colonel House and from Comte Bonin²

² Count Bonin Longare, Italian Ambassador to France.

suggesting that certain technical advisors be named to confer with Marshal Foch in the deliberations preceding the renewal of the armistice.

MARSHAL FOCH stated that there would be no technical advisors practically speaking when the armistice was renewed. He conferred with the technical advisors before talking to the Germans; he and Admiral Wemyss were the only plenipotentiaries who addressed the Germans. He recalled that when hostilities were interrupted he had received full powers from the Supreme War Council to sign for the Governments. It was the plenipotentiaries, not the technical advisors who signed. If it were thought well to choose other plenipotentiaries, then another question was raised.

BARON SONNINO said that he had a communication from M. Klotz concerning financial matters, gold, etc.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was after all not a question of military advisors.

The PRESIDENT said he did not understand that it was a question of having plenipotentiaries, but a question of having advisors for the plenipotentiaries.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that all four Great Powers send their technical advisors.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that if questions other than military questions were to be discussed, there should certainly be other experts at Spa. Marshal Foch thought that the experts were already there; if there were not enough of them he entirely approved of sending others.

BARON SONNINO thought that there were only a few military gentlemen at Spa, but, to his knowledge, no technical advisors. It was true there were a few French experts, but no British or Americans.

M. CLEMENCEAU was all for sending whatever technical experts were required.

M. PICHON then asked the Minister of Marine, M. Leygues, for a report upon the naval conditions of the armistice.

M. LEYGUES stated that the I. A. Naval Council in its investigation of the German ports had discovered that 65 German submarines were complete and capable of being towed, and 125 submarines in course of construction. 30 additional ones were at Dantzic or in the Baltic. He proposed as a new condition to the Naval armistice that all the submarines fit to take the sea should be towed to some point in Great Britain, that those in the process of construction should be destroyed, and that no further work should be permitted to take place upon ships of war in German shipyards.

The PRESIDENT asked whether these submarines were in addition to the 160 submarines stipulated.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that they were in addition; he said that they had only asked for 160, because they thought that Germany had no more; he thought that these pests should be destroyed.

The PRESIDENT asked why this clause was to be added in such a formal manner instead of demanding the fulfilment of the original armistice; he thought it would produce a bad impression if new clauses were added and more demands made than had been originally contemplated. President Wilson then requested to hear the terms of the original armistice; after hearing them read, the President was of the opinion that it was not necessary to do anything further than to prescribe an interpretation of the existing clauses.

BARON SONNINO drew attention to the artfulness of the Germans; he pointed out that to the German mind submarines not completed were not submarines; he thought therefore that they would claim it was not necessary to deliver them.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that they say this was the interpretation which they placed upon the terms of the Naval armistice and to insist upon it. What he wished to avoid was, because of mistakes made, to seem to add new conditions.

BARON SONNINO thought that this precaution would be maintained up to the signing of Peace. After that, the Germans would do what they liked with any submarine which remained to them.

The MINISTER OF MARINE stated that in addition to the submarines, there were also 800 hydroplanes and 11 zeppelins; he expressed the desire that these airships and hydroplanes be delivered to the Allies or else rendered inutilizable.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE objected that he did not think that they had met to discuss such matters; he thought that they were going to have some sort of agreement between themselves before the formal meetings took place; he thought they were going to have a confidential talk upon important matters. Marshal Foch departed the day after to-morrow and needed instructions to extend the armistice.

The PRESIDENT thought that it was not necessary to have a formal meeting on the following day but they could decide subsequently what would be the best day for such meeting.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE quite agreed that the lengthier conferences could be put off until later.

It was finally agreed that Marshal Foch should furnish the three Governments with a memorandum stating what technical subjects were to be discussed and that the four Governments should then appoint their technical advisors to meet at 10 o'clock on the following day at the Palais d'Orsay. After reaching a decision these technical advisors were to report to the Supreme War Council, which would sit again at 2:30 on the same day. He then decided that the

meeting should continue without the military men who thereupon withdrew.

M. PICHON thought that it was in order for the meeting to consider the procedure of the Conference. The French Government had already submitted a draft of such procedure.³ If any other Government had submitted a draft they would be glad to consider it; otherwise, he thought the French document might be taken as a basis.

The PRESIDENT asked whether this subject was not for the more general conference.

M. PICHON stated that there were many things in the procedure which could not be decided without the presence of the delegates, but they should at least decide upon the number of delegates.

LLOYD GEORGE had seen the document, and also [*although?*] he had a few suggestions to make, he thought that the draft was well considered and formed a good basis for discussion.

M. PICHON said they proposed that there should be 5 delegates for each of the great powers.

BARON SONNINO enquired whether they were to be interchangeable.

M. PICHON thought that this was another question which could be raised when the technical advisors were named.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE could not see the object of three delegates for each of the smallerelligent powers. He thought that for Belgium and Serbia two delegates would be enough and for Siam one. Belgium had been represented at several of the Meetings of the Supreme War Council by one delegate only and she had also found that sufficient. If they increased the number of delegates, there would be a tremendous crowd. He was afraid he would have to press for representation of the Dominions and the Colonies.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether that could not be provided for by making the delegates interchangeable.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that they were independent nations and that they had given the British Empire one million of their best troops.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that it was rather a psychological matter, that the impression would gain ground that such an addition would be an increase in the representation of Great Britain, the Great Powers would thus be running the Peace Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that they had run the war.

The PRESIDENT thought that if they restricted themselves to 5 they would remove the impression that they were overloading the top.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that they consider the question of South Africa. They had conquered their enemy; they formed a

³ Vol. I, p. 386.

league amongst themselves which was quite independent of the British Empire; they had a point of view quite different from theirs. What he wished to say was that as Belgium had been satisfied with one representative they consult the small powers only when they wanted them. Australia had furnished more men than either Belgium or Servia; she had had more men killed than the United States. The Colonies had a point of view different from that of the British Empire.

THE PRESIDENT requested Mr. Lloyd George to see how it would work out: while Great Britain did not represent her colonies, they were still her friends, so that in all questions affecting the Dominions Great Britain and her Dominions would have 10 votes.

M. CLEMENCEAU objected that there would be no voting, except by countries.

MR. LANSING suggested that Great Britain had 5 technical advisors in addition to her regular delegates.

THE PRESIDENT felt that the Colonies would have ample opportunities to state their views.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE insisted that the contribution of the colonies to the war had been tremendous.

MR. LANSING found it unjust that those South American Republics which had actually gone to war with Germany should have no better representation than those Republics which had merely broken off relations.

M. PICHON thought that to give Belgium, Serbia and Greece and Roumania the same votes and no more than the South American countries, which had done nothing in the war, would be a great injustice.

MR. SONNINO then inquired what would be the fate of Montenegro. MR. CLEMENCEAU replied that he preferred to take up one subject at a time.

MR. PICHON said it was necessary to decide the question whether the smaller powers which had taken part in the war should have three or two delegates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that there seemed to him to be another method of distinguishing between those nations which had taken part in the war and those which had not; that the privilege of frequent attendance should be given to powers which had taken part, and those which had not taken part might be called in less frequently. He was afraid of getting a sort of public meeting.

MR. LANSING inquired whether the Dominions would have a voice in discussing the question of the disputed boundaries. MR. LLOYD GEORGE answered that they really have a blood interest in France and Belgium.

The PRESIDENT interposed by saying that he believed that everything which affected the world's peace was the world's business. He said he had a sentimental feeling for Belgium, Roumania and Serbia which was affecting his thought, and that he would like to give them a greater proportional representation, if possible.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the part which they had taken in the struggle should count. The PRESIDENT asked why should Siam have a vote.

MR. PICHON believed that the meeting should name the powers and their representation in sequence. It was thereupon decided that Belgium should have two (2), Greece two (2), Serbia two (2), Portugal one (1), Siam one (1) and Roumania two (2).

MR. BALFOUR said he was the champion of Portugal and he wished to call attention to the fact that she had troops in France and had incurred debts.

MR. PICHON pointed out that Roumania had treaties with France, Italy and Great Britain which she had made before entering the war.

MR. BALFOUR did not mind Roumania being treated as an ally for the purpose of representation, but he did not want to put Roumania in the same position in which she would have been if she had fought successfully to the end. "I think Roumania ought to get a part of Russia."

BARON SONNINO thought that these were two distinct questions. He thought that they all agreed that Roumania deserved two (2) representatives for what she suffered, but that the question of whether the treaty rights were to be restored or not should be held in reserve.

MR. PICHON then went on with the representation. China was allotted two (2) and Brazil two (2).

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then said that he proposed an amendment about the Dominions. He called attention to the second paragraph of clause two of the French document and suggested that wherever questions arose which interested the Dominions they should have two representatives for each Dominion.

THE PRESIDENT begged to make the suggestion that other states had no backers for their Dominions. It is not, he said, as though they were isolated. They would, undoubtedly, welcome advice, but it seemed to him that with five representatives for Great Britain they could interchange their representation. It seemed to him that allowing each Dominion two representatives in addition to the five allowed Great Britain in these International Councils might be open to misconstruction. He suggested that each Dominion have one representative.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that if there were any feeling against the Dominions having two representatives he preferred to have the

matter suspended, rather than decided. The PRESIDENT hoped that Mr. Lloyd George did not get the impression that there was the slightest jealousy in his remark.

MR. LANSING inquired how many Dominions there were. If Newfoundland, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa and India were included, that would mean five additional representatives.

MR. PICHON then asked the conference to consider the representation of Poland and the Czecho-Slovaks. It was suggested that Poland should have two (2) and Bohemia two (2).

It was decided that the question of the Dominions would be postponed until the following day.

MR. PICHON then described the situation in Montenegro at length showing that there were two factions, one claiming that Montenegro desired to be amalgamated with the Greater Serbia, and the other, the party of the King, insisting that the meeting at Podgoritzza did not actually reflect the sentiment of the country.

The PRESIDENT said that the action of Serbia toward Montenegro had gone some way toward prejudicing his mind against Serbia. It was absolutely against all principle that the processes of self-government should be forced, and "I consider it likely that the meeting at Podgoritzza was an extra constitutional assembly, and called together under conditions which could not be considered legal." He knew of no reason for the presence of Serbian troops in Montenegro, and the circumstances of the last few months had made him a partisan of the rights of that country.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that Montenegro ought to have the right to state her own case, and we should hear the case before determining it. He said he was not anti-Serbian.

The PRESIDENT disclaimed any anti-Serbian feeling, except in this case. He did not very well see who was to select the Montenegrin representative. The *de facto* government was under Serbian domination and the King was in exile. While he feels that Montenegro ought to be represented, he did not see how the representative should be chosen.

MR. BALFOUR was not quite clear as to what had happened there. BARON SONNINO explained that what happened there had taken place after the armistice, and although according to the terms of the armistice Montenegro was to have been occupied by French troops, no armed forces were sent there except the Servian troops. He argued that as the Serbs and Montenegrins were practically one race, that if the King were allowed to have one representative, the other element would certainly have a representation in the Serbian delegates.

The PRESIDENT suggested that Montenegro be accorded a representative, and that the problem of how to find him be deferred.

MR. PICHON remarked that at any rate they ought to know who to inform that the state was entitled to representation.

BARON SONNINO said it comes to this: "That we must ask for a Montenegrin representative through the King of Montenegro."

The PRESIDENT thought that it was desirable that the meeting should show itself that the man who represented Montenegro actually represented her. He suggested that a representative be assigned to Montenegro, and that the conference reserve its right to examine his credentials. He remarked that Montenegro was as old a political entity as Serbia, and has handsome political history behind it. MR. LANSING asked, "Do you recognize the King of Montenegro?" He answered, "We do". MR. BALFOUR said, "We pay for him".

MR. PICHON thought they were engaging in a theoretical discussion of conditions in Montenegro. He thought they should decide that Montenegro should have a delegate, and that they should in the meantime endeavor to ascertain the real state of affairs in the country.

BARON SONNINO suggested that American troops be sent there to find out exactly what is going on. MR. CLEMENCEAU remarked that precisely similar conditions existed in other places. The PRESIDENT said he was perfectly willing to send a representative to ascertain the conditions, but he did not think it should be an official representative.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that he did not think that if an agent was sent that the fact should be recorded. It might create a painful impression if an agent were despatched to an allied Government to investigate conditions.

MR. PICHON stated that it was very difficult to determine the question of Russian representation without discussing the whole question of Bolshevism. He said that there were different groups of Russians in Paris; namely, Prince Lvoff's, Sazonoff's, Tchaikowski's⁴ parties, the latter the party of Savinkoff. He said these various representatives will be called in to give their views at the conference. He did not believe that they should apply to the Government of Omsk to send representatives, as the French Government did not believe it really representative of the people.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that they should agree upon a policy and should decide whether troops should still be kept there, whether the existing troops should be reinforced, or whether they should be withdrawn. While he did not greatly admire the Bolshevik Gov-

⁴N. V. Tchaikowski, President of the Russian Government of the Northern Region (Archangel).

ernment it was, nevertheless, a *de facto* government recognized by about two-thirds of the people. He hoped that the conference would carefully consider what their attitude should be toward the present Russian Government. He added that to pretend to make a permanent, endurable peace when Siberia and Russia were in a state of civil war would be mockery. In the meantime he protested strongly against the conference choosing representatives for one hundred million Russians.

The PRESIDENT argued that the various Russian leaders in Paris should not be admitted as representatives, but merely be heard.

MR. PICHON then stated that they would then have to consider the representation of the great powers. It was understood that the enemy powers should not be represented until the Allied powers had reached an [agreement].⁵

(A remark by the President). MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that at the Supreme War Council the smaller nations were only consulted when their intentions were involved. The PRESIDENT said he did not like the appearance of consulting nations that we are protecting unless they were interested. MR. LANSING remarked that if they followed that procedure they would be imitating the Council of Vienna. The PRESIDENT was in favor of holding informal conversations amongst the great powers, but believed that they must have an organization of all the nations, otherwise they would run the risk of having a small number of nations regulate the affairs of the world, and the other nations might not be satisfied.

MR. BALFOUR proposed that they have private talks to reach formal conclusions, and then put these conclusions before the smaller nations for their examination and admit them to the conference to hear their observations.

MR. CLEMENCEAU then spoke at some length: "Am I to understand from the statement of President Wilson that there can be no question however important it may be for France, England, Italy or America upon which the representative of Honduras or of Cuba shall not be called upon to express his opinion? I have hitherto always been of the opinion that it was agreed that the five great Powers should reach their decisions upon important questions before entering the halls of the Congress to Negotiate Peace. If a new war should take place, Germany would not throw all her forces upon Cuba or upon Honduras, but upon France; it would always be upon France. I request then that we stand by the proposals which have been made, proposals to the effect that meetings be held in which the representatives of the five countries mentioned shall participate, to reach decisions upon the important questions, and that the study of secondary

⁵ This word supplied from copy in Woodrow Wilson papers.

questions be turned over to the commissions and the committees before the reunion of the conference. We are not convened to reach a decision upon this subject this evening, and I readily concede that we take into consideration all that President Wilson has just stated. But there is a point that must not be lost to view, I refer to the making public of our deliberations. There is a general expectation on the part of the public which desires that everything occurring in the course of our deliberations, all the subjects that are discussed, shall be made known. If we limit ourselves in our publications to conversations invested with an official character, how can we keep the public informed? Would it not be believed that we are concealing something important? On the contrary, in my judgment, it is of the utmost importance for us to show to the public the results of our labors. Unquestionably the smaller Powers are quite as much interested in the conclusion of a peace as are the great Powers. France, England, the United States and Italy have a great past behind them. Upon them devolves the responsibility for the conclusion of peace and in the negotiations their commanding roles should be recognized. Unquestionably the smaller Powers have the same moral rights as have the great Powers, but it is impossible to permit the small Powers to render decisions on questions which do not directly concern them in any way. We are ready to do everything that is possible to defend their rights and their interests, but it is not possible to say that all the Powers are upon the same footing when they approach the settlement of the controversies raised by the war.

We have agreed that Japan should have five delegates like the Great Powers. Japan participated in the war in the Far East, but who can say that in the war she played a part that can be compared for instance to that of France? Japan defended its interests in the Far East, but when she was requested to intervene in Europe, everyone knows what the answer of Japan was. The account that has to be settled is not one alone of money; there is an account for the blood shed that has to be settled also; the blood which France has shed gives to France an indisputable right to raise her voice and to insist upon her point of view in those questions which are exclusively her [concern. If this way of looking at the matter is]⁶ not accepted by all, I could not retain the honor of representing France in the Peace Conference. The question is so important that I propose that we do adjourn its solution until tomorrow, to reflect upon the suggestions which have been made by President Wilson, and upon the remarks which I have just formulated."

This proposal was then adopted by the Assembly.

⁶These words supplied from copy in Woodrow Wilson papers.

Before those present separated **PRESIDENT WILSON** raised the question as to what should be stated to the representatives of the press as to what had been done in the course of the deliberations this day. (The **PRESIDENT** stated that his only suggestion was that they had better not begin the conference until they were in substantial agreement amongst themselves, otherwise the conference would become a debating society.)

It was thereupon proposed and approved by the Assembly that the following statement should be made to the press:

“After the meeting of the Supreme War Council authorized to study the necessary conditions for the renewal of the Armistice, the representatives of the Powers took up the examination of the procedure and the methods to be followed in the conversations to settle the preliminaries of the peace.”

(This proposition was approved by the meeting.)

M. PICHON requested the representatives present to settle the question of the selection of the technical delegates to the Peace Conference, and to decide if these delegates are to be interchangeable.

PRESIDENT WILSON remarked that if the delegates of the Powers have need of technical advisors, at all events it is not necessary to admit these technical advisors to sit in the conference. **MR. LLOYD GEORGE** expressed the opinion that the delegates of the Powers should be selected and named once for all, and that it is their right to be surrounded by all the counsellors they may need without, however, according to these counsellors a vote in the conference.

He proposed however that the Assembly should reserve to itself the right of conceding to these delegates the right to address the conference whenever they should hold it desirable to permit them to do so.

This proposition was approved and the session was adjourned at thirty-five minutes past six.

**Procès-verbal of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council, Held
at M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday,
January 13, 1919, at 14 Hours 30**

PRESENT

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau, President of the
Council and Minister for War.
M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for For-
eign Affairs.
M. Clementel, Minister of Commerce.
M. Loucheur, Minister of Munitions.
M. Legues, Minister of Marine.
M. Klotz, Minister of Finance.
Marshal Foch, Generalissimo, Allied
Armies on the Western Front.
General Weygand.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. de Lasteyrie.
Captain A. Portier.

ITALY

His Excellency Baron Sonnino, Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs.
Count Aldrovandi.
General di Robilant.
Major A. Jones.

GREAT BRITAIN

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George,
Prime Minister.
The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, Secre-
tary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, Lord
Privy Seal and Leader of the
House of Commons.
General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B.,
D. S. O., Chief of the Imperial
General Staff.
Major-General The Hon. C. J. Sack-
ville-West, C. M. G., British Mil-
itary Representative.
Lieutenant Colonel Sir M. P. A.
Hankey, K. C. B., Secretary, War
Cabinet.
Colonel Sir M. Browning.
Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.

UNITED STATES

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Mr. Hoover.
Mr. Hurley.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
General Tasker H. Bliss, American
Military Representative.
Admiral Benson.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux

RENEWAL OF ARMISTICE WITH GERMANY

M. PICHON said that the question to be discussed that afternoon
related to the conditions of the renewal of the Armis-
tice.

**1. Financial
Clauses**

MARSHAL FOCH said that the amendments to be in-
troduced into the financial, naval, and economic clauses of the armi-
stice with Germany had been agreed upon that morning, and, if
approved, they could be inserted, as far as possible, in the new
armistice.

M. KLOTZ said that the following resolution had been drawn up at that morning's meeting to give effect to the views expressed by Mr. Bonar Law and the representative of the United States of America :—

“Technical delegates of the Allied Governments and of Germany will be required to report how far it would be desirable, to force the German Government to undertake the necessary measures for the protection of the gold reserve in the Reichsbank, and of the machinery required for the issue of bank-notes. Marshal Foch is therefore authorised to demand the insertion of a special clause in the armistice to give effect to this decision at the time of the renewal of the armistice.”

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired what were the exact terms of the clause to be introduced into the armistice.

M. KLOTZ replied that the instructions to the delegates were that they should, in conjunction with the German Government, take steps to ensure the safety of the cash deposits and of the machinery used for the emission of notes. It was only after the experts had arrived at an agreement that Marshal Foch would be able definitely to draft the clause required.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the question under discussion was not a military one, and, though he had full confidence in Marshal Foch as regards the carrying out of the terms of the armistice, he did not think the question under consideration was one which should be left to the military authorities for Marshal Foch to decide.

MR. BONAR LAW agreed that this was not a military question. All he proposed to do was to ask their experts to report on the possibility and desirability of doing what had been suggested. It was even possible that the German Government itself might wish that this should be done, in order to prevent the gold and the presses from falling into the hands of the Spartacus Group.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he wished to avoid the impression that, as an afterthought, they now wished to impound the German gold and the presses used for the emission of paper money. It seemed to him that this procedure would be introducing a novel clause into the armistice. By all means let the envoys look into the facts and form an opinion. They should then submit the matter to the German delegates, and, in co-operation with the Germans, endeavour to arrive at a plan which the Germans themselves might welcome. But they did not wish to introduce new conditions into the armistice.

M. KLOTZ made the following suggestion, which he thought might embody President Wilson's proposals :—

He would suggest that, after agreement had been reached by the technical delegates on the lines suggested in the first paragraph of the above text, Marshal Foch should be authorised to add the following clause to the armistice :—

"Germany shall forthwith take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of the gold deposits in the Reichsbank and of the machinery required for the issue of bank-notes."

This would mean that the necessary action would be taken in consultation with the German Government, and that it is left to it to take steps to give effect to this decision.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether it would not be sufficient to authorise Marshal Foch, in the event of our own and the German delegates being in accord, to take steps to help the Germans to ensure the safety of the gold.

MR. BONAR LAW thought that if the German Government itself said to our delegates that it would be in a better position to do this if it were made a condition of the armistice, Marshal Foch should not be prevented from doing this.

M. KLOTZ urged that the clause should be kept secret. If made public it might lead to serious trouble, and bring about the very danger it was desired to avoid.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed, but said that that did not prevent their arriving at an agreement with the German Government on this question. Should the German Government prefer that the clause be entered in the armistice, he quite agreed that this should be done.

MR. BONAR LAW suggested that the German Government might, in the future, find itself in difficulties if it were discovered that they had willingly agreed to the removal of the gold without the stimulus of its being a condition of the armistice.

M. KLOTZ thought that the clause, as now amended, met all requirements. It was first suggested that the Allied and German experts must be agreed that action is necessary. It was then left to Marshal Foch to take action.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed, provided that it was quite understood that no clause be inserted in the armistice terms except at the wish of the German Government.

The following text was accepted:—

"Germany must take as soon as possible all measures to ensure the safety of the gold deposits in the Reichsbank, and of the machinery required for the issue of bank-notes. Marshal Foch is therefore authorised to take the necessary measures to give effect to the recommendation of the experts, either by the insertion of a clause in the armistice or otherwise."

M. LEROUX said that the technical advisers had agreed on the following amendments to Article XXII of the armistice:—

2. Naval Clauses

"All submarines which can proceed to sea or be towed are to be surrendered and are to proceed forthwith to Allied ports. These

are to include submarine cruisers and mine-layers, and submarine lifting vessels and docks. Those submarines which cannot be so surrendered are to be totally destroyed. Submarine building is to cease forthwith, and those submarines which are now under construction are to be broken up."

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had understood that these conditions could be included in the existing clauses of the armistice. He enquired how far the clause as now drafted added to the original text of the armistice.

M. LEYGUES replied that in Clause 22 as originally drafted there was no mention of destroying ships.

MR. BONAR LAW said there was no question that the original intention was that all submarines should be given up, and that this had not been done.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired why they should not merely insist on the execution of the clause; a few words would be sufficient to give effect to that desideratum.

M. LEYGUES pointed out that action was being taken "as a penalty". That was the view accepted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE insisted that the Germans must accept these terms as a condition of the renewal of the armistice. In the original clause of the armistice they had said "all submarines". It was not a penalty that they now proposed to impose, it was merely a question of the correct interpretation of the original clause.

M. PICHON proposed the substitution of the following words:—

"In order to insure the complete execution of Clause 22 of the armistice, it is laid down"

PRESIDENT WILSON—

"that what follows is insisted upon as an interpretation of that clause."

M. CLEMENCEAU said that a period of time should be given within which these terms should be carried out.

M. LEYGUES suggested that they might introduce the word "immediately".

(The clause as amended was agreed to:—

"In order to insure the complete execution of Clause 22 of the armistice, it is laid down that what follows is insisted upon as an interpretation of that clause:—

"All submarines which can proceed to sea or be towed are to be surrendered immediately, and are to proceed forthwith to Allied ports. These are to include submarine cruisers and mine-layers, and submarine lifting vessels and docks. Those submarines which cannot be so surrendered are to be totally destroyed. Submarine build-

ing is to cease forthwith, and those submarines which are now under construction are to be broken up.”)

M. LEYGUES said that they proposed to add the following sentence at the end of Article XXIII of the armistice:—

**Article XXIII
of Armistice**

“To ensure this being carried out, the German Commission are to furnish the Allied Naval Armistice Commission with a complete list of all surface craft, both built and building (either launched or on the stocks), giving estimated dates of completion.”

(This was accepted without discussion.)

M. CLEMENTEL said that the Food Council had considered the question of food supplies for Germany, and had submitted their suggestions to the naval experts in order to see how the German mercantile fleet could best be made use of by the Allied Governments. As a result the following clauses had been proposed by the Allied Naval Council:—

**3. Economic
Clauses**

“I. The whole of the German merchant fleet (including all passenger and cargo boats, other than those excepted by a committee to be set up by the Allies) to be placed immediately at the disposal of the Allies and of the United States, with a view to increasing the world-tonnage from which the tonnage required for the supply of foodstuffs to Europe, including Germany, can be drawn.

“The Allies and the United States will take over the administration of this fleet for the use of the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council or of any other organisation which they may create or set up for this purpose.

“II. The German merchant ships shall be put at the disposal of the Allies and of the United States in the ports and under the conditions laid down by the Allies and the United States. They shall be handed over completely fitted out both as regards crews and stores.

“III. In the case of those boats which, being in neutral countries, cannot get to the designated ports, unaided, owing either to lack of personnel or any other cause, Germany shall hand over these in the ports where they are at present, after previously notifying this handing over to the neutral Governments concerned.

“IV. German merchant ships shall put to sea flying a flag or flags of the Allied nations.

“V. The Allies and the United States may take such measures as they may deem advisable to assure the internal protection of the boats, the safety of navigation, and the supervision of the crews. They may, if necessary, place armed guards on board. The law applicable to these boats shall be that of the Nation which shall have taken charge of them in the name of the Allies and the United States.

“VI. The Allies and the United States may proceed with the partial or total replacement of the crews. German officers and crews who are thus discharged shall be repatriated to Germany.

“VII. All German merchant ships shall be handed over to the Allies and the United States within a period to be fixed later.

"The condition of boats which are unable to put to sea at the expiry of the period to be fixed shall be confirmed by a Commission of the Allies and the United States.

"VIII. The above clauses shall apply only to the use of boats during the armistice period, and for such later period as shall be determined by the Allied and Associated Governments.

"The above agreements shall not prejudice the ultimate disposal of these boats."

MR. BALFOUR said that he had been desired by Lord Reading¹ to put his views before the Conference. He had objected very strongly to any new conditions being added to the armistice, and he considered that the proposals now under discussion made an important addition to the armistice, and that this should be avoided. Lord Reading agreed that it was necessary to obtain the use of these ships, but he thought that this could be done by bargaining, and not by adding new conditions to the armistice. He would say to the Germans: "If you want food you must hand over your ships. If you hand over your ships we would give you sufficient food for a certain number of months." In this way the weapon of food would still be left in our hands. If Germany agreed to these terms the Allies would help to feed them. The inducement to the Germans would be that a certain quantity of food would be handed over to them in return for the use of a certain number of ships. That policy appeared to be different from the policy now set forth in the proposals under consideration.

M. CLEMENTEL said that Mr. Hoover was, according to his own statement, required to solve the following question: namely, the supply of 200,000 tons of corn and 70,000 tons of meat per month to meet the requirements of Germany, and this implied a total of from 800,000 to 900,000 tons of shipping. Germany had some 2,700,000 tons of shipping lying idle. The Allies were compelled to furnish supplies to the whole of Europe. It was necessary, therefore to make Germany give up these ships temporarily for the good of Europe. Otherwise Germany would say that she would only give up sufficient shipping to transport supplies required by herself. On the other hand, unless they insisted on the setting free of all the available tonnage, it was impossible to furnish supplies to Europe. Negotiations had been carried on for some considerable time without results. They were forced, therefore, to the conclusion that these demands should form part of the armistice conditions, so that the Germans would be bound to reply within a given period of time.

¹ British representative on the Inter-Allied Relief Commission.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether it would not be sufficient to issue instructions to our delegates forthwith to arrive at an agreement on these lines.

MR. BONAR LAW pointed out that during the last two months endeavours had been made to obtain the use of these ships, but without success: and unless this were made a condition of the armistice the ships would not be obtained. He did not think it would be necessary for the whole of these clauses to be introduced into the armistice, but a clause should be inserted to the effect that an agreement would have to be arrived at in order to set free the German merchant ships. The Germans should be told that, unless these ships are given up, food would not be supplied. The balance of shipping beyond the tonnage required for Germany's food supplies would be used for payment of food supplied.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that it was not only a question of feeding Germany; the whole of Europe had to be fed. Over two months had already been wasted in bargaining, and, if further discussion was to take place, more time would be lost. Whatever text was adopted, they must so act as to make Germany yield the shipping required without further delay.

PRESIDENT WILSON then pointed out that the only other means available, except force, was to withhold food, and to that he agreed.

MR. BONAR LAW pointed out that a meeting of the delegates would take place on Wednesday next. The delegates should be given to understand that they would be supported in any steps which they might consider it necessary to take in order to obtain the use of this shipping.

MARSHAL FOCH said that on the 13th December last this question had been considered. At the suggestion of Mr. Hoover, transmitted to him through General Pershing, he had told M. Erzberger² that 2,800,000 tons of German shipping should be pooled for the Allies to be used for the supply of food. M. Erzberger had agreed to this proposal, on the condition that the ships and the crews remained German. He had not refused, but had merely made a condition. As that question had not been settled nothing had been done.

MR. BONAR LAW thought they were all agreed that the armistice should be used to bring pressure to bear on the Germans. If the Germans did not agree, they should instruct their delegates to refer the matter back to the Supreme War Council for decision.

M. KLOTZ enquired whether the Council accepted the condition made by M. Erzberger that the ships should remain under the German flag.

² Matthias Erzberger, German Secretary of State without Portfolio; President of the German Armistice Commission.

MR. BONAR LAW said that the Council had decided that the ships should sail under our own flag. In this connection he would invite attention to Paragraph IV of the clauses under consideration.

M. LEYGUES pointed out that the Council had agreed to make use of German crews under certain conditions.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether any reply had been made to M. Erzberger's condition.

As no reply had been made, they were parties to the delay. He then suggested that the delegates should be authorised to sign without delay an agreement with the Germans on the lines proposed in the clauses under consideration, and he would add that, if the Germans refused to sign such an agreement, Marshal Foch should at once be informed so that it may be made a condition of the renewal of the armistice.

(This proposal was accepted.)

M. CLEMENTEL said that the next question to be considered related to the supply of food to Germany. Disagreement had arisen between the British, American, and French financial authorities as to the manner in which payment was to be made.

MR. BONAR LAW asked permission to explain the views held by the British authorities. It would be admitted that each of the Allies had got his own debts, but it was now proposed deliberately to add to these debts in order to supply food to Germany. Consequently, this additional debt, in his opinion, ought to be treated as one of the first charges, to be discharged at once. The supply of food was a necessity. It was therefore a necessity that it should be paid for. If payment was not made immediately, the outstanding debts would be proportionately increased.

M. CLEMENTEL pointed out that the expenditure to be incurred amounted to 4,500,000,000 fr., which was equivalent to 12,000,000£ sterling a month.

M. KLOTZ said he fully recognised Mr. Bonar Law's point of view. He also fully recognised the privileged position of the expenditure contemplated. But, in the absence of any Belgian representative, he could not admit that this expenditure should be given priority, that is, the first place above all other. He was, however, quite prepared to give it a privileged position, leaving it to the Peace Conference to decide the order of priority to be given to the various debts incurred by Germany. As a result of the discussion which had taken place that morning, he now wished to submit the following proposal:—

"That this question should be referred to a Conference of representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, who should be required to submit their recommendations within the period of one week."

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that any further delay in this matter might be fatal, as it meant the dissolution of order and government. They were discussing an absolute and immediate necessity. So long as hunger continued to gnaw, the foundations of government would continue to crumble. Therefore, food should be supplied immediately, not only to our friends, but also to those parts of the world where it was to our interest to maintain a stable Government. He thought they were bound to accept the concerted counsel of a number of men who had been devoting the whole of their time and thought to this question. He trusted the French Finance Department would withdraw their objection, as they were faced with the great problems of Bolshevism and the forces of dissolution which now threatened society.

M. KLITZ said he would gladly meet President Wilson's wishes. But it was not altogether a question of food supplies. They were all fully agreed as to the necessity of feeding the Germans, but he would appeal to President Wilson to consider also the question of justice. He was quite willing to admit that German foreign securities should be earmarked for this purpose. But they were creating a new German debt. There were other German debts which were just as honourable and noble. Therefore, he would ask, as a matter of justice, why Germany should pay for food in preference to paying off debts incurred for the restoration and for the reparation of damage committed elsewhere. Why should exclusive priority be given to such a debt? As a solution of the difficulty he would agree that payment for this food should be made in foreign securities and values. But he would add that "these assets shall be pooled and distribution shall be made by the Allies, taking into account such privileged claims as the Peace Conference would admit".

He would merely point out that it was not a question of food supply, it was purely a financial question, and no delay need therefore occur in the supply of food.

PRESIDENT WILSON urged that, unless a solution for the immediate situation could be found, none of these debts would be paid. The want of food would lead to a crash in Germany. The great point, however, was this—that the Associated Governments have no money to pay for these supplies; therefore Germany must pay for them. But if they were not paid for and supplied immediately there would be no Germany to pay anything.

MR. BONAR LAW pointed out that, in calculating the sums, they had been going on the assumption that the supply of food would last for one year. He did not think that it would need to last more than a few months, or, say, up to the harvesting of the next crop. The suggestion had also been made that the German merchant ships to be

requisitioned would yield funds for the payment of a portion of the sum in question.

M. KLOTZ proposed that they should accept for a period of two months the text as it stood. At the end of that period the Peace Conference would be able to come to a decision on the whole question of policy.

MR. BONAR LAW considered that if sanction for two months' payment only were obtained the food supplies could only last for two months.

M. KLOTZ thought that this showed some confusion of ideas. It was not a question of supplying food for two months. Food supplies could continue. The question to be settled during the course of the two months was merely as to the priority to be given to the payments to be made by Germany. It would be admitted that foreign securities must be considered as gilt-edged securities.

MR. BONAR LAW thought they were arguing in a circle. The first question to be settled was whether a new debt which they had no necessity to incur should be added to previous debts.

M. KLOTZ agreed, but suggested that at the end of the two months a priority list could be prepared.

M. PICHON said he thought that an agreement had now been reached. Everyone was agreed that payment had to be made. The proposal could therefore be accepted. But the Conference could reconsider the question later on should they wish to do so.

(This was agreed to.)

M. LOUCHEUR said that the return of machinery removed by Germany from the occupied territory was one of the points in the armistice. So far the Germans had refused to do this. It had been proposed, therefore, to add a new proviso to the armistice, making it obligatory for the Germans to return at once all machinery that had been removed to Germany. He proposed the following text:—

5. Article XIX
of Armistice

"I. As the restoration of material taken from French and Belgian territory is indispensable for industrial reconstruction, the following measures will be enforced:—

"II. Machinery, parts of machinery, industrial or agricultural plant, accessories of every kind, and, generally, all kinds of material appertaining to industry or agriculture which have been removed from the territories occupied by enemy armies on the Western front, under any pretext whatsoever, whether by military or civil authority or by private individuals, shall be held at the disposal of the Allies, to be returned to their original positions if the French and Belgian Governments so desire.

"No alteration shall be made or damage done to this material.

"III. In preparation for this restoration the German Government shall forthwith put before the Armistice Commission all official or

private transactions relative to this material, or contracts of sale or hire, or other contracts, all correspondence relative thereto, all declarations and evidence which will throw light on the existence, origin, transfer, present condition, and whereabouts of this material.

"IV. Delegates from the French and Belgian Governments shall proceed into Germany to make enquiries and personally examine into the condition of the material reported.

"V. The restoration shall be carried out in accordance with the detailed instructions issued by the French and Belgian authorities.

"VI. In particular, with a view to the immediate restoration of driving belts, electric motors or parts of motors, and factory apparatus taken from France, Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Alsace, or Lorraine, all depots of this material, whether in parks, or on railways or ships, or in factories, shall be immediately made known.

"VII. The information to be given as laid down in Paragraphs III and VI shall be submitted, commencing within eight days of the 20th January, 1919, and shall be furnished in its entirety before the 15th February, 1919."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired which clause of the armistice related to this question.

M. PICHON replied that it came under Clause 19, which read: "Reparation for damage done".

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether this was the interpretation of the clause.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he wished to enquire how these things were to be found in the present disordered state of Germany. The authority under which the machinery had been collected and transported no longer existed. How were these things going to be identified? It might be possible to get similar material, but it would be difficult to obtain the same.

M. LOUCHEUR stated that a "pillage corps" had been formed by the Germans, which had worked methodically and systematically. Full records of all machinery stolen, requisitioned, or removed, had been kept, and these papers were available. Everything was known.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that at Lille textile machinery had been taken away, and asked if that could be followed up now.

M. LOUCHEUR said that in most cases they knew where the machinery was. For instance, the machinery for the construction of waggons taken from Douai was now at Essen; they knew exactly where to find it.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Conference which formulated the terms of the armistice agreed that they should confine themselves to military conditions, and merely affirm other matters, in principle, in general terms, without entering into details.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that during the Armistice Conference a question had arisen as to whether Germany should be required to

make reparation in kind or in money. The Conference had, for obvious reasons, replied in the negative to the question concerning the supply of machinery. But the question of returning stolen machinery was quite a different one.

M. LOUCHEUR agreed that the French point of view was wholly opposed to payment in kind, but he insisted on the return of stolen goods.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he accepted the proposals now before the meeting on the understanding that only the things that could be identified were to be asked for.

MARSHAL FOCH enquired whether this clause was to be made a condition of the armistice. Should it not be accepted, was the armistice to be broken?

(It was agreed to accept the text proposed by M. Loucheur.)

ADMIRAL BROWNING said that the original obligation of the German Government was to deliver the interned and prize ships by the 17th December. This they had failed to do, and a considerable number of vessels had not yet left Germany. A strong protest should be made as to the failure of Germany to carry out this obligation, and an explanation should be demanded. Immediate compliance with the unfulfilled portion of this article should be required, and it should be understood that any further extension of the armistice would not be allowed to form the basis of a claim to delay the completion of the process of delivering ships until the end of the extended term.

With regard to the protest of the German Commission (G. W. 1726/A1 of the 15th December, 1918), repudiating liability for the reconditioning of ships in Great Britain if they were not allowed to complete the work in Germany, and to the subsequent telegraphic protest against our refusal to allow the German surveyors to act in their interests at the surveys of those vessels held there, it should be emphasised that these repudiations of liability were not accepted, and, adequate arrangements having been made for the interests of the German Government to be watched by the classification societies in which ships are severally classed, no repudiation of claims for damage or reconditioning on either of the above grounds can be admitted.

MR. BONAR LAW enquired whether it was necessary to bring this question into the armistice, and whether it could not be settled otherwise.

MR. BALFOUR also asked why this special question was singled out when many other cases where delays had occurred were not brought forward.

6. Article XXX
of Armistice

M. LEYGUES explained that the British naval authorities had pointed out that Clause 30 of the armistice was not being carried out, and as a result tonnage required by the Allies was being withheld from them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that it would be sufficient if this question were brought to the notice of the German authorities when the renewal of the armistice took place. A promise should then be exacted from the German delegates that these conditions would be fulfilled without further delay.

(Mr. Lloyd George's proposal was accepted.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 13, 1919.

The Following Conclusions Were Reached by the Supreme War Council at a Meeting Held in Paris on Monday, January 13, 1919, at 14:30 O'clock (2:30 p. m.)

1. The Supreme War Council agreed that—

Gold Deposits at
Reichsbank and
Machinery for
Issue of Notes

Germany must take as soon as possible all measures to ensure the safety of the gold deposits in the Reichsbank and of the machinery required for the issue of bank-notes.

Marshal Foch is therefore authorized to take the necessary measures to give effect to the recommendation of the experts, either by the insertion of a clause in the Armistice, or otherwise.

2. The Supreme War Council agreed that—

Submarine
(Article XXII
of Armistice)

In order to ensure the complete execution of clause XXII of the Armistice, it is laid down that the following shall be taken as the interpretation of that clause:—

“All submarines which can proceed to sea or be towed are to be surrendered immediately, and are to proceed forthwith to Allied ports. These are to include submarine-cruisers and minelayers, and submarine-lifting vessels and docks. Those submarines which cannot be so surrendered are to be totally destroyed. Submarine building is to cease forthwith, and those submarines which are now under construction are to be broken up.”

3. The Supreme War Council approved of the following sentence being added to Article XXIII of the Armistice:—

Surface Warships
(Article XXIII of
Armistice)

“To ensure this being carried out, the German Commission are to furnish the Allied Naval Armistice Commission with a complete list of all surface craft, both built and building (either launched or on the stocks), giving estimated dates of completion.”

4. The Supreme War Council decided to authorise the delegates to sign without delay an agreement on the lines given below, with the proviso that, should the Germans refuse, Marshal Foch shall be informed, so that the signing of this agreement may be made a condition of the renewal of the Armistice:

German Mercan-
tile Fleet

“I. The whole of the German merchant fleet (including all passenger and cargo boats, other than those excepted by a Committee to

be set up by the Allies) to be placed immediately at the disposal of the Allies and of the United States, with a view to increasing the world-tonnage, from which the tonnage required for the supply of foodstuffs to Europe, including Germany, can be drawn.

"The Allies and the United States will take over the administration of this fleet through the agency of the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council, or of any other organisation which they may create or set up for this purpose.

"II. The German merchant ships shall be put at the disposal of the Allies and of the United States in the ports and under the conditions laid down by the Allies and the United States. They shall be handed over completely fitted out both as regards crews and stores.

"III. In the case of those vessels which, being in neutral countries, cannot get to the designated ports unaided, owing either to lack of personnel or any other cause, Germany shall hand over these in the ports where they are at present, after previously notifying this delivery to the neutral Governments concerned.

"IV. German merchant ships shall put to sea flying one or more Allied flags.

"V. The Allies and the United States may take such measures as they may deem advisable to ensure the internal protection of the ships, the safety of passengers and the supervision of the crews. They may if necessary, place armed guards on board. The law applicable to these ships shall be that of the nation which takes charge of them in the name of the Allies and the United States.

"VI. The Allies and the United States may proceed with the partial or total replacement of the crews. German officers and crews who may be thus discharged shall be repatriated to Germany.

"VII. All German merchant ships shall be handed over to the Allies and the United States within a period to be fixed later.

"The condition of ships which are unable to put to sea at the expiry of the period to be fixed shall be verified by a Commission appointed by the Allies and the United States.

"VIII. The above clauses shall apply only to the use of vessels during the Armistice period and for such later period as shall be determined by the Allied and Associated Governments.

"The above agreements shall not prejudice the ultimate disposal of these ships."

5. The Supreme War Council decided to accept the recommendations contained in the following report submitted by the Allied Food Council:—

Food Supply to
Germany, Pay-
ment for

1. The Council has had under consideration the measures already in progress for the relief of the Allied, liberated and neutral territories, and is taking steps to provide and expand such relief.

2. The Council has formed the opinion, upon the material already in its possession (which is necessarily incomplete), that additional supplies of food will be required in Germany before the next harvest is gathered.

For the purpose of obtaining more precise information the Council is making further investigation.

3. The Council recommends to the Supreme War Council that, if the German cargo and passenger fleet is placed at the disposal of the Associated Governments, the Associated Governments should permit Germany to import a prescribed quantity of foodstuffs, so limited as not to interfere in any way with the priority of supply which must be assured to Allied, liberated and neutral countries.

4. Under the conditions indicated, the Council would recommend that in the first instance the supply should be permitted:— 200,000 tons of breadstuffs, and 10,000 tons of pork products.

5. The Council recommends that the Commanders-in-Chief of the Belgian, French, British, American, and Italian armies should each appoint an officer of experience so as to form a Commission to supervise the distribution of foodstuffs in Germany, acting on behalf of the armies of the Associated Governments and of this Council, and should take instructions from and report direct to this Council.

For the assistance of the Commission, this Council will provide it with an expert civilian staff.

6. It must be a condition precedent to any supply that satisfactory arrangements are made by Germany for providing the necessary payment.

The Council recommends that the representatives of the Treasuries of the Associated Governments be given full discretion to discuss the method of payment with the German representatives, and to arrange for the utilisation of the German credits abroad in preference to other resources, failing which the representatives should make recommendations to the Council and to their respective Treasuries.

It is reserved to the Peace Conference to revise the method of payment so arranged

6. The Supreme War Council approved the following resolution:—

I. As the restoration of material taken from French and Belgian territory is indispensable for industrial reconstruction, the following measures will be enforced:—

II. Machinery, parts of machinery, industrial or agricultural plant, accessories of every kind, and, generally, all kinds of material appertaining to industry or agriculture which have been removed from the territories occupied by the enemy armies on the Western front, under any pretext whatever, whether by military or civil authority, or by private individuals, shall be held at the disposal of the Allies to be returned to their original position if the French and Belgian Governments so desire.

"No alteration shall be made or damage done to this material.

III. In preparation for this restoration, the German Government shall forthwith put before the Armistice Commission all official or private records of transactions relative to this material, or contracts of sale or hire, or other contracts, all correspondence relative thereto, all declarations and evidence which will throw light on the existence, origin, adaptation, present condition and whereabouts of this material.

IV. Delegates from the French and Belgian Governments shall cause to be undertaken in Germany enquiries and local investigations into the condition of the material reported.

Restoration of
Machinery, etc.,
(Article XX of
Armistice)

"V. The restoration shall be carried out in accordance with the special instructions issued by the French and Belgian authorities as these may decide.

"VI. In particular, with a view to the immediate restoration of driving belts, electric motors or parts of motors, and factory gear taken from France, Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Alsace, or Lorraine, all depots of this material, whether in parks, or on the railway, on ships, or in factories, shall be immediately made known.

"VII. The information to be given as laid down in paragraphs III and VI shall be submitted, commencing within eight days from the 20th January, 1919, and shall be furnished in its entirety before the 15th February, 1919."

7. The Supreme War Council considered a report regarding delay in the return of interned and prize ships by the German Government:—

Surrender of Interned and Prize Ships. (Article XXX of Armistice)

It was decided that the question should be brought to the notice of the German authorities when the renewal of the Armistice took place, and that a promise should then be exacted from the German delegates that those conditions would be fulfilled without further delay.

Notes on the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held at the Quai d'Orsay, at 2:30 p. m., January 13, 1919

The following were present:

UNITED STATES:	The President Mr. Lansing General Bliss Admiral Benson Mr. Hoover Mr. Hurley Mr. Davis Mr. Baruch Lt. Gilbert White Mr. Frazier
FRANCE:	Mr. Harrison M. Clemenceau M. Pichon Marshal Foch M. Clementel M. Leygues M. Klotz M. Loucheur M. Dutasta M. Berthelot Prince de Bearn
GREAT BRITAIN:	Mr. Lloyd George Mr. Balfour Mr. Bonar Law Sir Henry Wilson Admiral Sinclair General [Sackville-West] Sir Maurice Hankey Major [Caccia]
ITALY:	Baron Sonnino General [D' R. J. J. J.] Comte [Vidrevald]
JAPAN:	Viscount Chamberlain Mr. Matsui

M. PICHON opened the session by calling upon Marshal Foch to report the decisions reached by the technical advisors at their meeting of 10 o'clock.

I

MARSHAL FOCH submitted the text of a new clause to be added to the terms of the Armistice, requiring the German Government to take the steps necessary to insure the safety of the funds in the possession of the Reichsbank and the material necessary for the issuance of bank notes. (See Annex A) ¹

¹ There are no annexes attached to the minutes; for text of the clause here mentioned, see p. 510.

PRESIDENT WILSON questioned the desirability of presenting the matter in the form of a demand on Germany.

MR. BONAR LAW explained the purpose of the clause and the fact that the Germans were required by the terms of the Armistice to safeguard their assets.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that instead of imposing such a clause on the Germans it would be preferable to persuade them to agree to take the necessary steps in the matter.

He, therefore, suggested that the Allied Financial Experts who were to accompany Marshal Foch to Spa, should be instructed to discuss the matter with the German representatives and endeavor to determine what was necessary and most desirable. The German representatives would have to decide whether the agreement should be in the form of an addition to the Armistice or a separate understanding. He thought, however, that it would be far preferable to have the agreement in the form of a separate understanding.

It was agreed that Marshal Foch was authorized to accept whatever plan was recommended by the Allied Financial Experts.

II

MARSHAL FOCH presented the text of a clause modifying Article XXII of the Armistice. (Annex B)²

It was proposed "As a penalty for delay in surrendering submarines," to demand that all submarines fit to take to sea should be delivered to the Allies as well as all submarine cruisers, mine layers, etc. Those which were still incomplete, should be destroyed.

M. LEYGUES explained the purpose of the proposal and the reasons therefor.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought it unwise to make this requirement an addition to the terms of the Armistice.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it most desirable that the Allied delegates should require the Germans to deliver the submarines, etc., but that they should insist on this as a proper compliance with the terms of the Armistice.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether any time limit had been set. He proposed the addition of the word "immediately".

It was agreed that the wording of the clause should be changed to read as follows:

"In order to insure the execution of Article XXII of the Armistice, all submarines fit to take the sea, shall be towed, immediately, etc."

² There are no annexes attached to the minutes; for text of this clause, see pp. 510-511.

III

MARSHAL FOCH proposed that a new clause be inserted in the Armistice to the effect that the German passenger and cargo fleet be placed at the disposition of the Associated Governments and that Germany be required to furnish a complete list of all ships already constructed or in course of completion. These ships were to be controlled and operated by the Allied Maritime Transport Council. In this way German tonnage would be made available for the supply not only of Germany but of Europe.

MR. BALFOUR stated that although he was not fully cognizant of the matter, he desired to make certain comments on the proposal now before the Council, in accordance with a request which Lord Reading had made of him just before the meeting.

MR. BALFOUR explained that it was Lord Reading's earnest conviction that this procedure should not be adopted. He recommended that every method should be employed to secure their ships without making use of force. He urged, as a matter of policy, that the transaction should be a voluntary one and that the matter should be placed before the German delegates in this way: "If you want food, then turn over your ships." Lord Reading thought that it would be most unwise to add a new provision to the Armistice.

M. CLEMENTEL advanced various arguments to show the absolute necessity for the Allies to secure German tonnage if they were to carry through any comprehensive plan for World Relief.

MR. BONAR LAW stated that Mr. Hoover estimated that 200,000 tons of corn and 70,000 tons of meat should be delivered to Germany every month. It was estimated that this would require 800,000 tons of shipping, which the Associated Governments did not have available for the purpose. According to our present advices, there were now some two and a half million tons of German shipping which were not in use. Therefore, he proposed that the Associated Governments should ask the German Government to accord them the power to administer and use the German tonnage so as to be in a position not only to feed Germany but the rest of Europe as well.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that a convention for this purpose be immediately negotiated with Germany.

MR. BONAR LAW remarked that the Allies had already tried to do so, but had failed. Consequently, the Associated Governments had no alternative but to make use of the renewal of the Armistice as a means to secure German compliance with their wishes.

MARSHAL FOCH recalled that on December 13th he had discussed the question of the use of German ships with Erzberger, who had given his consent, provided the ships and their crews remained Ger-

man. It was explained that the matter had gone no further at that time. It was out of the question to permit the German flag upon the seas until after Peace was signed.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it only just that the Germans should be forced to comply with the wishes of the Allies.

M. CLEMENTEL observed that Austria-Hungary was required to turn over her ships to the Associated Governments.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that the Germans had sunk fifteen million tons of British shipping, and it was only just that they should be required to make their tonnage available to the Allies.

PRESIDENT WILSON proposed that the technical experts be directed to make every effort to conclude a satisfactory arrangement for the use of German shipping with the German representatives direct. But, if the Germans do not agree, the technical experts should advise Marshal Foch, who is authorized to make the arrangement a condition of the renewal of the Armistice.

IV

M. KLOTZ submitted suggestions regarding the method of payment for supplies and recommended that the debt which Germany would incur, should be carried as part of the general indemnity which Germany would have to pay.

MR. BONAR LAW gave it as his opinion that the debt should not be considered as an addition to a general indemnity, but that it should be made a just charge to be paid right away.

In reply to an inquiry as to the probable amount of this debt, M. Clementel stated that it was estimated, taking Mr. Hoover's figures as regards requirements as a basis, that it would amount to four and one half billion francs per year, or as Mr. Bonar Law stated, twelve million sterling per month.

M. CLEMENTEL explained that he fully appreciated Mr. Bonar Law's point of view. But he thought it his duty, especially in the absence of a Belgian representative, to point out that there might be other debts which Germany should be called upon to pay before she was permitted to make use of her existing resources for the payment for food. He, therefore, suggested that the Associated Governments should come to some special agreement in this regard within a week and decide the question.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that "So long as hunger gnaws, foundations of governments crumble." Consequently, he believed that it was imperative to act now. A decision could not be delayed. It was more than a question of feeding Germany or a question of how she would pay; it was a question of Bolshevism.

M. KLOTZ stated that he did not think it right that the Germans should be permitted to pay for their food with money which they already owed for the reparation of the damages to France and Belgium.

THE PRESIDENT observed that the Allies did not expect to pay for the food which they now proposed to send to Germany. Germany must pay, not only for the food, but also for the damages which she has inflicted on the Allies. If the Allies, however, did not feed Germany, she would be unable to pay any indemnity at all.

M. KLOTZ suggested limiting the arrangement to a period of two months.

MR. BONAR LAW pointed out that, in essence, it was a question of principle, and that the Council had now to decide whether or not this new debt of Germany should have priority.

It was finally agreed that the new debt should be considered as having priority, and any arrangement with the Germans regarding food supplies was to continue for two months, when any one of the Associated Governments should have the right to reopen the matter.

V

MARSHAL FOCH submitted a clause to be inserted in the Armistice regarding the restitution of material stolen from French or Belgian territory. The Germans were to be required not only to restore machines and parts of machines, but also to furnish all the necessary information, papers, etc., to enable French and Belgian inspectors to locate this material in Germany. The information was to be furnished by February 15, 1919.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE understood that this new clause was to be considered as an interpretation of Article XIX of the Armistice.

PRESIDENT WILSON considered that this was a very hopeful Article and inquired how this material was to be found and how identified.

M. CLEMENTEL explained that the French Government knew that the Germans had kept a careful record of every machine they had stolen and he mentioned certain large machine tools which had been taken from Lille and which were now in a certain shop in the works at Essen. He did not think that there would be any difficulty in locating the material in question.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE inquired whether it was the intention of the French Government to demand a reparation in kind.

M. CLEMENTEL stated that France did not desire reparation in kind. France desired reparation in cash, and would herself restore the damage or use the cash for the purchase of the material necessary for restoration in Allied countries.

PRESIDENT WILSON saw no objection to the proposed demand on the German Government or the understanding that they should be required to restore only such machines, etc., as could be identified.

VI

It was pointed out that Germany had failed to execute the obligation to deliver certain ships (Article XXX of the Armistice). About 35 had not yet left Germany. Reference was also made to the claims advanced by the Germans that they were to supervise the repairs to these ships. It was not considered advisable to admit this claim.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that Marshal Foch should call the attention of the German delegates to their failure to observe the terms of the Armistice in this respect, and press them for the delivery of the ships. Mr. Lloyd George believed that the Marshal could extract a definite promise from the Germans in this regard.

The Council concurred in this suggestion and Marshal Foch was instructed accordingly.

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay on Monday, January 13, 1919, at 4 p. m.**

PRESENT

FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY
M. Clemenceau.	Mr. Lloyd George.	Baron Sonnino
M. Pichon.	Mr. Balfour.	Count Aldrovandi
M. Dutasta.	Lieut. Col. Hankey.	Capt. Jones.
M. Berthelot.	Major Caccia.	
Capt. A. Portier.		
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	JAPAN	
President Wilson.	M. Matsui.	
Mr. R. Lansing.	Viscount Chinda	
Mr. A. H. Frazier.		

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

(This Meeting was a continuation of a Meeting of the Supreme War Council commenced earlier in the afternoon, procès-verbal of which has been prepared separately.)

PROCEDURE OF THE PEACE DISCUSSIONS

M. PICHON said that it was proposed to continue the discussion of the Draft (see Appendix (A) of I. C.-104)¹ submitted by the French Government on the general procedure in regard to the Peace Discussions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wished in the first place to return to a question which had been postponed the previous evening in order to enable him to discuss it with the Dominion Premiers. The latter were disappointed at the smallness of the representation allotted to them. They had not even received the same representation as had been granted to Belgium and Serbia, though they had supplied a larger number of troops and their losses had been greater. He had explained quite frankly to them the reasons which had guided President Wilson in his desire not to accord a larger representation, as it would have had the appearance of an over-representation of England, regarding

¹ Representation of Brit. Dominions and India

¹ Plan of the Preliminary Conversations between the Allied Ministers, vol. 1, p. 386.

her as a unit. He had informed them that they would be treated like the smaller States, and that one Representative would be present whenever any question which affected them came under consideration. He had also agreed to add from time to time one or two of the Dominion Representatives to the British panel of five.

A second question had been raised at the conference of the British Imperial War Cabinet held that morning in connection with the representation of India. The native States of India, which represented a population of 70,000,000 to 80,000,000 men, and had furnished some 180,000 men to the army, had a right, he thought, to be represented. He had promised to put forward their claims.

PRESIDENT WILSON wished to remove any impression that he personally had any objection to the British Dominions being separately represented. He fully admitted that their claims were great. He had merely been guided by the desire to remove any cause of jealousy on the part of the other smaller States. He now understood the proposal to be that from time to time one or two of the Dominion Premiers should be admitted among the five National Representatives, and that, besides these five, there should be one Representative from each of the Dominions whenever any subject of interest to them came under discussion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, in connection with this matter, he wished to quote a remark made to him that day by Sir Robert Borden. He had pointed out that, if he returned to Canada and confessed that Canada was getting merely half the number of representatives that had been allotted to Serbia or Roumania or Belgium, there would be a feeling that they were being badly treated, especially when it was known that the Canadian losses during the war had been greater than those of Belgium. Nevertheless, if it were thought that a greater representation of the Dominions would create a bad feeling outside, he did not wish to press the question.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether Mr. Lloyd George would feel satisfied to give Canada two Representatives, South Africa two Representatives, Australia two Representatives, and New Zealand one Representative. He was trying to find a basis for general application.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that such an allotment would be fair. But he would not care himself to make that proposal to the Conference.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he himself would submit the proposal and enquired whether Mr. Lloyd George would be satisfied if one Representative was allotted to British India and one to the native States of India.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE accepted this number, and explained that, naturally, these Representatives would only be present when questions affecting them came up for discussion.

(It was agreed that the British Dominions and India should have the right to be represented by the following number of Delegates:—

Canada	2
Australia	2
South Africa	2
New Zealand	1
India, including native States of India	2
<hr/>	
Total	9

(For Newfoundland it was decided that, though it would not be given separate representation, a Representative from that country could be included in the British Delegation.)

M. PICHON expressed the view that all questions connected with the representation of the great Allied and Associated Powers, the smaller Powers, Russia, and Montenegro, had been settled at yesterday's meeting.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there was some misapprehension as regards Russia. They had decided that representatives of sections in Russia, such as Prince Lvof and M. Savinkof, should not be admitted. But the question of the general representation of Russia had never been discussed.

(It was agreed that the question of the representation of Russia should be postponed until the question of general policy of Russia had been examined).

PRESIDENT WILSON said that, in connection with the questions settled at yesterday's meetings, he wished again to refer to Brazil. Brazil was the only considerable Latin-American State containing a population of over 30,000,000. She had been more subject to German influence than any other of the South American States. Many of the States which went to constitute Brazil were controlled by the German elements in the population, and in another generation this country might have become wholly Germanised. He was therefore interested in attempting to divorce her from Germany. He thought if she were given an exceptional position—for instance, if three Delegates were allotted to her—she would be attached to our own interests, and so be of use to the Allies as one of the great States of South America.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE felt some doubt in accepting this proposal. He thought that the representation should bear some reference to the sacrifices made by each country. Brazil had certainly sent two or three torpedo-boats, but beyond that she had made no effort at all.

2. Representation
of Russia

3. Representation
of Brazil

He thought it would be invidious if she were to get three Representatives, as compared with the two Representatives allotted to Belgium, Greece and Serbia.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed. His heart bled for Belgium and Serbia; but they had not made a voluntary sacrifice.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that Greece had.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the argument that he urged concerned the future. It was a political argument. He believed that if they did not carry out this [*his*] proposal, Germany would at once regain her grip on Brazil.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not wish to resist his [*this*] proposal; he merely wondered what the outside public would think. On the other hand he did not wish to arrest the progress of the meeting by resisting further.

BARON SONNINO said that he would agree to three Representatives being given to Brazil, provided three were also given to Belgium. He thought it was impossible to give Brazil more Representatives than Belgium.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that if three Representatives were given to Belgium and to each of the other small countries, Brazil would no longer hold a proper derogating position, and President Wilson's argument would therefore fall to the ground, as they would all be on the same footing.

(It was agreed to give three Representatives to Brazil, the remaining smaller belligerent Powers retaining the number of Representatives previously agreed upon.)

PRESIDENT WILSON asked permission to raise a purely American question concerning the relations of America and Costa Rica. When he (President Wilson) first became President, revolutions had been fomented in Central America by people desirous of supplying arms and munitions, and anxious to obtain concessions. He had then issued a Note³ to the effect that the United States of America would not accept any Government formed for the purpose of furthering the ambitions of an individual. An example of this had occurred in Mexico, and for that reason America had refused to recognise Carranza. Later on, a similar instance had occurred in Costa Rica and the United States of America had refused to recognise the new ruler of that country. Costa Rica had made many attempts, without success, to renew relations with the United States of America. With this object in view, she had first offered to declare war on Germany and, finally, receiving no reply to these overtures, had actually declared war in order to force the United States of America to recognise her. In these

4. Representation
of Costa Rica

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1913, p. 7.

circumstances he could not bring himself to sit at the same table as a Representative of Costa Rica. Naturally, if any question directly affecting Costa Rica should come up for discussion he would be prepared to reconsider his decision, but under present conditions he proposed that Costa Rica should not be represented at the Peace Conference.

(This was agreed to.)

5. Representation
of Neutral States
and Small States
Who had Broken
Off Relations
With the Enemy

(It was agreed that each of these should have one Representative.)

6. Attendance
of Delegates

M. PICHON then read clauses contained in paragraph 2 of the French Draft Proposals relating to the attendance of Delegates.

(These were accepted without discussion.)

MR. BALFOUR said he wished to raise the question as to who should be responsible for summoning the small and neutral States. He presumed that France would be.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE and M. PICHON agreed that this would be done by all the five Great Powers.

(This was agreed to.)

7. Representation
of Enemy Powers

Paragraph 3 of the French draft note, relating to representation of enemy Powers, was read by M. Pichon and agreed to.

8. Technical
Advisers

M. PICHON then read paragraph 4 of the note relating to Technical Delegates.

M. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to the last sentence of the paragraph. He wished it to be quite clear that this sentence should not in any way preclude the adoption of the panel system by the various Powers in selecting the Plenipotentiaries for meetings of the Conference.

(Paragraph 4 was agreed to on this understanding.)

M. PICHON then proposed consideration of Part II of the French draft note relating to the principles and methods of conducting the Peace Conference. He explained that the proposals therein contained had been drafted on the basis of the principles put forth by President Wilson in his speech of the 8th January, 1918,⁴ and in his speech of the 27th September, 1918,⁵ and also on the answers which the Allies had drawn up on the 5th November 1918.⁶

PRESIDENT WILSON proposed, as a practical consideration, that a number of questions should be referred to the Delegates of the five Great Powers, so that they could discover their differences and points

⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 12.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 468.

of agreement before going into the Conference. For instance, if the League of Nations was to serve as the medium of treatment for any particular question, then they should begin by discussing a League of Nations. Therefore he could not now agree on a sequence or order of discussion. For example, some of the points, such as the publicity to be given to Treaties, could not be decided until they knew what was meant. He did not mean by this that there should not be confidential conversations between countries, but that no Treaty should come into force until it had been published. That was a subject for general discussion. It was proposed that that should be referred to the national Delegates. The same conclusion applied to other questions, such as the treatment of Russia, which called for immediate decision. It was necessary to remove quicksands before they could begin to walk. Therefore, the order of discussion should be settled from time to time. A list of subjects to be discussed could be prepared, but not the order of sequence.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed his entire agreement. He thought they must first take Russia and the League of Nations, and there might be other questions which were ripe for immediate settlement, and could be got out of the way.

MR. BALFOUR said that they must not put off too long the discussion of boundaries. The new countries would be in a state of perpetual disturbance until they knew where they were.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the question should be discussed from the point of view of its effect on demobilisation.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that demobilisation stood in relation to the condition of Russia, Germany, &c.

PRESIDENT WILSON wished to make a suggestion, namely, that each of the following questions be referred to the National Peace Delegates, with a request that they should submit their recommendations as concisely and as soon as possible:—

1. League of Nations.
2. Reparation.
3. New States.
4. Frontiers and territorial changes.
5. Colonies.

These subjects could then be discussed by the present Conference in the order given.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested adding, "The responsibility of the authors of the war."

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this question need not be referred to a Committee, since it could be settled forthwith by themselves.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that President Wilson proposed that certain questions should be referred to the five National Peace Delegates,

who would report to this Conference. This Conference was merely a Supreme War Council. As such it had no power to discuss such questions. Nothing could be done until the Peace Conference was brought together. He would therefore propose that an official meeting of the Peace Conference should be called together forthwith. Nothing of importance need be discussed, but the work could be distributed and questions could be referred to the Committees, as suggested by President Wilson. The day afterwards the Delegates of the five Great Powers could meet to examine questions ready for solution, such as Russia, and at the same time the National Delegates could be drawing up their recommendations.

PRESIDENT WILSON explained that his idea was a very simple one. He thought that the five Powers should hold a Conference to find out their own minds before they entered into the process of the Peace Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that President Wilson's proposal came to this: that they intended to arrive at a complete understanding before the Peace Conference could meet. That would take some months, and would be a great disappointment to the public. They had trumpeted abroad that the Conference was going to meet forthwith, and the Delegates had been appointed and had arrived. He fully agreed that the five Powers should first come to a decision amongst themselves; but it was necessary first to hold an initial meeting of the Peace Conference and give the Delegates a mandate to start work. After that the heads of the Associated Powers could meet together.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that no great difference existed between the two proposals. He fully agreed with President Wilson that they should exchange views in order to discover their differences and concentrate their efforts on these. But he also agreed with M. Clemenceau that a meeting of the Peace Conference should be called forthwith.

M. PICHON said that President Wilson's proposal was then accepted, with the amendment suggested by M. Clemenceau.

(This was agreed to.)

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that the meeting of the Peace Conference should be held on Thursday, the 16th January, 1919, at 14:30 o'clock.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that the Italian Delegates had not yet been appointed, and that Signor Orlando had left for Italy. The Italian Delegates could be appointed in a day or two, but they would then have to get to Paris. He proposed, therefore, that the Conference should be postponed to a later date.

MR. BALFOUR enquired how many of the important Delegates were now present in Paris.

M. PICHON replied that most of the Delegates had already arrived in Paris.

M. CLEMENCEAU insisted that no further delay should occur in holding the meeting. Two months had passed since the Armistice had been signed, and nothing had been done. He therefore urged that the meeting should be held on Thursday next.

BARON SONNINO said that he would regret the absence of his colleagues, but would withdraw any further objection. On the other hand, he wished to point out that if the object of the Conference was to pass President Wilson's proposal, it would, in his opinion, be found impossible to get twenty States to hand over to five Powers all questions relating to the drawing up of the Peace Treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the question might be disposed of as follows: The first Peace Conference would be opened by a speech by President Poincare; then M. Clemenceau would take the chair, and he would invite the small States to put forward their claims, and to submit these to the Great Powers for their consideration.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the small Powers should send their proposals to the Secretary of the Conference, in order to remove the impression that the big Powers were acting independently. M. Clemenceau would impress on these small States that the Great Powers wished to have their views, and, as far as possible, to be guided by them.

M. PICHON said that he understood that all the small Powers should be invited to attend the first meeting.

BARON SONNINO proposed that the first meeting should be postponed until Saturday, in order to give time for Signor Orlando and the Italian Delegates to attend.

M. CLEMENCEAU accepted this suggestion, and said that meanwhile other subjects could be brought under discussion. He suggested that a meeting should be held on Wednesday, the 15th instant, to settle the draft regulations of the Conference and to discuss the situation in Russia.

(It was agreed that the First Allied Peace Conference should be held on Saturday, the 18th January, 1919, at 14:30 o'clock, and that a meeting of the Supreme War Council should be held on Wednesday, the 15th January, 1919, at 10:30 o'clock.)

(It was also decided that an announcement should be published in the press to the effect that the formal Conferences would open on the following Saturday, the 18th January, 1919.)

10. Announcement
in Press of Meeting
of Peace Con-
ference

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 13, 1919.

Notes on Conversation Held in the Office of M. Pichon at the Quai d'Orsay on January 13, 1919

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :	President Wilson
	Mr. Lansing
	Mr. Frazier
	Mr. Harrison
FRANCE :	M. Clemenceau
	M. Pichon
	M. Dutasta
	M. Berthelot
	Capt. Portier
GREAT BRITAIN :	Mr. Lloyd George
	Mr. Balfour
	Lt. Col. Hankey
	Major Caccia
ITALY :	M. Sonnino
	Count Aldrovandi
	Capt. Jones
JAPAN :	Viscount Chinda
	Mr. Matsui

Interpreter: M. Mantoux.

(Continuation of Meeting of January 12, 1919.)

DISCUSSION OF THE PROCEDURE OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE referred to the question of the representation of the Dominions,—a question which had been suspended and not decided at the first meeting. He stated that he had discussed the matter with the Dominion Premiers and felt that each Dominion should be allowed to have a representative present when questions came up which concerned it. He had also promised to allow the Dominions representation in the British panel of five.

Mr. Lloyd George also stated that he thought it just that the Independent Indian Principalities should be represented at the Conference. He pointed out that the population of these states amounted to some 70 million and that they had furnished 150,000 troops. Their relationship to the Empire was established by Treaties of Peace.

PRESIDENT WILSON wished to make it clear that he personally had no objection to the Dominions being represented at the Conference. He then asked whether Mr. Lloyd George considered the following an equitable allotment: Canada, two representatives; Newfoundland, one; South Africa, two; Australia, two; New Zealand, one.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it only right that Canada, Australia and New Zealand should be properly represented as they had done so much in the War.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that Newfoundland be given a place in the British Panel.

PRESIDENT WILSON, therefore, proposed that Canada, Australia and South Africa be given two representatives each, and New Zealand, British India and Independent India one representative each, on the understanding that they were to be present only when matters which concerned them were under discussion. The proposal was approved.

2. It was decided that the individuals who are at present in Paris representing certain sections of Russia, should not be admitted as delegates to the conference. It was agreed that a final decision as to Russian representation at the Conference should be postponed until the whole Russian question shall have been discussed and a policy determined.

3. PRESIDENT WILSON presented arguments in support of a larger representation for Brazil. He pointed out that Brazil had lent certain assistance in the War; that there were 30 million people in Brazil, and that it was important for the Allies to attach Brazil firmly to their interests. President Wilson mentioned also the large number of German emigrants in Southern Brazil. MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that Brazil had sent but two or three torpedo boats and no troops. PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he was considering the matter from the point of view of the future and not of the past.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he merely wished to point out the possible effect it might have on other countries such as Greece, Serbia and Belgium. However, he did not wish to delay the proceedings of the meeting, and would not resist the President's proposal. BARON SONNINO suggested that Belgium be likewise given three delegates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that should this be done, the effect of giving three to Brazil would be entirely lost.

It was agreed to give three delegates to Brazil.

4. PRESIDENT WILSON referred to the matter of having a delegate from Costa Rica present at the Conference. He gave a short history of the events which led up to the existing condition of affairs in Costa Rica, pointed out that he had not recognized the present Government, that the Government of Gen. Tinoco had hastened to declare War on Germany after the United States had done so for the sole purpose of obtaining recognition, and that he felt that he could not afford to associate with a representative of Costa Rica at the Peace Conference. For these reasons, he proposed that Costa Rica should not be represented at the Peace Conference. This was agreed to.

5. It was agreed that small states theoretically belligerent should have one delegate.

6. It was agreed that those states which had broken relations with the enemy should be assimilated to neutrals, and should have one delegate who should be present at the Conferences in which questions concerning them might be discussed.

7. M. PICHON suggested that a committee be formed to settle details regarding the representation of small states and neutral states. PRESIDENT WILSON named Mr. Frazier as his representative.

8. The suggestions contained in the French plan¹ under subheading 2 of Section I regarding Terms of Participation were accepted, and it was agreed that the five powers whose representatives were then present should "summon" the Neutrals and states in the process of formation in the manner set out in the last paragraph of the section under consideration.

9. The first two paragraphs of subheading 3, of Section I, Representation of Enemy Powers, were accepted. The questions contained in the remaining paragraphs were postponed for the present.

10. MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that he had no objection to the suggestion regarding the attendance of Technical Experts at the Peace Conference provided this did not affect the understanding regarding the use of the panel system.

This was agreed to.

11. M. PICHON explained that the messages and notes of President Wilson had been taken as a basis for the order of the debates in Section II.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he was going to propose that certain questions be referred to those present with a view to determine their organic connection. He hoped that those present would not agree on any fixed order of discussion. For instance, he believed it more important at the moment that those present should consider the whole question of treatment of Russia rather than the publicity of Treaties.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE endorsed the suggestion.

MR. BALFOUR thought that the question of Boundaries was of importance.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that what was needed was a "list" and not an "order" of subjects to be discussed.

PRESIDENT WILSON submitted a list of subjects which he suggested should be referred to each Delegation with a request that they be prepared to state their views on each:

League of Nations
Reparation
New States
Boundaries
Colonies.

¹ Vol. I, p. 336.

12. This proposal precipitated a general discussion of the necessity for fixing a date for a General Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that there had already been a month's delay and that the public had been greatly disappointed. He therefore suggested that Thursday next be fixed for the first formal Conference.

BARON SONNINO explained that it would be impossible for M. Orlando to return by that date and suggested that the first meeting take place on Saturday, January 18th.

This proposal was accepted.

It was agreed that M. Poincare would deliver the opening address.

It was further agreed that the list of subjects for discussion submitted by President Wilson should be communicated to the delegates of the other belligerent states, with a request that they communicate their views on the subjects named to the Great Powers, whose desire it was to meet the wishes of the smaller belligerent states as far as possible.

It was decided that the next meeting to continue the discussion of the Plan of Procedure should take place at 10:30 a. m., January 15, 1919.

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay, on Wednesday, January 15, 1919, at 10:30
a. m.**

PRESENT

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
Captain A. Portier.

GREAT BRITAIN

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd
George.
The Right Hon. A. J.
Balfour.
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M.
P. A. Hankey.
Major A. M. Caccia.

ITALY

Baron Sonnino.
Count Aldrovandi.
Major A. Jones.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Mr A. H. Frazier.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.
Viscount Chinda.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there were two preliminary questions which he wished to raise. He had been under the impression that an agreement was always to be reached as to what was to be published in the Press. It was very important that the Press of one country should not give more information than that published by any of the others. There were two things published in the French Press to which he wished to draw particular attention. Firstly, it had been agreed that nothing should be published regarding the placing of Germany's gold reserve in a safe place. It had been recognized that any publicity on this question would be tantamount to giving notice of our intentions to the Germans and Bolsheviks. This was the very thing it had been desired to avoid. Secondly, he himself had enquired at the last meeting whether anything should be published on the subject of the number of delegates apportioned to the British Dominions and the smaller Powers. It had been agreed to say nothing until the list had been accepted in its final form. Now, this information had been published in the French Press. As a result, he himself had received numerous enquiries from the Representatives of the British Dominions, to which he could only reply that nothing definite had been settled.

**1. Publications
in Press**

He fully admitted that this publication was no doubt due to inadvertence. But steps were necessary to prevent a repetition of such occurrences.

M. PICHON explained that the reason for the publication of this information in the French Press was that the French correspondents had learnt that the facts mentioned by Mr. Lloyd George had been cabled to the United Kingdom and to the United States of America. And as there was no censorship in those countries, it was feared that this information would get into the British and American papers, and the French correspondents were anxious not to be forestalled by the Foreign Press.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that if M. Pichon's statement gave a correct interpretation of the case, there could be no safety. As regards Great Britain, one man had been appointed on behalf of the Press, who received all matter for publication in the Press. In the two cases under consideration nothing had been communicated to the British Press and nothing had appeared in that Press. Unfortunately, the information which he complained of had the drawback of being accurate.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that immediate steps should be taken to prevent such things appearing in the French Press. The mere fact that French journalists might or might not be forestalled by journalists of other countries could not be accepted as an excuse. Henceforth they must prevent the occurrence of any leakage of this nature.

MR. LANSING complained that, as a matter of fact, the French censorship was stopping messages addressed to America. The Americans had no censor of their own, but Mr. Baker had been appointed to give to the American newspaper correspondents such information as might be published.

M. PICHON explained that a Committee had met yesterday and agreed on the text of the information to be communicated to the Press. He now proposed that this Committee, consisting of an American, British, French and Italian representative, should meet daily and that the information so supplied should alone be published. Everything else would come under censorship and be refused publication.

(It was agreed, as regards the proceeding of these Conferences, that messages should be published as might be communicated officially to the Press by the Secretariat.)

BARON SONNINO said that it would be advisable to add that the opinions expressed by a particular Power on any question discussed should not be published, as if this were done it would undoubtedly interfere with the absolute freedom of discussion desired.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed. It was particularly important that the Press should not give prominence to views expressed by one Power which were not in complete accord with the views of other Powers. In carrying out these discussions they frequently had to fight a question out, but eventually ended in agreement. If the Press jumped in before agreement had been reached, it led to the difference becoming stereotyped. As an instance of this, he would mention the publication of M. Pichon's reply to the British Government in the "Humanité". He fully recognized that the French Government regretted this publication. But, unfortunately, the French Press continued to argue as if there was a difference of opinion between Great Britain and France on this subject. That was very bad. He fully realized that certain of the newspapers could not be influenced, but in so far as it was possible to influence the Press, steps should be taken to prevent their discussing such controversies as might from time to time arise between one country and another. Thus, as regards the question of Russia, Great Britain and France had never even exchanged views. But it made it very difficult if the Press of the place where the Conference was actually meeting began an attack on the Delegates of another country. The "Echo de Paris", for instance, continued to attack the British view without having seen the British Note. He could naturally sanction the British document being published. That would hardly be fair, but he might be forced to do so if the controversy continued in the Press.

(It was agreed that the Press should be prevented, as far as possible, from discussing controversial matters as between the Great Powers represented.)

M. PICHON said they would now take under consideration the draft scheme of procedure in regard to the Peace Conference. As a result of the work done the day before, the following Draft Regulations had been drawn up:—

2. Procedure of the Peace Discussions

I. The Conference assembled to fix the conditions of peace, first as regards the preliminaries of peace, and then the definite treaty of peace, shall include the representatives of the belligerent Allied and Associated Powers.

The belligerent Powers with general interests (the United States of America, British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan) shall take part in all sittings and Commissions.

The belligerent Powers with special interests (Belgium, Brazil, China, the British Dominions and India, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, the Czecho-Slovak Republic, and the States of Latin-America) shall take part in the sittings at which questions concerning them are discussed.

The Powers in a state of diplomatic rupture with the enemy Powers, Neutral Powers and States in process of formation shall be heard either orally or in writing when summoned by the Powers with general interests, at sittings devoted especially to the examination of

questions directly concerning them, but only so far as these questions are concerned.

The conditions of the representation of Russia shall be fixed by the Conference at the moment when the business concerning Russia is examined.

II. The Powers shall be represented by plenipotentiary delegates to the number of— 5 for the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan; 3 for Brazil; 2 for Belgium, China, Greece, Roumania, Serbia, Poland and the Czecho-Slovak Republic; 1 for Portugal and Siam; 1 for Cuba, Guatemala, Hayti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, and Panama.

The British Dominions and India shall be represented as follows: 2 delegates each for Australia, Canada, South Africa and India (including the Native States); 1 delegate for New Zealand. The representation of the Dominions (including Newfoundland) shall, besides, be included in the representation of the British Empire by the panel system.

Montenegro shall be represented by one Delegate, but the rules concerning the designation of this Delegate shall not be fixed until the moment when the political situation of this country shall have been cleared up.

III. Each ~~Delegation~~ of Plenipotentiaries may be accompanied by Technical Delegates properly accredited, and by two stenographers. The Technical Delegates may be present at the sittings for the purpose of furnishing information which may be asked of them. They shall be allowed to speak for the purpose of giving any desired explanations.

He wished to enquire whether these Regulations were accepted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that the words "may be" should be substituted for "shall be" in the second paragraph of Article II. The use of the words "shall be" made the clause mandatory. There was no necessity for this.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed to Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, but claimed the same concession for all other Powers. He suggested adding the following sentence:—

"It is understood that each Delegation shall have the right to avail itself of the panel system."

BARON SONNINO said that he understood that it had been agreed that any Power could change its Representatives from time to time.

M. PICHON said that as regards the numbers of Delegates for each Power (Article II. of the above Draft Regulations), the fact that only two Representatives had been apportioned to Belgium, China, Greece, and Serbia had given rise to bitter complaints. He wished to suggest, therefore, that all Powers who had been in the war since the beginning should be given three representatives and that three representatives should also be allotted to the British Dominions.

MR. BALFOUR asked permission to repeat his protest on behalf of a small country, namely, Portugal. This country really had a case.

Putting out of consideration all questions of justice, the fact remained that Portugal had sent some 60,000 troops to the Western Front. At a critical stage of the war they had given all the field guns which had been supplied to them by the French. They had, in addition, sent troops to the Colonies. Under these circumstances, they were justified in thinking that it was monstrous that they should be classed with Siam. Was it not an outrage that Brazil, a former part of the Portuguese Empire, should receive three representatives whilst Portugal had only one? Portugal knew that it had no supporters, and had turned to its most ancient ally, Great Britain, to support their case. He (Mr. Balfour) honestly thought that they ought to have two Representatives. If, now, three Representatives were given to China, and Portugal retained only one, a serious injustice would be done. . . .

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that China had sent labourers to Europe.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that Portugal had done so too. The labour contribution of Portugal had been as great as that of China.

M. PICHON stated that, in a protest sent in by China yesterday, she asked for five delegates. China based her claim on the importance of her territory, her population, the natural resources of the country and the part it played in the world.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the same arguments would apply to India.

BARON SONNINO said he saw no reason why Portugal should be given an exceptionally low position. She had been one of the belligerent powers, and she had done her best. She had supplied some 100,000 men and had lost some 15,000 dead in battle. He thought that Portugal should be placed in the same position as the other small States. She must not be put in a position different to Belgium, Greece, Roumania, or Serbia. Therefore, each must have either two or three Representatives.

M. PICHON enquired whether it was agreed that Belgium and Serbia, who had fought throughout the War, should receive three Representatives and Portugal and Greece two Representatives each.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he could not accept this proposal. The Great Powers, America, Great Britain and France, each with a population, all told, of some 100 million souls, were only to have five Representatives. Clearly Belgium, which at the height of its power only put some 150,000 men in the field, could not have three Delegates. There was no sense of proportion in such a proposal and no point in it. After all, the Delegates were only there to present their case and their case could be presented just as well by two Representatives as by three and perhaps better still by one only.

He thought if they agreed to give two Representatives all round there would be no room for jealousy. Each Power had done its best, including Portugal. There were also the Portuguese Colonies to be considered, Portugal being one of the chief Colonial Powers. Therefore he would propose that two Representatives should be granted all round.

(It was agreed to accept the Rule given above, Article II. being amended to read as follows:—

"II. The Powers shall be represented by Plenipotentiary Delegates to the number of— 5 for the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan; 3 for Brazil; 2 for Belgium, China, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, and the Czecho-Slovak Republic; 1 for Cuba, Guatemala, Hayti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, and Siam.

"The British Dominions and India shall be represented as follows:—2 Delegates each for Australia, Canada, South Africa and India (including the Native States); 1 Delegate for New Zealand. The representation of the Dominions (including Newfoundland) and India may, besides, be included in the representation of the British Empire by the panel system. It is understood that each Delegation shall have the right to avail itself of the panel system.

"Montenegro shall be represented by one Delegate, but the rules concerning the designation of this Delegate shall not be fixed until the moment when the political situation of this country shall have been cleared up.")

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that some publication should be issued in order to remove any misapprehension. He thought that the Powers might think that each of the Delegates had a vote, and that the number of Delegates would affect the number of votes. That misapprehension should be removed. The newspapers should be put in a position to explain that the number of Delegates did not represent a certain number of votes. Each country was merely put in a position to explain its case and in addition each Power was at liberty to change its Representatives from time to time.

(It was agreed that some publication should be made in newspapers in order to remove any misapprehension which might exist about the functions of the Delegates appointed to the Conference as regards the numbers accredited.)

M. PICHON said they could not [*now*] proceed with the consideration of the remaining articles of the Note submitted by the French Government (see Appendix "A" of I. C. 104).¹ Article III. stated that the delegates should take precedence according to the alphabetical order of the list of Powers (in French).

Article III. Order
of Precedence of
Delegates

¹ Vol. I, p. 386; the articles here referred to are those of section VI, beginning on p. 392.

(It was agreed that the Great Powers should take precedence in the following order:

Amérique, États-Unis d'.
 Empire Britannique.
 France.
 Italie.
 Japon.)

M. PICHON then read Article IV. as follows:—

Article IV. Au-
 thentication of
 Mandates of
 Delegates

“The Conference to be declared open by the President of the Republic; immediately after the President of the French Council of Ministers to be invested for the time being with the Chairmanship. A Committee, composed of the chief Plenipotentiary of each Allied or Associated Power shall proceed at once to the verification of the credentials of all members present.”

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that it would not be necessary for the Committee to be composed of the “chief” Plenipotentiary of each Allied Power. He thought that any one of the Delegates could perform this duty.

BARON SONNINO suggested that this duty could be carried out by one of the Plenipotentiaries of each of the five Great Powers only.

(It was agreed that Article IV. should read as follows:—

“The Conference to be declared open by the President of the Republic; immediately after the President of the French Council of Ministers to be invested for the time being with the Chairmanship. A Committee composed of one Plenipotentiary of each Allied or Associated Great Power shall proceed at once to the verification of the credentials of all members present.”

M. PICHON then read Article V., as follows:—

Article V. Ap-
 pointment of
 President and
 Vice-Presidents

“After the aforesaid verification, the Conference shall at once appoint a permanent President and four Vice-Presidents, chosen according to alphabetical order.”

M. PICHON pointed out that a Vice-President would be required to take the place of the President in his absence.

(This clause was accepted without amendment.)

M. PICHON then read Article VI., as follows:—

Article VI.
 Secretariat

“A Secretariat, appointed outside the Delegation proper, to be submitted to the agreement of the Plenipotentiaries by the President, who will have the control of and responsibility for it.

“This Secretariat to be entrusted with the task of arranging for the procedure of the sittings, of classifying the records, of looking after the administrative organisation of the Conferences and, gen-

erally, of assuring the regular and punctual working of all services ascribed to it.

"The head of the Secretariat to be in charge of and responsible for all protocols and records.

"The records to be open at all times to the members of the Conference."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the interpretation to be given to this clause was that the Secretariat should be organised on exactly the same lines as had been followed in the case of the Supreme War Council. The same organisation should be continued. That organisation had always worked very well.

(This was agreed to.)

M. MATSUI asked that the Japanese Representatives should be authorised to appoint a Secretary.

M. PICHON replied that it was intended that each of the five Great Powers should appoint Secretaries.

(It was agreed that each of the five Great Powers should be empowered to appoint Secretaries.)

M. PICHON then read Article VII. as follows:—

**Article VII. Com-
munications to
Press Concerning
Proceedings of
the Conference**

"The work of the Conferences to be made public by means of daily official bulletins prepared by the Secretariat and issued every day at the same hour.

The bulletins to be previously submitted to the members of the Conference for examination two hours at least before publication.

"Any member of the Conferences to have the right to request an alteration in the text of the bulletin. If a difference should arise, the point to be settled at the beginning of the next sitting.

"The Powers here represented and their Delegates expressly renounce all other communications concerning the proceedings of the Conferences."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this clause dealt with a very important point. Representatives of the Press had enquired from him whether they were entitled to go to any of the delegates and ask for information. He had replied, "Certainly not." This was undoubtedly the view held by his colleagues.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether there was any serious objection in the case of the large Conferences to having members of the Press present. He asked this question because leaks were absolutely certain to occur in such large Conferences, where a number of channels existed. In these large Conferences nothing of an embarrassing nature would be discussed. Important and delicate questions would have been discussed beforehand and only such questions as had been digested in various ways would be placed before these Conferences. Thus, questions such as those of Poland, Russia, etc., would never be dis-

cussed in public in the large Conferences. He himself would favour complete publicity rather than the publication of incorrect information through leakage.

MR. BALFOUR thought that President Wilson's proposals were open to the *prima facie* assumption that all the work of the big Conferences would be formal; that is to say, that merely agreed propositions would come before those Conferences. As a matter of fact, many other questions, such as those relating to the creation of new States, were bound to come under discussion. If Press representatives were admitted at these big Conferences, all questions would have to be thrashed out separately and it would be found necessary to bring into the small Conferences Czecho-Slovaks, Arabs, and others, in order that an agreement might be reached beforehand. It would end in these representatives of small States taking part in the discussions of the Great Powers.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied that his comment on that was, that it would not be possible in a big Conference to discuss such questions. The Representatives of the small States had, as a matter of fact, already stated their case in documents which had been published. They could say no more. It would, however, give them satisfaction to publish their views abroad. But, on the other hand, it would not be necessary for us to state our case in public. Written documents could be issued.

M. PICHON thought if President Wilson's proposals were accepted they would provoke unending discussions. If the Representatives of the smaller States knew that their speeches would be reported *in extenso* in the newspapers, they would feel bound to enter fully into all discussions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE hoped that President Wilson would not press the case until it had been further considered. There was a great deal to say in favour of President Wilson's idea as regards the publicity to be given to the large Conferences, but he feared there would be no end to these Conferences if reporters were there. One Delegate would get up and put forward all his case, so that it could be published in his native land and, as there were some twenty native lands, once they began that sort of business there would be no end to it. Again, someone would have to reply and he was not sure whether in the end this might not lead to unpleasant disputes in the Conference Room.

M. PICHON said there was another point of view which should be considered. During the study of the Peace Preliminaries it would be dangerous to let Germany know our difficulties. It was not desired to make a present to her of arguments which might divide the Allies

and so enable her to escape the necessity of accepting the conditions of the Preliminary Peace.

M. CLEMENCEAU said there was another point also to be considered. They had agreed that all decisions reached by the five Great Powers should be unanimous. In order to obtain this unanimity he would himself be prepared to give way on some points, and when these questions finally came before the large Conferences he would accept the decision so reached in silence. But if the Press were admitted to these Conferences, and the question came under discussion, he would be bound to take part in the debate. He could not let it be said that he had refused to speak on a question about which he held decided views. It would, however, clearly be seen that if he then expressed his opinion it would raise great confusion at the meetings.

BARON SONNINO expressed his complete agreement with Mr. Balfour. If the Press were admitted, not only would the small Powers put the whole of their case before the Conference, but the Great Powers would be compelled to do the same. Each Power would, therefore, be obliged to put forward the whole of its case—the public would expect that. As a result, the Conferences would never end.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether they could really avoid, in any case, the difficulties mentioned by Baron Sonnino. He did not think they were going to escape a syllable and they would still be obliged to give their answers even if the Conferences were held in private.

BARON SONNINO said a compromise might frequently be arrived at between two small States in private. At a large Conference, if held in private, the grounds upon which this decision had been reached need not be given. But if the Press were admitted, the parties to the compromise would feel compelled to put forward the whole of their case for the benefit of their countrymen.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether, even if the Press were excluded, any method could be found to prevent the leakage of information regarding the discussions that took place in the Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the only way to prevent leakage was not to give information. In the case of the Supreme War Council it had been found quite possible to maintain the desired secrecy.

BARON SONNINO held the view that a leakage of information was in many cases preferable to publicity.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had merely raised the point for discussion and he did not wish to press the question, but there certainly were two big sides to it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that all he wished was to press that for the moment the case should not be decided.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that, whatever decision was arrived at, it would be necessary to give information to the public of the various countries as a block, giving no advantage to one country over another.

(It was decided that the question should receive further consideration at a later date.)

M. PICHON next read Article VIII. of the Note, as follows:—

Article VIII “The French language is acknowledged as official
for the discussions and resolutions of the Conferences.

“The Delegates to be entitled to present observations or verbal communications in any language they may wish to use, on condition that a French translation be thereafter immediately provided. In this case, if the initiator so desires, the original foreign text may be appended to the official report.”

M. PICHON said he would give the interpretation of this Article. It would be possible for each of the Delegates to speak in his own language, but there could only be one official text of the proceedings. It would be admitted that even translations could not express the exact shade of meaning of the original. It would therefore be necessary to have one text to which it might be possible to refer as the official version. In recent times French had always been accepted as the diplomatic language. It had been accepted as the official language at the Conferences which had been held when the Treaties of Paris, of Berlin, of Peking and of Algenciras had been drawn up. Again, at the Hague Conferences all the conventions and proceedings had, by agreement, been drawn up in French. The Article now under consideration had, indeed, been taken almost textually from that which had been accepted by agreement for the Hague Conferences. Naturally, each of the Delegates had full right to the use of his own language, but only one text could be the official one. It was proposed that for the official text the French language should be used. This would not prevent the use of the English language, which was perhaps more widely spread and more widely known than any other language. Again, a French and an English text of all documents could be published. But should a dispute arise as to the correct interpretation to be given to a particular statement, the French text should be recognised as the official text.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE regretted that he could not accept the Article as at present drafted. He assured his French colleagues that he was in no way prejudiced on the subject of the French language. It was one of his greatest regrets that he was not better acquainted with it. But, for the first time in history, there would appear at a Conference of this class the representatives of the United States of

America, with a population of 100 million people, whose official language was English, and of the British Empire, with a total population of 350 millions, of which from 60 to 70 millions naturally spoke the English language. In other words, the official language of 160 to 170 million people to be represented at the Conference was English. He fully recognised that no attempt had been made to preclude the English language from being used at the Conference. But in the event of a dispute arising as to the interpretation of a given statement, the French language alone would be accepted. The British Empire had some experience on this question. In South Africa, Dutch and English were both recognised as official languages. Again, in Canada, French and English were the recognised official languages. In both cases the two texts were printed side by side and each was regarded as an official text. There had never been any practical difficulties, even though the test had been a far more severe one, since, in the case of legal documents, shades of interpretation, fine and subtle differences in words were of great importance, whereas in the case of the interpretation of Treaties, difficulties always arose on broad questions. He did not intend that the language employed by the majority of the people in the Alliance should be preferred to the French language, but he did propose that the English language should be used side by side with the French in the official documents of the Conference. He proposed, therefore, that the first paragraph of Article VIII should be amended to read:—

“The French and English languages are acknowledged as official for the discussions and resolutions of the Conference.”

BARON SONNINO said that, in a general way, he would prefer that only one language should be accepted as the authoritative language; but if two languages were to be admitted, it became very difficult to preclude the use also of the Italian language. French and Italian citizens were numerically equal. If only one language was to be admitted, he would agree to the use of French, because, historically, French had been recognised as the official language. But if the historic rule was to be changed, then Italian should also be admitted. Otherwise it would look as if Italy was being treated as an inferior by being excluded.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that they all recognised the historic claim of the French language. There were very few languages that excelled it in precision and delicacy of shading. But leaving this question out of consideration, he would invite attention to the fact that English was the diplomatic language of the Pacific. Negotiations, for instance, between Japan and China were conducted in English. All diplomatic transactions on that side of the globe were

in English. Further, there was an example of the use of three official languages in Switzerland, where French, Italian and German were used.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether this was really the case.

PRESIDENT WILSON continuing, said that the question under consideration was not really a matter for discrimination, but a question of general use. English was comprehended by a larger population than the language of any other of the peoples represented at the Conference. Therefore, it seemed to him that the language which was the official language of the greater part of the world was the most suitable language for a Conference of this nature. But he did not wish to propose that English should be the only official language. His proposal was that both French and English should be accepted as such. He fully recognised the claims of the Italians, both on account of the beauty of their language and on sentimental and other grounds. But it was so plainly the fact that English was now the language used by the great majority of the peoples represented at the Conference that it justified discrimination as against Italian.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that at Versailles, though the procès-verbaux of the Supreme War Council were printed only in English and French, the conclusions reached were printed in three languages. Was there any objection to the resolutions of the Peace Conference being given in three languages.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that in that case they should also be given in Japanese. He thought the question could only refer to the adoption of two languages or one language.

BARON SONNINO thought that, in the case of disputes, a decision as to the correct interpretation to be given would be easier if three languages were given, especially as it should be remembered that only a slight difference existed between nuances of the French and Italian languages.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he wished to draw attention to the second paragraph of this Article, which apparently entitled Delegates to submit observations in any language they chose, provided a translation in French was provided. It would obviously be a great burden to supply a French translation of every document and this part of the Article should not be retained.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was greatly embarrassed. He fully admitted that the English language was a most widely spread language and had brought with it great activity and liberal institutions. Now, in ancient times, Latin had admittedly been the official language and French had followed it. The French language possessed the great advantage of extreme precision, which was useful in the case of

official documents. Mr. Lloyd George had said that in South Africa and Canada the use of two languages had caused no trouble. He had also said that the interpretation of legal documents gave rise to greater troubles than the interpretation of Treaties. As a matter of fact, differences of opinion in the interpretation of Treaties led to the most serious upheavals. This fact had been fully recognised at the Hague and even at the Berlin Conferences, where it had been agreed to accept the French language. Still, he was prepared to admit that other languages (English and Italian) had claims and he was fully prepared to recognise those claims. He proposed, therefore, that they should retain perfect liberty to use the English, Italian and French languages at the Conferences, without the necessity of supplying French translations. Each of the texts, whether in English, French, or Italian, would be treated as the standard text. But if any difficulties or differences arose as to the correct interpretation, the French text would be recognised as the official text. In other words the three languages received complete recognition, but, in case of dispute, the French text would be accepted as the correct one. To give effect to his views he would make the following proposal:—

“The English, French, and Italian languages will be recognised as the official languages of the Conference, the French version holding good in case of dispute.”

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether the procès-verbaux should be kept in three languages.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied in the affirmative.

MR. BALFOUR thought that in reality there was no difference between the procedure proposed by M. Clemenceau and that given in the original text, since French was still to be the official language which was to be accepted in case of dispute.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would prefer to leave the case until the afternoon, in order that it might be given further consideration.

(The Meeting then adjourned, to meet again in the afternoon at 2.30 p. m.)

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, January 15, 1919,
at 14:30 O'clock**

PRESENT

FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY
M. Clemenceau.	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George.	Baron Sonnino.
M. Pichon.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.	Count Aldrovandi
M. Dutasta.	Lt-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	Major A. Jones
M. Fromageot	Captain E. Abraham.	
M. Berthelet		
Captain A. Portier		
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	JAPAN	
President Wilson.	M Matsui.	
Mr. R Lansing	Viscount Chinda	
Mr. A. H Frazier		

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux

M. PICHON said that the question of languages remained to be settled. He asked whether the text proposed by M. Clemenceau was accepted by the Meeting. This text was to the effect that the English, French, and Italian languages would be recognized as official languages at the Conference, the French version holding good in case of dispute.

1. The Official
Language of the
Conference

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he wished to present one of the aspects of this matter. Undoubtedly, French had been the language of European diplomacy in the past, but we were now dealing with a new case. This case did not affect only Europe: the rest of the world had come into the arena. A new Great Power was now concerned in the business of world diplomacy. He referred to the United States, whose language was English. The precedent in favour of the French language in diplomacy was only a European precedent. The language of diplomacy on the other side of the globe was English. There were, therefore, two precedents. Neither could be followed exclusively, as this was a Congress of the whole world. A very large part of the people affected by the settlements we hope to make use the English language. It was doubtful whether Americans, if they had before them a French document, could ever feel quite sure that it accurately represented their thoughts. The same

doubtless was the case with a Frenchman, if confronted with a document in English. He felt, therefore, that there should be two official languages. He made this proposal without intending any disrespect for the Italian language, the literature of which was justly admired throughout the world. The Italian language, however, would be known only to a small part of the representatives constituting the Congress. If the language of a minority were to be given official status, this principle would have to extend to the languages of other minorities. Harmony could be attained as between the languages by the Permanent Secretariat, the creation of which was contemplated. The officials on this Secretariat would, doubtless, have a perfect knowledge both of French and of English. Such knowledge of a greater number of languages would be hard to obtain. He therefore advocated the adoption of a bi-lingual scheme with great earnestness, as what we were about to do was to affect the future of the world, and all needless difficulties should be avoided. He therefore proposed that French and English should be the official languages.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then suggested that the English and French languages should be recognized as the official languages of the Conference, and that in any case of dispute the referee should be the League of Nations.

M. PICHON said that he wished to make certain observations. He wished to point out that this was not the first time that the nations of America were represented in an international diplomatic Conference in Europe. He would instance the two Hague Conferences. In both cases French had been adopted unanimously as the official language. At these Conferences, not only had the United States been represented, but also Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, and the Argentine. That very morning President Wilson had recognized that French had an historical privilege in this matter. He therefore appealed to him in order that, at the end of a War in which France had suffered so heavily, she should not find herself by the very first act of the Conference deprived of this ancient prerogative. M. Clemenceau, in a conciliatory spirit, had agreed that there should be two other official languages in addition to French, only reserving for the last the text which might be appealed to in exceptional cases of disputed interpretation.

BARON SONNINO said that he was satisfied with M. Clemenceau's formula, which recognized three languages as equally official, and, as a matter of convenience, reserved one for reference in case of contest. This was a departure from precedent. If a departure from precedent was to be made, he urged most strongly that Italian should

not be excluded. Italy had put four to five million soldiers in the field, and that should be taken into account.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if he listened only to his sentiment he would yield at once to M. Pichon's appeal. He and the people of the United States felt nothing but admiration and affection for France, but he felt obliged in this matter to omit sentiment. The work of this Conference concerned the future and not the past. The documents prepared by it were not merely to be useful to historians, but were to be the basis of the life and of the action of Governments in the future. Amongst the peoples to be affected by these documents were a very considerable number whose speech would be English. He had constantly to remind himself that the task in hand was a practical one and not a sentimental one. He was not concerned with the respective merits of various languages, but only with the case of interpretation in the future furnished by any one of them. He would be greatly distressed if it were thought that he felt any disrespect for any language. He wished the future to think that this Conference had done its best in a practical spirit, and placed in the hands of posterity the most useful instruments that could be devised.

M. PICHON drew attention to the procedure followed by the Joint Secretariat of the Supreme War Council at Versailles. He read the note appended to the *procès-verbaux* by the Joint Secretariat, which is as follows:—

"The French text of the Minutes was prepared in the French Section, and has been approved by the Joint Secretariat. The English text was prepared in advance in the English Section for the benefit of the British Government. It differs in no essential from the French, but the latter is the official text."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that when this had been decided the case lay between two European Powers. There was now another Power whose language was English and, moreover, the affairs of the Congress concerned the whole world. He, further, would point out that, when the Supreme War Council met in London, the official language was English. It was only French when the meetings took place in France. In addition to North America, the population of India should be considered. It might safely be said that English was the language of some 500,000,000 or 600,000,000 people. He had no desire to minimise the importance of The Hague Conferences which had been referred to, but there was no doubt that the public had been at that time apathetic, and had taken very little interest in what was debated there. Such was not the case now. Practical considerations, therefore, inclined him to support President Wilson.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that there was, perhaps, more agreement than appeared on the surface. He, for one, would never forget that, but for the intervention of English-speaking peoples, not only from America but from the British Empire, France would have been lost. He also, like President Wilson, wished to make a new world and to do new things, but (it was perhaps a trite observation) the future was attached to the past, and had its root in it. The English would remain English and the French French. This war had been a European war. Peoples had come to it from all parts of the world, but it had occurred in France. He agreed that it was indispensable to pay a tribute to the people who had come from so far and in so generous a spirit, but he would point out that in this matter something new was being done. He himself, a French statesman, had proposed that the official documents which an Englishman or an American would get should be in English. That was a novelty, but some care must be taken. If, in the archives at The Hague, for instance, a document in the French language were kept, which in quite exceptional circumstances might be required by a tribunal for the correct interpretation of a text, in what way could this offend any nation? In respect to Italian, he was opposed to its exclusion. Italian was spoken in Italy, in Asia Minor, in the Argentine. We were endeavouring to give a status to small Nations. Why should we therefore limit the official languages of Great Powers? He felt that as each nation matured it would acquire a right to a text in its own language. But, nevertheless, there must at all times be one final text to which to appeal. He therefore held to the proposal he had made that morning.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that we need not for the moment decide whether there should be two or three official languages. The point under consideration was whether one should have the position of a final standard, for this language would in effect be the official language. If French were adopted for this purpose, it would be the duty of all concerned to scrutinize the text very carefully. He, for his part, did not feel competent of his ability to detect the shades of meaning in a French text. He would therefore revert to his proposal that when difficulties of interpretation arose the case should be referred to the League of Nations. There was a precedent for this in Canada, where laws and enactments were promulgated in two tongues. When the Court declared that the texts were different the matter was referred to Parliament, which then decided what the meaning should be. He made these observations without prejudice to the question of whether Italian should be an official language or not, though he felt that perhaps one Latin and one Anglo-Saxon language would suffice.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that all Treaties between France

and the United States had been drawn up in the two languages; the English version was submitted to the American Senate for confirmation. Should any difference of opinion arise in the interpretation of the agreement between the two countries, the only solution could be a friendly meeting between representatives. Neither language in this case could be the standard.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if arbitration occurred the arbiter would have to decide on the French text. He further pointed out that the Treaty of Versailles,¹ which concerned America, had been drawn up in French.

PRESIDENT WILSON retorted that at the time of that Treaty America had no Constitution requiring reference of Treaties to the Senate. He further pointed out that the Bryan Treaty² had been drawn up in two languages, and a special official status had not been granted to either.

M. PICHON said that that was the first time that French had been challenged as the language of diplomacy throughout the world. Even such as related to customs, telegraphs, cables, treaties of commerce, &c., were made in French. Even Bismarck, who was no friend of France, had raised no objection to the use of French in the Treaty of Berlin.

MR. BALFOUR said that Great Britain had always accepted the tradition of French as the diplomatic language. As between France and England, the French text would undoubtedly have been appealed to in any case of dispute; but as in the United States it was the Senate that had authority to conclude treaties, it was clear that that body must ask for an English text.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he adhered to his proposal and did not feel that he could make any further concession.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the subject should be postponed and reconsidered at a later date.

M. PICHON read Article 9.³

After some discussion it was decided to amend this article as follows:—

2. Scheme of
Regulations.
Article 9

"Every document which is to be included in the official proceedings shall be presented in writing by the Plenipotentiaries who have brought it forward.

¹ Apparently a reference to the Declarations for Suspension of Arms and Cessation of Hostilities, signed at Versailles January 20, 1793; see Hunter Miller (ed.), *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America* (Washington, 1931), vol 2, p 108

² Treaty of September 15, 1914, between the United States and France for the advancement of general peace; English and French texts in *Treaty Series* No. 609; English text in *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 380.

³ Of section VI of the French plan of procedure printed in vol 1, p 386

"No document or proposal may be brought forward save by one of the Plenipotentiaries and in the name of the Power which he represents."

The question of language in the original text of this Article was reserved for future discussion.

M. PICHON read Article 10 which, on President Wilson's suggestion, was amended as follows:—

Article 10 "A Plenipotentiary wishing to make a proposal unconnected with questions on the agenda or not arising from the discussion should give notice thereof twenty-four hours in advance, in order to facilitate discussion. This rule, however, applies only to original motions, not to amendments or subsidiary questions."

M. PICHON then read Article 11.

Article 11 After some discussion, this Article was amended, on Baron Sonnino's proposal, to read as follows, with the object of restricting the circulation of certain documents concerning only the Great Powers:—

"Petitions, memoranda, observations, or documents forwarded to the Conference by any person other than Plenipotentiaries should be received and filed by the Secretariat. Such of these communications as are of political interest will be summarized in a list to be distributed to all the Plenipotentiaries. This list will be kept up to date as occasion requires. All such documents will be deposited in the Archives."

Article 12 Article 12 was read by M. Pichon and accepted without amendment.

Article 13 Article 13 was read by M. Pichon and accepted without amendment.

Article 14 Article 14, on the Proposal of President Wilson, was suppressed.

Article 15 Article 15 was read and accepted without modification.

Article 16 Article 16 was read by M. Pichon. After some discussion, it was agreed that the drafting of resolutions should be left to the General Secretariat of the Conference.

The article therefore reads:—

"It will be the duty of the General Secretariat to draft the Resolutions adopted by the Conference."

M. PICHON said that the decision that only official communiqués should be given to the Press required to be reinforced by certain measures. It was necessary to be able to check the despatch of telegrams to the Press in other countries. He therefore suggested that each Power should dele-

gate a Representative [to join a representative] ⁴ of the French Government and act with him for this purpose.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this proposal caused him some embarrassment. Not long before he had left America the Government had taken over the cables. It had then been suggested that this was done because he was coming to Europe, and meant to prevent the forwarding of any message unfavourable to himself. He had repudiated this insinuation, but if he now agreed to the censorship he would be convicting himself. In effect, he did not believe that anything was sent to America apart from the official communiqués, save what the American journalists obtained from the local Press. There were some eighty American journalists engaged in sending cables. The censorship of all their messages would involve a great deal of work and would entail great delay. He was of opinion that this matter could be set right if great care were taken by all concerned in the Conferences themselves. He also pointed out that France, if she so desired, could refuse any messages returning from America.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was not certain that if information went to America it would not on its return find its way into the British Press. It would certainly cause great discontent if the British Press obtained its information in this roundabout fashion. It was not possible to allow one half of the world to obtain news while depriving the other half.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that up to date nothing had been done in America to set the world on fire. He thought we could afford during the initial stage, when nothing of a very inflammatory nature was being discussed, to put the Press on trial. The British Government and the United States Government, and perhaps other Governments, dealt with one man, who acted as liaison between them and the Press. That person could be asked to assemble the pressmen and obtain a pledge from them to do nothing which might hamper the success of the Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU doubted whether this method would be successful in France.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE was of the same opinion with regard to Great Britain, but was willing to give this method a trial.

Mr. Lloyd George drew attention to Regulation No. 7, which he felt was not practicable. He felt that it would be impossible for the Secretariat to furnish bulletins in the time specified.

Article 7

He therefore suggested the following alternative:—

“The Conference to give general directions to the Secretariat as to what should be published, and what should not be published. If

⁴ These words appear in the British print but were omitted, apparently by typographical error, from the American print.

the Secretariat were in agreement on the text, publication would follow at once. If not, reference should be made to the heads of Delegations, or to any nominee acting on their behalf."

(This proposal was adopted.)

M. PICHON asked what the feeling of the meeting was concerning the meeting of the Peace Conference on the following Saturday.

4. Attendance at
First General
Meeting of Peace
Conference

Should only belligerent States be summoned to attend, or also those who had severed diplomatic relations with Germany? As this was the first meeting, he himself was of opinion that both categories of States should be asked to attend.

(This was agreed to.)

M. PICHON further stated that he proposed to send the invitations to the Ambassadors or Ministers representing the various States, because he was as yet unaware of the exact identity of the various Plenipotentiaries. The invitation to the British Dominions and India would likewise be sent to the British Embassy.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether the session on Saturday was to be a public one.

M. PICHON returned a negative answer.

VISCOUNT CHINDA enquired whether Technical Representatives would be present.

M. PICHON again answered in the negative.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the question of Russia should be resumed on the following morning.

5. Russia

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, but added the proviso that no communication of this intention should be given to the Press, as it was most unlikely that any conclusion would be reached on this subject, either on the following day or even the day after. This might lead the Press to suppose that there was disagreement. He would, therefore, suggest that memoranda should be prepared by each Power concerning Russia, giving the actual information at their disposal in regard to the present situation both in Russia and Siberia.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that such memoranda could not be ready for the following day.

(It was understood that these memoranda would be prepared as soon as possible.)

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether it would be advisable to obtain from the General Conference an endorsement of the regulations now agreed upon.

6. Acceptance of
Regulations by the
General Conference

M. PICHON was of opinion that if all these regulations were submitted to the Conference, there would be a protracted debate, especially on the subject of the numbers of Delegates. The

small Powers were well aware that these regulations were being prepared by the Great Powers. No protest had as yet been made.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether there was any objection to the communication to the Press by the Secretariat of all the conclusions reached that day.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that a short communication should be prepared containing items of such interest as the numbers of Delegates, the panel system, that there was no question of voting by Delegates, but that each Delegation, whatever its size, would be regarded as one.

(It was decided that the next Meeting should take place at 10:30 a. m. on the following day.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 15, 1919.

Notes on the Conversations Held in the Office of M. Pichon at the Quai d'Orsay on January 15, 1919

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :	President Wilson Mr. Lansing Mr. Frazier Mr. Harrison
BRITISH EMPIRE :	Mr. Lloyd George Mr. Balfour Lt. Col. Hankey Major Abraham M. Clemenceau
FRANCE :	M. Pichon M. Dutasta M. Berthelot Prince de Bearn
ITALY :	M. Sonnino Count Aldrovandi Capt. Jones
JAPAN :	Viscount Chinda M. Matsui.

Interpreter: M. Mantoux.

I

MR. LLOYD GEORGE referred to the agreement that no information regarding what took place at the meetings should be given out other than that issued by the Secretariat. He wished to point out that he had noticed that the French Press had published the clause regarding the proposed demands on the German Government to deliver its gold reserve, etc.

M. PICHON explained that while it was true that it had been published here, this was due to the fact that the French journalist[s] knew that it was known to British and American journalists, and that it would appear in their papers, as there was no British or American censorship of the Press.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that if this were true, their whole system was faulty. He referred to the fact that the British Delegation had a man in Paris especially for the purpose of handling the Press, and stated that he was quite certain that the information had not been obtained from this representative.

M. PICHON agreed that it was quite possible that the information had not been communicated officially to the British Press.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that it did not really matter how the leak had occurred. The question to be decided was whether there should be a censorship, and whether information should be suppressed. M. Clemenceau asked if the American Delegation had a man to handle the Press, as the British had.

MR. WILSON answered in the affirmative and stated this official's name to be Ray Stannard Baker.

M. PICHON proposed that the same Secretariat that met yesterday should meet every day and decide on what should be given to the Press and that all else should be censored.

M. SONNINO understood that nothing should be given out regarding the respective views of the Delegates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE laid stress on the importance of not having the Press give prominence to views of the representatives of any power which should not be in accord with the others. He called attention to the fact that the French Press were arguing the publication in *L'Humanité*, as if there were a difference between Great Britain and France. This was very bad. He thought it desirable that insofar as possible every effort should be made to influence the Press against discussing matters of supposed or actual controversy between one government and another.

II

MR. LLOYD GEORGE referred to the wording of the clause providing for the representation of the Dominions and India at the Conference and suggested that the word "may" be substituted for the word "shall".

The proposal was accepted.

M. PICHON informed the delegates that complaints had been received from the representatives of small powers like Belgium, China and Greece, that they had only two representatives, while Brazil had three.

He proposed, therefore, that the representations of small powers who have taken an active part in the War be raised to three.

MR. BALFOUR, in this connection, spoke on behalf of Portugal, who had sent 60,000 troops to the war, had supplied the field guns they had just obtained from the French, and had furnished a certain number of troops in her Colonies. If Siam has two representatives and Brazil, which is a daughter country of Portugal, has three, he thought Portugal should be allowed two. . . .

MR. WILSON proposed that Portugal be given two delegates.

MR. LANSING called attention to the fact that China had furnished 200,000 men.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE admitted this, but observed that they were all laborers.

M. PICHON stated that China has been very insistent for five delegates, basing her argument on the size of her population, her wealth, and the extent of her territory.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that India had 300,000,000 if China has 400,000,000.

M. PICHON inquired whether his proposition was accepted.

M. SONNINO suggested that no exception be made in the case of Portugal, and that she be permitted the same representation as the other small powers.

M. PICHON proposed that an exception be made in the cases of Belgium and Serbia, that they be given three delegates each, and that two delegates each be allowed to Portugal and Greece.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that some sense of proportion should be shown. He remarked that there was no point in giving Belgium three when the Great Powers had only five.

MR. WILSON inquired whether it would not be wise to have some statement issued to remove the apparent misapprehension regarding this question of the number of delegates. He remarked that we were now speaking only of votes, whereas the question was one of delegates, and not the number of votes; and he pointed out that each power was at liberty to use the Panel System, and could change its representatives.

It was decided to give Portugal two delegates instead of one.

CONTINUATION OF THE CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSED PROCEDURE

(See Section VI of the plan for the first conversations between the Allied Ministers submitted by the French Government, pages 12, et seq.)¹

III

M. PICHON proposed, and it was agreed, that precedence of the Great Powers should be in the following French alphabetical order:

United States of America
British Empire
France
Italy
Japan.

Section 4 was approved.

Section 5 was approved.

¹ Vol. I, p. 392.

Section 6 was approved. M. PICHON suggested a Joint Secretariat composed of the representatives of the Great Powers then present.

Section 7. MR. LLOYD GEORGE considered this section very important. The Press had asked him whether they were entitled to go to the other delegates for information, and he had replied in the negative.

MR. WILSON asked whether there would be any objection, owing to the likelihood of leaks, to having the representatives of the Press present at the Peace Conferences, as practically nothing would be discussed in the large sessions, at which any statement would be little more than a public statement of what had been decided beforehand. For his part, he would prefer complete publicity, rather than publicity by leak.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the suggestion that the Press should be present at the Conferences was open to this *prima facie* objection, viz.: that if this were carried out, the meeting would become purely formal. Moreover, should the Press be present at the large conferences, it would then be necessary to bring the other powers, say the Czecho-Slovaks, into the small conferences.

MR. WILSON assumed that it would hardly be possible to discuss cases such as this in the large conferences. Moreover, the Czecho-Slovak representatives could hardly do more than repeat at the large conferences what they have already given to the World. The determination as to what would be proposed by the Great Powers at the large conferences would be decided by the Great Powers beforehand.

M. PICHON remarked that should the Press be admitted to the conferences, there would be no end of speaking.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the hope that President Wilson would not press the suggestion. He feared that there would be no end to the conferences if reporters were present. Small nations would want to speak at great length. Moreover, as Mr. Balfour had pointed out, this might result in very unpleasant incidents, for instance, between Serbia and Montenegro.

M. PICHON observed that in the study of the preliminaries of Peace, it would be dangerous to give the enemy too much information on the points on which there was any difficulty or particular discussion between the Great Powers. The enemy would immediately make use of that information to endeavor to sow discord among those present.

M. CLEMENCEAU spoke at some length on this point, saying among other things: "We must be unanimous; there will be much that I will accept to maintain our unanimity. I will make sacrifices. If I go to the Conference I will say nothing that might tend to divide it,

but if one small power that has not been here in our conversation, asks how France has come to accept a certain provision, I will have to reply, and do not forget that this will then be made before the public."

M. SONNINO observed that the small powers would be obliged to make great speeches.

MR. WILSON thought that the gentlemen present seemed to be more hopeful than he was that long arguments could be avoided at the Conference.

M. SONNINO submitted the following supposititious case: "Suppose a great and a small power agree to compromise. The small power is not obliged to give all the information to the public, but if the Conferences are open, then the small power will be forced to ventilate all her case."

MR. WILSON observed that he had raised the point for discussion, but that he did not press it.

M. CLEMENCEAU insisted that the Great Powers go before the public as a block. He suggested that this matter be brought up again.

Section 8. M. PICHON pointed out that French has invariably been used as the language for the standard texts of treaties. The proposal that French be the official language, did not mean that delegates should not have the right to use their own language. The particular reason for having one language as the official language is that there may be assured but one document containing the standard text. There has been no exception to the use of French for that purpose. M. Pichon referred particularly to the last Conference at The Hague. Moreover, this requirement would not affect the right of delegates to use their own language such as English, which has the widest circulation in the world.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that he was very sorry not to be able to accept the text proposed for this section. He wished to say that it was not a matter of prejudice, but for the first time we now had the case of the United States taking part in a European Peace and this made with the British Empire a majority of the Associated Governments having English as their official language. He thought M. Pichon's point about a single document a good one, but it was interesting to recall that both English and Dutch are used side by side in South Africa, and English and French in Canada. In both countries all documents are published in both languages, and both hold. This is more important than in the case of treaties, where differences arise on questions of principle, rather than shades of meaning. In these instances, questions come up in connection with the interpretation of legal documents, and he knew of no case where any difficulty had arisen. Consequently, inasmuch as the majority of the

Alliance use the English language, he proposed an amendment to Section VIII, making English as well as French an official language of the Conference.

M. SONNINO stated that he preferred that one language be used, for if two languages were chosen, the Italian language would appear to be placed in an inferior position.

MR. WILSON observed that all recognized the historical claim for French to be made the official language, but there were some circumstances which he believed should not be overlooked. For instance, the official language of the East is English, and diplomatic documents are in that language. This is not a matter of discrimination, as M. Sonnino has said, but a matter of generality of use. It seemed to him that a language which is the official language of the greater part of the world should be the official language of the Conference. He did not, however, propose that French be excluded. He only asked that it be considered in a preferential manner, as compared with Italian.

M. PICHON referred to the fact that the resolutions of the Versailles Conference were in French.

M. CLEMENCEAU admitted that he was considerably embarrassed. He saw the justice of the claim that the English language was the language most commonly spoken throughout the world, and that it has carried civilization and liberal institutions wherever it has penetrated, but he would point out that French has taken the place of Latin, which, in its time, was the official language of the world, and moreover, it has the advantage of extreme precision. Nevertheless, he had the greatest desire to give each language its full right. Consequently, if English is admitted, it would not be right to exclude Italian.

He therefore proposed that there should be three official languages, and if a question of interpretation should ever arise, the French text would rule.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that this would make French the official language, or as Mr. Wilson suggested, the standard language.

MR. WILSON inquired whether the official minutes would then be kept in all three languages.

MR. BALFOUR requested that M. Clemenceau be good enough to submit his proposal in writing, so that he might see the actual wording of the clause, and that this should be presented for consideration at the afternoon meeting.

The conversations were resumed at 2:30 p. m.

M. PICHON submitted a new text for Article VIII, proposed by M. Clemenceau: (English, French and Italian to be the official languages—French the standard text).

MR. WILSON asked permission to present the following aspects of the matter: French has been the language of European diplomacy, but we have now reached the beginning of a new era, and enter upon world diplomacy. It is hardly decisive to follow European precedence which gives the French language this position. The language of the other side of the Globe is English, and this is a congress of the world. Moreover, the greater part of the people represented in this congress use the English language. He sincerely doubted whether any American when looking at this document in French would be satisfied that it was an exact expression of the decision of the Conference.

As regards the arguments for the Italian language, he would venture to point out that it was spoken by a limited part of what might be called the constituency of the Conference.

If English and French were placed on a parity there would be a perfect concurrence of mind of those who understood the French version with those who used the English version.

Mr. Wilson also pointed out that it was proposed to have a permanent Secretariat for the Conference, and this was one more reason why the documents of this Secretariat should be in both languages. Moreover, should another minority language be admitted, others would have to be included also.

He ventured again to lay stress upon the fact that a new element has been introduced in the diplomacy of the world by the entrance of a new power speaking English. For these reasons, he urged that both English and French be made the official languages of the Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE submitted a proposal providing for the use of French and English as the official languages of the Conference, and for the reference to the League of Nations for decision of any question of interpretation that may arise.

M. PICHON remarked that this was not the first time that the United States and other states of both North and South America had adopted French as the official language. He referred to the conferences at The Hague where according to precedent, French had been adopted as the official language by all those present.

In answer to the contention that The Hague Conferences had served no purpose and had been disregarded, M. Pichon replied that it was not the fault of France that this had occurred.

In conclusion he referred to President Wilson's statement that France in this matter had an historical privilege. He believed that President Wilson would be the last not to recognize that privilege. In view of what France had gone through, and in view of all her

sufferings, he thought it strange that the first act of this Conference should be to withdraw from her that right. He pointed out that M. Clemenceau had suggested a formula which seemed to meet the desires of the President, and still left France her privilege.

M. SONNINO pointed out that while it was true that Italy had not a majority of population, nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that she had contributed her full share to the War, and had put into the Field from four to five million soldiers. He repeated that if an exception were to be made to the historical rule, and Italy were left out, it would be a distinct slight against her. He wished to support M. Clemenceau's proposal. MR. WILSON spoke as follows:

"My sentiments would respond at once to M. Pichon's appeal, not only my own, but also those of all the people of the United States, but I felt obliged to leave sentiment out, by views of practical effects. The look of this Conference is to the future. We are trying to draw now together to do away with contest. These documents which we are to draw up and sign will be the basis and life of government all over the world. The interpretation of them will affect situations which are to come, and in such interpretations a preponderance of the peoples of the world will use the English text. I cannot refrain from reminding myself that we are engaged in a practical business, and I am bound to lay matters of conscience aside. What will be the languages in time to come, which will be easiest to interpret? French and English. The world will find it easier to interpret French and English texts, far easier than any other. Let me say that it is not in my heart to show disrespect. Let us so act that the future generations will say: 'These men had hard common sense, and put practical interests to the front.'"

After some general discussion the Chairman read the text of Article VIII, and put the question as to whether it was approved. He referred to the fact that French had been the official language of the Versailles Conferences of the Inter-Allied High Commission.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that when the Commission sat in London, English had been the official text. He reverted again to his former argument that English was the official language of a great section of the world. He laid stress on the point that the forthcoming Conference was to lay out a new era, and inasmuch as it was now necessary to deal with realities, he gave his support to President Wilson's appeal, although he found it most difficult to resist the appeal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. CLEMENCEAU believed that those present were more in accord than it appeared. Mr. Wilson had mentioned the part taken in the War by English-speaking people[s]. This is true. He frankly recognized the debt which France owed to the men who speak English. Like Mr. Wilson, he was ready to face new problems. It was

not only necessary to try, but also to succeed. This War, however, took place in France. It should not be forgotten that his proposal was that the official text shall be English, French and Italian, and he, a Frenchman, had proposed it. If it was now argued that the English speaking people must be able to read the text, he admitted it, and has proposed English, French and Italian. The mere fact that a small text is hidden away in the archives at The Hague, will not make any difference if it is in the French language. As regards Italian I believe that not only now, but in the future, it will be necessary to have many more officially stamped texts, but from the merely practical point of view there should be but one text in the hands of the judge. There should be but one standard to refer to.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that the question now under consideration was whether there shall be but one text, not two or three. If the French text is the standard for scrutinization, the British Delegate would have to examine it very carefully. Why would it not be well to have two or three official languages, and if there is a dispute, instead of referring it to a text, why not leave it to the League to decide? In Canada if the judge says that the texts are different, the matter is referred to Parliament. Such cases will undoubtedly arise, and it would be appropriate and preferable to have the matter referred to the League rather than to a text. Why could not the French language, so to speak, serve for all Latin peoples, and the English text represent the others? He suggested, therefore, that it would be better to proceed to the consideration of the amendment first proposed, that is to say, that there be two official texts, English and French. If that be accepted Baron Sonnino's proposal might then be taken into consideration.

MR. WILSON thought it of interest to remind those present that in treaties between the United States and France the text is in English and French. The Senate of the United States approves the English text. Therefore, so far as the United States is concerned, the English text would rule. Should there be a disagreement, the matter would be discussed, and an agreement reached between the two governments.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the Versailles Treaty ² was in French alone. MR. WILSON thought that this treaty had lapsed.

M. PICHON repeated that in all international agreements the French text ruled. Even at the Congress of Berlin, French was used. MR. WILSON pointed out that he did not dispute the fact that French has been the standard, but as to the Congress of Berlin, he would observe that America was not represented. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he could not go further than the amendment he had proposed.

² See footnote 1, p. 561.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that if that were to be the case it would be better to have no official text, and each country would only understand the text which its representatives signed.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that if so much importance were attached to such small matters, it was truly a bad beginning for the society of the League of Nations.

MR. WILSON observed that he was extremely sorry that this aspect had been given to the question. He did not like to leave a question of this sort where it then rested, and suggested that the delegates think the matter over, sleep on it, and take it up at the next meeting.

Section 9. MR. WILSON proposed that the provisions of the first sentence should be changed as follows: "And shall be presented in writing by the Plenipotentiaries who have brought them forward," instead of "read by the Plenipotentiaries, etc." Also that the second sentence should be stricken out. This proposal was accepted.

Section 10. MR. WILSON proposed that the words "or twenty-four hours beforehand" be inserted after the words "at the preceding session." This proposal was accepted.

Section 11. M. SONNINO suggested that the documents presented to the Conference should go to all the delegates but that the papers and minutes presented at the small meetings should not be circulated. He also proposed the addition of the words "to the Conference" after the word "presented" in the first line. His proposals were accepted.

Section 12 was accepted.

Section 13 was accepted.

Section 14. MR. WILSON inquired whether those present were ready to adopt such a rule. Would it not enable a small minority to hold up the proceedings? He also pointed out that this would be a body of sovereign powers, and as they could not be bound by such a regulation, why not omit the whole section? His proposal was accepted.

Section 15 was accepted.

Section 16. Instead of a drafting committee, Mr. Wilson suggested that the formulation of action should be taken by the Secretariat, and that the Article be changed accordingly. This was accepted.

IV

M. PICHON referred to the decision taken at the morning session to the effect that communications to the Press would be made by the Secretariat only. To make this effective, it would be necessary to stop any communications by cable, and he suggested that each Government appoint a representative to discuss this matter, and take the necessary steps.

MR. WILSON referred to the taking over of the cables by the United States Government. This action on his part had furnished an opportunity to his political opponents to criticize him, claiming that he had taken this action for the purpose of censorship of information regarding his actions in Europe. He had, of course, repudiated the idea. Therefore, should he now try to put a censorship in force, it would afford an opportunity to his opponents to further embarrass him. He felt confident that if those present were thoughtful regarding what they stated to the Press, censorship would be unnecessary.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that if there were no censorship in the United States, and censorship in Europe, half the world would know what was going on, and the other half would be left in ignorance.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the British people would have something to say if all the news came from America.

MR. WILSON thought that what had transpired so far in these private sessions, would not set the world on fire, even if it became public. He suggested that it might be advisable to have the representative of each delegation in charge of the Press, assemble his journalists, and inform them that those present had entered into a gentlemen's agreement not to discuss on the outside what was said during the conversation.

It was agreed that all those present place themselves under bond not to say to any journalist anything not contained in the official communiqué.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the daily official communiqué should be issued on the responsibility of the Secretariat, and would not be referred to the delegates unless there was a disagreement on some point between the secretaries. In that case the matter would be referred to the head of the delegation or his representative.

V

M. PICHON inquired whether he was expected to send invitations to those countries which had broken diplomatic relations with Germany.

It was agreed that invitations should be sent to the representatives of those Governments in Paris.

VI

MR. WILSON reverted again to the question of having the Press present at the opening Conference. It seemed to be the consensus of opinion that the Press would not be present.

VII

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that the question of Russia be considered at the next meeting, and suggested that each delegation be prepared to submit a brief memorandum containing the information in its possession regarding the existing condition of affairs in Russia, with special reference to the Bolsheviki.

Mr. Lloyd George thought it very important that no intimation should be given the Press that this subject was to be taken up at the next meeting.

The next meeting was fixed for 10:30 a. m., January 16th, 1919.

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay on Thursday, January 16, 1919, at 10:30
a. m.**

PRESENT

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
Captain A. Portier.

GREAT BRITAIN

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd
George.
The Right Hon. A. J.
Balfour.
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir
M. P. A. Hankey,
K. C. B.
Captain E. Abraham.

ITALY

Baron Sonnino.
Count Aldrovandi.
Major A. Jones.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.
Viscount Chinda.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. PICHON, in opening the meeting, said that M. Clemenceau would like to make an observation before the business of the day began.

**1. Publications
in Press**

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was in doubt whether the question of the Press had been settled in a practical manner. The censorship was being maintained in France. It had been discontinued in America, and was to be discontinued in Great Britain. Hence, news both true and false would be produced freely in some countries and not in others. He gave as an example a despatch produced in the *New York Tribune* attributing to President Wilson a threat of withdrawing all his troops from Europe unless the European Allies agreed to some of his desiderata. The statement was absurd, but it was sure to return to France and Great Britain and no obstacle would be placed to its return in the United States. Hence an absurd situation, certain to cause trouble. He therefore suggested that in addition to the Drafting Committee there should be a political Committee, composed of one representative from the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and France, to correct false news and guide public opinion in the right direction.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that such a Committee would not be able to put a stop to pure inventions like that of the *Tribune*.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the Committee could at least correct it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that it would be quite impossible to put a complete check on inventions of this kind. There were opposition papers in all countries anxious to discredit their Governments by backing the Plenipotentiaries of other countries against their own. It was impossible, nevertheless, to have complete publicity, especially in regard to the proceedings of the small Conference, in which it was public knowledge that the bulk of the business would be transacted.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether the protest from the Press addressed to himself and to the British Government did not refer only to the larger Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the protest really referred to the proceedings of the smaller Conference. He was of opinion that a general warning issued to the whole of the Press against believing unauthorised communications might serve to guide public belief and to protect the freedom of the Committee's deliberations.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought this warning might have effect if it were signed by President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, the Italian representative, and himself.

PRESIDENT WILSON doubted whether anything less than complete publicity would satisfy the American public.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the French censorship was mainly engaged in preventing such mischief, for instance, as attacks on President Wilson in the *Echo de Paris*. The only thing he desired to stop was the pitting of one Allied country against another. This he regarded as extremely dangerous, and he believed that the Press must not be allowed to attribute any given opinion to a particular statesman and a controversial view to another.

BARON SONNINO agreed that it was highly desirable that responsibility for all decisions should appear to be joint, but he did not know how this result could be achieved. If the suggested Committee were to attend meetings the numbers present at these gatherings would be too great. If, on the other hand, the Committee did not attend the meetings it would not be in a position to refute false news. There would always be inventions concerning the proceedings of the smaller Conference. False reports would be invented with the deliberate object of obtaining denials. Moreover, if the reports so invented happened to hit the mark, how could they be denied?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would issue a general caution to the public indicating that these Conferences were held with the object of reaching agreement. The process of reaching agreement necessarily involved debate and a statement of differing views. The differences were transitory, and were eliminated after debate, when the

common agreement was reached. It was the agreement that mattered to the public, and not the stages in the discussion.

PRESIDENT WILSON drew attention to another aspect of the case. All the members of the Committee were responsible representatives of their peoples. If it were given out that there was unanimous agreement on any point, their respective Parliaments and peoples would certainly enquire how they had come to consent. They were all responsible to public opinion in their own countries, and the public had a right to know what they had said.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that in the end each would have to defend himself, but if the defence must be undertaken from day to day as the discussion proceeded, work would be greatly hampered and the Conference would never reach any conclusions at all. He himself believed that the public as a whole meant to allow the Delegates fair play. Some of the newspapers, no doubt, were more concerned with their own tactics. He believed that if the kind of appeal he had suggested were made to the public, newspaper reports unauthorised by the Conference would be largely discredited by them.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that this appeared to be the best way. There was a well-known dodge in the American Press by which, after trying falsehood after falsehood and obtaining denial after denial, the seeker after information narrowed down the alternatives to the only possible residuum. He therefore suggested that each Government should through its deputy in liaison with the Press inform the reporters that the purpose of these meetings was to reach agreement, and that temporary disagreement was an ingredient in the process. He suggested that the reporters should be summoned together and asked to suggest their own means of dealing with this situation.

(It was therefore decided that a summons should be issued by each Government to the Pressmen of their own country to assemble that afternoon at 5 p. m. at the Club of the Foreign Press, No. 80 Avenue des Champs Élysées, in order to learn from the Press delegates attached to each Government the difficulty experienced in giving information of debates before their conclusion.

The delegates should inform the meeting that the Governments desired to keep the Press fully informed of the results achieved, and should enquire from the representatives of the Press what means suggested themselves as the best to carry out this intention.)

M. PICHON said that the French Government had received a protest from Siam against the attribution of only one Delegate to Siam at the Peace Conference. It was pointed out that Siam had not only declared war, but had also given assistance to the Alliance in many ways, by preventing Siam from becoming a base for enemy propaganda and

for trade after the War, by internirg enemy subjects and liquidating enemy firms, by handing over interned enemy ships to the Allies, and by sending a corps of airmen and motor transport to France. The communication ended by expressing the hope that the Press report was incorrect. M. Pichon enquired of the meeting whether there was consent to the representation of Siam by two Delegates instead of one.

(It was agreed that the Royal Government of Siam should be represented at the Peace Conference by two Delegates.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the plan put forward by the British Government had been misunderstood in many quarters. It had

never been suggested that the Bolshevik Government should be recognized to the extent of offering them a seat at the Peace Conference. It was only proposed that a truce among the various warring factions in Russia should be suggested. When this truce had been made, representatives of the various Governments should be invited to come to Paris to explain their position and receive from the Allies, if possible, some suggestions for the accommodation of their differences. The British Government was in complete accord with the French Government that the Russians could not be put on the same footing as Belgium, for instance, and M. Pichon had been misled if he thought that the British Government meant to offer them membership in the Conference. He made this proposal for the following reasons:—

(a) We did not know the facts about Russia. Differing reports were received from our representatives in Russia, and often reports from the same representative varied from day to day. It was clear that, unless we knew the facts, we should not be in a position to form a correct judgment.

(b) On one subject there could certainly be complete agreement, to wit, that the condition of Russia was extremely bad. There was misgovernment and starvation, and all the suffering resulting from both. It was impossible to know which party was gaining the upper hand, but our hopes that the Bolshevik Government would collapse had certainly been disappointed. Bolshevism appeared to be stronger than ever. Mr. Lloyd George quoted a report from the British Military Authorities in Russia, who could not be suspected of leanings towards Bolshevism, to the effect that the Bolshevik Government was stronger now than it had been some months previously. The peasants feared that all other parties would, if successful, restore the ancient regime and deprive them of the land which the Revolution had put into their hands.

(c) As to the Ukraine, where we had supposed a firm Government had been established, our information was that an adventurer with a few thousand men had overturned it with the greatest ease. This insurrection had a Bolshevik character, and its success made it clear that the Ukraine was not the stronghold against Bolshevism that we had imagined. The same movement was therefore beginning in the

Ukraine which had been completed in Great Russia. The former Government of the Ukraine had been a Government of big landlords only maintained in power by German help. Now that the Germans had withdrawn, the peasants had seized their opportunity. Were we going to spend our resources in order to back a minority of big landlords against an immense majority of peasants? There were three policies from which to choose.

(i) We could say that Bolshevism was a movement as dangerous to civilization as German militarism had been, and that we must therefore destroy it. Did anyone seriously put forward this policy? Was anyone prepared to carry it out? He believed that no one could be found to do so. The Germans, at the time when they needed every available man to reinforce their attack on the Western front, had been forced to keep about a million men to garrison a few provinces of Russia which were a mere fringe of the whole country; and, moreover, at that moment Bolshevism was weak and disorganized. Now it was strong and had a formidable army. Was anyone of the Western Allies prepared to send a million men into Russia? He doubted whether a thousand would be willing to go. All reports tended to show that the Allied troops in Siberia and in Northern Russia were most unwilling to continue the campaign and determined to return to their homes. To set Russia in order by force was a task which he for one would not undertake on behalf of Great Britain, and he questioned whether any other Power would undertake it.

(ii) The second policy was a policy of insulation, the policy known as "cordon sanitaire." This policy meant the siege of Bolshevik Russia, that is to say, the Russia that had no corn, but a large famished population. These people were dying by thousands, if not by hundreds of thousands, of famine. Petrograd had been reduced from the proportions of a great city to those of a moderate town. Our blockade of Russia would lead to the killing, not of the ruffians enlisted by the Bolsheviks, but of the ordinary population, with whom we wish to be friends. This was a policy which, if only on grounds of humanity, we could not support. It might be suggested that the continuance of this policy in Russia would lead to the overthrow of the Bolsheviks; but who in Russia was able to overthrow them? General Knox¹ reported that the Czecho-Slovaks were tainted with Bolshevism and could not be trusted, neither could the Russian troops of Kolchak. He had just seen a map revealing the area held by Denikin. He occupied with an effective force of perhaps 40,000 men what might be described as a little backyard near the Black Sea. Denikin was said to have recognized Kolchak, but he was quite unable to get into touch with him, as an immense Bolshevik area intervened between them. Kolchak, moreover, appeared to pursue the revival of the old regime in Russia; hence the lukewarmness of the Czecho-Slovaks in his cause. They were unwilling to fight in order to set up another Tzarist regime. So also were the British. This would not be helping to create a new world.

¹ Maj. Gen. Alfred W. F. Knox, in command of the British forces in Siberia.

(iii) The only other way he could think of was the plan he had proposed—that of asking representatives of the various Russian Governments to meet in Paris after a truce among themselves. The name of M. Sazonoff had been mentioned as representing the Government at Omsk. M. Sazonoff had been long out of Great Russia. It was questionable whether he knew anything of the conditions at Omsk. He was a strong partisan, and might as well be consulted on the present temper of Russia as the *New York Tribune* on the opinions of Mr. Wilson. We could not leave Paris at the conclusion of the Peace Conference congratulating ourselves on having made a better world, if at that moment half of Europe and half of Asia were in flames. It had been alleged that if Bolshevik emissaries came to France and England they would proselytise the French and British peoples. It was possible that Bolshevism might gain ground in these countries, but it would not be as a consequence of the visit of a few Russian emissaries. He himself had no fears on this score. Moreover, conditions could be imposed on the delegates, and if they failed to observe them they could be sent back to Russia. With this threat over them it was most likely that they would avoid giving offense as they would be anxious to explain their case.

M. PICHON asked whether the meeting would care to hear M. Noulens, the French Ambassador in Russia, who had just returned from Archangel. If so, M. Noulens could attend the meeting on the following day, and would be able to give very interesting information concerning Bolshevism.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in his mind there was no possible answer to the view expressed by Mr. Lloyd George. This view corresponded exactly with the information received from Russia by the United States Government. There was certainly a latent force behind Bolshevism which attracted as much sympathy as its more brutal aspects caused general disgust. There was throughout the world a feeling of revolt against the large vested interests which influenced the world both in the economic and in the political sphere. The way to cure this domination was in his opinion, constant discussion and a slow process of reform; but the world at large had grown impatient of delay. There were men in the United States of the finest temper, if not of the finest judgment, who were in sympathy with Bolshevism, because it appeared to them to offer that regime of opportunity to the individual which they desired to bring about. In America considerable progress had been made in checking the control of capital over the lives of men and over Government; yet, even there, labor and capital were not friends. The vast majority who worked and produced were convinced that the privileged minority would never yield them their rights. Unless some sort of partnership between these two interests could be obtained society would crumble. Bolshevism was

therefore vital because of these genuine grievances. The seeds of Bolshevism could not flourish without a soil ready to receive them. If this soil did not exist, Bolshevism could be neglected. British and American troops were unwilling to fight in Russia because they feared their efforts might lead to the restoration of the old order, which was even more disastrous than the present one. He recollected making a casual reference of sympathy to the distressed people in Russia, in a speech mainly dealing with other topics, to a wealthy audience in America. The enthusiasm evinced by this remark had surprised him, especially as coming from such an audience, and this incident remained in his mind as an index of the world's sympathies. These sympathies were against any restoration of the old regime. We should be fighting against the current of the times if we tried to prevent Russia from finding her own path in freedom. Part of the strength of the Bolshevik leaders was doubtless the threat of foreign intervention. With the help of this threat they gathered the people round them. The reports of the American representatives in Russia were to this effect. He thought, therefore, that the British proposal contained the only suggestion that led anywhere. If the Bolsheviks refrained from invading Lithuania, Poland, Finland, &c., he thought we should be well advised to allow as many groups as desired to do so to send representatives to Paris. We should then try to reconcile them, both mutually and with the rest of the world.

M. PICHON again suggested that before coming to a decision the meeting should hear M. Noulens, whose news from Russia was fresh.

BARON SONNINO suggested that M. de Scavenius, who had been Danish Minister in Petrograd and was now in Paris, could also give very valuable information.

(It was decided that M. Noulens and M. de Scavenius should be invited to attend the meeting on the following day at 10.30 a. m.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 16, 1919.

Notes on Conversations Held in the Office of M. Pichon at the
Quai d'Orsay, on January 16, 1919

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:	President Wilson Mr. Lansing Mr. Frazier Mr. Harrison
BRITISH EMPIRE:	Mr. Lloyd George Mr. Balfour Lt. Col. Hankey Major Abraham—Major Caccia
FRANCE:	M. Clemenceau M. Pichon M. Dutasta M. Berthelot Prince de Bearn
ITALY:	M. Sonnino Count Aldrovandi Capt. Jones
JAPAN:	Viscount Chinda M. Matsui

Interpreter: M. Mantoux.

I

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he did not think that the solution arrived at regarding the Press was practical. He pointed out that there was no censorship of the Press in the United States or in England, while there was a French censorship in operation. Consequently, this was manifestly unfair, as false news could be sent from here to the United States or England and come back via America. Coming from America, it would be impossible to stop it. He also referred to the story carried in the *New York Tribune* which practically threatens the Allied Governments with withdrawal of U. S. Forces in Europe. It would seem desirable to have either total secrecy on all sides, which is absolutely impossible, or complete publicity. Would it be well to create a Committee of Communication to the Press, which would give out news and reply to false news, also do what they could to remove false impressions?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that there were papers in each of the Allied countries which were opposed to the government, and that these papers would make use of any information which they might obtain from the delegates of one government to discredit the dele-

gates of another. There were several English papers which he knew were determined to discredit the plans of the British Government.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested complete publicity of all that happened.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought this inadvisable, as regards the small meetings. PRESIDENT WILSON inquired whether publicity were not practicable in the case of the large conferences.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE seemed to think this a small matter,—that what the Press wanted was publicity regarding what took place at the small meetings.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether the protest of the Press which he had received the previous evening did not refer only to the great conferences.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that this might be the case, and that the wording of the protest might give that impression. He did not think, however, that the protest was meant to refer only to the great conferences. He felt sure that the Press want to be able to publish anything that they can pick up regarding the small conferences.

BARON SONNINO remarked that the Press can always invent things.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that it was just for this reason that it was desirable to take steps to prevent it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether it would not be well to have a general warning issued to the Press of all countries.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired if this proposal meant a statement signed by President Wilson, Lloyd George, Orlando and himself.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that the public of the United States wanted open sessions.

M. CLEMENCEAU laid stress on the view that if there was to be no censorship of general news, it was most important to avoid by all possible means the efforts which would undoubtedly be made to sow discord among the delegates of the Great Powers. They must be unanimous.

BARON SONNINO agreed with M. Clemenceau, and pointed out that the responsibility of an amendment to a unanimous decision on any question should be the responsibility of all. As regards the suggestion for the formation of a committee to deny false stories and rumors, he did not see how the committee could refute false stories regarding alleged happenings at the small meetings, unless the members of the committee were present at these meetings. Moreover, if stories are denied, news will be invented by the Press for the purpose of obtaining a denial, and thus the point will be slowly narrowed down until the actual information is obtained.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that the issuance of some kind of statement explaining the danger of giving out information from day to day before a final decision on any one question was reached, appealed strongly to him. He thought it would be well to issue an appeal to the public not to pay too much attention to unauthorized news which might be entirely untrue, or consist of a part only of the facts, or give a false impression of the question. He believed that a majority of the public would understand such an appeal, and would discredit the news.

PRESIDENT WILSON inquired whether those present saw any virtue in the suggestion that Sir George Riddell,¹ Mr. Baker² and the representatives of the Italian and French delegates meet the newspaper correspondents, tell them frankly that the object of these conversations is to come to an understanding, and that if news were to be given out from moment to moment, a false impression would be made.

M. CLEMENCEAU did not think that this would stop the man who wanted to send false news from doing so.

PRESIDENT WILSON did not see how he could be stopped in any case. He thought that his proposal would be the most efficacious way of handling the matter, as regards small conferences, and suggested that meanwhile those present resolve that the large conferences shall be open to the Press.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that the Press once let in could never be excluded.

BARON SONNINO, referring to the suggestion of the creation of a committee, pointed out that when a certain piece of news was not completely false the committee would be unable to deny it.

MR. BALFOUR inquired whether the company present had carefully considered what would be the function of the great conferences, if they were made entirely open to the Press. Would it not result in their becoming purely a matter of form?

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it would be impossible without danger to reduce the part to be played by the great conferences. He called attention to the fact that all those present had named several delegates, because their presence was desired. It was true that certain questions should be discussed only in the small meetings, which perhaps it would not be well to discuss at the great meetings. Nevertheless, many questions will have to be discussed openly at the great meetings.

MR. BALFOUR referred to the fact that it had been decided that the small powers should be present only when questions came up which

¹ Sir George Riddell, British press representative at the Peace Conference

² Ray Stannard Baker, director of the press bureau of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.

concerned them. He mentioned the cases of Danzig and Poland generally. He did not think it would be wise to hold the discussion of both of these cases in public. If that were true, the great conferences would become simply formal and practically would be called together only to hear a decision.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that it was hardly conceivable that the big conferences would be obliged to accept the decisions of those present if the principle of: one nation, one vote, were adopted.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that surely the President did not propose to permit the Great Powers to be out-voted by the small powers.

M. PICHON pointed out that when such questions as those of Danzig and Poland were discussed, it would be necessary to have others present, because the Polish questions touched on the Czecho-Slovak questions and Baltic provinces, and in fact, the whole Russian problem.

BARON SONNINO suggested that all groups of questions should be examined in the small conferences, and then brought to the great conferences, and that general questions should be discussed at all conferences.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE again urged that the discussion revert to President Wilson's suggestion about a talk to the Press. He supported the suggestion and thought it most desirable to have the representatives of the delegates obtain the views of the Press by the following day. He asked President Wilson to be good enough to repeat his suggestion.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that the three representatives should call the representatives of the Press and explain the difficulties with which the delegates were faced with regard to the question of giving out information and inform them that the delegates did not think it would facilitate results if the details of the present discussions were outlined in public. The three representatives should also make it clear to the Press that it was the desire of the delegates to tell them as fully and freely as possible of the determination taken at these conferences. In conclusion, the three representatives should ask the Press to express their views as to what they considered the best method for carrying out the desires of the delegates.

It was suggested that the three representatives arrange to meet the Press at the Hotel Dufayel at five o'clock.

II

M. PICHON read a protest received from the Siamese Government against the assignment to it of but one delegate. M. Pichon read the arguments of the Siamese Government. It was claimed that Siam had done all that she could to help; that she had eliminated German propaganda of which she was a center; had destroyed German trade;

had deported enemy subjects, and had placed enemy ships at the disposal of the Allies.

It was decided to give Siam two delegates.

III

PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION REGARDING THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA

MR. LLOYD GEORGE commenced his statement setting forth the information in the possession of the British Government regarding the Russian situation, by referring to the matter which had been exposed recently in *L'Humanité*. He stated that he wished to point out that there had been a serious misconception on the part of the French Government as to the character of the proposal of the British Government. The British proposal did not contemplate in any sense whatsoever, a recognition of the Bolsheviki Government, nor a suggestion that Bolshevik delegates be invited to attend the Conference. The British proposal was to invite all of the different governments now at war within what used to be the Russian Empire, to a truce of God, to stop reprisals and outrages and to send men here to give, so to speak, an account of themselves. The Great Powers would then try to find a way to bring some order out of chaos. These men were not to be delegates to the Peace Conference, and he agreed with the French Government entirely that they should not be made members of the Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George then proceeded to set forth briefly the reasons which had led the British Government to make this proposal. They were as follows:

Firstly, the real facts are not known;

Secondly, if it is impossible to get the facts, the only way is to adjudicate the question; and

Thirdly, conditions in Russia are very bad; there is general misgovernment and starvation. It is not known who is obtaining the upper hand, but the hope that the Bolshevik Government would collapse has not been realized. In fact, there is one report that the Bolsheviks are stronger than ever, that their internal position is strong, and that their hold on the people is stronger. Take, for instance, the case of the Ukraine. Some adventurer raises a few men and overthrows the government. The government is incapable of overthrowing him. It is also reported that the peasants are becoming Bolsheviks. It is hardly the business of the Great Powers to intervene either in lending financial support to one side or the other, or in sending munitions to either side.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that there seemed to be three possible policies:

1. **Military intervention.** It is true that the Bolshevik movement is as dangerous to civilization as German militarism, but as to putting

it down by the sword, is there anyone who proposes it? It would mean holding a certain number of vast provinces in Russia. The Germans with one million men on their Eastern Front only held the fringe of this territory. If he now proposed to send a thousand British troops to Russia for that purpose, the armies would mutiny. The same applies to U. S. troops in Siberia; also to Canadians and French as well. The mere idea of crushing Bolshevism by a military force is pure madness. Even admitting that it is done, who is to occupy Russia? No one can conceive or undertake to bring about order by force.

2. A cordon. The second suggestion is to besiege Bolshevik Russia. Mr. Lloyd George wondered if those present realized what this would mean. From the information furnished him Bolshevik Russia has no corn, but within this territory there are 50,000,000 men, women and children. There is now starvation in Petrograd and Moscow. This is not a health cordon; it is a death cordon. Moreover, as a matter of fact, the people who would die are just the people that the Allies desire to protect. It would not result in the starvation of the Bolsheviks; it would simply mean the death of our friends. The cordon policy is a policy which, as humane people, those present could not consider.

Mr. Lloyd George asked, who was there to overthrow the Bolsheviks? He had been told there were three men, Denikin, Kolchak and Knox. In considering the chances of these people to overthrow the Bolsheviks, he pointed out that he had received information that the Czecho-Slovaks now refused to fight; that the Russian Army was not to be trusted, and that while it was true that a Bolshevik Army had recently gone over to Kolchak it was never certain that just the reverse of this did not take place. If the Allies counted on any of these men, he believed they were building on quick-sand. He had heard a lot of talk about Denikin, but when he looked on the map he found that Denikin was occupying a little backyard near the Black Sea. Then he had been told that Denikin had recognized Kolchak, but when he looked on the map there was a great solid block of territory between Denikin and Kolchak. Moreover, from information received it would appear that Kolchak has been collecting members of the old regime around him, and would seem to be at heart a monarchist. It appeared that the Czecho-Slovaks were finding this out. The sympathies of the Czecho-Slovaks are very democratic, and they are not at all prepared to fight for the restoration of the old conditions in Russia.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that he was informed that at the present time two-thirds of Bolshevik Russia was starving.

Institutions of Bolsheviks are institutions of old Czarist regime. This is not what one would call creating a new world.

3. The third alternative was contained in the British proposal, which was to summon these people to Paris to appear before those present, somewhat in the way that the Roman Empire summoned chiefs of outlying tributary states to render an account of their actions.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out the fact that the argument might be used that there were already here certain representatives of these

Governments; but take, for instance, the case of Sassonoff, who claims to represent the Government of Omsk. As a matter of fact, Sassonoff cannot speak from personal observation. He is nothing but a partisan, like all the rest. He has never been in contact, and is not now in direct contact with the Government at Omsk.

It would be manifestly absurd for those who are responsible for bringing about the Peace Conference, to come to any agreement and leave Paris when one-half of Europe and one-half of Asia is still in flames. Those present must settle this question or make fools of themselves.

Mr. Lloyd George referred to the objection that had been raised to permitting Bolshevik delegates to come to Paris. It had been claimed that they would convert France and England to Bolshevism. If England becomes Bolshevik, it will not be because a single Bolshevik representative is permitted to enter England. On the other hand, if a military enterprise were started against the Bolsheviks, that would make England Bolshevik, and there would be a Soviet in London. For his part, Mr. Lloyd George was not afraid of Bolshevism if the facts are known in England and the United States. The same applies to Germany. He was convinced that an educated democracy can be always trusted to turn down Bolshevism.

Under all the circumstances, Mr. Lloyd George saw no better way out than to follow the third alternative. Let the Great Powers impose their conditions and summon these people to Paris to give an account of themselves to the Great Powers, not to the Peace Conference.

M. PICHON suggested that it might be well to ask M. Noulens, the French Ambassador to Russia, who had just returned to France, to appear before the meeting tomorrow morning, and give those present his views on the Russian situation.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he did not see how it was possible to controvert the statement of Mr. Lloyd George. He thought that there was a force behind his discussion which was no doubt in his mind, but which it might be desirable to bring out a little more definitely. He did not believe that there would be sympathy anywhere with the brutal aspect of Bolshevism. If it were not for the fact of the domination of large vested interests in the political and economic world, while it might be true that this evil was in process of discussion and slow reform, it must be admitted, that the general body of men have grown impatient at the failure to bring about the necessary reform. He stated that there were many men who represented large vested interests in the United States who saw the necessity for these reforms and desired something which should be worked out at the Peace Conference, namely, the establishment of some

machinery to provide for the opportunity of the individuals greater than the world has ever known. Capital and labor in the United States are not friends. Still they are not enemies in the sense that they are thinking of resorting to physical force to settle their differences. But they are distrustful, each of the other. Society cannot go on on that plane. On the one hand, there is a minority possessing capital and brains; on the other, a majority consisting of the great bodies of workers who are essential to the minority, but do not trust the minority, and feel that the minority will never render them their rights. A way must be found to put trust and cooperation between these two.

President Wilson pointed out that the whole world was disturbed by this question before the Bolsheviks came into power. Seeds need soil, and the Bolsheviks found the soil already prepared for them.

President Wilson stated that he would not be surprised to find that the reason why British and United States troops would not be ready to enter Russia to fight the Bolsheviks was explained by the fact that the troops were not at all sure that if they put down Bolshevism they would not bring about a re-establishment of the ancient order. For example, in making a speech recently, to a well-dressed audience in New York City who were not to be expected to show such feeling, Mr. Wilson had referred casually to Russia, stating that the United States would do its utmost to aid her suppressed people. The audience exhibited the greatest enthusiasm, and this had remained in the President's mind as an index to where the sympathies of the New World are.

President Wilson believed that those present would be playing against the principle of free spirit of the world if they did not give Russia a chance to find herself along the lines of utter freedom. He concurred with Mr. Lloyd George's view and supported his recommendations that the third line of procedure be adopted.

President Wilson stated that he had also, like Mr. Lloyd George, received a memorandum from his experts which agreed substantially with the information which Mr. Lloyd George had received. There was one point which he thought particularly worthy of notice, and that was the report that the strength of the Bolshevik leaders lay in the argument that if they were not supported by the people of Russia, there would be foreign intervention, and the Bolsheviks were the only thing that stood between the Russians and foreign military control. It might well be that if the Bolsheviks were assured that they were safe from foreign aggression, they might lose support of their own movement.

President Wilson further stated that he understood that the danger of destruction of all hope in the Baltic provinces was immediate, and that it should be made very clear if the British proposal were adopted, that the Bolsheviki would have to withdraw entirely from Lithuania and Poland. If they would agree to this to refrain from reprisals and outrages, he, for his part, would be prepared to receive representatives from as many groups and centers of action, as chose to come, and endeavor to assist them to reach a solution of their problem.

He thought that the British proposal contained the only suggestions that led anywhere. It might lead nowhere. But this could at least be found out.

M. PICHON referred again to the suggestion that Ambassador Noulens be called before the meeting.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that it might be well to call the Dutch Consul, lately in Petrograd, if it was the desire of those present to hear the anti-Bolshevik side.

BARON SONNINO suggested that M. Scavenius, Minister of Denmark, recently in Russia, would be able to give interesting data on the Russian situation.

Those present seemed to think that it might be desirable to hear what these gentlemen might have to say.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, January 17, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. Fromageot.*
Captain A. Portier.

GREAT BRITAIN

The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
Lt.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.
Captain E. Abraham.

ITALY

Baron Sonnino.
Count Aldrovandi.
Major A. Jones.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.*

JAPAN

M. Matsui.
Viscount Chinda.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that before beginning the business of the meeting, he wished to inform the Conference that Marshal Foch had obtained the signature of the Germans to the Armistice clauses drawn up on the previous Monday, concerning finance, Russian prisoners, the occupation of a bridgehead east of Strasburg, the delivery of the German commercial fleet, and, in fact, of all the clauses which had been proposed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, referring to the anxiety of the Press to attend the meetings of the Peace Conference, said that two classes of general conference might be distinguished. Firstly, there was the kind of conference to which all were admitted. Such conferences would be of a formal nature and little business would be transacted in them. Secondly, there would be conferences of the Great Powers with two or three of the smaller Powers, or you might have such as Yugo-Slavs, the Poles, and Czecho-Slovaks associated with them. If publicity could safely be given to the first class, he asked whether it should be held to extend to the second. The second class of conference would be dealing with highly contentious questions, and he felt that their business would be much hampered by publicity.

* These were present at the two previous meetings. [Footnote in the original.]

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the reporters could be told that admission would be confined to conferences held in the large room at Quai d'Orsay. Conferences of the second class mentioned by Mr. Lloyd George could be held in the small room, and the Press could be thereby excluded from hearing the discussion.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, apart from this question, it must be clearly stated that no publicity would be granted to the kind of conference now sitting. He suggested that the Press should be definitely informed of this, and that there should be a unanimous vote to that effect.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that what took place on these occasions could correctly be termed conversations, but not conferences. He pointed out that all the Delegates of the Powers represented were not present, but only two. These meetings, therefore, were in no sense conferences.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he wished to issue a communiqué to the Press telling them clearly in what cases publicity would be allowed, and in what cases it would be refused.

PRESIDENT WILSON, quoting the resolutions of the Special Committee appointed by the delegates of the Allied and American Press, observed that they asked for "full publicity for the peace negotiations." The proceedings now going on were not peace negotiations. The peace negotiations would, doubtless, be undertaken only in the big conferences. The second point asked for was that the official communiqué should be as complete as possible. The third was that, in addition to communiqués, full summaries of the day's proceedings should be issued for the guidance of the members of the Press, "who would maintain full freedom of comment." The fourth was that free intercourse should be allowed between Delegates and responsible journalists.

M. MANTOUX, who attended the meeting of the Press, stated that their demands related to the small as well as the big conferences.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the full summaries requested by the Press, in addition to communiqués, meant an account of the speeches made in the conferences. If this was so, he was opposed to the granting of such summaries. The procès-verbaux of the meetings could not be made public, otherwise business would become impossible. The Conference would tend to resemble the Council of Trent, whose labours were terminated in forty-three years after the death of all the original members.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the matter should be approached from the other end. He suggested that representatives of the Press be admitted to conferences held in the large room.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired how the representatives were to be selected.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that it would be enough to fix a number and leave it to the pressmen to elect their own delegates.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if the decision was that the pressmen should not enter the smaller conferences, it was necessary to state this clearly.

BARON SONNINO suggested that their attendance should be limited to plenary conferences. He did not think a discrimination could be based upon the size of the room. Summaries of the smaller conferences would be furnished. He quite agreed that no pressmen could be allowed to attend the private conversations of the Great Powers.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the only plenary conferences would be those dealing with subjects in which all nations were concerned. It had been laid down that the small nations should only be present to watch their special interests. Hence, the range of subjects for plenary conferences was very limited. The question of the League of Nations might be instanced as one, and possibly there were financial questions concerning all nations. In any case, the subjects requiring plenary conferences would be very few. Hence, though the privilege granted to the Press might appear great, in practice it would be found insignificant.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether a plenary conference could not be held to mean a conference attended by all those interested in any given question. If, for instance, there were a question in which only the Great Powers were concerned, there would be a plenary conference when their entire Delegations were present.

MR. BALFOUR said that on this definition a subject like the territorial adjustment of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia or Yugo-Slavia, which required the presence of the Delegates of these peoples together with those of the Great Powers, would give rise to a plenary conference. Even if such a conference were held in the smaller room, we should be bound to admit the Press. He considered this very alarming.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was, then, perhaps wiser to mention the room instead of defining the nature of the conference.

BARON SONNINO said that in his view a plenary conference was not one held to decide a particular interest even should all those concerned in it be present. A plenary conference would be one dealing with a group of questions, or one held to give final sanction to a group of decisions. For instance, reparation due to a damaged country would not be a question for a plenary conference, but the whole principle of reparation and its distribution over the whole of the damaged countries would be a subject for a plenary conference.

Further, if general rules were laid down, it would be necessary to obtain sanction to them from a plenary conference.

M. PICHON said that he wished to make an observation which, in his opinion, had an important bearing on this subject. We were only considering Allied and Associated Nations, but there were also enemy nations, and this should not be overlooked. It had been decided that those nations should not be admitted to the Conference until the Allies had agreed among themselves. Were the Allies then to inform them in advance of their decisions and of all the discussions undertaken in the process of reaching these decisions? This would be in effect admitting them to the Conference, from which it had been decided to exclude them. He could not but regard this as extremely dangerous.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the question under discussion was not so much a question of publicity or no publicity, as one of useful as opposed to perverted publicity. Publicity as such could not be avoided. It had not been avoided in reference to the meetings held hitherto. The only problem, therefore, was to obtain correct publicity.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not feel quite sure that this was so. There was a great difference between conjectural reports and official summaries. The authority of the latter was infinitely greater than that of the former. If questions were put in Parliament regarding the former, it was always possible to reply that they were incorrect or incomplete. This answer was not possible in regard to the latter. If at every state of the discussion public and parliamentary agitation had to be pacified the discussion might be prolonged ad infinitum. What he wished to avoid was a Peace settled by public clamour. He had just had the experience of an election in England, during which the public was beginning to ask embarrassing questions concerning peace. Had the election lasted longer he might have come to the Conference with his hands tied by pledges, and deprived of his freedom of action. He wished to remain free to be convinced. If there were daily reports of the discussions as soon as the representative of any country yielded on a point that he had maintained on the previous day there would be headlines in the Press: "Great Britain is betrayed," or "France is betrayed." He therefore, on the whole, agreed with M. Pichon. He felt great misgiving concerning the view taken by Baron Sonnino that all final decisions on big questions should go to the plenary conference. There were numerous subjects concerning which premature publicity would render it impossible for any statesman to sign any treaty at all. He instanced the question of Syria and of indemnities. At a later stage it would be possible to show to the public that, if this or that had been conceded, other advantages had

been obtained. He was not afraid of facing the Press, as he did not believe their demands were backed by the public. The Press was well aware that it was excluded from proceedings of Cabinets. This was a Cabinet of the nations. Furthermore, the enemy must not know beforehand what our decisions were, and still less what our differences were. Dangerous agitations might be aroused even in our own countries by premature publication of news, and he pointed out that in France and Italy the elections had not yet taken place.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he might agree with all Mr. Lloyd George had said and yet feel that the difficulty had not been met. He gave as an instance certain conversations which had occurred in the house in which he lived, and had been reported shortly after in the Press with a considerable degree of accuracy. The subject discussed was one of great concern to a large group of nations. Leakages, he felt sure, could not be prevented. The Press would always either find out what had happened or make very accurate guesses.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE gave as an instance of a well-kept secret the debate on the language of the Conference, which had lasted some hours in that room, and had not been divulged in any newspaper, as far as he was aware. He thought that we should stand in the main on the line we had already taken up. What occurred in M. Pichon's room should be treated as conversations held with a purpose of reaching agreement. The Press should be given the result of each day's work. No summary should be given, as he wished to be able to say on one day what he thought, but on the morrow, if he had changed his mind after hearing his colleagues, to be free to do so. As to the Conference on Saturday, he proposed that the Press should be informed that 15 of their number should be admitted, and this without prejudice to the question of their admission at other conferences hereafter.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested a text in the following sense:—

“The widest publicity will be given to accurate reports of both plenary and partial sittings.”

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the word “general” should be substituted for the word “plenary.” He deprecated the offer of any information concerning partial conferences.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in the communication to the Press there should be a full and considerate explanation of the reasons for refusing the admission of reporters to the conversations. It might be added that those reasons did not apply with the same force to sessions of the general Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would not like to pledge himself to admitting the Press constantly to the general Conference. He saw difficulties ahead. Extreme views might be uttered in open meetings

which it might not be convenient to refute there and then. He would prefer to offer the Press an invitation for Saturday only, without reference to the future.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that in addition to an explanation concerning the conversations, it might be said that even the general Conferences might find it necessary to enter into what was called in America "Executive Session." He suggested that Mr. Lloyd George should draft the message to the Press on the lines explained by him so persuasively in the Meeting.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE undertook to do so and present the draft at the afternoon's Meeting.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he felt bound regretfully to draw attention again to certain mischievous statements in the American Press. He drew special attention to a despatch published in the *New York Tribune*.

PRESIDENT WILSON undertook to send a protest to the editor of the newspaper.

M. CLEMENCEAU also pointed out that it was stated in the American Press that the French censorship prevented telegrams from going to America.

(It was agreed that M. Clemenceau should deny this.)

MR. BALFOUR observed that, in the list drawn up concerning the representation of small belligerent countries the representation of the kingdom of The Hedjaz had been overlooked. He felt that all would recognize that The Hedjaz was entitled to representation as having taken an effective part in one of the most successful of the subsidiary campaigns of the war. He believed that the meeting would be unanimous in favour of rectifying the omission.

M. PICHON pointed out that the case was met by the clause guaranteeing one Representative to each State in process of formation.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the Hedjaz could be represented at the Conference on Saturday.

M. PICHON thought that The Hedjaz should be in the same category as Yugo-Slavia.

MR. BALFOUR observed that The Hedjaz was a constituted State, and should be represented as such. It had been recognised by France and Great Britain.

M. PICHON pointed out that it had not been as yet recognised by Italy, by the United States, or by Japan.

(After consulting the Representatives of the last-named Powers, it was decided that The Hedjaz should be represented at the Conference by two Delegates).

3. Indiscretions
in the American
Press

4. Representation
of The Hedjaz

PRESIDENT WILSON drew attention to the representation of States, such as Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay. He had understood that these States attended the Conference as of right when they were concerned in the subjects under discussion. In the Regulations, however, they were placed on the same footing as neutral Powers, attending meetings only when summoned. He, therefore suggested that the Regulations should be amended.

5. Representation of States Having Broken Off Diplomatic Relations With the Enemy

The Regulations were accordingly amended as follows:—

“Article I, paragraph 3. The Powers in a state of diplomatic rupture with the enemy Powers (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay) shall take part in the sessions at which questions concerning them are discussed”.

The last paragraph of Article I will read:—

“Neutral Powers and States in process of formation shall be heard either orally or in writing, when summoned by the Powers with general interests, at sessions devoted especially to the examination of questions directly concerning them, but only in so far as those questions are concerned.”

The last clause of the first paragraph of Article II will read:—

“One for Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Hayti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay.”

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that, at the afternoon meeting, an agenda should be fixed for the opening session of the Peace Conference on Saturday. He thought it was most important that discussions at the big conferences should not stray beyond the agenda. This agenda should, in all cases, be prepared in the small committee. This was specially necessary for the first occasion. He did not wish the gathering to be of a merely formal nature. Certain points should be laid down as questions for study. These would be referred, according to President Wilson's suggestion, to the various Delegations, and the public would infer that the Congress meant to work. The public would further understand that another sitting could not follow at once, as time would be required for the completion of the study of the various points enumerated.

6. Agenda for Opening Session of Peace Conference

(It was agreed that proposals should be made for this agenda in the afternoon.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 17, 1919.

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay, on Friday, January 17, 1919, at 15 O'clock
(3 p. m.)**

PRESENT

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. Fromageot.
Captain A. Portier.

GREAT BRITAIN

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Bal-
four.
Lt.-Col. Sir M. P. A.
Hankey.
Major A. M. Caccia.

ITALY

Baron Sonnino.
Count Aldrovandi.
Major A. Jones.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.

JAPAN

Viscount Chinda.
M. Matsui.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. PICHON said he wished to bring to the notice of the meeting that he had received two formal protests regarding the representation allotted to Belgium and Serbia. The Belgian Government had written to him in the following terms: "The Belgian Council of Ministers had decided to protest against the number of delegates allotted to Belgium. The decision of the Great Powers to give only two seats at the Conference table was unacceptable." It was left, therefore, to Baron de Gaiffier¹ to decide whether he would accept the invitation received from the Great Powers to attend the Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it would be unwise to accept a challenge of this nature. Belgium had only put 250,000 men in the field, compared with the millions supplied by the Great Powers. From the point of view of contributions to the war, as well as from the point of view of the total population of the country, he did not think it was possible to increase the number of Representatives for Belgium.

MR. LANSING argued that the point to be considered was that both Belgium and Serbia had suffered invasions from the very commencement of the war and this, in the case of Belgium, was the reason why she had not been able to put a larger force into the field.

¹ Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy, Belgian Minister at Paris.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE held that they must be guided by some standard of representation. He thought, in this connection, that they should consider the influence which the country exercised in the world, its contribution to the war, or the total population of the country.

MR. LANSING suggested that the sacrifices which the country had made must also be considered.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the sacrifices made could only be taken into account in determining the compensations and indemnities to be received.

MR. BALFOUR wished to put forward a practical consideration. He would like to do honour to Belgium and Serbia, but if they were going on sentimental grounds the Conference would find itself occupied forever in attempting to assess the relative claims of all the Powers concerned. The Conference had already devoted much time to all this. The sentimental claims, no doubt, were very great, but, if they were granted, endless discussions would be involved. If extra representation gave more power in voting there would be something substantial in these claims.

BARON SONNINO said that these countries admitted that voting had nothing to do with the question. Two great parties existed in Belgium—the Clerical party and the Socialist party—and if a sufficient number of Representatives was refused, it would put the Government in a political difficulty in attempting to satisfy the claims of the various parties.

MR. LANSING insisted that the losses incurred by Belgium and the interest they had in obtaining full indemnity for these losses must be given due weight.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he must insist on saying a word for Belgium and Serbia. Belgium and Serbia both found themselves in a most tragic situation. Belgium could have done as Roumania did later. She could have said that the country was sure to be overrun and that she could not resist. She could have given way like Luxembourg. The King of the Belgians, especially, might very well have abandoned his country. But he had set a noble and inspiring example which had impressed all the countries of Europe and, he felt sure he could say, America also. Again, the sufferings of Serbia had been terrible. She had suffered enormous losses; her manhood had been destroyed wholesale. Yet she had fought on without counting her losses. He agreed with President Wilson that it was extremely awkward to find themselves placed in such a situation and to be faced with such a document. But would it not be even more awkward to be compelled at to-morrow's meeting to refuse to accede to Belgium's demands? Further, should Belgium persist in her refusal to attend the meeting, the Great Powers would find themselves in an awkward position and

it would be a bad beginning to the Conferences. That morning they had decided to grant two Delegates to the King of the Hedjaz and he himself had agreed to that proposal. He begged his colleagues, therefore, to consider very carefully the remarks which he had just made regarding Belgium and Serbia. He was ready to accept any decision, but he was also particularly anxious to avoid a bad start.

BARON SONNINO drew attention to the fact that Serbia would probably very soon be entitled to additional Representatives, as soon as the new Yugo-Slav State was recognised.

M. PICHON said that the question of Yugo-Slavia was not involved. The protest which he had received was from the Serbian Minister, M. Vesnitch, who had notified him that he did not write as the Representative of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, but as the Representative of Serbia. He would point out that it had been decided to leave the question of the recognition of the Yugo-Slav State to the Conference. Meanwhile, they merely had to deal with Serbia. M. Vesnitch, in his letter, regretted both the smallness of the representation allotted to Serbia and also the fact that the Great Powers had taken this decision without any reference to his Government. He concluded his letter by saying that he reserved to himself the right to raise this question at the first meeting of the Conference. In conclusion, M. Pichon asked the meeting whether they would agree to accord three Representatives to Belgium and three to Serbia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether this was the end of it. He thought that, if they were to occupy their time in making decisions and reversing them and altering them, the Conference would never come to an end. Tomorrow, when it was discovered that Belgium and Serbia had been given three Representatives apiece, Greece, Roumania and even China, with her population of 400 millions, would undoubtedly protest. But if they were going to chop and change constantly, when would they come to the end of it? If he felt sure that this was the last case to be considered, he would not resist. But he felt that if they now changed this number, the representation question would never be closed.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Belgian Government in their protest had merely said that the number allotted to them was not acceptable. How did this meeting know that three would be acceptable? Had the Belgians themselves suggested this number?

M. PICHON replied in the affirmative. He explained that three Delegates were required, in order to represent each of the political parties, namely:—

M. Hymans, the Foreign Minister, as President.

M. Vandervelde, as representing the Socialist Party.

M. Van den Heuvel, as representing the Catholic Party.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it would be best to accept this proposal, on the understanding that they would refuse ever to re-open the question again.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, provided it was understood that it would definitely put an end to the question.

(It was agreed that Belgium and Serbia should have three Representatives apiece.)

(It was also agreed that the question of the number of Delegates apportioned to each country must now be regarded as finally closed.)

M. PICHON said that the next question to consider would be the drafting of the Agenda for the first Preliminary Conference. As

2. Agenda of First
Preliminary
Conference

regards the subjects to be entered on the Agenda, he suggested the list of questions proposed by President Wilson at a previous meeting, namely:—

1. League of Nations.
2. Reparations.
3. New States.
4. Frontiers and territorial changes.
5. Colonies.

These subjects to be discussed in the order given.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that that list had really been put forward to form the basis of discussion at the small meetings and not for the large Conference.

MR. BALFOUR wished respectfully to put the following point to the meeting. He agreed that questions such as the League of Nations and Reparation were eminently suitable for discussion at a full Conference, but when it came to discussing the creation of new States, frontiers and territorial changes, and Colonial possessions, he dreaded the position in which they might find themselves. If these questions were to be put to the Delegates sitting at the full Conference, they would also have to be debated in full Conference. He asked his colleagues to imagine what would be the state of the full Conference if all these explosive subjects, full of difficulties and likely to lead to violent disputes, came up for discussion in this manner.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether the following proposal would be preferable. The presiding officer at the Conference would appoint Committees on such and such subjects (large and small Committees), each consisting of a chosen number of Delegates who would be required to report to the Great Powers. The Great Powers would then decide on each question whether it should be sent back to the full Conference or not.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that a suggestion had occurred to him. No regular resolution should be proposed to the Conference, but a state-

ment should be made by M. Clemenceau, as Chairman of the Conference, giving the general headings under which they would be prepared to study the various questions to be taken up by the Conference and he would invite each of the Delegations to submit to the Secretariat their views on such questions as might concern them. It would not be necessary to ask each of the Delegations to submit their views on every question. For instance, the Hedjaz need not be asked to give its views on Poland. But each of the Delegations should be invited to send their views to the Secretariat on subjects which concerned them. This would meet the wishes of people such as M. Veniselos, who were anxious to present their case to the Great Powers before any decision was reached by these. As soon as these reports were received, the Great Powers could direct their advisers to examine these documents and to extract irrelevant matter. It was very important that each country should have an opportunity of presenting its case, particularly as regards boundaries which it might covet. This would give the Delegation something to do—a very important matter. It would also give a reality to the Conference on the next day. It would not make the Conference formal and it would give the Delegates an opportunity of putting questions affecting themselves.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that if Mr. Lloyd George's proposals were accepted, the large Conference, having nothing to discuss, would die of inanition. M. Clemenceau had said that his proposal would set the machinery working and he agreed that the Great Powers might be able to draw therefrom the work required by them. What they wanted was to give the members something real to do connected with the work of the Conference and not merely the appearance of work.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that if a large number of committees was set up, a machinery would be created which it would be impossible for them to control, especially if the small Powers were represented on each of these small committees. Dozens of subjects would have to be considered and it would be impossible for the small States to be adequately represented on all. On the other hand, each Delegation could prepare reports which would assure their interests being duly considered. The resolution which Mr. Clemenceau had proposed was intended as a guide for the meeting of the Great Powers. When extended to a large Conference of thirty Powers, it was, in his opinion, quite inapplicable, whereas, if the Chairman made a speech asking the Delegations to put forward their views on any subjects included in the approved list which might concern them,

the best results would be obtained. The Delegations themselves could decide what were the subjects of interest to them.

M. PICHON said that the Secretariat would receive all the reports and would make a digest of them.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired what would happen to these reports after they had been dealt with by the Secretariat.

MR. BALFOUR thought that if these reports were then transmitted to the Great Powers, that would be a satisfactory arrangement, but if they were referred back to the big Conference, it would be extremely dangerous.

PRESIDENT WILSON proposed that the reports so received by the Secretariat should be submitted "for such reference as the Chairman may determine."

MR. BALFOUR suggested as an amendment that the reports should be forwarded to the Secretariat, "who will transmit the same to the Great Powers."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that that was exactly what the small Powers wanted. The small Powers all wished that the Great Powers should receive and give due consideration to their views.

M. CLEMENCEAU said they would adopt Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, but he wished to add to it something of his own which would to some extent include the proposal originally made by President Wilson. Mr. Balfour had admitted that certain questions, such as the League of Nations and Reparations, could at once be referred to the big Conference. If they agreed to take these two subjects only, that alone would give enormous work to do. On the other hand, President Wilson had asked that the consideration of the League of Nations should be deferred till the second meeting of the Conference. There remained the question of Reparations—a most important one. Why should not that be placed before the Conference on the next day? Why should not a large committee, with financial experts, be appointed to consider that question?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was altogether in favour of that suggestion, but he hoped it would not be discussed on the next day. He hoped that the question of Reparations would first be discussed here and that, after discussion, a commission would be appointed to deal with the whole question. With this reservation, he would support M. Clemenceau's proposal. He was of the opinion that each of the Delegations should be asked to send their views on all subjects of interest to them, including the question of a League of Nations.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE wished to suggest one more subject to be entered on the list, if the list was to be complete, namely, "Punishment of those guilty of offences against the Law of Nations."

M. PICHON wished to invite attention to the list included in the Note of Procedure,³ which would be found to be more complete than President Wilson's. This list included the following:—

1. League of Nations.
2. Polish affairs.
3. Russian affairs.
4. Baltic Nationalities.
5. States formed from the late Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.
6. Balkan affairs.
7. Eastern affairs.
8. Affairs of the Far East and of the Pacific.
9. Jewish affairs.
10. International river navigation (Rhine, Danube, Elbe, Scheldt and Vistula).
11. International railways (45th parallel, Adriatic to Baltic, Bagdad railways, African railways, Cape to Cairo and Cape to Algiers).
12. Public legislation ensuring to the peoples their self-determination, combined with the right of ethnical and religious minorities.
13. International legislation on labour.
14. International legislation, patents and trade marks.
15. Penalties against crimes committed during the war.
16. Economic system.
17. Reparation.
18. Financial questions.

It would be noticed that Mr. Lloyd George's proposal regarding penalties against crimes committed during the war was included.

PRESIDENT WILSON held that subjects such as those included in items 10 and 13 could not be brought under discussion at the Conference. Special technical committees would have to be appointed to draft the necessary regulations.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that two or three questions only might be suggested for submission to the first Conference.

M. PICHON suggested that in submitting the list to the Delegations special attention should be drawn to the question of the "Responsibility of the authors of the war".

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked that they should add to that, "International legislation on labour".

MR. BALFOUR enquired what elasticity was given to the Great Powers to add subjects to the list. He thought the Chairman should be authorised to add any subjects which might at some future date require consideration.

³ Vol. I, p. 390.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the five Great Powers should decide what subjects were to be placed on the list. As Chairman he could not take upon himself the responsibility of deciding this question.

BARON SONNINO agreed that the Chairman should be the mandatory of the five Powers, but any Delegate could present an additional subject, which the Chairman would refer to the five Powers, who would give their decision as to its inclusion in the approved list.

MR. BALFOUR wished to raise one point of great importance. President Wilson, the Prime Minister and M. Clemenceau had pointed out how important it was to settle as soon as possible all questions which would facilitate demobilisation. Therefore it would be necessary to indicate the order in which the Delegates should settle the various questions entered on the list. This order would not be settled to-morrow, but they would reserve to themselves later on the right of settling the order of precedence.

BARON SONNINO thought that if they put off fixing the order of precedence the Delegates would not know what subjects to study and would do nothing.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that demobilisation could not take place before their work had been completed. Demobilisation up to a certain point was taking place at present and could go on as at present. But could they hasten the final demobilisation except by making peace?

BARON SONNINO thought that if all questions which would facilitate demobilisation were to be considered first, the territorial questions should take precedence of all others.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed with President Wilson that peace alone could settle the question of demobilisation.

To sum up, he understood that the Delegations would be invited to submit reports on all questions which might interest them. These reports would be sent to the Secretariat for transmission to the five Great Powers.

The attention of the Delegations would be specially invited to two of these questions namely :—

1. Responsibility of the authors of the war and penalties for crimes committed during the war.
2. International legislation on labour.

BARON SONNINO: The Delegations should be at liberty to suggest subjects for addition to the list. The Chairman would transmit these suggestions to the five Great Powers for decision regarding their inclusion in the approved list.

M. CLEMENCEAU, continuing said he would add that the Great Powers would, in due course, fix the date of the second Conference.

BARON SONNINO made it clear that no other subject outside those entered on the Agenda would be considered to-morrow.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that if another Power, either great or small, wished to propose any question to the Conference, due notice should be given in order that time should be available for it to receive full consideration.

M. PICHON pointed out that this had already been provided for in the Rules, copies of which would be supplied to each of the Delegations.

BARON SONNINO enquired whether he was correct in thinking that, as regards the organisation of the Secretariat, the Chairman would nominate the Head of the Secretariat, and that each of the Delegations or Governments would retain the power of appointing one representative to the Secretariat.

(It was agreed that the President of the French Council of Ministers, as provisional Chairman of the Conference, should invite the Delegations present to forward to the Secretariat of the Peace Conference reports setting forth their views on any question in which they may be directly interested. Such reports shall be transmitted by the Secretariat to the five Great Powers for their consideration. The Chairman shall invite special attention to the following two subjects as requiring immediate consideration:—

1. Responsibility of the authors of the war and penalties for crimes committed during the war.
2. International legislation on labour.

Delegations wishing to suggest additional subjects for consideration are entitled to submit them to the Chairman for transmission to the five Great Powers, who will decide as to the inclusion in the list of subjects.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE distributed a draft note to be issued to the Press for publication, drawn up in accordance with a resolution adopted at that morning's meeting.⁴

PRESIDENT WILSON wished to preface what he was going to say by the statement that he did not know how it would be possible for him to defend privacy for the meetings of the full Conference except on unusual occasions. The argument for privacy in these conversations between the Great Powers was conclusive. He wished to draw a distinction between the two. He would therefore suggest certain amendments in order to allow full publicity for the full Conference proceedings. He could not defend entire secrecy for the big Conferences. He felt compelled to draw a distinction between the two.

(President Wilson then read the text as amended by him in order to give effect to his proposals. Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour proposed minor amendments in the wording of certain sentences.)

⁴For text of this draft, see p. 620.

The following text was then unanimously accepted:—

The Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers have given earnest consideration to the question of publicity for the proceedings of the Peace Conference. They are anxious that the public, through the Press, should have the fullest information compatible with safeguarding the supreme interest of all, which is that a just and honourable settlement should be arrived at with the minimum of delay. It is, however, obvious that publicity, for the preliminary conversations now proceeding must be subject to the limitations necessarily imposed by the difficult and delicate nature of their task.

The conversations of the great Peace Conference are far more analogous to the meetings of a Cabinet than to those of a Legislature. Nobody has ever suggested that Cabinet meetings should be held in public, and if they were so held the work of the government would become impossible. One reason why Cabinets are held in private is in order that differences may be reconciled and agreement reached before the stage of publicity is begun. The essence of democratic method is not that deliberations of a Government should be conducted in public, but that its conclusions should be subject to the consideration of a popular Chamber, and to free and open discussion on the platform and in the Press.

The representatives of the Associated Powers are holding conversations in order to solve questions which affect the vital interests of many nations, and upon which they may at present hold many diverse views. These deliberations cannot proceed by the method of a majority vote. No nation can be committed except by the free vote of its own Delegates. The conclusions arrived at at these consultations, therefore, can only be formed by the difficult process of reaching agreement among all. This vital process would only be hindered if the discussion of every disputed question were to open by a public declaration by each Delegation of its own national point of view. Such a declaration would in many cases be followed by a premature public controversy. This would be serious enough if it were confined to controversy between parties within each State. It might be extremely dangerous if, as would often be inevitable, it resulted in controversy between nations. Moreover, such public declarations would render that give and take on the part of the Delegates themselves which is essential to a successful negotiation a matter of infinitely greater difficulty.

It is also extremely important that the settlement should be not only just but speedy. Every belligerent Power is anxious for the early conclusion of peace, in order that its armies may be demobilised and that it may return once more to the ways of peace. If premature publicity is given to the negotiations, the proceedings of the Peace Conference would be interminably protracted, and the Delegates would be forced to speak not only to the business before the Conference, but to concern themselves with the controversies which had been raised by the account of their proceedings outside.

Finally, there will often be very strong reasons against announcing the conclusions of the conversations as they are arrived at. Representatives of a nation may be willing to give their assent on one point only provided they receive a concession on another point which

has not yet been discussed. It will not be possible to judge of the wisdom and justice of the Peace settlement until it can be viewed as a whole, and premature announcements might lead to misapprehensions and anxiety as to the ultimate results for which there was no real foundation.

In calling attention, however, to this necessary limitation on publicity, the representatives of the Powers do not underrate the importance of carrying public opinion with them in the vast task by which they are confronted. They recognise that unless public opinion approves of the results of their labours they will be nugatory. This reasoning applies with conclusive force to the present conversations between the representatives of the Great Powers.

(With regard to the full Conferences, the following rule was adopted: "Representatives of the Press shall be admitted to the meetings of the full Conference, but upon necessary occasions the deliberations of the Conference may be held in camera".)

M. CLEMENCEAU communicated to the meeting the substance of a telephone message received from Marshal Foch, to the effect that the German Delegates had agreed to sign an agreement relating to the German mercantile fleet in accordance with the conclusion reached by the Supreme War Council at the meeting held in Paris on Monday, 13th January, 1919. (See I. C.-105.)⁵

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 17, 1919.

4. Renewal of
Armistice With
Germany

⁵ BC-1, Minute 3, p. 512

**Notes on Conversations Held in the Office of M. Pichon at the
Quai d'Orsay, at 10:30 a. m., January 17, 1919**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :	President Wilson Mr. Lansing Mr. Frazier Mr. Harrison
BRITISH EMPIRE :	Mr. Lloyd George Mr. Balfour Lt. Col. Hankey Maj. Abraham—Maj. Caccia
FRANCE :	M. Clemenceau M. Pichon M. Dutasta M. Berthelot Prince de Bearn
ITALY :	M. Sonnino Count Aldrovandi Capt. Jones
JAPAN :	Viscount Chinda M. Matsui

Interpreter: M. Mantoux.

I

The Chairman read a telegram from Marshal Foch stating that the Armistice had been signed, and that all the provisions drafted at the meeting of the Supreme War Council before his departure for Spa, had been accepted by the German Government, including the important clause regarding the use of the German Commercial Fleet.

II

M. PICHON referred to the demands of the Press, that their representatives be present at all the Conferences.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he assumed that they referred to the Peace Conferences, and not to the small conferences now taking place.

M. MANTOUX stated that he had been present when the matter was discussed with the Press, and that he understood they had insisted on being present at the small conferences.

MR. LANSING remarked that he understood from Mr. Swope¹ of the New York *World*, that the Press did not demand to be present at those conversations, but what they resented was the fact that they had been denied access to those persons there present.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that if full summaries of the proceedings should be issued, as demanded by the Press, there would be no end to the Conference, and it would last some thirty years, as was the case in the Council of Trent.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the matter be considered from the other end, and proposed that representatives of the Press be admitted to the conferences which would be held in the larger room.

M. PICHON observed that the larger room was too small to hold all the representatives of the Press.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the Press select a certain number of representatives.

PRESIDENT WILSON proposed that those present name the limit of the number of Press representatives who could attend the conferences in the larger room, and then have the Press select from amongst themselves those who should be present.

BARON SONNINO proposed that a limited number of Press men be admitted to the plenary conferences, that this should be announced, and that the Press be informed that they could not attend the private conversations.

MR. BALFOUR reminded those present that in accordance with their own decision plenary conferences would be held only when subjects which concerned all the delegates were considered.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed some doubt as to whether this was a final analysis. Surely a plenary conference would be a conference where all those who were interested in the subject under discussion were present.

MR. BALFOUR thought it very alarming if this were true, for it would be, in his opinion, inadvisable to have the Press present at conferences in which territorial relations between the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Roumanians and Yugo-Slavs were discussed, that is to say, at conferences where the delegates of the Great Powers and delegates of certain other powers would be present.

PRESIDENT WILSON granted this point, but observed that Baron Sonnino had proposed the plenary idea, while he had proposed the room.

M. PICHON desired to point out that if the Press were present at those conferences where the Associated Governments would have to

¹Herbert B. Swope, chief correspondent for the New York *World* at the Peace Conference.

decide on the terms to be handed Germany, it would be extremely dangerous as the Press might well furnish the enemy with valuable information.

PRESIDENT WILSON remarked that as it would seem to be impossible to work out a plan by which publicity would be avoided, the problem in hand was to work out a method to insure correct publicity.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE was not quite sure that this was the case. He referred to the fact that when questions were asked in Parliament as to the accuracy of a certain report, it was always possible to deny the truth of the report, unless it were absolutely correct. He thought that if he were now asked in Parliament questions concerning the decision taken in the conferences, he would be supported. If he were to refuse to make any statement, should he say that it would be against the best interests of the country to do so. He thought that he would be supported in such an attitude, as it would be readily understood that it would be impossible to give out the provisions of any treaty piecemeal. A treaty is always published as an entire completed document.

In his opinion the whole point of the discussion was whether things were to be decided by public clamor. He referred to the fact that just before the last elections in England the public were beginning to ask embarrassing questions about Peace terms, and if it had gone on his hands would have been tied. Consequently, he was in the main, in sympathy with M. Pichon's observations. For his part, however, he was not afraid to face the Press. He did not believe that the public would support these demands of the Press. He observed that the small meetings might be compared to a cabinet of our nations and it was manifestly absurd to think that the Press should be present at a Cabinet meeting. If everything were public beforehand, how could the Associated Governments ever meet the enemy?

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that he might agree with what Mr. Lloyd George had just said, if it were not for the fact that he still thought that leaks were bound to occur of what transpired in the small conversations, because recently a private conversation which he had held in his own house regarding the solution of the Adriatic question was reported a day or so thereafter with a considerable degree of accuracy in the *Daily Mail*. He was afraid that the Press would be able to find out or divine what transpired at the private conversations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE did not think that the publication of information of that kind had the same effect as if it had been an accurate statement from an official source.

M. PICHON again asked for some decision from those present, as to what sort of publicity shall be given the various types of conferences.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that it would be well to stand in the main on the position already taken, namely, that as regards these conversations, there be given to the Press an official announcement containing the decisions arrived at each day; that no summary of the discussions be given to the press, as he might change his mind from day to day on a certain subject in the light of arguments advanced, and that he did not wish to confine himself to any line of action; that it be decided that fifteen or any other definite number of Press representatives might attend the first conference, and that it be not now decided that they should always be present.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that it might be advisable to issue an explanation to the Press explaining the necessity for making reservations with regard to publicity, etc., and that restrictions did not apply to the presence of the Press at the general sittings, although it might be necessary sometime to go into executive session, or say, in camera.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE preferred not to commit himself regarding the President's last suggestion as yet. He was looking ahead, and thought it preferable simply to decide to let the Press be present on Saturday, without prejudice.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that it would be very difficult to withdraw the permission after it had once been given.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that Mr. Lloyd George draft a statement to be issued to the Press, explaining the reasons for their decisions in the matter.

M. CLEMENCEAU called President Wilson's attention to an article carried in the *New York Tribune*, which, like many others, had been very severe to France. In this article it was claimed that the President did not deny certain things.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that this was the most abominable form of lying, and pointed out that of course he had not denied things which they claimed he would not deny, as he had never been asked about them. The President assured M. Clemenceau that he would telegraph to the editor of the *New York Tribune* about the matter.

MR. BALFOUR inquired whether anything would be gained by asking American newspaper owners to come over here.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied that there were usually quite a number of owners of American papers, and in many cases the owners' control was occasional and indirect.

III

MR. BALFOUR called attention to an apparently inadvertent omission from the list of small belligerent Allied states who were to receive representation at the Peace Conference, namely the Hedjaz. The King of Hedjaz had been acknowledged as a belligerent by France, Great Britain and Italy, and as matter of fact, had pulled off one of the most successful side shows or subsidiary operations during the war.

M. PICHON thought that the case of the King of Hedjaz was covered in the section containing the proposal regarding representation of states under process of formation.

MR. BALFOUR observed that he thought there was a distinct difference between the Hedjaz and the Yugo-Slavs.

It was agreed that the Hedjaz receive two representatives.

IV

PRESIDENT WILSON called attention to the fact that the South American states who had broken relations were, according to his understanding, to be placed in the category of those who were to be present as of right. He inquired whether these states had received invitations.

M. PICHON answered in the affirmative.

PRESIDENT WILSON remarked that he thought the matter should be made clear and suggested a small amendment to the paragraphs of the procedure which was accepted.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that there be an afternoon meeting to fix the order for the business of the meeting on Saturday, and to draw up an agenda. He felt very strongly that the agenda for any meeting must always be fixed between those present, and nothing was to be discussed, but what should be in the agenda.

M. Clemenceau's proposal was accepted, and it was agreed to reconvene at three o'clock.

V

M. PICHON stated that he had received two emphatic protests, one from Belgium and the other from Serbia, against the number of delegates that had been assigned to them. The Belgian Council of Ministers had decided that resolutions to give Belgium only two seats are unacceptable, and had informed Baron Gaiffier, that he was himself to decide whether he would accept the invitation from the French Government to attend the Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that this action on the part of Belgium was monstrous, and that it was absurd to give Belgium more than

two votes, as against the five for the United States and France, when she had put only from 150,000 to 200,000 troops in the field.

MR. LANSING pointed out that both Belgium and Serbia were invaded countries, and that their sacrifices had been just as great as if they had entered the War of their own accord.

MR. BALFOUR observed that he personally would like to do any honor possible to Belgium. If these two countries were given three delegates on account of their sentimental claim he feared that it would open the door to many complaints. If they were to obtain more power in voting, he might agree, but he did not understand that that would be the case.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed regret that the protest had come in a form which might lead to an impasse.

BARON SONNINO explained that the Belgian Government was faced with the difficulty of finding places for representatives of the two parties, namely, the Catholic and Socialist Parties.

M. CLEMENCEAU spoke a word for Belgium, whose king had played a great part in a certain moment of history, and had given a fine example not only to Europe, but to America; as for Serbia, she had been most valiant, and had suffered great losses. He proposed that both countries be given three delegates.

BARON SONNINO observed that Serbia was likely to have more delegates when the Yugo-Slavs were recognized.

M. PICHON stated that he had received a notification from Mr. Vesnitch of the formation of a state composed of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The Foreign Office had replied to the notification by stating that the decision regarding the recognition of this kingdom would be made by the Conference. Vesnitch then made it clear that if an answer were not given, the Serbian delegates would present the matter at the first meeting of the Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that there had been too many reversals of decisions taken. He might not resist, if this were to be the end of it. He feared that if Belgium and Serbia were given three delegates, Greece would have something to say, also Roumania, as soon as the information became public. If he were assured that this were the end of the matter, he would not resist.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Belgian Government had stated in its protest that two delegates were not acceptable. Would they accept three?

M. PICHON explained that they would undoubtedly accept three, as they had already named their Minister for Foreign Affairs, and a representative of each of the two political parties.

It was decided to give three delegates each to Belgium and Serbia.

VI

M. PICHON suggested that President Wilson's proposal regarding a list of subjects to be discussed, should be used as the basis for the program of the work of the Conference, and that he would ask each delegation to submit their recommendations regarding the five following subjects, to the Conference:

1. League of Nations
2. Reparations
3. New States
4. Territorial Boundaries
5. Colonial Possessions.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that he had merely intended this list for the discussions at the conversations.

MR. BALFOUR thought that if this list were submitted to the full Conference many a burning question would immediately arise.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the presiding officer of the Conference should appoint committees on different subjects, then have the different delegations submit their reports on the different subjects to these committees, who will initiate in order the channels of distribution.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE preferred that this matter be not arranged in the form of a resolution, but rather explained to the Conference by M. Clemenceau who could state at the same time the general headings under which the subject would have to be examined, and then invite the delegates to send to the Secretariat their views on questions which might concern them.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked what would happen, supposing someone at the first session arose and made another motion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that if committees were set up a machinery might be created which it would be impossible to control. He thought it necessary to confine the action to reports on matters which concerned the delegations individually. These reports would then go to the Secretariat, and be submitted by the President to the Great Powers for their information.

This procedure was agreed upon.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE hoped that one of the questions that the delegates would be asked to report on, would be the question of the punishment of those who had been guilty of infringement of the Law of Nations.

M. PICHON read Section III of the Plan of Procedure proposed by the Foreign Office.^a

^a Vol. I, p. 389.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the delegates also be asked to report their views on the question of the responsibility of the authors of the War, and particularly on international legislation for labor.

MR. BALFOUR inquired as to how elastic this proposal for procedure was, and suggested that the President of the Conference be authorized to add any matters to the list he thought desirable.

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that he considered himself the mandatory of those present. He preferred not to accept responsibility for extending or limiting the subject.

M. Clemenceau explained that he would invite all the delegations to submit views on all the questions mentioned in Section III of the French Plan of Procedure, and they would then be passed on by the Secretariat for the information of the Great Powers.

BARON SONNINO referred to the constitution of the Secretariat of the Conference. He understood that the President of the Conference was to name the Secretary of the Conference, to be assisted by representatives of and appointed by each delegation.

VII

PRESIDENT WILSON read the draft of the statement to be issued by those present to the Press. He stated that he did not know how to defend the privacy of the meeting of the large conference, except on special occasions. He thought that the arguments for the privacy of the small conferences were conclusive. For this reason, it was necessary to distinguish between the great conferences and the private conferences, and suggested that this be made clear all through the statement to the Press.

The President then proposed certain alterations in the draft statement, submitted by Mr. Lloyd George. The amended statement was read in English, translated into French, and accepted by those present.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that it was therefore understood that the conferences between those present and the representatives of the small powers were to be considered in the category of private conversations.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he understood that that was the decision.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the distinction was then to be one of rooms: conferences in the large room were to be open to the Press, except in cases where it was desirable to consider a certain subject in camera; all conferences in the small room were to be private.

PRESIDENT WILSON confirmed this as his understanding of the matter, and remarked that in the slang of today it would now be possible

The draft statement proposed by Mr. Lloyd George reads as follows:

"The representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers have given earnest consideration to the question of publicity for the proceedings of the Peace Conference. They are anxious that the public, through the Press should have the fullest information compatible with safeguarding the supreme interest of all, which is that a just and honourable settlement should be arrived at with the minimum of delay. It is, however, obvious that the publicity for the Conference proceedings must be subject to the limitations necessarily imposed by the difficult and delicate nature of their task.

"The proceedings of a Peace Conference are far more akin to those of a Cabinet than to those of a Parliament. Nobody has ever suggested that Cabinet Meetings should be held in public, and if they were so held, the work of government would become impossible. Cabinets are held in private in order that differences may be reconciled [and] agreement reached before the stage of publicity is begun. The essence of democratic method is not that deliberations of a Government should be conducted in public, but that its conclusions should be subject to the revision of a popular Chamber and to free and open discussion on the platform and in the Press before they are binding upon the people.

"The representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers have met in order to solve questions which affect the vital interests of many nations, and upon which at present they hold the most diverse views. The Conference cannot proceed by the method of a majority vote. No nation can be committed except by the free vote of its own delegates. The conclusions of the Conference therefore can only be formed by the difficult process of reaching agreement among all. This vital process would only be hindered if the discussion of every disputed question were to open by a public declaration by each Delegation of its own national point of view. Such a declaration would in many cases be followed by a public controversy. This would be serious enough if it were confined to controversy between parties within each State. It might be extremely dangerous if, as would often be inevitable, it resulted in controversy between nations. Moreover, such public declarations would make that give and take on the part of the delegates themselves, which is essential to a successful negotiation, a matter of infinitely greater difficulty.

"It is also extremely important that the settlement should be not only just but speedy. Every belligerent Power is anxious for the early conclusion of Peace, in order that its armies may be demobilized and that it may return once more to the ways of peace. If premature publicity is given to the negotiations, the proceedings of the Peace Conference would be interminably protracted, and the delegates would be forced to speak not only to the business before the Conference, but to concern themselves with the controversies which had been raised by the account of their proceedings outside.

"Finally, there will often be very strong reasons against announcing the conclusions of the Conference as they are arrived at. Representatives of a nation may be willing to give their assent on one point only provided they receive a concession on another point which has

not yet been discussed. It will not be possible to judge of the wisdom and justice of the Peace settlement until it can be viewed as a whole, and premature announcements might lead to misapprehensions and anxiety as to the ultimate results for which there was no real foundation.

"In calling attention, however, to this necessary limitation on publicity the representatives of the Powers do not underrate the importance of carrying public opinion with them in the vast task by which they are confronted. They recognize that unless public opinion approved of the results of their labours they will be nugatory. They cannot forget that the conclusions at which they arrive can only become operative after they have received the free and unfettered assent of the representatives of the people. Communiqués as full as is compatible with the public interest will be issued regularly, and representatives of the Press will be invited to attend the proceedings whenever possible."

The text of the statement, as amended by President Wilson, reads as follows:

"The representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers have given earnest consideration to the question of publicity for the proceedings of the Peace Conference. They are anxious that the public, through the Press, should have the fullest information compatible with safe-guarding the supreme interest of all, which is that a just and honourable settlement should be arrived at with the minimum of delay. It is, however, obvious that publicity with regard to the preliminary conversations now proceeding must be subject to the limitations necessarily imposed by the difficult and delicate nature of their object.

"The proceedings of a Peace Conference are far more analogous to those of a Cabinet than to those of a legislature. Nobody has ever suggested that Cabinet Meetings should be held in public, and if they were so held, the work of government would become impossible. One reason why Cabinets are held in private is in order that differences may be reconciled and agreement reached before the stage of publicity is begun. The essence of democratic method is not that deliberations of a Government should be conducted in public, but that its conclusions should be subject to the consideration of a popular Chamber and to free and open discussion on the platform and in the Press.

"The representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers are holding conversations in order to solve questions which affect the vital interests of many nations and upon which they may at present hold many diverse views. These deliberations cannot proceed by the method of a majority vote. No nation can be committed except by the free vote of its own delegates. The conclusions arrived at at these consultations, therefore, can only be formed by the difficult process of reaching agreement among all. This vital process would only be hindered if the discussion of every disputed question were to open by a public declaration by each Delegation of its own national point of view. Such a declaration would in many cases be followed by premature public controversy. This would be serious

enough if it were confined to controversy between parties within each State. It might be extremely dangerous if, as would often be inevitable, it resulted in controversy between nations. Moreover such public declarations would render that give and take on the part of the delegates themselves, which is essential to a successful negotiation, a matter of infinitely greater difficulty.

"It is also extremely important that the settlement should be not only just but speedy. Every belligerent Power is anxious for the early conclusion of peace, in order that its armies may be demobilized and that it may return once more to the ways of peace. If premature publicity is given to the negotiations, the proceedings of the Peace Conference would be interminably protracted, and the delegates would be forced to speak not only to the business before the Conference, but to concern themselves with the controversies which had been raised by the account of their proceedings outside.

"Finally, there will often be very strong reasons against announcing the conclusions of the conversations as they are arrived at. Representatives of a nation may be willing to give their assent on one point only provided they receive a concession on another point which has not yet been discussed. It will not be possible to judge of the wisdom and justice of the Peace settlement until it can be viewed as a whole, and premature announcements might lead to misapprehensions and anxiety as to the ultimate results for which there was no real foundation.

"In calling attention, however, to these necessary limitations on publicity, the representatives of the Powers do not underrate the importance of carrying public opinion with them in the vast task by which they are confronted. They recognize that unless public opinion approved of the results of their labours they will be nugatory.

"This reasoning applies with conclusive force to the present conversations between the representatives of the Great Powers.

"With regard to the full conferences the following rule was adopted:

"Representatives of the Press will be admitted to the meetings of the full Conference but upon necessary occasions the deliberations of the Conference may be held *in camera*."

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at
the Quai d'Orsay, on Monday, January 20, 1919, at 10: 30 a. m.**

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Colonel U. S. Grant
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George, Prime Minister.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Bal-
four, Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Han-
key, K. C. B., Secretary,
War Cabinet.
Mr. H. Norman.
Capt. E. Abraham.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau, President
of the Council and Min-
ister of War.
M. Pichon, Minister for
Foreign Affairs
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
Capt A. Portier.

ITALY

His Excellency Baron Sonnino,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Count Aldrovandi.
Major A. Jones.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
His Excellency M. Matsui.
M. Saburi.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

(M. Noulens, French Ambassador in Russia, also attended by invitation.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he proposed to ask M. Noulens to make
a statement to the Conference concerning Bolshevism
in Russia.

1. Allied Attitude
to Russia

M. NOULENS said that he would confine himself to statements of facts. He would also present a few brief documents. Before our victory over Germany we had had a policy in Russia. He was quite aware of the gravity of the present situation, and perfectly ready to alter his own views in order to meet that situation. He would not, in the remarks he was about to make, allow himself to be influenced by any narrow sense of national interest. He felt that in order to save true democracy nothing was more requisite than close cohesion among the Allies. He felt that what he was about to say to the Conference would be backed by all the representatives of the Allied Powers at present in Archangel. The British, American, and Italian Ambassadors had witnessed the same facts, and had been brought into contact with the same doctrines, and they had all drawn the same conclusion. Everybody knew that the advent of Bolshevism had been followed by anarchy both in town and country. Though

food existed in Russia, famine ensued. This much was common knowledge. He proposed to say nothing about the confiscation of private property, deposits in the banks, and the repudiation of State debts. What he wished to lay stress on was the extent to which persecution had affected large classes of the Russian people. Those classes might not be a majority of the inhabitants, but they were a considerable minority, comprising all the character and intellect in the country.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether it must be understood that all but the intellectual minority were with the Bolsheviks.

M. NOULENS said that what he wished to convey was that all the well-to-do classes, including the richer peasants and working men, were against the Bolsheviks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired when M. Noulens had left Petrograd.

M. NOULENS replied that he had left Petrograd on the 27th February, 1918. Since then he had been at Vologda until the 26th July, after which he had been at Archangel. He and his colleagues had met witnesses of the facts he was going to relate, coming from all parts of Russia. The well-to-do and intellectual classes throughout Bolshevik Russia were odiously ill-treated. They were reduced to the most servile and repulsive occupations. Their quarters were commandeered and placed at the disposal of the Bolsheviks, and even their clothes were taken from them. These things were done not as a result of random pillage, but by deliberate official order. Even before he left Petrograd, that is, before the signature of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk,¹ while the Soviet Government was technically in a state of war with Germany, even at that time, naval officers had been handed over to the tender mercies of their crews. They were often tied to the masts of their ships, and in that posture made to direct the navigation. They were denied the exclusive use of their cabins. They were rated with the intellectual classes, and with them placed outside the law. He had with him the text of the Constitution laid down by the Soviet, published in the *Isvestia* on 19th July, 1917 [1918].² The phrase constantly used in this document was "Dictatorship of the Proletariat." He read from this document a paragraph requiring local Soviets to guarantee the absolute power of the labouring population, and to prevent by all means the restoration to any influence of the exploiting classes. To further this end, the working classes were to be armed and all other classes disarmed. A Red Army of workmen and peasants was to be formed to maintain this regime. As a consequence, M. Noulens said, all working men

¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 442.

² *Ibid.*, p. 587.

in all the towns he had visited were armed with rifles and other weapons, whereas if a bourgeois were found in possession of a revolver he would incontinently be shot.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. Noulens what, in his estimation, the strength of the Red Army might be.

M. NOULENS replied that he had no exact figures.

The figure of one million had been mentioned in the Press. This figure was certainly an absurd exaggeration. In any case, this Army was not composed of real soldiers, but of men driven by famine to take service. They did not want to fight, and they would certainly dissolve if faced by regular troops.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether there had not been fighting with the Red Army on the Archangel front.

M. NOULENS replied that Archangel had been occupied by a French battalion, 872 strong, on the 1st August, 1918. The town was then held by 5,000 or 6,000 Red Guards. This force had not waited to be attacked, and had retired in one movement 125 versts. The town of Archangel had been kept in order by 100 men, though its population numbered about 100,000. The remaining 700 had gone in pursuit of the retiring Red Guards. The Red Guards had never turned on their pursuers; but the latter were not reinforced, the Bolsheviks had cut all the bridges behind them, the rainy season had supervened rendering the country impassable, and the pursuing troops had therefore been forced to retire. With 10,000 men at that time it would have been possible to march to Vologda and Viatka. At the present time General Ironside had only 10,000 men at Archangel. There were also 10,000 at Murmansk. If the Bolsheviks really had an army of 1,000,000, they could easily detach a force to wipe out General Ironside's command; in fact, they only had about 15,000 to 20,000 men against him, who made no attempt to attack.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the figures supplied to him by the British Staff were 16,000 Allied troops at Archangel, faced by 5,000 Bolsheviks.

M. NOULENS said that he believed the Bolsheviks to be really more numerous on that front, but if there were only 5,000, this fact reinforced his contention that they certainly had not under their orders an army of 1,000,000 men.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, according to figures supplied to him, there were 15,000 Allied troops at Murmansk, faced by no more than 3,000 Bolsheviks. He believed these figures must be correct, as a British commander was in charge of the whole force, and the figures were supplied to him by the British Staff.

M. NOULENS said that if the Allies had been unable to attack hitherto, and were still unable to do so, it was by reason of the marshy

soil. The country furnished no material for the repair of the broken bridges, but he understood that General Ironside proposed to repair them and to make a move in the winter.

From all the evidence available to him, he had formed the opinion that the Bolshevik troops would not fight the Allies.

He now wished to return to the subject of the treatment of the bourgeoisie. In the elections for the Constituent Assembly the Bolsheviks had exercised the utmost pressure on the electorate. Nevertheless, they had not secured a majority in the Assembly. In consequence they had broken up the Assembly and set up in its place a government of Soviets. What might be regarded as the present Parliament of Russia had been constituted in July 1918 by delegations from the local Soviets. According to the Constitution framed by that body, a number of classes of persons were disfranchised. He quoted article 65, which enacted that all persons profiting by the results of other men's labour; all living on private income or trading for private interests; monks; spiritual servants of the Church; agents of the former police and constabulary; and members of the reigning house of Russia, were, even if otherwise eligible, debarred from voting or being elected. This, in fact, put all these classes outside the law.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the electorate in Russia was purely an electorate of peasants and workmen.

M. NOULENS said that even such peasants as employed labourers or servants and did not do the whole of their work with their own hands were disfranchised.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the bulk of the peasantry of Russia did not do all their work themselves.

M. NOULENS said that a great many employed as many as two or three labourers. Properties in Russia were of considerable extent, and since the confiscation of the larger properties a great deal of land had gone out of cultivation. Not only was this form of persecution resorted to, but all Press organs representing moderate or even Socialistic opinion not acceptable to the Bolsheviks were ruthlessly suppressed. He quoted the *Pravda*, which, on grounds of national security, demanded the complete obliteration of all hostile factions, and rejoiced at the suppression of all but the Bolshevik Press. Hence it could fairly be said that the Bolshevik Government set up inequality as a principle. This principle could not be accepted by the Allied Governments, which had fought for freedom and equality. It might be asked how such a regime was able to persist at all. The answer was, by terror alone. The majority of the people were both disarmed and torpid. Without the protection of Lettish and Chinese mercenaries and highly-paid Red Guards the commissaries of the people

would disappear. He proposed to cite a few cases of outrages which might fairly be described as systematic and official.

Last January Trotsky had threatened that, unless the people accepted the Soviet Government, that Government would be enforced by a terror unexampled in history. Mere denunciation of anyone as a member of the middle class or as an ex-officer was enough to warrant his imprisonment. Persons of these classes filled the prisons in Petrograd, Moscow, and Vologda, and they were fed with a little bread and an occasional herring. Many died of privation, and their bodies were often left among the living. At their own caprice the guards would shoot a dozen or so to make room for more. No form of trial was considered requisite. There were, in addition, exceptional occasions on which very considerable massacres were indulged in. He cited the case of Ouritsky, Minister of the Interior and President of the Commission for the Repression of the Anti-Revolutionary Movement. He was remarkable for his cruelty. He was assassinated by a student. The assassin was caught, and 500 officers were seized and despatched to Kronstadt, where they were either drowned or shot as a reprisal for the murder of Ouritsky. The assassin was still imprisoned and undergoing torture. His finger-nails and toe-nails were torn out in order to induce the betrayal of his comrades. He had so far refused to betray them and was therefore kept alive undergoing fresh torture. This was not an isolated case. At the fortress of Peter and Paul a company of professional torturers was maintained. He quoted a telegram received on the previous day from Commandant Boyard, Consul at Ekaterinberg, describing the devastated condition of the town and the miserable state of the population. On triumphal arches erected to celebrate the anniversary of the accession of the Bolsheviki to power were inscriptions reading: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat." In fact, no man could work unless he employed himself in Bolshevik interests. He wished to remind the meeting that not only Russians were the victims in these excesses, but also Allied citizens. He instanced the case of Mr. Darcy,³ who died of cold and hunger in prison; and that of Captain Cromie,⁴ the circumstances of whose death were doubtless known to all present. Finally, he wished to point out that the Bolshevik Government was definitely imperialist. It meant to conquer the world, and to make peace with no Governments save Governments representing only the labouring classes. It stated openly that the only legitimate war was civil war. It would respect no League of Nations. Should we even be weak enough to

³ Pierre Darcy, French commercial attaché at Petrograd.

⁴ British naval attaché at Petrograd.

undertake any agreements with such a Government, they would, on the very next day, send among us propagandists, money, and explosives. According to their open professions they intended to spread revolution by every means.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. Noulens whether it was Lenin or Trotsky who really ran the Government.

M. NOULENS replied that Lenin was the more popular of the two. He was the pontiff of the creed and Trotsky was the man of action.

(The meeting adjourned at mid-day).

(It was agreed that the next meeting should take place on the following day at 10:30 a. m.).

**Notes on Conversations Held in the Office of M. Pichon at the Quai
d'Orsay, at 10:30 a. m., January 20, 1919**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:	President Wilson Mr. Lansing Mr. Frazier Mr. Harrison Col. Grant
BRITISH EMPIRE:	Mr. Lloyd George Mr. Balfour Lt. Col. Hankey Mr. Norman Major Caccia Capt. Abraham M. Clemenceau
FRANCE:	M. Pichon M. Dutasta M. Berthelot Prince de Bearn M. Sonnino Count Aldrovandi Capt. Jones Viscount Chinda M. Matsui
ITALY:	
JAPAN:	

Interpreter: M. Mantoux.

I

M. CLEMENCEAU, who was in the chair, stated that M. Noulens, the French Ambassador to Russia, would give an account of conditions in that country. M. Clemenceau then introduced M. Noulens to those present.

M. NOULENS stated that he would try to present a certain number of facts and read and submit a few short documents. He explained that he realized that the situation had changed since the victory of the Allies, and that a new policy was required. For his part, he had no selfish preoccupation to influence those present to adopt the views of his own country. He fully realized that what was now necessary was the adoption of a single policy which would be supported by all. He was satisfied that what he would say would be confirmed by others.

At the present time it may be said that famine exists everywhere in Russia, in spite of the great resources of the country. This is largely due to the policy pursued by the Bolsheviks, which has been

one of confiscation of private property, nationalization of the banks, and persecution of private citizens, particularly those of the intellectual classes who form, if not the majority, then an important minority.

PRESIDENT WILSON inquired whether the Ambassador meant that all classes were opposed to the Bolsheviks.

M. NOULENS replied that while it could not be stated that the majority were opposed to the Bolsheviks, it could be asserted that the best people of the country were opposed to their doctrine.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked when the Ambassador had left Russia. M. NOULENS answered that he had left Petrograd on February 22nd [27th?], 1918, Vologda on July 6th [25th?], 1918, had arrived in Archangel in August, and had left there about the middle of December last.

Returning to his subject, the Ambassador stated that all those belonging to the well-to-do classes and the intellectuals had been subjected to the most hideous tyranny. Not only had they been forced to pay exorbitant taxes, but their personal safety had been attacked. They had been forced to perform the most disgusting labors; their houses had been thrown open to the Bolsheviks, and even their clothes had been requisitioned. All such acts had been done pursuant to official orders and decrees of the Bolshevik Government. In this connection, and as an instance of this policy of the Bolsheviks to oppress the better classes, he stated that the officers of ships coming to Petrograd were subjected to the orders of their crews; that they had been tied to the masts and forced to navigate their ships in that condition, and had not been permitted the use of their own quarters. This they had been forced to endure as members of the bourgeois class.

M. Noulens read certain articles of the Constitution of the Soviet Government to prove that the deliberate policy of the Bolsheviks was a policy of tyranny worse than any that had ever existed.

In reply to a question of Mr. Lloyd George as to how this Constitution from which he was reading had been adopted, he explained that he was reading from the official paper of July 19th, 1918 *The Isvestia*. The Bolshevik Government, he said, was in fact a *dictateur* of the proletariat, the ruling of one class over all others. He read a certain article from this constitution granting absolute power to the laboring classes, and also a decree providing for the arming of the working classes and the formation of a Red Army, while at the same time decreeing the complete disarmament of the well-to-do class. Should the latter be found with arms in their possession, they were shot without trial.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE inquired whether M. Noulens had any information on the size of the Bolshevik Army.

M. NOULENS replied that the general statement was that the army consisted of one million men. For his part, he thought this inexact and a gross exaggeration,—that even if it were exact, he would point out that a large portion of the Bolshevik Army consisted of men who had been forced to enlist in order to provide themselves with some means of livelihood, and also to secure food for their families. These men would not fight.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE inquired whether there had not been fighting at Archangel.

M. NOULENS replied that the Bolshevik Army was more a rabble than an army, and as an instance, referred to the fact that the Allied troops consisting of but 172 men¹ had entered Archangel in August, and that their appearance was enough to force some five or six thousand Red Guards to withdraw from Archangel some 125 versts. The town consisting of some 100,000 inhabitants had been left in the care of a garrison of 100 men. The remaining 72¹ went forward to pursue the Bolsheviks, but they never reached the enemy, as the latter had destroyed the bridges, and the winter weather set in, which made it impossible to pursue them further.

M. Noulens gave as his opinion that if there had been 10,000 men available last summer it would have been easy for them to have reached Vologda. It was his opinion that if the Bolsheviks had, in fact, an army of a million men, they could have easily destroyed the 10,000 at Archangel and the 10,000 at Murmansk, but they have never even tried to attack.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that according to the figures furnished him there were 16,000 Allied troops at Archangel, and 15,425 at Murmansk; that in front of those at Archangel there were now only 5,000 Bolsheviks, and in front of those in Murmansk there were no more than 3,000 Bolsheviks. M. NOULENS stated that he had obtained his figures shortly before his departure from Archangel from General Ironside.

Returning to his subject he stated that when the foreign representatives were at Vologda, the Bolsheviks had placed Lettish Guards around their residences, ostensibly to protect them. These soldiers stated that they would never fight against the Allies.

¹ Somewhat different figures appear in the account of M. Noulens' remarks given in the alternate version of the minutes of this meeting *ante*, p. 623.

Concerning the numbers of troops involved in the occupation of Archangel, see also *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, pp. 505 and 513.

M. Noulens then gave a brief history of the establishment of the Bolshevik Government. He recalled the fact that last year when the constituent assembly had elected a majority against the Bolsheviks, the latter had seized a number of representatives, shot them, and established the Soviet system by force. He read Article LXV of the Constitution of the Soviet Government of July, 1918, in which was set forth the categories of those who might not vote or be elected. The principal classes were those who might be said to live off the labor of others; those owning capital or property, tradesmen and private agents of commerce, priests, agents of the police, *gendarmes* corps, and members of the House of Romanoff.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that this was purely a working class electory. He asked M. Noulens if the peasants were included in the list. M. Noulens answered that only those peasants could vote who had no one in their employ. He explained that there was a great number of peasants who were helped by two or three men, and that if this were the case they would not be permitted to vote.

As regards the attitude of the Bolsheviks towards the Press, the bourgeois Press and the greater part of the Socialist Press had been absolutely suppressed.

Could the Allies, as defenders of liberty, recognize the existence of such a regime, a regime which exists solely by terror? If it were true that it was not only the property classes but the majority who were opposed to the Bolsheviks, why did they not rise? The answer was that they were disarmed, and that the whole country was in a state of prostration. If the Bolsheviks had not deliberately adopted the policy of engaging highly paid mercenaries consisting of Lettish, Chinese and Red Guards, the majority would have overthrown them long ago.

M. Noulens spoke at some length regarding the reign of terror which had been instituted by Trotsky's orders. He spoke of the summary executions of officers, and those of the middle classes. He stated that the fortresses were full of prisoners who were dying of starvation; that it was a regular thing for the Guards to take from ten to twelve of these poor prisoners every day and shoot them so as to make room for more. In this connection, he spoke of the assassination of the Minister of the Interior who was shot by a student. In reprisal, the Bolsheviks had taken some 500 officers at Kronstadt whom they had drowned or shot, while the student had been placed in the fortress of Peter and Paul where he was being slowly tortured.

The Ambassador read a telegram from Commander Boyard of Ekaterinburg, who had just arrived at Perm. The shops had been sacked and the town was dead. It was pitiful to see the yellow faces and the haggard eyes of the inhabitants. There was a general feeling

of terror. The Bourgeoisie, that is to say, all who were not Bolshevik or in the employ of the Bolshevik, had only been allowed three ounces of bread per day, and all children over one year had died. On the arches of triumph erected by the Bolsheviks was written: "The man who does not work does not eat", that is to say: "If you are not Bolshevik, then you receive no food". Not only men but women had been shot,—there had been atrocities, drownings, the cutting off of noses and tongues, mutilations, burials alive, mock shootings, rape and pillage everywhere.

But it was not only the Russians who had been the victims. There have been many cases of harmless foreigners who had suffered, and not only members of the well-to-do classes, but workmen also. He mentioned the case of M. D'arcy, the Chairman of the French Residence of Petrograd, who had no relations with the Russians, except in connection with charitable work, who had been seized and imprisoned, and who had died of hunger and cold. Then there was also the case of Captain Cromie, the British Naval Attaché who had been killed in defense of the British Embassy, and whose body had been exposed for three days in the window of the Embassy.

But the Bolshevik Government did not confine itself to the dissemination of its policy throughout Russia. The Bolshevik Government was an imperial[ist] government. The Bolsheviks desired to impose their regime on the whole world. The only peace that they will make is a peace with the laboring classes. For them there is one legitimate war only,—that is the war of classes, which they say must take place everywhere. They say there can be no peaceful settlement with the better classes. In a word, the foundation of their doctrine is: "No agreement with governments which do not represent the working classes". They consider themselves the enemies of all other states. Should, therefore, the Associated Governments ever come to terms with the Bolsheviks, the Ambassador was convinced that they would use it for propaganda purposes only. They would flood the Allied countries with money, and they would use all means to overthrow the existing governments.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked the Ambassador who was really in control of the Bolshevik Government. Was it Lenin or Trotsky?

M. NOËLÉNS explained that Lenin was more popular than Trotsky, but that Trotsky was the more energetic character, and had not hesitated to use force to achieve his ends.

After it was agreed to meet the following morning at 10:30, the meeting came to an end, to enable some of those present to attend the luncheon given by the French Senate to President Wilson.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, January 21, 1919, at 10 Hours 30

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Col. U. S. Grant.
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Lieut.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B., Secretary, War Cabinet.
Mr. H. Norman.
Capt. E. Abraham.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau, President of the Council and Minister for War.
M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
Capt. A. Portier.

ITALY

Signor Orlando, President of the Council.
His Excellency Baron Sonnino, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Count Aldrovandi.
Major A. Jones.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
His Excellency M. Matsui.
M. Saburi.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. de Scavenius, Danish Minister in Russia, also attended by invitation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would ask M. de Scavenius, the Danish Minister in Russia, to make a statement concerning Bolshevism.

1. Social Forces
Backing Bol-
shevism

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that in Russia there were two classes—one Bolshevik, and one opposed to Bolshevism. He would begin by describing the former. When the Bolsheviks overthrew Kerensky¹ they had behind them the soldiers and most of the peasants and workmen; the soldiers backed them because they wanted peace at any price, the peasants because they wanted land, the workmen because they desired privileges for themselves. At the present time the original soldiers had been demobilized and had become peasants. The peasants were neither Bolshevik, Socialist, nor Monarchist. All they desired was land. They now had it. Their present requirement was order, which would enable them to cultivate their holdings.

As to the workmen: there was among workmen a considerable amount of discontent. Though they had become the privileged class,

¹ Alexander F. Kerensky, Prime Minister of Russia, July to November 1917.

they were in straits for food, and felt that Bolshevism had not kept its promises. Consequently it might safely be said that the Bolsheviks could only depend on about half the workmen of Russia, whose total numbers might be put at 2,000,000.

The nucleus of the Red Army was composed of foreigners—Letts, Hungarians, Germans, and Chinese. Some Russians, no doubt, had been collected by Trotsky around this nucleus, but the best fighting elements in the force were foreigners, especially the Hungarians and the Chinese.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired how many Chinese there might be in the Red Army.

M. DE SCAVENIUS estimated their number at 20,000 or 30,000. He explained that before the revolution half a million Chinese had been brought into Russia to supply the deficiency of labour on the land. After the revolution these men were out of work, and had taken service to avoid famine. He himself had been for a time in charge of Chinese interests in Russia. He had tried to keep these people out of the Red Army, but the Chinese Government had not sent him enough money to maintain them; for instance, they had sent him 10,000 roubles to support 6,000 Chinese in Petrograd alone. Consequently, he had been unable to save them from enlistment in the Red Army. He thought that the Red Army numbered in all about 300,000 men. A vast number of these men were not Bolshevik in sentiment at all, but men who had either enlisted for the same reasons as the Chinese, or had been forced into the ranks. He had seen the mobilization in Petrograd. Many of the men enrolled were bourgeois. The Red Army, therefore, was not a serious force, except when considered in relation to the famished and disarmed population of Russia itself.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the Red Army had not fought the forces of Denikin and Kolchak.

M. DE SCAVENIUS replied that they had encountered those forces, but Denikin had been able to check them, and if Denikin's troops had not for some months made any advance, the reason was that the Cossacks were only willing to defend their own country and not ready to go further north. This applied likewise to Krasnoff's² Cossacks.

At the time when the Bolsheviks overthrew the Government of Kerensky, the Constituent Assembly was almost solely composed of Revolutionary Socialists. That party, however, lost prestige, and finally disappeared, because it showed itself incapable of defending Kerensky or saving the Constituent

3. Revolutionary Socialists

² Gen. Peter Nikolaevich Krasnoff, ataman of the Don Cossacks.

Assembly. It had failed to raise an army in the Urals. When Kazan was besieged by the Bolsheviks only 2,000 volunteers and one regiment of Czecho-Slovaks opposed them; the latter were ordered to retire, and the town was defended for two days by 2,000 volunteers only. The [defenders of?] Samara also bolted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the Revolutionary Socialists were Savinkoff's party.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that Savinkoff at that time belonged to that party. He had since joined a new party called the Radical Republicans, who had taken the place of the Revolutionary Socialists. This party was chiefly recruited in Siberia and the Urals. The peasants in Siberia were more advanced than those in Great Russia. They had been Revolutionary Socialists, but were now Radical Republicans. Before the fall of Kazan the Revolutionary Socialists were supreme at the Conference of Ufa which represented the united Governments of Omsk, Ufa, and Samara. After the fall of Samara this party was discredited, and Kolchak was able to bring off his *coup d'état*. Since that time the party had disappeared, and Kolchak's Government contained no Revolutionary Socialists.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired what Kolchak's opinions were.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that Kolchak had been an admiral and an explorer. He called himself a Republican, though some people doubted whether he really held Republican views. After overturning the Government at Harbin he had proceeded to repeat the achievement at Omsk.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked who were the men associated with him since the overthrow of the Revolutionary Socialists.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that they were Radical Republicans. He had the support of Savinkoff, who all his life had been a Revolutionary Socialist. The Kolchak Government was in relations with that of Ekaterinodar in the Kuban district. Both these Governments were represented in Paris by M. Sazonoff.

The Monarchists were recruited from the upper middle classes, the landed proprietors and the officers. They were especially strong in

Southern Russia. The Radical Republicans were inclined to come to terms with them, and did not fear them because the troops on which they relied were chiefly Cossacks whose local institutions had always approximated rather to Republicanism. The Monarchists, on their side, were also willing to work with the Radical Republicans, as they did not wish at present to raise the question of regime.

6. Anti-Bolshevik Forces

The military forces at the disposal of the adversaries of Bolshevism were:—

(a) The voluntary army of Denikin, which on paper numbered 80,000 men, but in reality hardly amounted to more than 50,000 as a fighting force.

(b) The Cossacks of Krasnoff, amounting to 50,000 or 60,000.

(c) The Siberian Army, with Czecho-Slovaks, nominally 250,000 men, with a fighting force of about 100,000.

In all perhaps 200,000 or 210,000 fighting men at the outside.

The Ukrainian Army had never existed except on paper. Petliura³ had encountered no resistance, and had easily turned out the Hetman, who had fled.

Those people in Allied Countries who opposed intervention in Russia did so on the ground that it was impossible to send to Russia troops tired after four years of war, and also impossible for democratically governed countries to help to suppress a democracy. The answer to these objections was that intervention must be carried out by volunteer troops, and that Bolshevism was not a democracy. A movement which had suppressed Parliamentary Government and the right of free speech and meeting could not be called a democracy. If intervention was undertaken, it must be undertaken at once. The longer it was delayed the more Russians would be forced by famine to enlist in the Red Army. So long as Bolshevism remained in power, anarchy and ruin would increase, and, finding no resistance, the Bolshevik bands would devastate wider and wider regions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether M. de Scavenius advocated immediate intervention.

M. DE SCAVENTUS replied in the affirmative. Intervention would already be a more difficult matter than it would have been three months ago, because, whereas at that time the Baltic provinces and the Ukraine were free from Bolshevism, the former were now under Bolshevik domination, and the latter under that of Petliura, whose troops were largely Bolsheviks. The Polish situation was also worse, the Bolsheviks having taken Vilna and being on their way to Warsaw. Meanwhile, Lenin and his supporters were exploiting the patriotism of the lower middle classes by saying that the Allies were Imperialists who wanted to turn Russia into a colony and restore the Monarchy; in fact, that their aims were indistinguishable from those of the Germans. To counteract this propaganda the Allies could reply that their only object in intervening was to permit the convo-

³ Simon Petliura, leader of the nationalists in the Ukraine.

cation of a Constituent Assembly, in order that Russia might be in a position to decide her own fate. The Russians were, in fact, complaining that their right to do this had been taken from them by a violent minority. It was also to be remembered that a famine was absolutely certain to occur in the present year, the peasants having refused to sow more than enough grain for their own requirements, because the Soviet Government had sent all over the country battalions of Red Guards with orders to requisition existing stocks. It would be a great mistake to intervene by means of small forces, as had hitherto been attempted, because, as in the case of the Germans, the troops sent would become contaminated with Bolshevism in a few months. The proper policy was to destroy the centres of Bolshevism by capturing Petrograd and Moscow. To accomplish this troops should enter Russia from Finland, which would be easy, because the port of Helsingfors was free from ice, while the Finnish Government would be glad to send troops against Petrograd in order to prevent the spread of Bolshevism into their country. To enlist the aid of the Finnish Government it would, however, be necessary for the Allies to recognize them. By this means from 30,000 to 40,000 troops could quickly be moved to Petrograd. Meanwhile the Allied troops at Archangel and Murmansk could advance to Vologda and Zvanka respectively, join the Czechs, and thus ensure the supply of the Siberian force. There were 100,000 good troops in Poland, but they were without arms or uniforms. He understood that the Poles were sending a Mission to Paris to ask for these. The Polish troops should be sent against Moscow via Vilna and Smolensk. Denikin's volunteer army would also march on Moscow through Kursk if they knew that they were assured of the support of foreign troops.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether M. de Scavenius meant to convey that Russian troops could not be depended upon without the support of foreign armies.

M. DE SCAVENIUS replied that this was his opinion. Without making any claim to military knowledge, he had explained to the best of his ability the methods by which he thought intervention should be undertaken. He thought that a stiffening of 100,000, or at the utmost 150,000, volunteers from the Allied countries would be sufficient to reinforce the Russian armies he had already enumerated, and to ensure success.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had understood from M. de Scavenius' remarks that Denikin's forces were unwilling to go to Moscow.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that this would be the case if they felt that they had to do all the fighting.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that he had been asked to make some observations on the subject of Bolshevik propaganda. The Bolshevik doctrine implied a declaration of war on all constituted governments, because Bolshevism in Russia could not survive unless the rest of the world was Bolshevised. They had reduced propaganda to a fine art. The chief propagandist was Radek—a former Austrian subject. This man was a genius at propaganda. He had formed in Moscow an International Confederation with representatives of all the nations of Europe, and even of some in Asia. There was, for instance, a French group of about twenty persons. It published in Moscow a newspaper called "The Third International," and issued pamphlets which were smuggled into France through Switzerland, and especially through Belgium. There were English and American groups working on the same lines. The English group paid particular attention to India, which they regarded as the most vulnerable part of the British Empire. A delegation of Hindus had been specially coached and sent back to India with proclamations. A school of Indian languages had been set up in Moscow for the benefit of special agitators. The English group was also busy with Ireland, which they regarded as good soil for Bolshevism because of the feeling against landowners existing there.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that this was little to the credit of their judgment. Nearly all land in Ireland was in the hands of peasants. If all Bolshevik propaganda fell as far short of the mark as this he was not afraid of it.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that the subject could be well studied in Germany. The old Imperial Government had not been afraid of Bolshevism, which it had regarded as a disease only attacking conquered peoples. It had neglected Bolshevik propaganda in the conviction that Germany was invincible. Radek had made no concealment of his work in Germany. In conversation with M. de Scavenius he had told him that he employed 400 agitators in Germany with the greatest success. The result had justified his boast.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that the Bolsheviks in Germany had nevertheless suffered a severe defeat.

M. DE SCAVENIUS was of opinion that this defeat was not a final one. The German revolution was following the course of the Russian revolution step by step. It was now at the stage that Russia had reached in July, 1917, when the Bolsheviks were defeated by Kerensky. He was convinced that Scheidemann and Ebert had no real support.

8. Propaganda

9. Bolshevism in Germany

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. de Scavenius whether he did not think that it was impossible to compare a population in which 80 per cent. were illiterate, as in Russia, with a highly educated population such as that of Germany.

M. DE SCAVENIUS did not attribute much importance to that consideration. He thought that the habit of expecting orders, so ingrained in the German people was of greater moment. It was always the case that 4 or 5 per cent. of the population led the way. The rest were a mere flock always ready to be driven. It was a matter of general surprise that a nation which had fought so well for four years, and, before the war, had had so high a reputation for organisation, should have collapsed so suddenly and so completely. The explanation of this was that their leading classes had been largely destroyed but their place would, in time, be taken by another small percentage of energetic men. These, he believed, would be Bolsheviks. If so, their first act would be to form a close alliance with the Bolsheviks in Russia. In that event, it would be difficult to obtain a real peace in the world, or to impose on the world the decisions of this Conference. There would be a great German and Russian army ready to fight the Allies everywhere. There would be a flood of propaganda, all the more to be feared inasmuch as the Germans were better organisers than the Russians. Bolshevism, he believed, was a world danger. He therefore advocated its speedy destruction.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked for information about the situation in the Ukraine.

10. Ukraine

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that Petliura had conquered almost all the Ukraine because he had encountered no resistance, the Hetman's army existing only on paper. Petliura was in the neighborhood of Kieff as much as two months ago, and could have entered it had he wished. He had told the local Danish Consul that the Allies, who had refused to recognize him, would now be obliged to do so, and were, in fact, already in unofficial negotiations with him. Bolsheviks tolerated Petliura because the troops supporting him were largely Bolshevik. The result of his rule had been identical with that of Bolshevik rule in Great Russia. Proprietors had been expelled from their estates, and acts of violence had been committed. Petliura represented the national movement. He reproached the Hetman with the intention of merging the Ukraine in Russia. He desired autonomy for the Ukraine, although he would be willing to join a Russian Federation on some such terms as Bavaria in the German Confederation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, before putting any question to M. de Scavenius, he would like to express, on behalf of the British Gov-

ernment, his gratitude to him for his active protection of British subjects in Russia, and most particularly for saving the body of a particularly brave public servant—Captain Cromie—from the outrages of the mob.

M. CLEMENCEAU, speaking on behalf of France, said that he wished to associate himself with Mr. Lloyd George's words.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. de Scavenius when he had left Petrograd.

M. DE SCAVENIUS replied that he was last in Petrograd on the 15th of December. Since then he had received reports as late as the 29th December; and he promised to furnish certain extracts from Russian newspapers of about that date, which contained violent abuse of the Allies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether conscription was working at the time when M. de Scavenius left Petrograd.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that it had begun at that time. There had been three mobilisations in Petrograd. 13,000 soldiers had been raised there, but owing to lack of food had been removed elsewhere.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired what the effect of capturing Moscow would be.

M. DE SCAVENIUS replied that Bolshevism would cease to exist. He did not suggest that the Constituent Assembly could be called together at once, but the elements, at present helpless, would gather round the Allies, and in time would call forth the Constituent Assembly.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this amounted to the setting up of a provisional government by the Allies.

M. DE SCAVENIUS agreed that this would be necessary, but it need not be apparent. In a few weeks the parties would be able to meet, talk over the situation, and set up a government.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE presumed that the election would be by universal suffrage, and asked what M. de Scavenius would propose to do if the Bolsheviks obtained a majority.

M. DE SCAVENIUS replied that such a result was impossible; but that, if it came, it must of course be accepted.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether M. de Scavenius assumed that if the Allies appeared in Moscow they would be able to gather round them an effective Russian force. As a matter of fact, a similar experiment had already been tried, for instance in Siberia and at Archangel, which were areas of considerable extent. In both instances, the moment when foreign support had been withdrawn the native forces had dissolved. The Russians appeared incapable of forming an independent force, and could only lean on foreign troops.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that the mistake hitherto committed had been that of employing too small forces.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British Government had recently received a report that the Mensheviks and the Revolutionary Socialists had been driven by Allied intervention to act with the Bolsheviks.

M. DE SCAVENIUS said that, as he had before remarked, the Bolsheviks were appealing to the patriotism of the lower middle class, and persuading them that the Allies were Imperialists who intended to exploit Russia as the Germans had done. Such propaganda as this would have the effect to which Mr. Lloyd George had alluded.

M. de Scavenius then withdrew.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he wished to draw attention to the request made to him by the King of Montenegro. The King of Montenegro wished to send by telegraph a message to his people. The message was in the following terms:

11. Message From
the King of Mon-
tenegro to His
People

"To my people—

I implore you to return quietly to your homes and not to combat with arms the forces which are seeking to obtain control of our country. I have received the highest assurances that early and ample opportunity will be given to the people of Montenegro to decide upon the political form of their future government.

And by this decision, so far as it concerns me, I will gladly abide.
Nicholas."

President Wilson enquired whether there was any sufficient reason for stopping this message.

(It was generally agreed that there was none, and that the message should be forwarded. The French Government undertook to do this.)

PRESIDENT WILSON read a letter addressed to him by M. Paderewski. The letter concluded by suggesting that the Allies should send a collective Note to the Ukrainian Directorate at Kieff ordering them to withdraw from Galicia and to cease interference in Polish territory. He further suggested that an Allied Commission be sent to Warsaw to gauge the situation, and that the Polish Government be supplied with artillery and German rifle ammunition.

12. Assistance
to the Poles

MR. LLOYD GEORGE questioned whether it was safe to admit that Galicia was Polish territory. Any summons to Kieff should be accompanied by a similar summons to the Poles to abstain from entering disputed territory such as Eastern Galicia.

(It was agreed that a French translation of this letter should be made, and that it should be discussed at the afternoon meeting.)

PRESIDENT WILSON read to the meeting the telegraphic report annexed (Annex "A") from Mr. Butler [*Buckler*],⁵ who had interviewed Litvinoff⁶ in Stockholm.

13. Bolshevik
Overtures

(It was agreed that this letter should also be translated and discussed at the afternoon meeting.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there was a small matter which he wished to bring to the notice of the meeting. The British Government had at their disposal a number of German submarines.

14. German
Submarines

It had been suggested that these submarines should be sunk, but the Controllor of the Ministry of Shipping and the Director of Contracts had been consulted, and all agreed that the ex-German submarines had considerable commercial value. The Director of Contracts considered he could dispose of forty or fifty within a month, the condition of sale being that they would be broken up and the proceeds of the sale divided amongst the Allies on a scale to be subsequently settled. It was, therefore, suggested that all surrendered submarines in excess of eighty be disposed of by sale on these conditions.

(It was agreed that this course should be followed.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 21, 1919.

Annex "A" to IC-113 [BC-6]

I 7

Report, Dated January 18, 1919, of Agent who Held Confidential Conversations With Litvinoff on January 14, 15, and 16

Litvinoff stated that the Soviet Government are anxious for a permanent peace, and fully endorse the telegram which he sent to President Wilson the 24th December.⁸ They detest the military preparations and costly campaigns which are now forced upon Russia after four years of exhausting war, and wish to ascertain whether the United States and the Allies have a desire for peace.

If such is the case, peace can easily be negotiated, for, according to Litvinoff, the Soviet Government are prepared to compromise on all points, including protection to existing foreign enterprises, the granting of new concessions in Russia, and the Russian foreign debt. It is

⁵ William H. Buckler, special assistant in the Embassy in Great Britain; for his mission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, pp. 15-18.

⁶ M. M. Litvinov, Assistant Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

⁷ For text of this report as received by the Commission to Negotiate Peace, see telegram No. 116 from the Chargé in Denmark, January 18, 1919, 11 p. m., *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 15.

⁸ Not found in Department files. For extracts, see *ibid.*, pp. 138-139.

impossible now to give the details as to possible compromises, because Litvinoff has no idea of the claims which will be presented by the Allies, nor of the resources which will be available to Russia for the satisfaction of those claims. The particulars in all phases can be worked out by experts when the data mentioned above are available. The Soviet Government's conciliatory attitude is unquestionable.

Litvinoff showed me an open wireless message which he had just received from Tchitcherine affirming the willingness of the Government to be conciliatory with reference to the question of the foreign debt. Litvinoff and his associates realize fully that Russia will need, for a long time, expert assistance and advice, particularly in financial and technical matters, and that she cannot get on without manufactured imports, including, especially, foreign machinery.

Russian Bolshevik propaganda in foreign countries would cease at once if peace were made. That revolutionary propaganda was called forth by the declaration of war on Russia by the Allies, as a measure of retaliation, which also produced violence and terror. These activities will all cease as soon as the war stops. Propaganda has been freely employed against Germany, but until recently militarist Germany was the most dangerous enemy of Russia, and, notwithstanding the nominal peace of Brest-Litovsk, really remained at war with her. While Litvinoff was Russian representative—a period of eight months—he conducted political propaganda designed to defend his Government against attack. Everything which he issued was published in England. The Foreign Office, which seized all his papers can confirm this.

It is realized by Russians that conditions are not favorable for a revolution of the Russian type in certain Western countries. No amount of propaganda could produce such a result.

If it were possible for Russia to make peace with the Allies, these results would immediately follow:—

First.—An amnesty would be extended to the Russians who have been hostile to the Soviet Government, and bitterness against them would soon disappear. As such persons are not numerous they would, if they chose, be permitted to leave Russia.

Second.—The intrinsic weakness of the forces in South Russia, Siberia, and Archangel, which are opposed to the Soviet Government, would at once be revealed. Those forces represent only a minority in each district, and their local successes have been solely the result of Allied support.

Third.—The hostility which at present exists towards Russia on the part of Finland and other countries which need Russian products would speedily vanish. Russians have no imperialistic designs on Finland, Ukraine, or Poland, and desire only to give these peoples full rights of self-determination. However, Litvinoff said, so long as foreign powers support the capitalist classes in these countries Russia feels justified in supporting the working classes.

Litvinoff makes no denial of the many Soviet blunders, but says that the system has worked well when there are taken into consideration the enormous difficulties which had been faced during the past year. He asserts that its efficiency is constantly improving. The distribution of food is now being managed well by the peasant cooperatives, who are working with the Soviet. More anarchy and starvation must ensue if this new system should now be overthrown. In so far as the League of Nations can prevent war without encouraging reaction, it can count on the support of the Soviet Government.

The foregoing is the substance of the interview with Litvinoff.

Arthur Ransome, Correspondent of the London *Daily News*, who left Moscow last August, but has kept in constant contact with Bolsheviks in Stockholm and has an intimate knowledge of their views, believes that they would compromise as to the Ural and other frontiers. I pressed Litvinoff on this point, but beyond a claim that all Siberia must be Russian received no definite answer.

Ransome believes also that continued intervention by the Entente can smash the Soviet power in time. However, when this has once been accomplished, intervention must continue on a still larger scale for an indefinite period in order to cure the inevitable anarchy. The Soviet Government is the only one which shows the capacity of holding the Russian people and, without military support, no successor to it could exist. A large class of Bolsheviks who oppose Tchitcherine's and Litvinoff's plans for compromise, and who hope for more active Allied intervention, fully appreciate this fact, on [no] less than the discontent certain to be caused in Entente Countries by such prolonged and military effort. The continuance of such intervention plays into the hands of these extremists, whereas a policy of agreement with the Soviet Government will counteract their influence, will strengthen the Moderates, and by reviving trade and industry will procure prosperity, the best of all antidotes for Bolshevism.

If it were desired to bring Ransome to Paris, he could give information almost as well as Litvinoff relative to the attitude of the Soviet Government on any question.

For a month Litvinoff has been deprived of mail and of wireless cypher; consequently no effective negotiations can begin until the Allies arrange with Sweden and Finland, that he may communicate confidentially with his Government. Since he fears expulsion from Sweden at any moment this should be arranged without delay if negotiation is contemplated.

As the only possible channel for such negotiation is through Litvinoff, it may appear to you that the Legation at Stockholm is not a

suitable intermediary as the journey from Copenhagen to Paris requires three-and-a-half days. I am waiting your instructions at Copenhagen in case you should wish me to return to Stockholm. Please instruct me as promptly as possible if you desire me to come on to Paris.

II⁹

The Agent in question submits the following estimate of the situation based on information obtained by him.

Military intervention and occupation of Russia, even if ultimately successful, can only succeed at an indefinite date in the future, meanwhile war conditions following Bolshevism there and elsewhere will continue.

It is possible for an agreement with Russia to be made at once, thus obviating conquest and policing, and reviving normal conditions as a counteracting agency against Bolshevism.

In spite of the guarded language used by Litvinoff, I feel convinced that we can make a fair bargain respecting foreign interests and the foreign debt if we do not greatly curtail Russian territory. If Siberia and the coal and oil fields should be lost to Russia the terms granted relative to the debt will be proportionately less good.

If the Allies boldly say, "We are now convinced that the Soviet Government has a firm hold on the Russian people, and will recognize it upon conditions, but we shall not drive a Brest-Litovsk bargain, we contemplate generous treatment and expect the same in return," such an attitude will be of value both in the course of events and immediately, by strengthening the Moderates, such as Tchitcherine and Litvinoff; moreover, it will drag the Soviet Government to the right, and keep in power men who see that foreign capital and industry must be fairly treated.

To embitter Russia by a repetition of German territorial rapacity would mean less advantageous terms for Allied interests there.

The account in the *Times*, January 10, page 9, of the increasing strength and efficiency of the Soviet Government is fully confirmed by Dr. Davidsohn, Major Wardwell's former assistant,¹⁰ who left Moscow only last November.

⁹For text of this report as received by the Commission to Negotiate Peace, see telegram No. 118 from the Chargé in Denmark, January 19, 1919, 6 p. m., *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 17.

¹⁰Major Allen Wardwell in May 1918 succeeded Col. Raymond Robins as head of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia.

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, January 21, 1919, at
15 Hours**

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Colonel U. S. Grant.
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George
The Rt. Hon. A. J.
Balfour.
Lt-Col. Sir M. P. A.
Hankey, K. C. B.
Mr E Phipps.
Major A. M. Caccia,
M. V. O.

FRANCE

M Clemenceau
M Pichon.
M Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
Captain A. Portier.

ITALY

Signor Orlando
His Excellency Baron Sonnino.
Count Aldrovandi.
Major A. Jones.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
His Excellency M. Matsui.
M. Saburi.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. CLEMENCEAU said they had met together to decide what could be done in Russia under present circumstances.

**1. Situation
in Russia**

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in order to have something definite to discuss, he wished to take advantage of a suggestion made by Mr. Lloyd George and to propose a modification of the British proposal. He wished to suggest that the various organised groups in Russia should be asked to send representatives, not to Paris, but to some other place, such as Salonica, convenient of approach, there to meet such representatives as might be appointed by the Allies, in order to see whether they could draw up a programme upon which agreement could be reached.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the advantage of this would be that they could be brought straight there from Russia through the Black Sea without passing through other countries.

M. SONNINO said that some of the representatives of the various Governments were already here in Paris, for example, M. Sazonoff. Why should these not be heard?

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that the various parties should not be heard separately. It would be very desirable to get

all these representatives in one place, and still better, all in one room, in order to obtain a close comparison of views.

MR. BALFOUR said that a further objection to M. Sonnino's plan was that if M. Sazonoff was heard in Paris, it would be difficult to refuse to hear the others in Paris also, and M. Clemenceau objected strongly to having some of these representatives in Paris.

M. SONNINO explained that all the Russian parties had some representatives here, except the Soviets, whom they did not wish to hear.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that the Bolsheviks were the very people some of them wished to hear.

M. SONNINO continuing, said that they had heard M. Litvinoff's statements that morning. The Allies were now fighting against the Bolsheviks, who were their enemies, and therefore they were not obliged to hear them with the others.

M. BALFOUR remarked that the essence of President Wilson's proposal was that the parties must all be heard at one and the same time.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that the acceptance of M. Sonnino's proposals would amount to their hearing a string of people, all of whom held the same opinion, and all of whom would strike the same note. But they would not hear the people who at the present moment were actually controlling European Russia. In deference to M. Clemenceau's views, they had put forward this new proposal. He thought it would be quite safe to bring the Bolshevik representatives to Salonica, or perhaps to Lemnos. It was absolutely necessary to endeavour to make peace. The report read by President Wilson that morning went to show that the Bolsheviks were not convinced of the error of their ways, but they apparently realised the folly of their present methods. Therefore they were endeavouring to come to terms.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked to be permitted to urge one aspect of the case. As M. Sonnino had implied, they were all repelled by Bolshevism, and for that reason they had placed armed men in opposition to them. One of the things that was clear in the Russian situation was that by opposing Bolshevism with arms they were in reality serving the cause of Bolshevism. The Allies were making it possible for Bolsheviks to argue that Imperialistic and Capitalistic Governments were endeavouring to exploit the country and to give the land back to the landlords, and so bring about a reaction. If it could be shown that this was not true and that the Allies were prepared to deal with the rulers of Russia, much of the moral forces of this argument would disappear. The allegation that the Allies were against the people and wanted to control their affairs provided the argument which enabled them to raise armies. If, on the other hand, the Allies could swallow their pride and the natural repulsion which they felt

for the Bolsheviks, and see the representatives of all organised groups in one place, he thought it would bring about a marked reaction against Bolshevism.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, in principle, he did not favour conversation with the Bolsheviks; not because they were criminals, but because we would be raising them to our level by saying that they were worthy of entering into conversation with us. The Bolshevik danger was very great at the present moment. Bolshevism was spreading. It had invaded the Baltic Provinces and Poland, and that very morning they had received very bad news regarding its spread to Budapest and Vienna. Italy, also, was in danger. The danger was probably greater there than in France. If Bolshevism, after spreading in Germany, were to traverse Austria and Hungary and so reach Italy, Europe would be faced with a very great danger. Therefore, something must be done against Bolshevism. When listening to the document presented by President Wilson that morning, he had been struck by the cleverness with which the Bolsheviks were attempting to lay a trap for the Allies. When the Bolsheviks first came into power, a breach was made with the Capitalist Governments on questions of principle, but now they offered funds and concessions as a basis for treating with them. He need not say how valueless their promises were, but if they were listened to, the Bolsheviks would go back to their people and say: "We offered them great principles of justice, and the Allies would have nothing to do with us. Now we offer money, and they are ready to make peace."

He admitted his remarks did not offer a solution. The great misfortune was that the Allies were in need of a speedy solution. After four years of war, and the losses and sufferings they had incurred, their populations could stand no more. Russia also was in need of immediate peace. But its necessary evolution must take time. The signing of the world peace could not await Russia's final avatar. Had time been available, he would suggest waiting, for eventually sound men representing common sense would come to the top. But when would that be? He would make no forecast. Therefore they must press for an early solution.

To sum up, had he been acting by himself, he would temporise and erect barriers to prevent Bolshevism from spreading. But he was not alone, and in the presence of his colleagues he felt compelled to make some concessions, as it was essential that there should not be even the appearance of disagreement amongst them. The concession came easier after having heard President Wilson's suggestion. He thought that they should make a clear and convincing appeal to all reasonable peoples, emphatically stating that they did not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, and especially that they had

no intention of restoring Czardom. The object of the Allies being to hasten the creation of a strong Government, they proposed to call together representatives of all parties to a conference. He would beg President Wilson to draft a paper, fully explaining the position of the Allies to the whole world, including the Russians and the Germans.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, and gave notice that he wished to withdraw his own motion in favour of President Wilson's.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood that all these people were to be asked on an equality. On these terms he thought the Bolsheviks would refuse, and by their refusal they would put themselves in a very bad position.

M. SONNINO said that he did not agree that the Bolsheviks would not come. He thought they would be the first to come, because they would be eager to put themselves on an equality with the others. He would remind his colleagues that, before the Peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed, the Bolsheviks promised all sorts of things, such as to refrain from propaganda, but since that peace had been concluded they had broken all their promises, their one idea being to spread revolution in all other countries. His idea was to collect together all the anti-Bolshevik parties and help them to make a strong Government, provided they pledged themselves not to serve the forces of reaction and especially not to touch the land question thereby depriving the Bolsheviks of their strongest argument. Should they take these pledges he would be prepared to help them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired how this help would be given.

M. SONNINO replied that help would be given with soldiers to a reasonable degree or by supplying arms, food, and money. For instance, Poland asked for weapons and munitions; the Ukraine asked for weapons. All the Allies wanted was to establish a strong Government. The reason that no strong Government at present existed was that no party could risk taking the offensive against Bolshevism without the assistance of the Allies. He would enquire how the parties of order could possibly succeed without the help of the Allies. President Wilson had said that they should put aside all pride in the matter. He would point out that, for Italy, and probably for France also, as M. Clemenceau had stated, it was in reality a question of self-defence. He thought that even a partial recognition of the Bolsheviks would strengthen their position, and, speaking for himself, he thought that Bolshevism was already a serious danger in his country.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he wished to put one or two practical questions to M. Sonnino. The British Empire now had some 15,000 to 20,000 men in Russia. M. de Scavenius had estimated that some 150,000 additional men would be required, in order to keep the anti-

Bolshevik Governments from dissolution. And General Franchet d'Esperey also insisted on the necessity of Allied assistance. Now Canada had decided to withdraw her troops, because the Canadian soldiers would not agree to stay and fight against the Russians. Similar trouble had also occurred amongst the other Allied troops. And he felt certain that, if the British tried to send any more troops there, there would be mutiny.

M. SONNINO suggested that volunteers might be called for.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that it would be impossible to raise 150,000 men in that way. He asked, however, what contributions America, Italy and France would make towards the raising of this army.

PRESIDENT WILSON and M. CLEMENCEAU each said none.

M. ORLANDO agreed that Italy could make no further contributions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Bolsheviks had an army of 300,000 men and would, before long, be good soldiers, and to fight them at least 400,000 Russian soldiers would be required. Who would feed, equip and pay them? Would Italy, or America, or France, do so? If they were unable to do that, what would be the good of fighting Bolshevism? It could not be crushed by speeches. He sincerely trusted that they would accept President Wilson's proposal as it now stood.

M. ORLANDO agreed that the question was a very difficult one for the reasons that had been fully given. He agreed that Bolshevism constituted a grave danger to all Europe. To prevent a contagious epidemic from spreading the sanitarians set up a *cordon sanitaire*. If similar measures could be taken against Bolshevism, in order to prevent its spreading, it might be overcome, since to isolate it meant vanquishing it. Italy was now passing through a period of depression, due to war weariness. But Bolsheviks could never triumph there, unless they found a favourable medium, such as might be produced either by profound patriotic disappointment in their expectations as to the rewards of the war, or by an economic crisis. Either might lead to revolution, which was equivalent to Bolshevism. Therefore, he would insist that all possible measures should be taken to set up this cordon. Next, he suggested the consideration of repressive measures. He thought two methods were possible—either the use of physical force or the use of moral force. He thought Mr. Lloyd George's objection to the use of physical force unanswerable. The occupation of Russia meant the employment of large numbers of troops for an indefinite period of time. This meant an apparent prolongation of the war. There remained the use of moral force. He agreed with M. Clemenceau that no country could continue in anarchy, and that an end must eventually come; but they could not

wait; they could not proceed to make peace and ignore Russia. Therefore, Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, with the modifications introduced after careful consideration by President Wilson and M. Clemenceau, gave a possible solution. It did not involve entering into negotiations with the Bolsheviks; the proposal was merely an attempt to bring together all the parties in Russia with a view of finding a way out of the present difficulty. He was prepared, therefore, to support it.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked for the views of his Japanese colleagues.

BARON MAKINO said that, after carefully considering the various points of view put forward, he had no objections to make regarding the conclusion reached. He thought that was the best solution under the circumstances. He wished, however, to enquire what attitude would be taken by the representatives of the Allied Powers if the Bolsheviks accepted the invitation to the meeting and there insisted upon their principles. He thought they should under no circumstances countenance Bolshevik ideas. The conditions in Siberia east of the Baikal had greatly improved. The objects which had necessitated the despatch of troops to that region had been attained. Bolshevism was no longer aggressive, though it might still persist in a latent form. In conclusion, he wished to support the proposal before the meeting.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that the emissaries of the Allied Powers should not be authorised to adopt any definite attitude towards Bolshevism. They should merely report back to their Governments the conditions found.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked that that question be further considered. He thought the emissaries of the Allied Powers should be able to establish an agreement if they were able to find a solution. For instance, if they succeeded in reaching an agreement on the subject of the organisation of a Constituent Assembly, they should be authorised to accept such a compromise without the delay of a reference to the Governments.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the emissaries might be furnished with a body of instructions.

MR. BALFOUR expressed the view that abstention from hostile action against their neighbours should be made a condition of their sending representatives to this meeting.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the manifesto to the Russian parties should be based solely on humanitarian grounds. They should say to the Russians: "You are threatened by famine. We are prompted by humanitarian feelings; we are making peace; we do not want people to die. We are prepared to see what can be done to remove

the menace of starvation." He thought the Russians would at once prick up their ears and be prepared to hear what the Allies had to say. They would add that food cannot be sent unless peace and order were established. It should, in fact, be made quite clear that the representatives of all parties would merely be brought together for purely humane reasons.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in this connection he wished to invite attention to a doubt expressed by certain of the delegates of the British Dominions, namely, whether there would be enough food and credit to go round should an attempt be made to feed all Allied countries, and enemy countries, and Russia also. The export of so much food would inevitably have the effect of raising food prices in Allied countries and so create discontent and Bolshevism. As regards grain, Russia had always been an exporting country, and there was evidence to show that plenty of food at present existed in the Ukraine.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his information was that enough food existed in Russia, but, either on account of its being hoarded or on account of difficulties of transportation, it could not be made available.

(It was agreed that President Wilson should draft a proclamation, for consideration at the next meeting, inviting all organised parties in Russia to attend a meeting to be held at some selected place, such as Salonica or Lemnos, in order to discuss with the representatives of the Allied and Associated Great Powers the means of restoring order and peace in Russia. Participation in the meeting should be conditional on a cessation of hostilities.)

M. CLEMENCEAU considered it to be most urgent that the delegates should be set to work. He understood that President Wilson would be ready to put on the table at the next full Conference proposals relating to the creation of a League of Nations. He was anxious to add a second question, which would be studied immediately, namely, reparation of damages. He thought the meeting should consider how the work should be organised in order to give effect to this suggestion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he agreed that these questions should be studied forthwith. He would suggest that, in the first place, the League of Nations should be considered; and that, after the framing of the principles, an international committee of experts be set to work out its constitution in detail. The same remark applied also to the question of indemnities and reparation. He thought that a Committee should also be appointed as soon as possible to consider International Labour Legislation.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that he had himself drawn up a constitution of a League of Nations. He could not claim that it was

wholly his own creation. Its generation was as follows: He had received the Phillimore Report,¹ which had been amended by Colonel House² and re-written by himself.³ He had again revised it⁴ after having received General Smuts' and Lord Robert Cecil's reports.⁵ It was therefore a compound of the various suggestions. During the week he had seen M. Bourgeois,⁶ with whom he found himself to be in substantial accord on principles. A few days ago he had discussed his draft with Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts, and they had found themselves very near together.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that President Wilson's draft should be submitted to the Committee as a basis for discussion.

PRESIDENT WILSON further suggested that the question should be referred as far as possible to the men who had been studying it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed his complete agreement. He thought they themselves should, in the first place, agree on the fundamental principles, and then refer the matter to the Committee. When that Committee met they could take President Wilson's proposals as the basis of discussion.

(It was agreed that the question of appointing an International Committee, consisting of two members from each of the five Great Powers, to whom would be referred President Wilson's draft, with certain basic principles to guide them, should be considered at the next meeting.)

M. PICHON called attention to the necessity for replying to the demand addressed by M. Paderewski to Colonel House, which had been read by President Wilson that morning, and asked that Marshal Foch should be present.

3. Poland

It was agreed that this question should be discussed at the next meeting.

MR. BALFOUR called attention to the urgency of the question of disarmament, and said that he would shortly propose that a committee should be appointed to consider this question.

4. Disarmament

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 21, 1919.

¹ David Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant* (New York, 1928), vol. II, p. 3.

² *Foreign Relations: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. I, p. 497.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 501.

⁴ Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. II, pp. 65-93.

⁵ For General Smuts' plan, see *Ibid.*, p. 23; for Lord Cecil's memorandum, see Miller, *My Diary*, vol. III, p. 85.

⁶ Léon Bourgeois, former French President of the Council of Ministers and former Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Notes on Conversations Held in the Office of M. Pichon at the
Quai d'Orsay, at 10:30 a. m., January 21, 1919

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :	President Wilson Mr. Lansing Mr. Frazier Mr. Harrison Col. Grant
BRITISH EMPIRE :	Mr. Lloyd George Mr. Balfour Mr. Norman Lt. Col. Hankey Capt. Abraham
FRANCE :	M. Clemenceau M. Pichon M. Dutasta M. Berthelot Prince de Bearn
ITALY :	M. Sonnino Count Aldrovandi Genl. Jones
JAPAN :	M. Makino

Interpreter: M. Mantoux.

I

THE CHAIRMAN introduced Mr. Scavenius, lately Danish Minister to Russia, who had come by request to give information regarding the present situation in Russia.

MR. SCAVENIUS explained that when the Bolsheviki overthrew the provisional government they were supported by the soldiers, who wanted peace at any price, by the peasants who desired the division of the land, and by the workingmen who desired the advantages they would obtain by becoming a privileged class.

At the present time, however, the Bolsheviki are not supported by the soldiers, as the soldiers no longer exist. They had now become peasants. The peasants had obtained a division of the land, and all they want now are guarantees to enable them to hold and develop the land. As a matter of fact, the peasants are neither monarchists nor socialists. As regards the workingmen, while it is true that they have become the privileged class, there is considerable discontent amongst them, because the Bolsheviki have not been able to furnish

them enough food. At the present time the Bolsheviks cannot count on those who were formerly soldiers, nor on the peasants, nor on a great part of the workingmen. Indeed, the Bolsheviks are now supported by a Red Army composed of Letts, Hungarians, Germans and Chinese, and these mercenary troops form a foreign nucleus around which there are a certain number of Russian forces. The best elements of this foreign nucleus are the Hungarians and Chinese.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE inquired how many Chinese there were in the Red Army.

MR. SCAVENIUS estimated that there were about 20,000 or 30,000. He explained that he knew something about them, as he had been in charge of Chinese interests, and had had in his care about a million Chinese workers who had been imported into Russia during the war. These poor people had been left destitute by their government, and to ameliorate their condition he had endeavored to organize co-operative assistance. He had asked the help of the Chinese Government, and had been furnished 10,000 rubles as a fund for this purpose. Of course this has been entirely inadequate, and the result has been that a considerable number of these Chinese have been forced to enlist in the Red Army.

Mr. Scavenius estimated that there are some 300,000 men in the Red Army, but said that a large part of these are Russians of the bourgeois class. The Red Army did not constitute a real force that would be of much use against foreign troops, but they did constitute a real force under present conditions in Russia, as they had nothing opposed to them but an unarmed and famished population.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if the Red Army were not fighting the forces led by Denikin and Kolchak.

MR. SCAVENIUS replied that this was true, that the forces of Denikin had been able to stop the advances of the Bolsheviks, but had not proceeded north against them. This has been the general attitude of Cossack troops, as well as of the forces of General Krasnov, who are quite satisfied to defend their own country, but are not prepared to attack the Bolsheviks.

As regards the different adversaries with whom the Bolsheviks had to contend, Mr. Scavenius stated that the principal opponents of the Bolsheviks had first been the members of the Socialist Revolutionary party. At the time of Kerensky, the Socialist Revolutionary party had an overwhelming majority in the constituent assembly. But since the overthrow of the assembly by the Bolsheviks, this party has almost entirely disappeared, having completely lost the confidence of the public. They had failed to defend the constitution of the national assembly; they had been unable to support Kerensky against the Bolsheviks, and they had not been able to raise an army to fight the

Bolsheviki. For instance, the failure of the party to defend Samara was an excellent example, and in the case of the defense of Kazan, all the army had fled except some two or three thousand volunteers composed principally of Czecho-Slovaks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE inquired whether Mr. Savinkov belonged to the Socialist Revolutionary party.

MR. SCAVENIUS replied that he had been a member of that party, but was now a member of the Radical Republican party, which had become the successor, so to speak, of the Socialist Revolutionary party. For instance, after the fall of Samara, Kolchak had forced out the Socialist Revolutionary leaders and had formed this new party called the Radical Republican party.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked Mr. Scavenius to state exactly who Kolchak was.

MR. SCAVENIUS replied that he was an admiral; that he had been in command of certain forces at Harbin, that he had been moved to Moscow, and that he now called himself a Radical Republican.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked who were with him now, since he had thrown out the Social Revolutionists. MR. SCAVENIUS answered that his followers are now Radical Republicans, amongst them being some of the old Social Revolutionists who had joined them. Also amongst them is this man Savinkov. Kolchak had also got control of the government at Ekaterinodar which is represented in Paris by Mr. Sazonov.

The other party opposing the Bolsheviki at this time is the Monarchist party composed of the higher middle class, landed proprietors and ex-officers of the former army. The Monarchist party is especially strong in South Russia at Kuban. The Radical Republican party had come to an understanding with the Monarchist party, and had been able to defend this by saying that while the officers might be Monarchists, the soldiers are really Republicans, and particularly that the Cossacks are Republicans. The Radical Republican party further defended its action by claiming that at this time it would not be desirable to raise the question as to whether there should be a monarchy or a republic in Russia. Their whole effort was to oppose the Bolsheviki and leave that decision until later.

As regards the numbers of the Monarchists, Mr. Scavenius estimated that there were some 80,000 troops in the Denikin Army, which probably meant that its fighting strength was 50,000. He understood that there were about 50,000 or 60,000 Cossacks with Krasnov, and that the Russian Army in Siberia, including the Czecho-Slovaks, though it was said to amount to 250,000 men, probably did not have a fighting strength of over 100,000. To sum up, therefore, the forces opposed to the Bolsheviki totalled some 200,000 or 210,000 men.

It was impossible to count on many forces in the Ukraine Army, as the army of the Hetmann of the Ukraine had been proved to exist principally on paper. This had been shown by the easy way in which Petlura had been able to overthrow the Hetmann.

Mr. Scavenius then took up the question of intervention in Russia. There are those, he said, who do not wish to intervene, and base their attitude on the fact that their soldiers are tired of the war, and that they could not undertake to suppress a democracy, as they themselves are a democracy.

Mr. Scavenius thought that their objections might be answered in two ways: First, by a voluntary army, and second, by the fact that the Bolsheviks are not a democracy. The Bolsheviks, on the contrary, had suppressed the only parliament that they had, and had denied the franchise to a large part of the Russian people.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that all those present admitted that the Bolsheviks were not a democracy, and that this was not even contended by the labor party in England.

MR. SCAVENIUS expressed his personal opinion, that if there is to be intervention it must come about quickly. He pointed out that famine is forcing many to become Bolsheviks, the formation of the Red Army being in fact due entirely to the famine conditions, starvation being its best recruiting sergeant. Moreover, if let alone the extension of anarchy will continue. As the Bolsheviks do not find opposition, they will desire to exploit further territories and anarchy will spread. As far as intervention is concerned, it would have been far more profitable three months ago than now. Within the last three months the Baltic provinces had been lost, Petlura had obtained the upper hand in Ukraine and the Bolsheviks had taken Vilna, and they are now within a few days' march of Warsaw.

In addition to their military operations, Mr. Scavenius pointed out, the Bolsheviks are carrying on a most energetic propaganda amongst the lower middle class. They claim, and Lenin is forcing the argument home, that the Allies will do to Russia just what the Germans wanted to do; that they will exploit Russia as a colony, and will restore the monarchy. This propaganda, however, could be met by saying that the purpose of intervention is not to restore the monarchy, but to restore the constituent assembly and to permit Russians to decide their own fate, for it should not be forgotten that the Russians now complain that the right to decide their own fate had been forcibly taken from them by a small and violent minority.

As still another point in support of the theory of intervention, Mr. Scavenius added that the peasants are now refusing to sow more than is necessary for their own needs. Consequently, next year there will be a famine. This attitude of the peasants was brought about by the

presence of Bolshevik troops who had been sent to requisition their supplies. The net result is that the peasants have no intention of producing more than what they themselves actually need.

He would recommend, if he might be permitted to do so, being a [*no?*] military man, that if anything were done in the way of intervention, it be done on a big scale. Small expeditions had proved entirely useless; the troops composing these expeditions had simply been Bolshevized. In his opinion, it would be absolutely necessary to take the Bolshevik centers, viz., Petrograd and Moscow, if anything is to be accomplished. This could be done via Finland, and the Finns would even go so far as to send troops themselves, if the Allies would recognize the Finnish Government. He felt convinced that the Finns would be able to put in the field some 30,000 troops, and these, together with the Allied troops now in Archangel and Murmansk, would be able to take not only Petrograd, but Vollogda, whence they could obtain supplies from the Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia. He thought that there are probably some 100,000 troops available in Poland, but they were without ammunition and had no uniforms. He would point out, however, that there is a Polish delegation now in Paris asking for help. This help should be supplied, and the Poles used to drive back the Bolsheviks, who are now near Warsaw. Vilna should be taken and the southwestern route to Moscow opened up. At the same time, the forces under Denikin should march northwards, and he felt certain the Cossacks would be prepared to undertake an offensive against the Bolsheviks if they knew that there were other foreign forces in the country.

In reply to an inquiry of Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Scavenius stated that he thought that at least 100,000 or perhaps 150,000 foreign forces would be necessary to stiffen the forces from Finland, Poland, Siberia and Southern Russia. He proposed that this foreign force should be composed of volunteers from amongst the Allied nations.

Mr. Scavenius then spoke at length about the importance of the Bolshevik propaganda. When the Bolsheviks declared war against all governments they found that they could not exist unless others were Bolshevized, and for this purpose they established a Bolshevik propaganda with its principal seat at Moscow. An international confederation had been formed with representatives not only from the countries in Europe, but also from other parts of the world. There were some twenty men in the French group, and a French paper was published called "The Third International", which was sent to France via Switzerland and especially via Belgium. There were also Anglo-Americans on this committee. The committee had made special efforts to disseminate their propaganda throughout India, and had set up a school for teaching the languages

of India in connection with their propaganda. They were also working on the Irish question. The case of Germany afforded a striking illustration of what the Bolsheviki propaganda could accomplish. The former German Government had claimed that Bolshevism would only attack a vanquished foe; therefore they had done nothing to combat Bolshevism in Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that the Bolsheviki had lost Germany.

MR. SCAVENIUS feared that the same would take place as had taken place in Russia, and pointed out that the sequence of events seemed to be very similar.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether Mr. Scavenius did not think that conditions were different, inasmuch as the Germans are an educated people, while the vast majority of Russians are illiterate. MR. SCAVENIUS agreed with this statement, but wished to call particular attention to the fact that it was a small minority, perhaps only five per cent of the German people, who had been really organizers of Germany; that this small minority no longer existed, and that those who remained, that is, the vast majority or 95 per cent, were like sheep. Moreover, their training had been such, and their psychology is such, that a small well-organized party like that led by Liebknecht¹ appealed strongly to the German people. If, therefore, the Bolsheviki should succeed in Germany, Mr. Scavenius believed that their first step would be to form an alliance with Russia, their second to organize a great army, and their third to carry on an intensive propaganda within the Allied and neutral countries. In view of what is now taking place in Germany, Bolshevism is becoming from day to day a greater threat against civilization. How would it be possible, should an alliance between Bolshevik Russia and Germany take place, to make any peace agreement possible or lasting?

MR. SCAVENIUS stated in all earnestness that he believed that Bolshevism presented a definite danger to the whole world, and that in his opinion there is but one thing to do, and that is to do away with it as soon as possible.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Mr. Scavenius could state in more detailed form just what had taken place in the Ukraine.

MR. SCAVENIUS explained that Petlura's success had been due to the fact that he found no resistance; that the army of Hetmann had existed only on paper, and that when the Germans withdrew and no Allies came to take their place, Petlura had found the way open to march on Kiev. The Danish Consul had met Petlura outside Kiev and Petlura had assured him that he could take Kiev whenever he wanted to. As a matter of fact, negotiations were opened between

¹ Karl Liebknecht, leader of the Spartacist movement in Germany.

Petlura and the Hetmann, and are still going on. But the important thing to note is that Petlura was supported by the Bolsheviki, and they had supported him because they desired to make use of him and his army to get their men into the Ukraine. Already the landed proprietors are being forced out, and Bolshevik doctrines are finding favor.

MR. PICHON asked why Petlura had started his movement.

MR. SCAVENIUS explained that Petlura represented a national movement. He reproached the Hetmann with being in accord with the Allies, and particularly for having declared that in his opinion the Ukraine should return to greater Russia. Petlura and his adherents do not wish to have Ukraine lose her autonomy. They oppose the return of Ukraine to greater Russia, but do not oppose the Ukraine under the federation of Russian states.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE took advantage of the opportunity to thank Mr. Scavenius personally for protecting British subjects, and particularly for having saved the body of the valiant Captain Cromie from desecration at the hands of the Bolsheviki. He asked when Mr. Scavenius had left Russia.

MR. SCAVENIUS replied that he had left Russia on September 15th, but had received reports up to the 29th of December.

MR. Scavenius read extracts from certain Bolshevik newspapers in which the Allies were branded as brigands.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that he hoped that the Allies would not have to prove to be so. He also asked Mr. Scavenius if he knew the system in force for recruiting the Red Army.

MR. SCAVENIUS stated that there had been three mobilizations, but, as a matter of fact, the greater part of the army is composed of the well-to-do classes, who could not be considered as reliable Bolshevik soldiers. He had heard that many of the Bolshevik troops had never reached the front.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that he understood Mr. Scavenius to argue that no purpose would be gained by organizing various armies in Russia, unless 100,000 or 150,000 foreign troops were sent to support them. He also asked what would be the purpose in taking Moscow.

MR. SCAVENIUS replied that should the plan that he had suggested work out, and Moscow be taken, he thought that the death blow to Bolshevism would be delivered. The principal purpose in taking Moscow would be to issue two or three weeks after its capture, a call for a constituent assembly.

MR. BALFOUR asked why the same would not happen in Moscow as had occurred in Archangel, namely, that intervention would simply tend to crystallize opposition to the foreign forces.

MR. SCAVENIUS answered that, in his opinion, the reason for the failure in Archangel and Murmansk and at other points, had been because the intervention had been on a small scale. What is necessary is intervention on a large scale, if intervention is to take place at all.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that his information is to the effect that the Menchiviks [*Mensheviks?*] and the remainder of the Social Revolutionists had determined to side with the Bolsheviki through fear of Allied intervention. In other words, the argument now advanced by the Bolsheviki with their opponents in Russia, is based on the threat of foreign intervention to reestablish a monarchy and restore the landed proprietors.

MR. SCAVENIUS recalled the point he had already made, that it should be made entirely clear to all that the Allies would intervene not to restore the monarchy or the conditions existing at the time of the monarchy, but to ensure a free expression of the will of the people, and to afford an immediate opportunity for the convening of a constituent assembly, through which they could express freely their desires as to the form of government they wished to set up; in a word, offered an opportunity for the establishment of a true democracy in Russia.

THE CHAIRMAN expressed the thanks of the representatives of the Allied Governments and of the United States, and Mr. Scavenius withdrew.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he had received a letter from the King of Montenegro inquiring whether he might be permitted to send a telegram to his people asking them to return to their homes, to cease hostilities, and to assure them that they would be afforded an early opportunity to decide as to the form of government they desired to establish in Montenegro. The King would add also, that he, for his part, would abide by their decision.

It was agreed to permit the King of Montenegro to send a telegram to that effect.

PRESIDENT WILSON read a letter which had been addressed by Mr. Paderewski to Colonel House, in which the former, among other things, stated that the Poles were nowhere the aggressive party, asked for certain assistance in the way of artillery, rifles and ammunition, and requested the Allies to insist on the withdrawal of the Yugo-Slavs from Western Galicia.

It was agreed that the whole Polish question should be taken up, and some line of action decided upon, after some decision had been reached with regard to the Bolshevik question.

President Wilson read two telegraphic reports from Mr. Buckler,^{1a} regarding his conversations with Litvinoff. At the request of the

^{1a} *Ante*, p. 643.

Chairman, he promised to furnish paraphrases of the telegrams in question.

It was agreed to continue the discussion of the Bolshevik question at the afternoon session, which was to begin at 3:00 o'clock.

THE CHAIRMAN opened the meeting in the afternoon at 3:00 o'clock.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that Mr. Lloyd George's proposal to summon representatives of the several governments in Russia to Paris, to give an account of themselves to the representatives of the Great Powers, might be amended in the sense that they should be asked to send representatives to a place other than Paris, say Saloniki. In that way, M. Clemenceau's original objection to inviting the Bolshevik representatives to Paris might be overcome.

M. SONNINO pointed out that there are representatives of several of the Russian states already in Paris, such as Sazonov.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that should these representatives be heard separately, it would be going into a circle. He thought it most desirable that they should be heard all in one room. This method would afford them an opportunity for a comparison of views, and if possible, a settlement upon some plan.

MR. BALFOUR supported President Wilson's suggestion.

M. SONNINO suggested that the meeting hear Sazonov, as they had heard Scavenius and Noulens.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the document which President Wilson had read in the morning session from Litvinoff was remarkable, not that it showed that the Bolsheviks were converted to a realization of the error of their ways, but that it showed that they had at last seen that their plan would not do, and that they were in the mood to come to terms. He pointed out that in hearing Sazonov and others like him, the same side of the arguments would always be heard. He thought it most necessary to hear from the representatives of the different governments in Russia, including the Bolsheviks. If Saloniki did not serve, why then another place might do, such as the Island of Lemnos.

PRESIDENT WILSON ventured to think that what was back of Baron Sonnino's suggestion was an antipathy to the Bolsheviks, and a natural repulsion against their acts. He would observe, however, that by opposing the Bolsheviks by armies, the cause of the Bolsheviks was being served by the Allies. They were being given a case. They could say to their followers that the imperialistic and capitalistic governments were desirous of destroying Russia. They would represent the Allies as the advocates and supporters of reaction. If the Allies could make it appear that this was not true, most of the moral

influence of the Bolsheviks would break down, as their case would be gone. They could no longer allege that it was the purpose of the Allies and the United States to enslave the Russian people and to take charge of their affairs. It was therefore desirable that the Allies show that they are ready to hear the representatives of any organized group in Russia, provided they are willing and ready to come to one place, to put all their cards on the table, and see if they could not come to an understanding. He ventured to think that such a line of action, if adopted, would bring about more reaction against the cause of the Bolsheviks than anything else the Allies could do.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that in principle he was not favorable to holding conversations with the Bolsheviks, as he considered them to be criminals. He objected principally for the reason that it would raise them to the level of the Allies and give them great prestige.

But sometimes in politics it is necessary to hold conversations with criminals. Moreover, things were going from bad to worse. Recently, the Baltic provinces had been overrun by the Bolsheviks, Poland is in danger, and he had just received word that Budapest is about to pass under their control. Should they once be established in Vienna, the danger of Bolshevism would be great in Italy. Therefore, it would become the same in France, should Central Europe be contaminated by this evil.

Referring to the Litvinoff conversation, he wished to call the attention of those present to the skill with which the matter had been presented. At first, the attitude of the Bolsheviks had been one of refusal to compromise with the foreign governments. They claimed that they could not have anything to do with those governments who were making a war of capital. They then proposed peace, and when they were not heard they accused the Allied Governments of being capitalists and imperialists. But today they have changed their tune. They now say: "We will give you money", and this was very clever, because, should the Allies show any signs of treating with them they would immediately say their former accusation, that the Allies were capitalists, was true, and that the only thing they thought of was getting money out of Russia.

He would point out further that the Bolsheviks never keep their plighted word.

But this, M. Clemenceau observed, did not find any solution to the problem. The question presses, and a speedy solution is necessary. The situation is growing worse from day to day. He could not say that the Russians were not anxious to see an end to present chaotic conditions, but if left to themselves, this change would not come within a short time, and certainly would not come quickly enough for the

Allies, who were about to make peace, which would be an absurdity as long as half of Europe was in flames.

A conclusion must therefore be reached. If he were alone, and had the decision to make for himself only, he would do nothing. He would set up a form of barrage between himself and the Bolsheviki, and let Bolshevism work out itself. But he was not alone. He had to think of his Allies and as he had already pointed out, he thought it of the most vital importance that at the beginning of these conferences the Allies stand together. They must be unanimous, and as President Wilson's proposal had opened new vistas and a new perspective, he was prepared to associate himself with President Wilson's proposal.

He therefore suggested that it would be well to issue a short, clear, substantial paper in which it would be explained once and for all, that it is not the wish of the Allies to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia; that they do not desire to lend their help to any one faction, and that their one wish is to see the establishment of some representative government with whom they could deal. He asked President Wilson to draw up such a paper, and requested him to bear in mind that in such a statement the Allies were speaking also to the Germans. Let the announcement be made to all countries in Europe, and let them be invited to state what they want, and come to terms with each other.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE withdrew his proposal in favor of President Wilson's suggestion.

MR. BALFOUR wished to say that he thought that if anyone would refuse to accept such an invitation it would be the Bolsheviki.

BARON SONNINO begged to disagree, and stated that for his part he thought that the Bolsheviki would be the first to come. He recalled their anxiety to enter upon some discussion with the Germans, and their efforts at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to secure means by which they could sow their seeds of dissension in Germany. He also pointed out again that they did not know what faith meant, and that they would make certain pledges with the fixed intention of breaking them. He feared that the Allies were now about to play their game.

He therefore suggested that Sazonov should be heard as well as the representatives of the other factions opposing the Bolsheviki, that they should be told clearly that if they should unite and give assurances that they would not endeavor to bring about reaction, the return of the monarchy and the re-establishment of the land again as it was before the Revolution, they would then be assisted by the Allies to form a strong government.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked how this could be done. The only answer was by furnishing the arms, munitions and food, and it had been

shown that the Allies were not in a position to furnish these factions with military support. For his part, he thought it unwise to let any question of *amour propre* affect the question. Moreover, it was necessary to consider the attitude of the people of Great Britain and of the Dominions, if some solution were not quickly found. In speaking that morning with Sir Robert Gordon [*Borden*], he had learned that Canada was going to withdraw her troops from Vladivostok, because the Canadians refused to remain longer. The same applied to the American forces in Archangel. If Great Britain tried to send troops to Russia there would be a mutiny. As regards volunteers, a few might be obtained, but he would ask what contribution Italy would make. Would Italy be prepared to intervene? He did not think so. Moreover, he would call attention to the fact that the Bolshevik Army was improving, as had been pointed out that morning by Mr. Scavenius. Mr. Scavenius had stated that if the Allies waited a few months longer, the Bolsheviks would have some 300,000 men, forming a fairly effective force, and it would require some 500,000 men to oppose them.

In addition, who was going to pay for military intervention in Russia? The people of the Allies would not stand for it; he was certain that the people of Great Britain would not stand for it.

While President Wilson's proposal did not go as far as he had proposed, it did meet the objections to his proposal advanced by M. Clemenceau, and he hoped that it might receive the unanimous approval of those present.

SIGNOR ORLANDO remarked that it was unnecessary to repeat how grave the danger is for all Europe. When a new sickness develops the first act is to endeavor to isolate it. This, in a word, is the proposal advanced by M. Clemenceau, and it is well worth considering. He referred to the statement that had been made that Italy was subject to the Bolshevik disease. For his part, he did not believe that Bolshevism could become supreme in Italy, unless it found special conditions there. These conditions might be brought about by a depression of the morale of the people through one or two causes, either the disappointment following a failure to attain national aims, or an economic crisis. He asked that those present bear this statement in mind.

The second method of extinguishing the epidemic was to use material force, but there were many insurmountable objections to this. While it might be true that Italian troops could be sent to Russia, should they form a part of an international expedition, such an expedition would be a costly and long drawn out matter, as the forces would probably have to occupy permanently a large part of Russia. The only remaining solution would be what might be called the ideal solution or the use of moral forces. This is the proposal now under

consideration. It is not a question of treating with the Bolsheviki; it is a matter of offering them an opportunity along with others, to find some way out of the difficult situation existing in Russia.

For his part, he indorsed the proposal.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked for an expression of the views of the Japanese delegates.

BARON MAKINO stated that he had heard and carefully considered all points of view. Not only did he have no objection to make, but he thought it to be the only step that could be taken. He would, however, make one inquiry, and he would ask what would be the attitude of those present should the Bolsheviki still stick to the principles enunciated in their constitution. He thought it absolutely necessary to avoid any appearance of countenancing their point of view.

According to the latest information which had reached him, it might be said that the situation, as regards the spread of Bolshevism in Siberia east of Lake Bikac [*Baikal*], had improved. He thought that the object of the Allied military expedition into Siberia had been attained. Bolshevism might be latent, but it certainly is not aggressive.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he thought that the emissaries of the Great Powers who were to meet the representatives of the different Russian factions including the Bolsheviki, should not be authorized to take any position regarding Bolshevism, but should simply report back to the Conference what they found in the way of accommodations of views and possibilities of the representatives of the different factions in Russia reaching some understanding.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the emissaries should, nevertheless, endeavor to persuade the Russian representatives to agree to refer their differences to a constituent assembly.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the exact wishes of those present be incorporated in the instructions to be issued to their emissaries.

MR. BALFOUR thought it important to decide whether the abstention from hostile actions against surrounding nations should be made a condition precedent to the Conference idea.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he had already made a note of this, and in his draft would incorporate a statement to the effect that the troops of the different factions should refrain from aggressive action outside their own territory.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that it might also be desirable to incorporate in the draft statement, a reference to the fact that the whole of Russia is menaced by famine, and to point out that the Allies were humanitarian and would consider the question of furnishing supplies to Russia. He thought that it would be found that the Bolsheviki

would be anxious to listen, and that this would constitute an excellent point to start from.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed some doubt as to whether there is sufficient food to supply the countries of the Allies, if Russia were to be supplied also. Should prices go up in France and England due to an effort to furnish supplies to Russia, he thought that this would constitute a real danger. Moreover, Russia had always been an exporting, not an importing country, as far as food went, and he thought that there would be a sufficient supply obtained in the Ukraine.

It was agreed that President Wilson should draw up a statement and submit it for consideration the following morning at 11:00 o'clock.

II

THE CHAIRMAN thought it very desirable that the different delegations be put to work as soon as possible. He understood that President Wilson would submit the question of a League of Nations at the next meeting. If so, he suggested that it would be well to proceed to consider the question of reparation of damages.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that he agreed to this, and suggested that the question of the League of Nations be taken up at the next meeting, and that those present lay down the general principles, and then appoint an international committee to work on the constitution of the League. It would be desirable to follow this by the consideration of the question of indemnity and reparation which should also be referred to a committee, and the same with regard to international labor questions.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether Mr. Lloyd George contemplated a committee formed of delegates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE answered that he thought it would be desirable to have qualified persons on the committee. President Wilson then explained for the information of those present, how he had gone about drawing up a constitution. He stated that he had taken the Phillimore report,² and had asked Colonel House to re-write it.³ He had then re-written Colonel House's constitution to suit his own ideas.⁴ Subsequently he had studied the plans prepared by General Smuts and Lord Edward [Robert] Cecil,⁵ and then he had re-written the constitution once more.⁶ Finally he had a talk with Mr. Bourgeois, and he was glad to say that he had found his ideas in substantial

² Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. II, p. 3.

³ *Foreign Relations: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. I, p. 497.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 501.

⁵ For General Smuts' plan, see Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. II, p. 23; for Lord Cecil's memorandum, see Miller, *My Diary*, vol. III, p. 85.

⁶ Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. II, pp. 65-93.

accord with Mr. Bourgeois, General Smuts and Lord Edward [*Robert*] Cecil.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the President's draft be referred to the committee. President Wilson thought it well that the committee be formed of those men who had already studied the question. Mr. Lloyd George agreed to this, and as he would like to have both General Smuts and Lord Edward [*Robert*] Cecil on the committee, he suggested that the committee be composed of two persons appointed by each of the delegations of the Great Powers.

III

M. PICHON desired to remind those present of the questions raised in Mr. Paderewski's letter to Colonel House which had been read by President Wilson at the morning session. It was most desirable that an answer be sent as soon as possible.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that Marshal Foch had already suggested the sending of the Polish Legion with the French Army to Poland via Danzig. He proposed that Marshal Foch be requested to attend the next meeting, and that the Polish question be discussed at that time. His proposal was accepted.

IV

MR. BALFOUR referred to the fact that it seemed to be agreed that a committee should be formed to consider the League of Nations, the question of indemnity, and international labor questions, and stated that he would like to suggest a fourth, namely, disarmament, which was so closely related to the question of strategic frontier. He pointed out that if the League of Nations is to be practical, the delegates must make up their minds as soon as possible regarding the question of disarmament. It was most important in this connection, to come to some agreement as to what arms Germany was to be allowed to have. It is evident that a League of Nations would be a sham if there is no disarmament.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that those present compare their views on this matter before referring it to a committee.

**Procès-verbal of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council, Held
at M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, on Wednesday,
January 22, 1919, at 11 Hours**

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Colonel U. S. Grant.
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
Maj.-Gen. P. P. de B. Radcliffe, C. B.,
D. S. O.
Lt.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.
Mr. H. Norman.
Captain E. Abraham.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
Marshal Foch.
M. Pichon.
Gen. Weygand.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
Captain A. Portier.

ITALY

His Excellency M. Orlando.
His Excellency Baron Sonnino.
Count Aldrovandi.
Major A. Jones.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
His Excellency M. Matsui.
M. Saburi.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. CLEMENCEAU, in opening the meeting proposed that the plan suggested by Marshal Foch of sending Polish troops from France to Poland via Dantzig and Thorn should be discussed.

1. Policy in Poland

He had received a telegram that morning stating that the British Government had agreed to this operation.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he was without advice from his military counsellors. The proposal, as he understood it, was that the Polish troops now under French command should be shipped to Dantzig, and that to facilitate their arrival in Poland an Allied control of the railway from that port to Thorn should be established. He asked by whom this control would be exercised, and whether the object of the expedition was exclusively to protect the Poles against external enemies.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Marshal Foch would give the requisite explanation.

MARSHAL FOCH said that there were in France a number of Polish troops ready to start. One division was quite ready; another was forming; and a third was in an early stage of formation, but could

count on 20,000 men. He thought they would be ready to embark as soon as transport could be assembled to convey them to Dantzig.

M. ORLANDO asked whether Marshal Foch was taking into account the Poles in Italy.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that, taking these into account, there was a fourth possible division.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether Italy agreed to the incorporation of the Poles in that country.

M. ORLANDO said he agreed.

MARSHAL FOCH (resuming) said that the troops therefore existed. The next question was ships to take them to Dantzig. Thenceforward these troops must use the Dantzig-Thorn railway line. This line, according to the terms of the Armistice, was at our disposal. But the Poles said that the Germans would not allow them to land at Dantzig or to use the railway to Thorn. They therefore suggested that the line should be held by Allied troops.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch to state his own opinion as to whether the Germans would resist the passage of Polish forces, and to give an estimate of the strength of the resistance, should it take place.

MARSHAL FOCH said that, in his view, as long as the Polish programme remained as indeterminate as it now was, there would undoubtedly be German resistance. The Germans certainly intended to dispute the possession of Posen, and still more, of Dantzig. Possibly German consent to the passage of Polish troops might be obtained if the Poles agreed to a restricted programme. For instance, that these troops should only go to Russian Poland to defend it against the Bolsheviks, and that the Polish authorities should undertake not to occupy any debatable ground. The Germans had eighteen divisions near their eastern frontier. He therefore thought that the Polish army could only be safely sent to Poland under cover either of a definite policy which obtained consent of the Germans or of Allied troops in occupation of the railway. To occupy this line effectually two Allied divisions would be required.

In order to give a firmer basis to the contemplated operation, it would be necessary that all the Allied Missions in Poland should be reorganised. There was at present a British Military Mission under Colonel Wade attached to M. Paderewski at Posen; there was a French Mission under General Barthélemy at Lemberg; there were other Missions elsewhere. Their information and views varied. It was desirable to have a unified Mission to study in particular the means of landing forces and of conveying them to Poland.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the policy of uniting all the Missions in order to obtain their collective advice would involve delay. If it

were true that Poland was threatened by an imminent Bolshevik attack, this delay might be disastrous. He would like to know whether, in Marshal Foch's opinion, a Bolshevik attack was really to be feared.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he thought it was important to gather the scattered Missions into one, and to get the Poles to have a definite policy. Their actions at present were divergent and eccentric. They were facing the Bolsheviks on the east, invading Posen on the west, and Galicia in the south. Some of these actions were not in any way forced upon them. The result was that they were wasting their energies and would not be able to succeed anywhere.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired how much time would elapse, according to the Marshal's programme, before the Poles from the west landed in Poland.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that all his proposals could be carried out concurrently. The Missions could be unified; the Poles could be prevailed on to amend their policy; and the despatch of the troops could be prepared at the same time. If all these problems were tackled at once he thought the troops might begin to arrive in three weeks or a month.

MR. BALFOUR expressed the opinion that among the many difficulties the greatest would be to get the Poles to accept a restricted programme. He felt that this would have to be imposed upon them. The Poles were using the interval between the cessation of war and the decisions of the Peace Congress to make good their claims to districts outside Russian Poland, to which in many cases they had little right, although in others their claims were amply justified. To Posen, no doubt, they were entitled. The case of Dantzic was of peculiar difficulty. Eastern Galicia, according to all the information at his disposal, did not desire to be Polish. He suggested that the Polish representatives should be gathered here and told that they must limit their actions to the protection of indisputable Polish territory against invasion from without. The ultimate frontiers of Poland should be left to the Peace Congress. He proposed that M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Orlando should tell them, in the name of the Powers exactly what their line of conduct should be before the final decision. Meanwhile, the Polish forces in France could be organised, transport could be made ready in Great Britain, and the missions in Poland could be unified.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this policy raised many grave doubts in his mind. It would involve the Allies in very complicated matters. It was proposed not only to send Polish contingents from France, but also two Allied divisions to hold the railway against five German divisions. These Allied troops would be employed for a purpose

that might be highly offensive to the German Government, which would undoubtedly raise objections. These objections might have to be admitted. Dantzig must remain an open question, yet its occupation was suggested. With the object of sending Polish troops into Poland we were going to prejudge the whole Polish question. This question, moreover, should not, he thought, be isolated from all others. Many other questions resembled it. The Roumanians, for instance, were taking action of a similar kind. The Serbians also were behaving towards Montenegro in what appeared to him to be a questionable manner. The Hungarians also were trying to bring about a *fait accompli* before the termination of the Peace Congress. If we were to say to the Poles, "You must hold your hand," the same must be said to the rest. They must all be told that they prejudiced their case by premature action. If you had to take a thing by force, the inference was that it did not belong to you. It would not, therefore, be fair to segregate this case entirely. Further, it had previously been agreed upon in the case of Russia that, on condition all parties held their hand, the Allies would meet them. This alone would put an end to the threatened Bolshevik attack on Poland. M. Paderewski, in his letter, only suggested that the Allies should supply him with weapons. He said that he had at his disposal from 600,000 to 800,000 men ready to fight if they could obtain ammunition. If this were the case, why should the Allies do what the Poles could do for themselves? The question was whether, since the Armistice, the Allies had enough German rifles and ammunition to equip the Poles. These stores could be sent to them via the Dantzig-Thorn railway, the use of which was guaranteed by the Armistice.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had no objection to this proposal. He was unable to check M. Paderewski's estimate of his forces, but he thought it was fair to assume that they had not a high military value. The supplies for these troops must go by the Dantzig-Thorn route, the free use of which could not be guaranteed. We must be able to explain the purpose of these arms. Failing that, the Germans might stop them. Paderewski's programme was a vague one. He therefore suggested that the Allied Missions should get into touch with the Poles and arrange an agreement ensuring the passage of the supplies.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that M. Paderewski, in his letter, had undertaken not to surprise the Powers by a *fait accompli*, or attempt to obtain one in Dantzig.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had come to the meeting with certain views, but admitted that he was much shaken by the opinions expressed by President Wilson. His impression was that we did not know enough about the facts of the situation in Poland. Action undertaken

without further knowledge might lead to a mess. What Marshal Foch had said had great force, and was not inconsistent with the President's remarks. He could not see any great difference between conveying armed men and conveying arms over the Dantzic-Thorn railway. We could not expect the Germans to allow arms to go through if they were to equip a Polish army to attack them. This would be asking more than was laid down in the Armistice. Fairness was due even to the enemy. He was not prepared at the present moment to make any declaration concerning the rights to Posen, which the Poles were attempting to conquer by force, and thereby to prejudge what the Congress was assembled to do. He pointed out that, although the Roumanians were doing the same thing, they were not asking the Allies to assist them. The Poles, on the other hand, were asking for all kinds of help—transport, supplies, rifles, ammunition.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that M. Paderewski asked for this help specifically for defence against the Bolsheviks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that he had no doubt of the honourable character of M. Paderewski. But the Poles were not all united, and M. Paderewski was unlikely to maintain complete control of the situation. The arms might pass into other hands. He felt that the representatives of the Powers should see the Poles, or appoint a Committee to meet them in Paris.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that in sending Polish troops to Poland we should not only be sending armed men, but strong partisans on Polish questions. These were burning questions, and great caution should be exercised in dealing with them.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he wished again to draw attention to the danger that Poland might be suffocated before its birth. It had no bases, no outlets, no communications, no supplies, no army. The Poles were fighting the Bolsheviks who might be attacking them, the Ukrainians whom they chose to attack, and the Germans from whom they wished to wrest Posen. From a military point of view, the policy they were pursuing was likely to be fatal to them.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the British Government could not settle the question of sea transport without reference to London. He wished, however, to draw attention to the suggestions made by M. Paderewski that an International Commission should be sent to Warsaw to report to the Congress on conditions in Poland. The Military Missions already in Poland might be utilised as a nucleus, and additional representatives might be deputed by the Supreme War Council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he supported this proposal. He would suggest, however, that the Commission should not be entirely military, but that it should be fortified by a political element. There was an

ancient quarrel in Poland between the feudal elements and the peasants. We should not take sides in this contest blindly. Men of political experience should therefore be sent with the Commission to enquire into the matter.

BARON SONNINO said that the Commission should try and induce the Poles to confine their activities to resisting the Bolsheviks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, provided that under this pretence they did not attempt to push their conquest eastwards and face the Congress with the capture of Kovno or Grodno.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the names of the delegates should be brought forward at the meeting on the following day. He asked the Japanese Representatives whether they desired to send delegates to this Commission.

BARON MAKINO replied that the Japanese Government did not desire to do so.

(It was decided that two Commissions should be appointed by the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy.)

(It was further decided that the question of furnishing sea transport should be investigated in London, in case Marshal Foch's scheme were adopted.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 22, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, January 22, 1919, at 15 Hours 15

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Colonel U. S. Grant.
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.
Mr. E. Phipps.
Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
Captain A. Portier.

ITALY

His Excellency M. Orlando.
His Excellency Baron Sonnino.
Count Aldrovandi.
Major A. Jones.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
His Excellency M. Matsui.
M. Saburi.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

PRESIDENT WILSON read a draft proclamation which he had prepared for the consideration of his colleagues, in accordance with the decision reached at yesterday's meeting.

1. Situation in
Russia. Issue
of Proclamation
to Russian Groups

After a discussion the following text was adopted, to be publicly transmitted to parties invited:—

The single object the representatives of the associated Powers have had in mind in their discussions of the course they should pursue with regard to Russia has been to help the Russian people, not to hinder them, or to interfere in any manner with their right to settle their own affairs in their own way. They regard the Russian people as their friends not their enemies, and are willing to help them in any way they are willing to be helped. It is clear to them that the troubles and distresses of the Russian people will steadily increase, hunger and privation of every kind become more and more acute, more and more widespread, and more and more impossible to relieve, unless order is restored, and normal conditions of labour, trade and transportation once more created, and they are seeking some way in which to assist the Russian people to establish order.

They recognise the absolute right of the Russian people to direct their own affairs without dictation or direction of any kind from outside. They do not wish to exploit or make use of Russia in any way. They recognise the revolution without reservation, and will in no way, and in no circumstances, aid or give countenance to any attempt at a counter-revolution. It is not their wish or purpose

to favour or assist any one of those organized groups now contending for the leadership and guidance of Russia as against the others. Their sole and sincere purpose is to do what they can to bring Russia peace and an opportunity to find her way out of her present troubles.

The associated Powers are now united in the solemn and responsible work of establishing the peace of Europe and of the world, and they are keenly alive to the fact that Europe and the world cannot be at peace if Russia is not. They recognise and accept it as their duty, therefore, to serve Russia in this matter as generously, as unselfishly, as thoughtfully, as ungrudgingly as they would serve every other friend and ally. And they are ready to render this service in the way that is most acceptable to the Russian people.

In this spirit and with this purpose, they have taken the following action: They invite every organised group that is now exercising, or attempting to exercise, political authority or military control anywhere in Siberia, or within the boundaries of European Russia as they stood before the war just concluded (except in Finland) to send representatives, not exceeding three representatives for each group, to the Princes Islands, Sea of Marmora, where they will be met by representatives of the associated Powers, provided, in the meantime, there is a truce of arms amongst the parties invited, and that all armed forces anywhere sent or directed against any people or territory outside the boundaries of European Russia as they stood before the war, or against Finland, or against any people or territory whose autonomous action is in contemplation in the fourteen articles upon which the present arrangements are based, shall be meanwhile withdrawn, and aggressive military action cease. These representatives are invited to confer with the representatives of the Associated Powers in the freest and frankest way, with a view to ascertaining the wishes of all sections of the Russian people, and bringing about, if possible, some understanding and agreement by which Russia may work out her own purposes and happy co-operative relations be established between her people and the other peoples of the world.

A prompt reply to this invitation is requested. Every facility for the journey of the representatives, including transport across the Black Sea, will be given by the Allies, and all the parties concerned are expected to give the same facilities. The representative[s] will be expected at the place appointed by the 15th February, 1919.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE read a draft of preliminary resolutions for a League of Nations. This document was intended primarily for the guidance of a special Committee to be appointed to draw up the constitution of the

2. League of Nations

League of Nations.

After a discussion, the following text was adopted:—

The Conference having considered the proposals for the creation of a League of Nations, resolves that:

- (a) It is essential to the maintenance of the world settlement, which the associated nations are now met to establish, that a League of Nations be created to promote international co-opera-

tion, to ensure the fulfilment of accepted international obligations, and to provide safeguards against war.

(b) This League should be created as an integral part of the general treaty of peace, and should be open to every civilised nation which can be relied on to promote it.

(c) The members of the League should meet for international Conference, and should have a permanent organisation and secretariat to carry on the business of the League in the intervals between the Conferences.

The Conference therefore appoints a Committee representative of the associated Governments to work out the details of the constitution and functions of the League.

BARON MAKINO wished to explain the position of Japan in connection with the subject of the League of Nations. In the first place, his country was sincerely desirous of co-operating with the Great Powers in this work of great importance, which had for its object the future welfare of mankind, but on account of the great distance and the lack of sufficient preparation, he was not prepared to bind his Government to the above resolutions or to any other definite action until he had received the instructions of his Government. As the work was of such very great importance his Government expected to have the opportunity of studying and understanding the duties and obligations of the new organisation before accepting it. If the work of the Committee was to be preparatory, and opportunity for further scrutiny was to be accorded to his Government, his work would be greatly facilitated. He did not wish to introduce any discordant note, but he simply desired to make matters quite clear. As regards the principles of the League of Nations, he noticed that in clause (b) of the preliminary resolutions, the stipulation was made that the League was to be treated as an integral part of the general treaty of peace. He wished to make it quite clear that his observations applied to that point as well.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether Baron Makino had any objection to his observations being published.

BARON MAKINO replied that he would ask that his observations be kept confidential.

PRESIDENT WILSON invited attention to the fact that these preliminary resolutions contained nothing new. The League of Nations had been accepted by the Supreme War Council as a basis for the armistice and for the peace treaty. He wished therefore to enquire whether Japan had not been represented on that Council.

M. MATSU stated that he had participated in the meetings of the Supreme War Council: but the fourteen points had not then been discussed.

PRESIDENT WILSON, continuing, said that at any rate the Supreme War Council had accepted the League of Nations as a basis for the armistice. Therefore he would like to enquire from Baron Makino whether he wished it to be understood that his Government reserved its decision with regard to the basis already accepted by the other Governments.

BARON MAKINO replied that his Government had given a general assent to the agreements reached up to the time of the signing of the armistice, but they made reservations as to future detailed developments.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the interpretation to be given to Baron Makino's statement was that Japan did not wish to be represented, even without prejudice, on the Committee to be appointed.

BARON MAKINO replied that, on the contrary, he wished to be represented on that Committee.

(It was agreed to adopt the text of preliminary resolutions for a League of Nations given above, the reservations made by Japan being duly noted.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that each of the Great Powers should appoint two representatives to form a drafting Committee, and that the Great Powers should in addition nominate two or more delegates to represent the whole of the small Powers. A plenary Conference should be summoned, so that these proposals could be laid before it. The names of the representatives of the small Powers nominated by the Great Powers would also be communicated.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had an amendment to propose. He thought the initial draft should first be drawn up by the delegates of the Great Powers alone. On completion of their report it would be submitted to a larger Committee, on which all the small Powers would be represented. That is to say, the small Powers would not form part of the drafting Committee, but of a criticising Committee, which would follow.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the League of Nations, however important it might be to the Great Powers, must be even more important to the small Powers, since, if efficacious, it would constitute their shield and protection. For this reason he thought the latter should be represented on the drafting Committee. Still, he saw the force of the objection made by President Wilson. He would therefore propose that the Great Powers should nominate their representatives to form a Committee, which would be authorised to add to their numbers representatives of the small Powers.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he would rather see a more elastic arrangement. He thought the opinion of the most thoughtful and

experienced men of the small Powers should be sought. He had expected that their Committee of ten would call in men like M. Venisselos from time to time, and put to them those features of the scheme that were most likely to affect the small Powers. In this way a considerable number of the representatives of the small Powers would from time to time be consulted as friends and advisers. Advice drawn from men who did not form part of the drafting Committee would be better than that given by men who could put in a caveat. In this way be thought they would avoid the difficulty of seeming to pick out representatives among people who were anxious to appoint their own representatives.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was his most earnest desire that the work of the small Powers should, as far as possible, be linked up with that of the Great Powers. In his opinion it was very important that this should be done to please the public; otherwise it would be said that they had agreed to publicity and yet worked in private. He agreed to the proposal that the Great Powers should nominate ten representatives, but he would leave it to the small Powers to nominate their five representatives. He was firmly convinced that on these Committees the small Powers would merely follow the lead of the Great Powers, but it was necessary to give them the idea that they were being consulted. He was anxious to call them together and to ask them to select five representatives to act on this Committee.

M. SONNINO enquired whether both neutrals and belligerents were included amongst the small Powers.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that at present the belligerent Powers alone should be summoned.

MR. BALFOUR thought that if an attempt were made to hold an election at a full Conference, serious trouble might arise. They had no apparatus for voting.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not think it would be necessary for the small Powers to vote. They should merely be asked to meet anywhere they liked and select five representatives.

M. SONNINO thought that if they gave the small belligerent Powers five delegates, they would find themselves in a great difficulty, because each of the more important small Powers—Belgium, Serbia, Roumania, Greece, Portugal—would want to be represented. He thought it would be more practicable if the delegates appointed by the Great Powers received a mandate to make proposals, a large number of the representatives of the small Powers being called in subsequently to consider the same.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that it would be impossible for so large a Committee to draft any instrument. But, as soon as some sort of a draft had been prepared, it should be shown to as many of the

representatives of the small Powers as possible, and their impressions and opinions taken. This procedure would greatly shorten the process of drafting. A public man, who had not previously made a careful study of the question, would necessarily require to see the proposals in a concrete form before expressing an opinion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the procedure now suggested would not bring in the small Powers, who were beginning to complain bitterly at their exclusion. They were here in Paris, and they were doing nothing. They felt they were locked out, and they ought to be brought into the making of the peace. He thought there would be no difficulty in including a certain number of the representatives of the small Powers on the Committee to be formed, because there was a draft ready. This draft had been thought out very carefully. He favoured a process of a select Committee, without reporters, to go through the draft, and to make the necessary amendments. On such a Committee a large number of representatives could be included. He thought that was very important. It was immaterial whether they asked the smaller Powers themselves to select their five representatives or whether the representatives were nominated by the Great Powers. He would propose, therefore, that they should in the first place meet all the Powers at a full Conference in order to ask them to accept the principles set forth in the resolutions for a League of Nations. The Conference would then be informed that the Great Powers had selected their delegates, and the small Powers would be asked to meet together and select their delegates.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that at a previous meeting it had been agreed that there should be no voting. Was an exception to be made in this case? This would be setting a precedent which should be seriously considered.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that the delegations would not be asked to vote. The small Powers would only be entitled to record their dissent. The Great Powers need merely say that they would take note of any suggestions or dissent and consider it later. The Great Powers must reserve the great decisions to themselves.

M. CLEMENCEAU, summing up, said that he understood the sense of the meeting to be that the above resolutions should be submitted for discussion to a full Peace Conference to meet on Saturday. The small Powers would then be invited to meet separately and to select five delegates to be added to the ten representatives of the Great Powers. The text of the preliminary resolutions for a League of Nations would not be communicated to the Press before the meeting on Saturday next, but it would be circulated forthwith to the various delegations.

As regards the selection of the delegates to be nominated by the small Powers, it was understood that the principle of one nation, one vote, would apply.

(It was agreed that the above resolutions should be submitted for discussion to a full Peace Conference to meet on Saturday afternoon, the 25th January, 1919. The small Powers would then be invited to meet separately and to select five delegates to be added to the ten representatives of the Great Powers. The text of the preliminary resolutions for a League of Nations would not be communicated to the Press before the meeting on Saturday next; but it would be circulated forthwith to the various delegations.)

3. Labour Legislation

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed the following resolution:—

“That a Commission composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers, and five representatives to be elected by the smaller Powers, be appointed to consider the establishment of a permanent organisation for concerting joint legislation in regard to industrial and labour questions between the States.”

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether it was contemplated that the acceptance of the recommendations of that Committee would involve something being put in the peace treaty. He thought that a proposal of this kind was pertinent to the League of Nations, and the agreement reached should not be included in the peace treaty. He enquired whether it would not be better to redraft the resolution in order to make this point quite clear.

(This suggestion was accepted, and Mr. Lloyd George agreed to prepare a fresh draft, embodying this point, for discussion at the next meeting.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that a Commission be appointed, with three representatives apiece for each of the five Great Powers and

4. Reparations

Belgium and Serbia, to examine and report on the question of the amount of the sum for reparation and indemnity which the enemy countries should pay or are capable of paying, and the form in which payment should be made.

PRESIDENT WILSON proposed that the word “indemnity” should be omitted. He thought the word “reparation” would meet the case. Bodies of working people all over the world had protested against indemnities, and he thought the expression “reparations” would be sufficiently inclusive.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE accepted the proposal, provided the word “reparations” was taken in its widest terms.

(This proposal was accepted.)

M. PICHON drew attention to the fact that Greece had been given no representation.

MR. BALFOUR said that Russian Poland had suffered more than any country, and almost as badly as Belgium.

M. SONNINO also mentioned Roumania.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the small Powers should be invited to select five delegates.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that Belgium, Serbia, Greece and Roumania might be given two representatives apiece.

M. PICHON said that Poland had two representatives at the Peace Conference, and should also be included.

(It was agreed that a new draft should be prepared by Mr. Lloyd George and submitted for consideration at the next meeting.)

(The meeting then adjourned, to meet again at 10 hours 30 the next day.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, January 22, 1919.

**Notes on Conversations Held in the Office of M. Pichon at the
Quai d'Orsay, at 11 a. m., January 22, 1919**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :	President Wilson Mr. Lansing Mr. Frazier Mr. Harrison Col. Grant
BRITISH EMPIRE :	Mr. Lloyd George Mr. Balfour Lt. Col. Hankey Mr. Norman Capt. Abraham
FRANCE :	M. Clemenceau M. Pichon M. Dutasta M. Berthelot
ITALY :	Prince de Beaun Baron Sonnino Count Aldrovandi Cattaneo Jones
JAPAN :	Baron Makino M. Matsui

Interpreter: M. Mantoux.

I

At the invitation of the Chairman, Marshal Foch, his aide, General Weygand, and General Radcliffe attended the meeting.

MARSHAL FOCH presented his view that the Polish divisions with the French and Italian Armies should be sent to Poland for the purpose of stiffening Polish resistance against the Bolsheviki. It would be necessary, he said, for those divisions to disembark at Danzig, and to proceed to Warsaw via the Danzig-Thorn Railroad. He pointed out that the Poles, claiming that the Germans would prevent this, had requested that the railroad line should be occupied by Allied troops, which might be done under the terms of the Armistice.

Marshal Foch agreed that the Germans would oppose the transportation of Polish troops across their territory to Poland, unless the Polish question were settled and a precise program imposed on the Poles. They might be required to agree that these troops be used only in Russian-Poland, and not used to seize German territory in advance of the decisions of the Peace Conference. Under the circum-

stances, he did not think that these troops could be sent to Poland unless: First, a limited political program were imposed on the Poles and accepted by the Germans; and Second, the railway line be held by Allied troops. He thought this could be done with two divisions. The Germans had eighteen divisions in that territory.

The Marshal further thought it would be necessary to re-organize various Allied missions now in Poland. At the present time the Allies are receiving different information and diverse views. The Allies should have the benefit of the opinion of a unified mission as to the necessity of sending troops to Poland.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the unification of the Allied missions might take time, and he doubted whether the Allies could afford to delay in this matter, if it be true that the Bolsheviki attack against Warsaw is imminent. He pointed out also that there would be considerable difficulty in getting a restricted program accepted by the Poles, who seemed to be determined to take the present opportunity not only to secure Poland, but to make good their claims on districts outside Russian-Poland, especially in Eastern Galicia, Posen and Danzig.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that the Marshal's proposal aroused many doubts in his mind. Should the proposal be accepted, the Allies would, he thought, be involved in an extraordinary step, because they were now at this stage, for a purpose of a different kind, about to decide one of the most difficult questions that had come before the Peace Conference. The Allies would, in fact, be isolating the Polish question from others which were much the same, namely, the Roumanian question, the Serbian question in Montenegro, and the Hungarian question. If we impose a restricted program on Poland, why would it not be wise to do the same to the others?

President Wilson called attention also to the fact that all that Mr. Paderewski had asked for in his letter to Colonel House was to be supplied with German rifles and ammunition with which to equip the 800,000 men he said he had available.

The President asked Marshal Foch whether the Allies possessed a sufficient number of rifles and ammunition to supply these unarmed Poles.

MARSHAL FOCH had nothing to say against the suggestion, but he doubted whether Paderewski's forces were of much value. Moreover, it really depended upon the Germans whether the arms and ammunition would be permitted to reach the Poles. It was clear that the Germans would object, unless the Allies were in a position to state the exact object for which such armament would be used. He referred again to the desirability of uniting the missions in Poland and obtaining from them precise information on the situation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated he was somewhat shaken by President Wilson's argument, of which he saw the force, and he agreed that it would be well first to find out exactly what is going on in Poland before sending any troops.

MARSHAL FOCH insisted that the Polish situation is bad from a military standpoint, and observed that by the policy Poland is now pursuing, she is running the risk of being killed before she is born.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that Paderewski's proposal to Colonel House, that the Allies send a mission to Warsaw, be accepted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE supported this proposal, but thought that the mission should not be purely military, but should have civilians on it, as there would be an important political side to the mission.

BARON SONNINO understood that the mission would propose to the Poles that they defend themselves against the Bolsheviki, and that they do not extend their boundaries.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Japan desired to have representatives on the mission.

BARON MAKINO replied in the negative.

MR. BALFOUR proposed that the United States, England, France and Italy each appoint two representatives, one military and one civilian, and that the mission proceed with its work as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the British Government would study the question of transportation.

Marshal Foch and his aides then withdrew.

II

PRESIDENT WILSON read a draft of a statement prepared by him to be issued to the warring factions in Russia.

It was decided to have the statement translated and considered at the afternoon session.

I

THE CHAIRMAN opened the afternoon session at 3:00 p. m.

The President's draft statement was carefully considered, amended in one or two particulars, and accepted by all.

(Copy of the statement is attached hereto.)¹

II

MR. LLOYD GEORGE read certain resolutions regarding the League of Nations, and they were accepted with certain amendments proposed by President Wilson. (Copies attached.)²

¹ *Post*, p. 691.

² *Post*, p. 692.

BARON MAKINO requested permission to make a statement in regard to the subject of the League of Nations. He desired to point out Japan's position in this matter. He explained that it was better that he should state this before the proceedings should take a definite form. In the first place, he desired to say that Japan was sincerely desirous of co-operating with the Great Powers in this work, having for its object the future welfare of mankind. However, on account of the great distance and lack of preparation on the part of Japan, he could not give a definite opinion on the binding principles of the League of Nations, without first receiving instructions from his Government. For his part, and he might say also for that of his Government, he expected to have an opportunity to study and understand the new organizations. If, therefore, the underlying principles should go to the committee, not signifying definite settlement, and leave an opportunity and occasion to express final opinions on the part of his Government, this would be acceptable.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that Mr. Lloyd George's proposal included nothing that was not in contemplation when the Peace Conference was called, and that the principles of the League of Nations had been accepted at the time the Armistice was made. He therefore asked whether Baron Makino wished it to be understood that the Japanese Government reserved its decision with regard to the bases which other powers had already accepted.

BARON MAKINO thought that the present proposal was much more concrete.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the Japanese Government wished to be represented on the committee.

BARON MAKINO stated that it did.

The proposal was agreed to by all, and adopted with the reserve stated by Baron Makino.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the Committee consist of two representatives to be appointed by each of the five Great Powers, and two to be nominated by the Great Powers to represent the small powers. He thought it desirable to proceed to name these two and then submit these names to the approval of the small powers at the next plenary session of the Conference, which might be called immediately.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that as a practical matter he would suggest that an initial draft for the League of Nations be made by a commission appointed by the Great Powers. This draft could then be submitted to a larger commission on which all the small powers would be represented. In a word, the drafting would be done by the Great Powers, and the result submitted to the criticism of the small powers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that inasmuch as the League of Nations is to be, in fact, a sort of shield of the small powers, they should be represented on the drafting committee. Perhaps it might be better to have the Great Powers nominate their own representatives, and also name the small powers who should likewise have representatives on the commission.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated he would prefer to see a more elastic arrangement, and thought it most desirable that the opinion of the thoughtful men representing the small powers should be sought. Would it not be well to have the commission of ten to be appointed by the Great Powers authorized to call in any one they choose, and discuss with representatives of the small powers those features of the scheme most likely to affect the latter? Moreover, they need not confine themselves to a few. It seemed to him that it was most advisable to proceed in this way. Much more would be gotten out of the small powers, if they were called in as friends and advisors. Furthermore, in that way, the Great Powers would avoid the difficulty of seeming to pick out men whom the small powers should themselves choose.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the work was as much for the Great Powers as it was for the small powers. He thought it most desirable that the great and small powers should get together, and that their work should be intimately connected. It was important to let the public feel that their work was connected. He suggested that the Great Powers name two representatives apiece and the small powers name five. He thought they would be only too glad to follow the advice of the representatives of the Great Powers. He proposed that the Bureau ask the small powers to get together and name five. The responsibility would then be theirs. He spoke, of course, of belligerents only, and not of neutrals. He was most anxious the work should begin as soon as possible, and he hoped the commission would be appointed at once.

MR. BALFOUR feared the bureau would get into great trouble if the small powers were asked to vote on the question at the Great Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that his intention was not to ask them to vote at the Conference, but to ask them to get together and name five representatives.

BARON SONNINO thought there might be some difficulty attending the proposal to ask the small powers to name but five representatives. For instance, Belgium, Serbia, Roumania, Greece and Portugal would each desire to name at least one representative on the committee, and there might be others also. This mode of procedure

would place the small powers in a difficult position. It would be more practical, he believed, if the ten representatives appointed by the Great Powers should form the committee, receive a mandate to make proposals, and then invite the representatives of all the smaller powers to discuss these proposals with them.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that it was impossible to draft an instrument on a large committee. It would be far more practical to appoint a manageable drafting committee, letting this small committee of a few men prepare and submit a draft to the others, and obtain their impressions and opinions.

MR. BALFOUR understood it was intended that the committee should from time to time consult the members of the Great Powers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it well to remember that the small powers were becoming very restive, and felt they had been locked out, so to speak. Why not let President Wilson prepare a draft for immediate consideration by the commission? He did not think it would be impossible to have a commission of fifteen representatives. As to the fear that the assignment of only five to represent all the small powers might cause some embarrassment to their delegates, he saw no reason why the matter should not be put up to them, letting them discuss and fight over the question of who should represent them.

M. CLEMENCEAU repeated that he thought it most necessary that the Great Powers should make the Conference feel that they wanted the smaller powers, and ask all to come in with them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that it was therefore understood that a plenary conference was to be called to pass upon the principles set forth in the resolution they had just adopted.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that it had been agreed that there would be no vote. Was it now the suggestion to ask them to vote?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE explained that they would simply be asked to record their objections.

BARON SONNINO inquired what would be done should the representatives of the small powers ask permission to name ten representatives.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought the Chairman might say that the Bureau would consider it. His view was that the Great Powers should always reserve the important decisions for themselves.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether the resolution was to be given out in the Official Communiqué, to be issued at the close of the meeting.

MR. BALFOUR suggested it be stated that the League of Nations had been discussed at the meeting and that it was proposed to bring the matter before the next meeting of the Great Conference.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether it would not be desirable to inform the small powers of the decisions of those present, in advance of publicity. Why not inform them that this resolution had been adopted by the Great Powers, and would be submitted for discussion at the Great Conference Saturday next?

MR. BALFOUR suggested that perhaps the small powers might prefer to have the resolution sent them in private.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that they were about to create a precedent, and that it seemed to him that it would be well to decide on a consistent course to be pursued on all occasions.

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed, therefore, that a plenary session of the Conference be called for Saturday next, January 25th; that the resolution containing the principles for the League of Nations be submitted thereat for discussion, and that the small powers be invited to appoint their five delegates. It was suggested that the text of the resolution be not published until Saturday, and that, in the meanwhile, copies be sent to the representatives of the smaller powers for their confidential information.

III

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed the appointment of a similar commission to consider the question of reparation and indemnity.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested it might be well to omit the word "indemnity".

BARON SONNINO suggested the substitution of "reparation and restitution".

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated he was quite prepared to accept the one word "reparation", provided it was understood that this included "restitution". He proposed, therefore, that a commission consisting of three representatives apiece for the Great Powers, and two representatives apiece for Belgium and Serbia, be named to examine and report on the amount of the sum that should be paid by Germany, the amount of the sum that Germany is capable of paying, and the form which the payment should take.

M. PICHON observed that Greece would certainly wish to be represented on such a commission.

MR. BALFOUR thought that Russian-Poland would also desire to be represented.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that, under the circumstances, it would seem desirable to assign two delegates apiece for Belgium, Serbia, Greece, Roumania and Poland.

[Annex 1]

*Statement Drafted by President Wilson to be Issued to the Warring
Factions in Russia*

The single object the representatives of the associated powers have had in mind in their discussions of the course they should pursue with regard to Russia has been to help the Russian people, not to hinder them, or to interfere, in any manner, with their right to settle their own affairs in their own way. They regard the Russian people as their friends, not their enemies, and are willing to help them in any way they are willing to be helped. It is clear to them that the troubles and distresses of the Russian people will steadily increase, hunger and privation of every kind become more and more acute, more and more widespread, and more and more impossible to relieve, unless order is restored, and normal conditions of labour, trade, and transportation once more created, and they are seeking some way in which to assist the Russian people to establish order.

They recognize the absolute right of the Russian people to direct their own affairs without dictation or direction of any kind from outside. They do not wish to exploit, or make use of Russia in any way. They recognize the revolution without reservation, and will, in no way, and in no circumstances, aid or give countenance to any attempt at a counter-revolution. It is not their wish or purpose to favor or assist any one of the organized groups now contending for the leadership and guidance of Russia as against the others. Their sole and sincere purpose is to do what they can to bring Russia peace, and an opportunity to find her way out of her present troubles.

The associated powers are now engaged in the solemn and responsible work of establishing the peace of Europe, and of the world, and they are keenly alive to the fact that Europe and the world cannot be at peace if Russia is not. They recognize and accept it as their duty, therefore, to serve Russia in this great matter as generously, as unselfishly, as thoughtfully, and ungrudgingly as they would serve every other friend and ally. And they are ready to render this service in the way that is most acceptable to the Russian people.

In this spirit and with this purpose, they have taken the following action: They invite every organized group that is now exercising or attempting to exercise political authority or military control anywhere in Siberia, or within the boundaries of European Russia as they stood before the war just concluded (except in Finland) to send representatives, not exceeding three representatives for each group, to the Prince's Islands, Sea of Marmora, where they will be

met by representatives of the associated powers provided, in the meantime there is a truce of arms amongst the parties invited, and that all armed forces anywhere sent or directed against any people or territory outside the boundaries of European Russia as they stood before the war, or against Finland, or against any people or territory whose autonomous action is in contemplation in the fourteen articles upon which the present peace negotiations are based, shall be meanwhile withdrawn, and aggressive military action cease. These representatives are invited to confer with the representatives of the associated powers in the freest and frankest way, with a view to ascertaining the wishes of all sections of the Russian people, and bringing about, if possible, some understanding and agreement by which Russia may work out her own purposes and happy co-operative relations be established between her people and the other peoples of the world.

A prompt reply to this invitation is requested. Every facility for the journey of the representatives, including transport across the Black Sea, will be given by the Allies, and all parties concerned are expected to give the same facilities. The representatives will be expected at the place appointed by the fifteenth of February, 1919.

[Annex 2]

Draft Preliminary Resolutions for a League of Nations

The Conference having considered the proposals for the creation of a League of Nations, resolves that:

(a) It is essential to the maintenance of the world settlement, which the Associated Nations are now met to establish, that a League of Nations be created to promote international co-operation to ensure the fulfillment of accepted international obligations, and to provide safeguards against war.

(b) This League should be created as an integral part of the general treaty of peace, and should be open to every civilized nation which can be relied on to promote its objects.

(c) The members of the League should periodically meet in international conference, and should have a permanent organization and secretariat to carry on the business of the League in the intervals between the Conferences.

The Conference therefore appoints a Committee representative of the Associated Governments to work out the details of the constitution and functions of the League.

PARIS, January 15, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay on Thursday, January 23, 1919, at 10:30 O'clock a. m.

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Colonel U. S. Grant.
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt Hon. D. Lloyd George.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
Lt-Col Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.
Captain E. Abraham
Mr. C. J. B. Hurst

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. Fromageot
Captain A. Portier.

ITALY

H. E. M. Orlando.
H. E. Baron Sonnino.
Count Aldrovandi.
Major A. Jones.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
H. E. M. Matsui.
M. Saburi.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. **M. CLEMENCEAU**, in opening the meeting, asked whether the Representatives had nominated their Commissioners to proceed to Poland.

Commission
for Poland

PRESIDENT WILSON said on behalf of the United States that General Kernan and Mr. Lord would be the American delegates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, on behalf of Great Britain, agreed to nominate the British delegates in the afternoon.

M. CLEMENCEAU, on behalf of France, nominated General Niessel and M. Velten.

M. ORLANDO said that he would nominate the Italian delegates in the afternoon.

2. **M. CLEMENCEAU** said that he had nominated, as the French delegates to proceed to Prince's Island, M. Conti and General Rampont.

Commission for
the Russian
Conference

BARON MAKINO said that he would nominate delegates on behalf of Japan and would furnish the names as soon as possible.

The other Powers agreed to supply the names of their nominees in the afternoon.

3. The following names were given:—

Commission for the 7 Nations	France.	M. Léon Bourgeois. M. Larnaude.
	United States.	President Wilson. Colonel House.
	Great Britain.	Lord Robert Cecil. General Smuts.
	Italy.	Senator Scialoja. M. Ricci-Busatti.
	Japan.	Viscount Chinda. M. Otchiai.

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said the next subject to be dealt with was that of the reduction of armaments, concerning which a draft had been proposed by Mr. Lloyd George. (See Appendix "A".)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the draft contained two distinct proposals. The first dealt with the immediate situation. A decision on this point was, for Great Britain, a matter of very grave moment. Unless the enemy's forces were immediately reduced, the British Government might be forced to maintain compulsory service. He did not know what might be the political result of such a decision. In another month's time, the renewal of the Armistice would be considered. He felt that at that time we should demand a drastic reduction of the armed forces of Germany to a fixed quatum, such as might suffice to maintain internal order. It would also be necessary to place a limit on the armaments and munitions available for these forces; the surplus could be placed under Allied guard. If the Germans maintained armaments and munitions sufficient for an army of two or three million men, their demobilization would be impossible. He was informed by the British War Office that to fulfil Marshal Foch's requirements, a British Army of 1,500,000 men must be kept with the colours. This was a very serious demand which would not be readily accepted by the country. He would, therefore, urge that the first clause in the draft be proceeded with at once. The second could be reserved for a future date.

PRESIDENT WILSON, commenting on the terms of the draft, suggested the elimination of the words "and drastic", as conveying the impression of a threat.

M. SONNINO suggested, as an alternative, the words "prompt reduction."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the text was not intended for communication to the enemy but only as a guidance to the Allied Commission that was to be set up to consider it. What he wished to convey to the Committee was that the enemy's forces should be

reduced to the minimum necessary for the maintenance of internal order.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether this could be done without consultation with the Germans and whether it ought not to be taken up by the Armistice Commission, so as to give the Germans a chance to state the numbers they actually needed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, if there was no objection he would propose to summon Marshal Foch.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would not be able to accept Marshal Foch's opinion unsupported by British military experts on subject of such political moment to Great Britain. Marshal Foch had forwarded a demand for British troops which it would be extremely difficult for the country to honour. It was for this reason that he had suggested as an alternative to increasing the Allied forces the reduction of the enemy's troops. It would be necessary for British members to be present on the Committee when dealing with this subject.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had no objection whatever to the presence of British, American or other representatives on the Commission. He fully understood the reasons which prompted Mr. Lloyd George's remarks. The question, however, was more difficult to solve than might appear. He, himself, had been asked in the Chamber of Deputies why Marshal Foch had not included in the Armistice an article requiring the demobilization of the German Army. Marshal Foch had explained that he had made no provision for this, as he did not wish to put any clause in the Armistice, the execution of which he would be unable to control.

5. The situation in Germany had grown worse during the last few days. He had brought telegrams with him which he proposed to show to the Meeting. It appeared that, since the defeat of the Spartacus party, German officers were resuming their arrogant attitude and were considerably harder to deal with than before. Moreover, German troops were being massed against the Poles. The "Frankfurt Gazette" made mention of a large concentration on the Eastern frontier. He was very much afraid that the Poles might be so imprudent as to attack the Germans, and, in connection with the Allied Mission that was going to Poland, he had intended to suggest that it be instructed to forbid the Poles from engaging in any such adventure. The Allies would always be considered the supporters of Poland and they could not at the same time support the Poles in attacking Germany and ask the Germans to disarm.

**Present Situation
in Germany**

6. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had felt bound to give notice to the Allied and Associated Governments that he was not able to undertake to maintain the forces demanded by Marshal Foch.

Maintenance of
Allied Troops on
the Western Front

M. ORLANDO said that he would like to raise a point of procedure. He fully understood Mr. Lloyd George's reasons. He also understood M. Clemenceau's anxiety. He wished to suggest that the question of immediate reduction of the enemy's forces was not a Peace Conference but an Armistice matter. The question of form often had a close relation to substance. He thought that we could obtain prompt demobilisation of the German armies more effectually by dealing with it as a condition of the renewal of the Armistice through the agency of Marshal Foch and the Allied Military Advisers, than by treating it as a question for the Peace Conference. He thought it would be a mistake to consult on a question of this kind all the Small Powers collected at the Peace Conference, which had no concern with the military commitments on the Western Front.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he also fully understood Mr. Lloyd George's point. Mr. Lloyd George had been bound to make it, but the military front must be maintained. He was not aware of the demands addressed by Marshal Foch to the British Government. He would therefore suggest that a British, a French, an American and an Italian General should meet and report to the meeting what military forces it was necessary for the Allies to maintain.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had thought the question was still under discussion. He also was deeply interested in the question of maintaining American troops in Europe. What [*When*] he had last met Marshal Foch, final figures had not been given him, but only approximations. He had therefore concluded that the matter was still being considered. He thought that this was a question for the Supreme War Council and suggested that the Military Advisors should be heard on the subject.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that on the following day the British Secretary of State for War would be in Paris and could be present at the Meeting.

M. ORLANDO said that General Diaz would also be present.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that a Meeting of the Supreme War Council would take place at 10 hrs. 30 in M. Pichon's room on the following day.

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch and the Military Experts of the Governments of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy be invited to advise the Supreme War Council on

the following day as to the size of the armies to be maintained by the Allied and Associated Powers on the Western Front, and more particularly as to the possibility of an immediate and drastic reduction in the armed forces of the enemy.)

7. M. CLEMENCEAU read a draft resolution proposed by Mr. Lloyd George. (See Appendix "B")

International
Legislation on
Industrial and
Labour Questions

M. ORLANDO asked if this text would be submitted to voting in the full Conference on Saturday.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it would be discussed but not voted on. There was to be no voting in the Conference. It would be included in the Agenda for Saturday.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that for the word "joint" in the eight[h] line, the word "common" should be substituted. Joint action would rarely be possible.

(This amendment was accepted)

MR. LANSING proposed certain other alterations in the draft and the following final text was adopted:—

That a Commission composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers, and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers represented at the Peace Conference be appointed to enquire into the conditions of employment from the international aspect, and to consider the international means necessary to secure common action on matters affecting conditions of employment and to recommend the form of a permanent agency to continue such enquiry in co-operation with and under the direction of the League of Nations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would like to have the opinion of the Conference concerning the kind of delegates that should be appointed to this Commission. As there were to be only two, he asked whether it would not be desirable that one should be an employer, and the other a representative of the working classes. In the alternative, one could be an official. He thought it desirable that the representatives of all the Powers should have the same character.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that uniformity might not be feasible. For instance, American officials might not be easy to obtain.

M. SONNINO pointed out that as the smaller Powers among them only found 5 delegates, the same composition could not apply to their membership.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that an American employer might be hard to get.

MR. BALFOUR said that the countries in which conditions of employment were bad were the only countries that need feel much anxiety about their representation on this Commission. America, for instance, where conditions of employment were exceptionally

good, need feel no anxiety on this score. There might be countries, however, in which the impression would be formed that they could only compete with such favoured countries as the United States or Canada by keeping down wages. Those countries must have an employer among their representatives, otherwise the 'anti' views of labour in those countries would think that wages were being raised in order to render competition with their rivals in other countries impossible. It is therefore, in his opinion, unnecessary to insist on an identical form of representation for all.

BARON MAKINO said that he entirely agreed with Mr. Balfour, and the case last cited was that of Japan.

M. SONNINO thought that this discussion somewhat anticipated the probable course of events. The means of procuring full and adequate representation could be dealt with at a later stage. The question was for the time being in the stage of study. This study could be adequately undertaken by officials, such, for instance, as the Italian officials serving on the Emigration Committee. After receiving their advice, further decisions could be taken. He thought it would be unfortunate to establish a precedent for a permanent organization not yet formed by insisting on one delegate from the employers and one from the workmen.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed with M. Sonnino. The Governments were now asked to nominate two delegates each. He for himself proposed to nominate two officials. The Commission was to report on the best means of getting all the interests concerned represented. The delegates would doubtless for their own work consult the various interests in their own countries.

(It was therefore decided that each of the Great Powers should appoint two delegates.)

8. M. CLEMENCEAU read a draft resolution proposed by Mr. Lloyd George. (See Appendix "C".)

Reparation

M. PICHON pointed out that Poland, which had suffered perhaps as much as any other country from devastation, had been omitted.

(It was agreed that Poland should be included).

BARON MAKINO suggested that instead of three representatives apiece, the Great Powers should be asked to supply not more than three each.

(This was agreed to).

MR. LANSING proposed certain alterations, which were included in the final text.

(The following text was then adopted:—

That a Commission be appointed with not more than three representatives apiece from each of the five Great Powers, and not more

than two representatives apiece from Belgium, Greece, Poland, Roumania, and Serbia, to examine and report, first on the amount for reparation which the enemy countries ought to pay, secondly on what they are capable of paying, and thirdly on the method, form and time in which payment should be made).

9. M. CLEMENCEAU read a draft resolution submitted by Mr. Lloyd George (Appendix "D").

Breaches of
Laws of War

M. SONNINO called attention to the expression in paragraph 3, "highly placed individuals". He thought that responsibility should not be confined to highly placed individuals.

(After discussion, it was decided to read the sentence as follows:—"All other individuals, however highly placed")

(The following final text was adopted:—

That a Commission, composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers, and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers, be appointed to inquire and report upon the following:—

(1) The responsibility of the authors of the war.

(2) The facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and their allies on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war;

(3) The degree of responsibility for these offences attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, including members of the General Staffs, or other individuals, however highly placed;

(4) The Constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate to the trial of these offences;

(5) Any other matters cognate or ancillary to the above which may arise in the course of the inquiry, and which the Commission finds it useful and relevant to take into consideration.)

10. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Agenda for Saturday would be composed of the resolutions accepted at this Meeting and on the previous day.

Agenda for
Plenary Conference on
Saturday

(This was agreed to)

MR. LANSING pointed out that according to the rules, they should be in the hands of the delegates 24 hours before the meeting.

(The Secretary-General undertook to fulfill this regulation).

11. M. CLEMENCEAU said that a number of territorial and colonial questions remained to be discussed. Of these the territorial were the most delicate problems.

Territorial
and Colonial
Questions

Doubtless each power would feel inclined to put off their discussion, but it must be undertaken. Before discussion these questions required classification. He would there-

fore beg the Governments to think of this, and at a later meeting to bring with them a classification.

M. SONNINO asked whether the most practical means would not be to fix a time by which each Delegation should present their wishes. The meeting would then have a notion of the ground to be covered. This applied to the Great Powers and to the smaller countries alike. A complete picture of the whole problem would then be available.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that considerable delay might be involved in waiting for the completion of all this work. European questions were so complicated that it would take a long time for such peoples as the Czecho-Slovaks and Poles to set forth a reasoned case. On the other hand Oriental questions and Colonial questions were less involved and to economize time he suggested that these matters might be tackled at once.

M. SONNINO pointed out that Mr. Lloyd George's proposal was not in contradiction with his. It was a question of the order in which problems were examined. Mr. Lloyd George proposed one subject to be discussed first. He agreed with him but before long questions would arise which concerned a great number of interests and then it would be necessary before settling them to have a statement from all the Delegations concerned.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would agree then to begin with the Colonial questions.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that the world's unrest arose from the unsettled condition of Europe, not from the state of affairs in the East, or in the Colonies, and that the postponement of these questions would only increase the pressure on the Delegates of the Peace Conference. He would therefore prefer to set in process immediately all that was required to hasten a solution of European questions. He entirely approved of utilizing intervals for the discussion of less important matters.

M. CLEMENCEAU summing up, said that he understood Mr. Lloyd George to propose giving precedence to Oriental and Colonial questions, while President Wilson preferred to begin with European ones.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he entirely agreed with the President in his estimate of the relative importance of these matters, and that he had only suggested dealing with the East and with the Colonies in order to save time while the various delegations were preparing their case.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that a date be fixed by which all Delegations should be requested to state their cases in writing.

(It was then decided that the Secretary General should ask all Delegations representing Powers with Territorial claims to send to the Secretariat their written statements within 10 days).

12. M. CLEMENCEAU read a resolution proposed by Mr. Lloyd [George] concerning the international regulation of Ports, Water-ways & Railways (Appendix "E").

International
Regime of Ports,
Waterways, &
Railways

After discussion the following resolution was adopted:—

"That a Commission composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers represented at the Peace Conference, be appointed to inquire into the Question of the international regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways."

13. M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that many complicated financial questions required settlement.

Financial
Questions

M. SONNINO said that the questions of Public Debts and paper money were especially difficult.

PRESIDENT WILSON questioned whether these problems could be isolated from territorial problems.

MR. BALFOUR thought that even in so complex a case as that of the previous Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, some general principles of financial obligation should be laid down.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that these questions varied so much that their settlement should not be subjected to any general rule.

M. SONNINO said that on certain definite questions a common principle could be found, for instance, to what extent were new States responsible for the debts of the older States they replaced? At what date did the State in process of dissolution cease to be responsible for the paper money it issued? Who was responsible for the money now circulating throughout the former Dual Monarchy? These questions related to phenomena of common occurrence and some principle could be laid down to deal with them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE added the instance of the Turkish Empire, a large part of which would be parceled out. What part, if any, of the Ottoman debt must be taken over with each portion? Who the Mandatories would be was not yet settled, but what their relations would be to the monetary obligations of the Turkish Empire was a difficult problem. Would they, for instance, be compelled to take over the debt at par or at the present value? Was Palestine to bear a share of the burden, and Syria, the Armenians and the peoples of the Caucasus?

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that these problems be drafted in the form of resolutions on which the representatives could take action.

M. SONNINO said that an expert committee would be [appointed] to frame these questions in appropriate terms.

(It was therefore decided that the Great Powers should appoint a Committee of five, composed of one member from each, to frame and set in order the financial questions requiring solution)

14. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that one of the problems requiring solution was whether claims for reparation should take precedence of the national debt in enemy countries.

Status of Claims
for Reparation

(It was agreed that this was one of the problems that should be referred to the Committee above mentioned)

(The meeting then adjourned)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 23 JANUARY, 1919.

Appendix "A"

Draft Resolution in Regard to the Reduction of Forces and Armaments

For Presentation to the Peace Conference

That a Commission be appointed with two representatives apiece from each of the five Great Powers, and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers represented at the Conference:—

1. to advise on an immediate and drastic reduction in the armed forces of the enemy;
2. to prepare a plan in connection with the League of Nations for a permanent reduction in the burden of military, naval and aerial forces and armaments.

Appendix "B"

Draft Resolution in Regard to International Legislation on Industrial and Labour Questions

For Presentation to the Peace Conference

That a Commission, composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers, and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers represented at the Peace Conference, be appointed to enquire into the question of the international adjustment of conditions of employment, and to consider what forms of permanent international machinery should be established to enable the several countries to secure joint action on matters affecting conditions of employment, and to recommend what steps should be taken to set up an appropriate organization for the above purposes in connection with the League of Nations.

Appendix "C"

Draft Resolution in Regard to Reparation

For Presentation to the Peace Conference

That a Commission be appointed with three representatives apiece from each of the five Great Powers and two representatives apiece from Belgium, Greece, Roumania and Serbia, to examine and report on the question of the amount of the sum for reparation which the enemy countries should pay, and are capable of paying, as well as the form in which payment should be made.

Appendix "D"

Draft Resolution in Regard to Breaches of the Laws of War

For Presentation to the Peace Conference

That a Commission, composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers, and five representatives to be elected by the smaller Powers, be appointed to inquire and report upon the following:—

- (1) The responsibility of the authors of the war.
 - (2) The facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and their allies on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war.
 - (3) The degree of responsibility for these offences attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, including members of the General Staffs, or other highly placed individuals.
 - (4) The Constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate to the trial of these offences.
 - (5) Any other matters cognate or ancillary to the above which may arise in the course of the enquiry, and which the Commission finds it useful and relevant to take into consideration.
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Appendix "E"

Draft Resolution in Regard to Ports, Waterways and Railways

For Presentation to the Peace Conference

That a Commission, composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers, and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers represented at the Peace Conference, be appointed to enquire into the question of the international regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways.

Procès-verbal of the Twelfth Session of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, January 24, 1919, at 10 Hours 30

PRESENT

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

GREAT BRITAIN

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.,
Prime Minister.
The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M.,
M. P., Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs.

ITALY

His Excellency M. Orlando.
His Excellency Baron Sonnino.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
His Excellency M. Matsui.
M. Saburi.

The following also attended:

FRANCE

M. Loucheur.
Marshal Foch.
General Weygand.
General Belin.
Major Lacombe.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.

GREAT BRITAIN

The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, M. P.,
Secretary of State for War.
Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, K. T.,
G. C. B., G. C. V. O., K. C. I. E., Com-
mander-in-Chief, British Armies in
France.
General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B.,
D. S. O., Chief of the Imperial
General Staff.
Lieutenant-General Sir G. M. Mac-
Donogh, K. C. M. G., C. B., Adjutant-
General to the Forces.
Major-General Hon. C. J. Sackville-
West, C. M. G., Permanent Military
Representative.
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M. P. A. Han-
key, K. C. B., Secretary, War Cabinet.
Mr. H. Norman.

ITALY

General Diaz.
General di Robilant.
Count Aldrovandi.
General Cavallero.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

General Tasker H. Bliss.
General J. J. Pershing.
Brigadier-General Fox Connor.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.

Secretariat

FRANCE

Captain A. Portier.

GREAT BRITAIN

Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.

ITALY

Major A. Jones.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Colonel U. S. Grant.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux

1. ALLIED ARMY OF OCCUPATION

M. CLEMENCEAU having declared the meeting open, said they were met together to consider Mr. Lloyd George's proposal to fix the strength of the forces to be maintained by the Allied and Associated Powers on the Western front during the period of the armistice.

MARSHAL FOCH then read the following memorandum:—

"From the demobilisation or re-embarkment schemes, which the various Allied Governments seem to have settled, each for their own account, it appears that the following forces will be available on the 31st March in the Franco-Belgian zone:—

French armies. . .	46 $\frac{1}{2}$ inf. div. and 6 cav. div.
British armies. . .	18 " " 2 "
American armies. . .	15 " (and 5 in base ports).
Belgian armies . . .	6 "
(Total, 85 to 90 inf. div. and 8 cav. div.)	

"In his memorandum No. 52, P. C. L., dated the 24th December, the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the allied armies stated that it was necessary to keep in arms, opposite Germany, until the signature of the preliminaries of peace, a total of 120 to 140 Allied infantry divisions.

"Since that date the German demobilisation has followed its course. From the information given on the 13th January by General von Winterfeldt¹ at Spa, and on the 15th January by M. Erzberger at Treves, the German forces still included, during the first fortnight in January, the following organised great units:—

"37 divisions on the western front;

"Between 15 and 18 divisions on the eastern front; that is, a total of 52 to 55 divisions.

"The same information stated that the German figures included at the same time, as under the colours, the two classes of 1898 and 1899, 200,000 men by class; that is, 400,000 men and 'several' hundred thousand men, kept in active service, either as volunteers or as out of work. Therefore it follows that the actual numbers of the German army may be estimated at 600,000 to 700,000 men.

¹ Military representative on the German Armistice Commission.

"As the correctness of this information cannot be confirmed, we must, in consideration of their source, look upon the figures above given as a minimum.

"Taking into account these remarks, the number of 120 to 140 Allied divisions given on the 24th December as necessary to be maintained in front of Germany, may be reduced to 100.

"Therefore the figure of 80 to 90 Allied divisions mentioned in the first lines of this memorandum appears as an extreme minimum, under which it would be dangerous to fall as long as the preliminaries of peace are not signed. And yet this figure can only be agreed to on the express condition that these units, the number of their men, and the degree of their efficiency, will be kept up so that they may go back in action without any delay.

"As long as the preliminaries of peace are not signed, it is impossible to proceed further with the scheme, and to let the number of divisions which are being kept up fall below the above-mentioned figures.

"Or else it will not be victorious armies which will come forward in front of the defeated German forces—armies able to renew the fight, if peace is not signed—but armies which are being demobilised or moved, already for the greater part demobilised, will appear on our side, both being powerless for military action. To sum up, the debate will start on the base of an equal military situation, and then how shall we be able to speak of compensation, important indemnities? How shall we be able to impose any terms on the enemy?"

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether the number of men corresponding to the number of divisions quoted could be given.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that, taking an average of 20,000 men per British, Italian, and French division, and 30,000 men per American division, the following very approximate totals would be obtained:—

	<i>Men</i>
France	900,000
Great Britain.	350,000
America	450,000
Belgium	120,000
Approximate total	1,820,000

This figure included cavalry divisions.

MARSHAL FOCH laid stress on the fact that the above figures included combatants only. This total was in accordance with the programme at present accepted by the Allied Governments, and he pressed that no alterations should be made before the 31st March next.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had nothing to say regarding the figures given by Marshal Foch. His first comment, however, would relate to the number of German divisions, as obviously the number of troops to be kept under arms by the Allies would have

to bear a direct reference to the number of German troops. Marshal Foch made no proposals for the reduction of the number of German divisions. The Germans were supposed to have thirty-seven divisions on the Western front, in addition to two classes with a total of 400,000 men, plus fifteen to eighteen divisions on the Eastern front. Why should the Germans keep all these troops under arms? There was nothing in Marshal Foch's document about calling on the Germans further to demobilise. He would like to propose that when the armistice should be renewed in three weeks' time, the Germans should be asked to explain why they wished to keep all these troops. They could offer no real resistance. Therefore, we should refuse to renew the armistice unless further demobilisation were carried out. The Allies should fix a definite number for the Germans, adequate for the maintenance of internal order. They must have a sufficient number of troops to police, in order to put down Spartacists and other revolutionary parties. Naturally, the Germans should not be permitted to maintain any forces to carry on warfare against the Poles. On the other hand, the Allies must undertake to keep the Poles within their frontiers. The Allies should refuse to give the Poles arms or assistance so as to enable them to take the law into their own hands, and so attempt to settle their own frontiers. That should obviously be a question for the Peace Conference. He (Mr. Lloyd George) firmly believed that the Germans would like us to put forward proposals of this kind. The German soldiers were not under control, and were merely hanging around the dépôts in order to get food and housing.

It must be clearly understood that the figures given in Marshal Foch's memorandum did not represent the total number of men which would have to be maintained under arms. Together with the British quota of 350,000 divisional troops prescribed, hundreds of thousands additional men would have to be kept for other purposes, which would probably represent a total of 700,000 to 800,000 men in France alone. He proposed, therefore, that they should consider the question of imposing, as a condition of the renewal of the armistice, a reduction of the German forces, which would permit of a corresponding reduction of our own. In addition, he would insist on the delivery of arms and of the machinery for the construction of arms, e. g., at Essen, Minden, and elsewhere, until peace should be signed.

MARSHAL FOCH said that if he correctly understood Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, it meant that an effective demobilisation should be imposed on Germany. There would be no difficulty in adding such a clause to the armistice. The Germans would no doubt accept it, but it would be extremely difficult to ensure its execution. In a

country like Germany it would be very easy for the people to take up arms again. Should a real leader arise, it would not be difficult for him to reconstruct the armies—trained men, officers, staffs, and a skeleton organisation existed. In a short time it would be possible to have a good army, in splendid fighting trim. In his opinion, therefore, such a clause could no doubt be included in the armistice, but it would be ineffective.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that a control could be exercised.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the controlling parties would only be allowed to see what the Germans wished them to see. Undoubtedly, guarantees could be taken by seizing arms, but it was doubtful whether they would give them all up. In addition, munition factories could be taken over, but it would be quite impossible to occupy them all. Our own line of action could not be based on the estimate of the military situation existing in Germany at any given time, because it would be impossible to say what the actual military strength of Germany at the time really was. Therefore, conditions might be made, but in reality there was no guarantee that they would be adhered to. He would not take up time in referring to the clauses entered by Napoleon in the Treaty of Tilsit,² limiting the Prussian forces to 40,000 men. It was well known how Prussia, notwithstanding these conditions, had been able to prepare for a levy en masse in 1813. Herr Erzberger, on the 14th January last, at Trèves, had said, "The German army has ceased to exist." Nevertheless, over seventy divisions still existed. Von Winterfeldt, at the same meeting, had also maintained that it was not incumbent on the Germans to supply figures relating to their demobilisation; but since false and exaggerated statements had appeared in the British press, he had supplied the figures which had been quoted in his (Marshal Foch's memorandum). To sum up, he maintained that clauses relating to demobilisation, including the surrender of arms and the seizure of munition factories, could be entered in the armistice, but it would be very dangerous to base our policy on the assumption that these conditions would be fulfilled. He urged, therefore, that the Allied Governments should make no reductions in the agreed strengths of the armies of occupation, at all events before the 31st March next.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked that the following aspect of this matter be considered before coming to a conclusion. It had been stated that the officers of the German army had no control over their men. Consequently, even if remobilisation were ordered, it probably could not be carried out. They had also been told that the men were

² Treaty of Peace between France and Prussia, July 9, 1807, G. F. de Martens, *Recueil des principaux traités d'alliance, de paix, de trêve, etc.*, 2d ed., vol. 8, p. 661.

merely hanging round the dépôts in order to be fed. It was admitted that it would be very difficult for Germany to establish any credit until she could resume her economic life. Obviously this was difficult under present conditions; meanwhile, the number of unemployed must increase, and would still further increase if demobilisation were hastened. The increase of unemployment would widen the soil for the seeds of Bolshevism, and so create a Germany with which it would be impossible to deal at all. Moreover, sooner or later the Allies would be compelled to trust Germany to keep her promises. When peace would be signed, should we still be compelled to maintain a great army of occupation to make sure that Germany would keep her promises? In the Peace Treaty, Germany might agree to maintain a smaller army; should we be compelled to keep an army on her border to ensure the fulfilment of this promise? The real solution of the question lay in an early peace. Peace would bring with it a settlement of the many questions which were troubling Europe, which now consisted of a seething body of an uncertain and fearful people who did not know what fate awaited them. He put forward these considerations, though he realised they did not lead to a definite conclusion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed with President Wilson that the only satisfactory solution of the difficulty would be the making of peace. But they, in Great Britain, were compelled to face the problem of demobilisation at once. It was a very serious problem. Great Britain was not a military nation like France, and the people were not disciplined. Therefore, he felt compelled at once to say that he was doubtful whether Great Britain could contribute the troops asked for. At any rate, he could give no undertaking. He would, without further delay, have to discuss the question with his advisers in order to arrive at an immediate conclusion. He admitted that it might be best to put off the decision until the signing of the Peace Treaty; but they could not do that in Great Britain. Some means must, therefore, be devised for reducing their effort.

Marshal Foch's argument really meant that Germany could never be trusted, and, therefore, that the armies of occupation could never be materially reduced. On the other hand, he thought they had in food, raw material, and the seizure of arms, better means of controlling the situation in Germany. As long as it was a question of fighting, they had had no difficulty with the British troops. But, now that the soldiers were standing to their arms, whilst many of their comrades were being demobilised and were able to obtain good employment at high rates of pay, the feelings of discontent were bound to arise, which made matters extremely difficult. Therefore, he would still press that they should make an effort to reduce the

German armies, using food, raw material, and the surrender of arms as levers. The Germans had already surrendered most of their cannon, and, without cannon, men alone constituted a small danger.

GENERAL BLISS expressed the view that the problem that confronted the United States of America was different from that which Great Britain had to solve. The two, however, were the same in this respect: that behind the Government were the people, who might at any moment take matters into their own hands. Consequently, in drawing up their plans, that fact had to be taken into consideration. As regards the United States, taking the rate at which troops could be shipped to America, it did not appear that the numbers could be reduced to the figures requested by Marshal Foch before next summer. Consequently, as peace would doubtless be concluded before then, the problem became one of little moment as far as America was concerned.

Looking at the question from a broader point of view, he wished to support Mr. Lloyd George's proposal that they should do all they could to reduce the armies and to reduce the output of armament and munitions in Germany. While complete disarmament might be impossible of attainment, much could be done on those lines to improve the situation. On the other hand, he was of the opinion that these limiting conditions should be included in the Treaty of Peace and not in the armistice. In the Treaty of Peace it would be possible to lay down any conditions they liked relating to the reduction of the armies, the dismantling of factories, the output of munitions, &c. Therefore he urged his colleagues to hasten the conclusion of peace.

GENERAL PERSHING said that in his opinion the position of Germany to-day was such that it would be impossible for her to resume offensive operations with any possible chance of holding her own. Demobilisation had proceeded so far that possibly not more than 1,000,000 men were now under arms, and these were not in a state of discipline or efficiency such as to cause alarm. They were at rest or scattered about, and not in any sense an organised body of troops well in hand. Food conditions were such that she could be prevented from carrying on military operations. Her ports were all open to the British Navy, and her rivers could be ascended with facility. The Allies controlled the Rhine and its commerce. They also occupied a large part of her territory. As regards armaments, she had surrendered such an amount that what was left would not permit her resuming hostilities. Therefore the situation did not require the Allies to fix the numbers of troops they should retain and, with the prospects of early peace, he could see an early settlement of these questions. Under these conditions he thought that the demobilisation

of all the armies might proceed without bothering much about it. The demobilisation of the American troops depended on the quantity of shipping available; but if their calculations held good, they would be able to reduce their troops by April next to the numbers prescribed by Marshal Foch.

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG said that he could add no fresh arguments, but he could state his opinion. General Pershing had stated that Germany would be unable to offer any marked resistance, in which view he differed somewhat from the opinion expressed by Marshal Foch. In his own opinion, Germany was still in a position to cause a great deal of trouble. Therefore, until peace was signed, the Governments ought to maintain their forces up to the strength prescribed by Marshal Foch. Unless they could obtain guarantees that arms would be surrendered and munition factories destroyed, they must maintain the forces laid down by Marshal Foch. These forces were, in his opinion, not excessive.

GENERAL SIR HENRY WILSON agreed that they ought to do what Mr. Lloyd George had said to get the German army reduced. But, until they saw that this had been done, they could not reduce their own forces. Until they had sufficient guarantees, they ought to be careful what they did. The Germans were a martial people, magnificent soldiers, and a proud people, and, if the opportunity came, they would certainly be able to do as well as the Bolsheviks. The Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, wished to discuss with Marshal Haig, Mr. Winston Churchill, and himself the question of the strength of the Army of Occupation to be maintained by Great Britain, so that he was obliged to reserve his decision. But he would point out that Great Britain had large commitments elsewhere, including the maintenance of the navy, which might militate against her keeping in France the forces asked for.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the destruction of the machinery at Krupp's and Minden would not be sufficient guarantees.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the Germans had had another factory at Mayence which the Allies had now seized. But there might be many other factories, and a full list of these was not in their possession.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had had considerable experience of munitions. In his opinion, in every country two or three factories alone were absolutely essential, and when these went the others would prove inadequate. Guns, for instance, could only be manufactured in one or two places.

GENERAL PERSHING remarked that it was largely a question of the supply of material, and a large percentage of the necessary material was already controlled by the Allies.

GENERAL DIAZ said that they were discussing a question which greatly affected Italy. They had so far demobilised 13 divisions, and the balance of 38 divisions were kept under arms merely to satisfy the requirements of the Alliance. For instance, one division was kept at Innsbruck merely with the object of acting with the Allies against Germany if necessary. In many parts of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire there was a tendency to increase the number of troops, using these as nuclei to form large armies. In a word, the authorities in those regions were carrying out the principle adopted by Prussia in 1806. This, he thought, constituted a grave danger. On the other hand, he agreed that they could not indefinitely remain mobilised on a war footing, and a way out of the difficulty must be found. In his opinion, they should take action against Germany and Austria by removing all the artillery, by destroying munition factories, and by regulating the output of mines. In other words, the Allies should hold in their hands all the sources from which engines of destruction were produced. Without artillery the Central Powers would have no means of carrying out a successful war. Therefore, he would insist that the Allies should take essential guarantees, otherwise the difficulty would never be solved.

GENERAL PERSHING said that he would approve of any steps being taken to reduce Germany's means of producing war material.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he did not think the German people would be willing to take up arms again, nor that Germany could in her present condition possibly carry out an organised war against organised Governments. He would ask that a draft resolution be drawn up embodying in explicit terms the proposals made by Mr. Lloyd George. This resolution could then be submitted to the meeting, and brought under discussion. He thought they should at the same time study a scheme to relieve unemployment in Germany. In his opinion, Bolshevism was the greatest danger, and the only real protection against it was food and industry. Consequently, whilst demobilising the German Army, they should take steps to protect themselves against the greater danger of Bolshevism.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that following what President Wilson had said, the question of immediate disarmament was important, because it was understood that the German troops were selling their machine-guns, rifles, &c., and it was possible that these were being sold to Bolshevik agents. In his opinion, that danger added to the argument in favour of disarmament. Again, whatever figures were put down on paper, it was evident that the Allied Armies would become less

efficient as time went on. Germany would then be more formidable in proportion to ourselves, unless she were disarmed. He quite agreed with President Wilson's suggestion that they should have a definite proposal placed before them. He would suggest, therefore, that a small committee, including some member with a knowledge of manufactures, should be appointed to consider and put forward proposals as to the best manner of disarming Germany.

(This proposal was agreed to.)

M. LOUCHEUR, who at this stage entered the Council Chamber, said, in reply to a question put to him by M. Clemenceau, that all the production of Germany depended on the basin of Westphalia, and if Essen and its neighbourhood were seized, Germany could under no circumstances go on fighting. As regards the surrender of artillery, he felt convinced that Germany would be effectually disarmed only if machine guns were included.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Mr. Lloyd George's proposal had been accepted: it remained to nominate the members of the Committee. He, himself, would nominate M. Loucheur.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE nominated Mr. Winston Churchill.

PRESIDENT WILSON nominated General Bliss.

M. ORLANDO nominated General Diaz.

(It was agreed that a Special Committee, composed of Mr. Churchill, M. Loucheur, Marshal Foch, General Bliss, and General Diaz should be appointed to consider and report on:—

1. The strength of the armies to be maintained by the Allied and Associated Powers on the Western Front during the period of the armistice.

2. The demobilisation of the German Army and the guarantees (e. g., surrender of arms, seizure of munition factories, &c.) necessary to ensure the fulfilment of the conditions imposed.)

2. STRENGTH RETURNS OF ARMIES OF OCCUPATION

MARSHAL FOCH asked permission to take this opportunity of suggesting that the chiefs of the Allied armies should meet together to devise a means of keeping each other informed regarding the process of demobilisation. In his opinion, it was very necessary for them to have advance information regarding the number of troops under arms at given dates.

M. ORLANDO proposed that these plans of demobilisation should also include data relating to the small Powers. He thought that was most important. In the old Austro-Hungarian Empire it would be found that some of the States, instead of demobilising, were calling men under arms. He thought that the scheme prepared should include both maximum and minimum figures.

(As this matter did not require action by the Supreme War Council, it was decided that Marshal Foch should assemble the Allied Commanders-in-Chief, and arrange to obtain from them the required data relating to the *proportion* of demobilisation.)

ALLIED WAR MEDALS

MARSHAL FOCH then read the following proposal:—

“I have the honour to propose to the Supreme Council of the Allies that those who have fought in the great war, of all the Allied nations alike, should receive one identic commemorative medal. This glorious emblem, worn by them in all parts of the world, would help to maintain among them the feeling of close fellowship which, after fortifying our armies on the battlefield, will assure during peace, by the bond of common memories, the greatness of the associated nations.”

PRESIDENT WILSON, in approving the idea, enquired whether the intention was that each individual Government should strike a medal of the same kind.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that each individual Government should agree to issue to their troops the same medal and the same ribbon.

(The Supreme War Council agreed to recommend for the approval of the Governments concerned, the issue of an identic medal and ribbon to all the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers who had fought in the war.)

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay on Friday, January 24, 1919, at 12:15
O'clock p. m.**

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson
Mr. R. Lansing
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison
Col. U. S. Grant

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J.
Balfour, M. P.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A.
Hankey, K. C. B.
Major A. M. Caccia,
M. V. O.
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
Capt. Portier

ITALY

M. Orlando
Baron Sonnino
Count Aldrovandi
Major Jones

JAPAN

Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui
M. Saburi

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux

1. **PRESIDENT WILSON** read the following communication, which he suggested should be published and transmitted by wireless telegraphy to all parts of the world:—

W. O. To
B. O. To
R. O. To

"The Governments now associated in conference to effect a lasting peace among the nations are deeply disturbed by the news which comes to them of the many instances in which armed force is being made use of, in many parts of Europe and the East, to gain possession of territory, the rightful claim to which the Peace Conference is to be asked to determine. They deem it their duty to utter a solemn warning that possession gained by force will seriously prejudice the claims of those who use such means. It will create the presumption that those who employ force doubt the justice and validity of their claim and purpose to substitute possession for proof of right and set up sovereignty by coercion rather than by racial or national preference and natural historical association. They thus put a cloud upon every evidence of title they may afterwards allege and indicate their distrust of the Conference itself. Nothing but the most unfortunate results can ensue. If they expect justice, they must refrain from force and place their claims in unclouded good faith in the hands of the Conference of Peace."

(This was agreed to.)

The meeting adjourned until 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

24 JANUARY 1919.

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay on Friday, January 24, 1919, at 3 p. m.**

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson
Mr. R. Lansing
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Colonel U. S. Grant
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour
The Rt. Hon. Sir R. L.
Borden
The Rt. Hon. W. M.
Hughes
The Rt. Hon. W. F.
Massey
Lieut. Gen. The Rt. Hon.
J. C. Smuts
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Han-
key, K. C. B.
Captain E. Abraham
Mr. E. Phipps

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
Captain A. Portier

ITALY

H. E. Orlando
H. E. Baron Sonnino
Count Aldrovandi
Major A. Jones

JAPAN

Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui
M. Saburi

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. **M. CLEMENCEAU** said that, before inviting the Dominion Prime Ministers to come in, he wished to obtain a decision on one or two urgent matters. The first question was that of nominating Commissioners to go to Poland. He asked whether the Powers had each nominated their delegates.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that General Botha, designated by the British Government, had not yet formally accepted.

With this exception, it was understood that the members of the Commission had already been nominated.

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the opinion that the Commission should not start without receiving instructions in writing from the Council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that someone be designated to draw up draft instructions, copies of which should be circulated.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would ask M. Pichon to prepare this draft and submit it to the Council before being issued to the Commission.

M. SONNINO said that one of the Italian nominees was the Italian Minister at Christiania. He asked whether it was necessary to summon him to Paris, in order to receive his instructions.

(It was agreed that this should be left to the discretion of the Italian Government, and that M. Pichon should prepare draft instructions for the approval of the Council.)

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he heard through Sir George Riddell that the Press were very anxious to send two pressmen from each nation to accompany the Commission to Poland.

Press Delegation
To Accompany
the Commission

M. SONNINO expressed the opinion that this would not assist the labours of the Commission.

M. CLEMENCEAU was of the same opinion.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Press were clearly entitled to send a Mission independently.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, but thought that the pressmen would not be able to reach their destination save under the aegis of the official Mission. Dantzig was in enemy country and the railway from that port was in German hands.

M. SONNINO thought that the introduction of irresponsible politics into the labours of the Mission would be highly embarrassing.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that English and American pressmen had no special views on Polish politics. They would merely report events as they saw them.

M. CLEMENCEAU was of the opinion that they would undoubtedly send telegrams and attempt to exercise a control over the Delegates.

M. PICHON strongly supported this view.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that, as far as the American Press was concerned, the pressmen would not represent individual papers but News Associations without any particular bias. They would send bare news without any colouring. Unfortunately, there were in America three such News Associations and the choice of two delegates might be difficult.

M. PICHON pointed out that the same was the case in France, where there were three News Agencies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then proposed that there should be only one press delegate from each nation, and that the choice of the delegate should be left to the Press.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed, provided that it be well understood that the delegates sent only news and not views.

(It was accordingly agreed upon that one Press delegate from each of the five Powers, chosen by the Press, should be allowed to proceed to Poland with the Commission on the express understanding that he should only transmit news and not expressions of opinion.)

3. M. CLEMENCEAU said that most of the questions submitted to the Council had been distributed to Commissions. Financial and economic questions, however, remained. He proposed that Commissions of two members from each Power should be set up to classify and frame in suitable language all questions coming under these categories. The work of these Commissions would be to submit to the Council a questionnaire. In this manner, the whole work of the Conference would be distributed.

Financial and
Economic
Questions

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that with regard to the framing of financial questions, this had already been decided on.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that time should be given for further consideration of these matters.

(It was agreed that the question should be discussed on the following day.)

At this stage the Dominion Prime Ministers entered the room.

4. M. CLEMENCEAU welcomed the Prime Ministers of the British Dominions.

Disposal of
German Colonies:
Claims of British
Dominions

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he thought it best that each of the Dominions should present its case separately. As far as the British Empire was concerned, most of the Colonies captured had been taken by Dominion troops. This even applied to German East Africa, where a considerable contingent of home troops had been employed. All he would like to say on behalf of the British Empire as a whole was that he would be very much opposed to the return to Germany of any of these Colonies. His reasons for saying so had been put in writing, and he was prepared, if necessary, to circulate the document to the Council. In many cases the Germans had treated the native populations very badly. For instance, in South-West Africa, they had deliberately pursued a policy of extermination. In other parts of Africa they had been very harsh, and they had raised native troops and encouraged these troops to behave in a manner that would even disgrace the Bolsheviks. The French and British, doubtless, had also raised native troops, but they had controlled them better.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he thought all were agreed to oppose the restoration of the German Colonies.

M. ORLANDO, on behalf of Italy, and BARON MAKINO, on behalf of Japan, agreed.

(There was no dissentient and this principle was adopted. It was agreed that no public announcement of this policy should at present be made.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the second question, therefore, was to decide in what manner these territories should be dealt with.

The Mandatory System There were two or three methods proposed. The first was internationalisation or control by the League of Nations. It was generally agreed that these territories could not be directly administered internationally. Therefore, it was suggested that some one nation should undertake the trusteeship on behalf of the League as mandatory. The conditions of the trust would doubtless include a stipulation that the territory should be administered, not in the interests of the mandatory, but in the interests of all the nations in the League. There must be equal economic opportunity for all, and, further, there must be a guarantee that the natives would not be exploited either commercially or militarily for the benefit of the mandatory. There would also, no doubt, be a right of appeal to the League of Nations if any of the conditions of the trust were broken. For instance, if the missionaries or concessionaires of any nation complained of unfair treatment. He did not suggest that this was an exhaustive account of the conditions, and if his account were in any way inaccurate, it would, no doubt, be set right hereafter.

He would like to state at once that the definition he had just attempted to give did not differ materially from the method in which the British Empire dealt with its Colonies. In all British Colonies there was free trade. He did not think there was such a thing as a preferential tariff in any. Germans or Americans could trade throughout the British Colonies on the same terms as British subjects. In fact, in British East Africa, most of the commerce was done by a German firm and Germany subsidized a shipping line which carried the bulk of the trade. No troops, save for police purposes, were raised in the British Colonies. British coaling stations were as free to foreign as to British ships, and German battleships coaled in them as freely as British battleships. As far as Great Britain was concerned, therefore, he saw no objection to the mandatory system.

The next alternative was frank annexation. The German colonies conquered by Australia, New Zealand and South Africa would be dealt with in detail by the Ministers representing these Dominions.

Annexation German South West Africa was contiguous to the territories of the Union. There was no real natural boundary and unless the Dutch and British population of South Africa undertook the colonisation of this area it would remain a wilderness. If the Union were given charge of German South West Africa in the capacity of a Mandatory there would be in a territory, geographically one, two

forms of administration. It was questionable whether any advantage would be derived from this division capable of outweighing its practical difficulties.

In the case of New Guinea, one-third of the island was already under direct Australian administration, another third had now been conquered from Germany. It was manifest that to draw a customs barrier between one portion of the island and the other presented disadvantages. Yet, if Australia were the Mandatory of the League of Nations for the administration of what had been German New Guinea, it might have to administer this portion of the island on different lines to those followed in its previous possessions.

Samoa also would be best administered directly by New Zealand. He pointed out that the task of administering Colonies was an expensive one. The British Colonial Budget was steadily increasing. Unless money were to be spent upon them colonies should be dropped. The Dominion of New Zealand had a population of little more than one million souls. It had put 100,000 men into the field, had incurred a war debt of £100,000,000 sterling, had suffered 60,000 casualties and lost 16,000 killed. New Zealand had taken Samoa and fully realized that money would have to be spent upon it if the island was to be retained. It might not think it worth while to undertake the task of administration only as a Mandatory.

To sum up, he would like the Conference to treat the territories enumerated as part of the Dominions which had captured them rather than as areas to be administered under the control of an organisation established in Europe which might find it difficult to contribute even the smallest financial assistance to their administration.

Mr. HUGHES said that the Prime Minister of Great Britain has dealt with the question as a whole. He would beg leave to present the particular case for Australia. Pointing to a map, he indicated the intimate geographical relations of Australia to the Pacific. The Pacific was not only greater than any other sea, it was a world in itself, to which the construction of the Panama Canal had given added importance. Strategically the Pacific Islands encompassed Australia like fortresses. New Guinea was the biggest island in the whole world save Australia itself, and was only 82 miles from the mainland. South-east of it was a string of islands suitable for coaling and submarine bases, from which Australia could be attacked. The value of the islands in themselves he made no mention of. Australia had enough land not merely for its present population but for 100,000,000 men. It was obvious that 5 million people could not hold, against powerful enemies, a

Australian Claims
to New Guinea

country larger than the United States, with a coast-line as long as the distance between Australia and England. If there were at the very door of Australia a potential or actual enemy Australia could not feel safe. The islands were as necessary to Australia as water to a city. If they were in the hands of a superior power there would be no peace for Australia. He proposed to explain shortly how the Germans came to possess a part of New Guinea. Australia's claim to the Island was not a new one. It had been advanced in 1867, but not supported by the British Government. It had been raised again in 1871 and 1873 when Captain Moresby had provisionally annexed part of the country, but the annexation had not been ratified by the Imperial Government. In 1875 Sir John Robertson had put forward a proposal for the annexation of the country, and in 1877 Queensland had despatched an expedition to New Guinea and had been responsible for order until 1884 in all the non-Dutch portion of the Island. At that time Germany had asked for a friendly consultation to deal with this subject and had taken possession without waiting for British consent and established her stations in the Island. Germany had done little or nothing to develop the Islands she possessed in the Southern Pacific. She had regarded them from the strategic aspect only. In 1914, when this war broke out, Australia had sent troops to New Guinea and had captured the country. Australia had been in occupation ever since. The other Islands had also been seized, as they were, in the hands of the Germans, a direct menace to Australia.

As to internationalisation, he would endeavor to show why this principle should not be applied in this particular case. As Mr. Lloyd George had pointed out, part of the country was under Australian administration and Australian laws were current there. Control by the League of Nations would lead to confusion of authority, which could only be harmful. If the Mandatory were to exercise real authority, its policy would have to be directed presumably by the League of Nations. In this case the Mandatory would be so overwhelmingly superior in power to Australia that Australian authority would be completely overshadowed. The Mandatory, as it were, would be living in a mansion and Australia in a cottage. Any strong power controlling New Guinea controlled Australia. He questioned whether any country represented at the meeting would consent to be overshadowed in such a way, even by an international authority. The policies of nations were liable to change, and history showed that friends in one war were not always friends in the next. From this point of view he was prepared to say that in the Mandatory Power established in New Guinea under international control, Australia

would see a potential enemy. It was reasonable and fair that the rights of the natives should be insisted upon. Australia was ready to agree to such requirements, but Australia also had a right to claim freedom from the menace of any enemy such as had weighed upon her before this war. The security of Australia would threaten no one. No state would suffer if Australia were safe, Australia alone would suffer if she were not. Australia had suffered 90,000 casualties in this war and lost 60,000 killed. Her troops everywhere had fought well. Her war debt alone amounted to £37,500,000 sterling exclusive of another £100,000,000 for the repatriation and pensioning of her troops. Australia did not wish to be left to stagger under this load and not to feel safe.

GENERAL SMUTS said that the Union of South Africa was putting forward a claim to the German territory in South-West Africa. The map would show that the two countries were geographically one. The reason why South-West Africa had not been annexed to the Union was the dilatoriness of the Imperial Government. The Imperial Government had regarded the country as a desert and had taken no action. In 1884 any possible action on their part had been suddenly forestalled by Bismarck. As to the subsequent history of the country its administration under the Germans had been a failure. The country was only fit for ranching. The Germans had not colonised it. They had done little else than exterminate the natives. It must be remembered that, at the outbreak of this war, there had been a rebellion in the Union, very largely fomented by the Germans in South-West Africa. Some of the officers of the Defence Force had been seduced, and General Botha, after his victory had found German telegrams offering to recognize the independence of South Africa if the rebellion succeeded. The rebellion had been very formidable, and its suppression had employed 40,000 troops. It was only after this that the Union had been able to conquer German South-West Africa.

The question to be decided was whether the Union of South Africa should absorb this country, or should be appointed mandatory for its administration. He would point out that this territory was not in the same category as other German possessions in Africa. The Cameroons, Togo-Land and East Africa were all tropical and valuable possessions; South-West Africa was a desert country without any product of great value and only suitable for pastoralists. It could, therefore, only be developed from within the Union itself. He thought, therefore, that, although there might be a good case for the administration of the other German possessions in Africa by a

Union of South
Africa and Ger-
man South-West
Africa

mandatory, there was not, in this instance, a strong case. It was on this ground that South Africa claimed the country. A white community in South Africa had been established there for two or three centuries. It had done its best to give a form of self-government to three million natives, and its policy had been tested and found good. It was suited as much to the whites as to the natives, and this policy should be applied to the natives in South-West Africa. The fiscal system, he also thought, should be the same. It would be impossible to set up police posts along many hundred miles of desert frontier.

Another very serious ground for the claim made was that in the rebellion General Botha had gone a very long way to do his duty to the British Empire in fighting his own people. There was at that time a great issue at stake in South Africa. The Dutch people, to whom General Botha and he himself belonged together with many who were of German descent, wished to be neutral in this war. Their position, however, was such that they could not legally or constitutionally remain neutral. If the territory in question were not ceded to the Union, the result would be the overthrow of General Botha and of all his policy. Apart from the interest of the British Empire, it was to the interest of South Africa that the two white peoples inhabiting it should live in harmony. He would greatly deprecate that this Conference should adopt any form of settlement that would justify the rebellion of 1914. This would render the position in South Africa most deplorable. On these grounds he would press very strongly that, whatever might be decided in respect to the valuable African Colonies in other parts of the Continent, this desert country, so closely connected with South Africa, should be included in the Union. The community to which he belonged had been in South Africa since 1650. They had established a white civilization in a savage continent and had become a great cultural agency all over South Africa. Their wish was that one of the effects of the great settlement now to be made should be to strengthen their position and to consolidate the union of the white races in South Africa. The Boer pastoralists were always looking for uninhabited country in which to settle. He was quite sure that if German South-West Africa were given by the Conference to the Union, its work in this respect would be good.

In conclusion, he would like to add that the Union had made great sacrifices. He did not wish to stress them particularly as all had made great sacrifices; but he believed that the effort made by South Africa, sometimes with a divided heart, would prove on examination to be second to none among the small States that had partaken in the war.

Mr. MASSEY said that he wished to thank the President of the Council for the opportunity given to him to state the case on behalf of New Zealand. New Zealand was particularly concerned with Samoa. In the first instance, he would like to call the attention of the President of the Council to New Zealand as it appeared on the map. The point he wished to make was that New Zealand was much more important than its size on the map would seem to indicate. The area of New Zealand was as nearly as possible the same as that of the United Kingdom. The race occupying New Zealand was exactly the same kind of race as that which occupied the United Kingdom today. They were just as enterprising and just as virile as they were in the United Kingdom, and he hoped and believed in time to come New Zealand would be as useful to humanity in the Southern Hemisphere as the United Kingdom had been to humanity in the Northern Hemisphere. It was necessary for him to refer, as previous speakers had done to past history and this he would do very briefly. He would like to go back to the events which took place in the seventies, when the attention of European nations first began to be directed to the potentialities of the islands in the Pacific, and particularly to Samoa and New Guinea. There was a genuine impression that the natives of Samoa were, or had been not many years ago, savages. That impression was not correct. The Samoans, so far as records went, were never savages. It was true they had no written language, but they had had, during the years we had been acquainted with them, and for many years before, a form of local government which was sufficient for their own requirements. In the seventies the leading natives of Samoa became alarmed at what was likely to take place. They heard the intentions of Germany, of the intentions of the other European Powers, and they formed a big deputation which journeyed to Fiji to interview the High Commissioner of the Pacific, who at that time was also Governor of Fiji, in order to ask Queen Victoria either to annex the Samoan islands, or to establish a protectorate, and so to preserve and protect them in the future. But so far as Samoa was concerned nothing was ever done. Matters went on quietly and without anything serious happening for some years, until a number of Germans appeared in the Pacific, and settled there. The Samoan group of islands had a population even today—and it had not decreased for a long time past—of about 35,000 people. Civil war broke out among the natives themselves and it was said that this was the result of interference by the Germans. The attention of the Government of the United States was called to this; Germany of course was taking notice; Great Britain was taking notice. Germany

New Zealand's
Claim to Samoa

sent a fleet of three warships to Samoa in 1889; the United States of America sent a fleet of three warships to meet the German fleet, and Great Britain sent one smart, second-class cruiser. All those present would remember the immense hurricane that happened. The three German warships were driven ashore and the three American warships were in trouble. The British ship alone had a chance of escape by steaming right out to the open sea. She did so and was saved. The natives were religious or superstitious enough to think that the hurricane's interference was providential. However, what happened was this: A sort of Protectorate was established of the three nations—Germany, The United States and Great Britain. To say the least, the result was by no means satisfactory. Germany was given the larger and much more important of the Islands; the United States of America were given a small portion with a very good harbour. He did not wish to find fault with that. Great Britain was given some rights in other Islands. Germany, then became established there. He was delighted to notice the decision practically arrived at by the Council against German occupation of these Islands in the future. He was inclined to believe that we had not reached the last war. History has a knack of repeating itself and nations, just as unscrupulous as Germany had proved herself to be during the last few years, might make war. What took place in the triple Protectorate was that Germany was allowed to establish great trading stations all over the Pacific; great financial and commercial companies came along and settled there, and a strong squadron of German warships was sent to the Pacific and there established a huge wireless station. That was the position New Zealand had to face when war broke out. Then, for the first time, New Zealand appeared on the scene. New Zealand had a population of very nearly 1,200,000 which included 50,000 natives, who were treated exactly as all other citizens. As an instance of this he mentioned that there were six native Members in the New Zealand Parliament today. It could not be said that the native race was going out of existence; it was merging into the European population.

Immediately on the declaration of war they received a request to send a military force to take possession of German Samoa, whose harbours were offering shelter to raiders on our commerce. In fact, the headquarters of the German Fleet were there. Within ten days of the outbreak of war, 2,000 New Zealanders sailed out of Wellington to take possession of German Samoa. This was a great risk, the extent of which very few realised. At Noumea they were met by the battle cruiser "Australia" and also a French ship—the "Montcalm". On reaching their destination they called upon the Germans

to surrender, which they did, and German Samoa was occupied by New Zealand troops and had been occupied by them ever since. That was the position at the present time.

And now he would like to make one or two remarks in regard to the hardships New Zealand had suffered from the presence of the Germans in Samoa. The Germans had a strong squadron of warships in the Pacific. The British Government sent a number of ships into the Pacific to look after the interests of New Zealand. The result was a sea-fight, in which our ships were outclassed and outranged by those of the Germans and we sustained a loss of 2 cruisers and 1,600 British seamen. However, there was some consolation in the fact that the victorious German ships met their fate off the Falkland Islands not very long afterwards. Had it not been, however, for the presence of the *Australia* with the battle cruisers, the Germans would most certainly have bombarded the New Zealand coastal towns, and much shipping would have been sunk, especially ships trading between New Zealand and Great Britain. Fortunately they had not been troubled with the submarine difficulty. The Pacific was too far away. Nevertheless, as he had previously said, the Germans got raiders into the Pacific, which had reached the New Zealand coast, sunk several of their ships, and laid minefields. That was the sort of experience they had had from the Germans, and it was needless for him to say that they did not want the Germans ever to appear in the Pacific again. New Zealand was endeavouring, and not unsuccessfully, to build up a British nation in the Pacific. They were doing their best for civilization in that part of the world. They did not want to be confronted with a menace such as Germany had been to the nations of Europe for the last hundred years. They in New Zealand were not fighting for themselves, but for those who would come after them. Samoa was of great strategic importance, and the key to the Pacific.

He would like to call attention to the position taken up by the Natives under British control in the South Sea Islands during the years of the war. When they asked for volunteers in the early days of the war, 2,000 natives had come forward and many others had volunteered since. Many Maoris had been accepted as first grade fighting-men. Besides these there were the natives of Rarotanga who had volunteered and a contingent of them had been sent to Palestine where they had done good work. Natives of Niue, which was a comparatively small island, had also volunteered; further, the natives of Fiji had rendered most useful service in the Great War. Contrast this with the natives under the rule of Germany; he did not think there was a single case where any natives had volunteered to fight for Germany. He had received most pathetic letters from people of the

native races begging that never again should they be allowed to be placed under German rule. These were merely illustrations of the argument which he would put forward presently. Everyone knew what Germany would have done if she had been victorious in this war; most of them had read German publications on the subject. Direct references had been made by prominent German statesmen to various parts of the British Empire. Dr. Solf¹ himself had taken a very prominent part in German public affairs; at one time he was Governor of Fiji [*Samoa*]. Dr. Solf had stated publicly that when Germany became victorious he was quite certain that she would occupy some of the British Colonies. He (Mr. Massey) did not suggest that we should do what Germany would have done, as we were not out for territorial aggrandisement. We had been forced into this war, and it was up to us to prevent anything of the sort happening in the future.

With regard to the League of Nations, which had not yet been established, he hoped that it would be established and that it would be very successful. He would like to remind those present that we had had experiences in the past, which had sometimes been sad experiences, of joint control of native races. Mr. Massey mentioned the case of the New Hebrides. We were the best of friends today with the citizens of France and the Government of France, and he hoped and believed that that very satisfactory state of things would continue for all time. But he thought it would be admitted, not only by the people of France, but by others, that our joint control of the New Hebrides had been an ignominious failure. Egypt, too, had not been a success under joint control, neither had Samoa. He was very sceptical in regard to the success of any joint arrangement in regard to the German Colonies.

New Zealand had sent over 100,000 men to the war; 16,456 had been killed, and 41,404 had been wounded. That was a big record for a small country with a small population. They did not regret it because they believed it was their duty. The men went out to fight for the great cause of civilisation. He believed they would do the same thing again in similar circumstances.

In conclusion, on behalf of his fellow-citizens, and on behalf of the people in the Islands of the South Pacific, for the sake of the native races, and for the sake of humanity, he most strongly urged that the claim he was making in regard to Samoa should be granted by the Congress, and that the island should be allowed to remain under British control.

¹ Wilhelm Solf, Former German Secretary of State of the Colonial Office; Secretary of State of the Foreign Office in the Cabinet of Prince Max of Baden.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN said that the Dominion he represented had no territorial claims to advance. There was one thought, however, that he would like to present to the Council on behalf of the claims put forward by the other Dominions. Those Dominions were autonomous nations within an Empire which might more properly be called itself a League of Nations. He realised that the British Empire occupied a large part of the world, but the prejudice raised by the word Empire might be dispelled by considering the matter from the angle he had just suggested. All the cases advanced rested upon the plea of security, and he considered that the arguments put forward deserved the closest attention of the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU thanked the Dominion Ministers for the statements they had made. The Council had listened to them with the greatest attention, and he begged to assure them that no decisions would be taken without full consideration of all they had said, with regard both to the interests of each and to the interests of all.

25 JANUARY, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, January 27, 1919, at 10 hrs. 30

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.
Col. R. H. Williams.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon D Lloyd
George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Bal-
four, M. P.
Lt. Col Sir M. P. A. Han-
key, K. C. B.
Captain E Abraham.
Mr. H. Phipps.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
Capt. Portier.

ITALY

M Orlando.
Baron Sonnino.
Major Jones.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
H. E. M. Matsui.
M. Saburi.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. CLEMENCEAU, in opening the meeting, said that there were several small questions requiring solution before beginning the main business of the day.

1. M. Clemenceau said that the Small Powers were meeting in the afternoon to elect their delegates. It was necessary to find a Chairman for this meeting, and he suggested M. Jules Cambon.
(This proposal was accepted unanimously.)

Chairmanship of
Meeting of Small
Powers for the
Election of Dele-
gates to Com-
missions

2. M. Clemenceau said that up to the present time he had received only two formal protests against the arrangements made for the Conference; one was from Belgium and the other was from Portugal. He intended to answer these protests, but suggested that a delay of some days should be allowed to elapse before he replied.

Protests From
Belgium and
Portugal

(This was agreed to.)

3. M. Clemenceau said that he had received a proposal from M. Klotz, French Minister of Finance, that the word "guarantees" should be included in the terms of reference to the Commission set up on the subject of reparation.
(I. C. 117, paragraph 8.)¹

Terms of
Reference to
Commission on
Reparation

(This proposal was agreed to.)

¹ BC-8, p. 698.

(The terms of reference as amended therefore read:—

That a Commission be appointed with not more than three representatives apiece from each of the five Great Powers, and not more than two representatives apiece from Belgium, Greece, Poland, Roumania and Serbia, to examine and report, first on the amount for reparation which the enemy countries ought to pay, secondly on what they are capable of paying, thirdly on the method, form and time in which payment should be made, and fourthly on the guarantees that should be obtained for payment.)

4. M. Clemenceau said that the second proposal put forward by M. Klotz was that there should be a financial section of the League of Nations. (I. C. 117, paragraph 13.)²

Financial Section
for the League
of Nations

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that this proposal should be sent to the Drafting Committee on Financial Questions.

(This proposal was agreed to.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that each of the five Powers had agreed to nominate one member for the Financial Drafting Committee. He asked whether the members had yet been nominated by all concerned. On behalf of France, he nominated M. Klotz.

Designation of
Members of
Financial
Committee

On behalf of Great Britain, Italy and Japan respectively, Mr. Montagu, M. Salandra and M. Mori were designated. It was agreed that the American nominee should be appointed very shortly.

6. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he proposed to nominate a similar Commission to deal with Economic Questions. This Commission should frame in appropriate language questions arising under the following suggested headings:—

Commission
on Economic
Questions

Revictualling.

Raw Materials.

Industrial Re-constitution.

Privileges that should be granted to the devastated regions for their revictualling in raw materials and for the sale of their manufactured products. (President Wilson's suggestion.)

Customs Regulations.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he thought a distinction should be maintained between the questions of immediate moment to the Allied and Associated Powers and those which should form a part of the peace settlement proper. Certain questions related merely to co-operation between ourselves; others required consideration from the point of view of conferring with the enemy and with neutral Powers. These two categories should not be confused.

² BC-8, p. 701.

M. PICHON suggested that the Committee might be charged with the task of discriminating between those two classes of problems.

PRESIDENT WILSON gave, as an illustration of his meaning, the revictualling and re-starting of industries in devastated regions. This would call for co-operation between the Allied and Associated Powers in respect to shipping, priority of supply, etc. This question was one strictly confined to the Allies and not one connected with making peace with the enemy.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the question of preferential dealing in the matter of raw material appeared to involve both kinds of interest. The re-constitution of Belgian and French manufacturing industries was hard to separate from the re-construction of German industries. Germany could not pay for the re-building of the former unless herself assisted to re-start manufacturing. Priority of supplies, therefore, had a direct bearing on the Peace Treaty as well as on the arrangements to be made between the Allies.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that it was quite true that Germany could not make reparation unless she had the means therefor. Unless German industries were reconstituted, it was clear that Germany could not pay. The means of obtaining reparation from Germany was obviously a question to be considered by the Commission on reparation. He could see ahead certain difficulties in connection with this matter. If he were to carry back to America a treaty in which economic arrangements with America's friends were included in the settlement made with her enemies, the Senate might raise objections. Congress was jealous of being forestalled in commitments on economic matters. He could see no objection to the proposal under consideration provided it were not tied up with other matters in which the constraint of making peace was involved.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he also anticipated considerable difficulty in dealing with matters of this sort. Much of the raw material that would be required by Germany could only be found in the British Empire. France also, by the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine would dispose of more raw material than she did before. This would be still more the case were she to acquire the Saar Valley. Germany, therefore, could not start her industrial life again save at the good pleasure of the Allies. There would be in England parliamentary difficulties similar to those alluded to by President Wilson in the United States. It was clear that Germany would be entitled to ask what her economic future was going to be. It would be very difficult to obtain her consent to a Peace Treaty which took from her all her colonies and left the victorious Powers in exclusive possession of a number of raw materials which she required. Unless we were prepared beforehand, we should be met by a series of questions on these

subjects to confront our territorial demands and we might be at a loss to answer them. He felt that we ought to be prepared to meet this situation, and, therefore, supported the proposal that a Committee be set up to investigate these questions without, in any way, committing the Allied Powers.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether the questions enumerated above by M. Clemenceau were the only questions the Committee was to deal with.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that other questions might be added if occasion arose.

M. ORLANDO stipulated that the Committee should only be asked to frame the questions and not to offer solutions.

PRESIDENT WILSON remarked that every time a report was received on any questions, territorial or otherwise, problems of this nature were bound to arise. The Committee, therefore, would be dealing with conjectures. It could not know exactly what questions would arise. It might be preferable to deal with them only as they came up for solution in conjunction with other problems.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that the investigations of the Committee might influence the judgment of the Council on territorial questions.

MR. BALFOUR wished it to be recorded that the Committee should be entitled to add questions not included in the list given above.

(It was, therefore, agreed that each of the five Powers should nominate one member to form a Committee to investigate and to formulate economic questions having a direct bearing on the peace negotiations, and requiring solution by the Allied and Associated Powers before conferring with the enemy.)

On behalf of France and Great Britain respectively, M. Clementel and Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith were nominated as members of the Committee. It was agreed that the names of the American, Italian and Japanese members should be given on the following day.

7. M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that a Commission should be established to consider the following subjects:—

Commission on
Questions of Pri-
vate and Mari-
time Law

Reestablishment of the conventional regime of the treaties.

Settlement of private claims.

Enemy ships seized at the beginning of the War, in Allied Ports (Hague Convention 1907).³

Goods on enemy ships that have taken shelter and remained in neutral ports.

Restoration of illegal prizes.

Goods which have been stopped without being captured. (O. C. March 11th, 1915).⁴

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1247.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1915, supp., p. 144.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE was of the opinion that a very big issue was raised by this proposal, but he did not think that all these questions could be settled in the Peace Treaty with the enemy. The whole subject appeared to him to be more suitable for the League of Nations. These matters, moreover, could be discussed in a more favourable atmosphere in the League of Nations than in debate with Germany. It would be far more difficult for himself to make concessions in dealing with the enemy than in treating on behalf of Great Britain with the League of Nations.

M. SONNINO agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that four-fifths of these subjects would be better dealt with by the League of Nations. They referred not so much to the consequences of this war, as to the future conditions of the world. There were, however, among the subjects proposed, some such as the disposal of enemy ships and the restoration of illegal prizes, which were strictly suitable for inclusion in the Peace Treaty with the enemy.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed on this point with Baron Sonnino.

PRESIDENT WILSON also expressed the view that the cases cited were matters for immediate disposal, but felt with Mr. Lloyd George that questions of principle should be referred to the League of Nations.

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that the list should be divided into two.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the special cases alluded to in the list should be referred to the Commission on Reparation, while the question of general principles should be reserved for the League of Nations.

(This proposal was adopted.)

8. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a despatch from M. Bratiano, who wished it to be laid down that Bessarabia was not to send delegates to Prinkipo.

Question of Bessarabian Representation at Prince's Island

M. PICHON explained that according to M. Bratiano, Poland and Finland had been expressly excepted, whereas Bessarabia had not been mentioned. Bessarabia had willingly joined Roumania, and should therefore not be affected by the invitation to the various Governments of Russia.

M. PICHON was of opinion that it should be left to the Bessarabians themselves to decide whether or not they wished to go to Prinkipo. He himself felt convinced that they would not go.

(It was decided that no reply was immediately necessary, and that the question should stand over until the question of the meeting at Prinkipo came up for discussion.)

9. MR. BALFOUR said that he wished to raise a point which he thought had been settled, but of which he could find no record in the Minutes. He wished to know whether those elements of Old Russia which, we hoped, would succeed in forming se[parate states?] such as Esthonia, Georgia, possibly Russian Armenia and Daghestan, were invited to the meeting on Prince's Island.

Representation at
Prince's Island
of the States
Successor to the
Russian Empire,
Whose
Territories
were
in the Russian
Empire

(It was decided (See I. C. 116(1)):° that all such elements, unless expressly excluded, were invited to attend.)

10. MR. BALFOUR said that the British Government had been asked by the French Government to recognize Finland. The British Government hitherto had been friendly to Finland, but had stopped short of official recognition. At the present moment the Finns were behaving well, and he was inclined to agree. But as recognition of the Finnish Government would add one or possibly two delegates to the Peace Conference, he felt that the matter was not one which could be settled simply between the French and British Foreign Offices.

Recognition of
Finland

M. PICHON agreed that it was necessary to consult the Conference, but he had made the communication in question to the British Government, because both France and Great Britain had been concerned in dealings with General Mannerheim;⁷ he also pointed out that Finland figured not as a belligerent in the Conference, but as a neutral.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he saw no objection to recognizing Finland. Even Mr. Sazonoff did not propose its incorporation in Russia. Poland had been recognized, and Finland had far clearer boundaries than Poland.

M. PICHON said that France was all the more disposed to agree, as she had previously recognized Finland, and had only withdrawn her recognition when the Finns had displayed obvious pro-German leanings. This had now been amended.

BARON SONNINO thought that the Finnish question was too closely bound up with the Russian question as a whole to be prejudged at the present time. Any decision concerning the frontiers of Finland might be regarded as a settlement hostile to Russia, if made without hearing the Russians.

Finland was pro-Ally now, but a short time ago she had chosen for herself a German Prince. These alternations of conduct seemed to recommend caution and delay on the part of the Powers.

M. PICHON said that there was one advantage in avoiding delay, which was that General Mannerheim's Government might be overthrown if it failed to obtain recognition. He would, however, ask

° BC-7+, p. 676.

⁷ Gen. Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, Regent of Finland.

that, if a decision were not taken there and then, it should not be too long delayed.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he agreed with Baron Sonnino.

M. SONNINO proposed that the Finnish question should be taken up again when the question of the meeting on Prince's Island came up for discussion.

M. PICHON pointed out that the Powers had given a mark of confidence to the Finns by excluding them from the invitation.

(It was, therefore, decided that the question of recognizing Finland should be taken up in connection with the general problem of Russia.)

11. (It was decided that the instructions drafted by M. Pichon for the Commission to proceed to Poland should be discussed on the following day.)

Instructions
for the Polish
Commission

12. MR. BALFOUR said that he wished to draw attention to a matter which was rather of form than of substance. On the previous Friday the representatives of the British Dominions had been here. No discussions had followed on the statements they had made. Their position might appear somewhat ambiguous. According to the regulations, smaller belligerent powers with particular interests were entitled to participate in the Conference, while matters concerning them were discussed. It had originally been intended to deal with Colonial questions at this meeting, but other urgent matters came up for discussion. He would therefore suggest that in all such cases the meeting should be devoted primarily to the discussion of matters in which representatives of the Smaller States were interested, and at which they should be present throughout. At such meetings no other questions should be given precedence.

Procedure for the
Reception of
Delegates of the
Small Powers by
the Council

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the opinion that this proposal was fair, but he would like to ask that the representatives of powers with special interests be required by the Chairman to confine their attention to the subject for which their attendance had been requested.

(The Chairman undertook to do this.)

13. President Wilson, referring to the discussion on the previous Friday (I. C. 120),^s asked whether it was wise to deal with the Pacific piecemeal. He asked whether the Japanese case should not be heard before any partial decision was taken. If ready, he suggested that it should be heard first.

Presentation of
the Japanese Case

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that, as Australia and New Zealand held views on these subjects which in some respects might not be

^sBC-10, p. 718.

the views of the British Government, these Dominions be present at the statement of the Japanese case.

M. CLEMENCEAU said, that as the Dominions had been heard it appeared to him reasonable to hear Japan and then, after the statement had been heard, to open the discussion with the representatives of the Dominions in the room.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that Japan had been represented when Australia and New Zealand had been heard.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that Japan had a seat among the five Powers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE was of the opinion that Chinese as well as Australian and New Zealand Delegates should be present at the Japanese statement.

14. MR. BALFOUR thought that if his Japanese colleagues would agree, the case of the Japanese acquisitions in this war would fall into two categories—first, the Pacific Islands, second, those parts of China conquered from the Germans. In the first Australia and New Zealand were concerned. In the latter they were not at all concerned. He hoped, therefore, that the two cases would be dealt with separately.

**Mandatory
Principle**

BARON MAKINO said that he had no objection to the presence of the Dominion representatives, but he had prepared a statement including both Kiaochow and the Pacific Islands, as the capture of both had been the result of one campaign. He would therefore not be able, in his statement, to follow the distinction laid down by Mr. Balfour. He again stated that he had no objection to the presence of any interested Power.

MR. BALFOUR thought that great difficulties would be encountered if the discussion on China and the Pacific Islands was treated as one.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that even if the case for both were presented at one time and in one document the discussion might afterwards be held separately on each question.

BARON MAKINO asked whether the question would be discussed at once after his presentation of the Japanese case, or whether all statements of Colonial claims would be awaited.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that France had no claim to advance in the Pacific. He was therefore prepared to deal with this question first in isolation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that South Africa had raised a question which had no connection with the Pacific, namely, that of German South West Africa. Were we going to discuss the whole question of the Colonies or only some portion?

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the case as a whole interested many Powers. The effect of dealing with each portion of the subject

in the presence of the Powers specially interested in it would be kaleidoscopic. There would be a number of partial discussions followed by a general discussion with all parties previously heard present. This would be both a lengthy and unwieldy procedure.

MR. BALFOUR said that underlying the whole discussion was the question of the mandatory principle. He asked when this was to be discussed.

PRESIDENT WILSON then suggested that the question [of] the Pacific should first be taken up and a decision reached as to whether the mandatory principle should, or should not, apply in that area. The discussion might then move to another quarter and investigate whether or not the principle was applicable there. This would avoid very large conferences and very long discussions. He therefore proposed that the Japanese case should be heard in the presence of the Chinese delegates and that after the statement, that part of the case concerning the Pacific should be discussed in the presence of the Dominion delegates. At a later meeting the other portion might be taken up in the presence of the Chinese delegates.

BARON MAKINO said that the mandatory system mentioned by Mr. Balfour was not the only principle underlying the Colonial question. There were others. He therefore urged that the discussions to be undertaken should, for the time being, only have a provisional character.

15. Baron Makino said that he had another point to make. The presentation of the Japanese case concerning Kiaochow would be made with reference to Germany only. Japanese relations with China on these questions were on a different footing. The claim he would put forward was addressed to Germany alone, not to China. He did not wish to discuss in the presence of the Chinese delegates Japanese relations with Germany.

Question of
Kiaochow

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he did not understand Baron Makino to contend that the disposition of Kiaochow did not affect China.

BARON MAKINO said that he was not very well versed in the procedure of the Conference. He asked whether he was to conclude that third Powers interested were to join in the discussion.

It was pointed out by the Chairman that this had been so decided in the regulations.

It was therefore decided that the Japanese statement should be heard both by the Chinese and the Dominions delegates:

and

That in the discussion to follow, the Dominions delegates should participate with regard to the Pacific Islands, and the Chinese delegates with regard to Kiaochow.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday Afternoon, January 27, 1919, at 3 O'clock

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
President Wilson Mr. Robert Lansing Dr. G. L. Beer Prof. E. T. Williams Mr. A. H. Frazier Mr. L. Harrison Col. U. S. Grant	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P. The Rt. Hon. A. J. Bal- four, M. P. The Rt. Hon. Sir R. L. Borden, G. C. M. G. The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes Gen. The Rt. Hon. L. Botha The Rt. Hon. W. F. Mas- sey Lt.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B. Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O. Mr. H. Norman	M. Clemenceau M. Pichon M. Dutasta M. Berthelot Capt. Portier
ITALY	JAPAN	CHINA
M. Orlando M. Sonnino Count Aldrovandi Major A. Jones	Baron Makino H. E. M. Matsui M. Saburi	Dr. C. Thomas Wang Dr. K. Wellington Koo Mr. W. P. Chao

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. CLEMENCEAU having declared the meeting opened, said that he would call on the Japanese representative, Baron Makino to put forward the views of the Japanese Government on the question of the Pacific, with special reference to the German Pacific Islands. It has been decided to take into consideration the question of Kiaochow at a subsequent meeting.

Disposal of
German Colonies

BARON MAKINO then read the following statements:—

"The Japanese Government feels justified in claiming from the German Government the unconditional cession of:

(a) Japanese
Claims to Pacific
Islands and
Kiaochow

(a) The leased territory of Kiaochow together with the railways, and other rights possessed by Germany in respect of Shantung province.

(b) All of the Islands in German possession in the Pacific Ocean North of the Equator together with the rights and properties in connection therewith.

At the outbreak of the war, the German military and naval base at Kiaochow constituted a serious menace to the international trade and shipping, jeopardising the peace in the Extreme Orient. The Japanese Government in consultation with the British Government conformably with the agreement of 1911,¹ gave notice to the German Government to surrender the leased territory of Kiaochow with a view to its restoration to China. The German Government failing to make reply within the specified time limit, no other course was left to Japan but to proceed to reduce the German base by recourse to arms. The Japanese forces have, in conjunction with the British contingents, succeeded in taking the leased territory as well as the railway line connecting Tsingtau with Chinanfu, which the Germans used for military purposes. Japan has since continued in possession of the rights then enjoyed by Germany. By the reduction of the German stronghold, the base of her military as well as political offensive in the Extreme Orient has been completely destroyed, thereby re-establishing the uninterrupted course of trade, commerce, and communication in these regions.

Now that the primary object for which Japan entered the war and which was clearly set forth in her Declaration of war against Germany, has been successfully achieved, Japan cannot view with equanimity anything that may tend to revive German activities in the Far East to the undoing of all that has been achieved at no small sacrifice, and is compelled to advance the claims under item A.

Subsequently to the fall of Kiaochow it became a matter of urgent necessity to clear the Indian and Pacific Oceans, including the Australian routes, of the enemy ships and to keep these waters free and secure from enemy raids; and for carrying out this object, the Japanese navy extended its sphere of activities in co-ordination with those of the British navy. The enemy ships had been planning to escape from the superior Japanese and British naval forces, and the Japanese squadron, upon arrival at Panope, of the East Caroline group, found that they had been left. From the objects and materials left behind, it was abundantly clear that a full preparation for further raids was being made, using the harbour as their naval base. The circumstances demanded that the German South Sea Islands should forthwith be taken possession of in order to defeat the enemy's object, and the German possessions North of the Equator have since remained under Japanese occupation and control. The inhabitants of these Islands are being given employment so as to ensure livelihood for them, besides being provided with schools for their instructions, and they are fully contented under the present Regime. The total area of these Islands is about two thousand five hundred square kilometres with the population of some fifty thousand in all, composed of many different tribes. These tribes have each its own peculiar language, unable to understand one another without resorting to the medium of interpretation; and being on the whole still in a primitive state, they are not in a position to organize themselves politically, economically, or socially, in the modern sense. Japan being in actual possession and having regard to the circumstances which led to such

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. civ, p. 173.

occupation and to the present conditions above alluded to, and further, in view of the public opinion of Japan which is unanimous in this connection, she claims the definite possession of these Islands where she may continue to protect the inhabitants and to endeavour to better their conditions.

In conclusion, it may be stated that, in view of the extent of their efforts and achievements in destroying German base[s] in the Extreme Orient and the South Seas, and in safeguarding the important routes on the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the Mediterranean waters, to say nothing of their contribution in other respects, the Japanese Government feels confident that the claims above advanced would be regarded as only just and fair".

Baron Makino added that a documentary statement setting forth the Japanese claims in full would be handed in by him at a later date.

DR. C. THOMAS WANG said that the question was of such vital interest to China that he hoped the Great Powers would reserve decision until the views of China had been heard.

(This was agreed to)

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in order that the field of discussion should be defined as clearly as possible perhaps it would be better

to begin with a clear statement of what was the mind of those who proposed a trusteeship by the League of Nations through the appointment of mandatories.

The basis of this idea was the feeling which had sprung up all over the world against further annexation. Yet, if the Colonies were not to be returned to Germany (as all were agreed), some other basis must be found to develop them and to take care of the inhabitants of these backward territories. It was with this object that the idea of administration through mandatories acting on behalf of the League of Nations arose. This idea would be most distinctly illustrated by an example. The case of the South West Africa would be found a most favourable instance to make a clear picture. South West Africa had very few inhabitants, and those had been so maltreated, and their numbers had been so reduced under German administration, that the whole area was open to development that could not yet be determined. Therefore, either it must be attached to its nearest neighbour and so establish what would seem a natural union with South Africa, or some institution must be found to carry out the ideas all had in mind, namely, the development of the country for the benefit of those already in it, and for the advantage of those who would live there later.

This he assumed to be the principle: it was not intended to exploit any people; it was not intended to exercise arbitrary sovereignty over any people.

(b) Application
of Mandatory
System

The purpose was to serve the people in undeveloped parts, to safeguard them against abuses such as had occurred under German administration and such as might be found under other administrations. Further, where people and territories were undeveloped, to assure their development so that, when the time came, their own interests, as they saw them might qualify them to express a wish as to their ultimate relations—perhaps lead them to desire their union with the mandatory power.

Should the Union of South Africa be the mandatory of the League of Nations for South West Africa, the mandate would operate as follows:—In the first place, the League of Nations would lay down certain general principles in the mandate, namely, that districts be administered primarily with a view to the betterment of the conditions of the inhabitants. Secondly that there should be no discrimination against the members of the League of Nations, so as to restrict economic access to the resources of the district. With this limitation, the Union of South Africa would extend such of its laws as were applicable to South West Africa and administer it as an annex to the Union so far as consistent with the interest of the inhabitants. The expense of its administration would be met by fiscal arrangements, which, if they involved customs duties, would be the same for all nations trading with South West Africa; all countries would pay the same duties, all would have the same right of access.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that South Africa under present arrangements gave a preference to Great Britain of 3 per cent. He enquired whether that preference would extend to South West Africa under the scheme proposed by President Wilson.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied in the negative. Preference as far as South-West Africa was concerned, would be excluded under the circumstances, but, with the elimination of that exception, there would be no administrative difference between his scheme and annexation.

It was in the mind of many people that the mandatory power might be subject to constant irritation and constant interference by the League of Nations. In his opinion, that would not be so, as long as the mandatory performed his duties satisfactorily. In so far as the administration by the mandatory power became a financial burden, it was clearly proper that the League of Nations should bear a proportion of the expense. The fundamental idea would be that the world was acting as trustee through a mandatory, and would be in charge of the whole administration until the day when the true wishes of the inhabitants could be ascertained. It was up to the Union of South Africa to make it so attractive that South West Africa

would come into the Union of their own free will. Should that not be the case, the fault would lie with the mandatory.

He would ask: Was this merely camouflage: a means of bringing about the willingness of the people to be united with the Union, to which the Great Powers were not now willing to consent. He would answer, No, as under the Mandatory the administration would be so much in the view of the world that unfair processes could not be successfully attempted. If successful administration by a mandatory should lead to union with the mandatory, he would be the last to object. Therefore, the only difficulty which might arise would be that associated with the dangers of aggression. In this connection he was reminded of a story he had recently heard: In the United States a man bought an inordinate amount of real estate. When asked by a friend when this process would stop, he replied that he would never be satisfied so long as anyone owned any land adjoining his own.

With all respect, it seemed to him that this was the difficulty in the mind of the representative of Australia. If the present conditions in regard to annexation were permanently to continue, he would himself feel inclined to agree with the representative of Australia. But this position was based on a fundamental lack of faith in the League of Nations.

If any nation could annex territory which was previously a German Colony, it would be challenging the whole idea of the League of Nations. Under the League of Nations they were seeking to lay down a law which would rally the whole world against an outlaw, as it had rallied against Germany during the last war. Should a nation attempt to take from a mandatory the country entrusted to it, such nation would become an outlaw. When any nation became an outlaw, all nations should rise up against it, and treat it as such. If they had any confidence in the League of Nations there was not the slightest danger that anyone else except the mandatory power could take possession of any colony entrusted to it, such as New Guinea, because all the other nations would be pledged, with the United States in the lead, to take up arms for the mandatory.

Therefore, all danger of bad neighbours was past, and the only question remaining was whether administration by a mandatory would not be as useful as direct Australian administration. If the League of Nations did not prove adequate to its task, general chaos and confusion would arise in all parts of the world. Therefore, the League of Nations must succeed, and if all the delegates in this room decided that it must succeed, it would succeed.

As regards who should be the mandatory in New Guinea, his mind was absolutely open. It was perhaps so near to Australia that no

other alternative was possible. This reminded him of a story he had read in regard to the annexation of Mexico by the United States of America. Someone had asked whether America would annex that country. The reply was that the country was so contagious that America might be forced to take it whether it wanted to do so or not. Now, New Guinea might be so contagious that Australia would be obliged to take it whether it desired to do so or not. But this was in the lap of the gods.

If the process of annexation went on, the League of Nations would be discredited from the beginning. Many false rumours had been set about regarding the Peace Conference. Those who were hostile to it said that its purpose was merely to divide up the spoils. If they justified that statement in any degree, that would discredit the Conference. The attitude of the people on this point had been quite clearly expressed. Therefore he would say, "Let us have a frank interchange of views on this question", and he would put two questions:—

Assuming the League of Nations existed (and it was born on Saturday), was it necessary, from the point of view of protection to have annexation? If not, what was there in the principle of a mandatory that would make its adoption objectionable?

GENERAL BOTHA said that he did not wish to go over the ground which had been traversed by his colleague last week. German South

(c) Claims of
Union of South
Africa to German
South West Africa

West Africa, as everybody knew, was part and parcel of South Africa. It was a piece of land cut out of the Union. The Eastern and Southern frontiers of German South West Africa were merely lines drawn

on a map. The only good port on the West Coast was Walvis Bay, which belonged to the Union of South Africa. Walvis Bay had always been under the administration of the Union of South Africa. German South West Africa was a desert. It had been occupied by Germany for 30 or 40 years; but it had never been used for colonising purposes. There were no white people, with the exception of a few pensioned soldiers, who had been given grants of land as an inducement to remain. The only real settlements consisted of immigrants from the Union of South Africa. But these settlers were extremely few in numbers on account of the disabilities to which they had been subjected by the Germans. The Germans used the country only as a military station. The natives were utterly miserable; they were merely slaves of the Germans. On the other hand, these people must be given protection because the country was still full of wild bushmen, and for this purpose a big force would have to be maintained. The country had been very peaceful since its occupation by the Union of South Africa, and the people were quite happy. As already stated

the Germans never had any idea of settling the country. It was merely used as a military station. A large wireless station had been set up in direct communication with Berlin and it was also connected with other wireless installations 50 miles to the North. At present, under its constitution, the Union of South Africa enjoyed certain free rights. If a mandatory were now appointed to administer German South-West Africa, the trade relations of that territory with the Union would necessarily undergo a great change, and the Union would be compelled to protect itself economically, and to place customs houses round the frontiers. That naturally implied a large expenditure.

The Union of South Africa had suffered greatly from animal diseases, which invariably came from the North. Nothing was being done in the North of Africa to stop these diseases, and the South was compelled to take the necessary measures. If a mandatory were placed there, and if it did not spend money to stop these diseases, the Union would be obliged to do so. In his opinion, there was therefore only one solution, namely, complete union between the two territories.

The few German colonies still remaining in German South-West Africa had recently passed a resolution proclaiming a republic. Should a mandatory be appointed, would it be obliged to respect that decision? This demand for a republic had been merely put forward in order to favour the Germans, and, should it be granted, the Union would be the only sufferers. The League of Nations was a long way off, and could not possibly know the true requirements of the country. Had there been a large population in German South-West Africa, he would have concurred in President Wilson's proposal. He would ask that the point of view of the Union should not be lost sight of. For the sake of peace, in order to satisfy the peoples of South Africa, German South-West Africa must be incorporated in the Union. Should this not be done, then there would be constant agitation. The small German population would continue to foment trouble in order to get back to Germany, and those troubles might extend to the Union. It must be recollected that in South Africa there had been two republics (Transvaal and Orange Free State) and two British Colonies (The Cape and Natal). In the past there had been a great struggle between the two. It was no use to talk about the past, but the struggle still existed, and the danger of an uncertain frontier might re-open the sore. The Union consisted of two peoples—the English and the Dutch. He had spent his life in an endeavour to get those two races to understand each other. It was necessary that they should co-operate for their own

good and for their own future and, unless their requirements were fully understood, grave trouble might at any moment arise.

He himself was a great enthusiast for the League of Nations, and realized that all must be ready to make great sacrifices to attain that high ideal. But they must not be too hasty in settling these questions, lest the burden prove to be too heavy in the beginning. Therefore, they should settle each case on its merits, and let the League of Nations start with a clean sheet.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN enquired whether both races—the Dutch and British—in South Africa were agreed on this question.

GENERAL BOTHA replied in the affirmative.

(d) Australian
Representative's
Views on the
Application of
the Mandatory
Principle to
New Guinea

MR. HUGHES said he would, in the first place, direct himself to the general principle of mandatories before applying the principle to Australia. The mandatory principle, although generally applied to the management of estates and private affairs, but [*had*] never been applied to countries. He would, to begin with, ask the question: Was the mandatory principle *per se* desirable? If contrasted with the direct control, which every country exercised over its own territories, the answer must be in the negative. Consequently, the mandatory principle was merely a compromise suggested by the circumstances in which the Allies now found themselves. It was not suggested that either the United States of America or Great Britain, or France should be governed through a Mandatory State. It was only suggested that the mandatory system should be applied to the territories previously under German Dominion. He was not personally, in principle, opposed to the idea of a mandatory, but he thought it would be necessary to prove the necessity for making use of this machinery in each case separately. If it were asked what was the best form of Government: clearly the most direct form would be the best, and the most indirect form the worst. Therefore, as a general principle, the mandatory system would have to give way, and direct Government would be given the preference. This being the case, he would ask: Why have a mandatory? The President replied: Because the world was against annexations. To that, he would reply: Was it proposed then, to adopt that principle to all questions to be dealt with by the Peace Conference? Was it proposed to appoint mandatories to the New States to be created in Europe? It was proposed to take away the Pacific Islands from Germany because she had not governed them well. But why should the mandatory principle be applied to any of the territories taken by the Dominions? It was for those who wished to apply the principle to prove their case. They all desired to do what was right; but what advantage was to be gained by the

appointment of a mandatory for New Guinea in preference to handing it over to Australia? Geographically, and by virtue of its action during the war, Australia had a just claim. President Wilson had said that Australia should accept the mandatory system as she would thereby obtain greater security. Australia owned, at present, governed, and had for many years governed, parts of New Guinea. Australia possessed a good Government; the people were very critical and censorious, and had shown that they were capable of taking over responsibilities. Consequently, that Government which had been governing adjoining territories for centuries had the best claims. To sum up: Australia had governed New Guinea; New Guinea was essential to the safety of Australia; Australia was a democracy; the Australians were on the spot; Australia knew what New Guinea wanted far better than any League of Nations. Australia actually at the present moment represented the Nations, and if the claims of Australia were not now accepted, what more attention would it in future receive from the League of Nations? Were this mandatory principle applied to Great Britain, to America, to France, it would not work. As Ireland is to the United Kingdom, as Mexico is to the United States of America, as Alsace-Lorraine is to France, so was New Guinea to Australia; but it was said that the taking over of Alsace-Lorraine by France merely meant a restoration. The mandatory system could never be as satisfactory for New Guinea as the direct system. It is said that the World favours the mandatory system because it is against annexations; but annexation was only bad when it made for Imperialism. The Australians had fought to govern themselves in their own way, and New Guinea was the outward and visible sign of the World's recognition that they were worthy to be entrusted with the Government of that country. Next, it would be asked, what assurances could Australia give for its good behaviour? Australia would be a member of the League of Nations. The League would control their members, and if necessary outlaw them. He would point out, however, that progress had not been made by the World in general, but by peoples in particular. France and England and America were examples of this. They had now reached their present stage not because the World had put them there, but because they had worked out their own salvation. Australia was a democracy, not unworthy of comparison with any other. The people of Australia would never tolerate the ill-treatment of other peoples. They had fought against militarism and for the liberty of the people. The choice between annexation and the mandatory system was a narrow one. There was nothing to be gained by the mandatory system that could not be got by direct Government, except that the World was said to dread annexations. But he was positive that no one

dreaded the annexation of New Guinea by Australia. The world only dreaded annexation for Imperialistic purposes or for the purpose of exploiting other peoples. But Australia was a democracy and responsible for its actions to its people. He would readily admit that the mandatory system would be applicable to other parts; but it could never apply to New Guinea.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that before examining particular cases he thought the meeting should have an opportunity of considering the practical application of the mandatory system. This was the first time they had heard an exposition of the principle. As far as the principle was concerned, apart from certain particular cases, he had no objections to make; but its practical application required careful consideration and he would like to consult his experts and discuss with them the proposals put forward in President Wilson's speech. He saw a practical difficulty, for instance, as regards the expenditure of money. Colonies, as far as Great Britain was concerned, did not mean a division of spoils, but rather the incurring of expenditure. Great Britain had no Colony from which a contribution towards the national expenditure was obtained. He thought the same consideration would present itself were the mandatory system applied to Mesopotamia, Syria, and other parts of the Turkish Empire. Whoever took Mesopotamia would have to spend enormous sums of money for works which would only be of profit to future generations. It might pay in the future, but who was to pay at present? Was the League of Nations to pay? How would it be possible to raise sufficient money to carry out all the necessary works for the development of these countries from which no returns could be expected for many decades? Consequently, if a country was to be merely a mandatory, it would be necessary to have a levy from all members of the League of Nations in order to make good the annual deficit. But would countries be able to raise money by taxation in order to enable, say, France to develop the Cameroons? Take again the protection of the shores. Where would the League of Nations come in with reference to all these questions? Therefore, he thought each of those present at this meeting should consult their advisers purely on the practical application of the principles of the mandatory power, as laid down by President Wilson in his speech.

MR. MASSEY enquired whether, if the meeting were adjourned, he would have an opportunity of putting forward his case when debate was resumed.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied in the affirmative.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that experts could give opinions only on subjects in which they were experienced. Undoubtedly, their training

(e) Practical
Application of
Mandatory
System

was such that they had experience only in what they had been accustomed to; but a new regime was now about to be established. It had been said that the British Colonies had cost Great Britain a large amount. But he preferred to say that Great Britain had carried the burden of their development up to the point where they were prepared for independence and self-Government. They were then admitted to a little family of nations. It was just this burden which he wanted the League of Nations to take up, and it was not inconceivable that an assessment might be made against the members. General Smuts, in his pamphlet, had rightly compared the British Empire to a League of Nations. Undoubtedly, the obligation of defending the territory would rest upon the mandatory but part of the expense of the defence, if too heavy, would be borne by the League of Nations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE repeated that a new principle had been put before them and he would like to have it examined, before its application to particular cases came under consideration. He was not afraid of the principle, because in the British Crown Colonies they did not differentiate between nationals as regards the grant of concessions; but he would like to have time carefully to examine the scheme proposed.

(Mr. Lloyd George's proposal was accepted, and the Meeting adjourned until 11 o'clock next morning.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 28 January, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, January 28, 1919, at 11 O'clock a. m.

[PRESENT]

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson
Mr. R. Lansing
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison
Col. Williams
Dr. G. L. Beer
Professor E. T. Williams

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Bal-
four, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Sir R. L.
Borden
The Rt. Hon. W. M.
Hughes
Gen. The Rt. Hon. L.
Botha
The Rt. Hon. W. F.
Massey
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A.
Hankey
Captain E. Abraham
Mr. E. Phipps

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
Capt. Portier

ITALY

M. Orlando
M. Sonnino
Count Aldrovandi
Major Jones

JAPAN

Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui
Viscount Chinda
General Nara
M. Yamakawa
M. Saburi

CHINA

Dr. C. Thomas Wang
Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo
M. W. P. Shao

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that on the previous evening he had had an opportunity to consult his Colonial experts. All that he was, for the moment, prepared to say was that in so far as the territories conquered by troops from the United Kingdom (in distinction from those conquered by Dominion troops) were concerned, he saw no insuperable difficulty in reconciling the views of Great Britain with those expressed by President Wilson. There certainly were practical difficulties, but there were always practical difficulties in attempting to realize any ideal. He was trying to formulate a plan which would overcome those difficulties, and he had good hope of success. The Dominions case, however, was a special case, and he hoped that President Wilson would look into it again. He did not think that

**Mandatory
System:
(a) Attitude
of the British
Empire**

a special exception in favor of the Dominions would spoil the whole case, possibly the reverse might be true. A scheme might more readily be wrecked by courting resistance than by avoiding difficulties. The contiguity of the territories in question to the Dominions claiming them suggested that they should form an integral part of those countries, more especially as it would be from them that emigration would take place. Another point he would like to put to the Allied Powers, including France, was that there was no large difference between the mandatory principle and the principles laid down by the Berlin Conference, under which Great Britain, France, and Germany held many of their colonies. This Conference had framed conditions about the open door, the prohibition of the arms and liquor traffic, which resembled those President Wilson had in view in many respects, except that no external machinery had been provided for their enforcement. It followed, therefore, that by adopting the mandatory principle wherever possible Great Britain would not be altering her Colonial regime to any appreciable extent. He would be very glad to hear the French view, as France was as much concerned in the question as Great Britain.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the French Minister for the Colonies would be ready to make a statement on the following day.

M. PICHON said that on the points raised by Mr. Lloyd George he thought there would be no differences between France and Great Britain.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that there were certain Franco-British conventions relating to the German colonies; for instance Togoland.¹ He asked whether these conventions should be produced before the Council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE was of the opinion that any arrangements made during the war should be placed before the meeting.

M. CLEMENCEAU undertook to produce them, and asked whether the Japanese delegates would do likewise.

BARON MAKINO said that he had no objection to doing so, and would send all such agreements to the Chairman. He would point out, however, that the Japanese conventions were in the form of an exchange of ideas rather than formal conventions.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether Baron Makino alluded to the agreement reached in 1917.²

¹ The text of the Togoland agreement made in August 1914 is given in "Rapport au Ministre des Colonies sur l'administration des territoires occupés du Togo, de la conquête au 1^{er} juillet 1921", *Journal Officiel de la République française*, August 25, 1921, p. 9873.

² H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1924), vol. vi, p. 634.

BARON MAKINO replied that this was the agreement to which he referred. M. ORLANDO said that Italy also had a convention with France and Great Britain concerning German colonies.

M. PICHON asked if M. Orlando referred to the Pact of London.³

M. ORLANDO replied in the affirmative.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked that if drafts were submitted to the Council, no sense of finality should be attached to them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE entirely agreed. He was much influenced by what the President had said on former occasions, and quite agreed that any proposal submitted should be provisional.

MR. MASSEY said that he had not much to add to the two speeches made on the previous day. He wished, however, to assure President Wilson that though he did not quite take his point of view, he would speak in no spirit of opposition to the idea of the League of Nations. He could not, however, help recalling the precedents of history. Similar attempts had been made before. The most notable instance was that of the Congress of Vienna, where all the nations of Europe had been gathered in order to frame universal peace. The results of its labors had been a failure. He hoped that this Congress would not end in the same way, but it was well to remember that history repeated itself.

He wished to point out that New Zealand and Australia were, so to speak, in the same boat. If Australia were invaded by an enemy power, New Zealand must fall, as her communications would be cut. The converse applied with equal force. The danger to both would doubtless grow less in course of time as the populations of these countries increased.

Samoa was of vital importance to New Zealand. It was situated on the main water route to the South Pacific from the Panamá Canal. If, by any chance, Samoa were in hostile hands, New Zealand would be strangled. This eventuality, therefore, was a cause of anxiety to the country he represented, and on this point, despite other differences, all its inhabitants were of one mind. He hoped that he would be able to induce President Wilson to see the question from their standpoint.

One of the main purposes laid down by President Wilson for the mandatory system was the betterment of the inhabitants. He felt he could claim that New Zealand had done in this respect as well as any mandatory power was ever likely to do. New Zealand was not only composed of the two islands generally attributed to her. She also governed the Cook Archipelago, which had been assigned to New

³ Great Britain, Cmd. 671, Misc. No. 7 (1920): *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915.*

Zealand twenty years ago. The experiment made by New Zealand in administering this territory had been highly successful. Schools had been instituted in all the larger islands; agricultural experts had been sent to train the populations, which had now become industrious and productive; hospitals had been set up at Rarotonga, which was the seat of the New Zealand Commissioner and of his staff. The same system had been applied to the natives there as since the treaty of 1840⁴ had been applied to the Maoris. The Maoris of New Zealand were highly respected by the whites, and every trade and profession was open to them. One of his own ministers in the government, Dr. Pomare, was a Maori. His great knowledge of the Polynesian races had suggested that he should come to the Peace Conference, and, but for the expense of sending an additional minister from New Zealand, he thought that he would have been a most suitable delegate.

When Samoa was taken over at the beginning of the war, the same policy of education and improvement was started there, and had been satisfactory. The Cook Islanders and Samoans were related, and spoke dialects of the same language. If a change were to be made, the inhabitants of Samoa would be dissatisfied.

The difference between the mandatory principle and that instituted by New Zealand was that between leasehold and freehold tenure. No individual would put the same energy into a leasehold as into a freehold. It would be the same with governments.

President Wilson had suggested improvements. He agreed it was necessary to increase production, but certain financing would have to be done. On the credit of a government like Australia, loans could be raised for the development of New Guinea, which, before it could support a civilised population, would require docks, roads, telegraphs, and a number of other improvements. The country itself, when developed, would afford ample security for further loans. Could this process be as successfully set in motion by a mandatory power?

Though it might not be the time to discuss what should be done with the German Empire, he held that Germany was an outlaw among nations, and should be treated as such. Unless broken up, it would become a danger again, and future generations must be safeguarded against its pernicious activities.

Unless these territories were annexed to some strong state, the Germans would attempt to get them back. All knew what German intrigue and peaceful penetration meant. It had occurred even in New Zealand.

⁴ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xxix, p. 1111.

The phrase "division of spoils" had been used. He begged to point out that New Zealand would not obtain much spoil. Her financial burdens incurred during this war were very heavy. At a time when New Zealand was not half developed, it had been called upon to send volunteers immense distances to take the field in Europe. It had done so willingly, and not only lost a valuable portion of its population, but had also incurred 100 millions of debt. There was little prospect of any recoupment of such losses. The financial value of Samoa was a mere trifle in comparison. He appealed to the President to look at the whole question from the New Zealand point of view. He would ask him to recall the period immediately after the American War of Independence. What would Washington have done had it been suggested to him that a mandatory power, or even the colonists themselves as mandatories of a League of Nations, should be given charge of the vast territories in North America not at that time colonised? There was little doubt that the American settlers would have protested at this offer, and rightly so, for, had this taken place, the United States would not have grown into one of the greatest Powers of the World. New Zealand had only fought to protect the citizens of the South Pacific and all decent citizens of the world from future wars.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that for the sake of keeping history straight, he would make a passing comment on one of the remarks just heard. He would not admit that there was any historical precedent for the work now in hand; least of all should the Congress of Vienna be cited as such. The Holy Alliance of that time existed professedly to extend the system of monarchical and arbitrary government in the World. Such, he hoped, was not the purpose of the present conference. It was the Holy Alliance which had provoked in the Western Hemisphere the Monroe Doctrine, which was a protest against the system brought about by the Congress of Vienna. Great Britain had soon dissociated herself from the Holy Alliance and supported the Monroe Doctrine.

The present enterprise was very different from that undertaken at Vienna a century ago, and he hoped that even by reference no odor of Vienna would again be brought into its proceedings.

As to Samoa, he had one remark to make. There was another Power present in the Samoan Islands which was not unfriendly either to Great Britain or to New Zealand. This power had not played the same part as New Zealand in the war in the Southern Pacific, because it was not then at war with Germany. The Power in question was the United States of America. He dared assert, however, that under the regime of the League of Nations there was

little chance that any Power would be able to play in Samoa the part played by Germany without attracting the attention of the United States.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this part of the discussion was now adjourned. The Council would proceed to discuss the question of the German possessions in the Far East, together with the Chinese delegates.

As the question of restitution of the fortress had been raised, he thought it useful to read the words of the Japanese ultimatum to Germany, because it had a bearing on the purpose in hand:—

“Considering it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East, and to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the agreement of the Alliance between Japan and Great Britain in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim of the said agreement—the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

(1) To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm, at once, those which cannot be withdrawn.

(2) To deliver on a date not later than the 15th September, 1914, to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition and compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiauchow, with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China.”

Since the occupation of Kiauchow, Japan has been in actual possession. In view of all that had passed between the Governments of China and Japan, Baron Makino thought that China fully realized the import of Japanese occupation. The friendly interchange of views on this subject had been entered into, and Japan had agreed to restore Kiauchow as soon as Japan had free disposal of the place. Agreements had also been reached with regard to the (leased) railway.

As notes had been exchanged, he thought that a statement of these engagements⁵ might be worth the consideration of the members of the Council.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked Baron Makino whether he proposed to lay these notes before the Council.

BARON MAKINO said that he did not think the Japanese Government would raise any objection, but as the request was an unexpected one he would be compelled to ask its permission.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked on behalf of China if Mr. Koo would do likewise.

⁵ For the text of these notes and the engagements entered into, see *Foreign Relations*, 1915, pp. 177 and 193

MR. KOO said that the Chinese Government has no objection to raise.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked both the Japanese and Chinese Delegates to state whether they would make known to the Council the conditions of the restoration agreed between them.

BARON MAKINO said that he would do so, provided his Government would make no objection. He did not think it would. If it were within his own power, he would produce these documents as soon as possible. There was, however, one point he wished to make clear. Japan was in actual possession of the territory under consideration. It had taken it by conquest from Germany. Before disposing of it to a third party it was necessary that Japan should obtain the right of free disposal from Germany.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Council was dealing with territories and cessions previously German without consulting Germany at all.

BARON MAKINO said that the work now in hand was one of preparation for the presentment of the case to Germany. It followed therefore that the cession of Kiauchow would have to be agreed upon by Germany before it was carried out. What should take place thereafter had already been the subject of an interchange of views with China.

MR. KOO said that he was very glad, on behalf of China, to have the opportunity of putting the case of his country. He had heard with interest the Dominion speakers, who spoke on behalf of a few million people. He felt his own responsibility was enhanced by the fact that he was the spokesman of 400 millions, one quarter of the human race. The Chinese delegation would ask the Peace Conference for the restoration to China of the Leased Territory of Kiauchow, the railway in Shantung, and all other rights Germany possessed in that province before the war. He would confine himself to broad principles in order not to employ too much of the Council's time. Technical details would be explained in full in a memorandum which he proposed to submit. The territories in question were an integral part of China. There [they?] were part of a province containing 3 million inhabitants, of Chinese in race, language and religion. The history of the lease to Germany was doubtless familiar. The lease had been extorted by force. The German fleet had occupied the coast of Shantung and landing parties had penetrated into the interior. The lease had been extorted as a price for the withdrawal of the expedition. The pretext of this proceeding was the accidental killing of two missionaries in the interior of the country in a manner quite beyond the control of the Chinese Gov-

German Lease-
hold Rights in
China

ernment. On the principles of nationality and of territorial integrity principles accepted by this Conference, China had a right to the restoration of these territories. The Chinese delegation would feel that this was one of the conditions of a just peace. If, on the other hand, the Congress were to take a different view and were to transfer these territories to any other Power, it would, in the eyes of the Chinese Delegation, be adding one wrong to another. The Shantung province, in which Kiauchow and the railway to Chinanfu were situated, was the cradle of Chinese civilisation, the birthplace of Confucius and Mencius, and a Holy Land for the Chinese. This province had always played a very important part in the development of China. Economically, it was a densely populated country, with 36 million people in an area of only 35,000 square miles. The density of the population produced an intense competition and rendered the country quite unsuitable for colonisation. The introduction of a Foreign Power could only lead to the exploitation of the inhabitants, and not to genuine colonisation. Strategically, Kiauchow commanded one of the main gateways of North China. It controlled one of the shortest approaches from the sea to Peking, namely, the railway to Chinanfu which, at its junction with the railway from Tientsing, led straight to the capital. In the interest of Chinese national defence which in time would be organised, the Chinese Delegation would be unable to admit that any Foreign Power had claims to so vital a point. China was fully cognisant of the services rendered to her by the heroic Army and Navy of Japan in rooting out German power from Shantung. China was also deeply indebted to Great Britain for helping in this task at a time of great peril to herself in Europe. China also was not forgetful of the services rendered her by the troops of the other Allies in Europe, which had held in check an enemy who might otherwise have easily sent reinforcements to the Far East and thereby prolonged hostilities there. China appreciated these services all the more because the people in Shantung had also suffered and sacrificed in connection with the military operations for the capture of Kiauchow, especially in regard to requisitions for labour and supplies of all kinds. But, grateful as they were, the Chinese Delegation felt that they would be false to their duty to China and to the world if they did not object to paying their debts of gratitude by selling the birthright of their countrymen, and thereby sowing the seeds of discord for the future. The Chinese Delegation therefore trusted that the Conference, in considering the disposal of the leased territory and other rights held by Germany in Shantung, would give full weight to the fundamental and transcendent rights of China, the rights of political sovereignty and territorial integrity.

BARON MAKINO said that he had listened with great attention to

what had fallen from his Chinese colleague concerning the direct restitution of Kiauchow to China. In the statement put forward on the previous day, he had explained the reasons for which the Japanese Government had undertaken the reduction of this German stronghold.

Mr. Koo said that the Chinese Delegation did not adopt quite the same view as Baron Makino. He was well aware that Japan after her undertaking in 1914—which he was glad to note had just been renewed by Baron Makino—would not retain the territory.

But there was a choice between direct and indirect restitution. Of the two China would prefer the first. It was always easier to take one step than two if it led to the same place. They had always considered all the Conventions made with Japan as provisional and subject to revision by the Peace Conference. Before becoming a belligerent China had agreed to accept all the conditions made to Germany by Japan.

China's entry into the war, however, had completely altered her status. None of the previous arrangements precluded China either from declaring war on Germany, or from being represented at the Peace Conference. Nor could they preclude her now from demanding from Germany direct restitution of her rights. China's belligerency had in itself put an end to the leases obtained by Germany in Chinese territory. Furthermore, there was a clause in the lease to the effect that Germany could not transfer her rights to another power.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, 28 January, 1919, at
4:00 p. m.**

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.
Dr. G. L. Beer.
Professor E. T. Williams.
Colonel U. S. Grant.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Bal-
four, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Sir R. L.
Borden.
The Rt. Hon. W. M.
Hughes.
Gen. The Rt. Hon. L.
Botha.
The Rt. Hon. W. F. Mas-
sey.
Lt-Col. Sir M. P. A. Han-
key.
Major A. M. Caccia.
Mr. H. Norman.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
Captain Portier.

ITALY

M. Orlando.
Baron Sonnino.
M. Salvago-Raggi.
Count Aldrovandi.
Major Jones.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
Viscount Chinda.
H. E. M. Matsui.
M. Saburi.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. Simon, the French Minister for the Colonies, also attended for part of the proceedings.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU, after declaring the meeting opened, said he would ask M. Simon, the French Minister for the Colonies, to submit the French case on the African question.

Disposal of
German Colonies:
(a) French
Claims to
Cameroons &
Togoland

M. SIMON said that as it had been decided that the German Colonies should not be given back to Germany, the two questions to be decided were: To whom should these Colonies be given, and what should their form of government be? He would place before them the French point of view. In the first place he would read two letters exchanged between M. Cambon and Sir Edward Grey during the war, dealing with the provisional division of Togoland and the Cameroons.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he did not think it would serve any useful purpose to read these documents just then. Other agreements

would have to be put before the meeting also, and the delegates could take a note of the complete file. They were only concerned that afternoon with the French point of view.

M. SIMON said these agreements were merely temporary. They were to be submitted to the Peace Conference, who would decide whether they should be considered as definite agreements or not. There was also a similar agreement in Article XIII of the Pact of London, under which possible rectifications of frontiers in Africa, in favour of Italy, France and Great Britain, subject to certain territorial compensations, were considered.

France at once had declared that she was not concerned in the German East and West African Colonies, but on the other hand she wished to state her claims to the Cameroons and Togoland. For what reasons did France claim those territories? She claimed them for the same reasons that had been used by the Dominions in putting forward their claims. They had had to take account of the sacrifices which they had been forced to make to conquer these territories from Germany, who, in spite of her undertakings, had violated the acknowledged neutrality of these regions.

Historically, the French also had certain claims. They had been the first to explore these territories; they had also been the first to sign agreements or treaties with the native races. There had been a signed agreement with Togoland since 1892, and some years later they had signed one also with the Cameroons. The treaty with Malimba,¹ which gave Duala to France, would also be recalled. He would lay stress upon this point, because allusion to this treaty had been made when difficulties occurred with England about the possession of Duala.

They would consider the treaties signed with Germany as abrogated. Furthermore, certain of these treaties had been signed under the pressure of political events. He would refer in particular to the Treaties of 1895 and 1897 in regard to Togoland,² and to that of 1911 in regard to the Cameroons.³

They would now have to consider certain political considerations. Ever since they had occupied these territories the tribes had been happy, and they had asked to remain under French control. He would refer in particular to the requests made by Garua and Marua, in the name of the inhabitants, that the Cameroons should be united to France.

¹ French treaty with Malimba of April 19, 1883, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. lxxv, p. 340.

² Franco-German treaty with regard to Togoland of July 23, 1897, *ibid.*, vol. lxxxix, p. 584.

³ Franco-German convention concerning Equatorial Africa, November 4, 1911, *ibid.*, vol. civ, p. 956.

Then there were also the questions of economic and geographical contiguity, as had been set forth by Mr. Hughes in respect to New Guinea.

Geographically, Togoland was an integral part of Dahomey, which was rather closely wedged in between Nigeria and the Gold Coast. Togoland and Dahomey were inhabited by the same tribes, possessing the same traditions.

The same reasons of contiguity existed between the French Congo and the Cameroons. The policy of Germany, which ended in the agreement of 1911, had been to cut the French possessions off from the sea, so as to smother the French economically later on. The large sea coast of the Cameroons, and the port of Duala were required for the development of French Equatorial Africa.

It now remained for them to consider the question of the Government to be given to these territories, which had become ownerless.

There were three possible solutions:

1. Internationalisation, pure and simple.
2. A mandate given to one of the Powers by the League of Nations.
3. Annexation, pure and simple, by a sovereign power.

Mr. Lloyd George had frankly condemned the first system in the course of the conversation of 24th January,⁴ when he had said that it could not be adopted in regard to backward countries—that it would lead to disorder, and that the high ideals for which such a system would be established could not be reached.

He would agree with this view for humanitarian reasons. Similar experiments tried in the past had failed ignominiously. He would only mention the dual control over Samoa, against which the American President himself had spoken, and that of the New Hebrides, which, he hoped, would not be allowed to continue, where, under British control, a tribunal composed of a Spanish judge and a Dutchman, etc. existed.

What was not possible for small territories, was all the less possible for large regions.

The second system consisted in the appointment of a mandatory by the League of Nations. The Dominions had made very strong objections to this system, and these objections were supported by France also. When, in two territories inhabited by the same population, two different systems of government were created, difficulties would ensue and the very opposite of what was desired would result.

The mandatory system consisted of empowering one nation to act

⁴ See BC-10, p. 719.

on behalf of another. Every mandate was revocable, and there would therefore be no guarantee for its continuance. There would thus be little inducement for the investment of capital and for colonisation in a country whose future was unknown. The mandatory would be content to live quietly without trying to develop the colony or to improve the conditions of life of the natives, and the desired ideal would not be attained by this means.

Another question occurs. Who would be the mandatory? Would it be a little nation, without colonising traditions, capital, or men? Or, would the mandatory be a large nation whose presence would be a danger and compel the adjoining nations to organize for defence, as Mr. Hughes said in regard to New Guinea? This same remark applied to the Cameroons and to the Congo. It would also be necessary to take into account the uncertainty of alliances, which were always liable to be changed.

He (M. Simon) could not, therefore, favour the system of a mandate to be given to one Power by the League of Nations.

The third system still remained to be considered—that of annexation, pure and simple, which he had come to support that day. It was the only one which would accomplish the double object of every colonial government worthy of the name, namely, the development of the country and the effective protection of the natives during the period required for their development towards a higher plane of civilization.

He would ask his hearers to consider the objections that could be raised against a policy of annexation. Annexation might be said to lead to the exploitation of the country for the benefit of the individual; it might be said to lead to the ill-treatment of the natives; it might permit of the setting up of the economic policy of the "closed door".

All these points were part of a theory which was today quite obsolete and condemned by all. France had higher aspirations, and the Colonies were no longer considered as a kind of close preserve for the exploitation and benefit of the individual.

Higher moral principles now guided the nations. All the great Powers worthy of the name, considered their colonies as wards entrusted to them by the world. They accepted this guardianship and the duties connected therewith, duly appreciating their duties in regard to the maintenance of peace, their duties in regard to the protection of the people either by the limitation of the sale of alcohol, the prevention of gun-running, etc., and their duties in regard to the provision of social education. Only a great nation, in possession of trained administrative services, and with men and money

at its disposal could undertake and carry through such an enterprise. The work of civilization could only be carried out under the auspices of the sovereignty of a country.

If France were to receive the territories under consideration, she would be prepared to give assurances to those who might still harbour fears. The French formally announced that day that their policy in regard to the territories formerly German would entail the application of a liberal system, practically open to everybody, the "Open Door" system, without differential tariffs. Everybody would be able to enter and to trade in Togoland and the Cameroons without let or hindrance. France henceforth renounced all economic protective measures. She accepted what she had always done for the protection of the natives, the limitation of alcohol, the stoppage of traffic in arms, etc. She would not attempt to enforce any policy which might appear to be directed against the natives, for she had always co-operated with them. The French had always desired that the natives should take part in the management of their own territory. He had enunciated the general principles which guided the French. These principles were such that they were bound to satisfy all those interested in the moral development and liberties of the population.

President Wilson's fifth point in his message of the 8th January⁵ read as follows:—

"A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty, the interests of the populations concerned have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined."

As regards this clause, he had already stated how, in his opinion, the interests of the population in question would be protected. He had also explained the just claims of France. As to the claims of France, these were based on sacrifices made by them in the course of past centuries in Northern Africa. And now that work would appear to be concluded, for their old Colonies formed part of the old country. The inhabitants had equal rights, they had their representatives in the French Chamber, their system of local government was exactly the same as that of the French, and the natives enjoyed the same rights as French citizens.

For centuries past France had used all her strength for the purpose of exploring and developing the territories of Northern Africa; and the whole world had been able to enjoy the benefits to be derived therefrom.

⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 12.

France has spent 9 milliards of francs on the Mediterranean coast, 626 millions on West Africa, and 272 millions on equatorial Africa. When the efforts made by France for the civilization of Northern Africa were considered they would feel fully confident that she would be able to carry out the same programme in Equatorial Africa. That was his reply to President Wilson's third condition.

France relied on these facts that day, in asking to be allowed to continue her work of civilization in tropical Africa, and he hoped the delegates would give her the means of doing so by recognizing her right to sovereignty in those regions, subject to the assurances he had outlined.

(M. Simon then withdrew.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that after having heard M. Simon's statement, he proposed that they should now return to the question of the claims put forward by the British Dominions to certain German Colonies. He trusted the discussion would be completed that day.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that it would be better in the first place to come to a decision on the general principle without reference to particular cases. Were annexations to be permitted? Or was some other method to be adopted?

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that the discussion so far had been, in essence, a negation in detail—one case at a time—of the whole principle of mandatories. The discussion had been brought to a point where it looked as if their roads diverged. He thought it would be wise to discontinue this discussion for a few hours, say until the next day, as he feared it might lead to a point where it would otherwise appear as though they had reached a serious disagreement, and this he particularly wished to avoid.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether it was not true that whilst a good deal of thought had been given to the League of Nations, very little thought had been given to the position of a Mandatory Power. The British Delegates did not reject the idea of a Mandatory Power. On the contrary, broadly speaking, as far as the greater part of the areas conquered by British arms and managed from London were concerned, they regarded that idea with favour.

The objections so far raised had been made, not as regards areas under the direct control of the Capital of the Empire, but as regards the areas conquered by the self-governing Dominions within that empire. Therefore, it might be said that the Delegates of the British Empire were not antagonistic to the principle of the Mandatory.

He, (Mr. Balfour), was strongly in favour of the principle. But he was conscious that it had not been worked out. He knew of no

paper or speech in which the practical difficulties which they had to face had been worked out in detail. For instance, with reference to the financial question, it had been stated yesterday that should the Mandatory require funds, it would be for the League of Nations to supply the same. That might be a good plan, but he was faced with insuperable difficulties. He agreed that these were not essential to the application of the principle, though they were undoubtedly important points for consideration.

No conclusion had been reached, and no authoritative statement had been made regarding another point, namely, should the tenure of the Mandatory be made temporarily or not? If the tenure were merely temporary, difficulties would arise and there would be perpetual intrigues and agitation. For instance, if a German population were left in one of the German Colonies who could hamper the mandatory and promote a sense of grievance in the minds of the natives by raising expectations of some elysium to come, that might lead to a change in the Mandatory by the League of Nations. In his opinion, the thing could only work, firstly, by the appointment of an honest and competent mandatory, and secondly, by securing his tenure of office. He would like to think these questions over. Further, it appeared to him that exactly the same conditions of trusteeship would not be applicable everywhere, and there were several other similar questions which deserved critical attention. Should not, therefore, those interested carefully consider together what the difficulties were? Any decision come to now would be premature. As regards the general principle, however, the British Empire Delegates favoured it. Moreover the Delegates of the United Kingdom were prepared to go further, and for the areas which fell to them they were prepared to accept the idea. In conclusion he said that he only spoke for himself. He had not consulted the Prime Minister.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had some discussion about mandatories with the representatives of the British Colonial Department, who raised no difficulties. They thought the difficulties were more imaginary than real. He had been greatly struck by the fact that M. Simon, in his speech, had in the beginning appeared to be bitterly opposed to the whole idea, but in the end he had detailed as acceptable to France the whole list of conditions proposed for a mandatory, except the name. As far as the British Empire was concerned, most of the conquests had been accomplished by British troops, and as far as those territories were concerned Great Britain would be prepared to administer them under such conditions as might be laid down by the League of Nations. He could see no difficulties except perhaps difficulties of definition. Exceptions might have to be made; but then every rule had an exception. He could see no reason why any

difficulties should arise in laying down general principles. He was afraid the delegates might, when confronted by a difficulty, get into the habit of putting it off. He himself could not stay here indefinitely, therefore he would ask his colleagues to face the difficulty and to come to a decision. There would be special applications to be thrashed out, but until the principle had been adopted no conclusion on the details could be come to.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed with Mr. Balfour that there were many points to be cleared up. He admitted that the idea was a new one, and it was not to be expected that it would be found developed in any records or statements. He agreed with what Mr. Lloyd George said were the views of his Colonial Department, viz., that the difficulties were more imaginary than real. In the first place, the composition of the League of Nations, whenever spoken of heretofore, had left the lead to the Great Powers.

Taking the case mentioned by Mr. Balfour where an area contained a German population inclined to intrigue, the mandatory would certainly not be a friend of Germany's; and even if the latter should eventually qualify and be admitted to the League of Nations, at least during a generation her disposition and efforts would be so well known that no responsible man would be misled by them.

He wished that he could agree with Mr. Lloyd George that there was no great difference between the mandatory system and M. Simon's plan. The former assumed trusteeship on the part of the League of Nations; the latter implied definite sovereignty, exercised in the same spirit and under the same conditions as might be imposed upon a mandatory. The two ideas were radically different, and he was bound to assume that the French Colonial Office could not see its way to accept the idea of the mandatory.

He pointed out that Australia claimed sovereignty over German New Guinea; the Union of South Africa over German South West Africa, and Japan over the leased territory of Shantung and the Caroline Islands; while France claimed a modified sovereignty over the Cameroons and Togoland under certain terms. Here they were at this stage when the only acceptance had been on the part of the Imperial British Government with respect to the area taken from Germany by troops under the direct authority of the Government in London. This was an important exception in which he rejoiced, but it appeared to be the only exception to the rejection of the idea of trusteeship on the part of the League of Nations.

They must consider how this treaty would look to the world, for as it looked to the world it would be, since the world would not wait for explanations. The world would say that the Great Powers first portioned out the helpless parts of the world, and then formed a

League of Nations. The crude fact would be that each of these parts of the world had been assigned to one of the Great Powers.

He wished to point out, in all frankness, that the world would not accept such action; it would make the League of Nations impossible, and they would have to return to the system of competitive armaments with accumulating debts and the burden of great armies. There must be a League of Nations, and they could not return to the *Status quo ante*. The League of Nations would be a laughing stock if it were not invested with this quality of trusteeship. He felt this so intensely that he hoped that those present would not think that he had any personal antagonism. To secure it no sacrifice would be too great. It was unfortunate that the United States could not make any sacrifice in this particular case as she held none of the territories in dispute. But her people would feel that their sacrifices in coming into the war had been in vain, if the men returning home only came back to be trained in arms and to bear the increased burden of competitive armaments. In that case the United States would have to have a greatly increased navy and maintain a large standing army. This would be so intolerable to the thought of Europe, that they would see this great wave from the East which would involve the very existence of society, gather fresh volume, because the people of the world would not permit the parcelling out among the Great Powers of the helpless countries conquered from Germany. He felt this so solemnly that he urged them to give it careful thought.

He desired the acceptance of the genuine idea of trusteeship. He regarded this as a test of their labours, and he thought the world would so consider it. He thought it would be most unfortunate if they were, in the instance, to give the world its initial cold bath of disappointment. Sacrifices which seemed critical would have to be made, but if they were not made, they would have to face constant intolerable burdens. He believed that it was from this point of view that the question should be approached and examined. He appreciated the difficulties mentioned by Mr. Balfour, but he believed they were soluble. However, they could not be solved by discussion until they arose in concrete form. They must agree on the principle and leave its application to the League of Nations.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN enquired from President Wilson, purely for his information, with a view to the removal of the difficulty in case it became acute, whether the nomination of a mandatory need be postponed until the League of Nations was constituted. Under the scheme for the creation of a League of Nations, he understood that the five Great Powers would form a Council controlling the work of the League. Therefore the difference between making the decision

now or leaving it to the Council of the League of Nations was not great. He would, therefore, ask whether President Wilson would take that suggestion into consideration.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied that he had himself, informally, made that suggestion.

M. ORLANDO said that as regards Colonial questions, the Italian point of view was extremely simple. Italy would readily accept whatever principles might be adopted, provided they were equitably applied and also provided that she could participate in the work of civilization. He did not wish to make the slightest allusion to article 13 of the Pact of London⁶ because, even if that agreement had not existed, its principles were so just that they would be applied as a matter of course. The question they were considering was one of extreme gravity, and the consequences of their decision might be even more serious. Therefore, he thought that perhaps a short adjournment might be advisable. He fully understood Mr. Lloyd George's contention that an adjournment would not of itself lead to a solution of the difficulty, whilst an indefinite adjournment would naturally be a confession of impotence. But President Wilson had proposed that a short adjournment should take place in order that the delegates might have time to reflect and, perhaps, to consider and understand the practical aspect of the question. Under these circumstances he felt inclined to ask one or two questions. Was it the intention of President Wilson that all questions relating to the disposal of conquered territories should, without discussion, be referred to the League of Nations? The consequences of such a procedure would be extremely grave, because the world would think that this Conference had done nothing, and a confession of impotence would be even more serious than disagreement amongst the delegates. He thought that the Conference should lay down general principles, whilst leaving to the League of Nations the practical application of these principles to special cases. There were a number of questions that might well be considered during a short period of For instance, should all the German Colonies, without exception, be confided to the League of Nations? In other words, was the rule to admit of no exceptions? As was well known, exceptions proved the rule. He agreed that no exceptions could be made for purely private reasons. But if exceptions were made, based on concrete reasons, then such exceptions would not weaken the rule, but strengthen it. Again, if adjoining territories craved for union on the same grounds that union had been fought for by peoples in Europe, should no exception be made? For instance, if part of a

⁶ Great Britain, Cmd. 671, Misc. No. 7 (1920) : *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915.*

Colony lately under German sovereignty could be joined to an existing colony of which, ethnographically, it formed a part, he thought that an exception should be made and such a decision would be in accordance with President Wilson's ideas on the subject, the rights of peoples to self-determination.

Another point he wished to raise was, how far should the power of a mandatory extend? He thought this trusteeship need not be purely transitory. The difference in the powers accorded to trustees were extreme. In some cases, the trusteeship meant nothing, whereas in other cases it practically meant ownership.

The attributes of the mandatory might well be camouflaged by hypocrisy. Therefore he thought that the powers of the mandatory should be properly graduated to meet the requirements of each case, and in his opinion it was necessary from the very commencement to define the powers to be attributed to mandatories. For instance, South Africa had claimed the right to extend its laws to German South West Africa; but such action would obviously mean the exercise of the powers of sovereignty by a mandatory.

In conclusion he thought the whole question required very careful consideration. He himself was disposed to make every sacrifice to avoid disagreement; but the various issues of the question should be very clearly defined. Personally, he hoped that the general principles would be accepted.

M. CLEMENCEAU wished, in the first place, to say that Mr. Lloyd George had interpreted M. Simon's speech better than President Wilson. The French Colonial Office had expressed its views, but that did not mean that he himself was not ready to make concessions if reasonable proposals were put forward. All his sentiments were in agreement with those of President Wilson. He agreed with him as to the gravity of the decision to be taken, and the seriousness of the situation that would result therefrom. There was danger in refusing a means of salvation; but there was greater danger in adopting the wrong means of salvation. The League of Nations, he thought, was to be a League of Defence to ensure the peace of the world. But it appeared they had now gone beyond that limit when they proposed to create a League of Nations with governmental functions to interfere in internal affairs, with trustees in various places sending reports to—he did not know whom. Throughout the world, even in Europe, and perhaps in the Adriatic, a control would be set up. President Wilson himself had said so, and, as a result, appeals would be heard from all parts of the world. Who would deal with those appeals? It had been said that an International Legislature and some sort of executive power, about which he knew nothing, would have to be created, without any power to

administer penalties, since this question had never been raised. The idea of an unknown mandatory acting through an undetermined tribunal gave him some anxiety. He did not regret the discussions which had taken place on the subject, since these discussions had impressed him with the justness of the claims of the Dominions. However, since Mr. Lloyd George was prepared to accept the mandate of a League of Nations he would not dissent from the general agreement, merely for the sake of the Cameroons and Togoland. But, when President Wilson asked that every question should be referred to the League of Nations, he felt a little nervous, and feared that the remedy might be worse than the disease. President Wilson had said that the opinion of the world would rise up against them and that savagery was ready to flow over the world from the East to the West. That might be, but he was not in full agreement with President Wilson when the latter said that they had to choose between a League of Nations with legislative initiative, as he had already dealt with that question. He would at once take up the question of a League for the preservation of Peace. He greatly favoured such a League, and he was prepared to make all sacrifices to attain that object. If insisted upon, he would assent to a League with full powers to initiate laws, but he would ask that his objections be recorded, as he had no confidence in such a scheme. He might be too conservative—that being a fault of age. In a speech which he had made to the Chamber of Deputies a few days ago he had stated that if, before the war, the Great Powers had made an alliance pledging themselves to take up arms in defence of any one of them who might be attacked, there would have been no war. Today they had not only five nations in agreement but practically the whole world. If the nations pledged themselves not to attack any one without the consent of the members of the League, and to defend any one of them who might be attacked, the peace of the world would be assured. Such an alliance might well be termed a League of Nations. Such procedures, and tribunals, as might be thought necessary could be added. He would accept all these. If Mr. Lloyd George were to promise that he would accept these two conditions, the League of Nations would be created in less than three days.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau that if the League of Nations were made an executive for purposes of governing, and charged with functions which it would be unable to perform, it would be destroyed from the beginning. But he had not so interpreted the mandatory principle when he had accepted it.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he too had not so interpreted it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that he regarded the system merely as a general trusteeship upon defined conditions. Only when those conditions were scandalously abused would the League of Nations have the right to interfere and to call on the mandatory for an explanation. For instance, should a mandatory allow foul liquor to swamp the territories entrusted to it, the League of Nations would have the right to insist on a remedy of the abuse. The Powers now exercised this right by diplomatic correspondence, resulting in the giving of assurances, but frequently nothing was done. He would, however, make an appeal to President Wilson to consider the following point of view. He trusted the President would not insist on postponing the selection of mandatories until after the League of Nations had been established. That was a serious matter, for, as long as all these questions were unsettled, everything would be unsettled. People were unsettled all over the world, not only the labourers and the soldiers, but also the capitalists. Great Britain now occupied territories where they had no intention of remaining even if the League of Nations asked them to stay. For instance British troops occupied Russian Armenia and Serbia [*Syria*]. They did not wish to be there, but some one had got to be there. Was Great Britain to be compelled to keep its troops there until the League of Nations was a going concern? Again, as regards German East Africa, if Great Britain was not to be the mandatory, it had a big force there now which it would not wish to keep there. Therefore, they must know what their position was to be, and they would not settle down to their own business until these questions were decided. During the past week, the question of the renewal of the Military Service Act in the United Kingdom had come under consideration. It appeared they were now maintaining large forces—over 170,000 British troops alone in Syria, Caucasus, East Africa, and other out-of-the-way places. These troops must sooner or later be withdrawn, but they could not do that without knowing who would take their place. They could not withdraw and leave the people to massacre each other. They would be compelled to hand the country to some one. Therefore, he would leave the settlement to this tribunal, and an early solution was urgently needed. As Sir Robert Borden had stated, this Council was practically the League of Nations, which was born on Saturday. In conclusion, he asked whether he had correctly interpreted M. Clemenceau's views to the effect that he was prepared to accept trusteeship.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that although he did not approve of it, he would be guided by the judgment of his colleagues.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether this meeting would, under those conditions, be prepared to accept the principle of trusteeship.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that the difficulty about troops mentioned by Mr. Lloyd George applied equally well to the 371,000 troops on the Western front. He also observed that the question of deciding the disposition of the German Colonies was not vital to the life of the world in any respect. It was the determination of the pressing European questions which was all-important. They could address themselves to the solution of those European questions while waiting for a solution of the Colonial questions.

As to what Mr. Lloyd George was so kind as to call an appeal, of course he appreciated its weight; but his difficulty was to prevent the assignment of mandatories, if they were to be the Great Powers, from appearing to the world as a mere distribution of the spoils.

MR. HUGHES expressed the view that "trustee" was a better word to employ than "mandatory".

MR. MASSEY agreed that the public did not know what was meant by the word "mandatory".

BARON MAKINO enquired whether the principle of a mandatory had been accepted.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied in the negative, and added that the question had merely been adjourned.

(The Meeting adjourned until 11 a. m. on the following day.)

29 JANUARY, 1919.

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 29 January, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
President Wilson Mr. R. Lansing Dr. Lord (Mission to Poland) Dr. Bowman (Polish Expert) Mr. A. H. Frazier Mr. L. Harrison Col. Williams	Mr. A. J. Balfour General Botha Sir Esme Howard Mr. E. Phipps Captain G. Brebner	M. Clemenceau M. Pichon M. Dutasta M. Berthelot Captain Portier
ITALY	JAPAN	POLAND
M. Orlando Baron Sonnino Count Aldrovandi Major A. Jones	Baron Makino Viscount Chinda H. E. M. Matsui M. Saburi M. Kimura	M. Dmowski M. Piltz

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that they had met this morning to examine the instructions for the Commission that was proceeding to Poland. M. Pichon had prepared a text of these instructions and the British Government had suggested certain amendments thereupon. This document, however, proved to be too long, and Mr. Balfour had looked into the matter and curtailed it considerably, and reproduced a further draft instruction which was submitted to the meeting. This draft instruction contained the contents both of the original draft instruction of M. Pichon as well as the amendments made by the British Government.

**Instructions for
the Mission to
Poland**

(The draft instruction as finally drawn up was then read.)

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the last paragraph of the draft instruction was not suitable, and Mr. Balfour agreed.

(Consequently, it was agreed that the last paragraph should be omitted. For text as finally adopted see Appendix "A.")

BARON SONNINO said that Italy had some Polish prisoners ready to go to Poland and wished to know whether Italy should await the report of this Commission before the soldiers should proceed.

M. CLEMENCEAU was of opinion that they should wait, particularly as the decision would depend upon what was going to be done with the Polish soldiers in France.

2. Thereupon M. Dmowski, accompanied by M. Erasme Piltz were called in in order to enlighten the meeting as to the position in Poland.

M. DMOWSKI wished to know on what particular point he should first attempt to speak, or what points the meeting specially desired information upon.

Statement by
M. Dmowski

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that it would perhaps be best that he should say whatever he might have to say so as to place the meeting in a position to consider the question as a whole. It would be possible later on to take the various points in rotation.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he was anxious to know the whole case, but that the present object of the Allies was to assist Poland, as far as the Allies could, and they were certain that his views on that subject would be most interesting.

M. DMOWSKI then proceeded to state that the Poles had not been protected to any large extent by the Armistice, but two things did have reference to the situation in Poland. By Article 12 of the Armistice the Germans were obliged to occupy the Eastern Frontier until such time as the Allies should request them to withdraw their troops. And, secondly, Article 16 provided that access should be given the Allies to Poland via the Dantzig-Thorn railway. If the German troops had remained, under the terms of the Armistice, in the Eastern Provinces, their presence would have protected the Poles against the Bolsheviks; and if the route through Dantzig had remained open Poland would have been able to have obtained all the arms and ammunition and supplies that she might require. The revolution in Germany had prevented the carrying out of the terms of the Armistice, and the German troops withdrew in a disorderly manner before the Allies had requested them to do so. On their way they were guilty of committing crimes, and they carried away supplies and railway material with them as they went. Dantzig was situated within German territory and was in German possession after the signing of the Armistice. The railway from Dantzig to the Frontier of Poland (a distance of some 100 miles) ran through German territory, and since the conclusion of the Armistice the Germans had shown more and more hostility towards the Poles. Secondly, Article 16 was altogether a dead-letter. In order to make it effective it was absolutely necessary to occupy Dantzig and the railway line running to the Polish Frontier so as to allow of arms, ammunition and supplies being forwarded to Poland. Unless this was done, both Articles would remain a dead-letter.

3. Dmowski next turned to the situation in German Poland specifically. He stated that, according to German statistics, there were four million Poles in Eastern Posen, Eastern Prussia, Western Prussia and Upper Silesia; but, according to the Polish estimate, this number was five million. These Poles were some of the most educated and highly cultured of the nation, with a strong sense of nationality and men of progressive ideas. Even according to the German statement, in these Provinces it was admitted that the Polish farmers and merchants were of a higher standing than the German ones. As soon as the opportunity offered itself to organise themselves, these Poles established a Government by pacific means and then waited until the Peace Conference should have decided upon the status of Poland. All they desired was that Germany should not put anything in the way of their joining up with the other Polish Provinces. But this movement, as showing the aim of the Poles, rather frightened the Germans who immediately proceeded to take steps to suppress it and organised a special corps, known as the "Heimatschutz Ost", consisting largely of officers, with the idea of crushing this political movement. Troops had been concentrated in the Eastern Provinces waiting for the opportunity to attack. When M. Paderewski came to Posen, he was most enthusiastically received by the population, which remained quite pacific. But the Germans attacked them with machine guns. In consequence an armed conflict arose and fighting took place in the streets of Posen. The Poles were victorious and occupied the city and the fortress. Once that conflict had begun it was bound to spread, and it spread throughout the whole of the Province until the Germans were practically pushed out of the district. The Poles established a civic government which kept order without doing harm to the inhabitants: conduct very different from that of the Germans, possibly because the Poles were at home, or the Germans were in a foreign territory to them. Further, he reminded the meeting that the Conference had issued a declaration with regard to disputable territory. (see I. C. 119).¹ The Poles in Posen would understand that this declaration and this warning was addressed to them as well, and as it is their desire to stand well with the Allies, they will certainly respect it and it will make a great impression on them. But the Germans certainly will not respect it, but are continuing their organisation against Poland. The result will be that unless the Allies stop both sides (the Germans as well as the Poles), Poland inevitably must be crushed. The Germans have a great respect for the power of the Allies, and M. Dmowski felt

Situation in
German Poland

¹ BC-9, p. 715.

that if they received a similar order to cease fighting the possibility was they would accept the same.

M. Dmowski added that German Poland had as much in the way of supplies as she wanted, in fact more than she required, as the German soldiers, on their return, had requisitioned food along the way to carry themselves on. But the other Polish provinces were starving for want of food. He compared Germany to the god Janus. Germany had one face towards the West, where she had made peace, and the other face towards the East, where she was organising for war. Her troops there were concentrated and out for war. She might have given up the West, but she had not given up her plan for extending her Empire to the East. As regards German Poland, he made one proposition only, and that was that both sides should discontinue fighting, and should be ordered to stay where they were. The Poles were extremely anxious to keep the rolling stock at present at Posen which the Germans were threatening to take away as they themselves were short of rolling stock.

4. Russian Poland found itself, after the Armistice, in a most difficult position. The nucleus of the Government, which the Germans had established in 1916, continued until the Armistice, but once the Armistice was concluded it could not stand, on the one hand because it had been established by the Germans, and on the other hand, because it was too conservative. The Government was then handed over to General Pilsudski, a member of the Socialist Party, who had become very popular as he had fought against Russia in the beginning of the war and afterwards had been imprisoned by the Germans. It was perhaps the safest thing for Poland that she now had a Socialist Government, because she had no arms or army to protect herself. On the one side there was a Socialistic Revolutionary Government, and on the other, a Democratic Government, which had established a revolution in Germany. Had this not been the case, the Socialistic Government of Pilsudski could not have lasted. As it was, his Government was in great difficulties, as there was a majority against them even in Russian Poland, but more particularly in German Poland and also in Austrian Poland, the two latter provinces being much better organised and more advanced than Russian Poland. But the greatest weakness of all was that the Pilsudski Government had no money. Inevitably, therefore, attempts were made to overthrow his Government, and even the National Council of the Poles in Paris was approached to aid in this object. The National Council refused because it felt that a Socialistic Government, situated between two extreme Socialistic Governments, was necessary for the safety of

Russian
Poland

Poland at the time, and it concentrated its efforts on arranging a compromise with the Socialists. Consequently, the National Council sent M. Paderewski to Poland in order to establish a Government by compromise, his strong point being that he had so far taken no part in party politics. He was successful and formed a Government representing all portions of the provinces of Poland and also the main parties. We [*They?*] had, perhaps, taken too long to come to this compromise, but the reason was that Socialistic Governments were, from their very nature, not given much to compromise.

5. As already mentioned the German soldiers on returning from the Eastern front committed many crimes, but their worst crime of all was the fact that they assisted the Bolsheviki by leaving them their arms and ammunition, and also by allowing them to follow the Germans up in close succession. At the same time the German General at Vilna refused passage to the Polish troops. In this way the Germans were advancing the aim of Bolshevism to get into touch with German territory and so to join hands and make common cause with the Spartacist group inside Germany. Today the Bolshevik troops were threatening Poland and were about 150 miles from Warsaw. The difficulty of Poland was not the lack of men; she had enough to defend herself, but her difficulty was that she had no arms to arm them with or ammunition with which to fight. As evidence of the shortage of ammunition, he stated that the inhabitants of Poland had sent 8 million rounds of cartridges to Warsaw in order to assist in defending the country.

6. The Austrian troops on their return from Eastern Galicia distributed their arms amongst the people, and, at the same time, were guilty of atrocious massacres, particularly of land-owners. It was estimated that some 2,000 land-owners with their families were murdered in this fashion. In Eastern Galicia, Ukrainian bands actually took Lemberg and held it for a few days, and even though they had been driven out, they were not far from the town.

M. Dmowski summed up the position by stating that Poland was threatened on three sides; first by the Bolsheviki on the East, second by the Ukrainian bands on the South-East and by the Germans on the North-West. The problem to settle was not the question of supplying Poland with men, but with arms and ammunition and assistance to organise their army. This object could only be attained by using the railway running from Dantzic to the Polish frontier. It was impossible to use the Austro-Hungarian railway system, as that system was not extensive enough

External
Situation
Generally

Ukraine and
Eastern Galicia

Summary

and it would take too long, and the question of assistance was extremely urgent. He suggested the temporary occupation by Allied troops of Dantzic and of the railway line between Dantzic and Poland. He further suggested that some agreement should be made with the Germans whereby arms, ammunition and troops could be sent along this railway line and the railway line be occupied by Polish troops. In his opinion it would be much better for the Allies to occupy this line in agreement with the Germans, as if the Poles were to do so the Germans might regard this as an aggressive act by Poland. If Poland could not be assisted and assisted quickly, she must be crushed and absorbed by Bolshevism. The only way was to open a means of rapid and sure communication and the only sure and rapid route was that between Dantzic and Thorn. He expressed the opinion that there was not much fear of Bolshevism extending to German and Austrian Poland because those provinces were well organised and politically sound. In his opinion Bolshevism really was the rule of a despotic organisation representing a well organised class in a country where all other classes were passive and disorganised. In a country where the various classes were politically organised and enlightened, Bolshevism in the true sense of the word was not a serious danger. It was only possible where a country was passive and disorganised.

7. The province of Teschen in Silesia is occupied partly by Czechs and partly by Poles, the latter of whom are in a great majority. It was accordingly agreed in November, 1918,² that that portion of the country where the majority of the inhabitants are Poles should be regarded as the Polish sphere, and that portion which is inhabited by the Czechs as the majority, should be the Czech sphere. This agreement, which had been concluded by the local organisations, was approved by the Polish Government, but not by the Czecho-Slovak Government and recently Czech troops had entered this disputed territory. This act was not only one of violence but it was a dangerous act because if the Czech troops continue to remain there bloodshed inevitably must follow and much more harm might be done to the ultimate settlement of this dispute. M. Dmowski urged that the only settlement was that these Czech troops should be withdrawn to the territory as arranged in the terms of the agreement of the 5th November, pending a settlement by the Peace Conference.

Upper Silesia
(Teschen)

² For text of agreement of November 5, 1918, see Commission polonaise des travaux préparatoires au Congrès de la Paix, *Mémoire concernant la délimitation des frontières entre les états polonais et tchéco-slovaque en Silésie de Cieszyn, Orawa et Spisz*, annexe B 4, pp 27-31. (Paris Peace Conf. 186.3114/5)

8. M. Dmowski proceeded to direct attention to the anti-Polish policy of the Germans and referred to their anti-Polish laws, their prohibition of the use of the Polish language in the schools and their confiscation of the property of Poles. He quoted the special and powerful company which had been erected for the special purpose of colonising portions of Poland with German settlers and in that connection quoted von Bülow's remarks that the whole of Poland is an enemy and pointed out that Germany had employed means to influence both Austria and Russia to adopt the same line of policy. During the war there were two policies, one of annexation of Poland, but this plan was given up because there had been so much difficulty with the five million Poles in the German Eastern provinces, that it was felt to increase the number of recalcitrant subjects would only make matters more difficult. So the other programme was adopted of establishing a small kingdom consisting of some twelve million inhabitants and round it to place two other small states, Lithuania and Ukrainia. The latter two, in case of a German victory, would be completely under German domination, as neither Lithuania nor Ukrainia could, strictly speaking, be said to have reached the stage of nationhood. The national movement in Lithuania was not older than 40 years, and, although the movement had shewn great activity, the Lithuanians had not advanced so far yet as to entitle themselves to be called a nation fit to protect themselves and to accept the responsibilities and duties of the state. The same remarks applied to Ukrainia. The aim of this arrangement of establishing two small states was to split up Russia and Poland, both of whom were enemies. The whole idea dominating this programme was that by this means Poland would ultimately be strangled and submerged.

9. M. Dmowski suggested that in reaching the settlement of the territory to belong to Poland, we should start from the date 1772, before the first partition. This did not mean that she must be reconstituted on the same boundaries as then existed, but this must be the point of departure and the boundaries should be rectified according to present conditions. France, Italy, Great Britain and similar countries owing to the statistics they kept, and to their well-defined boundaries, were able to state immediately what their territory was, and what their people were. But not so with Poland. In settling the boundaries of Poland, the principle of including within those boundaries those territories where the Poles were in a large majority, must not be accepted altogether. In the West, Poland could not be satisfied with the historical boundaries of 1772. For instance, Silesia was lost in the 14th Century, but today 90% of the population, owing to the national revival, had kept its language and was strongly Polish. For instance, 15 years ago,

German Policy
Towards Poland

Territorial
Claims

Silesia sent a Polish representative to the Austrian Reichsrat. Furthermore, geographically speaking, Silesia falls within the whole territory of Poland.

(The Meeting adjourned until 3.30 p. m. in the afternoon.)

29 JANUARY, 1919.

PB-10

Appendix

Draft of Instruction for the Delegates of the Allied Governments in Poland

It will be the business of the Delegates of the Allied Governments to convey as early as possible information to their Governments on the present situation in Poland. The Military question and the Food question are the most urgent, but reports on the political and social conditions of the country should be sent without unnecessary delay.

The Polish Government should be warned against adopting a policy of an aggressive character. Any appearance of attempting to prejudge the decisions of the Conference will have the worst possible effect. The Delegates should invite the most earnest consideration of the Polish Government to the declaration recently made on this subject by the representatives of the Powers at Paris.

Every effort should be made to bring to an end the hostilities which are now taking place between the Poles and neighbouring peoples. Armistices should be arranged wherever possible and the Delegates should use their good offices to bring them about.

In this connection it should be noted that the invasion by the Poles of German territory tends to restore the German military spirit and to delay the breakup of the German army; and it has the further disadvantage of complicating the arrangements for German disarmament which the Allies desire to carry out with the least possible delay.

The Delegates should enquire how far the Polish Government possess the means to maintain order within their existing territory and of preserving it from external aggression whether carried out by Bolsheviks or any other forces and they should study and report on the measures necessary to supply any deficiencies which may be found to exist.

The food question will require their earnest attention and they should co-operate with the Mission about to be despatched to Poland by the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief. In order to secure this co-operation the principal Delegates of the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief should be attached to the Delegation whenever questions of food supply have to be dealt with.

JANUARY 29, 1919.

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Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 29 January, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.

[PRESENT]

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
President Wilson.	The Rt. Hon D. Lloyd	M. Clemenceau.
Mr. R. Lansing.	George, M. P.	M. Pichon.
Dr Lord (Mission to Poland).	The Rt Hon. A. J. Bal- four, M. P	M. Dutasta.
Dr. Bowman (Polish Ex- pert)	Gen The Rt. Hon. Louis Botha.	M. Berthelot
General Kernan.	Sir Esme Howard	Captain Portier.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.	Lt. Col Sir M. P A.	
Mr L. Harrison.	Hankey.	
Col. U. S. Grant.	Mr. E. Phipps	
Capt. Ewell.	Major A. M. Caccia.	
	Captain G. Brebner.	
ITALY	JAPAN	
M. Orlando.	Baron Makino	
Baron Sonnino	Viscount Chinda.	
M. Montagna.	H. E. M Matsui.	
General Romei.	M. Saburi.	
Count Aldrovandi.	M. Kimura.	
Major Jones.		
CZECHO SLOVAKIA	POLAND	
Dr. Kramartz.	M. Dmowski.	
Dr. Benes.	M. Piltz.	

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. DMOWSKI, resuming his statement, stated furthermore that the whole territory of Eastern Germany was not naturally German but was Germanised, and quoted Von Bülow as saying what Germany had lost in the West as a result of the break up of the Empire of Charlemagne, she had gained in the East. He quoted Dantzig as an illustration, saying that though, according to the German statistics, only 3 percent of the inhabitants were Poles, he felt certain that at least 40 percent belonged to that nationality. As the Poles were mostly employees, they would be afraid of stating that their nationality was Polish for fear of being dismissed, and he referred to the fact that soon after the Armistice a protest meeting had been held by the Germans against Dantzig being incorporated in Poland. When the petition which had been drawn up at that meeting was circulated for signa-

**Territorial
Claims**

ture, only 16 signatories were to be found, and of those 14 were those of officials. Ethnographically, the limits of Poland were irregular, and pointed to the fact that some wrong would have to be done East Prussia. Either a small island of German[s] must be left in the midst of Polish territory, or the large Polish population must remain under Germany. His suggestion was that the small island of German people should be made a republic with its capital at Königs-berg. He maintained that it would be more just to expose a small Germanised country to infiltration by Poles, than to deprive all Poland of economic independence and to expose it to German aggression. Summing up the question of what is, or what is not, Polish territory, he said that a rough definition would be that such territory as had been oppressed by anti-Polish laws was Polish territory. From the point of view of the preservation of peace, it was evident that if the coast belonged to one nation and the land to another, there would be mutual tendency to conquest. This had been fully appreciated by the Germans with the result [that] was apparent in their policy, which had aimed at the gradual absorption of Polish lands, and pointed out the colonisation schemes not only in German Poland but also in Russian Poland, and in this connection he quoted Herr Bobel, the Socialist Democrat in his work *Die Frau*: "Our task is not to colonise Africa, but to colonise the Vistula." It could not be expected that this idea of absorbing Poland would die amongst the Germans. Therefore, he urged that the frontiers should be so arranged that Poland should no longer be exposed to this danger.

2. Polish land reached to the Dnieper and the Dwina when the union of the colonies of Poland and Lithuania took place in the 13th and 14th centuries, but to-day the bulk of the population of Lithuania was not Polish, though the Lithuanians were closely allied, so he conceded that the Eastern Frontiers of Poland should be curtailed and a large portion remain under Russia. Both Lithuania and Ukrania he excluded, and did not lay claim to these countries as part of Poland.

Finally, he suggested that the subject of Poland should be viewed from the standpoint of a League of Nations and he defined a nation as a race of men capable of so organising itself as to be able to express collective will and of organising its affairs both externally and internally. In a word, it must be able to govern itself and to oppose oppression. Tested by this test Russia, strictly speaking, was not fit for admission to a League of Nations, nor were the Lithuanians advanced far enough in national unity or ideals to be included amongst the nations. The Ukrainian State at present was really organised anarchy and the Ukrainians were not so far advanced

as the Lithuanians on the road to nationality. The great need in Eastern Europe was to have established Governments, able to assure order and to express their will in foreign and in internal policy. It was too early to think of Lithuania or Ukrainia as independent States. Therefore, it would be best that, if organized as separate states they should be united in some other state, and as the Lithuanians were closely allied to the Poles, he suggested Poland as the best state to which they should be united. All that remained East of Poland, he feared, would remain for a long time subject to anarchy. He expressed the opinion that in Russia there would be a despotism for some time to come, because the masses were too indolent and passive. They were able to be ruled but not fit to rule. The red despotism of Bolshevism would last for some time but the reaction would come and a possible return to Czardom with all its vices. In Poland they were afraid to [of?] the anarchy prevalent in the Eastern districts of old historical Poland and, therefore, they were satisfied to renounce these districts for the sake of preserving peace and order within their own borders.

3. Eastern Galicia was, he admitted, a disputed territory, but he claimed that they were unable to organize a Government and pointed to the fact that in the intellectual professions, excluding small farmers and clergy, there were 400,000 Poles and only 16,000 Ruthenes. They might be entitled to home rule but they were unable to create a separate state.

M. ERASME PILTZ wished to associate himself with M. Dmowski as to the danger threatened from the Bolsheviks, and expressed the fear that if troops were sent they would arrive too late. The point he wished to express most forcibly was the urgency of sending help to Poland as soon as possible.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that the first portion of M. Dmowski's statement dealt with the immediate and pressing question of the Polish situation. The latter part dealt with territorial questions which would have to be discussed later on by the Conference. To-day they were only concerned with the first question.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Czecho-Slovak representatives were there to deal with the Teschen question, which is disputed territory.

(It was decided that the Czecho-Slovak representatives should be admitted).

4. DR. BENES, on behalf of Czecho-Slovakia, proceeded to make a statement as to the position of Bohemia, Moravia, and Eastern Silesia.

Claims of
Czecho-
Slovakia
to Teschen
Province

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was sorry to intervene to point out that the meeting was not dealing with the whole question of Czecho-Slovakia to-day,

but would have to enter into that whole question at a later date. They were dealing to-day with one narrow point, and that was the territory in dispute between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought it was necessary to have the whole case of the Czechs as the meeting had had the whole case of Poland.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the only question which was the business of the day was information as to the position in Eastern Silesia between the Poles and the Czecho-Slovaks, and suggested that the statement should be confined to that point only.

M. CLEMENCEAU then requested Dr. Benes to confine himself to the dispute between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles.

DR. BENES proceeded to deal with this question at length [on] statistical, ethnological, historical and economic grounds.

(Full details are available in the Pamphlet entitled "The Problem of Teschen Silesia" submitted by the Czecho-Slovak delegation. Copies of this pamphlet are obtainable at the office of the Secretary-General.)

DR. BENES added, as regards the ethnological question, that his government disputed the correctness of Austrian statistics. For instance in the case of the town of Richvaldt the Austrian statistics gave as the population in 1900: 4,500 Poles against 11 Czechs; and in 1910, 2,900 Czechs against 3,000 Poles. This gives a clear idea of the manner in which Austrian statistics are compiled.

DR. KRAMARTZ asked to be allowed to emphasise certain points made by Dr. Benes and stated that he had always thought that the points of difference between the Poles and the Czecho-Slovaks would be settled by mutual agreement. To his surprise, the Poles invaded this territory, mobilized the male population, and even went so far as to fix an election day, and settled that the Courts should fall under the Court of Cracow. On representations being made to him by the population of that quarter, his reply was that the Peace Conference must decide the question of disputed territory, and that he had been informed by France and Great Britain that the Czecho-Slovaks were entitled to occupy the historical boundaries of the old Czech Kingdom. He had protested to the Polish Government, and has sent a second protest; but no reply was forthcoming. He was told that if this present condition continued, it was very likely the Bolshevik activity would follow, and therefore he had acted carefully so as to avoid bloodshed.

The second point he emphasised was the fact that the Czecho-Slovak Republic could not exist without the large coal area which was within the disputed area.

In conclusion, he stated that they had always endeavored to arrive at a private agreement with Poland, but this had failed. Therefore,

they now desired to place themselves entirely in the hands of the Peace Conference, in the full confidence that the Great Powers would not forget the great sacrifices which they had made in their cause during the war, and that they would not lose sight of the economic requirements of the country upon which the whole prosperity of the Czecho-Slovak Republic depended.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the representatives of Poland and of the Czecho-Slovaks should meet the members of the Commission appointed by the Peace Conference to investigate Polish questions the following morning at 10 o'clock, so that they could commence that work of pacification and arrangements could be made in Paris immediately.

(This was agreed to.)

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the wish to hear what M. Dmowski had to say on this subject.

M. DMOWSKI in a short reply, regretted that apparently the Czecho-Slovak Government had not been fully informed as to what was taking place in Silesia, and stated that it was not the Poles that had invaded Teschen, but the inhabitants had organised themselves militarily; not a single soldier had been sent from Poland. He suggested that any further movement of the Czecho-Slovak Army should be stopped, pending the decision of the Conference.

5. MR. BALFOUR suggested that the Commission which would meet on the morrow should also consider the question of supplying arms and munitions to Poland.

Polish Commission to Enquire Into the Teschen Dispute

M. CLEMENCEAU, in summing up, stated that the delegates would meet the representatives of Poland and of Czecho-Slovakia the following morning, Thursday, the 30th January, at 10 o'clock, at the Quai d'Orsay, and would report on the Teschen dispute as well as on the supply of arms and munitions to Poland.

(This was agreed to, and the meeting adjourned until 11 o'clock on Thursday, January 30th).

29 JANUARY, 1919.

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held at Mr. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, January 30, 1919, at
11 a. m.**

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson
Mr. R. Lansing
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison
Col. R. H. Williams
Mr. G. L. Beer
Prof. E. T. Williams
Mr. D. H. Miller

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Bal-
four, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. W. M.
Hughes
Gen. The Rt. Hon. L.
Botha
The Rt. Hon. W. F. Mas-
sey
Mr. C. J. B. Hurst
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Han-
key
Major A. M. Caccia
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
M. Simon
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
Captain Portier

ITALY

M. Orlando
Baron Sonnino
M. Salvago-Raggi
Count Aldrovandi
Major Jones

JAPAN

Baron Makino
Viscount Chinda
H. E. M. Matsui
M. Saburi
M. Kimura

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was intended that morning to con-
tinue the exchange of views on the question of the disposal of the
German Colonies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had circulated a
document (see Annexure A) to each of the repre-
sentatives of the Great Powers. That document did
not represent the real views of the Colonies; but it
had been accepted by them as an attempt at a compromise. Great
Britain had deliberately decided to accept the principle of a man-
datory; but that decision had not been wholly accepted by the Domin-
ions. The Dominions, however, were prepared to accept the
conclusions reached in the document as a compromise, because they
fully realized that there could be no greater catastrophe than for
the delegates to separate without having come to a definite decision.
It had been decided to accept the doctrine of a mandatory for all
conquests in the late Turkish Empire and in the German Colonies.

Resolution Regarding the
Application of
the Mandatory
System

But three classes of mandates would have to be recognized, namely:—

Firstly: Mandates applicable to countries where the population was civilized but not yet organized—where a century might elapse before the people could be properly organized. For example, Arabia. In such cases it would be impossible to give full self-government and at the same time prevent the various tribes or units from fighting each other. It was obvious that the system to be applied to these territories must be different from that which would have to be applied to cannibal colonies, where people were eating each other.

Secondly: Mandates applicable to tropical Colonies situated a long way from the country of the possible mandatory. In other words, territories which did not form an integral part of any particular mandatory country. For example, New Guinea. In these Colonies the full principle of a mandatory would be applied, including the "open door."

Thirdly: Mandates applicable to countries which formed almost a part of the organization of an adjoining power, who would have to be appointed the mandatory.

Finally, he wished to emphasize the fact that the memorandum was intended to deal only with those parts of the Turkish Empire and of the German Empire, which had actually been conquered. Districts such as Smyrna, Adalia, the North of Anatolia were purposely excluded. Such territories would have to be considered separately on their merits.

MR. HUGHES said that the Prime Minister of Great Britain had accurately set out the position taken up by the Dominions. The members of the Conference had already heard his own views and they knew that Australia desired direct control. But, Australia fully recognized that grave interests, involving the fate of humanity were at stake, and, therefore, he did not feel justified in opposing the views of President Wilson and those of Mr. Lloyd George, beyond the point which would reasonably safeguard the interests of Australia. He had indicated to the Conference substantially the position as it stood, because his Government had desired him to emphasize its position and its attitude towards it, and it had asked him to press for direct control. As soon as his Government had heard that the mandatory principle was to be imposed, it had asked for full details and for an opportunity of considering those details. His colleagues were to meet for this purpose that afternoon and he felt compelled, therefore, to withhold his assent until they had communicated their decision.

2. PRESIDENT WILSON said that, first of all, in unaffected good humor, he wished to refer to a question of privilege. Each morning in the Paris press, printed in English, appeared a great deal more information regarding the meetings than was given in the official communiqués. He re-

ferred especially to the comments on President Wilson's idealistic views. It was stated, for instance, that, as regards President Wilson's ideals, he (President Wilson) did not know how his ideals would work. If these articles continued to appear, he would find himself compelled to publish his own views. So far he had only spoken to people in that room and to the members of the American Delegation, so that nothing had been communicated to the Press regarding President Wilson's views, either by himself or by his associates. He and his colleagues had been extremely scrupulous that nothing should come from them that implied that there were divergencies of view. For example, the Press had disclosed that morning that there was, apparently a Dominion point of view, and that the United States of America was in some way or another standing out against that view. If these articles continued to appear a public discussion would become inevitable, and such a public discussion would be fatal at this juncture. He himself was greatly distressed at these occurrences, but he did not know how they could be prevented. Nevertheless the time might come when he would be compelled against his own wishes to make a full public exposé of his views.

3. Next, to take the document circulated by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, he considered it to be a very gratifying paper. It made a long stride towards the composition of their differences, bringing them to within an easy stage of final agreement. On the other hand he did not think they could have a final decision immediately. Mr. Hughes, for instance, wished to discuss the question with his colleagues, who were anxious to know just what it all would mean. Mr. Hughes was not in a position to answer that question, neither could anyone else answer it. He could say that President Wilson said that a mandatory would work in a certain manner, but President Wilson's views had not been adopted. There were obviously other views but he could not say what they were. He (President Wilson) had in his possession a separate paper showing how the scheme would work in connection with the League of Nations, but that scheme had not yet been accepted. He had discussed it with Lord Robert Cecil and Mr. Balfour, and that day he would discuss it with M. Orlando. So far these were merely the exchange of general views in an attempt to arrive at a decision.

Furthermore, the difficulty with which they were faced was not to satisfy the Powers in that Room (France, the United Kingdom, Italy and America), but to satisfy the disturbed communities of the world, mostly on the other side of the Rhine. It would be difficult to harness these communities to any kind of arrangement. It would be impossible to drive them tandem; they must be driven abreast.

Constitution of
League of
Nations in
Reference to
Appointment
of Mandatories

Mr. Lloyd George was disturbed with regard to the number of troops which had to be maintained in different parts of the world—troops which could not be withdrawn until Peace was signed. Even if an understanding could be reached with another country to replace these troops, the world would ask “Are you exchanging territories before peace is made?” For instance, it had been suggested that America should act as a mandatory. The people of America would be most disinclined to do so. He himself had succeeded in getting the people of America to do many things, and he might succeed in getting them to accept this burden also. But even if it was suggested that American troops should occupy Constantinople, or Mesopotamia, it was evident that they could not do so as they were not at war with Turkey. Therefore, it would, in his opinion, be extremely unwise to accept any form of mandate until they knew how it was intended to work.

To return to the immediate subject, could they take a clean sheet, and say that Australia, for example, would accept a mandate about New Guinea? How would that mandate be exercised? What would it involve? No one could give an answer to Australia. He could say that he himself had proposed various forms of mandate. He surmised that the character of the mandate would be left in the hands of an executive of the League of Nations, consisting of the Great Powers with a minority representation of the Smaller Powers. He imagined, also, that no action could be taken by that Council in the face of three negative votes. Should that system be adopted it would be impossible for any harmful conditions to be imposed upon the mandatory state. But that arrangement had not yet been adopted; no agreement had as yet been reached. He had been accused of being a hopeless Idealist, but as a matter of fact he never accepted an ideal until he could see its practical application. The practical application was always the more difficult. Mandatories might work unsatisfactorily under one programme, whilst they might work well under another. Therefore no one should accept the scheme unless it was shown how it was going to work. The mandatory system was not intended to satisfy merely the interests of the mandatory Power but to care for, protect and develop the people for whom it was intended. Consequently to hand over distinguishable people to a mandatory in perpetuity and to say: “You never shall have a voice in your future; you are finally disposed of”, would be contrary to the principles of that Conference and contrary to the principles of self-determination accepted by it. For instance, if South Africa managed South-West Africa as well as she had managed her own country, then she would be married to South West Africa. Further, it would be necessary to define the methods of self-expression of the ward or people under tutelage. There must be a responsible body which would be in a

position to hear that self-expression and not be carried away by its sympathies. As had already been stated, in many parts of the world hitherto German, strong German influences might remain; but they were familiar with German methods and the body proposed would be most familiar with the German nature. However, his was merely a personal proposal and he could give no assurances that it would be accepted. But, whilst accepting the paper of Mr. Lloyd George as a precursor of agreement, it did not constitute a rock foundation, as the League of Nations had not yet been fixed, on which this superstructure would rest.

Therefore, he thought that the whole idea on which this principle depended should be put forward and then the Nations would know where they stood. Meanwhile, he would accelerate discussion of all these disturbing questions of the world which prevented Europe from settling down to normal life. The Great Powers had agreed that the League of Nations should form an integral part of the Peace Treaty. Therefore, it would not be accepted by itself, and to make the document presented by Mr. Lloyd George valid, they were bound to complete a preliminary peace. He thought that could be done in a few weeks. Disinterested students had been studying territorial questions on documentary evidence of every kind, working like scholars and basing their conclusions on acknowledged facts as far as they were ascertainable. If a map of Europe were produced showing the limits of the territories to be created, based on historical, racial and economic facts, the Great Powers could then sit down to consider these suggestions and give weight to those points of view, such as expediency, natural antagonisms, etc., which played no part in scholarly wisdom. They could then arrive at a conclusion quickly and be able to conclude the preliminary peace, and the League of Nations would thereby be established without the haunting element of conjecture. In every instance the mandate should fit the case as the glove fits the hand. In conclusion, accepting the document presented by Mr. Lloyd George as practically clearing away all prospects of serious differences he thought they should build upon this agreement the solid foundations which would carry this superstructure.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that, with all due deference to President Wilson, he could not help saying that the statement to which they had just listened filled him with despair. Should that attitude be taken about each question, no agreement would ever be reached. If the delegates said that they could not agree to problem (a) until agreement had been reached regarding questions (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f), the result would be disastrous. Each of them had his questions (b), (c), (d) and (e) which he considered more important than

any other. Further, he would point out that it was only with the greatest difficulty that the representatives of the Dominions had been prevailed upon to accept the draft submitted, even provisionally. These gentlemen were not enamoured of the mandatory system: they represented real democracies and the people were solid behind them on this question. He had reminded them that they were not only members of a particular democracy but also members of a Conference which had met to settle the peace of the world. Consequently, they had accepted his proposals, but only as a compromise. Now, President Wilson had expressed the view that the mandatory business should not be trusted until more was known about it, that was to say, until the League of Nations was definitely set forth on paper. To this, the representatives of the Dominions would obviously reply that they wished to see it working and not on paper. President Wilson had suggested that they should leave the Colonial questions for the moment and take up those relating to Europe. There, again, they would be met with difficulties which would have to be settled by the League of Nations, so that the proposal really meant a 15 days' adjournment until a paper League of Nations was produced. He felt confident that what had been done last Saturday¹ in giving birth to a League of Nations was a reality. It had really been born. That he treated as a fact. Therefore, he begged them to accept it as such and to get to business. The suggestion that the constitution of the League of Nations would be completed by the end of next week, he considered rather sanguine, as it meant formulating the constitution of the whole world. How long did it take to lay the foundations of the 13 original states of the United States of America? How long did it take to produce the constitution of the Federation of the states of Australia? To think that a federation of the whole world could be produced in 9 or 10 days would be ideal. However, he was only pleading for immediate peace. It was not across the Rhine that his Government had to keep their eyes, but at home. At the present moment, the British Empire was maintaining 1,084,000 troops, including 300,000 British troops, in the Turkish Empire alone, and the settlement of that part of the world was, therefore, important. In conclusion he felt that if the delegates continued to adjourn questions, because they were not as important as others, no final decision would ever be reached. He sincerely hoped, therefore, that his colleagues would provisionally adopt the resolutions he had submitted (see appendix "A"), subject to such reconsideration as might be required when the complete scheme of the League of Nations was formulated.

¹ See Protocol No. 2, Plenary Session of January 25, 1919, p. 176.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that he had said nothing which need justify discouragement. He was willing to accept Mr. Lloyd George's proposals, subject to reconsideration when the full scheme of the League of Nations was drawn up. He suggested that the resolutions be accepted as an immediate settlement, and, if the premise added by Mr. Lloyd George were added, it would prevent any further delay. Mr. Lloyd George said that the League of Nations had already been accepted, and that it would [be] necessary to turn to it for the settlement of various questions. In his opinion, that view emphasised the necessity to know the instrumentality which was to deal with these questions. It would be impossible to refer to an undefined instrument. He did not wish to delay any decision and he was ready to accept any provisional arrangement.

Yesterday they had listened to a discussion between the Czechoslovaks and the Poles, but it was inconclusive because there was nothing on the table saying what was to be discussed. M. Dmowski had said that Poland must be a barrier between Russia and Germany. Did that mean a barrier based on armaments? Obviously not, because Germany would be disarmed and if Germany was disarmed Poland could not be allowed to arm except for police purposes. To carry out such disarmament the necessary instrumentality for superintendence would have to be set up. That was the gist of the question. Therefore, he would urge his colleagues to press on the drafting of the League of Nations in a definite form.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the actual constitution itself of the League of Nations would have to be settled before the meeting of the delegates could discuss the Italian, French or Polish question.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied in the negative and added that in future only definite propositions should be discussed and meanwhile the drafting of the constitution of the League of Nations should be pressed forward. Yesterday, they had been unable to confine the discussion within proper limits because they did not discuss anything in particular, therefore he would urge that they should formulate the League of Nations as a final court of appeal. In conclusion he expressed his readiness to accept as a provisional arrangement the resolutions proposed by Mr. Lloyd George.

4. M. ORLANDO expressed his pleasure at the agreement reached. He fully understood the difficulties of the question and he raised no objection provided everyone was willing to accept the proposals, but he would like to clearly understand the situation. If Mr. Lloyd George's resolutions were accepted it would mean that all territories of Austria, Turkey, and the late German territories of Africa and in the Pacific, would be reserved to the League of Nations. He thought that was agreed.

Temporary
Mandates

The League of Nations would administer these territories through mandatories which would reserve to themselves the choice of the mandatories, as well as the terms of the mandate, which would differ in each case until the League of Nations was constituted and able to give its decision. These countries would remain under a provisional *status quo* which was equivalent to saying that during the period between the decision reached on that day and the final decision to be given by the League of Nations, temporary mandatories would be established, subject to future changes, if so desired by the League of Nations. Was that agreed or was the *status quo* to be maintained, namely, a military occupation in virtue of the armistice, by troops (Chiefly British), occupying the territories in the name of the Allied and associated powers in accordance with the terms of the Armistice. In that case he had only one observation to make from the point of view of the particular interests of Italy. As he had already stated on previous occasions, Italy had only one simple and perfectly just desire, namely, that a proper proportion between the Allies should be maintained in respect of the occupation of these territories. Consequently whether a temporary mandatory were appointed or the *status quo* maintained, he would ask, and he trusted this would not be considered excessive, that Italy obtain its share of mandates or territories to be militarily occupied.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired what subject should next be placed on the agenda now that Mr. Lloyd George's resolutions had been accepted. From what had been said it would appear that everything depended on a decision being reached regarding the constitution of the League of Nations. consequently, the meeting would be bound to wait until the League of Nations had been established, and it would be obviously useless to discuss the claims of the Roumanians, Yugo-Slavs and others. If he had correctly interpreted what had been said that morning he felt compelled to make serious formal reservations. In his opinion it would be impossible to establish a League of Nations which was not to be a common organism of defence, but an organism to deal with all the world. Furthermore, if this new constitution for the whole world was to be produced in eight days he was bound to feel some anxiety.

5. BARON MAKINO expressed his satisfaction that a provisional agreement had been reached on the question of mandatories. As regards the League of Nations, he wished to state that as the matter was so important his Government was quite ready to associate itself with the work of this very important organization. Frankly there were difficulties, and his Government was not quite certain how it would work. But, seeing that it was a matter which was being very

earnestly considered by the Great Powers it was quite ready to associate itself with this great work. Although so far his Government was not in possession of any official plan of the organization, he had had the privilege a few days ago of receiving President Wilson's exposition, and yesterday he had received the more concrete plans of Mr. Lloyd George. Yesterday he had telegraphed both documents to Tokio, and he had added that it was desirable that his Government should favorably consider the proposition suggested by Mr. Lloyd George. Naturally no reply could yet have been received; but since he had already asked for instructions his duty was to wait for the receipt of his Government's reply before giving his definite adherence. Meanwhile all he could do was to adhere to the resolutions *ad referendum*.

6. MR. HUGHES asked to be permitted to say one word on the matter as the question had now taken a new aspect since hearing President Wilson's statement. When the British Empire Delegates had discussed the question yesterday, they had agreed to the proposals of Mr. Lloyd George as a compromise. But the basis of the proposals had now been disturbed by what President Wilson had said that morning. He thought President Wilson had set out the case for Australia better than he himself could do. President Wilson had said things which he (Mr. Hughes) had been afraid to say; they were things which agitated the minds of the Colonies. It was proposed really to govern the fate of people by declaring that a certain principle should apply, but to what extent that principle should apply, or by whom that principle should be applied, or when it should be applied, no one knew. For that reason President Wilson had pointed out that the acceptance of Mr. Lloyd George's resolutions would not settle anything until the League of Nations had been created and clothed with authority and with certain powers, duties and functions. Meanwhile he was faced with a great difficulty, for he would have to say to the people of Australia not what he thought, but what he was permitted to say. For Australia the War had been a question of life and death, and still remained so. Now he would have to tell the people of Australia how the whole matter was to be settled, and they would ask, how? His reply would be that the mandatory principle was to apply but he did not know how except that the arrangements would be such that the scheme would fit like a glove to the hand. Having lived all his life in Australia and knowing the Australian temperament, he thought it would be impossible to expect them to accept a principle the nature of which was not known. A definite decision could only be expressed when they knew what it all meant. In conclusion, he enquired whether they should

Australia's
Reservations
Regarding
Application
of Mandatory
System

wait the acceptance of the League of Nations by the Conference and by the world whilst they were waiting for a decision. Was not the *de facto* League of Nations already in existence in that room? He suggested that they as a League of Nations should act as the executive of the future League of Nations and settle the various problems which awaited settlement. This League should say who were to be the mandates outside the Polish question and impose their will on Germany. No League of Nations could be superior to the members of that Conference. Those that came after could only have one-tenth of the power. The world looked to them for decisions, and the world would breathe more freely if those decisions were made.

7. SIR ROBERT BORDEN expressed his pleasure at the fact that an agreement, if only provisional, had been reached. He was one of those who most earnestly desired the establishment of the League of Nations. He agreed that the future destinies of the world depended largely on it because there were forces in Russia which would manifest themselves unless some proposal of that kind could be accepted. The success of the League of Nations would not depend upon the machinery that might be created, but on something behind it, namely, public opinion, which would give it the power; the same power which steam or electricity gave to the machinery of a factory. He would beg them to be careful not to impose too heavy a burden on it in the first instance. Born as an infant it might develop as a giant, but whilst an infant too much should not be imposed on it. He had carefully studied the organisation of the British Empire, which was not unlike the proposed organization of the League of Nations, and he knew that the British Empire depended only on public opinion. Not one of the Dominions could have been forced to send a single man to the war; they joined in the war because of the cause involved, and because of public opinion. The League of Nations would have to depend on the same considerations. Therefore as far as possible, he hoped that the Conference would come to a conclusion on all proper matters with as little delay as possible. It would be for the representatives to decide forthwith whether they would themselves settle this question or whether they would constitute themselves into machinery to settle such questions at some future date. At any rate it was essential that the organisation of the League of Nations should be determined without imposing too much on it at once. It was well known that no democratic country attempted to enforce every law to its fullest extent as that would be impossible. Government by convention and goodwill founded on public opinion was the only Government possible; and the working of the League of Nations would depend on similar foundations. Therefore he hoped the mat-

ter under consideration would be determined as speedily as might be possible because the world was looking to the proceedings of the Conference and might become tired in face of any delay.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that M. Orlando had raised a very important question that would have to be discussed later on. He suggested that further discussion of the question should be postponed until the afternoon meeting.

(This was agreed to.)

The Meeting then adjourned until 3.30 p. m. in the afternoon.

Appendix

PB-11

Draft Resolutions in Reference to Mandatories

1. Having regard to the record of the German administration in the colonies formerly part of the German Empire, and to the menace which the possession by Germany of submarine bases in many parts of the world would necessarily constitute to the freedom and security of all nations, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that in no circumstances should any of the German Colonies be restored to Germany.

2. For similar reasons, and more particularly because of the historical mis-government by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire. This is without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire.

3. The Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that advantage should be taken of the opportunity afforded by the necessity of disposing of these colonies and territories formerly belonging to Germany and Turkey which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, to apply to those territories the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League of Nations.

4. After careful study they are satisfied that the best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations.

5. The Allied and Associated Powers are of opinion that the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

6. They consider that certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory power.

7. They further consider that other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory subject to conditions which will guarantee the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the military training of the natives for other than police purposes, and the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League of Nations.

8. Finally they consider that there are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the Islands in the South Pacific, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the mandatory state, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory state as integral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

In every case of mandate, the mandatory state shall render to the League of Nations an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

JANUARY 29, 1919.

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at
the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, January 30, 1919, at 15
Hours 30¹**

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.
Col. R. H. Williams.
Mr. G. L. Beer.
Prof. E. T. Williams.
Mr. D. H. Miller

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Bal-
four, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Sir R. L.
Borden.
The Rt. Hon. W. M.
Hughes.
Gen. The Rt. Hon. L.
Botha.
The Rt. Hon. W. F.
Massey.
Mr. C. J. B. Hurst.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A.
Hankey.
Major A. M. Caccia.
Mr. H. Norman.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.
M. Simon.
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
Captain Portier.

ITALY

M. Orlando.
Baron Sonnino.
M. Salvago-Raggi.
Count Aldrovandi.
Major Jones.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
Viscount Chinda.
H. E. M. Matsui.
M. Saburi.
M. Kimura.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU, having declared the meeting open, called on Mr. Massey to address the Meeting.

Views of New
Zealand on the
Mandatory
System

MR. MASSEY said that he found it necessary to say just a few words, because he had expected some fairly clear and definite statement from President Wilson with regard to the proposals contained in Clause 8 of the document which they had been discussing.² In that expectation he had been disappointed, and he need hardly tell the members of the Council, or remind his colleagues from the Dominions, that the matters referred to in

¹ These minutes bear the penciled notation "Substituted for Revised Copy." The text of the latter may be found printed in Miller, *My Diary*, vol. XIV, pp. 87-119; also in Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. II, pp. 204-228.

² Appendix to BC-17, *supra*.

Clause 8 were matters of the utmost importance to the people whom they represented there. They had repeatedly expressed to him that it was a matter of life and death to many of them. He would like to say that he had not gone back in the very slightest on the opinions that he had expressed on the first occasion when he addressed the Council. He knew the very serious, important and urgent matters that were waiting to be dealt with as soon as that Council and Conference could find it convenient to do so, and on that account he did not want to waste any more time than he could possibly help, or place any more difficulties in the way of a settlement. He was still prepared, as far as the Dominions were concerned, to accept the suggestions contained in Clause 8, which had been inserted there to meet the cases of Australia, South Africa and New Zealand. He would like to quote the last three lines of the Clause, which were intended to meet the cases of the Dominions, whose—"geographical contiguity to the mandatory state, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory State as integral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population." The safeguards were as follows:—The prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic, the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the military training of the natives for other than police purposes. Those were the conditions, and, so far as he was concerned—and he thought he could speak for his colleagues in these respects—they were prepared to accept them. They were prepared to accept them right away, but they had not yet had any definite opinion or statement from President Wilson that he was willing to accept them. If President Wilson would say he was willing to accept them, he thought it would clear the ground sufficiently to enable them to proceed, and in saying that he was not suggesting in the very slightest degree any delay so far as he was concerned. The sooner they came to a conclusion on these matters the better for all concerned. He believed, as he had already indicated, in the principle of direct annexation, because direct annexation would enable them to proceed very much more quickly with the development of the territories concerned. He believed it would be better for the European races, and also better for the native races. They would be able to proceed with the education of the native races, not only in secular matters, but also in the principles of Christianity, which he believed were necessary for the welfare of all nations.

There was just one other point to which he would like to make some reference. It had been said by some of the previous speakers that the Dominions entered into this war because they knew it was

right to do so—because it was a good cause. That was only one reason. They went into this war because the Empire, of which they were a part, was fighting for a great cause—fighting for its honour—for humanity—for civilisation, and in order to keep faith with its Allies, and fighting for the defence of the smaller nations. There was also another reason why the Dominions entered this war—because they had confidence in the leaders of the Empire and their judgment—in their discretion—and, in saying that, he hoped that if it ever became necessary for Great Britain again to go to war, the Dominions would be officially represented as never before in the Council of the Empire. He would like to say that he supported the proposal of a League of Nations. He hoped and believed it would be a good thing; he believed it would do much to prevent war in the future. Members of that Conference had a tremendous responsibility so far as the prevention of war in the future was concerned. He believed that if war was not to be renewed in the near future—he meant from 25 to 50 years hence, which was a very short period in the life of a nation—they had not only to see that justice was given on the one hand to those who had suffered in this war—and there were many—but to those who had broken the laws of civilisation during the last 4½ years. He believed that would do more to prevent war than anything else. So far as he was concerned, he was responsible to his constituents, and he was prepared to shoulder that responsibility.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if he was to understand that New Zealand and Australia had presented an ultimatum to the Conference. They had come there and presented their cases for annexation of New Guinea and Samoa. After discussion among themselves, they agreed to present to the Conference that proposal. Was he now to understand that that was the minimum of their concession? That their agreement upon a plan depended upon that concession? And that if they could not get that definitely now, they proposed to do what they could to stop the whole agreement?

MR. MASSEY said: "No"—but he thought he had made himself perfectly clear. Of course he could speak for his colleague from Australia.

MR. HUGHES said he did not know how he could put it better than he had done that morning. He would like to say that Clause 8 of that proposal—

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired if Mr. Hughes had heard his question.

MR. HUGHES replied in the negative.

PRESIDENT WILSON then said he wanted to know if they were to understand that Australia and New Zealand were presenting an ultimatum to that Conference, and that finding the Conference

probably disinclined to agree upon the annexation of New Guinea by Australia and Samoa by New Zealand, they had reluctantly agreed to the modification of Clause 8; and that was the minimum of what they would concede, and if that was not conceded definitely now, they could not take part in the agreement at all.

MR. HUGHES replied that President Wilson had put it fairly well, that that was their attitude subject to the reservation which he had stated that morning. Like his colleagues from New Zealand and South Africa they were in favour of direct control. They found the Conference (as President Wilson had remarked) not in accord with their views. The Dominions had fallen in with the suggestion put forward by the Prime Minister of Great Britain. For the present that represented the maximum of their concession in that direction, but he would like to say: that he had put the position, as he understood it, for his colleagues, and if they were prepared to go further he would offer no objection. He thought it would be agreed that because they were unable to put any definite concrete proposal before the Conference, at least they should be asked to be clothed with those plenary powers giving them discretion to accept whatever that Conference was able to accord to them. Speaking for himself, with great reluctance, he agreed to the proposal in Clause 8. Beyond that he felt that he ought not to go.

GENERAL BOTHA asked that he might be allowed to address a few words to the conference. As everybody knew he was not a British subject of very long-standing and therefore his English was not so good as it might be. He would like to say that he heartily supported President Wilson with regard to what was in the papers that morning. When he saw the paper he had thrown it away. What had appeared in those papers was being sent by cable all over the world. It would upset the people of South Africa, as they did not understand the position. That afternoon he hoped to have a peaceful lunch, but in the middle of it he received a cable to return at once. They were there as gentlemen and they must keep those things out of the newspapers or it would be impossible for other people to remain there. He was of opinion that such an article ought to be investigated to see whence it came, and have a stop put to it. It would create a great deal of mischief.

He would like to tell President Wilson that he had understood that in the speeches which had been delivered that morning there was no threat. He observed that the Prime Minister of Great Britain had met the Dominion representatives and had discussed the question with them and he (General Botha) could assure President Wilson that it was only after very serious discussion, worry and trouble and through the influence of Mr. Lloyd George, that the resolution

had been handed in that morning. He was one of those who would give up everything to reach the highest ideal. Therefore he supported Mr. Lloyd George but he sincerely trusted that President Wilson would also agree. Do not let them stop at small things. If they could gain that bigger and higher ideal, then smaller versions of it ought not to stand in the way. He remembered that after the war in his own country, which was on a smaller scale than the present, but which was just as bloody and miserable, they got self-government; but he saw at once that four different self governing bodies in that country must lead to war. He was one of the original promoters of the Union of South Africa. He had his ideals and they were very high indeed. When he assembled all the leading statesmen he found then that the other people held views from which it would be impossible to persuade them. He had then personally investigated these and had come to the conclusion that these were smaller things. On that occasion he asked his colleagues to stick to one thing, to aspire to the higher ideal, and that was the Union of South Africa. They must give way on the smaller things. He would like to say the same on this occasion. They must give way now and get their higher ideal, get a better understanding and bring the people together, and through that they would gain eventually all the things that they wanted to get. It was a small thing on which he had given way after the war in his own country, but unless they had done so they would have been in a very miserable condition to-day.

He appreciated the ideals of President Wilson. They were the ideals of the people of the world, and they would succeed if they all accepted them in the same spirit and supported them in the manner in which they were intended. If they departed in an indifferent spirit it would not have the success that they would all wish it should have. Therefore, to his own mind, if they differed it was not a threat because at the back of everybody's heart there was only one idea,—that of attaining a better world understanding. Mankind looked upon them for support to do away with all future wars. He felt that by conceding smaller things they made the higher ideal more acceptable, and it would have the hearty support of the whole world. They must remember that their various peoples did not understand everything from the same point. In that light therefore they must guide them to the bigger ideal. Personally he felt very strongly about the question of German South-West Africa. He thought that it differed entirely from any question that they had to decide in this conference, but he would be prepared to say that he was a supporter of the document handed in that morning, because he knew that, if the idea fructified, the League of Nations would

consist mostly of the same people who were present there that day, who understood the position and who would not make it impossible for any mandatory to govern the country. That was why he said he would accept it. He hoped that the second document there was entirely unnecessary because the first document that was handed in that morning, was an entirely provisional one. They could not accept anything by resolution now on hard and fast lines; everything depended on the ultimate resolution. That was how he understood the matter, and he hoped that they would try in a spirit of co-operation, and by giving way on smaller things, to meet the difficulties and make the bigger ideal more possible.

MR. MASSEY said that the representatives of Australia and New Zealand had been asked a direct question by President Wilson. Mr. Hughes had answered for Australia and he (Mr. Massey) would answer for New Zealand. The position of Mr. Hughes and himself was practically on all fours up to a certain point. It was on all fours so far as the desire of their people was concerned for what they considered direct control—"annexation" to put it bluntly; but perhaps it was not on all fours after that, because Mr. Hughes had been communicated with by the acting Prime Minister in Australia. He (Mr. Massey) had not been communicated with by his Government and he had not communicated with it. Therefore he was prepared to take the responsibility of supporting the proposals contained in Clause 8. He wanted to emphasise that again. He wanted to assure President Wilson that if he (President Wilson) imagined that any threat was intended he had quite misunderstood the matter so far as both he and Mr. Hughes were concerned. As a public man he never used threats and he did not accept threats from any one if he could possibly meet them. However, he had made that point perfectly clear and he might go as far as the proposals of Clause 8 without consulting his own Government. He was prepared to go so far because he could not get what his Government wanted and in that case he was prepared to accept the next best proposal. If he found it necessary he would communicate with his Government and explain the position; but he was prepared to accept and support the provisional proposal put forward by Mr. Lloyd George.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would like to suggest, after everybody had made his position quite clear and when nobody was under any illusions as to Mr. Hughes' position, or General Botha's position, or Mr. Massey's or anybody else's, that they take that as a provisional decision subject to revision when either they found the League of Nations unsatisfactory, or that there was some other reason for revising it.

SIR R. BORDEN proposed some slight alteration in one of the clauses in order to prevent misunderstanding. Was the proposal in clause 7 to encourage the establishment of military or naval fortifications?

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was intended to prevent them.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN observed that at present it might mean otherwise. Therefore he would read the clause as he proposed it should read, subject to the opinion of the conference, as follows:—

“They further consider that other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory subject to conditions which will guarantee the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of the military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League of Nations.”

PRESIDENT WILSON said that made it clearer.

(This was agreed to.)

M. PICHON said that France could not renounce the right of raising volunteers in the countries under her administration, whatever they might be. The Germans had recognised the importance of the support France had received from her Colonies. Before powerful American troops came to her aid, they had resisted with their own forces for a long time, together with the British Armies, and it was certain, but for the help they had received from their Colonial Possessions, the situation would have been very critical. It was necessary for them to be able to recruit not conscripts but volunteers from all colonial territories under French control. This was absolutely necessary for the future security of the French territory.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired if this referred to the territories controlled as mandatory states as well as the present.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the French were the nearest neighbours of Germany, and could be at all times, and had been in the past, suddenly attacked. He did not know whether it was possible to disarm Germany, but they would try. They knew Great Britain had responsibilities in all parts of the world, and could not have the whole of her strength concentrated at one point at a moment's time. America was far away, and could not come at once to the assistance of France. If the League of Nations and the peace of the world were to be established, it must not begin by putting France in a position of peril which would be much more dangerous for them than for any other Power. America was protected by the whole breadth of the ocean, and Great Britain by her fleet. If the French could not find any territories for which they would have to take the responsibility,

and on which they would have to spend money in improving;—if they could not raise volunteers without compulsion—then they felt that the people of France would resent this very much, and would have a grievance against the Government.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was thinking of what the position was in the French and British Colonies at the beginning of this war. Great Britain had native forces in Uganda and Nigeria and other places, and the French also had forces in Senegal and other territories.

Algeria and Morocco were in a different position. He was thinking of the tropical colonies. The only forces Great Britain had there were forces for the defence of those territories. That was equally true of France. France had not raised and armed and equipped great forces for any offensive purposes outside.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that they were free to do it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there was nothing in the clause under review to prevent that. The words used there were: "for other than police purposes and the defence of territory". He really thought that those words would cover the case of France. There was nothing in the document which would prevent their doing exactly the same thing as they had done before. What it did prevent was the kind of thing the Germans were likely to do, namely, organise great black armies in Africa, which they could use for the purpose of clearing everybody else out of that country. That was their proclaimed policy, and if that was encouraged amongst the other nations even though they might not have wars in Europe, they would have the sort of thing that happened in the 17th and 18th century in India when France and Great Britain were at war in India, whilst being fairly good friends in Europe. Then they were always raising great native armies against each other. That must now be stopped. There was nothing in this document which prevented France doing what she did before. The defence of the territory was provided for.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if he could raise troops, that was all he wanted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that he had exactly the same power as previously. It only prevented any country drilling the natives and raising great armies.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not want to do that. All that he wished was that the matter should be made quite plain, and he did not want anybody to come and tell him afterwards that he had broken away from the agreement. If this clause meant that he had a right of raising troops in case of general war, he was satisfied.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that so long as M. Clemenceau did not train big nigger armies for the purposes of aggression, that was all the clause was intended to guard against.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not want to do that. He therefore understood that Mr. Lloyd George's interpretation was adopted.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Mr. Lloyd George's interpretation was consistent with the phraseology.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was quite satisfied.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would like to move an amendment to his own document. He said that he was sorry that he had left out one country in Turkey which ought to have been inserted. He did not realise that it was separate. He thought Mesopotamia or Armenia would cover it, but he was now informed that it did not. He referred to Kurdistan, which was between Mesopotamia and Armenia. Therefore, if there was no objection, he proposed to insert the words: "and Kurdistan".

(This was agreed to.)

M. ORLANDO said that the question he put was: With regard to the situation concerning the German Colonies, was it to be considered as the continuation of occupation *de facto*, or was it to be, after they had passed that resolution, a system of provisional mandate—German or Turkish? After having heard the discussion, M. Orlando said that he had come to the conclusion that the solution was to give provisional mandates. If that were so, he asked whether those mandates would be distributed by a further resolution of the conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that the resolution did not deal with the distribution of mandates at all, but only laid down the general principles.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that was accepted. The question put by M. Orlando was then discussed.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had a suggestion to offer. The maintenance of the *status quo* involved the difficulties which the Prime Minister of Great Britain had pointed out about the maintenance of large forces of troops. It ought to be possible by agreement among the Allies. He said that, because the United States could not participate at present, as they had not declared war against Turkey. By agreement with the Allies, the military control of those several parts of the Turkish Empire could be arranged as they pleased by substitution. Would not that be better than going through the difficult form of provisional mandate?

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that they were to discuss M. Orlando's proposal. His proposal was that as France, England and her Dominions had had their share, Italy wanted to have her own share. That was what he understood.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought the problem put by M. Orlando was one that they would have to face. M. ORLANDO said, either they

could leave things as they were—leave the mandatories to be settled by the League of Nations and the occupation go on exactly as at the present moment—or they could have a provisional mandate, leaving the definite final thing to be settled by the League of Nations; or they could now say they were the League of Nations and settle the business finally. Those were the three points and he would say quite frankly that he would rather face them at once, as he could not see that there would be any greater light thrown on the subject when the League of Nations came to deal with it or that there would even be a different tribunal—they would be exactly the same people; as a matter of fact, there would be this difference, perhaps—they might not then be able to have the advantage of the presence of the President of the United States at the League of Nations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that they could not accept the *status quo*. He wanted to put the British position again. The German Colonies did not matter very much, although the maintenance of troops in German East Africa was a very considerable burden. He could not say exactly how many troops they had in that theatre, but he knew it was a very considerable number. Coming to the Turkish Empire, he had handed some figures to the President of the United States and to M. Clemenceau, and he had also told M. Orlando that they had 1,084,000 men there. It was true that only between 250,000 and 300,000 were British troops, but they had to maintain the lot, and it was an enormous expense. The difficulty was to keep all these various tribes in some sort of peace with each other. If they kept them there until they had made peace with Turkey, and until the League of Nations had been constituted and had started business, and until it was able to dispose of this question, the expense would be something enormous, and they really could not face it, especially as they had not the slightest intention of being mandatories of a considerable number of territories they now occupied, such as Syria and parts of Armenia. He thought the same thing applied to Kurdistan and the Caucasus, although they had rich oil-wells. He did not think that they had the slightest intention of being mandatories even for the oil-wells of Baku, but somebody had to be there to protect the Armenians and to keep the tribes and sects in Lebanon from cutting each other's throats and attacking the French or Turks, or whoever also might be there. Therefore, he was afraid that they must insist (he was not using that word in a military sense but, from the point of view of those who had to pay taxes in the United Kingdom, and to propose it to Parliament). He was afraid however that Parliament would want to know:—Why should they keep 1,084,000 men there? Did they really mean to occupy the country? Why should they do so when they had no intention of having a perma-

nent garrison there? This question specially affected them, and unless the Conference was prepared to relieve them of that responsibility, he would really have to press very hard for a definite appointment of the mandatories, which he should have thought was the most satisfactory way of dealing with it. Then they could clear out, and leave the mandatory to undertake the job.

As to the remark made by President Wilson in regard to Turkey, Mr. Lloyd George said that he did not think that was a conclusive reason. Matters could easily be arranged with Turkey. It would not be regarded as a hostile act by the Turk. He knew he was not going to Armenia and Syria, and he also knew that that was going to be taken away from him, and the Turk would not object to the United States going there instead of the British; in fact, he might object much less, for the reason that the United States had not been fighting him for the last four or five years, whereas the British had.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated what seemed to him to stand in the way of a permanent designation.

Many of these mandates would constitute a burden—by no means a privilege—and a very serious burden, but while he should not be disinclined to see the United States get any advantage out of this war, he should be equally disinclined to see her shirk any burden or duty. But he could think of nothing the people of the United States would be less inclined to accept than military responsibility in Asia. If the United States of America, therefore, was to be asked to share a burden of mandates, the request would have to be postponed until he could explain the whole matter to them, and try to bring them to the point of view which he desired them to assume. That, if the United States was to be included in the request, would lead to permanent assignments. He would therefore like to make a suggestion. The question in the meantime was chiefly a military question, and he wished to suggest that the military advisers of the Supreme War Council should have this question of the military occupation and control of these various regions referred to them for recommendation to that Council as to the distribution of the burden, so that they should have something definite for the military authorities to consider.

(There was no objection to this.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this would clarify the question. The Secretary of State for War would be there the following day, so that he, Mr. Lloyd George, would be quite prepared to have it examined, say, on Saturday.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his advisers were already there.

M. CLEMENCEAU said everything depended on the situation in Russia. The French had troops in the East, the British had troops in the Caucasus, the French had troops in Odessa, as also had the

British and the Italians. As long as they did not know exactly what they would do with Russia, he doubted if they could do anything at all. It was very difficult to recall troops.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that it was a question of redistribution and substitution.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that supposing the British agreed to withdraw from Syria altogether, he would like to know the attitude of the military authorities. This was a point put to him by Mr. Balfour.

PRESIDENT WILSON said "Or from Mesopotamia."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE added "Or Kurdistan."

He also said that they had troops in Persia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, in answer to M. Clemenceau, said that he was prepared, so far as the British delegates were concerned, to examine the matter on Saturday with his military experts and that they would have them there.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether it would not be better for someone to formulate the question in writing for the military men to discuss, and present a memorandum to that meeting. If they brought their military experts there it would probably lead to a long discussion.

MR. HUGHES said there was one small point to which he would like to call the attention of the President. He did not like the wording "principle afforded by the necessity of disposing of these Colonies and territories." He did not think that that was the best way of expressing it. It seemed to be opposed to the principle. Therefore he suggested that it should be made to read "apply to" or "dealing with". It was a small thing, but it seemed to be against the general spirit of the clause, which did not mean the disposing of people at all. Perhaps, therefore, this alteration might be made.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the meaning would be the same.

Continuing, President Wilson said they had not yet adopted the instructions to the Polish delegates.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that they were going to have the reports of the people who were now considering the question.

In regard to the Czecho-Slovaks, there would be a paragraph to introduce into the instructions.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if those present were willing to hear the Belgian representatives in regard to the Congo.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Congo was not a German conquest. He did not know on what point the Belgians wished to make themselves heard. No doubt there were many other Powers who would like to be heard. There was the question of the Portuguese Colonies, about which General Botha would probably like to say a

good deal. There was a good deal that he himself would like to say about the Congo which would be very useful, but not at that Conference.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that they had got a big enough job already, and that if they went into history by mending the actions of previous Conferences, they would have a very difficult business.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that it was a little harsh to say they would not hear them.

M. PICHON observed that the Belgians had some claims to certain parts of the German Colonies.

(At this point the Belgian representatives entered.)

M. ORST said that the participation of Belgium in the discussion on the fate of the German Colonies in Africa was justified by the importance of the political and economic interests of Belgium in that part of the world, and by the fact that the Belgian Colonies in Africa were neighbours both of the Cameroons and of German East Africa. Also it should be mentioned that the Belgian troops took a considerable part in the fighting that took place in those districts.

He would like to say a few words about the international régime under which the Belgian Congo has been living. An exceptional system had been established between the two oceans by the Berlin Act of 1885,³ in what was called the Conventional basin of the Congo river. There were two clauses which must be specifically recalled. Article X of that Act stipulated that perpetual neutrality should exist in that part, and the Belgian Congo State in execution of this has declared itself to be perpetually neutral.

Article XI gave the faculty to all the colonies of that hemisphere that belong to those parts to be declared by their owners neutral in the event of a general war.

So, when war broke out, Belgium had a colony and a régime of neutrality, which, by the way, was on a different basis from that of the Mother Country. They decided to observe that neutrality, and instructions were sent to the Belgian authorities which were defensive instructions. On the other hand, Belgium decided to act upon Clause 11 of the Treaty, that was to use the faculty of declaring territories of that area neutral all round. Belgium was ready to make a proposal in that direction to Germany, i. e. for the neutrality of all the territories of the conventional basin of the Congo River. But war broke out instantaneously there. As a matter of fact, the Germans fought in many parts, and very soon the

³ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXVI, p. 4.

fighting extended to the borders of East Africa and the Cameroons and on both sides of the Congo State. Very soon the fighting extended throughout the Congo State.

On the 15th August, 1914, Belgian positions were attacked. This was merely a proof that Belgium had no responsibility in the matter and that a state of war already existed in that part of the world, although she had done everything to maintain peace in Central Africa, as provided for in the Act of Berlin and that all these sacrifices had to be made on account of the hostilities in Africa which were begun by the hostile action of Germany.

The dangers to the Belgian Congo were great, because the Belgian Congo was not prepared for war. Belgium at once applied to the two Great Powers which were most concerned in these matters—Great Britain and France—and on the 19th September, 1914, they received a formal declaration from Great Britain, which was immediately supported by France, giving them an assurance of the integrity of the Congo territory. Another declaration repeating and emphasising this first one was issued by the French Government on the 28th [29th] April, 1916.⁴

The part the Belgian troops had taken in the war in that part of the world could be divided into three different actions. They had gone up the valley of the Skumbi [*Sanga?*] to the heart of the Cameroons until the end of that campaign. Then, with the French troops, they had occupied the capital of the German Cameroons. They had sent other troops to help in the defence of North-Eastern Rhodesia. On their Eastern borders, on the frontier of German East Africa, they had kept troops for 18 months, which had prevented the Germans from invading that colony. They had then advanced into German East Africa, co operating with the British troops, and the Belgian troops were partly responsible for the taking of Tabora, the main town inland.

The question seemed to be settled at that time, but six months later the Germans came back and another campaign ensued, in which Belgian troops helped the British troops and drove the enemy across the frontier into Portuguese territory.

The effort there had been considerable. If they considered that while the British troops had been fighting in that part of the world the whole of Belgium was invaded and their effort in that direction appeared very much more important. The Allies fully recognised the value of the importance [*assistance?*] given by Belgium in that direction. What Belgium had been fighting for in Africa was the

⁴ M. Paul Fauchille, *La Guerre de 1914, Recueil de documents intéressant le droit international*, vol. II, p. 112.

territorial integrity of her Colony. They knew that the Colony was threatened by the German schemes, which were fairly well known, but better known since the war had taken place. The Germans, not only by their enterprise but also by propaganda, prepared their way into that part of Central Africa. Their propaganda tended to show that Belgium was incapable of the administration of such a large Colony. They also said they had done more, when, after the incidents which everyone remembered between France and Germany in 1911, a Treaty had been signed which bargained for a Moroccan concession against some territories in the Congo region.⁵ Germany asked France to surrender to her two "feelers" as they were called—two long strips of territory reaching from the Congo on the point where the Lobi river and the Sanga river joined the main river of the Congo. These two feelers were a direct threat to the Belgian Congo and it was now absolutely clear from the map that Germany contemplated the complete satisfaction of her ambitions by joining her colonies in West Africa with her colonies in East Africa through the Belgian Congo.

The French Government, more than any other Government, knew what the ambitions of Germany were in that part of the world. There was an incident which took place before the war between Herr Mogo (?) [*Von Jagow*]⁶ and the French Ambassador in Berlin, and which is recorded in the Yellow [*Grey?*] Book.⁷ Herr Mogo [*Von Jagow*] made no mystery of the fact that it was Germany's intention to take the whole of the Belgian Colony when opportunity offered. The Germans in Africa had always been the enemy of Belgium and of the Belgian Colonial policy. During the war the intentions of Germany were not concealed. It was made clear when they thought they were going to win, by speeches, by articles in the newspapers and reviews, that the Belgian Congo was to become a basis of the future of the German Empire in Central Africa. At the present time the question for Belgium was the question of security. A feeling of security was necessary for further enterprise in those regions. They wished first of all that the Germans should no longer be their Western neighbours and especially that the points driven through French territory to the River Congo should disappear, so as to re-establish that vicinity with the French

⁵ See Franco-German Convention of November 4, 1911, concerning Morocco, Great Britain, Cd. 6010, Morocco No. 4 (1911), and Franco-German Convention of November 4, 1911, on Equatorial Africa, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. civ, p. 956.

⁶ Gottlieb E. G. von Jagow, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁷ Document No. 2, *The Second Belgian Grey Book*, printed in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War* (New York), 1916, pt. 1, p. 420.

Government, whom they had always found in those parts of the world to be good and friendly neighbours.

In regard to East Africa the Belgians had made a provisional agreement with the British authorities by which an important part of that country was provisionally under Belgian administration. That country was of considerable value. It was geographically different from the Belgian Congo though the population was of the same family. The comparatively high altitude of the country made it possible to colonise part of it by white settlers. There were fertile valleys, good pasture lands and cattle, and all sorts of facilities for rearing cattle to be sent to the Congo valley afterwards in order to maintain the stock. Also it would be very valuable for the Congo State to have access to the great Victorian (?) range, which was a central attraction for the railways from the coast, and thus enabled the great central basin of the Congo to be within easy communication with the Indian Ocean. The natives have been very friendly since the occupation and there would be no difficulty with them. They seemed to be satisfied with the present administration. They were a superior race to that in the lower valley and he thought that they would be quite satisfied to remain under the existing authorities.

The claims of Belgium might be summarised as follows:—They wished that the former conquests made by the Germans and the points of the Cameroons towards the Congo should disappear and the same on the Eastern side. They had no desire for conquest, but they thought it would be only fair in view of all the losses they had sustained, and it would complete the Congo Colony in many respects, if they could be allowed to retain permanently under their administration the territories in East Africa which they now provisionally occupied. Belgium accepted the 14 points as laid down by President Wilson, and especially point number 5 dealing with colonial claims and with the legitimate interests of those concerned in that question, which was the title upon which they had based their present claim.

M. PICHON said that Portugal had asked to be heard during the last few days. The Portuguese Minister had been to see him at the beginning of the Conference and said that Portugal would have something to say about the settlement of all those regions when the time came.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Belgium asked for something that they had not yet started to discuss, namely, who should be the mandatory. They were making out a case that they should be the mandatory in respect of those territories, a question which had not yet been reached.

PRESIDENT WILSON added: "to divide up East Africa".

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said Belgium asked for the most fertile portion of East Africa whereas they had not made good use of what they had on the Western side.

MR. BALFOUR stated that Portugal wanted to say the same thing. The Portuguese Ambassador had often been to see him in London, and among other grievances he had tried to bring before his notice, was the question that Portugal would like to have some part of German East Africa, and would also like to have a large British loan in order to enable them to exploit and develop the side they have had for centuries. He did not know whether all those points should be discussed there. He thought not.

(The question was reserved.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Roumanians wished to be present the next day.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that raised the question of the agenda and he thought it was very important that some sort of agenda should be formulated. He was not complaining. But he did not know that the Belgians were coming there that afternoon and they were putting up a claim which very specially affected the British and he found himself without experts on this question and without maps, etc.

In regard to Roumania, Mr. Lloyd George enquired if that meant that they were beginning the following day with the discussion of the territorial questions in Europe. He thought the discussion on Czecho-Slovakia and Poland the other day was absolutely wrong. He would not use the term "a waste of time" because that was a very provocative one, and he could already see the glare in the President's eye! At the same time he thought it was not quite the best method of dealing with the business. If they were going to begin to hear them in part, let them each make their statements before the matter had been broached at that Conference. Unless they began business with Roumania and considered her claims the next day, he did not think the Roumanian representatives ought to be present. If they came without intending to do business, it would be a waste of time.

M. SONNINO thought that the question of the Czechs and the Poles could not be considered as a waste of time. They knew that the Poles and Czechs were fighting and they wanted to stop that, consequently they had decided to send a Mission to Warsaw. It was their duty to hear the Czechs and the Poles with the least possible delay, instead of sending a Mission which would take a fortnight. If the Poles put out all their aspirations, that was another question.

MR. BALFOUR said that was their fault.

M. SONNINO thought that the talk with the Czechs and the Poles was very useful and if, as a consequence of that conversation, they

could decide how to put a stop to the fighting, they would have gained and not lost time.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that those present did not always share the same views. President Wilson had proposed that they should begin to deal with territorial questions. They began with the Pacific, then passed to Africa. Now they had come to Europe, beginning with Poland, because there was a pressing necessity and fighting was taking place there. If it were decided not to hear the Roumanian case the following day, well, let it be so; but they must have courage to begin with those questions one day or other. If Mr. Lloyd George wished to have another agenda, of course he (M. Clemenceau) was ready to accept his suggestion, but he only wished that suggestions should be other than negative ones. If it was suggested that they should leave out the Colonial question, that they should not deal further with Poland, that they should not hear the Roumanian case, then that would lead them to a *cul de sac*. President Wilson had given very important reasons why the discussion of the Colonial questions should be postponed for the moment. They had reached an agreement on the proposal made by Mr. Lloyd George that morning, and President Wilson had said he wished to stop at that stage for the present. Now, if they did not courageously deal with the European questions, what else was there for them to do? M. Clemenceau said that he expected to receive a report from the Committee on the Czecho-Polish dispute the following day, and it would be ready for issue the same afternoon.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was afraid he had not made himself very clear but did not object to Roumania being taken. What he said was that if they took Roumania they must examine the territorial question. That was what he meant. If Roumania was to be taken as a serious examination of the problem, he had not a word to say. If the Roumanian and Serbian delegates had come there for the conference to hear what they had to say, then he had not the slightest objection to Roumania being taken the following day, so long as it was with a view to serious discussion.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had a suggestion to make, which at least looked practical. Discussions such as they had heard on the previous day he admitted were most instructive. His only objection was that they did not bear upon a single point that was in doubt in their minds. Now he wanted to hear the full Roumanian case and it was probable that an opportunity could not be found the next day. His suggestion was that the British students of the subject, and the Americans, French, Italians, and Japanese if they had a body of students conversant with those things, should take up any one of

those questions and find how near they were in agreement upon it, and then submit to the conference for discussion their conclusions as to what, for example, the territory of Roumania should be. Then they should submit their conclusions to the Roumanians for their opinion. By this means they would eliminate from the discussion everything in which they were in agreement.

Continuing, President Wilson said that he had on his desk the recommendations of the American students on all those questions, in a digested form, so that he would not be laying them before the conference as American proposals, but as a basis of discussion.

MR. BALFOUR said that the only observation he had to make was that he was quite sure that the President was right in thinking that a discussion among the experts who had studied those questions would be most valuable, and that it would tend to eliminate a great many agreed points, and therefore enable them to concentrate their attention on points upon which agreement had not been reached. He was not sure that it would not be wise to allow those people to have their day to explain their case. He thought they would be much happier, although he admitted it took up a great deal of time. He thought it would make a great difference to them if they came there and said that they would put their whole case before the conference.

The second part of his suggestion was that they should have representative experts there.

Mr. Balfour, continuing, said that with regard to the suggestion for allowing each of these groups to have it out before the conference with their experts, he thought that the discussions would be more fruitful, and they would know exactly what these people were thinking in their own minds. The Americans had done most of their work in America. The British had done their work in England and France. They had had books but more than that they had seen the representatives of these countries. If they could come face to face with the actual living feelings of the people concerned, he thought it would be beneficial. That is why he suggested they should have the Roumanians there the following day.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE added that Serbia must also be present.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then drew attention to a paragraph which had appeared in the "Daily Mail" published that morning. He said that it was really a very monstrous report, and one might have thought that there was a battle going on between them. President Wilson had called his attention to it that morning. In the afternoon he had obtained a copy, and he thought the language of the Presi-

dent had been very restrained and very moderate, and he was not at all sure that it was adequate having regard to the seriousness of the article.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied that he had left his profane vocabulary at home.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this article gave the impression of a royal row between America, Japan, Great Britain and her Dominions, France, and everybody else, with quotations from the speeches of some of the delegates which appeared in inverted commas, and which were correct. General Botha had already told them that he had received a number of telegrams of a serious nature from South Africa. They would get some in from Great Britain, and would have to give an explanation. It was a grossly inaccurate account, and yet one could see that it was accurate enough to have been supplied by somebody who either directly or indirectly had inside knowledge. That must be stopped.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not see how that Conference could be conducted at all if such statements were allowed to continue. In that case they would have to have public séances with speeches, which meant that they would never settle the Peace of Europe or of the Pacific either, because there would be no Pacific. What he wanted was a clear understanding that whatever communiqué was issued, it should be the only communiqué. The next thing that he wanted to know was what the communiqué should be. He hoped for the moment that it would give the impression of an agreement being arrived at so as not to excite further the disturbed state of the people in all those countries, because that was the way to Bolshevism, if the peoples thought that they in that Conference were wrangling and tearing each others' eyes out. They could say what was absolutely true, that they had arrived at a satisfactory provisional agreement and were examining the question later on.

MR. HUGHES enquired if they were going to put their decisions into the communiqué.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied in the negative.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that they should say that they had arrived at a satisfactory provisional arrangement with regard to dealing with the German and Turkish territory outside Europe. Then they should say that they had heard the Belgians with regard to the Congo, and that the military advisers of the Supreme War Council should make a report to the Conference as to the best and most advisable disposition of troops to take care of the Turkish territories that are now outside Europe and were now being occupied.

(This was agreed to.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then read the draft terms of reference to the Supreme War Council on the Turkish question:—

“The Military Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Versailles are directed to meet at once and to present a report as to the most equitable and economical distribution among these Powers of the burden of supplying military forces for the purpose of maintaining order in the Turkish Empire,^s pending the decisions of the Peace Conference concerning the Government of Turkish territory.”

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 31 January, 1919.

^s A correction issued on February 1, 1919, reads as follows:

After “Turkish Empire” insert “Trans-Caucasia.”

NOTE:—This addition has been agreed to between President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau and M. Orlando.

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 31 January, 1919, at
3 p. m.**

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson
Mr. B. Lansing
Mr. Miller
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Col. U. S. Grant
Mr. C. L. Swem

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George
Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour
Mr. H. Norman
Lt. Col. Sir Maurice
Hankey
Major A. M. Caccia, M.
V. O.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn
Capt. Portier

ITALY

M. Orlando
Baron Sonnino
Count Aldrovandi
Major Jones

JAPAN

Baron Makino
Viscount Chinda
H. E. M. Matsui
M. Saburi
M. Kimura

PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION OF POLISH QUESTION

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Major Gen. F. J.
Kernan
Mr. Lord
Capt. Ewell

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Botha
Sir Edward [Es-
me] Howard
Captain Brebner

FRANCE

M. Noulens
Gen. Niessel

ITALY

M. de Martino

PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION OF BANAT QUESTION

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Prof. C. Day
M. C. Seymour

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. H. Nicolson
M. A. Leeper

ROUMANIA

M. J. Bratiano
M. N. Misu

SERBIA

M. Pachitch
M. Trumbitch
M. Vesnitch

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. **M. CLEMENCEAU** introduced **M. Noulens**, the Chairman of the Committee appointed by the Great Powers to proceed to Poland, and called on him to submit to the Council the conclusions which had been reached.

Poland and
Czecho-Slovak
Contention

M. NOULENS said that the Council was well acquainted with the reasons which had led to the appointment of the Commission on Poland. That Commission had been requested to examine and report on the situation in the Teschen District, which

had led to serious conflicts between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles. It appeared that the Czecho-Slovaks, contrary to the agreement made by their local authorities with the local authorities of the Polish nation, had entered the territory of Teschen in question and had seized the railroad from Teschen to Jablunkau. As a result of these operations, the Czecho-Slovak troops had occupied the mining region and made prisoners of various Polish citizens: they had even arrested certain Polish delegates, who were on their way to Paris. The Czecho-Slovak delegates had been asked to explain the reasons which had led to the aggressive operations. The Czecho-Slovak delegates had explained that the Teschen District in reality formed part of Czecho-Slovakia for ethnological, geographical, historical and economic reasons, but in addition their Government had been forced to occupy this territory to prevent the spread of Bolshevism, which was rampant in the Polish provinces. The commission on Poland had at once set aside historical and ethnological reasons, and had endeavoured to arrive at a provisional solution, which would put a stop to the conflict between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles. The Czecho-Slovaks had been asked whether they would consent to the immediate withdrawal of their troops from the railroad, leaving the final settlement of the question to the Peace Conference in accordance with the proclamation recently issued by the Great Powers here and in accordance with the agreement entered into by the local Czech and Polish authorities. The Czech delegates maintained that the authority of Mr. Masaryk and Mr. Kramarcz would be compromised by the acceptance of this proposal, which would be in opposition to the popular will. The Czech delegates had also maintained that the Poles were incapable of maintaining order in the mining districts, and that as a result Bolshevism would spread into Czecho-Slovakia. Therefore, whilst declining to accede to an unconditional withdrawal of their troops, the Czecho-Slovak delegates had expressed their readiness to agree to the withdrawal of both the Polish and Czech troops provided the contested districts were occupied by three Allied battalions. This was considered to be a sufficient force for the maintenance of order.

The commission on Poland had expressed no views on this latter suggestion, feeling that the proposal should be submitted to the Great Powers for discussion.

The Commission had then proposed that the Czecho-Slovak troops should occupy the mining regions and the railroad north of Teschen, while the Poles should occupy the southern part of Teschen, adjoining Galicia. In other particulars, until the final decision was reached by the Peace Conference, the *status quo* would be maintained, in accordance with the agreement of the local authorities of the 25th [5th?] of November, 1918. These proposals could only be ac-

cepted with serious reservations by the Czecho-Slovak delegates. They feared that as a result of the direct contact of the troops of the two nations along the railroad, disturbances were bound to occur, and they made the counter proposal that Teschen should be occupied by one battalion of Inter-Allied troops with a view to separating the two contestants.

Summing up, Mr. Noulens held that if the Allies occupied the contested territory with three battalions, the whole difficulty would be solved; even if only one Allied battalion could be spared for the occupation of Teschen, a satisfactory solution would have been attained. If, on the other hand, neither of these solutions were practicable, he thought perhaps the Czecho-Slovak and Polish delegates might still be brought to agree to the arrangement above proposed for the occupation of defined areas by the Poles and Czechs respectively. There was, however, another solution, which he felt was worthy of consideration, namely, that an Inter-Allied commission be sent to Teschen, to remain there permanently until the final settlement of the question by the Peace Conference. This Commission would be required to supervise the execution of this agreement, and to study the statistics and data which would form the basis of the ultimate decision. This proposal had been suggested by Mr. Piltz of the Polish delegation. This Inter-Allied Commission should also be charged with the duty of controlling the exploitation of the mining region, and of insuring a sufficient supply of mining products to the Polish people. The Czecho-Slovak and Polish delegates had both accepted this proposal, and it was agreed that the Czecho-Slovaks, having control of the mining region, should furnish coal and a proportion of their manufactures, especially munitions and arms for the campaign against the Bolsheviks, to Poland. The Czecho-Slovak Government should be requested to allow the free passage by rail to Poland through this territory of arms and munitions.

Finally, the Czecho-Slovak delegates had declared that orders had been issued to stop the further advance of their troops in the Teschen district and for the immediate release of all Polish prisoners recently taken.

(M. Noulens then submitted the text of the recommendations made by the Commission, which read as follows:—

“The undersigned Delegates representing the Great Powers deem it their duty first of all to recall that the nationalities who have undertaken the engagement to submit the territorial questions which concern them to the Peace Conference are, pending its decision, to refrain from taking as a pawn or occupying the territories to which they lay claim.

"The Delegates take note of the engagement by which the representatives of the Czech Nation have declared that they were definitely stopping their troops on the line of the railway which runs from Oderberg to Teschen-Doblowlas [*Jablunkau?*]. They similarly note that the representatives of the Czech and Polish Nations have agreed to admit that, pending the decisions of the Peace Conference as to the definite assignment of territory the railway line and mining regions which are at the present moment in the hands of the Czechs shall be handed over to Inter-Allied troops representing a force of three battalions, if the Associated Governments so decide.

"In case this solution be not adopted and always remembering that this is a provisional arrangement, the part of the railway lines to the north of Teschen and the mining region would remain in the occupation of the Czech troops while the southern section of the line starting from and including Teschen down to Jablunkau and Doblowlas [*sic*] would be entrusted to the military control of the Poles. In this case it would be desirable that the city of Teschen should be occupied by an Inter-Allied battalion.

"The undersigned consider it indispensable that a Commission of Control should be immediately sent to the spot to avoid a conflict between the Czechs and Poles in the region of Teschen. This Commission, apart from the measures that it will have to prescribe, will conduct the investigation on the basis of which the Peace Conference may form its decision in fixing definitely the respective frontiers of the Czechs and Poles in the contested zone.

"In order to seal the Entente between two friendly nations which should follow a policy in full accord with that of the Great Powers, the Delegates register the promise of the Czech representatives that their country will put at the disposition of the Poles all its available resources in war material and will grant to them every facility for the transit of arms and ammunition.

"The exploitation of the mines of the Karwin-Ostrawa district will be carried out in such a way as to avoid all infraction of private property while reserving any police measures which the situation may require. The Commission of Control will be empowered to supervise this and if necessary to secure to the Poles that part of the output which may be equitably claimed by them.

"It is understood that the local administration will continue to function in accordance with the conditions of the pact of the 5th November, 1918, and that the rights of minorities will be strictly respected.

"Pending the decision of the Peace Congress, political elections and military conscription will be suspended in the principality of Teschen.

"No measure implying annexation of all or of a part of the said Principality either to the territory of Poland or of Czecho-Slovakia taken by interested parties shall have binding force.

"The Delegates of the Czech Nation engage to release immediately with their arms and baggage the Polish prisoners taken during the recent conflict.")

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether the Czecho-Slovaks had consented to the furnishing of a proportion of coal and manufactures

to Poland, and to the free passage by rail of ammunition and war material for Poland.

M. NOULENS replied in the affirmative.

GENERAL BOTHA stated that whilst the Czecho-Slovaks had been producing 1,400 tons a day from their mines, the Poles were only getting 1,200 tons a day. The former claimed that Bolshevism had made such progress among the Polish mining population that it had appreciably raised the price of labour and reduced the output.

M. CLEMENCEAU, after consulting the representatives of the Great Powers, said that the third proposal was accepted. This proposal meant the sending of a commission to Teschen, to maintain order and to control the distribution of coal, etc.

(It was agreed:—

(1) That the part of the railway lines to the North of Teschen and the mining region would remain in the occupation of the Czech troops, while the southern section of the line starting from and including Teschen down to Jablunkau-Dublowkas [*sic*] would be entrusted to the military control of the Poles.

(2) That a Commission of Control should be immediately sent to Teschen for the purposes set forth in the recommendations submitted by the Commission for Poland.)

(The Members of the Commission for Poland then withdrew.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU then introduced the members of the Roumanian and Serbian delegations, who would present their cases in regard to the question of the Banat.

The Question
of Banat

M. BRATIANO read the paper presenting the claims of Roumania to the Banat (See Annexure "A").

M. VESNITCH stated that he had not a written memorandum to present, because he had only been informed of this meeting at eleven o'clock that morning. He had heard, with regret, that the Roumanian delegation based their country's claim in part on the secret treaty of 1916.¹ When this treaty was being negotiated, Serbia was fighting on the side of the Allies, without asking for any assurances, in the firm belief that after the war settlement would be made on the principles of justice, on the principles of the self-determination of nationalities, and in accordance with the promises of the Allies.

As in the past, so at the present, and in the future, Serbia desired to live in amicable relations with her neighbours, the Roumanians. Roumania and Serbia had existed side by side for ten centuries and no serious difficulties had arisen. As regards the Banat the Serbs

¹ Treaty of Alliance of August 17, 1916, between the Allies and Roumania; for French text, see Italy, R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, *Trattati e convenzioni fra il regno d'Italia e gli altri stati*, vol. 23, p. 412.

based their claims solely on the principles recognised and proclaimed by all the Allies, and confirmed by the last nation to enter the war, the great democracy of America.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was not aware that the Treaty of 1916 had been secret.

M. VESNITCH replied that not only had the treaty never been published, but that as a representative of a power fighting with the Allies, he had several times asked here in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to know terms of the Treaty. He had been told that the contents of the Treaty could not be divulged.

M. BRATIANO stated that the discussion of the claims of Roumania had been begun in London in 1916, and had then been transferred to Petrograd, as a place where the examination of Eastern questions could be more conveniently carried on, especially in regard to Serbia.

M. PICHON then read the last paragraph of the Treaty, which required the maintenance of its secrecy to the end of the war.

M. VESNITCH continuing, said that Serbia had no pretensions to the whole of the Banat. Serbia merely claimed that part to which she had a right on ethnological grounds, where their race had a majority over the Germans and Hungarians, and an absolute majority over the Roumanians. He did not mean to offend his Roumanian friends when he said that Germany and Hungary had always shown greater favour to the Roumanians than to the Serbians, and the Roumanians had been allied to the Central Powers for nearly thirty years.

Under the Hapsburgs this very part of Hungary had occupied a peculiar position. The boundaries of military districts had been arranged according to nationalities. The regiments raised in those districts had been recruited by nationalities, but no exact statistics were available. Moreover, while both Serbians and Roumanians belonged to the Orthodox Church, the Hapsburgs had insisted on their religious administration being carried out by nationality, and though this classification had been made by strangers the results showed the justice of the Serbian contention.

Furthermore, for forty years there had been Parliamentary elections in the Banat. These elections had always led to political contests between the Serbs and the Magyars; but there had never been any contests between the Roumanians and the Magyars.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether any Serbian members had ever been returned to Parliament, and for what districts?

M. VESNITCH replied in the affirmative to the first question and mentioned Werschetz, Temesvar, Pancsova, Weisskirchen, Kikinda, Banat Komlos, as electoral districts represented by Serbs at Buda-Pest at

the outbreak of the war. He added that in latter years the artificial means used by the Magyars to manipulate the elections had brought about a diminution in the Serbian representation.

MR. LANSING asked whether the Roumanians had returned any delegates.

M. BRATIANO replied that violent political struggles had always occurred during the elections in the Banat in which the Roumanians had been involved, but he lacked any definite records as to the numbers of Roumanian deputies returned. He thought, however, three million Roumanians were represented at Buda-Pest by five Deputies, while the Servians had only three. The violence of the Roumanian political struggles could not be reassured [*measured?*] by the number of Deputies sent to Buda-Pest, but by the number of Roumanian candidates in the prisons.

M. VESNITCH continuing, said that as regards the violence of the political struggles they were in complete agreement. M. Bratiano's remarks applied equally to the Serbs and the Roumanians.

Since the Middle Ages the portion of the Banat claimed by Serbia had always been closely connected with the Serbian people. The manners, customs, aspirations, and traditions of the Serbs of the Banat and of the Serbs of Serbia were the same. At critical periods they had helped one another. When, in 1848, the Serbs had endeavoured to free themselves by siding with the Hapsburgs against the Magyars, the Hapsburgs had rewarded the Serbs by declaring the autonomy of a part of the Banat. A Voivoidia had been created with its own elected Voivod. As usual, the promises of the Hapsburgs had not been kept, but the territorial limits of the Voivoidia had been fixed, and the territory then demarcated was exactly the same as that which the Serbs now claimed. Historically, as the Isle of France was to France, and Tuscany to Italy, so was the Banat to Serbia. Serbian Renaissance had taken root in the Banat in the 17th Century; there Serb literature, art, theatre, etc., had reappeared; there the great Serbian ideal had been conceived. He, himself, entered political life there. In 1881 the young Serbians met there to discuss their new aspirations. The Banat had given birth to many Serbian leaders who had rendered service to the Allies, and carried their cause to a happy conclusion. He would merely mention such well known names as Pirdrik, Pashek, the greatest authority on financial questions, Nicholvitch, Porpish [*Pupin?*] of Columbia University, and the present Rector of the University of Belgrade. As a further proof of the close attachment between the Serbians of Serbia and the Banat, he called attention to the fact that the Royal Family, when exiled, had found an asylum there.

He submitted in addition two supplementary arguments. In his country, lying on the border land between Christendom and Islam, the monasteries played a prominent part as a civilising agency, all of which were Serbian. Further, all real estates were still to this day in the hands of the Serbians, in spite of the efforts made by the Germans and Hungarians to dispossess them.

So far, he had presented merely the Serbian point of view, and he had not referred to the question of the frontiers. In dealing with this question both the interests of Serbia and the general interest must be considered. He was glad to say that from the Serbian point of view the two questions were identic. During the war the Serbian General Staff had realised that a successful offensive could only be made along the valley of the Morawa. As long as the Austrians had failed to attack along this line, the Serbians were able to resist successfully. But finally when the German General Staff assumed the leadership, and attacked down the Valley of the Morawa, further defence became impossible.

In conclusion he thought that if guarantees for future peace were required the proper protection of this feeble strategic point must be assured. He felt sure the Conference would consider favourably the just claims and aspirations of the Serbs, and coordinate these aspirations with the general interests of the world, and of civilisation, with which he felt confident they would be found to agree.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the Serbian Representatives were in a position to give any figures. So far, only a general statement had been made but no statistics of populations by nationalities had been given.

M. VESNITCH replied that he was quite ready to supply the figures, but had not brought them with him.

M. PASHITCH asked permission to lay on the table an official map dated 1853, prepared at the time when the Banat Voivoidia had been created. This map clearly showed the parts then belonging to Serbia and to Roumania. It would be seen that in the eastern portion, the population was chiefly Roumanian, whereas in the western part the Serbians were predominant. Between the two, the population was very mixed, because it had always been the policy of Austria to prevent the expression of national feeling by the introduction of emigrants. Notwithstanding this, it was extremely easy to find, between these two territories, the just line of demarcation, based on grounds of nationality. In conclusion, he would add that a paper setting forth the Serbian case had been prepared and would be submitted in due course.

M. BRATIANO invited attention to the fact that though sentimental reasons, such as the statement that some great men had left one coun-

try to settle in another, deserved some recognition, it would, as a rule, be extremely unwise for statesmen to be influenced by such facts. It was with some emotion that he had heard the statement that the Royal Karageorgevitch family had taken refuge in the Temesvar. He thought that that hardly constituted a claim to the acquisition of that territory by Serbia, otherwise the whole of Roumania might as well be claimed by Serbia, since many of the members of the Royal families of Obrenovitch and Karageorgevitch had taken refuge in Roumania, and even M. Pashitch himself, when the situation in Serbia was somewhat dangerous, had made his home in Roumania. Furthermore, the convent question could establish no right, since the fact that many of the convents in the Banat were inhabited by Serbs was due to the religious leanings of the Slavs as a race. Thus, even in Roumania itself, many of the convents would be found to be occupied by more Serbs than Roumanians. Further, he wished to point out that the provisional partition of the Banat in 1848 by the granting of autonomy to the Voivoidia lasted theoretically for a period of ten years only. Moreover, Roumania had also taken part in the struggles for independence, but the tendency of the Hapsburg Government had always been to favour the Yugo-Slavs because they had stood by them in their wars against the Magyars.

Stress had been laid upon the secret character of the treaty of 1916. Though the treaty may have been secret, its consequences were not secret, since that treaty had permitted the maintenance at Salonika of an army of occupation, which had led to the results known by all.

M. TRUMBITCH asked permission to add a few words to M. Vesnitch's statement. As regards the secret treaty he wished to declare most emphatically in the name of Serbia, as well as in the name of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, that the treaty had been negotiated without Serbia's knowledge, and consequently Serbia refused to recognise it. Therefore, the problem must be discussed on another basis. In the first place, it was essential to define the objects of the discussion. Obviously there existed a territory which was in dispute between the Roumanians and the Serbo-Croat-Slovenes, namely, the Banat. M. Bratiano had talked about the whole of the Banat which included three comitats:—Torontal, Temesvar, and Krasnow (?) [*Krassó-Szörény*]. Now, the Serbians did not claim all three comitats: they merely claimed Torontal in the West of the Banat, Temesvar in the centre, and a small part of the Krasnow [*Krassó-Szörény*] comitat. They were prepared to admit that all the Eastern part of the Banat was Roumanian. Therefore, he had nothing to say about that territory. The Serbs recognised Roumania's claims to that territory, which was inhabited by Roumanians, so that

the principle of nationality could be applied. Consequently the question only dealt with two comitats, the claims of which were based on population and territory. As regards the population, everyone would agree that in those two comitats the inhabitants did not all belong to one nationality. There were Magyars, Germans, Serbs and Roumanians. The Magyars and Germans were enemies. The Germans were colonists living far from their own country and consequently they could possess no sovereign claims. Consequently it could positively be stated that the Germans must remain under the Sovereignty of the country that would own that territory. The Magyars who inhabited the Banat were separated from Magyaria, and the Serbs and the Roumanians possessed the same rights and claims to ownership. In addition, he fully admitted that the wishes of all the people should be considered, not only those of the Serbs and Roumanians, but those of others also; because the question of future peace was involved and it was essential to ensure contentment to all the peoples. The Serbs thought that they were justified in claiming the two comitats not only on account of nationality, but also because the population itself would be pleased to form part of their State. The reason for this would also be made apparent by a study of the topographical situation. The Germans and the Magyars would obviously prefer to belong to a State which was situated along the Danube, whose Capital was on the Danube, and towards which river the people gravitated. Their economic and social interests were such that the Germans and the Magyars who were very numerous, would prefer to belong to Serbia, consequently the Serbs rested their claims not only on nationality, but also on the will of the people. Should the Great Powers decide to have a referendum on this question, Serbia would certainly agree.

The two comitats were bounded on the North by the River Maros, on the West by the River Theiss, on the South by the Danube and on the West [*East*] by a line east of Temesvar and Werschetz. Hungarian statistics, which were never favourable to the Serbs, gave the following figures of population in the two comitats:—

Roumanians.....	266,000
Germans.....	328,560
Magyars.....	251,000
Serbs.....	272,000

These were official statistics and they showed that the four nationalities were equally represented. The Serbs, however, were in the majority in the South and West, that is to say, in the territories of the Theiss, Danube and Maros. The above figures showed no great preponderance in favour of any nationality. Consequently the problem must be solved on other grounds than those of the principle

of nationality. For this purpose he thought in the first place the will and wishes of the people themselves should be considered, because the people were always fully alive to their own interests and were prepared to give them their full value.

The whole of the valley from the Maros to the Danube constituted the natural continuation of Serbia. That would explain why, in history, Serbs, when unhappy in Serbia, especially during the period of Turkish misrule, emigrated to the Banat and there created a new Serb centre of civilisation. When the Serbs began their struggle for independence it was the Serbs of the Banat who first fought for the cause of the first Karageorge; and in 1849, when the Magyars attempted to crush the Serbs in the Banat, the Serbs of Serbia rushed to their rescue and they fought side by side, just as they had done in the last war. Though the Danube divided the territories into two, it did not divide the nationality, the civilisation, or the traditions of the Serbs on either side, and they could not now when victory had been achieved, after a struggle lasting so many centuries, abandon their brothers on the other side of the Danube.

The Serbs were anxious to establish good relations with the Roumanians. With the exception of the Banat problem, for which a solution must be found, the two countries had no differences. If the Roumanians wanted the Danube and the Theiss as their frontiers no agreement could possibly be reached. During this war of liberation Roumania had suffered bitterly, but it must not be forgotten that Serbia in particular and Yugo-Slavia in general, had also suffered heavy losses. And for this reason the Serbs insisted on the recognition of their claims to the two comitats. These claims meant no injustice to Roumania, for the Banat was a continuation of Serbia and Yugo-Slavia, whilst between Roumania and the Banat claimed by Serbia, stretched a chain of mountains the importance of which in the settlement of this question could not be overlooked.

M. BRATTIANO apologised for having to address the meeting a third time. He was compelled to do so as the Roumanians had only two representatives to pit against the three representatives of Serbia. M. Trumbitch had explained the situation of the population in the Banat, and he had proposed to divide the territory into two parts, giving the mountainous portion with its mines and forests to Roumania, whilst allotting to the Serbs the industrial areas of Temesvar and the agricultural districts of Torontal. As regards the figures relating to the two comitats, given by M. Trumbitch, it would be remembered that the Germans and Magyars were twice as numerous as either the Serbs or Roumanians. The only possibility of applying the ethnical test was to consider the Banat as a whole, because on ethnical grounds it would be impossible to justify the placing of

580,000 Germans and Magyars under the control of 272,000 Serbs. Therefore, the Banat could not be divided into two for ethnical reasons. Similarly it would be easy to say that economically it would be unsound to separate the mines and forests from the commercial, industrial and agricultural regions. In the course of history the frontiers of the Banat had never been changed except on the Roumanian side because on that side no real frontier existed between the Banat and Wallachia. On the other frontiers no changes had ever occurred except during the ten years which covered the period of the existence in theory of the Voivoidia. Consequently, politically the Banat formed part of Roumania. Furthermore, the idea of separating the two fertile districts of the Banat from the mountainous one, where the population would be left without food resources, would be impossible, since the population of the latter would thereby be compelled to emigrate.

To sum up, for the populations inhabiting those regions, the work which the Conference was now called upon to carry out could be compared with that of an Inter-Allied Commission (had such a Commission then been possible) appointed in the time of Charlemagne to adjudicate on the question of the Rhine. Had the Commission at that time decided that the Rhine should form the boundary between Germany and France, what untold benefits might have been conferred on the world, what influence such a decision might have had on the events leading up to the present war. That Conference was now in the same way settling the future of Eastern Europe. The use of the Danube was essential for the development of civilisation. The Danube could alone form the only real boundary of everlasting friendship. That being his conviction he would, in conclusion, invite the attention of the Great Powers to the dangerous situation now existing in the Banat which called for immediate action. The Serbian troops occupying the Banat were in open strife with the Roumanian population, and if the real wishes of the peoples must be known, the first step must be the removal of the Serbian troops and their replacement by Allied troops who could hold the scales evenly between the various peoples. This course was urgent, as serious developments might otherwise take place.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired from M. BRATIANO whether he would agree to the general principle of the referendum.

M. BRATIANO replied that he considered the question already settled. He had insisted on the Banat being dealt with as a whole, and he could not agree to any partition of the area. If a referendum were insisted on, he would require time for consideration, although at the moment he would not oppose the proposal.

M. VESNITCH expressed his regret that M. Bratiano had thought it necessary to raise the question of the actual occupation of the Banat by Serbian troops. If the French Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the East had ordered the Serbian troops to occupy that territory, the welcome that Army had received was sufficient proof that the decision taken had been a good one. At any rate, Serbia was not to blame if Roumania had not entered the Banat either now or in 1916.

(The Roumanian and Serbian Delegates then withdrew.)

The meeting adjourned until Saturday, 1st February, at 3-0 p. m.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 1 February, 1919.

Annexure to IC-129 [BC-19]

[*Statement by M. J. Bratiano, of the Roumanian Delegation*]

THE QUESTION OF THE BANAT

The task of setting forth Roumania's rights to the Banat is greatly facilitated by the fact that this question was considered by our three great European Allies during the weighty discussions which took place before the Treaty of Alliance of 17th August, 1916, and that this Treaty, which was signed by them, recognises the validity of our claim.

We have complete confidence in the support which the said signatory Powers will grant in demonstrating our just claim to the two great non-European Powers who took no part in the examination of this question in 1916 and who may, therefore, be ignorant of the principles thereof.

These claims are based on the principle of ethnology, and are put forward in virtue of our right to national unity.

This principle should, however, be in accordance with other requirements of national life, which it is impossible to dissociate from the territorial conditions amongst which a nation has evolved.

Those desirous of assuring the future of Eastern Europe must face the problem of uniting these two principles. Our claims with regard to the Banat are based on the solution of this problem.

THE QUESTION OF THE BANAT OF TEMESVAR

Nobody can think of denying Roumania the right to claim political union with a territory which has been inhabited for many centuries by Roumanians and where they number 600,000, as against less than 400,000 Germans, who settled in the district in the 18th century, and

rather more than 300,000 Serbs, who immigrated in the 15th and especially in the 18th centuries, to mention only the ethnical units of most importance.

But it has been imagined that a distinction might be drawn in the Banat between the districts where the Roumanian population is absolutely in the majority and those in which it constitutes only a relative majority or an important minority; it has been thought that it might be possible to trace a State frontier line across the plain of the Banat between the Roumanians on the East, who would be re-united to the Kingdom of Roumania, and the non-Roumanians on the West, who would become subjects of the Serbian State; the Roumanian Government considers this a dangerous error.

The Banat is not a geographical term, it is a reality, a real geographical region and also a real political province forming at the present day, as it has done throughout the ages, a complete and indivisible whole. It is, in fact, difficult to conceive that any State can claim or accept one portion only of the country, and still more difficult to expect that, once in possession of that portion, it would be able to withstand the necessity of soon claiming the whole country.

The waterways which surround the Banat on three sides (the Maros, Theiss and Danube) form a natural frontier which bounds a region of plains on the West and a mountainous district to the East, which are closely interconnected. It is the plain of the Banat which yields the necessary food supplies for the inhabitants of the mountains; whilst the people of the hill country send the plain dwellers their wealth of timber and minerals. The rich plains, which are comparatively sparsely populated, draw their indispensable supplies of labour and settlers from the mountains; the plain and the mountains cannot exist apart from one another.

All the systems of communication, whether by road, rail, or water, are organised in the Banat for the whole province, and if a State frontier were drawn which would cut them asunder, all efforts made in this region since the 18th century to establish the means of communication indispensable to economic welfare, would be rendered ineffective.

The navigable rivers and canals traversing the plain carry the heavy produce of the mountains on the East to the Theiss and the Danube; a division of the Banat would leave the Roumanians the upper courses of the rivers and give the Serbs the lower reaches and the canals, which would result in ruining the very advantages of the natural situation of the Banat between its three waterways, by cutting off one entire part of the country from free access to the Danube and the Theiss.

Transylvania itself, where the Maros is the one great waterway intersecting the country and penetrating into the heart of its mountains, would be deprived of one of its most necessary outlets. The produce of its forests and mines normally descends the Maros and Theiss to the Danube and thence to the sea; but a Serbo-Roumanian frontier would stop its course below the Lower Maros.

No useful purpose would be served by solemnly affirming, or even guaranteeing *de facto*, freedom of navigation on all the waterways, streams, rivers and canals. Navigation requires something more than this—i. e. technical organisation, dépôts and warehouses, mechanical, commercial, and industrial installations—in order to preserve, manufacture, distribute, work up or convert the produce at the most suitable points and under the most favourable conditions.

The river trade of Transylvania and the Banat would naturally find all those advantages on the Roumanian banks of the Theiss and Danube; it would be useless to expect them from a foreign State for the products of another State.

But if, notwithstanding everything, the Banat were to be cut in two by a frontier on imaginary ethnographical lines, this would be impossible except by disturbing the necessary balance in every direction.

Even in the region where the Serbs are numerous, large groups of Roumanians are interspersed among them, as well as German colonies which cannot be reunited politically to any other State of the same nationality, but which there is no reason to join to Serbia and which could not, in any event, be annexed to that State because of their distribution throughout the centre of the Banat. These Germans (Suabians), so soon as they are at liberty to give public expression to wishes which are already known, will moreover refuse to allow their national numbers to be diminished by a division between Serbia and Roumania, and they will rally round the latter State.

The intermixture of these various nationalities in the West of the Banat is such that, in order to detach from Roumania the 200,000 Serbians inhabiting such region, it would be necessary, at the same time, to annex to Serbia double the number of non-Serbs, Germans, Magyars and Roumanians. And thus new hotbeds of Irredentism would be created.

In order that at least the south-western portion of the Banat might be wrested from Roumania, it is probable that the necessity for giving Belgrade a protective zone may be brought forward. The lessons of the last year of the war have resulted in an extraordinary diminution in the belief in the utility of such protection, and consequently of the importance of its corresponding argument.

Furthermore, Roumania replied to this contention in 1916, by inserting in her agreement with the Allied Powers a clause undertaking to leave a zone opposite the present capital of Serbia without military works or garrison.

This is a sufficient guarantee from the defensive point of view. But the creation, on the left bank of the Danube, of a protective zone in the nature of a Serbian political and military possession, would be a veritable bridgehead, or a military organisation less defensive than offensive.

Ever since the Serbian and the Roumanian States have adjoined each other on the Danube, history has furnished proofs of their active intercourse from the point of view of trade and civilisation, but has never had to record disagreements between them. The pacific feeling of both peoples has been greatly assisted by the fact that the Danube formed a well-defined and certain boundary between them, both as regards geography and interests.

The Roumanian Government has always been so persuaded of the Danube's importance as a peace-maintaining frontier, that it has never cast its eyes beyond this river, nor considered the possibility of uniting to that part of Roumania watered by the Northern Danube the many Roumanians settled in Serbia between the Timok and the Morava valleys.

It is persuaded that once the Danube is crossed, once a bridgehead is established on the further bank, yet wider territorial extensions in this direction will become of ever-increasing political and economic urgency. There would then be no end to the unappeasable disputes connected with more or less conventional frontiers. And these disputes, which Roumania has steadfastly refused to tolerate on the right bank of the Danube, could not fail to arise on its left bank with regard to a frontier line drawn across the plain of the Banat, for no nice adjustment could make it anything but ill-defined and inequitable.

Thus, the only results of allowing Serbia to cross the Danube in order to ensure that State a supposed ethnographical boundary, in the hope of finding in such concessions a guarantee for the organisation of international peace, would be economic disorganisation, arrested development of a whole region, and the certainty of future disputes.

It is hardly necessary to add that Roumania will ensure to all Serbs who may remain within her territory all the rights and guarantees ensured to Roumanian subjects by the Serbian State, in conformity with the principles which may be laid down by the League of Nations in the case of minorities.

Such were the general outlines of the arguments put forward by Roumania before the war, in order to justify the validity of her

claims to the Banat. The part played by Roumania in the war cannot fail to confirm such rights.

In order to appreciate what Roumania has done, without even calling to mind the conditions under which she was obliged to begin and continue her military action, one has only to remember the fact that the losses of the Roumanian army alone, not including even greater losses among the civilian population amount to a total of 335,000 men, and to trace on the map appended hereto² the proofs of the influence of Roumania's military action on the general conduct of the war.

² Map not filed with the minutes.

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 1 February, 1919, at
3 p. m.**

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
President Wilson	Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George	M. Clemenceau
Mr. R. Lansing	Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour	M. Pichon
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Gen. the Rt. Hon. Louis	M. Dutasta
Col. U. S. Grant	Botha	M. Berthelot
Mr. L. Harrison	Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A.	M. de Bearn
	Hankey	M. Guerin
	Major A. M. Caccia	Capt. Portier
	Mr. E. Phipps	
ITALY	JAPAN	
M. Orlando	Baron Makino	
Baron Sonnino	H. E. M. Matsui	
Count Aldrovandi	M. Saburi	
Major Jones.		

PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION OF ROUMANIAN QUESTION

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	ROUMANIA
Major Stephen Bonsal	Mr. H. Nicolson	M. Bratiano
		M. Nicolas Misu
		M. Al. Lapardaru
		M. Constantin Bratiano

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. **PRESIDENT WILSON** asked permission to communicate to the Conference the gist of a telegram, which he had received from M. Tchi-cherin, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the Bolshevik Government. In this telegram M. Tchi-cherin said that he had seen in the Press some reference to the summoning of a Conference of Russian Delegates at Prinkipo, and he asked for an official invitation.¹ He, (President Wilson), wished to know what action should be taken. To send an official communication would be tantamount to a recognition of the Bolshevik Government.

Meeting of
Russian Repre-
sentatives at
Prinkipo

¹ A telegram dated February 4, 1919, but answering this description, sent by M. Chicherin to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 39.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that M. Tchicherin had received his notice like everybody else.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that a notification had been made to the Press and not in a direct manner. He was quite willing to ignore M. Tchicherin's request, but the Great Powers were anxious to get these delegates together, and perhaps an answer should be sent to take away the excuse that they had received no invitation to attend the meeting. Apparently M. Tchicherin wanted a personal invitation.

(It was decided to adjourn the question for further consideration).

2. M. CLEMENCEAU handed in the following document representing the final agreement reached between the Czechs and the Poles regarding the occupation of the Principality of Teschen:

Agreement
Between Czechs-
Slovaks and
Poles- Regarding
Teschen

"The Representatives of the Great Powers, having been informed of the conflict which has arisen between the Czechs and Poles in the Principality of Teschen, in consequence of which the mining district of

Ostrawa-Karwin and the railway from Oderberg to Teschen and Jablunkau has been occupied by the Czechs, have declared as follows:

In the first instance they think it necessary to remind the nationalities who have engaged to submit the territorial questions which concern them to the Peace Conference, that they are, pending its decision, to refrain from taking as a pawn or from occupying the territories to which they lay claim.

The representatives take note of the engagement by which the Czech Delegates have declared that they were definitely stopping their troops on the line of the railway which runs from Oderberg to Teschen-Jablunkau.

Pending the decisions of the Peace Conference Congress as to the definitive assignment of the territories that part of the railway line to the North of Teschen and the mining regions will remain in the occupation of Czech troops while the southern section of the line starting from and including the town of Teschen down to Jablunkau will be entrusted to the military supervision of the Poles.

The undersigned consider it indispensable that a Commission of Control should be immediately sent to the spot to avoid any conflict between the Czechs and Poles in the region of Teschen. This Commission, apart from the measures that it will have to prescribe, will proceed to an enquiry on the basis of which the Peace Conference may form its decision in fixing definitely the respective frontiers of the Czechs and Poles in the contested zone. The seat of this Commission will be situated in the town of Teschen.

In order to seal the Entente between two friendly nations which should follow a policy in full accord with that of the Allied and Associated Powers, the representatives of the Great Powers register the promise of the Czech representatives that their country will put at the disposition of the Poles all its available resources in war material and will grant to them every facility for the transit of arms and ammunition.

The exploitation of the mines of the Karwin-Ostrawa district will be carried out in such a way as to avoid all infraction of private prop-

erty while reserving any police measures which the situation may require. The Commission of Control will be empowered to supervise this and if necessary to secure to the Poles that part of the output which may be equitably claimed by them to meet their wants.

It is understood that the local administration will continue to function in accordance with the conditions of the pact of the 5th November, 1918, and that the rights of minorities will be strictly respected.

Pending the decision of the Peace Congress, political elections and military conscription will be suspended in the Principality of Teschen.

No measure implying annexation of all or of a part of the said Principality either to the territory of Poland or of Czecho-Slovakia taken by interested parties shall have binding force.

The Delegates of the Czech Nation engage to release immediately with their arms and baggage the Polish prisoners taken during the recent conflict."

On the proposal of Mr. Lloyd George and General Botha—

It was agreed that the document should first be signed by the representatives of the Great Powers and subsequently by the Czech and Pole delegates and by the members of the Commission for Poland.

3. M. CLEMENCEAU read the following reply received from the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council, Versailles, with

Allied Troops
of Occupation
in Turkish
Territory and
Trans-Caucasia

reference to the Resolution passed by the Delegates of the Five Great Powers at the Conversation held at the Quai d'Orsay on the 30th January, 1919, (see I. C. 128)² on the subject of the proper distribution of

the Allied Military forces required for the maintenance of order in the Turkish Empire and in Trans-Caucasia:—

The Military Representatives consider it necessary for them to be further advised on the three following subjects:

1. The territories to be occupied in view of the fact that certain parts of the Ottoman Empire are not at the present time occupied.

2. The total number of troops required to maintain order in these territories as estimated by the local military commanders.

3. Whether a joint occupation of these territories is intended, or whether definite zones are to be allotted to the interested Powers, who would be designated by the Conference.

M. Clemenceau said that the Conference had put certain definite questions to the Military Representatives, who had merely asked the same questions in reply.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that it was the duty of the Military Representatives to reply to the questions set to them. The first question put by the Military Representatives was perhaps only partly a military question, but the second was wholly a military one. It was one of the very questions the Military Representatives themselves had been asked, and, in his opinion, they should certainly

² BC-18, p. 817.

give an answer. The third question was one which the Conference could perhaps, and, indeed, ought to answer.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the answer to the last question would be that definite zones would be allotted to particular Powers, and there would be no joint occupation.

After some further discussion, it was agreed to transmit the following reply to the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles through the Secretaries:

1. The Conference does not contemplate a joint occupation of any territories.

2. The Conference did not contemplate the military occupation of any territories other than those already occupied, unless the Military Representatives think that the occupation of additional territory is desirable.

3. The Military Representatives should themselves obtain and submit estimates regarding the number of troops required for the maintenance of order in the occupied territories.

4. The Minutes of the Meeting of the 30th January, 1919, relating to the question under reference, shall be supplied to the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles.

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would next ask the Conference to give their formal approval to the Instructions for the Delegates of the Allied Governments to Poland.

Instructions To
Be Issued to the
Commission for
Poland

On the proposal of President Wilson it was agreed, after some discussion, that the following clause should be added to the Instructions for the Delegates of the Allied Governments to Poland:

"Marshal Foch is requested to inform the German military authorities that the Associated Powers are sending to Poland a commission which is fully empowered to compose all disturbances there so far as possible, and instructed, for that purpose, to insist that the Polish authorities refrain from all use of force against the German forces, and the Marshal is requested to convey to the German authorities in German Poland the demand of the Associated Powers that they altogether refrain from the further use of force in that province and from interference with the life of the people there pending the conclusion of the Peace Conference."

GENERAL BOTHA then proposed the addition of the following final clause to the Instructions:

"Where matters within the scope of these instructions require the making of special arrangements for their immediate disposition, the delegates are authorised and empowered to make such necessary and provisional arrangements, which shall be binding upon all parties concerned unless and until disapproved by the four Powers concerned."

(This was agreed to.)

GENERAL BOTHA pointed out that the Delegates would have to deal with the neighbours of Poland. One of these neighbours would be the Bolsheviks. He enquired whether the Delegates were authorised to enter into negotiations with the Bolshevik representatives.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that it was almost an inevitable part of their duties as Commissioners to endeavour to bring about an armistice between the Poles and the Bolsheviks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there would be no objection to the Delegates seeing the leaders of the Bolshevik Armies. But it would obviously not be necessary for them to meet either M. Trotski or M. Lenin.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought the sense of the meeting would be that the Delegates could meet whoever they liked, provided they did not ask for definite permission to meet particular individuals to be named.

(The following text of Final Instructions for the Delegates of the Allied Governments in Poland was then formally accepted:

"It will be the business of the Delegates of the Allied Governments to convey as early as possible information to their Governments on the present situation in Poland. The Military question and the Food question are the most urgent, but reports on the political and social conditions of the country should be sent without unnecessary delay.

The Polish Government should be warned against adopting a policy of an aggressive character. Any appearance of attempting to pre-judge the decisions of the Conference will have the worst possible effect. The Delegates should invite the most earnest consideration of the Polish Government to the declaration recently made on this subject by the representatives of the Powers at Paris.

Every effort should be made to bring to an end the hostilities which are now taking place between the Poles and neighbouring peoples. Armistices should be arranged wherever possible and the Delegates should use their good offices to bring them about.

In this connection it should be noted that the invasion by the Poles of German territory tends to restore the German military spirit and to delay the breakup of the German Army; and it has the further disadvantage of complicating the arrangements for German disarmament which the Allies desire to carry out with the least possible delay.

The Delegates should enquire how far the Polish Government possess the means to maintain order within their existing territory and of preserving it from external aggression whether carried out by Bolsheviks or any other forces and they should study and report on the measures necessary to supply any deficiencies which may be found to exist.

The food question will require their earnest attention and they should co-operate with the Mission about to be despatched to Poland by the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief. In order to secure this cooperation the principal Delegates of the Supreme Council of

Supply and Relief should be attached to the Delegation whenever questions of food supply have to be dealt with.

Marshal Foch is requested to inform the German military authorities that the Associated Powers are sending to Poland a Commission which is fully empowered to compose all disturbances there so far as possible, and instructed, for that purpose, to insist that the Polish authorities refrain from all use of force against the German forces, and the Marshal is requested to convey to the German authorities in German Poland the demand of the Associated Powers that they altogether refrain from the further use of force in that province and from interference with the life of the people there pending the conclusion of the Peace Conference.

Where matters within the scope of these instructions require the making of special arrangements for their immediate disposition, the Delegates are authorised and empowered to make such necessary and provisional arrangements, which shall be binding upon all parties concerned unless and until disapproved by the four Powers concerned.")

5. M. ORLANDO invited attention to the fact that the period granted for the submission of documents relating to territorial claims would expire on that date. He wished to enquire whether this period was to be rigidly applied. He had been informed by M. Dutasta that, up to yesterday, no documents had been received by the Secretariat General, except a part of the Greek case and a report by the Czecho-Slovak Delegates.

Mr. BALFOUR expressed the view that a time limit having been granted, the Conference could now proceed with their business. Should any of the Delegations object, the obvious reply would be that the Delegations themselves were to blame for not having submitted their reports in due time. On the other hand, the Conference should not refuse to accept any documents which might be sent in hereafter.

6. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the members of the Commission for Teschen would have to be nominated. France would appoint M. Veltel, one of the Members for the Commission for Poland.

Nomination of
Members of
Commission for
Teschen

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the members of the Teschen Commission should be military or civil.

(It was agreed that the Members of the Commission for Teschen might be either military or civil, and that their names should be handed in Monday morning, 3rd February, 1919.)

7. At this stage M. Bratiano and M. Misu, members of the Roumanian Delegation to the Peace Conference, accompanied by their experts, MM. A. Laperdatu and Constantin Bratiano, were admitted to the Conference.

Roumanian
Territorial
Claims

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Bratiano to put forward the Roumanian case.

M. BRATIANO then read the following report on the situation in Roumania :

M. Bratiano said that the Balkan War, into which Roumania entered at the appeal of the Serbs and Greeks, who had been attacked by the Bulgars, bore witness to the strength and moral ascendancy of her people in that region of Europe. Far-reaching democratic reforms of a social and political nature were being carried out. The last sixty years of Peace made it possible to profit fully by the productivity of her soil, which had been constantly ravaged for centuries. It was in this phase of productive labour and of great political and economic prosperity, that the world-war broke upon Roumania. But, from the very outbreak of hostilities, Roumania, although bound to the Central Powers by a defensive alliance, refused to follow the aggressors in their action, which was contrary to her feelings and opposed to her interests.

During the course of the war she never ceased to emphasise the benevolent nature of her neutrality with respect to the Entente. Thus, contrary to her own most important economic interests, she restricted such of her exports as might benefit the Central Powers, and only let them have an indispensable minimum as compensation for the supply of necessary arms and equipment to the Roumanian army, which she was, at that time, unable to obtain elsewhere.

Roumania facilitated the passage of arms for Serbia and prevented the transit of any war material for Turkey—just at the time when the question of Constantinople appeared to be of paramount interest. The importance of the services thus rendered to the Entente, which drew down upon Roumania the unfriendly feeling and threats of Germany, was expressly recognised by the Entente Governments and gave rise to a formal undertaking on the part of Russia defining the territories in Austria-Hungary claimed by Roumania, which had, moreover, been recognised in principle by the Russian Government at the outset of war in consideration of the benevolent neutrality of Roumania. (Agreement of 1st October, 1914).³

At the request of the Entente Governments, Roumania declared herself ready to give effective support by her army to a cause which she already considered her own. She accordingly notified London of the conditions on which she could take effective military action and which would assure victory, at the same time appealing to the great

³ For a description of this agreement, see the telegram of September 20/October 3, 1914, from the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Sazonov) to the Russian Ambassador at Bucharest (Poklevsky), French translation in *Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917, d'après les archives du ministère des affaires étrangères à Pétrograd* (Paris, 1928), p. 179.

principles of justice, and stating the conditions necessary for the national development of the Roumanian people.

The Roumanian point of view, summarised in the reply made by the Roumanian Government to the Entente in the Spring of 1916, was determined by the necessity:

1. Of defining the position of Italy, whose intentions certain of the Allies at that time appeared to doubt, although the Roumanian Government knew them to be quite favourable;

2. Of defining on the map the claims which had already been admitted in the former undertaking by Russia, in order to obviate any discussion at a later date, which is always to be deprecated;

3. Of ensuring the supply of arms and munitions for the Roumanian army;

4. Of ensuring the position of Roumania against Bulgarian aggression by political and military conditions, and to guarantee her against a war on two fronts which her geographical position would not allow her to wage successfully.

After various delays, the causes of which it is unnecessary to explain, but which did not emanate from the Roumanian Government, whose attitude never varied, the Entente Powers finally recognised the justice of the Roumanian demands and undertook, by a Treaty of Alliance⁴ and a Military Convention,⁵ to give effect thereto. These two documents were intended, on the one hand, to ensure the ability of Roumania to assist the common cause by effective military action, and at the same time to guarantee, after victory, the claims which had been recognised as legitimate and necessary for the development of the Roumanian nation.

Roumania was conscious that, without allowing herself to be discouraged by the worst disappointments, which did not always come from the side of the enemy, she loyally fulfilled her duty to the great cause which she had espoused, to the extreme limits of possibility and in the supreme hope that, no matter what her sacrifices might cost, they might be in proportion to the services she rendered.

Neither the Bulgarian attack, nor the possibility accorded to Germany by quiet on the other fronts of concentrating her efforts against Roumania, nor the inactivity of the neighbouring Allies, who did not meet in Transylvania as arranged, nor the delay in the Russian assistance which might have covered Bucharest and Wallachia, nor that which from the material and moral points of view represented the loss of two-thirds of the country, including the capital,

⁴ Treaty of Alliance of August 17, 1916, between the Allies and Roumania; for French text, see Italy, R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, *Trattati e convenzioni fra il regno d'Italia e gli altri stati*, vol. 23, p. 412.

⁵ Military convention of August 17, 1916, between the Allies and Roumania; French text, *ibid.*, p. 415.

shook the loyalty and devotion of the Roumanians to the cause they had made their own.

Aided by the French Mission, the Roumanians, who had lost more than half their army, continued the fight, and at Marasesti inflicted a defeat upon Marshal Mackensen's best troops and made the invasion of Russia from the south impossible.

Unfortunately, Russia collapsed at this time, and the Roumanian army found itself surrounded by the enemy, with whom its Russian Ally was openly treating. Neither this situation nor the Bolshevik example and propaganda succeeded in demoralising the Roumanian army and nation. Although enveloped and penetrated on all sides by these elements of disorder, not a single Roumanian company, not a single platoon deserted.

The armistice concluded on the Roumanian front was the result, not of Roumanian disengagement, but of the condition demanded by the Ukrainian command, which at that time was the last hope of the Allies in Russia, who saw in this measure the sole possibility of re-forming a Russian front capable of carrying on the struggle. This possibility was far from being realised. Bolshevism continued to complete its work of dissolution on the Russian front in Moldavia and began open hostilities with the Ukrainian command which the representatives of the Allies attempted to constitute on the Roumanian front.

At the demand of the representatives of the Entente, who declared in writing that this operation was the last military co-operation that they were entitled to expect from Roumania, the Roumanian army commenced open hostilities with the Bolshevik troops which then occupied the whole territory of Moldavia and Bessarabia. It was thought that this supreme effort would at least ensure the existence of an Ukraine friendly to the Allies.

In spite of all the risk involved in an operation of this nature, when Roumania had the enemy army before her and no possibility of obtaining supplies, she did not hesitate to provoke the hostility of the million Russians who were in occupation of her territory, thus giving her Allies a last proof of her spirit of sacrifice in their cause and affording them, since they thought it possible, an opportunity in which she herself did not believe.

Whilst desultory warfare was being waged on Roumanian territory with her Allies of yesterday, the peace of Brest-Litovsk was concluded. The Ukraine threw off its mask, openly negotiating and signing the peace with the Germans, who occupied its territory and descended the Dniester, threatening the rear and cutting off the retreat of the Roumanian Army.

As the representatives of the Allies admitted, military action on the part of Roumania was no longer possible at that period of the war.

The only thing that remained for the King of Roumania and his Government to do, was to attempt to maintain the Roumanian Army at sufficient strength to enable it to resume active operations so soon as more favourable conditions should render this possible. This resolve—which was immediately communicated to the Allied Governments—gave its right interpretation to the so-called “Treaty of Bucharest”—⁶ i. e. that of a lull in a conflict which was to be resumed.

The peace negotiations were only entered into in order to gain time and not to separate the King from his Army. The peace was merely a means of awaiting events.

Neither legally, practically, nor morally, were the Roumanians ever really at peace with the enemy.

The Treaty of Bucharest, passed by a Parliament elected under the German occupation, when the Moldavian refugees were not allowed to return to their homes and all electoral manifestos were subject to German censorship, was never sanctioned or ratified by the King.

The character of the military occupation continued the same; 8 German divisions, having to maintain Germanic order in Roumania, were prevented from returning to other fronts; 40,000 Roumanian prisoners were still in Germany. The burden of requisitions increased even after the signature of the general armistice. The restrictions imposed on persons and property continued arbitrary and violent; Roumanian institutions such as the Appeal Court and the large government offices refused, with the consent of the King, to continue their functions at Bucharest, in fact both individuals and property were subjected to the same reign of iniquity and violence which inaugurated the occupation by the enemy.

In their hearts, neither King, Army, nor people, had ever ceased longing for the day when they could once more take action. The military and civil representatives of the Allies at Jassy continued to co-operate in expectation of that moment.

Therefore it was without a day's delay that Roumania responded to the call of the Allies when they thought it once more possible for Roumania to resume operations, and on the same day that General Berthelot's⁷ army crossed the Danube, the Roumanian troops crossed the line of trenches which had never ceased, during the Peace of Bucharest, to form a fortified line between two enemy nations.

It is thus that the position and action of Roumania developed during the war. Having espoused a great and noble cause, she had

⁶ Treaty of Peace between Roumania and the Central Powers, May 7, 1918, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 771.

⁷ Gen. Henri Mathias Berthelot, of the French Army, commander in chief of the Army of the Danube.

served it with loyal devotion, and had achieved even more in the common interests than was imposed by her treaty conditions.

The occupation of two-thirds of her territory, the pillage and exhaustion of the whole country, the decimation of her population by epidemic disease, casualties in her army amounting to over 335,000 men, such in broad outline were the sacrifices borne by Roumania. She did not grudge them for a single instant, being convinced that they were entailed by the service she was rendering to the Allies and that they were at the same time assuring the realisation of her national ideals, as guaranteed by the Treaty signed with the Allies and by the sense of justice of those whose cause she had joined. Roumania had an unshakeable trust in that sense of justice, which she found faithfully expressed in the noble words of President Wilson, who in his speech on the 27th September, 1918,³ stated "That solutions * have arisen from the very nature and circumstances of the war; the most that statesmen or assemblies can do is to carry them out or be false to them".

In very truth, the question of Roumania arose from its "very nature" on the day when the principles of justice, independence and liberty for the peoples were proclaimed; it also arose from "the circumstances of the war" when, by the treaty of 16th [17th] August, 1916, the Allies undertook to ensure the national unity of Roumania.

The claims of Roumania, as recognised by her treaty of alliance had never been of an imperialistic character. Her claims had only represented the manifestation of the national aspirations of the people and the desire of the Roumanians to be once more united on the ethnical territory assigned to them by history.

A reference to the map would show in this corner of the world a mountainous district forming the central portion of Transylvania.

This elevated region on the one side gradually sloped down to the rich plains of the Danube and the Dniester, whilst on the North it was bordered by the Carpathians and Galicia, and so constituted a well defined geographical area from every point of view. It was in this territory that the Roumanian nation had been constituted and formed; and all its aspirations for centuries had tended towards the political union of that territory.

At the outbreak of War, Hungary, with the Banat, constituted what might be called Transylvania, because from the political point of view Transylvania occupied the exact centre of the whole of that region.

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 316.

* In the "Times" of September 28th, 1918, President Wilson is quoted as follows: "It (the war) has positive and well defined purposes, which we did not determine and cannot alter—no statesman or assembly created them . . . they have arisen from the 'very nature' etc. . . . [Footnote in the original.]

(b) Roumania's
Claims to
Transylvania

But in order to avoid mentioning different parts of that territory at every turn, in the term "Transylvania" would be included not only the Banat but all the countries extending as far as the Galician Carpathians and as far as the Theiss; the whole of that region having formed part of the late kingdom of Hungary.

According to Hungarian statistics, (the nature of which were such that they could not be taken as basis for an accurate estimate), the Roumanians represented 55% and the Magyars 23% of the population.

M. ORLANDO enquired how many Hungarians there were in this district.

M. BRATIANO replied that, according to these same statistics, there were 1,000,000 Hungarians and 2,500,000 Roumanians in Transylvania, not including the Banat. It was, moreover, certain that these statistics were inaccurate. As a matter of fact, if one considers the increase in the Roumanian population according to these statistics, one finds fanciful figures, varying according to the political situation and the degree of acuteness of political struggles. Whilst the Roumanian population on the other side of the Carpathians had tripled and quadrupled, the Roumanian population of Transylvania remained stationary, according to the Hungarian statistics. If an exact census could be taken, 2,900,000 Roumanians and 687,000 Magyars or 72% and 15% respectively of the population would be found to be the exact figures. Whilst the Roumanian population represented 23% of the population of the towns and 72% of that of the villages, the Magyars only represented 40% of the urban population and 13% of that of the villages. The Magyars were chiefly officials and soldiers, but from the ethnical point of view they were far from representing the ethnical proportion that they claimed for themselves. The Magyar population formed a dominating class which had lived in the midst of the Roumanian population.

Transylvania also included, near the Moldavian frontier, a race related to the Hungarians and a Saxon population: the former numbering 450,000 and the latter 260,000.

On the whole, the great ethnical majority of the population was therefore Roumanian. There was one region that Roumania did not claim, although it included some Roumanian villages, namely the district of Debreczyn; but, in order to maintain the ethnical character of their claims, the Roumanians did not claim such an active Hungarian centre as this town constituted for the adjacent district.

At the beginning of the armistice, the German colonies on the Wallachian and Moldavian frontiers joined Roumania, and the union of Roumania was accomplished with the greatest ease. The Saxon colonies even concluded a formal deed of union with the Kingdom

of Roumania. The Roumanians of Transylvania immediately held a great meeting and constituted themselves into an Assembly, 150,000 men meeting for this purpose from all parts of the region; Roumania had already admitted into its Government three Ministers representing Transylvania and the Roumanian countries in Hungary.

As regards the Roumanian claims in the Bukovina, this was a Moldavian province, annexed 140 years ago by Austria. The policy of Austria with regard to this province was quite different to that of Hungary. Hungary tried to suppress the ethnical character of the populations by means of violence. The programme of Austria, on the contrary, was peaceful penetration. Thus, for example, she encouraged Ruthenian immigration. In the Bukovina there are about 200,000 inhabitants of various races who had rallied to the Roumanian rule. The Bukovina had constituted an autonomous government since Austria collapsed, thus annulling the annexation by Austria in 1775.

(c) Roumanian
Claims to
Bukovina

In 1916, Roumania had claimed the whole of the Bukovina, but Russia had not wished the Roumanians to cross the river.

The Bukovina, by its reunion with Bessarabia and Moldavia on the Dniester, had become once more what it originally was, and it would be inconsistent, both politically and geographically, not to leave to Roumania the Bukovina in its present form. 500,000 inhabitants out of 800,000 were represented at the proclamation of the union of the Bukovina with Roumania.

As regards Bessarabia, there were at the present moment 500,000 Roumanians on the other side of the Dniester, more than 100,000 in Bulgaria, more than 300,000 in Serbia, and several hundred thousand in Macedonia, but they did not form groups sufficiently compact for Roumania to be able to claim them at present. It was otherwise in Bessarabia, which was severed from Moldavia in 1812. Part of the province was restored to Roumania after the Crimean War, but after the war of 1878, Russia took back this province, although admitting the integrity of Roumania by a formal treaty.

(d) Roumania's
Claim to
Bessarabia

The Roumanian claims had always extended to Bessarabia, but they would probably not have been allowed if a great political event had not occurred; Tsarist Russia collapsed and Bessarabia constituted itself an autonomous Republic, recognised by the Russian Government under the presidency of M. Kerensky. The Bolshevik disturbances created a serious situation in Bessarabia, and the Government then applied to Roumania for help in maintaining order. Roumania had refused until she had received similar requests from the Ukrainian Government and the representatives of the Allies at

Jassy. The military occupation of Bessarabia by Roumanian troops only took place, therefore, with the consent of the local Government and at the request of the Ukraine and the representatives of the Entente. Subsequently, Bessarabia separated itself completely from Russia and, later, the Bessarabian Government declared its desire to unite with Roumania, and united itself once more to Moldavia, from which it had been severed in 1812.

Such was the history of the reunion of Bessarabia and Roumania. A great injustice had thus been righted. More than 72% of the inhabitants are Roumanians, the remainder are Slavs, Bulgars, or Germans, and they did not represent even 15% of the populations; therefore from every point of view Bessarabia was a Roumanian country.

The incorporation of Bessarabia with Russia was an anachronism which could no longer be allowed to exist. Whatever may be the fate of Russia, she could and must no longer exercise supremacy in the Balkans. This dream was perhaps cherished by the Russian Government at the beginning of the 19th century, and the occupation of Bessarabia was doubtless a first step towards the occupation of Moldavia, Bulgaria and Constantinople, but it was a false political move. Bessarabia was, moreover, of no importance to Russia, for there was scarcely a Russian in the country. But after having once seized the country, it was difficult for Russia to restore it. As soon as circumstances allowed, it returned to Roumania who was able to prevent the work of destruction which the Bolsheviks had begun. It was far more advantageous to have a friendly country as neighbour than a country foreign in her ideas and ways of life. Now Bessarabia would possess community of ideas with Roumanian national consciousness.

For all these reasons, Roumania believed that the Peace Conference would not question the justification of the union of Bessarabia with Roumania.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the national assemblies formed in these three countries, Transylvania, the Bukovina and Bessarabia had demanded their return to Roumania and whether they had laid down any conditions?

(e) Present Constitutional Arrangements in Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia

MR. BRATTANO said that the three countries had made different constitutional arrangements. In Transyl-

vania, the Roumanian representatives formed themselves into a National Assembly, which the representatives of the Saxon population joined: But the Hungarian population had refused to do so.

For the Bukovina all nationalities, except the Ruthenians, elected a government, which had proclaimed the union of the Bukovina with Roumania.

In Bessarabia, elections had taken place under the Russian Republican Government, and the Assembly thus elected had proclaimed the union with Roumania, subject to certain reservations which the Assembly had since withdrawn, on condition that it should be granted a special Agrarian Law.

Transylvania had proclaimed complete union, but with provisional autonomy, in order to settle the legal conditions under which effect would finally be given to such union. Transylvania had, as a matter of fact, different laws from those in force in Roumania and her representatives wished to study these specially important questions and to refer the decision reached to the people before signing the final act of union.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether Roumania was asking the representatives of the Powers purely and simply to proclaim the annexation of these different territories, or was she asking the Conference to declare that in these various regions regularly constituted assemblies shall have power definitely to declare for union and to settle the conditions? When the union of Scotland with England had taken place, that union was only effected after certain conditions imposed by Scotland had been carried out.

MR. BRATIANO said that Roumania asked for the recognition of the union of these provinces with Roumania, for that union had already been proclaimed and the latter had already sent three Ministers to the Roumanian Cabinet. A Statute had even been arranged. The same remarks applied to the Bukovina.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had reason to believe that certain minorities had not taken part in the elections. It was important that the decision should be made by assemblies representing the whole population.

MR. BRATIANO said he could not quite follow the question put by the Prime Minister of England. Roumania had fought in order to impose her national will on the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. It was certain, therefore, that if the Hungarians were asked to vote in favour of union with Roumania, they could hardly be expected to do so. He did not think a fresh election should be held at the present time. As regards the situation created in Transylvania by the armistice, he considered that the question of principle had been decided by the war, and that these territories must be restored to Roumania. In their future political life, the rights of the minorities would assuredly be respected and they would be granted the greatest possible freedom. But the vanquished could not now be expected willingly to unite themselves to a country, which for a thousand years they had sought to dominate.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that the majority must be the final arbiters: but it was essential that the wrongs which had been imposed under Hungarian domination should not be perpetuated. It must not be possible for the minorities to be treated in future as were the Roumanians in the Hungarian State, who were deprived of their language, their traditions and their own life.

M. BRATIANO expressed complete agreement on that point. In the Deed of Union with Transylvania it had been stipulated that the religious and political liberty of all the nationalities in Transylvania would be recognised, and that was the reason why the Saxon population had associated itself with the Union. The principle involved was one of general application, to be extended to all annexed

(f) Roumania
Asks Authoriza-
tion to Occupy
Immediately All
Territories
Claimed by Her

countries without exception. But it would be an act fraught with serious consequences if the union with Transylvania were not to be declared now, at a time when her late masters were convinced that their cause was lost. There had been too much delay already; occupation of the territories must take place under the most favourable conditions, in the very interests of the nations who were to live together. For instance, the conditions were most satisfactory in the districts bordering on the Roumanian frontier which had been occupied before the signing of the armistice, even though Roumanians there actually formed the minority of the population, on the other hand, in the territories not occupied by Roumania, although Roumanians were in the majority, conditions were very serious owing to the enemy having organised a violent agitation on Bolshevik lines. The division of wealth and the abolition of rank had been promised: Wilson's policy had been proclaimed to be nothing but a capitalist policy; people had been told to kill officers and to do away with the governing classes. This propaganda had caused 100,000 workpeople to strike and the news received from Transylvania was very disquieting. This state of affairs was largely due to the uncertainty of the future. Therefore, he would beg the Commission to come to an immediate decision on the practical questions arising out of the war, and to authorise Roumania to occupy these territories immediately. The Roumanian Government might still be able, without bloodshed, to make relations between the various nations possible and even fraternal. But if the present situation were allowed to drag on, a new animosity would be created and blood would flow once more. Roumania was in a condition of great exhaustion due to the trials she had undergone and to the Bolshevik propaganda which had spread from the Ukraine through Bessarabia. Roumania was in need of the moral support of the Allies, if she was to remain what she had been hitherto—a rallying point for Europe against

Bolshevism. He did not know what decisions would be reached by the Conference with regard to Bolshevism; but it was not a political doctrine; it was a serious and contagious disease that must be fought. Roumania asked to be placed in a position to resist it. She asked this not only in her own interests, but in those of the whole of Europe and, without exaggeration, of the civilisation of the world.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what troops were at present occupying Transylvania.

M. BRATIANO replied that the small tract bordering on the Roumanian frontier had been occupied by the Roumanians and that the remainder of the country, not being under any occupation, was a prey to anarchy. The Bukovina had been occupied by the Roumanians.

Yesterday, at the close of the meeting with the Serbian representatives, he had ventured to request that the Banat should be evacuated

by Serbian troops, and that these should be replaced by the Allied troops at present in that neighborhood. In consideration of the nature and purpose of the meeting, he did not wish to enlarge upon the acts

of violence which the Serbian Army were committing against the peoples of the Banat, and which might sow regrettable seeds of enmity. Whatever might be the decision of the Conference, it was most desirable that such occupation should be effected by Allied and not by Serbian troops. The question was an urgent one. The same applied to the Dobruja, where, by reason of the armistice conditions, the Roumanian

State was not yet able to exercise its full authority. Whatever decision the Conference might reach, it surely could have no desire to wrest a portion of territory from an Allied State, without such State having consented to an alteration of the frontier line; and justice demanded that Roumania should remain mistress of the Dobruja.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that the question of the Banat could not be discussed in the absence of the Serbs.

M. CLEMENCEAU thanked M. Bratiano for his statement with regard to Roumania's claims.

(The Roumanian delegates then withdrew.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, speaking for himself and for many of those whom he had been able to consult, it was extremely difficult to decide questions of boundaries on statements, however lucid, made in the course of a Conversation. He wished, therefore, to propose that in the first place experts of the five Great Powers should examine such questions, and, if possible, make a unanimous recommendation. It is quite possible that on many of the questions to be considered, the experts would agree. Naturally, these experts

(f) Roumania
Asks for Occupa-
tion of Banat &
Dobruja by
Allied Troops

(g) Situation
in Dobruja

could not decide the problem, but they could clear the ground, and, in cases of disagreement, the representatives of the Great Powers would be compelled to argue out the case there in that Council Chamber. But there were many questions regarding which the Great Powers were perfectly impartial. For instance, they were quite impartial regarding the Roumanian claims on Hungary, to an exposé of which they had listened that day. He thought, therefore, that if a preliminary investigation was carried out by experts, it would greatly assist. He fully admitted that this procedure could not be introduced as a permanent arrangement, or be accepted as a precedent for universal application; but in the particular case of the Roumanian claims, in order to arrive at a decision, he hoped the experts would be allowed to examine the ground in the first instance, and the representatives of the Great Powers would eventually decide the question. He wished, therefore, to move the following Resolution:—

“It is agreed that the questions raised in M. Bratiano’s statement on the Roumanian territorial interests in the Peace Settlement shall be referred for examination in the first instance by an expert Committee composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy.

It shall be the duty of the Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits, and to make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee is authorised to consult the representatives of the peoples concerned.”

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view, which he felt sure was shared by the mover of the Resolution, that only those aspects of the question, which did not touch the purely political side of the problem, should be examined by the experts. All other questions requiring the exercise of tact and compromise must necessarily be reserved to the representatives of the Great Powers, including the protection of minorities, etc. The experts, therefore, should merely consider the territorial and racial aspects of the case.

MR. BALFOUR thought that strategical questions might also be considered by the experts.

M. ORLANDO said he had a statement to make in reference to a matter of individual conscience, which he did not wish to force on his colleagues. But he felt himself bound to Roumania by a Treaty. In his opinion, the laws relating to public and civil rights only became valid after their promulgation. He did not wish to defend secret treaties which, indeed, were now out of fashion; but a treaty having been signed by Italy, France and Great Britain, he could make no distinction between a secret treaty and a public treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU drew the attention of M. Orlando to the fact that the Roumanian Treaty had, by the common assent of the representatives of the Great Powers there in that room, been cancelled. It had been agreed that Roumania should, for reasons given, have proper representation at the Peace Conference; but, it was distinctly understood that the grant of representation would not renew every clause of the Treaty, which she had broken by going out of the war. (I. C. 104.)⁹

MR. LLOYD GEORGE also pointed out that Roumania was now claiming more than she had been granted by the secret treaty.

M. ORLANDO said he had no recollection of the incident quoted. But, in any case, the treaty of 1916 between Roumania and the Allies having been signed, did that fact tend to invalidate the Peace Treaty subsequently signed by Roumania with the Central Powers at Bucarest? If so, the previous treaty with the Allies was *ipso facto* annulled. In his opinion, Roumania was forced to sign the Peace Treaty with the Central Powers, and she had not been a free agent. Consequently, he did not consider the latter treaty to be valid, no more than he would consider himself bound by an agreement signed whilst a pistol was being held at his head.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that he did not think such an argument really helped the case of the Roumanians.

M. ORLANDO said that, at any rate, he had given expression to a matter which had lain on his conscience. He turned now to Mr. Lloyd George's proposal and was glad to find that it was not to form a precedent. Therefore, some of his objections would fall to the ground. But, as regards the application of the proposal to the case under consideration, the decisive question to be settled was wholly and solely a political one. Being exclusively political, the whole responsibility for the settlement must rest with the representatives of the Great Powers.

Mr. Lloyd George's resolution said that specialists would be appointed. What kind of specialists? If it was intended to appoint specialists on the Roumanian question, he himself had none; and they would be difficult to find. But even then, he would ask: What branch of the Roumanian question should those specialists represent? Should they be geographical, historical, strategical or ethnographical specialists? The question was a very complex and mixed one, and its various aspects could not be separately examined. Consequently, the specialists who might be appointed though knowing their particular subject could not give good assistance in the final solution of the problem. Further, the resolution said that the Committee would

⁹ BC-A1, p. 486.

consult the representatives of the people concerned. The experts would thus, in fact, become examining magistrates. Mr. Lloyd George's proposal thus became a very serious one, since the experts would constitute the Court of First Instance and the delegates of the Great Powers, the Final Court of Appeal. He failed to see how such a procedure would expedite matters. In his opinion, it necessarily meant delay, especially if the experts decided that the enquiry must take place *in situ*. His proposals might not be acceptable to his colleagues: but he had felt obliged to put forward his views though he did not wish to press them. In his opinion, the procedure proposed by Mr. Lloyd George in this case had great inconveniences, and, if accepted, he noted with pleasure that it would not form a precedent.

M. SONNINO expressed the view that the experts might find themselves compelled to go to the spot to consult the representatives of the people concerned.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE explained that the experts would carry out their work in exactly the same manner as their Committee on Teschen had done.

M. SONNINO replied that unfortunately in the case of the Roumanian claims, the representatives of the minorities, (Hungarians, Ukrainians, Bolshevists), would have to be consulted, and they had no representatives here in Paris. He did not see why the representatives of the Great Powers themselves should not first discuss the question with their own experts, and afterwards consult the delegates of the countries concerned, who could give the most expert information available.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that perhaps it might be wise to omit the clause of the resolution which authorised the experts to consult the representatives of the people concerned. Ever since the United States of America had entered the war, he had had a body of scholars continuously studying such questions of fact as racial aspects, historical antecedents, and economic and commercial elements: the two latter being of very great importance in many of the questions under dispute, as had been realised in the case of the Banat. Furthermore, it must be remembered that however complete their confidence might be in the delegates of Roumania, Serbia, and other countries, who would present claims; these delegates were merely advocates, and they made opposite claims as to the right inferences to be drawn from facts. They did not represent their facts in the same way, and there would always be something that was not quite clear. As the United States of America were not bound by any of the treaties in question, they were quite ready to approve a settlement on a basis of facts. But the claimants did not always restrict themselves even to the

limits set by Treaties and their claims frequently exceeded what was justified by the Treaties.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, in this connection, drew attention to the Roumanian claims on the Banat. The Roumanians now claimed the whole of the Banat, whereas the Treaty only gave them a part.

PRESIDENT WILSON, continuing, said that he was seeking enlightenment, and this would no doubt be afforded by a convincing presentation by the experts. If the resolution proposed by Mr. Lloyd George did not receive acceptance, he would find himself compelled to fight the question merely on the views expressed by the American experts; but he would prefer that these conclusions should be corrected by the views of the French, British and Italian experts.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired from M. Orlando whether he still objected to the resolution.

M. ORLANDO said that he had already expressed his willingness to accept the resolution, provided it was not to create a precedent.

(It was agreed that the questions raised in M. Bratiano's statement on the Roumanian territorial interests in the Peace settlement should be referred for examination in the first instance by an expert committee, composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy.

It shall be the duty of this Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits, and to make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee is authorised to consult the representatives of the peoples concerned.)

8. It was decided that the Naval Peace Terms Committee should forthwith meet to draft the Naval clauses to be introduced in the Peace Treaty with Germany.

Naval Peace
Terms Com-
mittee

(The Meeting adjourned to 11 o'clock on Monday, the 3rd February, 1919).

2 FEBRUARY, 1919.

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 3 February, 1919, at
11 a. m.**

[PRESENT]

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson
Mr. R. Lansing
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison
Lieut. Burden

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Bal-
four, M. P.
Gen. The Rt Hon. Louis
Botha
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A.
Hankey
Major A. M. Caccia
Mr. E. Phipps

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
Capt. Portier
M. de Bearn

ITALY

M. Orlando
Baron Sonnino
Count Aldrovandi
Major Jones

JAPAN

Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui
M. Saburi
M. Kimura

PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION OF GREEK QUESTION

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Mr. C. Day

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. H. Nicolson
Mr. A. Leeper

GREECE

M. Venizelos
M. Politis
M. Speranza
M. Rentis

ITALY

M. de Martino
Colonel Castoldi

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. **M. CLEMENCEAU** informed the meeting that M. Velten, one of the members of the Commission for Poland had been appointed to represent France. He asked the representatives of the Great Powers to name their delegates.

**Appointment of
Delegates to
Commission for
Teschen**

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had consulted the British military authorities yesterday as it had been agreed that the British delegate should be a military man. It was expedient that he should be of the same rank as the French representative, M. Velten, he had decided to appoint an officer of the ranks of Colonel.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the American delegate had not yet been found: there were so few available Americans on this side of the water.

M. ORLANDO said that the Italian representative would be named to-morrow.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU announced that the following experts had been appointed for the examination in the first instance, of the questions raised in M. Bratiano's statement on the Rumanian territorial interests in the peace settlement, in accordance with the resolution passed at a conversation held in M. Pichon's room at the Quai d'Orsay on Saturday, February 1st, 1919 (I. C. 130).¹

Appointment of
Delegates for
Commission to
Rumania

AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF

Mr. C. Day
Mr. Seymour

FRANCE

M. Tardieu
M. Laroche

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir E. Crowe
Mr. A. Leeper

ITALY

M. de Martino
Count Vannutelli

3. M. CLEMENCEAU said he wished to raise the question of the appointment of additional delegates to represent the Small Powers on the various committees. The number of delegates to form part of each of these committees had been duly agreed upon and were already appointed; but he thought they should if possible endeavour to meet the special wishes of the Smaller Powers, treating each case on its merits.

Delegates for
Committee on
League of
Nations

First as regards the League of Nations. The Conference had decided that each of the Great Powers should appoint two delegates, and that 5 delegates should be elected to represent the whole of the Smaller Powers.

The Smaller Powers had nominated delegates from Belgium, Serbia, Brazil, China, and Portugal, but they now asked that an additional delegate should be appointed by each of the following countries, namely, Poland, Greece, Czecho-Slovakia, and Rumania.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that the proposal would have the effect of constituting a very large committee, and the representation of the Smaller Powers would thereby become equal to the representation of the Great Powers. The League of Nations committee, however, was to meet that afternoon, and he proposed that he should be empowered to put the question to the Drafting committee for decision.

¹ BC-20, *supra*.

(It was agreed that the question of appointing additional delegates to represent Poland, Greece, Czecho-Slovakia, and Rumania, on the League of Nations Committee should be referred by President Wilson to that Committee for decision.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said the Conference had agreed that this committee should consist of 2 delegates for each of the Great Powers, and 5 delegates to represent the whole of the Smaller Powers. The 5 representatives of the Smaller Powers included members of the delegations for Belgium, China, Serbia, Greece, and Uruguay. The Smaller Powers now asked for 4 supplementary delegates to be appointed, selected from the Powers in the order of the votes recorded at the election of delegates, namely, Rumania, Portugal, Czecho-Slovakia, and Poland. Rumania on account of its special interests in the Danube, had good reasons to be represented, and he thought that satisfaction would be given to all the Smaller Powers if their request for 4 additional delegates were granted.

(It was agreed to refer the question of the appointment of supplementary delegates to represent the Smaller Powers on the Inter-Allied Commission on the International Regime for Ports, Waterways, and Railways, to that Committee for decision.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU continuing said the Conference had agreed that each of the Great Powers should have 3 representatives on this Committee, and that 10 seats should be reserved for the Smaller Powers. Accordingly two representatives of each of the following Small Powers, Poland, Rumania, Serbia, Greece, and Belgium had been appointed. Czecho-Slovakia now also asked to appoint a representative on account of its paramount economic and financial interests in connection with the final liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, especially as they had agreed to take over part of the Austrian debt. If Czecho-Slovakia were admitted, all the Powers interested in the liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire would be represented, as Poland, Rumania, and Serbia, were duly represented.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that Czecho-Slovakia had a good case and should be represented.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that Portugal had also put forward claims to a seat.

(After further discussion it was agreed that two additional seats should be granted to Czecho-Slovakia on the Inter-Allied Commission on Reparation).

Commission on
International
Regime for
Ports, Water-
ways & Railways

Inter-Allied
Commission
on Reparation

6. MR. LLOYD GEORGE informed the meeting that the British Representatives on this Commission would be:—

Inter-Allied
Commission on
Breaches of the
Laws of War

- (1) The Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon Hewart, Attorney-General, and
- (2) Sir Ernest Pollock, K. C., Solicitor-General.

It was proposed that these two representatives should form a panel.

(This was agreed to.)

Panel System
of Representa-
tion to Apply
to all Com-
mittees

7. It was also agreed that when any one delegate was unable to attend a Committee Meeting, a substitute could be appointed.

8. (At this stage M. Venizelos and M. Politis, members of the Greek Delegation to the Peace Conference, accompanied by their experts M. Speranza and M. Rentis were admitted to the Conference.)

Greek Terri-
torial Claims

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Venizelos to explain the territorial claims of Greece.

M. VENIZELOS said that he came there at the invitation of the Great Powers to put forward the territorial claims of Greece, and he proposed to divide the subject into the following chapters:—

N. Epirus;	Thrace;
The Isles;	Asia Minor.

He would first deal with Epirus and the Isles, partly because one of the Great Powers was greatly interested in the settlement of these questions. Conversations had actually taken place between Italy and Greece with a view to arriving at an agreement and to prepare the way to a settlement without binding the Conference. He need hardly point out that it was to Greece's interest to maintain good relations with Italy and with all the Mediterranean Powers, in the same way as it had always been to her interest to maintain good relations with the other Western Powers. Greece was a small Power whereas Italy was a Great Power; but it was in the common interest of both to reach an amicable agreement.

M. ORLANDO asked permission to say that Italy was animated by the same spirit and desire to come to a sound and friendly agreement with Greece on territorial questions. He only disagreed with M. Venizelos when he referred to Greece as a small Power. It was a noble country, entitled to maintain an honoured place in the world.

M. VENIZELOS expressed his gratification at the words spoken by M. Orlando. He would first discuss the Greek claims in N. Epirus. In Northern Epirus Greece claimed a population majority. There were 120,000 Greeks as compared with

(a) Claims in
N. Epirus

80,000 Albanians. He fully admitted that many of these Greeks did not speak the Greek language; they only spoke Albanian. When Albania was created as an Independent State, two Commissions had been appointed—one for Northern Albania—the other for Southern Albania. The Commission for Southern Albania had proposed to carry out a plebiscite, but this proposal was not accepted and a census was held on the basis of the language spoken in each house. Albanian-speaking families were recorded as Albanians: the language test being accepted as proof of nationality.

After the experience gained in this war, neither race, nor language, nor skull, could be taken by itself as determining nationality: national conscience alone must decide. Thus Christians and Mohammedans inhabited Albania and, whilst the latter had, during the course of Turkish domination, accepted the Turkish Government and become real Turks, the Christians of Southern Albania had always remained attached to Greece. Over 300,000 of these Christians of Southern Albania had emigrated southward into Greece in order to protect themselves from the persecution of the Mohammedans. These 300,000 Albanians had become Hellenised both in manners and customs, whilst retaining the Albanian language, and they now played an important part in the economic life of Greece. Over two-thirds of the Greek Fleet was at present manned by men of Albanian origin. It might be interesting to mention that the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers in Greece—M. Repoulis; the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Armies—General Danglis; the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces in Greece—Admiral Coundouriotis, were Albanians. Again Albania had, during the war of Greek Independence, furnished many of the leaders of the revolution.

In conclusion, he drew attention to the fact that since the time of the declaration of the independence of Greece, the Christians of Albania had always considered themselves to be Greeks, and the Albanian movement only began 2 or 3 years ago. The Albanian situation should not be compared with the Irish question as regards the relations between the Orthodox Mohammedans and the Christians; for whilst in Ireland no civil war had occurred, in Albania, civil war had raged for over three centuries.

At Korytza, during Turkish rule, Greek schools had been established, supported by the residents of Korytza, and these were attended by 2,400 scholars. These schools had been closed during the war. When reopened in September last the attendance immediately numbered 2,300 scholars, but only 200 children attended the Albanian school which was extremely good, being under the direction of an American master. He thought that incident would supply perhaps the best evidence of the true sentiments and feelings of the people.

Tukan Pasha, the President of the Albanian Committee, who was in Paris at the present moment to put forward the Albanian claims, had said that the Greek schools in Albania had been particularly favoured by the Turks, and that this fact accounted for the large attendance of scholars. This statement was obviously quite incorrect, as the Albanian Mohammedans had, until the last 2 or 3 years, never entertained any national feelings: they had always considered themselves to be Turks.

He did not propose to discuss the question of N. Albania: Greece put forward no claims to any part of that territory. The northern boundaries of the territories of N. Epirus claimed by Greece were demarcated by a line passing through Cimarra, N. of Tepeleni, W. of Moskhopolis, to Lake Prespa, where it joined the former frontiers of Greece.

Next, as regards the question of the Isles, all these were without exception Greek. The population was Greek, more especially in the Dodecanese, where there were 110,000 Greeks as compared with 12,000 persons of other nationalities.

(b) Greek
Claims to
the Isles

He drew attention to an album published in Italy. The illustrations of this book showed the degree of development of civilisation in these small inlands. No doubt some remnants of Latin domination still remained, especially in the architecture, due to the passage of the Crusaders. But this domination had had no influence whatever on the ethnic position of the islands, and at the present moment only the principle of nationality could be taken into consideration. Greece claimed not only the islands of the Dodecanese, but all the Aegean islands, including those which for strategic reasons owing to their situation at the entrance to the Straits, had not been attributed to Greece by the Conference of London after the Balkan War.

It might be asked why no specific claim had been put forward to the island of Cyprus. He had not done so for various reasons, the most important of these being that he was convinced that the British Government, who, 50 years ago, was the first to increase the Grecian Kingdom by the grant of the Ionian Islands, and who during the war had offered Cyprus to Constantine, would at the end of the war be sufficiently magnanimous to surrender Cyprus to Greece.

To sum up, Greece claimed all the islands of the Western [Eastern] Mediterranean, including the Dodecanese, Imbros, Tenedos, KastelORIZO, Rhodes and Cyprus.

Thrace contained a population of 730,000 Greeks and 112,000 Bulgarians. He fully realised the difficulty of getting reliable statistics, as in those parts religion played such an important part in the preparation of all statistics. He was,

(c) Greek Claims
to Thrace

however, in a position to give definite proof that the Greeks numbered seven times more than the Bulgarians. This fact had been so well recognised by the Bulgarians that when, in 1912, the Bulgarians found themselves compelled to combine during the elections to resist the programme of the Committee of Union and Progress, it had been agreed between the Greek Patriarch and the Bulgarian Exarch to divide the representation between themselves in such a way as to give seven Greek and one Bulgarian deputies. Further, it was agreed that if the one Bulgarian failed to be elected, one Greek delegate would retire in his favour. The principle of nationality must therefore be applied to Thrace, and Bulgaria must cede the Western portion of Thrace to Greece.

Undoubtedly, this would entail for Bulgaria loss of access to the Aegean Sea. That was inevitable. But he was prepared to suggest a solution to meet the economic requirements of the Bulgarians, thus deprived of direct access to the Aegean. Although Bulgaria already possessed magnificent harbours in the Black Sea, which, as a result of the Straits becoming internationalised, would become a free and open sea, Greece would be prepared to grant to her a commercial outlet either at Kavalla or at Salonika on the same conditions and with the same international guarantees that would be granted to the other Powers of Central Europe similarly situated, namely, Hungary, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, etc. He drew attention to the fact that after the Balkan War Greece had made a formal Treaty with Serbia, allowing her the free use for trade purposes of the port of Salonika, and of the railways giving access thereto. In this way Bulgaria would not only have her own Black Sea ports, but also the free Aegean ports. Bulgarian interests would thus be fully satisfied. But on grounds of nationality, Thrace must form part of Greece, to enable her to redeem the two and three quarter million Greeks inhabiting that territory. The frontiers of Thrace claimed by Greece were the following:— From the summit of Koula, on the present North-East Greco-Bulgarian frontier, the line followed the course of the Arda up [*down?*] to its junction with the Maritza and thence along the Turco-Bulgarian frontier of 1913 to Cape Iniada on the Black Sea. It was a curious fact that the proposed frontier corresponded very nearly to the Southern frontiers of Bulgaria as laid down by the St. Stefano treaty of 1878,² which had been superseded by the Treaty of Berlin.³ This Treaty was intended to make every allowance to Bulgarian pretensions. Consequently, no injustice would be done to Bulgaria if those frontiers were now accepted. The portion of Thrace, claimed by Greece, had

² *Foreign Relations*, 1878, p. 866.

³ Treaty of July 13, 1878, *ibid.*, p. 895.

sometimes been likened to a narrow corridor, which would afford a vulnerable strategic boundary. His reply to that argument would be, firstly, that this corridor had a width of 80 kilometres from the sea; and, secondly, that it had been used by Turkey itself for 40 years as the only passage between Thrace and the rest of the Turkish Empire in Europe; and it would still have been in Turkish possession, but for her own misdeeds. Consequently, it would not constitute such a bad frontier after all. The Maritza cuts Thrace into two parts: Eastern Thrace and Western Thrace. Western Thrace contained a population of:—

35,000 Bulgars,
81,000 Greeks,
229,000 Turks.

In this territory Turkish Mohammedans preponderated, but the Greeks were more than double the Bulgars in numbers.

In Eastern Thrace, excluding Constantinople, there were:

35,000 Bulgars,
267,000 Greeks,
213,000 Turks.

In this region the Greeks had a larger population than the Turks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether Eastern Thrace, as defined by M. Venizelos, included Adrianople.

M. VENIZELOS replied in the affirmative. It had been said that the Balkan War had been continued in order to hand Adrianople over to the Bulgarians, and that negotiations with Turkey had on that account been broken off. The question of population in the town of Adrianople deserved attention. In the town of Adrianople there were:—

25,000 Turks,
25,900 Greeks,
9,500 Jews,
3,500 Armenians,
300 Bulgarians.

This actually meant a Greek majority in Adrianople. Again, as regards the various counties of Adrianople the following figures might prove of interest:—

(1) Kaza of Adrianople

41,000 Greeks,
44,500 Turks,
7,000 Bulgarians,
3,500 Armenians,
9,500 Jews.

(2) Kaza of Harsa [*Hafsa*]

9,000 Greeks,
8,000 Turks,
7,000 Bulgarians:

- | | |
|----------------------------|--|
| (3) Kaza of Mustapha Pasha | 7,000 Greeks,
13,000 Bulgarians,
10,000 Turks. |
|----------------------------|--|

He drew attention, however, to the fact that this Kaza was not claimed by the Greeks; they agreed it should, as at present, remain a part of Bulgaria.

- | | |
|--------------------------|--|
| (4) Kaza of Ortakeui | 14,500 Greeks,
15,000 Turks,
4,000 Bulgarians. |
| (5) Kaza of Ouzoun Keple | 19,000 Greeks,
10,000 Turks,
5,000 Bulgarians. |

Taking the two parts of Thrace actually claimed by Greece, excluding the parts granted to Bulgaria after the Balkan War, as well as Constantinople, and other outlying parts, the total population would be:—

348,000 Greeks,
442,000 Turks,
70,000 Bulgarians.

The Turks thus had a slight majority, but this majority only existed in the Western part, which, as a matter of fact, was no longer in the hands of the Turks. In the parts at present held by Greece the Turks were in a decided minority. Admitting the fact that these territories should not under any circumstances be occupied by Turkey, he himself was quite willing that the inhabitants of Western Thrace should be consulted whether they would prefer union with Greece or Bulgaria. He prophesied with confidence that the inhabitants of Western Thrace, including the Mahommedans who had during the last War fought on the side of the Bulgarians, would decide in favour of Greece.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. Venizelos how he proposed to ascertain the wishes of the Mahommedan population.

M. VENIZELOS said that he had intended his suggestion to apply only to Western Thrace: Eastern Thrace had never known Bulgarian domination. He suggested that some unannounced representative of the Great Powers at present in Sofia should be asked to ascertain confidentially the views of the Deputies, representing the Mahommedans of Eastern Thrace. Naturally, those Deputies would prefer union with Turkey; but if this were precluded, he felt confident they would elect to form part of Greece.

At the beginning of his speech he had said that Thrace contained 730,000 Greeks. In the detailed figures he had last given, the Greek population was stated to be 348,000. The difference was due to the fact that the borderlands along the Bulgarian frontier, inhabited by a large number of Greeks, were not claimed by Greece. Con-

Constantinople also had a population of 360,000 Greeks, but he put forward no claims to Constantinople. In reality Constantinople was a Greek town, but there were so many great international interests connected with the place that a special régime was undoubtedly indicated. The town, together with sufficient hinterland, should be placed under the League of Nations with a mandatory. The mere fact, however, that Greece had waived her claims to Constantinople only enhanced her rightful claims to the rest of Thrace. Speaking, however, on behalf of the whole Greek people, including the 350,000 Greeks in Constantinople, he expressed his firm conviction that in the general interests of the world, the Turkish Government together with the Sultan, should be made to leave Constantinople, and establish the new Capital of a new Ottoman State either at Konia or Brusa. As long as the Sultan remained at Constantinople even without the title of Calif, he would retain considerable prestige, which would permit him to exercise important influence over the Mussulman world and to cause trouble to all the Great Powers, including France and Great Britain. It had always been said, and he himself had always thought so, that Constantinople was a purely Turkish town. That however was not the case. It would actually be found that the Mohammedans of Constantinople were in a minority as compared with the Christians. Consequently, if the definition given in the 12th of President Wilson's 14 points, were accepted, it would be admitted that Constantinople need not be included in the Ottoman Empire. For the future security of the world, a small Turkish state with its own Capital should be constituted in Asia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether M. Venizelos proposed that Constantinople and environs should be internationalised, including Skutari and the opposite shores of the Bosphorus.

M. VENIZELOS replied in the affirmative, and suggested that the following localities should be internationalised—namely:—the vilayet of Constantinople: the sanjaks of Ismid, of Gallipoli, of Biga, and part of Brusa.

A certain Greek population would be included in this territory but Greece was prepared to accept the arrangement, as they felt certain that the population would receive fair treatment.

In conclusion it might be thought that he was dealing severely with the Bulgarians. People might say to him: "Why were you during the Balkan war, prepared to cede everything to Bulgaria, and now you are so irreconcilable?" He would reply that all he did at that time was done in the hope of forming a federation of Balkan people. He had been an idealist, and it had been a dream without reality. Again, during the last European war, he had agreed to make further sacrifices in order to bring the war to an end.

Surely these sacrifices, which he had then been prepared to make, could not now be brought up against him. On the contrary, all these would-be sacrifices only strengthened his present claims. As a matter of fact, Bulgarian ambitions never could be satisfied. Whatever concessions might be made would be useless, for Bulgaria would never rest until the whole of the Balkans were handed over to her. Bulgaria claimed complete hegemony over the whole of the Peninsula, and she would seize every opportunity to fulfil her ambitions. Bulgaria represented in the Balkans the Prussia of Western Europe. She would always attempt to impose her militarism on the Balkans, just as Prussia had attempted to do in Western Europe. He wished to be strictly just to Bulgaria, but he had no wish to temper justice with benevolence. Bulgaria laid claim to a population of 4,900,000. He thought this figure excessive: his own estimate would be 4,500,000. But, whatever their population might be, it gave the Bulgars no right to rule over Greeks. Bulgaria now possessed a territory and a population which fully represented her ethnic rights. Should the claims of Greece now be fully admitted, Bulgaria would still remain in a better situation than Greece as regards the ratio between population and territory.

(It was decided that M. Venizelos should put forward the claims of Greece to Asia Minor on the following day).

(The meeting adjourned to 11 o'clock on Tuesday, the 4th February, 1919).

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 3 February, 1919.

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, 4 February, 1919, at
11 O'clock a. m.**

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson
Mr. R. Lansing
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison
Lieut. Burden

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Bal-
four, M. P.
Gen. The Rt. Hon. Louis
Botha
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A.
Hankey
Major A. M. Caccia
Mr. E. Phipps

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
Capt. Portier
M. de Bearn

ITALY

M. Orlando
Baron Sonnino
Count Aldrovandi
Major Jones

JAPAN

Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui
M. Saburi
M. Kimura

PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION OF GREEK QUESTION

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Mr. C. Day
Mr. Westermann

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. H. Nicolson
Mr. A. Leeper

GREECE

M. Venizelos
M. Politis
M. Speranza
M. Rentis

ITALY

M. de Martino
M. Galli
Colonel Castoldi

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. MR. LANSING said he wished to bring a matter to the notice of the Conference, which, if left unsettled, might lead to considerable confusion. He referred to the supply of information to the Press regarding the proceedings of Committee Meetings. Recently the Secretariat-General had issued to the Press a Communiqué relating to the proceedings of the Committee on Breaches of the Laws of War. That Committee had already prepared a communiqué of their own, and he

**Press
Communiqués
Relating to
Committee
Meetings**

thought the Secretariat-General should avoid taking up such matters, especially as they did not really know what took place at such meetings, except through the procès-verbaux. He wished to propose, therefore, that the Secretariat-General should give to the Press no information relating to Committees.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed that in future the Committees should issue their own communiqués, and the Secretariat-General would take no action in the matter.

M. SONNINO enquired whether, as a matter of principle, each Committee should not send its communiqués to the Secretariat-General for communication to the Press.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought this procedure though, strictly speaking, correct would lead to a considerable loss of time.

(It was agreed that Committees would in future issue their own communiqués to the Press).

2. M. VENIZELOS said he would next deal with the claims of Greece to Western Asia-Minor. Article 12 of President Wilson's programme, which he had already cited, also governed the solution of the problem of Asia-Minor. Article 12 read as follows:—

Greek Territorial Claims in Western Asia Minor (i) Claims Based on President Wilson's 12th Point

"The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolute unmolested opportunity of autonomous development."

Now, what should be the correct interpretation of that Article? What regions should, according to the principle therein laid down, be submitted to Turkish sovereignty? A broad and generous interpretation must be given to the principles contained in President Wilson's 12th Article, if Turkey was to retain as large a territory as possible, whilst admitting the grant of autonomy to all suppressed nationalities. Unless this procedure were followed, it would, for instance, be impossible to solve the Armenian question and so put a stop to the sufferings of those people, who had lost through massacres over one million people during the course of the war. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, a wide latitude of action was admissible, because Turkey had signed the Armistice without conditions. Again, when the Emperor of Austria had announced on the 7th October, 1918,¹ his willingness to apply the autonomous principle to the various parts of his Empire, President Wilson had replied ² that he was no more free to accept simply the autonomy of those peoples as a

¹ See note No. 4978, October 7, 1918, from the Swedish Minister, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 341.

² See *ibid.*, p. 368.

basis of peace and he insisted that it was they, and not he, who ought to judge what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government would give satisfaction to their aspirations, and to their conception of their rights and their future as members of the League of Nations. The same principle must obviously be applied to the Ottoman Empire. He did not know whether his views were shared by the Conference, but he would explicitly state that the claims of Greece to Western Asia-Minor were based on the principle that no territory previously belonging to Turkey could remain a part of the future Ottoman Empire unless it contained an absolute majority of Turks.

Now, applying this test, it would be evident that on a population basis, the western part of Asia Minor, west of a line running between Kastelorizo and the Sea of Marmora could not form part of the Turkish Empire and must be allotted to Greece. From that territory, however, he would exclude a portion of the Dardanelles sandjak, which should form part of the Internationalised Area. The western territory of Asia Minor claimed by Greece could be separated from the rest of Asia Minor not only for ethnic reasons, but also because geographically and historically it formed a specially distinct and separate region.

This particular region of Asia Minor had been described as follows by the German geographer Philipson in his work "Reisen und Forschungen [1898-1900] im Westlichen Kleinasien", of which the fifth and last part had appeared during the war of 1915:—

"The Asia-Minor Peninsula shows a great geographical contrast which explains the part it played in History as a hyphen between the Asiatic and the Hellenic-European Civilisations.

The central part of the large and moderately levelled country surrounded from the N. S. and E. by high mountains is formed of homogeneous and partly dry wide plateaus, divided into sections by a few ranges. On the contrary, the western portion, from S. of Constantinople shows a remarkably varied formation. Ranges in every direction, of varied area, formation and shape, are divided by deep valleys ravine-like or basin-like, which extend themselves from East to West from the central plateaus to the multifarious coast which gives their outlet to rather important rivers.

These valleys have on the orographical formation of western Asia-Minor a greater influence than that of the interior ranges, because they provide it with rich and useful land and easy means of communications.

This compact morcellation of the country and the useful variety of the coast-line, which is a consequence of it, as well as of the general slope brought on by the last geological periods, show common features between Western Asia-Minor and Greece proper, to the

(33) Geography
 & Geology of
 Western Asia
 Minor

extent that we may consider both as one geographical entity—the *Ægeide*—.

To this contrast between Central and Western Asia-Minor, in shape and formation, corresponds an equally important contrast between their respective climates and vegetation. In the Centre surrounded by high ranges, prevails the lack of rainfall and the cold winter of the steppes. On the contrary, the open western position is provided by the sea breeze with ample rainfall, so that the warm summer alone is dry. Therefore, the essential feature of Western Asia-Minor is the most genuine Mediterranean climate and vegetation. Thus one great natural barrier divides Asia-Minor: on one side a secluded plateau of a practically Asiatic nature; on the other, an *Ægean* country with all the features of Greece proper and reciprocal relations both in history and in nature with the sea and overseas with Greece. Therefore, we meet in the Centre the Asiatic civilisation, and the Greek civilisation on the Western coast both in the past and in present time."

Turning next to the numeration of the population inhabiting this region, no official statistics had ever been issued. Each nationality

(iii) Population
of Peninsula
of Asia Minor

had, from time to time, issued separate statistics, but these, when compared, gave fantastic results. The statistics which he would now quote had been obtained

by the Greek Patriarchate, and he could guarantee their accuracy. These estimates gave a total population of 1,700,000 Greeks for the whole of the peninsula. A proof of the correctness of these estimates was contained in a pamphlet published in 1915 in Berlin by a Mr. Dietrich. The Turkish persecutions in Asia Minor had always been directed from Berlin. Still, the Germans were a practical people and they were anxious to have correct statistics, and so Mr. Dietrich had been commissioned to make a census, with the result that he arrived at the figure of 1,600,000 Greeks. This result, which was based on the population existing after the persecutions of 1915, fully corroborated his own estimate of 1,700,000. The handbooks of geography used in the high schools of Turkey proper gave the figure of 1,300,000 as the Greek population of Asia Minor. There was a considerable difference between this figure and the one previously quoted by himself, but the difference was not greater than could be expected under the circumstances.

Turning now to the portion of Western Asia Minor, claimed by Greece, including the vilayets of Aidin and Broussa, and the inde-

(iv) Population
of Western
Asia-Minor

pendent Sandjaks of the Dardanelles and Ischmid, the Greek population amounted to 1,081,000. If, to the above territory, were added the islands, adjoining

the mainland, between Kastelorizo and Mytilene, a total of 1,450,000 Greeks would be obtained. Though the islands of Khios, Mytilene and Samos had been incorporated in Greece at the end of the

last Balkan war, the Turkish Government had never recognised the allegiance of the inhabitants of those islands to Greece. The islands were strictly connected economically with the mainland, and many of the landowners of the islands also possessed holdings on the mainland. There had been a rapid increase in the Greek population everywhere, whilst the Turkish population had continuously decreased. Thus, for example, Cyprus, at the present moment, had a population of 300,000. According to the "Almanach de Gotha" the population in 1879 had been only 135,000. That is, in 40 years, the Greek population had almost doubled, whilst during the same period the Turkish population had only very slightly increased. Again, in Crete, in 1830, when the first census was taken, 70,000 Mussulmans and 70,000 Greeks were enumerated; the two nationalities being equal. In 1881, after 50 years, the population was returned at 207,000 Greeks and 72,000 Turks, clearly showing that whilst the Turkish population had been practically stationary, the Greek population had increased three-fold, in spite of the fact that the former represented the dominating power and the latter the persecuted and subservient race. Finally, the Greek population in 1900 was 273,000 and in 1910 330,000, whilst during this period the Turkish population had diminished through emigration. Exactly the same thing had occurred at Mytilene, Khios and Samos. These facts clearly exhibited the vitality and vigour of the Greek element as compared to the Ottoman element.

The total population of Western Asia Minor, including the adjoining islands, had been given as equal to 1,480,000. The whole of the territories inhabited by these Greeks, however, was not claimed by Greece: certain outlying portions, including the territory round Constantinople, containing a total population of 319,000 Greeks, should be excluded. This gave a total population of 1,132,000 Greeks in the whole of the area claimed by Greece. Within this same territory the corresponding Mussulman population was 943,000, including Mahommedans of all races, though Turks were in greater numbers. The Greek population, however, had a majority of 189,000, and this was sufficient to show that it could not be considered to form "a part of the Turkish portion of the Ottoman Empire". The Turkish minority of 943,000 would be still further reduced after the 100,000 Jews and Armenians and other Christians were added to the Greek, thus raising the total to 1,250,000 non-Mussulmans, as compared to 943,000 Mussulmans.

The more Eastern portions of the territory claimed by Greece was more thickly inhabited by Turks. Consequently, by the exclusion of certain portions of the Eastern Sanjaks, a territory more compactly

(v) Population
of Western Por-
tion of Asia
Minor claimed
by Greece

occupied by Greeks could be obtained. But economic reasons would militate against such procedure and, in his opinion, the same principle should apply as for Bohemia, Bohemia formed a geographical entity having on its North-Western border a fringe of Germans, who, for economic reasons, could not be excluded. It was argued that Bohemia should therefore be incorporated as a whole in Czecho-Slovakia, the Czech population being in the majority, for if the Germans were excluded, the economic life of the country would become impossible. This principle being accepted for Bohemia, where the various populations had all reached the same degree of civilisation, it must be the more readily accepted in the case of Asia Minor, which was inhabited by two races differing so greatly; the one representing an old and advanced civilisation, the other unable to establish a Government acceptable to foreign races. The Turks were good workers, honest in their relations, and a good people as subjects. But as rulers they were insupportable and a disgrace to civilisation, as was proved by their having exterminated over a million Armenians and 300,000 Greeks during the last four years.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether the figures relating to the Mahomedan population had been obtained from the Greek Patriarchate, or from official Turkish sources. He thought the latter figures were always too small, as taxation was involved.

M. VENIZELOS replied that the figures had been supplied by the Greek Ecclesiastical Authorities, but he thought they had been originally derived from official Turkish statistics.

Outside the area of Western Asia Minor, claimed by Greece, some 922,000 Greeks, perfectly organised and maintaining 1,400 schools, with 100,000 scholars, would still remain under the Turkish Government of Central Asia Minor. For this evil there was only one possible remedy. Under the Peace Treaty, the Turkish Government should undertake to purchase the real estate and house property belonging to such of the Greeks inhabiting Turkish territory as might desire to emigrate into Greek Asia Minor. The Greek Government should adopt the same policy in regard to property and real estate belonging to Turkish Asia Minor. There would thus be set up a current of mutual and voluntary migrations, thanks to which it might be hoped that in the course of a few years the people remaining in the Turkish State would be composed exclusively of Mahomedans; whilst the Greek element would become overwhelming.

In reply to an enquiry which had been addressed to him by President Wilson, he explained that Trebizond, containing a population of 360,000 Greeks, had claimed to be formed into a small Republic. He did not favour this proposal as

(vi) Greek Population in Turkish Government of Central Asia Minor

(vii) Trebizond

he thought it would be very undesirable to create a large number of small States, especially as the country surrounding the town comprised a very large number of Turks. In his opinion the vilayet of Trebizond should form part of the State of Armenia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether M. Venizelos had any idea as to what should constitute the Armenian State.

(viii) Armenia

M. VENIZELOS said that in his opinion the Armenian State should include the six Armenian vilayets, together with Russian Armenia and the vilayets of Trebizond and Adana.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether Cilicia would be included in the Armenian State.

M. VENIZELOS replied in the affirmative and said that Armenia would contain all the territories around Mount Ararat.

PRESIDENT WILSON remarked that the whole question was mixed up with humane considerations. The American missionaries had said that the Turks had also treated the Turks very badly at the time they were ill-treating the Armenians. He enquired if M. Venizelos could throw any light on this report.

M. VENIZELOS said that no Turks had been ill-treated; but Mahomedans, such as Arabs, Kurds, etc. had certainly been persecuted, and that was quite natural.

It might with justice be asked whether conditions in the interior would be rendered extremely difficult by the surrender of Western

Armenia [*Anatolia*] to Greece. He thought that question could be answered in the negative, for, on the

(ix) Free Ports
in Asia Minor

South side, as well as on the North side, Anatolia would have free outlets to the sea. Furthermore, he would strongly favour the creation of a Free Port, with international guarantees, on the Western coast of Asia Minor for the import and export of the commerce of the interior. This would be to the mutual benefit of the two nations and especially to Greece, who was a commercial maritime nation.

Statistics showed that Western Asia Minor had a majority of Greeks. It was therefore entitled to the grant of autonomy, and since the principle of autonomy naturally involved the right of union, the new autonomous State of Western Asia Minor would thereby be entitled to union with Greece, if the inhabitants so preferred. Can it be said that Asia Minor would prefer to join Greece rather than to form a separate unit? In the present day the spirit and feeling of nationality in all countries was so strong that the desire of these peoples would not be to form an independent Greek State, but to unite with their Greek brothers.

Again it might be asked whether the acquirement of this new territory would not place too heavy a responsibility on Greece, both from a military and administrative point of view. The military situation would present no difficulties, for Greece, unlike Roumania, who was ringed about on all sides by her enemies, had only to guard against the Bulgarians. Greece was already allied to Serbia and Roumania, and she possessed a numerical superiority over the Turks. Moreover, the guarantees of the League of Nations would constitute a further protection. The Administrative responsibility would no doubt be heavy, but it would not exceed her powers. During the last twenty years the Greek element had played a considerable part in the administration of Turkish territories. Moreover, the Greek nation had a special capacity and genius for co-operating with the Turks whenever political conflicts ceased. A large number of the Turkish populations was of Greek origin and, therefore, as soon as religious and political troubles ceased, it was easy for them to live together in perfect amity.

A reference to the map would show that new Greece would have the singular appearance of a State formed around a sea. That certainly was an inconvenience. But for thirty centuries Greeks had lived under these conditions, and had been able to surmount great catastrophes, to prosper and to increase.

In conclusion, he realised that Greece did not appear before the Peace Conference with the full titles she would have possessed, but for the betrayal of a King. Still he had a right to ask that a people should not be held responsible for the acts of their King. The people had not supported the King's actions, but they had striven to bring about a reaction by electoral strikes and revolutions and, in spite of German propaganda which had been carried on for many years, the country had succeeded at a critical moment to right itself. It had been faced with a sort of Bolshevism, but it had been able to recover. At the commencement of the war he had offered to side with the Great Powers. He had proposed intervention when the Allies had appeared in the Dardanelles. He had never asked for any reward. Indeed, when he had first suggested an alliance with the Great Powers, neither Turkey or Bulgaria had entered the war, so that it would have been impossible for Greece to have obtained compensations. At the time when he himself had gone to Salonika and ordered mobilisation, the situation was such that Greece could not possibly have hoped for any benefit. At that time he had suggested to Mr. Lloyd George that Turkey should be allowed to retain Asia Minor as well as her

(x) Anticipated
Military & Ad-
ministrative
Responsibilities
of Greece in
W. Asia Minor

(xi) Greek Ter-
ritorial Claims
& Greece's Action
During War

European possessions as an inducement for her to negotiate a separate peace. Greece was a small country, and her greatest strength lay in her honesty. It was in full confidence that he left the future of the country to the Conference.

M. ORLANDO said he wished to repeat his expression of sympathy for M. Venizelos and for Greece. He sincerely hoped that the small differences existing between Italy and Greece would be readjusted to the satisfaction of both countries.

(M. Venizelos, M. Politis, and the experts who had been present during the discussion of the Greek question then withdrew).

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked permission to make a proposal. The statement of M. Venizelos had raised so many questions, both statistical and geographical, that he proposed the same course should be followed as had already been taken in the case of Roumania. That is to say, that experts be appointed to co-ordinate all the facts and the Conference would then decide questions of policy when the reports of the experts were received.

(xi) Resolution
Regarding Greek
Territorial Claims

It was agreed:—

"That the questions raised in the statement by M. Venizelos on the Greek territorial interests in the Peace Settlement shall be referred for examination in the first instance to an expert committee composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, The British Empire, France and Italy.

It shall be the duty of this Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits and make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee is authorised to consult representatives of the peoples concerned."

(The meeting adjourned to 3 p. m. tomorrow, 5th February, 1919).

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 5 February, 1919, at
3 p. m.**

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson
Mr. R. Lansing
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison
Lieut. Burden

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Bal-
four, M. P.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Han-
key
Captain L. Abraham
Mr E Phipps

FRANCE

M Clemenceau
M Pichon
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M de Bearn
Capt. Portier

ITALY

M. Orlando
Baron Sonnino
Count Aldrovandi
Major Jones

JAPAN

Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui
M. Saburi

PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION OF CZECHO-SLOVAK QUESTION

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Major Bonsal
Mr. Dulles
Mr. Seymour

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. H. Nicolson
Mr. A. Leeper

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

M. Benes
M. Kramartz

ITALY

Count Vannutelli

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU, in opening the meeting, asked for the names of the delegates appointed by the various Powers to serve on the Greek Committee.

**Nominees for
Greek Committee**

The following names were given:—

United States of America

Mr Westermann.
Mr. Day.

British Empire

Sir Robert Borden.
Sir Eyre Crowe.

France

M. Jules Cambon.
M. Gout.

Italy

M. de Martino.
Colonel Castoldi.

(At this stage Dr. Kramartz and M. Benes and the technical advisers entered the room).

2. M. BENES said that, before beginning to expound the Czecho-Slovak problem, he would like to declare what were the principles guiding Czecho-Slovak policy. The movement culminating in the formation of an independent Czecho-Slovak State had begun 3½ years ago. The agitation had been carried on by scattered exiles in the various Allied countries. There was, at that time, no Government and no organised political body. In 3 years these exiles had succeeded, with the help of the population remaining at home, in putting up a Central Government and a political organisation which was vital, and, with the help of the Allies, three armies in the field.

Before dealing with the question of the future frontiers of this new State, he would like to recall that the Czecho-Slovak people had shown a practical sense of politics which had won for them the recognition of the Allies. He would also like to recall that, in all these years, the Nation had been entirely united. It had never hesitated to side with the Allies in the interests of democracy. It had not fought for territory, but for the same principles as the Allied Nations. It had risen against a mediæval Dynasty backed by bureaucracy, militarism, the Roman Catholic Church, and, to some extent, by high finance. The Nation had plunged into this struggle without asking for any guarantees or weighing the probabilities of success. All the Nation wanted was to control its own destinies. The Nation felt itself to be a European Nation and a member of the Society of the Western States.

In seeking now to shape the Czecho-Slovak State, the very same principles would be their guide. They would adopt the European and human point of view, and base their claims on the very principles the Conference was assembled to establish.

The Nation, after 300 years of servitude and vicissitudes which had almost led to its extermination, felt that it must be prudent, reasonable and just to its neighbours; and that it must avoid provoking jealousy and renewed struggles which might again plunge it into similar danger. It was in this spirit that he wished to explain the territorial problem.

M. Benes, continuing, said that the first territorial question was that of the four provinces, Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia and Slovakia. These territories were claimed for ethnographical reasons. They contained 10 millions of the Nation.

Czecho-Slovak
Territorial Claims

(i) The Four
Provinces of
Czecho-Slovakia

The first three had been one State from the sixth Century. The Czech Dynasty had lasted until 1747, when a unitary form of government had prevailed against federalist and national tendencies. In 1526, the Hapsburgs had been elected Kings of Bohemia, and, though, up to the present time they had *de jure* recognized Czech Institutions, they had begun from that date to centralize power. Czech independence might be said to have lasted until 1747. Since then, though the Juridical existence of the State continued to be acknowledged, it had no practical significance. Hence the Czech Insurrection in 1848 and that which had coincided with the beginning of this war.

(ii) Historical
Considerations

Historical considerations, though not the predominant factor at the present time, must be accorded some weight, in as much as they very deeply affected public opinion. It was these old historical causes that armed the Czech people against the Germanic masses around them. Three times the Czech people had rebelled, not merely against Germanism but against a system of aristocratic and Roman Catholic privilege; three times the nation had been overwhelmed by the superior numbers of the German peoples. At the end of the 17th Century, after the great battle of the White Mountain, the Czech people had practically ceased to exist. It was reanimated only at the end of the 18th Century by the French Revolution. Since then the Nation had worked so hard that, at the beginning of the 20th century, it was industrially, intellectually and politically, the most developed community in Central Europe. Throughout the 19th Century whenever the Czech people had attempted to free themselves it was always the appeal to history that had inspired them.

M. Benes said that he must draw attention to the exposed situation of the Czecho-Slovak nation. It was the advanced guard of the Slav world in the West, and therefore constantly threatened by German expansion. The Germanic mass, now numbering some 80 millions, could not push westwards as its road was blocked on that side by highly developed nations. It was, therefore, always seeking outlets to the south and to the east. In this movement it found the Poles and the Czechs in its path. Hence the special importance of the Czecho-Slovak frontiers in Central Europe. It might be hoped that the Germans would not again attempt forcible invasions, but they had done so in the past so often that the Czechs had always felt they had a special mission to resist the Teutonic flood. Hence the fanatical devotion of the Czechs which had been noticed by all in this war. It was due to the constant feeling of the Czechs that they were the protectors of democracy against Germanism, and that it was their duty at all times to fight the Germans.

(iii) Exposed
Situation of
Czecho-Slovakia

The first territorial claim of the Czechs was to Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia, which formed a geographical and ethnographical whole. However, there were some 2,400,000 Germans in Bohemia according to Austrian official statistics. The presence of these Germans was the result of centuries of infiltration and colonisation. The statistics, however, were official statistics drawn up with a deliberate political purpose. It was easy to prove their mendacity. The Czech figures showed that the Austrian census exaggerated the number of Germans in Bohemia by 800,000 or a million. The Czech statistics had been very carefully made. When the Austrian census in 1910 was under preparation, State and Municipal authorities sent to each village in the mixed districts warnings that the census would be established on the lines of spoken language not of mother tongue. If, therefore, a workman conversed in German with his employer, he was set down as a German, under pain of losing his employment and of being evicted from his home. The same method had been employed in the territories of other mixed populations in the Austro-Hungarian Kingdom. According to Czech calculations there were about 1,500,000 Germans in Bohemia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked when the previous census had taken place.

M. BENES replied that it had been in 1900, and that the same methods had been employed and the same results obtained.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked how many Czechs there were in Bohemia.

M. BENES replied that in Bohemia itself there were 4,500,000.

He wished to add that in the Bohemian territory represented as German there was also an autochthonous Czech population representing about one-third of the whole. To this must be added the fluctuations of the industrial population. He explained by the help of a map the progress of the German encroachments on Bohemia. Four distinct spheres could be distinguished, and it was noticeable that the greatest German advance had always taken place after the defeat of the Czech nation. The most notable encroachment had occurred at the end of the 17th and during the 18th Centuries. The progress had been checked in the 19th Century and in the 20th a beginning of the reversal of the process had been noticeable. It was on these considerations that the Czechs founded their claim to the restoration of the land taken from them.

The best argument, however, on which to establish the rights of the Czechs was of an economic order. The Czecho-German parts of Bohemia contained nearly the whole of the industries of the country. Bohemia as a whole was the strongest industrial portion of Austria-Hungary. It possessed 93% of the

(iv) German
Element in
Bohemia

(v) Economic
Arguments

sugar industry (it was the fourth sugar producing country in the world). The whole of the glass works of Austria-Hungary were on Czecho-Slovak territory. It possessed 70% of the textile industry, 70% of the metal industry, 55% of the brewing, and 60% of the alcohol production. Nearly all these industries were on the confines of Bohemia in the mixed territory. Without the peripheral areas Bohemia could not live. The centre of the country was agricultural, and the two parts were so interdependent that neither could exist without the other. If the Germans were to be given the outer rim of Bohemia they would also possess the hinterland. Most of the workmen on which these industries depended were of Czech nationality. In particular, the mining regions attracted large numbers of Czechs. The whole country was really homogeneous, and must remain united.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired what the reasons might be which led to the concentration of industries on the edges of the country.

M. BENES replied, that the presence of water-power, coal and minerals explained it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the population engaged in these industries was German or Czech.

M. BENES replied that the majority was Czech, but that the employers were chiefly German. However, since the educational movement in Bohemia, the professional and middle classes among the Czechs were rising in importance and had begun to compete with the Germans as employers of labour.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired at what date the educational movement among the Czechs had begun.

M. BENES replied that it began in 1880.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the majority of the employers was still German.

M. BENES replied that this was so, but that the majority was diminishing. It was the economic aspect of the Czech national movement which had most alarmed the Germans and Magyars. They saw that this movement would be irresistible, and this consideration had precipitated the war.

He would add one more point. The Bohemian Germans fully understood their position. Whether they were bourgeois, workmen or peasants, they all realised that they must remain in Bohemia. They said freely in their Chambers of Commerce that they would be ruined if they were enclosed in Germany. The competition of the great German industries was such that they could not possibly survive. They were prevented from making open declaration of this feeling because they were terrorised by a small number of Pan-German agitators from Vienna. It was not the Germans of Germany proper

that exercised any pressure on them, but only the Germans of Austria, for it had always been a deliberate policy of the Austrians to set German and Czech against one another.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the area in question had been represented in the Reichsrat by German deputies.

M. BENES replied in the affirmative, and explained that the voting areas were so contrived as to give the Germans a majority. Nevertheless, in two such districts, the Czechs had put up candidates of their own who obtained substantial minorities in their favour.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the inhabitants of these districts, if offered the choice, would vote for exclusion from the Czecho-Slovak State or for inclusion.

M. BENES replied that they would vote for exclusion, chiefly through the influence of the Social Democratic Party, which thought that the Germans would henceforth have a Social Democratic regime. The Czech Government was a coalition Government, and was regarded by them as bourgeois. It would be for reasons of this kind and for nationalist reasons, rather than for economic reasons, that the German Bohemians would be likely to adhere to their fellow-countrymen outside Bohemia.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the German manufacturers in Bohemia were protected by tariffs against the competition of German manufacturers in Germany.

DR. KRAMARTZ replied that this was so, and that without such protection they could not have resisted the competition at all. He added that the Germans would be very pleased to have this territory added to theirs, as it would afford them an outlet for their products, which in many parts of the world would for a long time be denied them.

M. BENES said that to close the question of the German Bohemians, he wished to lay down that the Czecho-Slovak Government had no intention to oppress them. It was intended to grant them full minority rights, and it was fully realised that it would be political folly not to do so. All necessary guarantees would be accorded to this minority.

M. BENES said that on the subject of Teschen he would be brief, as the problem had been previously dealt with. He had then stated the problem from its economic side. He would like

(vi) Teschen

to add that the Czech argument was strong on ethnographical grounds, also. Austrian official statistics were false, and for political reasons favoured both Poles and Germans at the expense of Czechs. The reason for this was that since 1848, and especially since 1867, the whole Czecho-Slovak population had always been in opposition to the Government. The Germans and the Poles, who

in Austria had been far better treated than in Germany or Russia had been supporters of the Government. In consequence, the census exaggerated the numbers of Poles to the detriment of the Czechs. 50 years ago official life in Teschen had been Czech. When the industrial exploitation of the country began, cheap labour, mostly Polish, had been introduced. Of the 230,000 Poles set down in the Census as living in the country, at least 50,000 were really domiciled in Galicia. If these were deducted, the Poles were a minority as opposed to 115,000 Czechs and 80,000 Germans. The territory was not Polish. Teschen itself was a German town, and the industrial and mining parts of the country were really occupied by a Czech population. The inhabitants of the mountains in the South spoke a half Czech and half Polish patois. North of them the people were German. Still further North they declared themselves to be Silesians. The people as a whole, if given the choice, would elect to join the Czecho-Slovaks rather than the Polish state, as being the richer of the two, and the one which offered the greater likelihood of order and freedom. This certainly applied to all the Germans and Jews in the country.

MR. LANSING asked whether this was the locality concerning which President Masaryk had said that the population was not ready for a plebiscite.

M. BENES said that he had no information about any such statement. He thought it unlikely, as in his opinion a plebiscite would certainly result in favour of the Czechs. He also wished to point out that the coal in Teschen was absolutely essential to the development of Czecho-Slovak industry. Bohemia before the war had bought 470 million Kroners worth of coal from German Silesia. Teschen supplied the coal most suitable for Czech industries. By losing this region the Czecho-Slovak State would lose one of the essential things on which its life depended. The whole Teschen area was one geological whole. The coal-field had not been entirely explored. It extended across the Vistula, and the Czecho-Slovak State claimed the whole basin. Nothing less could ensure its industrial revival, and this claim could not be given up.

Moreover, the only important railway linking up Bohemia, Moravia and Northern Slovakia passed through Teschen. Slovakia was economically backward, and could only be developed by means of this railway. This territory also contained the only pass through the mountains affording connection between Silesia, Moravia and Slovakia.

M. BENES said that certain alterations in the existing frontiers

were required, mostly for economic reasons, but also with the object of including outlying Czech towns within the State, and in particular he wished to mention the district of Ratibor, in Prussian Silesia. Ethnographically the Czechs spread beyond the frontier of Austria into Prussian Silesia. The people called themselves Moravians, but **it was** for economic reasons that this district was claimed. It was a continuation of the Teschen coal-fields. The town of Ratibor was populated in the proportion of 60 per cent by Germans, and the regulation of their status would be a subject for the Committee.

(vii) Rectification
of Present Fron-
tiers of Bohemia,
Moravia &
Silesia

Ratibor
District

The next subject was that of the County of Glatz, which intruded into the corner of the Czecho-Slovak territory. Some wished to annex the whole of this territory, and some only a part of it. Historically, it was Czech, and had been yielded by Austria to Germany in 1867. He did not wish to be uncompromising about this area, but for national and economic reasons some portion of it should be included in the Czecho-Slovak State.

County of
Glatz

M. Benes said that Slovakia had at one time formed part of the Czecho-Slovak State. It had been over-run by the Magyars at the beginning of the 10th Century. The conquerors had attempted without success to magyarise the country. The population still felt Czech, and wished to belong to the new state. There was never any suggestion of separatism in Slovakia. The same language, the same ideas and the same religion prevailed. Slovak national enthusiasm had been bred by antagonism to the Magyars.

(viii) Slovakia

The Northern frontier of the Slovaks was formed by the Carpathians; their Southern frontier by the Danube. From the southward bend of the Danube to the River Theiss the frontier was partly natural and partly artificial. It was bound to include many Magyars, and this constituted a problem which must be solved by the Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the opinion that no doubt existed about the claim to Slovakia proper. If this were so, he would suggest that Dr. Benes should confine his remarks to the doubtful points.

(It was generally agreed that the claim to Slovakia presented no difficulties, and that the only points requiring elucidation referred to the frontiers with Hungary.)

M. BENES, resuming, said that the Danube frontier was claimed as a matter of principle. Slovakia was a Danubian country. At the time of the Magyar invasion the Slovaks had

(ix) Danube

thrust the Slovak populations into the mountains, and after clearing them from the right bank of the Danube had come into contact with the Germans. On the left bank the Slav population had not been exterminated. They had remained on the land, though they had become more or less magyarised. The deepest strata of the population in the villages on the Northern side were Slovak. Only the upper strata artificially superposed were Hungarian.

There was also a very cogent economic reason for the Danube frontier. The Czecho-Slovak State would have no direct access to the sea. It was surrounded on three sides by Germans and on the fourth by Magyars. It was an industrial country, and absolutely required some access to the sea. The Danube internationalised would afford them this access. It would become the base of the economic life of the State. This was a *raison d'être* necessity, and the new State could not survive without it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what percentage of Slovaks inhabited the Danubian regions.

M. BENES replied that in taking over this region the Czecho-Slovak State would be including some 350,000 Magyars. He again pointed out that the country had been forcibly magyarised. These figures applied to the area between Pressburg and Vaitzen. He would add that on the other side of the river there were many scattered communities of Slovaks. For instance in the region of Budapest there were as many as 150,000. These would be abandoned in compensation for the Hungarians absorbed.

M. SONNINO asked what proportion the Slovaks represented as opposed to the Hungarians.

M. BENES replied that this varied according to the district. The districts on which statistics were based had been traced from North to South and thus made to comprise strong Magyar majorities. He estimated that in the districts to which he referred the Slovak population represented 60 per cent but it was difficult to make a trustworthy estimate, as these areas had never been used as districts for census purposes.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether communal statistics could be obtained and whether it was a fact that the Slovak population only touched the Danube at Pressburg.

M. BENES replied that it reached the Danube also North of Budapest, but he admitted that the greater part of the riverain population was Magyar.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the rivers passing through Slovakia were navigable.

M. BENES replied that only the Vah was navigable, but only half way up its course.

M. KRAMARTZ said that an attempt was being made to render the Morava navigable and a great development of canal communication was in project, which would connect the North Sea through the Elbe with the Black Sea through the Danube. These communications would pass through Czecho-Slovak territory.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether, if the territories claimed declared themselves Magyar, free access to the internationalised route of the Danube through the rivers of Slovakia would satisfy M. Benes.

M. BENES replied that these rivers were not at present navigable, with the exception of the Vah. The whole of Slovakia would be cut off from the Danube.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether, if Czecho-Slovakia obtained access by railway to fixed points on the Danube, this would satisfy them.

M. BENES replied that the valley and the uplands were so interdependent that great disorganisation would ensue on their separation. These territories lived by the exchange of industrial and agricultural necessities. The uplands of Slovakia were industrial and the valley was agricultural.

M. BENES said that the claim for this frontier was dictated by railway communications. The mountains ran from North to South and there was little communication from East to West.

(x) Frontier
Between Danube
and Ung

It was therefore necessary to include the only railway offering lateral communication. He admitted that a considerable Hungarian population would thus be brought in to the Czecho-Slovak State, but he would point out that the Hungarian census was even worse than the Austrian. As a whole, 250,000 Magyars would be included, while 350,000 Slovaks would be left out. In all, 650,000 Hungarians would become subjects of the new State, while 450,000 Czecho-Slovaks would remain within Hungary. Racial confusion in Hungary owing to the savage persecutions of the past, was very great.

The Slovaks had been particularly oppressed, and even Kossuth had said that the Slovaks could not be granted the franchise. Magyars freely said that the Slovaks were not men. Out of 2,300 officials in Slovakia only 17 had been Slovaks. Out of 1,700 judges only one had been Slovak, and out of 2,500 Collectors of Taxes only 10 had been Slovaks. In consequence nearly one third of the Slovak population had emigrated to the United States of America. Others had left their homes and settled in places in Hungary where it was easier to make a living, which accounted for the 90,000 Slovaks found near Budapest, and the 80,000 round Debreczin.

M. Benes said that it remained for him to draw attention of the conference to certain suggestions which were not to be considered claims made on behalf of Czecho-Slovakia.

(xi) Ruthenes
in Hungary

The first of these suggestions related to the Ruthenes in Hungary. Next to the Slovaks and to the East of them, was a territory inhabited by Ruthenes.

These Ruthenes were the same stock as the Ruthenes of Eastern Galicia, from whom they were divided by the Carpathians. They were close neighbours to the Slovaks, socially and economically similar to them, and there were even transitional dialects between their language and that of Slovakia. They did not wish to remain under Hungarian control and proposed to form an autonomous state in close federation with Czecho-Slovakia. They numbered about 450,000. It would be unjust to leave them to the tender mercies of the Magyars, and though Czecho-Slovakia made no claim on their behalf, he had undertaken to put their case before the Conference. If Eastern Galicia became Russian it would be dangerous to bring Russia South of the Carpathians. If Eastern Galicia became Polish, the Poles themselves would not wish to include this population. It followed therefore that this people must either be Hungarian or autonomous. If the latter, they wished to be federated to the Czecho-Slovak State. This would impose a burden on Czecho-Slovakia, but would afford them the advantage of a common frontier with the Roumanians.

A similar problem was that of the Serbs of Lusatia numbering from 150,000 to 160,000. These people were the remnant of the

(xii) Serbs
of Lusatia

Slav population which at one time extended as far as Lübeck. With the exception of this group, that population had been germanised. These Serbs lived independently in the Spreewald. They were nearest to the Czechs, and had begged him to present their problem to the Conference. These Serbs desired to be autonomous under Czech protection, but the Czechs made no claim on this subject, and even thought it might be dangerous for them to undertake this mission. He thought, however, that the Conference should examine the problem. It was a moral rather than a political matter. The country had once belonged to Bohemia, and had become German territory in 1867. It was situated only 6 kilometres from the Bohemian frontier.

M. Benes said that in order to free itself from the grip of the Germans and Magyars the Czecho-Slovak State wished to establish close relations with the Yugo-Slavs and with Italy. The nearest sea to the Czecho-Slovak territory was the Adriatic. He thought that by means of a small territory either under the Czech or Yugo-Slav Government, or under the

(xiii) Communi-
cation With
the Adriatic

League of Nations, means of communication would be best established. A railway line alone, with territory on either side of it would, he thought, be insufficient. He would suggest that this territory should be marked out on the confines of the Germans and the Magyars. It would thus furnish a corridor between Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-Slavia.

This was merely a suggestion put forward for consideration with reference to the general principle adopted by the Conference.

The Czecho-Slovak Government had no wish to hamper the purposes of the Conference. They wished to do all in their power to assist a just and durable peace.

(The following resolution was then adopted:—

That the questions raised in the statement by M. Benes on the Czecho-Slovak territorial interests in the Peace Settlement shall be referred for examination in the first instance to an expert Committee composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy.

It shall be the duty of this Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits and make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee is authorised to consult representatives of the peoples concerned.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 6 February, 1919.

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 6 February, 1919, at
3 p. m.**

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson
Mr. R. Lansing
Mr. L. Harrison
Colonel U. S. Grant

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Bal-
four, M. P.
Gen. The Rt. Hon. Louis
Botha
Captain E. Abraham
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn
Capt. Portier

ITALY

M. Orlando
Baron Sonnino
Count Aldrovandi
Major Jones

JAPAN

Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui
M. Saburi

PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION OF ARAB QUESTION

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Major Bonsal
Mr. Westermann

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Montagu
Sir A. Hirtzel
Sir Mark Sykes
Mr. Toynbee

FRANCE

M. Gout
M. de Caix
M. Coulondre
Ben Ghabrit

HEDJAZ

Emir Feisal
Colonel Lawrence
Rustum Haider
Amir Abdul Hadi
Nuri Said

ITALY

M. de Martino
M. Galli
M. Piacentini

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. **M. CLEMENCEAU**, in opening the meeting, said that before beginning the business of the day he wished to make mention of a matter previously decided. He referred to the destruction of German submarines. He had understood that the decision had been that only submarines under construction should be destroyed. On referring to the Minutes, however, he saw that destruction of those handed over complete was also

**Destruction of
Submarines**

included. This decision was not that which he thought had been reached. He would, therefore, advise that before this decision was carried out, the advice of the Naval Commission concerning the fate of all the captured ships in Allied hands, should be awaited.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that it would be better to destroy as many of these pests as possible.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that some had been assigned to France and some to Italy. He thought it was wrong that some should be destroyed while others were given away.

BARON MAKINO said that seven had been given to Japan.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood M. Clemenceau to desire a uniform policy.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that that was exactly his meaning.

(It was agreed that further information as to what steps had been taken, should be obtained, and that the question should be decided later.)

2. (At this stage the Delegates for the Hedjaz and their technical advisers entered the room.)

Statement for
the Hedjaz
(a) General

EMIR FEISAL said that

In his memorandum of January 29th to the Peace Conference,¹ he had asked for the independence of all the Arabic speaking peoples in Asia, from the line Alexandretta-Diarbekir southward.

He based his request on the following points:—

(i) This area was once the home of important civilisations, and its people still have the capacity to play their part in the world.

(ii) All its inhabitants speak one language—Arabic.

(iii) The area has natural frontiers which ensure its unity and its future.

(iv) Its inhabitants are of one stock—the Semitic. Foreigners do not number 1% among them.

(v) Socially and economically it forms a unit. With each improvement of the means of communication its unity becomes more evident. There are few nations in the world as homogeneous as this.

(vi) The Arabic speaking peoples fought on the side of the Allies in their time of greatest stress, and fulfilled their promises.

(vii) At the end of the war the Allies promised them independence. The Allies had now won the war, and the Arabic speaking peoples thought themselves entitled to independence and worthy of it. It was in accord with the principles laid down by President Wilson and accepted by all the Allies.

(viii) The Arab army fought to win its freedom. It lost heavily: some 20,000 men were killed. Allenby acknowledged its services in his despatches. The army was representative of Arab ideals and was composed of young Syrians, Lebanese, Hejazis, Mesopotamians, Palestinians, and Yemenis.

¹ Miller, *My Diary*, vol. iv, p. 300.

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¹ Miller, *My Diary*, vol. iv, p. 300.

(ix) The blood of Arab soldiers, the massacres among the civil populations, the economic ruin of the country in the war, deserved recognition.

(x) In Damascus, Beyrout, Tripoli, Aleppo, Latakia, and the other districts of Syria, the civil population declared their independence and hoisted the Arab flag before the Allied troops arrived. The Allied Commander in Chief afterwards insisted that the flag be lowered to install temporary Military Governors. This he explained to the Arabs was provisional, till the Peace Conference settled the future of the country. Had the Arabs known it was in compliance with a secret treaty they would not have permitted it.

(xi) The Syrians who joined the Northern Army were recognised by the Allies as Belligerents. They demand through this delegation their independence.

His Father did not risk his life and his Kingdom by joining in the war at its most critical time to further any personal ambitions. He was not looking for an Empire. He rose up to free all the Arabic provinces from their Turkish Masters. He did not wish to extend the boundaries of the Hedjaz Kingdom a single inch.

His ideal was the ideal of all Arabic patriots. He could not believe that the Allies would run counter to their wishes. If they did so the consequences would be grave. The Arabs were most grateful to England and France for the help given them to free their country. The Arabs now asked them to fulfil their promises of November 1918. It was a momentous decision the Conference had to take, since on it depended the life of a nation inhabiting a country of great strategic importance between Europe and Asia.

The greatest difficulty would be over Syria. Syria claimed her unity and her independence, and the rest of the Arabic liberated areas wished Syria to take her natural place in the
(b) Syria future confederation of liberated Arabic speaking Asia, the object of all Arab hopes and fears.

Some of the people of the present province of Lebanon were asking for French guarantees. Some of them did not wish to sever their
(c) Lebanon connection with Syria. He was willing to admit their independence, but thought it essential to maintain some form of economic union in the interest of mutual development. He hoped nothing would be done now to render the admission of the Lebanon to the future confederation impossible, if it desired admission.

For the moment also the inhabitants of the rest of Syria hoped that the Lebanon people would of their own accord decide for federal union with themselves in Syria.

The Arabs realised how much their country lacked development. They wanted it to be the link between the East and West, to hand on Western civilisation to Asia. They did not wish to close their doors to civilised people; on the contrary, as rulers of their own country, in their zeal for their country's betterment, they wanted to seek help from everyone who wished them well; but they could not sacrifice for this help any of the independence for which they had fought, since they regard it as a necessary basis of future prosperity. They must also guard their economic interests, as part of their duty as Governors. He hoped no Power imagined that it had the right to limit the independence of a people because it had material interests in their country.

(d) Economic
Interests

Arab religious differences were being exploited. These had been triumphed over in the Hedjaz army, in which all creeds co-operated to free their country. The first efforts of the Arab Government would be to maintain this welding of the faiths, in their common service of the principle of nationality.

(e) Religious
Differences

Palestine, for its universal character, he left on one side for the mutual consideration of all parties interested. With this exception he asked for the independence of the Arabic areas enumerated in his memorandum.

(f) Palestine

When this principle was admitted, he asked that the various Provinces, on the principle of self-determination, should be allowed to indicate to the League of Nations the nature of the assistance they required. If the indications before the Conference in any one case were not conclusive as to their wishes for their complete independence or for their mandatory power, he suggested that an international inquiry, made in the area concerned, might be a quick, easy, sure and just way of determining their wishes.

(g) International
Enquiry as to
Desires of the
People

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked how many troops the Hedjaz had put into the field.

EMIR FEISAL replied that it was impossible to give the exact figure; but, including the Hedjaz Army, the Arabs had put about 100,000 men into the field. There was, in addition, a considerable number of Irregulars who were not on his registers. He thought he could assert that every man of fighting age in possession of a rifle between Mecca and Aleppo had joined the Arab standards. How many that might have been it was difficult to say, as he had no figures of the population. There remained four Divisions of Regulars as the standing army: the Irregulars had dispersed to their own homes.

Arab Military
Effort

He wished to explain that the Arab Government had been organised, as it were, in the firing line. It had been born after the outbreak of war and was not yet regularly constituted. Hence the dif-

ficulty of producing exact figures. Medina had only surrendered a few days ago.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the Arab troops had taken any part on the Mesopotamian front.

EMIR FEISAL replied that all their operations outside the Hedjaz had been in Syria. In Mesopotamia there had been no need for an independent Arab movement and no scope for one in that region. Five of his Commanding Officers, however, and many of his men came from Mesopotamia. They had fought in his army to vindicate their rights to self-government.

4. PRESIDENT WILSON asked the Emir whether, seeing that the plan of mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations had been adopted, he would prefer for his people a single mandatory, or

Question of
Mandatory

several.

EMIR FEISAL said that he would not like to assume towards his people the responsibility of giving an answer to this question. It must be for the Arab people to declare their wishes in respect to a mandatory authority. Neither he, nor his father, nor, he thought, any person now living, would be ready to assume the responsibility of deciding this question on behalf of the people. He was here to ask for the independence of his people and for their right to choose their own mandatory.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he understood this perfectly, but would like to know the Emir's personal opinion.

EMIR FEISAL said that personally he was afraid of partition. His principle was Arab unity. It was for this that the Arabs had fought. Any other solution would be regarded by the Arabs in the light of a division of spoils after a battle. The Arabs had fought a hard fight to achieve unity. He hoped the Conference would regard them as an oppressed nation which had risen against its masters. The Arabs asked for freedom only and would take nothing less. He thought the Conference would be of the opinion that the Arab revolt had been as well conducted as any rebellion of an oppressed people in recent memory. The Arabs were an ancient people, civilised and organised at a time when the nations represented in this room were unformed. They had suffered centuries of slavery and had now seized the chance of emancipation. He hoped that the Conference would not thrust them back into the condition from which they had now emerged. The Arabs had tasted slavery: none of the nations gathered in the room knew what that meant. For 400 years the Arabs had suffered under a violent military oppression, and as long as life remained in them, they meant never to return to it.

5. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would like the Emir to give a

short account of the services rendered by the Arab forces in the defeat of the Turkish Armies.

Arab Military
Operations

EMIR FEISAL said, when his father rebelled against the Turks, he was hereditary Governor of Mecca—a position held by the family for 800 years. He had no arms, machine-guns, guns, ammunition or supplies, and only took Mecca with difficulty. He was unable to take Medina. The Turks then sent 35,000 men to retake Mecca. God helped the Arabs, and the English also sent them material assistance. Officers and volunteers from the old Turkish army joined them and formed the nucleus of a regular force. In 14 months the Arab forces advanced 800 miles to the North and cut the Hedjaz railway South of Maan. This was an important military achievement as the Turkish army at Medina threatened the rear of the Arab forces. He had then attacked Maan by a frontal attack without any hope of success, in order to cover General Allenby's preparations and to prevent a Turkish concentration. He had placed his army voluntarily under General Allenby's command and did this to co-operate with him. General Allenby then asked the Arab forces to attack the three railways at Derat. The Arab army did its duty and cut these lines two days before General Allenby's attack which eventually led him to Damascus. The Arab army entered Damascus together with General Allenby's forces. From that point the Arab revolt spread like a flame and in one bound reached Latakia, which was entered by the Arabs the day before the French entered Beyrout. His forces were the first to enter Aleppo. Throughout these operations the Arab plan had been subordinated to General Allenby's. They had abandoned all ambition to shine by themselves, or to do anything spectacular. They took 40,000 prisoners, who were delivered to the Allies. He need add nothing to the praise bestowed on the Arab troops in General Allenby's despatches.

M. PICHON asked whether the French had taken any part in the Arab operations on this front, and asked Emir Feisal to describe it.

EMIR FEISAL said that with him there had been a French contingent with four 65 mm. guns and two 85 mm. guns. This contingent had done wonderful work, and the help rendered by the French detachment placed upon the Arabs a debt of perpetual gratitude. There had also been with him a British detachment to whom he was equally grateful. He did not wish to praise them as their actions were beyond praise, as were those of his own troops which he had also abstained from praising.

Besides the military effort made by the Arabs, he wished to draw attention to the civil losses incurred. The Allied Officers who had witnessed the destroyed villages of Tafaz and Ahwali, could testify to the extent of the massacres perpetrated on the Arab population.

6. MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the Emir could say whether there was any Arab population in Turkey outside Arabia and Syria: for instance in Anatolia.

Arab Populations
Outside Arabia
and Syria

EMIR FEISAL replied that there were a few in the Adana district; a few in the Tarsus and Mersina area; but none in Anatolia. In all these regions they were a small minority and the Arabs were not claiming minority rights anywhere. Part of the population in the Diarbekir area spoke Arabic. There were also Arabs living across the Persian border. But no other considerable portions of the Arab population lived in isolated enclaves at a distance from the bulk of the race.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether there was any affinity between the Arabs and the Kurds.

EMIR FEISAL said that he would be delighted to claim all the Kurds as Arabs; but he felt he would ruin his case if he made even one questionable statement.

Finally he begged that he should not be penalised because he only spoke Arabic, an ancient and honourable tongue and the language of an ancient and honourable people.

(The Emir Feisal then retired and the meeting adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 7 February, 1919.

Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the 13th Session of the Supreme War Council, Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, February 7, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson
Hon. R. Lansing
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George,
M. P.
Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner,
G. C. B., G. C. M. G.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Han-
key, K. C. B.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
M. Leygues
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn

ITALY

H. E. M. Orlando
H. E. Baron Sonnino
Count Aldrovandi

JAPAN

Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

ALSO PRESENT DURING FIRST PART OF MEETING

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Gen. John J. Pershing,
Commanding A. E. F.
Gen. Tasker H. Bliss,
Military Representative
Admiral W. S. Benson,
Naval Adviser.
Capt. F. H. Schofield,
U. S. N.
Com. A. F. Carter,
U. S. N.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Admiral Sir R. Wemyss,
G. C. B., C. M. G.,
M. V. O., 1st Sea Lord
& Chief of the Naval
Staff.
Maj. Gen. W. T. Thwaites,
C. B. Director of Mili-
tary Intelligence.
Maj. Gen. The Hon. C. J.
Sackville-West, C. M. G.,
Permanent Military
Representative.
Maj. Gen. Sir F. H.
Sykes, K. C. B., C. M. G.,
Chief of the Air Staff.

FRANCE

M. Loucheur
Marshal Foch, O. M.,
G. C. B.
Gen. Weygand, K. C. B.
Gen. Belin
Admiral De Bon
Colonel Mercier
Major Lacombe
Capt. [Lt.†] Odend'hal
Captain Levavasseur

ITALY

H. E. Gen. Diaz
Gen. Cavallero
H. E. Admiral Thaon di Revel
Admiral Grassi
Commander Ruspoli

JAPAN

Admiral Takeshita
General Tanaka
Colonel Sato
Commandant [Captain?] Nomura
Commandant [Captain?] Yamamoto

Secretariat

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Colonel U. S. Grant.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Major A. M. Caccia,
M. V. O.

FRANCE

Captain A. Portlier.

ITALY

Major A. Jones.

JAPAN

M. Saburi.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU, having declared the meeting opened, stated that the question of the occupation of the enemy's territory by the forces of the Allied and Associated Powers had been studied by a Committee, with M. Loucheur as Chairman, and by Marshal Foch. Their reports were now ready, and he asked Marshal Foch to make a statement in this regard.

Renewal of Armistice With Germany: Proposed Amendments to Military Clauses:
(a) Statement by Marshal Foch

MARSHAL FOCH read the following note:—

"The meeting of the Commanders in Chief at Marshal Foch's, which was ordained by the Supreme Council of the Allies on January 24th,¹ was held on January 26th. The object of this meeting was to determine, with the greatest possible accuracy, the situation of the Allied Armies on March 31st, 1919, such as will result from the measures taken by each Government for demobilisation and repatriation, and also to consider what further provisions could be made, given these measures.

The French Army, on April 5th, will still have under the colours 2,257,000 men, of which 1,350,000 in the Armies of the North and North-East. It will comprise a minimum of 46 divisions, each with 4 regiments up to fighting strength, (and sufficient men in reserve for their maintenance during 3 to 4 months of operations) and 6 Cavalry Divisions.

No measure has yet been decided upon to be carried out after this date (April 5).

The British Army, according to the measures decided upon by the British Government on January 23rd, will comprise 900,000 men for the whole of the Empire.

The arrangements made will render it possible to have in France, on April 1st, 10 strong divisions and 2 cavalry divisions, (Infantry divisions up to 10 battalions of 900 men). To this should be added, for an indefinite period, 2 or 3 divisions from the Dominions.

These forces in France amount to a total of 552,000 men, the fighting force of which will be 212,000 men.

It will be possible to maintain this situation for a period of several months.

The American Army, on April 1st, will have in France :

- 10 Divisions in the zone of the Armies,
- 5 Divisions near the embarkation ports.

These forces amount from 1,380,000 to 1,400,000 men, with a fighting strength of 680,000.

On May 1st, the American Army in France will comprise :

- 10 Divisions in the zone of the Armies,
- 5 Divisions near the embarkation ports.

¹ See BC-A9, p. 704.

If, on this date, the Peace Preliminaries are not signed, the American Command considers, but without making any definite agreement on the subject, that during May and June sufficient troops and war material will be left in France to provide for home transportation, and this without encroaching upon the above mentioned 10 divisions, in such a way that on July 1st, there may remain in France 10 divisions amounting to 300,000 men.

The Italian Army has actually, in the war zone in Italy, 1,540,000, with a fighting strength of 1,020,000 men. Up to April 1st, four classes (each of 100,000 men) will probably be mustered out, that is to say a total of 400,000 men, 225,000 of which from the war zone, 1,315,000 men will therefore remain in the war zone.

On April 1st, the Italian Army will comprise:

- 31 Divisions (including those of Dalmatia, but exclusive of the two divisions forming the 2nd Army Corps),
- 3 divisions in Albania,
- 1 division in the Balkans.

The table, given in Appendix "A" summarizes the situation of the Allied Armies facing Germany on April 1st.

This situation shows that there are sufficient resources to oppose Germany up to April 1st on the Western Front.

It also shows that after this date, and if the Peace Preliminaries are not signed, the Future can only be ensured by maintaining the above mentioned resources in stopping the process of demobilization."

M. LOUCHEUR then gave a summary of the report of the Commission appointed by the Supreme War Council at the meeting of

the 24th January, 1919. (For full text of report, see Appendix "B", with its annexures 1 to 5 inclusive).

(b) Report of
M. Loucheur's
Committee

M. Loucheur added that his Committee considered that the control over the manufacture of arms and munitions in Germany could be easily established with a force of 200 officers, and that this control could be in operation by the end of March, provided the proposed new Armistice clauses were duly signed on 20th February next, on which date the present Armistice period would expire. Moreover, by April 5th, sufficient material would have been surrendered to justify the continuance of demobilisation, if Germany carried out her agreement with sufficient good-will. According to Marshal Foch's estimate, there would still be 51 Divisions and 10 cavalry divisions in the French Army.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he understood the proposal to contemplate very serious and extensive additions to the original armistice conditions. Whenever this was attempted it was always possible that the armistice would not be renewed, and if renewed, that the Allies would [not?] be prepared to enforce the new conditions. He would like to ask Marshal Foch two questions, namely, whether in

the latter's opinion these new conditions would be accepted, and, if so, whether it would be necessary to undertake any serious measures to ensure their enforcement.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that he did not think the Germans would accept the new conditions without pressure. When he met the German delegates he would say: "Accept those conditions or the armistice will be broken". He could not enter into negotiations with the Germans.

As to the second question, it would evidently be necessary to take measures to insure fulfilment of the new condition, and to establish control. Whether the control proposed would be effective he did not know; but it did not guarantee anything. The officers who went to Germany would only see what they were allowed to see, and if later they discovered that the terms of the armistice had been violated they would so report; but meanwhile demobilisation would have progressed. The demobilisation was to progress on the assurance given by this control, and if the terms agreed to were violated, it would then be too late to do anything about it. He, therefore, thought it futile to base the demobilisation plans on promises of this kind, fulfilment of which could not be insured.

M. CLEMENCEAU then inquired if Marshal Foch could suggest any more effective method of control.

MARSHAL FOCH said they might occupy all the factories, but he considered that to be an impracticable solution. Or, they might occupy one or two factories, such as Essen; but to occupy Essen alone it was estimated seven divisions would be required, so that the burden to be borne would be enhanced thereby rather than diminished. The hoped-for relief would in reality merely mean an additional burden.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Marshal Foch had any other suggestion to make.

MARSHAL FOCH replied in the negative. It would be impossible to prevent a country like Germany from doing what she wished at home. She would always be able to manufacture arms. The Allies could not stop all their industries.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed his appreciation of the clear and frank reply made by Marshal Foch, and he called attention to the fact that what was desired was to find means for reducing the Allied forces; while it seemed that the occupation of the factories might call for a further increase.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the application of that part of M. Loucheur's report which demanded the surrender of guns, rifles and machine guns, would not make Germany impotent, at least during the duration of the armistice.

MARSHAL FOCH agreed that it would weaken Germany, but by how much and for how long he did not know; nor did he know how long the armistice would last.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that it would take a certain period of time to replace all the equipment Germany was to be asked to surrender, and he enquired from M. Loucheur whether he could say what that period would probably be.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that with all her available resources it would take Germany at least two years.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE next enquired whether Germany could manufacture all those arms unless the Allies allowed the necessary raw material to go through to Germany.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that the producing power of Germany in iron and steel had already been reduced 40% by the occupation of Alsace-Lorraine by Allied troops.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it would therefore take Germany more than two years to turn out the immense armament proposed to be surrendered; and he certainly did not think that it could be manufactured without the knowledge of the Allies' inspecting officers who would be present in the country.

M. LOUCHEUR agreed that this would be quite impossible, and he was prepared to take full responsibility for this statement.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that if Germany were told that unless she assented to these terms, the supply of raw materials and needed food would be refused, that she would undoubtedly consent. It would also be advantageous to Germany to reduce her army to the maximum [*minimum?*] figure required for the maintenance of order, if by so doing she assured a proportionate reduction of the armies of the allies.

M. LOUCHEUR and MARSHAL FOCH agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said: "Supposing the disarmament of Germany were made one of the conditions of peace", (and he could not conceive the omission of such a condition), "would it be easier to impose this condition at that time, say in July, rather than now?"

MARSHAL FOCH did not know what peace conditions would be imposed; but the question now before the Conference relating to the surrender of the armament still possessed by Germany was so vague and indeterminate that the experts themselves had never been able to agree on the number of guns Germany still possessed. The experts had only been able to say that Germany should surrender various items of war material in excess of certain given figures.

M. LOUCHEUR said that his Committee had in their report adopted the figures supplied by the Intelligence Services of the different armies, and it had called for the surrender of three-fourths of the total number given.

MARSHAL FOCH interposed that he could not assume any responsibility for those figures—they were necessarily unreliable.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked what the Allies would do if Germany promised the surrender of these materials and did not give them up. How would they get them?

MARSHAL FOCH replied that there would be only one way, viz: "By War". But, instead of pursuing a question so indeterminate as the size of Germany's armaments, which could never be accurately known, there were other methods of exercising pressure, which should be considered. Besides the resumption of hostilities by means of the Armies of Occupation, there were the maintenance of the blockade and the stoppage of supplies. Germany needed food and raw materials, and if those three instruments (Armies of Occupation, supplies, blockade), were centralised under a single military control, with powers to open and close the channels of supply according to the observance of Germany, he thought that the fulfilment of the conditions which it was proposed to impose could be attained.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether Marshal Foch could doubt that, if the surrender of these guns were made a condition for the renewal of the armistice, Germany would not do so rather than renew hostilities.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that he did not know, but, if the proposition were made and refused, the armistice would have to be broken.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the Germans would face a continuance of the blockade rather than surrender their guns, which after all were not of the slightest use to them except for offensive purposes.

MARSHAL FOCH thought it would be unwise to speculate on the answer to that question.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. Loucheur if, in his opinion, it would be necessary to occupy all the factories. On a previous occasion he (M. Loucheur) had stated that there were two or three essential factories, which, if taken over, would practically mean the disarmament of Germany.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that if the factories in the area of Westphalia, such as Essen, Bochum up to Duisburg were held, it would mean a diminution of 75% of the effective means of production of Germany.

(At this stage the military, naval and technical advisers withdrew.)

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the last time the armistice conditions had been discussed, he had thought it his duty to oppose any addition to the armistice terms. He thought that the council should have known what it was doing when the armistice was drawn up, and that it was not sportsmanlike to attempt to correct now the errors that had then been made. It was quite clear to him that the Allies were running a grave risk of bringing about a situation when, having made a threat, they might be challenged to carry it out. He understood that the Allies already controlled in the occupied districts of Germany 26,000,000 out of 32,000,000 tons of the iron production of Germany. He was afraid that the control of the factories by officers, as proposed, would prove insufficient, and that it would become necessary to occupy more territory, with the result that the military commanders would require more troops. It had already been suggested by Mr. Lloyd George that, as Germany was paying for the Army of Occupation, it would clearly be to her interest to reduce this burden. It must also be remembered that if the demobilisation of the German Army were imposed on a large scale, Germany would have forced on her a large body of unemployed, who would add to the element of unrest and be a danger to Germany and to the Allies. It was, therefore, to the interest of the latter to give Germany the means of renewing her economic life, not only for the purpose of reducing the number of unemployed, but also to enable her to pay the reparations which the Allies had a right to expect. He, therefore, proposed the institution of a civil commission to meet a similar German commission, to negotiate with them and to say—that if Germany would reduce her forces and yield a proper proportion of her mischievous equipment, the Allies would reduce their army of occupation, reducing the charges therefor; they would at the same time relax the blockade to allow the passage of sufficient raw materials, except for armaments, to enable her to renew her economic life.

He thought in that way the Allies would avoid doing the improper thing of exacting terms, without running the risk of renewing war and of bringing about an intolerable state of affairs.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not think they were necessarily bound either as an obligation of honour, or as sportsmen, to renew the Armistice for ever or on exactly the same terms. He did not know how long the Armistice would last, but he felt that he and his colleagues were under obligation to the world and to their people to protect them against a renewal of hostilities. The terms of the Armistice did not contain any undertaking either to feed Germany or to furnish raw materials; but these things were now being considered. The alterations were not, therefore, all on one side; and

(c) President
Wilson's Proposal
to Appoint a Civil
Commission To
Negotiate Dis-
armament Terms

if the terms could be changed in favour of the Germans, they could also be changed in favour of their own people. He had been very much impressed by a conversation he had held with Sir Douglas Haig. Field Marshal Haig had expressed views similar to those held by President Wilson, namely, that the number of infantry did not matter. But he had also called attention to the fact that Germany still had the materiel and armament, which would enable her within a short period of time to call back three or four million men, fully equipped for war. By that time most of the American and British troops would have gone home and be out of reach, and the French would have scattered over the country. If Germany should therefore mean mischief, she could call together millions of well-trained men, with full complement of officers and non-commissioned officers, thousands of the best guns in the world, and fifty thousand machine guns. A fit of anger might come over her. It was impossible to say how long the present government would last, and a change of government might mean a change of policy. A tailor named Ebhardt [*Ebert*] was Chancellor, Scheidemann was one of the leaders; but neither were men of real power. It was impossible to say who would be on top in six weeks' time. Germany herself was being endangered by having this temptation left at her door. Consequently, nothing unfair would be done by imposing the proposed conditions. The only question to be settled was how those conditions should be imposed. It might be fair to do this on the lines suggested by President Wilson by making clear that the Allies would not help Germany unless these conditions were accepted. Nothing with reference to the supply of food or raw materials appeared in the Armistice. Consequently, they were fully entitled to refuse to supply these things to Germany. He thought there was a good deal to be said in favour of appointing a civilian commission; but the question would have to be settled at the time of the renewal of the Armistice. This arrangement would be best both for the Germans and for the Allies.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that the Allies were under no moral obligations to furnish food. He was proud as a moral man that on humane grounds it was not intended to let the people of Germany starve. There was also no obligation to furnish raw materials, and the price which the Allies had in their mind to exact for these concessions was not extravagant. But, if they were prepared to assist Germany to renew her commercial life, they had a right to ask guarantees for their own safety: and it would be both honourable and reasonable to impose such conditions. He thought that there would be a great moral advantage in approaching the German delegates through a civilian commission, which would not threaten them. He would also like to see the negotiations begun immediately so as to be completed before the date fixed for the renewal of the Armistice.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that he had forgotten to mention one most important point. According to Marshal Foch's report, the Allied forces would by April next be very greatly reduced. At the present moment sufficient men were available and, therefore, the question should, he thought, be discussed at once before further demobilisation took place.

M. CLEMENCEAU regretted that he was not in accord with President Wilson in this matter. France would be placed in a position of great danger if a firm attitude were not adopted. When the terms of the Armistice had been discussed he had said that only what was necessary should be inserted, in order not to risk a refusal of the terms. But, each time it had been agreed to renew the Armistice for a period of one month only, and this was done with the express object of having an opportunity of imposing new terms, adapted to the changing situation. The right to impose new terms, or new conditions, could not therefore be contested either on juridical or any other grounds; and the Germans themselves had made no objection to the occupation of Kehl and other places. But he had one other thing to say. The present moment was decisive, not because it was a question of winning the war, but because there was danger of losing the fruits of victory. It was essential to act quickly. The forces at the call of the Allies had not yet diminished appreciably. In the last few weeks the Germans had become insolent, and recently an incident had occurred. Marshal Foch had been forced to use constraint to bring the German delegates to a meeting. If now ambassadors were to be sent and negotiations were to be begun, much valuable time would be lost; and April would come and find our forces partially scattered. The American and Australian troops would have returned to their homes, and France and Great Britain would be left alone to face the Germans, who, seeing the Allies always giving way, would in turn become more arrogant. He knew the German people well. They became ferocious when any one retires before them. Was it forgotten that they were still at war; that the Armistice was a status of war? The Germans had not forgotten it. He called attention to the case of Poland. The Poles had stopped the further advance of their troops at the request of the Allies; but the Germans had treated a similar request with a blank refusal. The terms of the refusal were well-known.² The Allies would be exposed to great danger unless they menaced the Germans now. There was need of a strong Poland. Furthermore, President Wilson had, as one

² A correction issued on February 11 reads as follows:

For "The terms of the refusal were well known", substitute "The terms of the refusal are given in Appendix 'C.'" [For Appendix "C," see p. 924.]

of his fourteen points, assumed the obligation of reconstituting Poland. The League of Nations was a very fine conception, but it could not be constituted without nations. As one of the nations concerned, Poland was most necessary as a buffer on the East just as France formed a buffer on the West. If the Germans were formally told that any attack by them on the East would mean an advance by the Allies on the West, he knew that such language would be understood by the Germans and would command immediate compliance. Instead of this, it was proposed to buy the good will of the Germans by offering them food and raw materials. A state of war still existed, and any appearance of yielding would be construed as an evidence of weakness. At any rate, personally he could not accept President Wilson's proposition. He did not wish to starve the Germans, but the blockade must be maintained. If he so far forgot the interests of his country and of Europe as to consent to this proposal, the Chamber would undoubtedly dismiss him, and it would be acting right in doing so.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had never suggested raising the blockade. It had but [*been?*] agreed to let some food through, and

(d) Mr. Lloyd George's First Draft Resolution Regarding Appointment of a Civilian Commission To Enforce Conditions Contained in M. Loucheur's Report

the question of permitting the passage of some raw materials being considered. But it would not be to the interest of the Allies to starve Germany, or to have Germany completely unemployed—a pool breeding infection throughout Europe. He therefore proposed the following resolution.

“The Supreme War Council agree—

(1) That a Civilian Commission shall be appointed at once to negotiate an agreement with the Germans on the following lines:—that food and raw materials, other than those required for the manufacture of material of war, shall be allowed to enter Germany on the following conditions: (M. Loucheur's Committee to insert the conditions in their report.)

(2) That the Commission shall be instructed to complete the negotiations before the next renewal of the Armistice in order that if necessary, Marshal Foch may put pressure on the enemy to comply as a condition of the renewal of the Armistice.

(3) That the Commission be authorized by Marshal Foch to commence the negotiations at once and to complete them before the next renewal of the Armistice in order that, if necessary, Marshal Foch may put pressure on the enemy to secure compliance.[”]

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed his inability to accept this proposal. He objected to it after long reflection. He had no objection to offer to civilians being attached to Marshal Foch's Commission; but he felt convinced that as long as a state of war existed it was for soldiers

to confer with soldiers. He proposed that a new clause should be drafted to be included in the Armistice, reversing the sequence of ideas contained in Mr. Lloyd George's proposal. Their demands should, in the first place, be stated, followed if necessary by a statement to the effect that the Allies would be ready, as an act of grace, to consider the question of relaxing the blockade with a view to the supply of certain quantities of food and raw materials.

PRESIDENT WILSON wished respectfully to submit that M. Clemenceau's proposal was open to strong objection. A demand was first put forward, and then followed an offer of concession. He thought, the concession would nullify the threat. M. Clemenceau had said that Germans could be handled only by threats, and he might be right. But, if what they wanted could be got by negotiations, with the idea in the mind of the Germans that a threat might follow, threats could still ultimately be resorted to. But if they began with threats and then offered concessions, the force of the threat would be reduced.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had tried in drafting his resolution to reconcile the ideas of President Wilson and M. Clemenceau. As a matter of fact, his sympathies were entirely with M. Clemenceau. It would be impossible to reduce the allied forces until the conditions now proposed had been accepted. On the other hand, the Allies could not continue to maintain their big forces until peace was signed.

PRESIDENT WILSON reminded his colleagues that as far as Marshal Foch's opinion was concerned, it would not be possible before April to know whether the conditions, if accepted, were being carried out, and, there would be no safety in reducing the Allied forces between now and April. No Government was going to reduce its forces below the point of safety. Certainly the United States would not do so. If he saw any good prospect of bringing about a reduction of forces by the proposals made, he would be more impressed by them, but it seemed to be Marshal Foch's opinion that these forces could not safely be reduced until peace was signed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he saw no safety even then, unless the Germans were compelled to surrender these thousands of guns. The situation on the signing of peace would be the same as now.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Marshal Foch was not a military Pope; he was sometimes mistaken. He was a great General and all were prepared to do him honour as such; but as a matter of fact he had always been opposed to the idea of imposing disarmament on Germany. When asked what means could be taken to enforce disarmament he had proposed strengthening the blockade. In this he was directly opposed by President Wilson. He (M. Clemenceau) was as deeply impressed as anyone by the seriousness of the situation,

and dreaded as much as anyone a renewal of the war. But he knew the Germans; and today they must be spoken to firmly. The German people wanted economic advantages, and he did not object to their being eventually granted. But it was a *sine qua non* that they should in the first place accept the Allies' demand as a matter of right. He would not consent to Ambassadors being sent to Germany to negotiate with offers of concessions when the Allies had a right to demand. He felt confident this was wholly a psychological question. He would merely ask the Council to consider the Germans' reply to the Allies' request for a cessation of hostilities against the Poles. The German reply would have to be answered. Should the answer be: "If you stop attacking Poland, we will give you bread, sugar and other supplies?" No. The Germans must be told that if they attacked the Poles, the Allied troops would march into Germany. That argument would appeal to the Germans and, after due compliance with the Allies' demands, sugar, butter and supplies could then be granted.

BARON SONNINO thought that Marshal Foch's statement had not been quite correctly interpreted. The Marshal had concurred in the opinion that the disarmament of Germany would be advantageous. He merely did not consider that disarmament would by itself give complete assurance of safety.

M. ORLANDO thought that Marshal Foch had a basic idea, which explained any inconsistencies in his statements. He wanted to have at his disposal the greatest number of troops he could get. His idea was a sound one, for he could count on the troops under his orders, but he could make no certain estimate of the strength of the enemy's forces. On the other hand, civilians were obliged to consider things in a more complicated manner. This question of demobilisation was a difficult one. President Wilson had said, that should the necessity arise American troops would be retained, and Italy, no doubt, would be prepared to do the same. But demobilisation once begun was very difficult to stop. Italy's soldiers had now been under arms for four years and were tired. The progress of demobilisation could be slowed down, but it could not be stopped. It is for that political reason that it would be impossible to count on being able to stop demobilisation. It could be done; but it would be most undesirable to have to do so. At a previous meeting it had been decided that it would be more difficult to stop demobilisation than to insist upon a reduction in the enemies' force. The present proposal was a consequence of the decision then taken.

In regard to President Wilson's contention that they were under an obligation not to insert new conditions on renewal of the armistice, he thought that M. Clemenceau's point was just, namely, that

the armistice had deliberately been made renewable at given intervals of time so that new conditions might be made, if necessary. The Allies had signed two important armistices—one with Austria which was for an indefinite period; the other with Germany which provided periodic renewals, and so implied the possibility of changes and additions. As far as the psychological question was concerned, he begged President Wilson to believe that he also knew the Germans well. If the Allies were willing to accept less than was contained in M. Loucheur's report, let them reduce their demands; but whatever was wanted must be demanded in the form of an order and in a loud tone of voice. If a German thought that the one having the mastery showed any signs of hesitation, or failed to look him straight in the eyes, he would concede nothing. The victors must speak to the Germans as to the vanquished. It would be undesirable to have to face a refusal. Therefore, if necessary, the conditions might be reduced, but whatever was agreed to must be demanded as an order.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the present moment was particularly favourable because there was practically no government in Germany now. In three months' time the situation might be quite different and unfavourable to the Allies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was anxious for a unanimous decision. All he wanted was to get the guns away from the Germans, so that it might not be necessary to maintain huge armies. He did not contemplate making Europe an armed camp for ever, and the way to prevent this was to disarm Germany. If it was possible to blend President Wilson's suggestions with the French proposals and get the guns, concerted action might become possible. With this object in view he offered the following draft resolution:—

(c) Mr. Lloyd George's 2nd Draft Resolution Regarding Appointment of a Civilian Commission To Enforce Demands Contained in M. Loucheur's Report

The Supreme War Council agree:

- (1) That a Civilian Commission of the Allied and Associated Powers shall be attached to Marshal Foch on the occasion of the next renewal of the Armistice and in connection with the Marshal's negotiations shall endeavor to arrange with the Germans that controlled quantities of food and raw materials other than those required for the manufacture of material of war shall be allowed to reach Germany. That it shall be an essential part of the above arrangement that the demands set forth in M. Loucheur's Report be complied with.

M. CLEMENCEAU regretted that he could not accept this resolution. He had two objections to it. First, he could not take any obligation in the matter of supplies without having consulted his experts.

Secondly, this proposal had the vice of first discussing the reward, while in his opinion the demand should be made first. Otherwise, there would be endless discussion about the kinds and classes of supplies required. The discussions would last for months and the favourable moment would be lost. He wanted the military conditions agreed to first, and the diplomatic negotiations might then follow.

PRESIDENT WILSON considered the recommendations contained in the Loucheur report to be a panic programme. The report not only called for the surrender of big guns, which in his opinion should be given up, but it also went into details of aircraft and factory production. He was in favour of controlling factories by regulating the raw material that went to them; but he thought that if officers were sent there they would get into trouble and would have to be supported by military forces.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, but thought that the output of factories must be supervised.

M. SONNINO thought that the Allies' demands could be reduced to three or four important items, such as big guns and machine guns.

LORD MILNER agreed. In his opinion if the demands were reduced as suggested by M. Sonnino, and a certain number of factories were watched, the desired result would be obtained.

(f) Mr. Lloyd
George's Proposal
Regarding Ap-
pointment of a
Committee To De-
cide on Equipment
To Be Surren-
dered by Germany

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that a Committee be appointed consisting of one member representing each of the Great Powers having armies on the Western Front, to examine and determine the items of war material to be surrendered by Germany with a view to her disarmament.

This was agreed to. The following representatives were nominated:—

United States of America
Great Britain
France

Mr. Lansing
Lord Milner
M. Tardieu

It was further agreed that the report should be submitted at the next meeting to be held on Saturday, February 8th, at 3.30 p. m.

PARIS, 8 February, 1919.

Appendix "A":
ALLIED FORCES STILL CONFRONTING GERMANY AT COMBAT STRENGTH ON APRIL 1, 1919

Belgium	United States			France			Great Britain			Total	
	Number Div.	Combatants	Total Effectives	Number Div	Combatants	Total Effectives	Number Div.	Combatants	Total Effectives	Of Days	Of Combatants Not Including the Belgians
12	15 D. I. *	337,000	1,340,000	{ 51 D. I. 6 D. C. †	{ 1,050,000	† 1,350,000	{ 10 D. I. 2 D. C. ‡	212,000	552,000	88	1,639,000
4 D. I.	8 D. I.			{ 19 D. I. 3 D. C. ‡	Of which there are in the Rhineland		10 D. I. 2 D. C.			41 5 D. C.	

Italian Army

Number of Divisions	31.
Combatants	990,000 men.
Total Effectives	1,400,000 men.

* Besides 5 in the region of the ports of embarkation.

† Not including 575,000 men in the interior and the forces in the Orient and North Africa.

‡ Not including 2 to 3 Divisions from the Dominions

• Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Appendix B

1557

*Report by the Committee Appointed by the Supreme War Council
at the Meeting of the 24th January, 1919 (morning)*

The Committee consisting of

Monsieur Loucheur	as President	(France)
Marshal Foch	Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces.	
General Bliss		(America)
General Sir Henry Wilson		(Great Britain)
	(Acting for Mr. Winston Churchill)	
General Sir Frederick Sykes		(Royal Air Force)
H. E. General Diaz	Chief of the Staff, Italian Army,	

assembled on the 27th January, 2nd and 5th February.

From an examination of the Reports⁴ made by the sub-Committees and from the discussion which followed it appeared that—

1. There is some uncertainty regarding the strength of the existing German Army, and the resources in war material of all kinds at its disposal, but both are still considerable.

2. There is similar uncertainty regarding the war material and stocks of munitions in the interior of Germany, both in proof and in course of manufacture, also regarding the means of production of such materials, but these stocks and the means of production also are certainly still considerable in quantity.

Any serious reduction in the effective strength of the Allied Army of Occupation must depend on the carrying out of certain necessary measures, the execution of which must be controlled. To this end the Committee recommends the following arrangements:—

War material actually in possession of the German Armies.

An approximate estimate of such war material is set forth in Annex No. 1.

The Committee therefore considers that the Allied Governments should fix definitely the number of troops and the amount of war material of certain categories to be left in the hands of the German Armies, which it proposes should be reduced to a strength of 25 Infantry Divisions and 5 Cavalry Divisions, and recommends that all material in excess should be handed over.

All the war material to be surrendered by the Germans, all stock of asphyxiating gas and gas masks, must be given up at places selected by agreement, to Committees of Allied officers who will carry out the removal, or the destruction, or the putting out of action of the surrendered war material, according to circumstances.

⁴ See annexes I and II, *infra*.

As regards destruction and putting out of action, certain detailed measures have been considered; these will be carried out by the above-mentioned Allied officers if the general principles are accepted.

Manufacture of War Material.

Similarly it is necessary that the German Government should pledge itself not to continue the manufacture of war material during the period of the armistice, in order that she may not re-arm in secrecy.

The most certain method of ensuring the correct execution of the above undertaking would consist in controlling certain German munition factories but not necessarily all of them and in removing or destroying special machinery as indicated in the Report of the Technical Sub-Committee (Annex 2). This control could be exercised by a comparatively small number of Allied experts.

It is, however, necessary to provide for the possibility that, after the Allies have reduced the Army of occupation, Germany may put obstacles in the way of such control and resume the production of war material.

The Committee, therefore, calls attention to the fact that a form of guarantee less comprehensive, but sufficiently efficacious, provided that the delivery of existing material has taken place, could be found in the establishment of absolute control by military occupation of the area extending to the east of the Rhine for an average depth of about 50 kilometres from Cologne to 15 kilometres to the north of Duisburg, in such a way as to embrace Essen and the principal Krupp establishments, the greater part of the Rheinisch-Westphalian coal-fields and the metallic industries which depend on these. A map has been sent to Marshal Foch showing this zone.

The importance of this region from the point of view of war in industries is so great that it would be practically impossible for Germany once disarmed to take up arms if she had not free disposal of it.

Further, the prevention of exportation to the unoccupied German territories of the general products of this area, would have the most serious consequences from an economic point of view. If the general munition control is interfered with or if unauthorised production is found to be going on, trade between the occupied territory and the unoccupied territory would be prohibited.

These results can be looked for as a consequence of negotiating with the enemy, or they can be enforced upon him as a condition of the renewal of the armistice. In the latter case the text of the agreement might be that of the appended draft.

General Bliss has drawn up a Note (Annex 3) dealing with certain reservations he wishes to make on the subject matter of the above paragraphs.

General Diaz brought to notice the importance, in case German Austria should be joined to Germany, of foreseeing the necessity of taking analogous measures as regards factories in which war material is manufactured in that region, where there are many of importance.

(Attached is an additional clause to the Armistice conditions compiled in accordance with the above mentioned idea).

To this Report are annexed the following documents:—

Annex 1. Report dated 1st February, 1919 of the Military Sub-Committees.

Annex 2. Report dated 2nd February 1919 of the Technical Sub-Committee.

Annex 3. Memorandum by General Bliss, United States Army.

Annex 4. Paper by General Groves⁵ devoted to aeronautics.

Annex 5. Normal allowance of arms for German units.

Additional Clause to the Armistice Conditions

1. It is hereby agreed that provided Germany renounces definitely any intention to resume hostilities and carries out the following conditions as a guarantee of such renunciation, the Allied and Associated Governments will reduce the financial burden imposed upon Germany by the Allied occupation.

2. The reduction of the burden of occupation must be preceded by the adoption of the measures mentioned below, the execution of which will show clearly the wish of Germany not to resume hostilities and to cease the manufacture of war material.

3. Germany undertakes to reduce the effective personnel of her Armies to such numbers as are strictly necessary for the garrison of their frontier and the maintenance of order in the interior, that is to say

25 Divisions*

5 Cavalry Divisions*

4. Germany consequently undertakes to reduce the quantity of war material to be maintained to the following figures:—

NOTE General Weygand wishes to give further consideration to these figures before accepting them.

⁵ Brig. Gen. Robert M. Groves, Deputy Chief of the British Air Staff.

* The establishment of a Division is shown in Annex 5. [Footnote in the original.]

Heavy Guns.....	1,000
Field Guns.....	1,575
Machine Guns.....	3,825
Automatic Rifles.	4,500
Rifles.....	412,500
Aeroplanes	See para: 5 bis.
Trench Mortars... . .	1,400

5. Consequently all war material of the above natures in excess of these figures will be delivered at places to be fixed by agreement, either in occupied or non-occupied portions of Germany or outside Germany, to Commissions of Allied officers who will be appointed for this purpose. These surrenders will apply to the whole of the war material existing either with the Armies or in the interior in parks, depots, factories, etc., whether finished, under proof or in course of construction or repair. The Allied officers will carry out according to circumstances the removal or the destruction or the putting out of action of the war material so surrendered.

5. bis. Aircraft. With regard to aircraft, Germany to surrender the following:—

(a) 5,000 engines of types to be selected by the Allies.

(b) 450 German marine aircraft (i. e. Aeroplanes, seaplanes and flying boats) to be selected by the Allies.

(c) 15 Airships to be selected by the Allies.

(d) All aircraft will be complete with all war equipment and armament and to be flown by German personnel to places to be specified by the Allies before a date to be fixed by the Allies.

(e) 6 rigid airship sheds over 800 feet long, with the complete hydrogen-producing plant for each of the airship-sheds, will also be surrendered in an efficient condition.

NOTE It is considered important that the question of the ultimate destination or destruction of all aircraft and aircraft material surrendered by Germany shall be settled by the Supreme War Council when a decision as to the amount to be delivered has been arrived at.

6. All tanks, (all gas masks) and stocks of mustard and arsenical gases with projectors and cylinders will be surrendered.

7. Germany will, in addition, bind herself expressly to stop all manufacture of war material of every kind, except that strictly necessary for the upkeep of material of which the existence is authorised.

8. To ensure the loyal and complete execution of the pledges undertaken by Germany as laid down in paras. 1, 3, 4, 5, 5 bis, 6 and 7, the Allied Governments will maintain in Germany a Mission of technical experts and officers who will control the factories, workshops and building yards engaged in the manufacture of the classes of war

material mentioned in pars. 4, 5 bis, and 6 and munition parks and magazines of all kinds.

This mission shall be authorised to inspect factories and to remove or destroy such specialised machinery engaged in the production of the above mentioned claims of war material as they may consider necessary to ensure the cessation of output as aforesaid.

The civil and military German authorities will supply these experts with the whole of the information which they will need to carry out their mission and will furnish them with all the necessary material means, and all the necessary authorisations to complete it, without allowing any obstacle to be placed in their way.

9. In the event of Germany not agreeing to the above proposals, or in the event of her not carrying them out after having agreed to them the Allied Governments will proceed to the military occupation of the Westphalian basin on the right bank of the Rhine, the territory painted red on the map which is annexed.⁶

General
C. I. G. S.

MILITARY SECTION, BRITISH DELEGATION, 5 February 1919.

ANNEX I

(Translation)

General Weygand's Report

NOTES ON THE ESTIMATES OF RESOURCES IN MEN AND MATERIALS IN THE GERMAN ARMY ON FEBRUARY 1, 1919

General Thwaites, of the British Army,

General Nolan, of the American Army &

General Weygand, of the French Army,

having assembled the actual resources in men and material in the German Army during Conferences held on the 29th January and 1st February, compared papers produced on this subject by the British, American and French Armies.

Having examined together the information from various sources in their possession, and having estimated the respective value of each of them, these General Officers are in agreement on the average figures which it is useful to adopt to estimate the military forces of Germany at the present time.

⁶No map accompanies the minutes.

⁷No signature indicated on file copy.

These figures are as follows:—(the accuracy of these estimates should be taken with reserve).

(1) Personnel serving with the Colours of the German Army at the end of January:

From 600,000 to 700,000 men (at least).

(2) Various war materials existing with the fighting troops: (exclusive of material in depots, factories, & arsenals).

(a) *Machine guns of all types:*

50,000 (A minimum).

(b) *Field guns* (including anti-aircraft guns):

8,000

(c) *Heavy guns* (including super-heavy artillery):

2,500 of which nearly all is good modern material.

(d) *Trench Mortars.*

The estimates vary between 4,000 (the figure furnished by the English Army) and 6,000 (the figure furnished by the American and French Armies).

(e) *Rifles.*

1,300,000 for the fighting line troops (according to British and American information), 3,500,000 to 4,000,000 (for the total existing at the Front, in the Interior and in Arsenals).

(f) *Aviation.*

It is very difficult to estimate the value of Aviation material remaining in the hands of the Germans. The Squadrons stationed on the different Fronts at the time of the Armistice contained about 3,000 machines (not including those in Army Parks and on lines of communication, nor those of the Fleet), but on account of the intensity of production, and of the necessity for frequently replacing service aeroplanes, this number only represents a fraction of the machines existing in Germany, (just as in France there were from 10,000 to 12,000 aeroplanes for 3,000 in service).

It follows that, although Germany has surrendered a large part of the machines belonging to Squadrons at the Front, she may have made up since then her air force: we do not know the number and the position of the aircraft factories which have continued to function since the 11th November.

The Naval aircraft (estimated by the British as amounting to 450 machines), is still intact; and so are the dirigibles. Nearly all the engines are produced at 3 Factories, namely, the Benz, the Mercedes and the Maybach.

In the above estimates no account has been taken of the material taken from the Allied Armies on the Western Front during the whole war, nor of the considerable quantity of Russian material which remains in German hands, which would constitute an important augmentation of these estimates.

ANNEX II

*Report to Main Committee*CONCLUSIONS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE LIMITATION OF GERMAN
ARMAMENTS (NAVAL ARMAMENTS EXCLUDED)

The Technical Sub-Committee was constituted as follows:—

United States.	Brigadier-General Rice.
Great Britain.	Major-General Thwaites.
	Mr. Layton.
France.	Colonel Mercier.
	Commandant Aron.
Italy.	Colonel Malvani.

The Sub-Committee met on the 27th January, 1919, at 3 p. m. on the 31st January, 1919, at 3 p. m. and on the 1st February, 1919, at 2:15 p. m., to decide on the terms of the procès verbal. The conclusions arrived at by the Committee are as follows:—

Object. To prevent the German Government from being in the possession of a number of guns, machine guns, etc., greater than those decided on.

The Sub-Committee considers that it will be necessary first for the Military Authorities to fix the quantity of the following items of war material which Germany will be allowed to maintain:

Heavy Guns,
Field Guns,
Machine Guns, Automatic Rifles & Rifles,
Aircraft (including airships),
Tanks,
Asphyxiating Gas,
Gas Masks.

The Sub-Committee does not consider it necessary to extend the limitations to other articles, a resumption of hostilities being impossible provided that the total supply of the arms above mentioned remains insufficient.

As regards explosives, the Sub-Committee considers that as set forth hereafter, supervision to a certain extent is desirable.

Means of Execution.

The limited quantities having been fixed under each category, it is necessary in the first place to take steps to ensure that the materials in excess existing in Germany should be made useless. On this point the Committee wish to emphasize the fact that by the words "material in excess" are understood not only the completed material existing in the armies, in the parks or in the depots, but also the materials

existing with the manufacturers or in course of fabrication. The measures hereafter mentioned should be applied to all the materials. To control the execution of these measures it is agreed that technical experts, English, American and French, should assess the amount of materials manufactured or in course of fabrication now existing on the enemy's country.

With this object the Sub-Committee suggests that:—

The German Government should be told to furnish on its own responsibility all the information necessary regarding all the materials mentioned below.

Artillery Material.

All the material in excess must be delivered at place to be designated to officers who will be instructed to take delivery.

These officers will be required to ensure the rendering useless, or better still the destruction, or the removal of these materials. The removal of breech blocks and of sights is insufficient; only destruction by blow-pipes or by explosion can be considered efficacious.

Machine Guns and Automatic Rifles.

The excess arms will be given up to officers of the Allies as mentioned above.

Rifles.

These will be treated in the same way as machine guns.

Aircraft.

Machines in excess will be given up as mentioned above.

Tanks.

Tanks to be handed over if considered necessary.

Gas Masks.

To be handed over (owing to the resulting moral effect which will be thereby produced in the German armies).

Limitation of Fabrication.

As regards all the materials enumerated above, the Committee considers that Germany should be placed in such condition as to make a resumption of manufacture on a large scale impossible. To this end, the Committee considers that it will suffice to control the items enumerated below.

As the penalties fixed by such control can only be enforced by the judicious employment of the troops of occupation, the Committee considers that the period during which the measures should be applied should be the same as that of the military occupation of Germany by the Allies.

Generally speaking, as regards all the special gear which could not be used by Germany for work unconnected with war, the Allied experts of whom mention will be made later, will carry out its removal, or its destruction, unless they consider that control over its use by periodical inspection would suffice.

Heavy Guns.

Control should be limited to the two operations of rifling and of shrinking. As regards rifling and boring machines the experts sent for the purpose will specify what machines or parts of machines are to be disposed of as above.

Field Guns.

Control will be limited to the factories where gun tubes are made.

Machine Guns, Automatic Rifles and Rifles.

Control will be limited to the principal assembling plants. The delivery also will be demanded of all the gauges and jigs and fixtures used for their manufacture.

Explosives.

On the understanding that control over manufacture in Germany will only last for a limited period (under eight months) the Sub-Committee considers that it would be of no particular advantage to control explosive factories owing to the large stocks which exist. But in case control should last more than eight months, as an additional guarantee, the Sub-Committee considers that it would be necessary to control all the fabrication of synthetic ammonia in Germany, whether it is made by the Haber or by the Cyanamide process.

Aircraft.

The sub-committee considers that all aircraft, for whatever purpose built, can be easily turned into military machines. Therefore if it is decided to limit the number of German military aeroplanes, the Sub-Committee considers that it would be indispensable to control the whole of the factories in which aircraft are made, but excluding factories where engines, magnetos, etc. are manufactured.

Tanks.

All manufacture of tanks to be stopped. Control to be applied to assembling works.

Asphyxiating Gas.

Control will on principle be limited to the production of yperite and to arsenical gas, but might be extended to every other product of which Germany may be understood to be studying the employment. With this object, a periodical control of gas manufactories will be made.

Organization of Control.

The Sub-Committee considers that the whole organisation of control, both in the occupied and unoccupied portions of Germany could with advantage be entrusted to an inter-Allied Committee, composed of experts appointed for the purpose.

This Committee would appoint sub-Committees in the principal industrial centres in unoccupied Germany.

Every sub-committee would be charged with the control of a district as determined by the parent Committee.

Every sub-committee would send out experts allotted to them for this purpose, to carry out tours of inspection of the factories mentioned below, and such other factories as may be considered important.

The British and French representatives suggest that in case the German authorities, either official or industrial refuse to afford to the experts of the Allies the facilities which are necessary, or should the orders given by the control officers not be obeyed, a strong measure of coercion would be provided by the military occupation of the bridgehead of Duisburg, to include the whole of the Krupp factories at Essen, and the greatest part possible of the mining district, owing to the industrial importance of this region.

The American and Italian representatives consider that this question is beyond the scope of the sub-Committee.

Naval Armaments having been dealt with by the Naval Armistice Commission, the subject has not been considered here, for which reason the sub-committee has added the following words to the title of the procès verbal: "Naval Armaments Excluded".

List of Principal Factories To Be Controlled

Guns and Munitions

Spandau
 Essen (Westphalia)
 Stieburg
 Deutz (Cologne)
 Magdeburg-Buckau
 Yolstadt [*Ingolstadt*]
 Oberndorf sur Neckar
 Düsseldorf
 Dantzig
 Dresden

Small Arms

Spandau
 Erfurt
 Danzig
 Amberg

Machine Guns

Berlin
Nuremburg
Sömmerda
Spandau
Erfurt
Suhl

Explosive Factories

Spandau
Gneschwitz
Hanau
Ingolstadt

 ANNEX III
[Memorandum by General Bliss, United States Army]

The report of the Committee is based on the assumption that any serious reduction in the effective strength of the Allied Army of Occupation calls for:

1. The fixing of the strength of the German Army.
2. The surrender of all war materials in Germany not required by the German Army whose size is thus regulated.
3. The control of all factories, shops, building yards, engaged in the manufacture of war material.

Under (1) the strength recommended for the German Army is 25 divisions of infantry and 5 cavalry divisions, it being assumed that these divisions are sufficient for the garrisoning of the frontiers and the maintenance of order in the interior. The infantry and cavalry divisions would be organised and armed as at present. The total arms needed for this force is given as:

Heavy guns	1, 000
Field guns	1, 575
Machine guns	3, 825
Automatic rifles	4, 500
Rifles	412, 000

Under (2) it is proposed that Germany turn over to the Allies everything in excess of the war material listed in the above paragraph. Subtracting the above amounts from the material listed in the report of the sub-committee, it would appear that the following would be turned over to the Allies:

Heavy Guns	1,500
Field Guns	6,425
Machine Guns	41,675
Rifles	838,000

In addition to the above the report calls for the surrender of all war material in the interior of Germany both in proof and in course of manufacture, including all stocks of asphyxiating gas and gas masks. The amount of this material is unknown, but it is believed to be considerable in amount.

Under (3) it is proposed that the Allies maintain in Germany technical experts and officers who will control the factories, workshops, and building yards engaged in the making of the war material discussed above.

It is proposed in the new armistice terms (para. 9) "in the event of Germany not agreeing to the foregoing proposals or in the event of her not carrying them out after having agreed to them, the Allies will proceed to the military occupation of the Westphalian Basin on the right bank of the Rhine."

The paragraph quoted above (para. 9) negatives in a large degree the idea that the Allies by negotiation reach an agreement with Germany in regard to the above demands.

Previous to the negotiation of the original armistice with Germany my position was that Germany should be required to completely demobilise except such forces as were needed for the maintenance of order and to surrender her arms. These terms were at the time considered too harsh, and milder terms were offered Germany which she accepted in the original armistice conditions. I do not find it consistent with my sense of right to go beyond the terms of the original armistice agreement except as a penalty for Germany's wilful failure to comply with these conditions. To my mind to proceed now to a military occupation of the Westphalian basin on the right bank of the Rhine in the event of Germany not agreeing to the foregoing new proposals would be on the part of the Allies and the United States a breaking of the Armistice agreement. If it did not lead to a resumption of hostilities the Allies could be readily accused of violating their own agreement and justly so. If it led to the grave consequence of the resumption of the war due to this act the responsibility would belong to the Allied Governments and the Government of the United States.

I regret that I find myself unable to agree to the report of this Committee to the Supreme War Council recommending the addition of clauses to the original armistice agreement which are based on the threat of forcible occupation of further German territory unless our proposals are agreed to.

ANNEX IV

[*Paper by General Groves, Deputy Chief of the British Air Staff*]

MATTERS WHICH ARE OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE IN REGARD TO THE
FUTURE AIR POWER OF THE ENEMY NATIONS

1.

1. As to both Sea and Land Air Services it would be desirable that the proper authority in each enemy country should be forced to supply complete lists giving full particulars of all the various types (including experimental types) of seaplanes (which terms shall include flying boats) aeroplanes and engines in existence or under construction at the time of signing Peace, from which the Allied Governments will signify the numbers in the various types of seaplanes, aeroplanes and engines respectively required to be handed over to the Allies. The particulars desired to include:—

- (a) Name of manufacturer.
- (b) Number and type of seaplane or aeroplane.
- (c) Number, type, horse-power and revolutions of engines fitted to such aeroplane or seaplane.
- (d) Number, type, horse-power and revolutions of each engine not fitted to a seaplane or aeroplane.
- (e) Number of each type of seaplane, aeroplane or engine available at the date of signing the Armistice, and the number produced per week since that date.
- (f) Location of each seaplane, aeroplane or engine at the date of signing the Armistice and the location at the date of signing Peace.
- (g) Photographs of the seaplane, aeroplane or engine taken from at least two positions to enable subsequent identification to be made.

2. All fittings and equipment of a purely military value except such as in the opinion of the Allies may be reasonably necessary for police purposes and internal defence shall be handed over to the Allies in a complete and efficient condition. These would include, for example, bomb gears, bomb sights, machine guns, aircraft torpedoes, aircraft ammunition and bombs.

NOTE. The following details are applicable to Germany only, but it is assumed that the Powers more immediately interested will deal with Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey, to whom the same principles should be applied.

2. GERMAN AIR SERVICE (SEA)

1. The following numbers of machines of the types collected by the Allies from the lists of seaplanes and aeroplanes referred to in para. 4 (1), complete with all equipment, including engines, armament, bomb or torpedo carriers or release gears, wireless equipment, full

navigational instruments etc., in an efficient condition, should be flown to places to be specified and before a date to be fixed by the Allies and handed over to the Allies:

2. A minimum total of 450 seaplanes and aeroplanes of the various types, the numbers in each type to be selected by the Allies.

3. In addition a number of seaplanes and aeroplanes of these types, not less in the aggregate than 50 per month from the 11th November 1918 up to the date of signing Peace.

3. GERMAN AIR SERVICE (LAND)

1. The following numbers of engines of the types selected by the Allies from the list of engines referred to in paragraph 1 (1) complete and in an efficient condition should be handed over to the Allies at a place to be specified and before a date to be fixed by the Allies:

2. A minimum total of 5,000 engines of various types, the numbers in each type to be selected by the Allies.

3. In addition a number of engines of these types not less in the aggregate than 600 engines per month from the 11th November 1918 up to the date of signing Peace.

NOTE. In view of the fact that the aeroplanes so far handed over to the Allies have not, with the exception of single seater fighters, been of their latest types, it is desirable that a certain number of the latter should be called for.

4. AIRSHIPS

1. All rigid airships in existence and under construction at the time of signing Peace, complete with all equipment and armament to be delivered in flying condition to Air Stations designated by the Allies. Those which cannot be made capable of flying to be destroyed in Germany under the supervision of the Allies within three months of the signature of the Peace Treaty.

2. Six rigid airship sheds over 800 feet long, with the complete hydrogen-producing plant for each of the airship sheds, should also be surrendered in an efficient condition.

ANNEX V

Normal Allowance of Arms for German Units

Infantry Division.

12,000 Rifles.*

108 Heavy Machine Guns.

144 Light Machine Guns.

45 Trench Mortars.

48 Field Guns and field howitzers.

332 Heavy guns.

Cavalry Division.

6,000 Rifles or Carbines.

72 Heavy Machine Guns.

12 Field Guns.

NOTE. In the calculations pencilled in para. 4^s 25% has been added in the case of every category of war material e. g.

$$25 \times 12000 \text{ rifles} = 300,000$$

$$5 \times 6000 \text{ " } = 30,000$$

Total	330,000
Add 25%	82,500
	<hr/> 412,500

Appendix "C" to SWC-3

No. 956. FROM ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, February 3, 1919.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, to the President of the Council, Minister for War

In continuation of the letter from the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference, dated February 1st, which you transmitted to me in Schedule No. 1561.D., and received by me on February 2nd at Noon, I have the honour to inform you that I have addressed to General Nudant, President of the International Armistice Commission, the following telegram:

"Please to make the following communication without delay, to the High German Command:

"Marshal Foch informs the German Military Authorities that the Associated Powers are sending to Poland a Commission which has full powers to allay all disorders there in so far as is possible. For this purpose the Commission has been instructed to urge the Polish

* General Weygand desires to reserve these figures. [Footnote in the original.]

^s Of the proposed "Additional Clause to the Armistice Conditions," p. 912.

Authorities to abstain altogether from the use of force against the German forces. The Marshal is communicating to the German Authorities in German Poland the injunction of the Associated Powers that they should henceforward abstain from any use of force in that province and from all interference in its public life, pending the completion of the labours of the Peace Conference."

I enclose herein copy of the telegram which I have received on this subject from General Nudant.

FOCH

[Enclosure]

Telegram From General Nudant to Marshal Foch, February 3rd, 1919, 2.45 p. m.

No. 431.PG.

(1) I communicated this morning to the German Commission telegram No. 934 of February 2nd, in regard to the despatch of an Inter-Allied Commission to Poland.

(2) The President of the German Commission immediately asserted the absolute right of the German Government to ensure the protection of their subjects within their own territory. He added that present events necessitated a rapid intervention so as to re-establish order in view of the assassination of German subjects and of Pogroms against the Jews. This point of view will undoubtedly be confirmed to me shortly by the German delegates.

Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the 13th Session of the Supreme War Council, Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, February 8, 1919, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson
Hon. R. Lansing
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J.
Balfour, O. M., M. P.
Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner,
G. C. B., G. C. M. G.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A.
Hankey, K. C. B.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn

ITALY

H. E. M. Orlando
H. E. Baron Sonnino
Count Aldrovandi

JAPAN

Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Admiral W. S. Benson,
Naval Adviser
Com. A. F. Carter,
U. S. N.
Mr. Hoover
Mr. McCormick
Mr. Davis

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. Lord R.
Cecil, K. C., M. P.
Admiral Sir R. Wemyss,
G. C. B., C. M. G., M. V.
O. 1st Sea Lord & Chief
of the Naval Staff
Maj. Gen. W. T. Thwaites,
C. B., Director of Military
Intelligence.
Maj. Gen. The Hon. C. J.
Sackville-West, C. M. G.,
Permanent Military Rep-
resentative.
Maj. Gen. Sir F. H. Sykes,
K. C. B., C. M. G., Chief
of the Air Staff.
Brig. Gen. H. Studd,
C. B., D. S. O.

FRANCE

M. Klotz
M. Loucheur
M. Clémentel
M. Leygues
M. Tardieu
M. de Lasteyrie
Marshal Foch, O. M.,
G. C. B.
Gen. Weygand, K. C. B.
Admiral Lacombe
Major Lacombe
Captain [Lt.?] Odend'hal
Capt. Levavasseur

ITALY

H. E. Gen. Diaz
Gen. Cavallero
H. E. Admiral Thaon di Revel
Admiral Grassi
Commander Ruspoli

JAPAN

Admiral Takeshita
General Tanaka
Colonel Sato
Commandant [Captain?] Nomura
Commandant [Captain?] Yamamoto

Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Colonel U. S. Grant

BRITISH EMPIRE

Capt. E. Abraham

FRANCE

Captain A. Portier

ITALY

Major A Jones

JAPAN

M. Saburi

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. CLEMENCEAU, in opening the Meeting, said that before continuing the discussion of the previous day which had remained incomplete, he proposed to settle two small matters:

One—relating to the demand of the German National Assembly at Weimar for greater postal facilities in the occupied regions;

The other—relating to a demand of the Germans for the repatriation of their prisoners.

(This was agreed to).

1. M. CLEMENCEAU read the request made on behalf of the German National Assembly at Weimar and Marshal Foch's suggested reply, (see Appendix "A").

Postal &
Telegraphic
Facilities
in Occupied
Regions

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether the formula "All liberties compatible with a state of war" offered the Weimar Assembly any considerable facilities as compared with the present conditions.

MARSHAL FOCH stated that the German demand was for full liberty, and the reply offered a conditional freedom.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he did not wish to grant the Germans any freedom which it was not safe to give them, but it was clearly desirable to assist the Germans in the formation of some authority with which the Allies could deal. It was therefore important to assist the Weimar Assembly. It was clearly undesirable that their letters should take as long as three weeks and their telegrams as long as seven days for delivery.

MR. BALFOUR said that, in his opinion, Marshal Foch's answer was the right one. It might, however, be possible, without touching any question of principle, to ask the administration to hasten the process.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the delays alleged were probably exaggerated.

MARSHAL FOCH concurred.

PRESIDENT WILSON then proposed that the Council express the hope to Marshal Foch that communications should be hastened as far as possible.

(It was therefore decided to ask Marshal Foch to expedite the delivery of letters and telegrams as far as possible.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU read the correspondence which had taken place between Herr Erzberger¹ and Marshal Foch on this subject, (see Appendix "B").

¹Matthias Erzberger, Secretary of State without Portfolio, President of the German Armistice Commission.

**Repatriation
of German
Prisoners**

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether he was to understand that Marshal Foch was in favour of the repatriation of German prisoners.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the demand had been presented to him in a manner which suggested that certain categories of prisoners deserved favourable consideration. For instance, the wounded, the unfit, and fathers of large families. He had undertaken to forward to his Government and to support the demand made in regard to certain categories of prisoners.

M. CLEMENCEAU, referring to the demand made by Herr Erzberger, pointed out that his request concerned all German prisoners, and, in a subsidiary manner, asked that special treatment should be accorded to the severely wounded, the sick, those who had been long in captivity, fathers of large families and all civilians. He asked Marshal Foch whether he had supported the entire demand, or only a portion of it.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that, in his letter, he had referred only to certain special categories. The Allies would, themselves, determine which of these categories deserved consideration.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it would not be possible for the Governments to give an answer to this request without hearing the competent Ministers. For instance, in the case of France, the Minister answerable for the restoration of the devastated districts. The question had an economic side to it. He, therefore, proposed that an answer should be sent to Herr Erzberger through Marshal Foch that the Governments were examining the question and would give him a reply as soon as possible. As to the fathers of large families, he, personally, would resist this demand very strongly.

M. SONNINO suggested that the Powers might yield at once concerning certain classes, such as the wounded, the sick, the old and civilian prisoners, whose retention had no economic value. There was no doubt in these cases and good will could be shown without any risk.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had done no more than transmit a request and his support in respect to certain classes which might be considered to deserve special consideration.

(Marshal Foch and General Weygand then withdrew).

MR. BALFOUR said that he agreed that the competent authorities should be consulted before a decision was reached on this subject. He would like to point out that Great Britain, after France, possessed the greatest number of German prisoners and he would suggest that the British authorities should also be consulted. The British Minister dealing with German prisoners might be put in touch with the

French Minister mentioned by M. Clemenceau, and a joint report might be obtained from them.

(It was therefore decided that no reply should be given to Herr Erzberger's request for the repatriation of German prisoners until a joint report had been received from the Competent French and British Authorities.)

3. M. TARDIEU read and explained the solution proposed by the Committee on this subject (See Appendix "C"). The committee had aimed at the simplification of the proposals made on the previous day. It had not thought it right to lay down the number of Divisions Germany was to be authorised to keep. The Committee had left this matter for the decision of the Council. The first request was that the German Government should furnish the full figures of machine guns, field guns, heavy guns, aeroplane motors and seaplanes. An allotment of each would be made for the Divisions the Germans were to keep up. All the surplus would be yielded to the Allies according to Article 2 of the Report. As, however, the enumeration by the Germans might be a lengthy operation, it was proposed under Article 3 that they should yield at once certain quantities of the equipment mentioned.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his first impression on looking at the document was that the third point was the only one which gave a determinate proposal. He had expected that the result of the Committee's deliberations would be the formulation of a definite demand from Germany in the form of Article 3. Article 2, however, introduced an indeterminate demand. We left it to the Germans to calculate the surplus over and above the equipment of the Divisions we allowed them to maintain. If we did not trust their calculations we should have to verify them. It might be extremely awkward and difficult to achieve this. This was the very sort of difficulty which he wished to avoid. He had hoped that we should be able to make a final demand once and for all in fixed numbers. After that he would like to make a fresh statement to the Germans, not by way of inducement or bargain, but in order to indicate to them our whole temper and the plan we proposed to follow, to the effect that after the surrender of the arms and equipment required of them we should relax the blockade, not only in respect of food but also in respect of raw materials. This we could not do unless assured that the latter would not be used for the disturbance of the peace. We must be certain that in the period elapsing between the renewal of the Armistice and the preliminaries of Peace—a period which he hoped would not exceed six months—the Germans would be unable to set up a stock of big guns and ammunition. He thought it was both

Reduction
of German
Armaments

wise and fair that Germany should know what we intended to do after imposing these new terms upon them. Much of the irritation caused by the imposition of these terms would, he thought, be removed by proceeding in this manner. He quite saw the necessity of stating the number of divisions Germany should maintain for the preservation of internal order, but he felt that the uncertainty introduced into the demands by Article 2 should be eliminated.

MR. LANSING said that he would like to make an explanation concerning Articles 2 and 3. He had only just seen the English version of the Resolution. The Committee had discussed both an immediate minimum and a final minimum, that is to say, a minimum for immediate delivery and a minimum for ultimate delivery. He had understood that only the former would be specified.

LORD MILNER said that he did not at all disagree with the additional proposal made by the President of the United States. He thought, however, that any such proposal was outside the scope of the Committee's reference. The Committee was appointed to simplify the demands to be made on Germany. It seemed to him that it had succeeded in doing so. It was now apparently considered that the Committee's proposal was itself complicated. To his mind it appeared simple. We began by fixing the strength of the German Army. We then allotted to it a fixed number of machine guns, field guns, heavy guns and aeroplanes. We then said to the Germans: "Surrender everything you have of these categories over and above this allotment." This constituted not an indefinite but a definite demand. As, however, its execution would take time, we demanded the immediate cession of certain fixed quantities.

M. TARDIEU said that he agreed with Lord Milner. Article 2 was not really indefinite, because our object was to ensure that no arms or material remained in Germany which would enable her rapidly to equip more forces than we allowed her to maintain.

PRESIDENT WILSON quoted from a report furnished on the previous day, giving an estimate of all the equipment now in Germany over and above the requirements of 30 divisions.² He pointed out that the figures were not round figures, but had the appearance of exact statistics. The figures were:—

Heavy guns.....	1, 500
Field guns.....	6, 425
Machine guns.....	41, 675

Now the demand for immediate delivery made in Article 2 of the Committee's report was for:—

² See BC-25, appendix B, annex III, p. 920.

Heavy guns.	1, 000
Field guns	4, 000
Machine guns.	20, 000

We therefore left the Germans, even after this demand, an excess of:—

	21, 675 Machine Guns
	2, 425 Field Guns
and	500 Heavy Guns.

over the requirements of the divisions we permitted them to equip. He had understood that the intention had been to demand the surrender of sufficient arms to render the Allies safe. If the figures could be trusted, we were leaving the Germans enough to equip in a short time 60 divisions, rather than 30. If we really knew what quantities they possessed, we could make an exact demand.

M. LOUCHEUR said that if definite quantities were to be demanded, a great deal more should be required than the Committee had put down. The figures given on the previous day represented what was in possession of the German Armies. The figures took no account of what was in the arsenals and in the factories. If these were added, the figures should be doubled. Since November 1st the Germans had completed the construction of armaments then in process of fabrication. France had done likewise. If definite figures were therefore to be fixed, they must be far bigger than those given.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he wished to recall that when the Armistice Terms were sent to America, the people regarded them as the terms rather of a surrender than of an armistice. Now M. Loucheur would demand of the Germans in addition the cession of 82,000 machine guns, 12,000 field guns and 3,000 heavy guns, as in his opinion the numbers given on the previous day should be doubled. If this request were sent to America, people would say that the original figures of the Armistice must have shown astonishing ignorance of the situation in Germany, if the demand then made was so insufficient that an almost equivalent demand must be made now, three months later.

It was very important that the Allies should make a good impression on the world. These continual aggravations of the armistice put the Allies to a moral disadvantage. As far as the interests of safety were concerned, he would be content for himself to leave the Germans in possession of what they had. The Germans were beaten, and they knew it. Their spirit was broken, and they would not renew the struggle.

M. TARDIEU said that Article 2 saved us from the appearance of making extravagant demands. It affirmed the principle that no more armaments should exist in Germany than were required for the

maintenance of 30 divisions. If the margin were suppressed, we should be forced to raise the figures.

M. LOUCHEUR said that in the last three months, according to the normal rate of production, the Germans were in a position to have completed 50 field guns per day, 15 heavy guns, and 200 heavy machine guns, without counting lighter machine guns. It was therefore not surprising if their stock had been greatly increased since November 11th. France was in the same position.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that at the time of the Armistice the experts had worked on hypothetical figures. The same was the case at the present time. He thought the finding of the Committee was a reasonable one and secured the safety of the Allies.

LORD MILNER added that the proposal had a sort of finality about it. We should not be saying month by month to the Germans, "Give us more and yet more than we previously demanded." The proposal did contain a settlement of the question, at least until the preliminaries of peace. The demands, moreover, were simplified in that they were confined to certain categories of equipment.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the demand was not susceptible of successful administration. He had made this point on the previous day, and had been supported in this by so competent a military authority as Marshal Foch. He had a strong distaste for the practice of making reiterated demands. He thought it was fair, however, for the victor to demand information from the vanquished concerning military equipment in his possession. This demand could be made through Marshal Foch before the renewal of the Armistice. Definite figures would then be at hand and the vagueness he complained of would be eliminated. M. Loucheur assumed that German factories had continued turning out armaments at the same rate as before the Armistice. Possibly M. Loucheur had certain knowledge on this subject. If he had not, it appeared very unlikely that this process should have gone on. It was quite likely that little more armament existed in Germany than that with the Armies. The figures for this equipment had been given. He would therefore suggest that Marshal Foch should obtain statistics from the Germans.

LORD MILNER said that this was the demand formulated in Article 1 of the Report.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that it was suggested as one of the terms of the Armistice. He proposed to make the demand immediately as a preliminary to the renewal of the Armistice.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the refusal of the Germans to cease hostilities with the Poles afforded the Allies a good pretext for making this demand.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU then asked President Wilson to draft a text combining his own views with the suggestion just made concerning Poland.

Should it be impossible to obtain the German reply before February 17th, the next renewal of the Armistice might be for a shorter period than one month.

(The following draft was then read by President Wilson, and adopted:—

"It is agreed that an immediate demand shall be made of the Germans that they supply us with all the information now in their hands as to the number of machine guns, of field guns, of heavy guns, of aeroplane motors and of naval aircraft now in their Depots and factories. That they be informed that their refusal to desist from hostilities in Poland, notwithstanding the fact that the Polish authorities have agreed to desist from the use of force against the Germans in Poland, makes this demand for information immediately imperative with a view to determining the terms which shall be exacted when the time comes for the renewal of the armistice.")

4. (See Appendix "D").

Report of
Committee on
Naval Peace
Terms

ADMIRAL WEMYSS said that the naval questions to be solved were simpler than military questions. The Admirals knew exactly what the conditions were, exactly what they wanted, and what they could get. Delay, however, would render the situation more difficult. The condition of the German Fleet was not as chaotic as it had been at the time of the Armistice. The Allied Admirals had come to the conclusion that they could now fix what should be the state of the German Fleet in time of peace. They could obtain its reduction to that extent at the present time. The Associated Navies had no power of inflicting any damage on Germany to enforce the carrying out of the terms of the Armistice. When the Germans failed to carry out any of the terms, the Navies had to request their colleagues on land to put pressure on them. All this could be stopped by telling the Germans immediately that our requests were not provisional but final. It was possible to lay down at once how many ships Germany should keep; what should be the fate of her naval fortifications, arsenals, etc. How the Allies should dispose of the surrendered ships was a question which concerned the Allies alone and not Germany, and he did not propose to enter into this question at all. The continuance of the blockade was a matter which affected the Navies very materially. It deprived the Fleets of their freedom of action and hampered demobilisation. If final terms could be fixed at once, the Navies would no longer be tied down to their present employment as instruments of the blockade. The spirit of unrest in the world did not leave the Naval Services untouched. A very calming influence on

sea-faring folk as a whole would be effected by the settlement of naval peace terms at the next renewal of the Armistice.

M. LEXGUES said that he had no objection to raise as long as the question of the distribution of German ships was left out of account.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that he wished to support Admiral Wemyss. He would specially emphasise the fact that the blockade was depended on to make Germany amenable. It would soon be impossible to carry out this blockade by reason of the demobilisation of the Naval Forces. The most practical way of solving the present difficulties of the Associated Navies was to lay down at once the general principles which should form the preliminaries of peace. He would suggest that other Departments of the Governments concerned should do likewise. This would ease the general unrest in the world.

MR. BALFOUR said that on reading the proposals made by the Admirals, he noticed that a number of subjects were introduced, such as the question of Heligoland, the Kiel Canal, the German Colonies, and other territorial questions. These were very important matters concerning which the Council had not been consulted and though he sympathised very much with the trouble experienced by the Associated Navies in continuing the blockade he felt that such subjects could not be introduced into the naval terms of an Armistice.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed with Mr. Balfour that it was not possible to anticipate the conditions of peace in the renewal of an Armistice. The present Assembly was not concluding peace terms. He would give most careful and friendly study to the document but he thought it quite impossible that many of its provisions should form any part of the Armistice.

ADMIRAL WEMYSS explained what was the naval bearing of all the questions entered into. The question was then adjourned.

(It was decided that:—

The Blockade of Germany should be discussed on the following Monday.)

8[57]. PRESIDENT WILSON read the following draft:—

“(1) Under present conditions many questions not primarily of military character which are arising daily and which are bound to become of increasing importance as time passes should be dealt with on behalf of the United States and the Allies by civilian representatives of these Governments experienced in such questions as finance, food, blockade control, shipping and raw materials.

(2) To accomplish this there shall be constituted at Paris a Supreme Economic Council to deal with such matters for the period of the Armistice. The council shall absorb or replace such other existing interallied bodies and their powers as it may determine from time to time. The Economic Council shall consist of not more than five representatives of each interested Government.

Formation of
the Supreme
Economic
Council

(3) There shall be added to the present International Permanent Armistice Commission two civilian representatives of each associated Government, who shall consult with the Allied High Command, but who may report direct to the Supreme Economic Council."

This Resolution was adopted.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he understood that he was authorised by the Council to send to Marshal Foch, for communication to the Germans, the proposal relating to the disarmament adopted in paragraph 3.

This was agreed to.

The Meeting then adjourned.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 9 February, 1919.

Appendix "A"

(1) *German Demand on the Subject of Assembly at Weimar*

No. A. A. I.-763

The Representative of the German Government to the President of the Inter-Allied Commission of the Armistice.

As the National Assembly is to meet on February 6th in Weimar, it is of an urgent necessity that the members of the National Assembly should be free, without any obstacle whatever, in their personal and postal intercourse with their constituents.

At the present time, the forwarding of letters takes as much as three weeks, and telegrams require sometimes 7 days.

In the name of the German Government, I request that the necessary steps should be taken in order that the deputies of the occupied territories may be assured that they will be able to have unrestricted telegraphic and postal intercourse from Weimar with their constituents.

SPA, February 3rd, 1919.

(2) *Suggested Reply by Marshal Foch*

Marshal Foch to General Nudant, Spa.

Reply to request No. A.A.I.-763 of the German Commission of Armistice forwarded on February 3rd, number 3.186.

As has been already stated by the High Command of the Allies all liberties compatible with the state of war will be granted to allow as far as possible the relations between the German National Assembly and the occupied territories.

But there cannot be any question of the Allies allowing a free and unrestricted exchange of correspondence, and consequently of their giving the assurance asked for on that point by the German Government.

Appendix "B" to IC-136 [BC-26]

(Translation)

[*Correspondence Between Herr Erzberger and Marshal Foch*]

I

To:—Marshal Foch.

SIR, By your letter of January 16th you expressed, in a way which deserves our gratitude, the intention of using your credit with the Allied Governments in favour of the repatriation of German prisoners of war, special consideration being given to the most deserving categories.

This promise has awakened in the whole German nation eager and joyful hopes with regard to the return of our brave men.

The German National Assembly which is to meet in a few days at Weimar and of which I have the honour to be a member, will first of all consider the question of the fate of German prisoners of war. The deep emotion produced in the whole nation by the feeling of uncertainty which has hitherto prevailed on their account, will be powerfully and unanimously echoed in the Constituent Assembly of the German people.

The representatives of the nation are sure to ask the Government—and such an inquiry will be fully justified—what they have done to secure the immediate return of our sons. The Government should be in a position to supply the nation with precise and unequivocal information.

I therefore beg you, Sir, kindly to let me know in a few days the result of the intervention to which you had allowed us to look forward. I cannot believe that the Allied Governments have refused to listen favourably to the Marshal to whom they have confidently entrusted the Supreme Command of all their military forces and who conducts the Armistice negotiations in their joint names.

Pray accept, Sir, the assurances of my most distinguished and highest consideration.

ERZBERGER

Secretary of State

BERLIN, February 3rd, 1919.

II

Marshal Foch

To:—H. E. Herr Erzberger, Secretary of State, President of the German Armistice Commission, Trèves.

MR. SECRETARY, I quite understand the concern which Germany has as regards the repatriation of prisoners of war now in the hands of the Allied Governments. It is my intention to forward to these Governments your request asking in particular for the early repatriation of the most deserving cases, and to support it.

As regards relations between the occupied regions and those regions not occupied, I am disposed to allow intercourse so far as is compatible with the security of the Armies, with a view to avoiding any unemployment and subsequent disturbances.

FOCH

Appendix "C"³

[Proposal by Committee on the Reduction of German Armaments]

1. The German Government will report on its own responsibility, within a period of two weeks, the quantities of war material of the following categories remaining on February 17, 1919, in possession of its combat troops, and in its depots, arsenals, and factories:

machine guns,
field guns,
heavy guns,
aeroplane engines,
machines for naval aviation.

2. All material of these various categories in excess of the equipment necessary for will be delivered to the Allies before March 17.

3. Without waiting to fulfill the preceding clauses, the German Government will deliver to the Allies, before March 1, the following minimum numbers of the materials mentioned:

machine guns	20,000
field guns	4,000
heavy guns	1,000
aeroplane engines	5,000
machines for naval aviation	250

4. The said quantities will be furnished out of German material, beginning with the most modern types, and, as regards heavy guns, in the following order:

³ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

mobile short guns
 long-range short guns
 mobile long guns
 long-range long guns

5. After the carrying out of the provisions outlined under 1. and 2., all material concealed and brought to light, which is in excess of the figures furnished by the German Government, will be rightfully seized and destroyed.

Appendix "D"

NAVAL PEACE TERMS

Joint Note From the Admirals of the Allied and Associated Powers ⁴

(Translation from the French Text)

After having received authority from their Governments, the Admirals representing the Admiralties of America, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan held a meeting to study the Peace conditions which it is considered advisable to impose on the enemy at the Peace Conference.

The existing situation was first examined into and may be summed up as follows:—

Germany has not yet fulfilled the clauses of the Armistice concerning the handing-over of submarines and merchant ships.

According to authentic information the spirit of anarchy which existed in the Fleet is tending to disappear, and the enemy is re-establishing and re-organising himself.

During this time demobilisation is weakening the Allies' powers of action on land as well as on sea. The continuation of the blockade is weighing exceedingly heavily on all the nations, and it is desirable to set them free from it as soon as possible.

Moreover, the present situation leaves the world in great uncertainty, the effects of which are considerable in every branch of human life. This cannot continue much longer without causing the gravest difficulties.

As regards Austria Hungary, the difficulties are no less great.

In making the conclusion of Peace dependent on the programme which the Conference has arranged, we have exposed ourselves to an indefinite prolongation of the state of Armistice, in which for nearly three months we have lived in a state of continual discomfort.

For these reasons the Admirals consider that they should ask their

⁴ Bears the notation "Advanced copy without appendices."

Governments that the Peace Conference may examine and decide as soon as possible the definite naval and military conditions to be inserted in the Peace Preliminaries which should be imposed on the enemy Powers. They accordingly submit their proposals on the subject of those conditions.

The other Ministerial Departments might, no doubt, do the same.

If this is so, on the date when the Armistice with Germany is to be prolonged or, in any case, within as short a period as possible, all the enemy Governments might be informed of the conditions to be imposed upon them as preliminaries of peace, these conditions replacing those of the Armistice.

Signed by	For
ADMIRAL BENSON.	America.
VICE-ADMIRAL DE BON.	France.
ADMIRAL WEMYSS.	Great Britain.
ADMIRAL DI REVEL.	Italy.
VICE-ADMIRAL TAKESHITA	Japan.

PARIS, 7 February, 1919.

Naval Clauses for Insertion in the Preliminary Peace Terms With Germany

I. SUBMARINES

(a) All German submarines, without exception, submarine salvage vessels and docks for submarines (including the Kiel tubular dock) are surrendered to the Allies and the United States of America. Those which can proceed under their own power or be towed shall be taken into Allied ports within a maximum period of fifteen days, to be there sunk or broken-up.

(b) The German submarines which cannot be delivered thus, as well as those which are in course of construction, shall be completely broken-up by the Germans, under the supervision of the Allied Commissioners.

The destruction of these submarines shall be completed within a maximum period of three months after the signature of the preliminaries of Peace.

(c) The materials arising from these submarines may be used, but solely for industrial and commercial purposes. It is forbidden to make use of these materials for works having a warlike object.

Additional clause containing an agreement between the Allies and not for insertion in the Terms with Germany:—

(d) All the German submarines, submarine salvage-vessels and docks for submarines, which are surrendered to the Allies, shall be sunk or broken-up under the supervision of the Allies or the United States of America.

The materials arising from the above vessels may be used, but solely for industrial and commercial purposes. It is forbidden to make use of these materials for works having a warlike object.

A maximum period of three months is allowed for the removal of the material and the destruction of the submarines. In the particular case of Japan this period shall not, in any case, be less than 180 days after arrival in Japan.

II. SURFACE VESSELS

All the German surface warships now interned in Allied or neutral ports, in conformity with the terms of the Armistice, cease to belong to Germany; they are definitely surrendered to the Allies and the United States of America.

The ships shall be sunk or broken-up in the shortest possible time.

III

The German warships named below shall be delivered to the Allies and the United States of America, at ports to be designated by them, within a period of one month for the purpose of being sunk or broken-up. These vessels should be in condition to proceed under their own power to the places decided on by the Allies; the guns and torpedo material must remain intact.

With these reservations the German Government may remove from the ships, before their surrender, such material as has a commercial value.

These vessels are:—

BATTLESHIPS

Oldenburg	Posen
Thüringen	Westfalen
Ostfriesland	Rheinland
Heligoland	Nassau

LIGHT CRUISERS

Pillau	Strassburg
Graudenz	Augsburg
Regensburg	Kohlberg
Stralsund	Stuttgart

Forty-two modern destroyers
Fifty modern torpedo boats

IV. CONSTRUCTION OF WARSHIPS

Germany shall stop the construction of all warships now on the slips. These vessels shall be broken up under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America. The materials arising from the breaking-up of these vessels may be used by Germany on condition that they are used for commercial purposes and on no account for warlike purposes.

Until the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace Germany shall not undertake any new construction of warships, submarines included.

V. HELIGOLAND

The fortifications, military establishments, and harbours of Heligoland shall be destroyed under the supervision of the Allies, by German labour and at the expense of Germany, within a period to be determined by the Commissioners of the Allied Powers.

The final disposal of the island of Heligoland remains to be decided by the Peace Conference.

VI. ROUTES OF ACCESS INTO THE BALTIC

In order to secure free access into the Baltic to all nations, Germany shall not erect any fortifications in the area comprised between the latitudes $55^{\circ}27'$ N. and $54^{\circ}00'$ N. and longitudes $9^{\circ}00'$ and $16^{\circ}00'$ E. of the meridian of Greenwich, nor install any guns commanding the maritime routes between the North Sea and the Baltic.

The fortifications now existing shall be demolished and the guns removed under the supervision of the Allies.

VII. KIEL CANAL

The Kiel Canal shall be open at all times to all war or commercial vessels of every nation. No nation shall benefit by specially favourable treatment, and no class of vessel shall be excluded from the Canal.

VIII. GERMAN COLONIES

The German Colonies shall not be returned to Germany.

IX. SUBMARINE CABLES

The German Cables enumerated below shall not be returned to their previous owners.

The final allocation of these cables will be determined by the decisions of the Prize Courts of the Allies concerned.

Emden-Vigo.
Emden-Brest.
Emden-Teneriffe.
Emden-Azores (two cables)
Azores-New York (two cables)
Teneriffe-Monrovia.
Monrovia-Pernambuco.
Monrovia-Lome.
Lome-Duala.
Constantinople-Constanza.
Chifu-Tsingtau-Shanghai.
Yap-Shanghai.
Yap-Guam.
Yap-Menado (Celebes)

X

German auxiliary cruisers, whether in German or Austrian ports, or interned in neutral ports, and Fleet auxiliaries which could be rapidly turned to commercial purposes or which are converted merchant vessels, shall be treated as are other merchant vessels.

The vessels affected by this clause are enumerated in the attached list. (Appendix I.).⁵

XI

All Allied or neutral merchant vessels which have been captured, brought into port and condemned by the German Prize Court, shall be included in the number of the German merchant vessels which will be surrendered under the heading of Reparation.

XII

Having in view:—

(1) The reiterated and flagrant violations of the Laws of Nations committed at sea by the Germans;

(2) The extensive damage of all sorts caused to the merchant navies of the world by the systematic destruction of merchant vessels carrying passengers and cargoes;

(3) The impossibility, in the greater number of cases, of exactly determining the circumstances to which the losses of vessels are due, the reparation required from Germany (for merchant vessels sunk) will be fixed according to the total number of vessels destroyed by the Germans, whatever the means used for their destruction.

XIII. MINESWEEPING

Germany shall sweep up all mines in the areas which have been assigned to her in the agreement already entered into between the Allies and the United States of America.

⁵ See footnote 4, p. 938.

In accordance with this agreement, Germany shall be responsible for sweeping in the following areas:—

(1) That portion of the North Sea which lies to the eastward of longitude 4°00' E. from Greenwich—

- (a) between the parallels of latitude 53°00' N. and 59°00' N.
- (b) to the northward of latitude 60°30' N.

(2) The Baltic Sea, excluding Russian waters. In regard to these waters further details will be given as soon as the Russian question is determined.

XIV. AIRCRAFT

The Admirals support the proposals made by the inter-Allied Committee which has dealt with this subject.

XV. WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY

(1) The German high-power W/T stations at

Nauen,
Hanover, and
Berlin

shall not be used for the naval, military or political purposes of Germany, or of any State which has been allied to Germany in the war, without the assent of the Allied Powers and the United States of America, which will not be given until they are satisfied that the naval and military stipulations of the Treaty of Peace have been fully carried out. During the intervening period these stations may be used for commercial purposes, but only under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America, who will decide the wavelengths to be used.

(2) Germany shall not build any more high-power W/T stations in her own territory or that of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey, until the naval and military stipulations of the Treaty of Peace have been fully carried out.

(3) In the event of Germany violating the provisions of the Treaty of Peace or disregarding the decisions of the International Radio-Telegraphic Conference, the Allies and the United States of America shall be at liberty to withhold the services of their W/T stations from German stations.

(4) Germany shall have only one vote at the next International Radio-Telegraphic Conference, irrespective of the number of independent or Semi-independent States into which Germany may be divided.

*Naval Clauses for Insertion in the Preliminary Peace Terms With
Austria-Hungary*

I. SUBMARINES AND SURFACE WARSHIPS

All Austro-Hungarian warships, including submarines and the Danube flotillas, shall be broken-up or sunk as soon as possible by the Allies and United States of America.

A list is given in Appendix —.⁶

II. WARSHIPS UNDER CONSTRUCTION

The construction of all Austro-Hungarian warships (including submarines) actually on the slips shall cease. These vessels shall be broken-up under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America; and no new warship construction shall be undertaken by Austria-Hungary before the final Peace is signed.

The material arising from the breaking-up of these vessels may be utilised, but only for commercial purposes.

III. MERCHANT CRUISERS AND FLEET AUXILIARIES

Austro-Hungarian merchant cruisers and Fleet auxiliaries which can be readily adapted for commercial purposes (or which have been converted from merchant vessels) shall be dealt with as merchant vessels.

The vessels affected are given in Appendix —.⁶

⁶ See footnote 4, p. 938.

Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the 13th Session of the Supreme War Council, Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, February 10, 1919, at 3 p. m.

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson.
Hon. R. Lansing.

Secretaries

Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner,
G. C. B., G. C. M. G.

Secretary

Lt Col Sir M. P. A.
Hankey, K. C. B.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

Secretaries

M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. de Bearn.

ITALY

H. E. M. Orlando.
H. E. Baron Sonnino.

Secretary

Count Aldrovandi.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
H. E. M. Matsui.

Joint Secretariat

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Colonel U. S. Grant.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Major A. M. Caccia,
M. V. O.
Mr. H. Norman.

FRANCE

Capt. A. Portier.

ITALY

Major A. Jones.

JAPAN

M. Saburi.

ALSO PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Mr. Baruch,
Mr. Davis,
Mr. McCormick,
Gen. T. H. Bliss

BRITISH EMPIRE

Maj.-Gen. The Hon. C. J.
Sackville-West, C. M. G.
Maj.-Gen. W. T. Thwaites,
C. B.
The Rt. Hon. Lord Robert
Cecil, K. C., M. P.
Rear Admiral G. P. W.
Hope, C. B.
Capt. C. T. M. Fuller,
C. M. G., D. S. O., R. N.
Mr. J. M. Keynes, C. B.
Sir John Beale, K. B. E.

FRANCE

Marshal Foch,
General Weygand,
General Belin,
M. Klotz,
M. Loucheur,
M. Clementel,
M. Teyssie,
M. de Lamoignon.

ITALY

General Diaz.
General Cavallero.
Admiral Grassi.
H. E., M. Crespi.

JAPAN

General Nara.
Colonel Nagai.
Capt Fujikura.
K. Matsumura.
M. Yamamoto.
M. Anno

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU called upon M. Klotz to explain the conclusions reached by the Inter-Allied Commission on the subject of the Financial Clauses to be added to the Armistice when next renewed.

Renewal of
Armistice:
(a) Financial
clauses

M. KLOTZ said that since the last renewal of the Armistice the Germans had sought to elude the financial clauses of the Armistice, or have executed them with the greatest ill-will:—

(1) They had only handed over an insignificant quantity of bonds and securities stolen by them and deposited in Germany in the *Kriegs Kassen* and public banks.

(2) They had prevented the operation of the financial control over their foreign securities and only nominated the Commissioners, who were to be put into touch with the Allies, a few days ago.

(3) They had refused, contrary to their undertaking made in the same protocol, to examine, together with the Allies, measures tending to the restitution of property sequestered by them to the detriment of Allied subjects.

(4) The attitude adopted by them in the Financial Commission at Spa, and the tone in which their notes to the Allies were framed, were deliberately aggressive and should not be tolerated.

Taking these facts into consideration, the Inter-Allied Financial Commission had proposed that the following clauses should be added to the Armistice when next renewed:—

(1) The German Government will, for the restitution of the property taken from the nationals of the Allied nations, follow, in all its conditions, the provisions which have been made by a common agreement by the Allied Delegations at the Financial Sub-Committee of the Spa Armistice Commission, and which will be notified by the Commander-in-Chief.

(2) This will also apply to the carrying-out of the obligations referred to in paragraph 3 of the Trèves financial clauses of December 13th, 1918.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked that the terms of the financial clauses referred to might be read.

M. KLOTZ then read paragraphs III and IV of the Financial Clauses of the Agreement for the prolongation of the Armistice, dated Trèves, December 13th, 1918, as follows:—

"III. The German Government binds itself to pay at maturity and in conformity with current legislation to the natives of Alsace-Lorraine (Alsaciens-Lorrains) all debts or bills of exchange which have fallen due or which may fall due during the armistice and connected with German public funds, such as Treasury Bonds, bills of exchange, money or other orders, transfers, acceptances, etc., the corresponding transactions not being limited to those enumerated in the above recital.

The German Government binds itself not to place any special obstacle in the way of free disposal and enjoyment by Alsace-Lorrainers of all property, securities, shares and monies belonging to them and situate or being in Germany.

IV. The German Government binds itself to consider, in agreement with the Allied Governments, the steps to be taken for the speedy restitution of property sequestered to the prejudice of nationals of the Allied countries".

PRESIDENT WILSON said that on Friday [*Saturday?*] last an Inter-Allied Economic Commission had been formed to report on all financial and economic matters.¹ He suggested, therefore, that this question should be referred to that Commission.

M. KLOTZ stated that a unanimous decision had been arrived at by the Inter-Allied financial experts, sitting at Spa, on the question now before the Council. He did not think, therefore, that any useful purpose would be served by again referring the matter to a similar Inter-Allied body.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that although the proposed resolution had been agreed to by the Inter-Allied Financial Commission, the manner of ensuring its enforcement had not yet been considered, and he suggested that that question be referred to the Inter-Allied Economic Commission.

MR. BALFOUR said he had no objections to oppose to the question of the enforcement of the financial clauses of the Armistice being referred to the Inter-Allied Economic Commission. But he wished to suggest that the manner in which the Germans could be compelled to carry out all the agreed conditions of the Armistice should also be referred to that Commission. He had that day received a report from the Inter-Allied Naval Armistice Commission, sitting in London, to the effect that the Germans had not as yet carried out their engagements relating to the surrender of submarines and mercantile shipping. Furthermore, there were no signs that they intended to surrender the latter. Consequently, if the Armistice were renewed, it would be essential in the first place to see that the conditions already accepted were duly being complied with. He thought, therefore, that a body was required to decide how the Germans could be compelled to comply with the accepted terms of the

¹ See BC-26, p. 934.

Armistice. He could express no definite opinion in regard to the financial question, but in regard to the Naval terms he felt that a very serious situation had arisen. The Germans had promised things, but had failed to carry them out even when in a position to do so.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed his entire agreement with Mr. Balfour, but he thought it would be necessary to have expert advice in each case. For instance, he understood that some difference of opinion existed between the Allied experts in regard to the correct interpretation of certain of the financial clauses. Therefore, he thought it was a proper question to be referred to the Inter-Allied Economic Commission. He did not know whether the Naval experts had expressed any views as to how the Naval clauses could be enforced.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would have agreed, without hesitation, to accept President Wilson's proposal, were it not for the fact that Admiral Hope had expressed the view that no further means were available for the enforcement of the Naval conditions of the Armistice. Therefore, the Army should come to the aid of the Navy to exert the necessary pressure.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that the employment of force would mean the end of the Armistice.

MR. BALFOUR explained that he had meant to suggest the use of threats and not the actual employment of force.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked Admiral Hope to say what sort of military action would, in his opinion, be necessary and practicable.

ADMIRAL HOPE said that his instructions were that no suitable naval penalties existed. Consequently, the penalties to be imposed must be of a military character, and for this reason it had been agreed that the question should be referred to the Supreme War Council. The Naval Authorities offered no suggestions.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether Admiral Hope could, as an individual, suggest any line of action.

ADMIRAL HOPE replied in the negative.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he would put a hypothetical case to Admiral Hope. On the supposition that the Germans refused to surrender the submarines under construction, would it be Admiral Hope's idea that the military should go and seize them?

ADMIRAL HOPE replied that this would mean the occupation of dockyards and some of the larger ports such as Bremen, Hamburg, etc., which would not be possible. He thought that the naval authorities had in view the employment of some other form of pressure.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that two questions were being discussed, namely, a financial question and a Naval question. He sug-

gested that the former question should first be settled, and asked M. Klotz to reply to the statement which President Wilson had made to the effect that disagreement existed between the French and American experts on the interpretation of the financial clauses.

M. KLOTZ admitted that there had been some disagreement as to the interpretation of Clause 1 of the Armistice of the 13th December, 1918, but in regard to Clauses 3 and 4 there had been complete unanimity, and all the financial experts had subscribed to the resolution which he had placed before the Council. Therefore, whilst he agreed that Clause 1 should be referred to the Inter-Allied Economic Commission, he thought that the resolution which referred to Clauses 3 and 4 should be accepted without further reference.

PRESIDENT WILSON held that this Council was not competent to decide the means of enforcing the clauses of the Armistice, and he urged that that question be referred to the Inter-Allied Economic Commission for report.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that whilst it was quite true that no two questions were more different than a Naval and a financial question, yet the method of enforcing the conditions agreed on would probably be the same in each case. He did not think that a Financial Council was the best body to decide the method of enforcing the clauses of the Armistice. In his opinion, the military would be the best body for the purpose.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Germans required means of purchasing in foreign countries. There was, therefore, an economic method as well as a military method of exerting pressure. He did not ask the Economic Commission to recommend the military means but the economic means; the latter were manifold and could be applied gradually.

MR. BALFOUR agreed, and suggested that the Inter-Allied Economic Commission should be asked to report also on the economic means of enforcing acceptance of the Naval Clauses. He thought it was essential that the Germans should be made to carry out their promises, and he fully believed that the economic method would probably be found to be the best, and he concurred in the view that the Economic Commission would be the best body to decide what kind of economic pressure should be brought to bear.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he accepted the proposal, provided immediate action were taken. The matter, in his opinion, was a very serious one. The Germans were getting very haughty, and had given insolent replies to the Allies' demands. For instance, in the case of Poland, they had refused to comply with the Allies' request to stop their attacks. From the Allies' point of view the Weimar Assembly had selected the very worst candidate as President, and the same

remark applied to the newly appointed Chancellor, M. Rantzau. "Deutschland über Alles" had been sung at the conclusion of the last Meeting of the Constitutional Assembly. Consequently, he fully agreed with President Wilson's view that economic pressure should be applied, but a decision should be reached without delay, as the Armistice would expire on the 17th of this month.

MARSHAL FOCH said that, as a matter of fact, the Armistice would have to be signed on the 16th. The negotiations would therefore have to be begun on the 14th and completed on the 15th.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that a conclusion would have to be reached by the 14th, and proposed that each of the Great Powers should appoint one expert, either naval, economic or financial, to report in two days' time on the best methods of applying pressure on Germany to obtain compliance with the conditions of the Armistice, already accepted. Should the Commission report that economic means would give the desired result, so much the better.

PRESIDENT WILSON declared himself ready to act on any plan that would throw sufficient light on the subject. But he was also aware that the Allies were about to take a very serious decision, because they found themselves confronted by a momentous situation which might force them to a renewal of the war, since a refusal to renew the Armistice meant a renewal of war. The work done would have to be done over again, and he wondered what would be the reaction in the minds of the people of the world. Their choice on Wednesday would be very serious and solemn. No nation of the world would forgive them if hostilities were renewed for any but the most imperative reasons. It could not be foreseen what might be brought upon them by an insufficiently considered action. He could not help feeling that if, on Wednesday, they were not perfectly clear as to the steps they were going to take, it would be better to renew the Armistice on its present terms for a very short period, say one or two weeks, until they could reach a well-considered decision.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Marshal Foch had any statement to make on President Wilson's proposal.

MARSHAL FOCH agreed that a very grave decision had to be taken, for if the Armistice were not renewed, it would mean war. The heavier, the more important and the more precise the new conditions to be inserted in the Armistice, the more likely would the enemy be to hesitate and to show disinclination to accept. But, not knowing the whole of the new conditions to be imposed on the enemy, it was impossible for him to say what was the chance of their being accepted. On the other hand, the non-execution of the clauses already agreed on gave serious cause for reflection, and on this

account he was inclined to favour the idea of renewing the Armistice for a short period only.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he did not wish to delay matters, but it might have a very important effect on the enemy if the Armistice were renewed only for two weeks, the enemy being told that the reasons which rendered this necessary were that the Allies were considering the action to be taken in order to enforce compliance with their conditions. The Germans would doubtless employ the short period of time so accorded to them in profitable thinking.

MR. BALFOUR thought that President Wilson's warning would no doubt be most impressive. He wished, however, to suggest a procedure which did not possess all the gravity of a refusal to renew the Armistice. It was open to the Allies to tell the German[s] at any time that they were not fulfilling their engagements, and that any further failure to do so would result in serious economic measures being taken which would entail serious consequences. He thought that in the economic blockade the Allies possessed a weapon which was conceded by the Armistice and yet did not involve war.

M. PICHON expressed the view that it might be dangerous to renew the Armistice, even for a short period, as long as the Germans failed to fulfil the conditions already agreed to. He did not think the Germans would be likely to fulfil, during the short period of extension, the conditions which they had refused to fulfil during the period of the Armistice, especially when they realised that at the end of the extended period additional serious conditions would be imposed. He thought that the proposal merely meant a temporary postponement of their difficulties. The Germans would realise that the Allies hesitated to give orders, and they would thereby be encouraged to further resistance.

PRESIDENT WILSON admitted that M. Pichon's remarks were very just, but the right solution had still to be found. M. Pichon was concerned with the effect the action contemplated would have on the German mind, but the effect which a renewal of the war would have on the minds of the Allied peoples must not be lost sight of. In his opinion, a renewal of the war would require the most extraordinary justification.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the further consideration of the question be adjourned to Wednesday morning next (February 12th). No decision would have to be reached before Wednesday evening next, so that, if necessary, two meetings could be held that day. Furthermore, by Wednesday next the promised report on the situation in Poland would have been received, and that might assist them in arriving at a decision. He agreed that nothing hasty or

precipitate should be done. By an adjournment, 36 hours for thought would be obtained, and by them more information bearing on the problem would have been received.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed, on the understanding that during the interval the question would be referred to a Committee consisting of a military and an economic adviser representing each of the four Great Powers, who would report on Wednesday next as to the wise and practical means of bringing pressure to bear on the enemy for the enforcement of the clauses of the Armistice.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked that the Committee be instructed to submit their report on Wednesday morning next and that the Commanders of the Allied Armies be invited to attend the Meeting on that date.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Commanders of the Allied Armies should not be the military advisers on President Wilson's Committee: They should merely be present at Wednesday's meeting to assist in the consideration of the whole question.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed, and suggested that Marshal Foch should be asked to call together the Chiefs of the Allied Armies on Tuesday next in order to have a preliminary discussion of the whole question.

(It was agreed that a Committee consisting of a Military and an Economic adviser representing each of the four Great Powers should be appointed, to report on Wednesday next as to the wise and practical means of bringing pressure to bear on the enemy for the enforcement of the clauses of the Armistice. It was also agreed that the Chiefs of the Allied Armies should meet on Tuesday next, under the Presidency of Marshal Foch, for a preliminary discussion, and that they should attend the meeting on Wednesday next to assist in the consideration of the whole question).

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether it would be possible for the Governments forthwith to nominate the representatives to serve on the Committee.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the Meeting should be adjourned for five minutes in order to carry out President Wilson's suggestion.

(When the Meeting resumed, the following names were announced:—

America	Mr. Norman Davis and General Bliss.
British Empire	Lord Robert Cecil and General Thwaites.
France	M. Clementel and General Degoutte.
Italy	M. Crespi and General Cavallero.

It was decided that the Delegates should hold their first meeting at 6 p. m. that evening at 4 bis Boulevard des Invalides).

Renewal of the
Armistice:
Request of
the Poles

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that since the discussion of the Armistice had been adjourned, he thought that the question relating to the insertion of additional clauses relating to Poland should also be postponed.

(This was agreed to.)

The Arrest of
Enemy Per-
sons Guilty
of Breaches of
the Laws of
War

3. MR. BALFOUR said that the suggestions he had to make arose from a discussion he had had with the British Solicitor-General, who was making up the case of inhumane breaches of international law. Many of the members of the Committee were in favour of its being made a condition of the Armistice that all those against whom a prima facie case could be made should be given up.

In the clause of the Armistice dealing with this question, no names would be given, but a condition would be entered to the effect that any person asked for would in due course be surrendered. It was felt that if this were not done, there would be no use in setting up a tribunal, because when the names of the guilty people became known, they would have disappeared. He himself thought that the question was important, but that it might not be right to make it a condition of the Armistice. The question, however, required careful consideration. He understood that Mr. Lansing did not think this was a proper question to put into the Armistice, and he himself did not dissent from that view. He would even go further and say that were this clause to be put into the Armistice, no great advance would have been made. The clause would merely state that the Germans should give up a number of people whose names would be communicated at a later date. The Germans would already know who the people were, and they would resent these men being taken away to be tried before a foreign tribunal. The Germans would express their willingness to deal with criminals and to try them themselves. Consequently, he was in some doubt whether the method suggested would prove effective in the long run, and he saw no reason for introducing anything so novel into the Armistice. But by what other means could these guilty people be brought to justice? It would obviously be very lamentable, after all the expectations raised in the public mind, if when the time came, after the tribunal had been established, none of the criminals could really be brought to trial. Whether his proposal was relevant or not to the renewal of the Armistice, he had felt it his duty to bring this question to the notice of the assembly. He had no definite proposal to make, and he personally felt profoundly perplexed.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that the proposal would be futile at present. When the terms of peace were made it would be possible to know the names of the guilty people, and a demand could then be made for their surrender. Meanwhile the criminals might endeavour to conceal themselves, but it was not likely that they would even try to leave Germany. Consequently, the difficulty would be no greater then than at the present moment. On the contrary it would be less, because the names of the people wanted would then be known.

(It was decided to postpone the further consideration of this question.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council had agreed to refer all questions relating to the Blockade to the Inter-Allied Economic Commission. M. Klotz had no objections to offer, but he wished to discuss a document which revealed the fact that the Germans had drawn up a systematic plan for the destruction of French industries in the occupied territories.

M. KLOTZ said that the Conference had referred to a technical Committee all questions relating to finance, blockade and raw materials. But these questions frequently had a direct bearing on the general policy affecting the renewal of the Armistice. The question of food supplies concerned the general policy of the Armistice just as the question of the supply of raw materials concerned the general policy of the Peace Terms. Since a Commission had been formed to consider the best means of bringing economic pressure to bear on the enemy, he would confine himself merely to the question of the supply of raw materials, which had not yet been brought under discussion. The Allies had never agreed to supply raw materials to Germany. The devastated countries would never agree to raw materials being supplied to Germany, where the factories were still intact, until their own industries had been re-established. To do so would be contrary to President Wilson's third point, which prescribed "the removal so far as possible of all economic barriers, and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all nations consenting to the Peace and associating themselves for its maintenance." In order to bear out his contention, he would read some extracts from a German pamphlet which had been published in Munich by the German General Staff in February, 1916, at the time when the Verdun offensive was being launched.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired what was the object M. Klotz had in view.

M. KLOTZ replied that the pamphlet in question would afford evidence of the premeditated and systematic character of the destruction of industries in France by the German official authorities.

The fact that
the German
official authorities
had drawn up a
systematic plan
for the destruction
of French industries
in the occupied
territories.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that this evidence might no doubt affect their frame of mind, but what effect would it have on their plans?

M. KLOTZ said that in his opinion it would not in fairness be possible to consider the supply of raw materials to Germany, unless the facts contained in this document were given due weight. The Inter-Allied Economic Commission would study the question from a purely technical point of view, but there was also a political aspect of the case, which could not be ignored by the Conference. It was the latter point which he wished to bring forward.

(M. Klotz then read extracts from the work entitled "Die Industrie in Besetzten Frankreich", published in Munich under the direction and by order of the German Great General Staff in February, 1916. Copies of this publication may be obtained from the Secretariat-General.)

M. KLOTZ, in conclusion, expressed the view that a Technical Committee having been appointed to deal with the supply of raw materials, it was its bounden duty in the first place to consider and to give an absolute priority to the needs of the industries of the occupied territories, which had been destroyed by the enemy during the course of the war. To do otherwise would be to permit the aggressor to gain what he had hoped for at the expense of the victim. Subject to these observations, he had no objections to offer to the whole question being referred to the Inter-Allied Economic Commission.

5. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the next question to consider was the report submitted by the Military Representatives at Versailles.

LORD MILNER remarked that he came new to the question. There might, therefore, be argument which would account for a report which, at first sight, had somewhat surprised him. As he understood the case, the reason for the reference to the Military Representatives was that there was a desire to discover whether the military forces occupying the Turkish Empire were not excessive and whether they could not be reduced. In his opinion, that was quite a proper question to remit to the Military Representatives, namely: the amount of force required to occupy those territories. But not only had a most startling reduction in forces been proposed, but the report went on to specify the particular nature of the forces. It did not merely say that so many forces were required to hold Palestine, or Syria, or Trans-Caucasia, but it went on to show that the forces holding each of those places should be either British, or French, or Italian, as the case might be. In his opinion that was a big political question and not a military one, and very large issues had thereby been raised. For instance: he thought that the suggestion that Italy should occupy the

Occupation of
Territories in
the Turkish
Empire and
Trans-Caucasia

Caucasus not only implied very serious operations, but raised the question very directly of the future political problem of this country, a problem which had not yet been before this Conference. Consequently, it was a question which he might have thought should not be discussed before the audience there present. In one word, it was not a question for the Supreme War Council, but for the Peace Conference.

PRESIDENT WILSON explained that it was only fair to the Military Representatives to say that they had not gone further than they had been authorized to go. Mr. Lloyd George had expressed anxiety as to the number of forces the British Empire was compelled to keep in these territories and the Military Representatives had been asked to estimate the number of troops actually needed and to advise on an equitable distribution of the burden amongst the Allies, it being understood that this distribution would not prejudice any arrangement that the Peace Conference might subsequently make. Mr. Lloyd George had, at the same time, expressed the hope that the United States of America would share the burden. He (President Wilson) had replied that whilst agreeing with this sentiment, he doubted his authority to order American troops into the territory of a country with which the United States was not at war. He agreed with Lord Milner that the recommendation made by the Military Representatives tied in so closely with the possible future of these areas that it was not a matter for the Supreme War Council but for the Peace Conference to decide.

LORD MILNER, whilst disclaiming any intention of criticising the action of the Military Representatives, desired to maintain his contention that the decision of the question appertained more to the Peace Conference than to the Supreme War Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the solution was a simple one. The representatives of the Great Powers need only convert themselves into a Peace Conference today. Otherwise, the question could be adjourned to the following day.

(It was agreed to adjourn the further consideration of the question to the following day.)

It was also decided to place the following questions on the Agenda Paper of the meeting to be held on Tuesday, the 11th February, 1919, at 3 p. m.:-

- 1.—Belgian territorial claims.
- 2.—Occupation of territories in the Turkish Empire and Trans-Caucasia.)

11 FEBRUARY, 1919.

Minutes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, 11 February, 1919, at 3 p. m.

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson
Hon R. Lansing

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon A. J. Bal-
four, O M., M P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount
Milner, G. C. B., G. C.
M. G.

FRANCE

M Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries

Mr. A H Frazier
Mr. L Harrison

Lt Col. M. P. A Hankey,
K C. B.
Mr. H. Norman

M Dutasta
M Berthelot
M. de Beain

ITALY

H. E. M. Orlando
H. E. Baron Sonnino.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
H E. M. Matsui.

Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi.
M. Bertele.

Joint Secretariat

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Lieut. Burden

BRITISH EMPIRE

Captain E Abraham

FRANCE

Capt. A. Portier

ITALY

Major A. Jones.

JAPAN

M. Saburi.

ALSO PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Professor Haskins

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe
Lt. Col. Cornwall

FRANCE

General Belin.

ITALY

M. Piacentini
Major Rugiu

BELGIUM

M. Hymans
M. Van den Heuvel
M. Vandervelde
M. Rolin-Jaequemyns
M. Bourquin

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. CLEMENCEAU opened the meeting by asking M. Hymans to make his statement of Belgian territorial claims.

1. M. HYMANS said that the general statement of the Belgian peace problem might be summarised in one comprehensive demand: the revision of the Treaty of 19th April 1839. There were in reality three Treaties of the 19th April 1839 which together formed one whole. The first¹ was drawn up between the five Great Powers of the period—France, Great Britain, Prussia, Austria and Russia on the one hand, and Holland on the other hand. By this Treaty Holland undertook to transform into a final Treaty with Belgium the Provisional Treaty known as the ‘Treaty of the 24 Articles’ made on the 15th November 1831. The second Treaty of the 19th April 1839² registered the agreement of Belgium and Holland to the 24 Articles. The third Treaty of the same date³ recorded the guarantee to Belgium by the five Great Powers that the clauses of the Treaty should be executed. This Treaty fixed the territorial status of Belgium, the regime of the Rivers—especially the Scheldt, and set up the permanent neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the five Powers. This Treaty as between Belgium and Holland was not the result of free negotiations between the two contracting parties; it was dictated to these two countries by the five Great Powers.

Belgian Terri-
torial Claims

2. Fifteen years before the Belgian Revolution, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 added Belgium to Holland⁴ in order to create a buffer against France. The revolution of 1830 freed Belgium from Dutch rule and shook the foundations of the Treaties of 1815. The Conference of London sought by other arrangements to achieve the same ends as had been pursued at the Congress of Vienna. It sought to reconcile Belgian independence with the stipulations of the Treaties, with the interests of the Powers, and with the preservation of the balance of power in Europe.

Historical
Retrospect

While deliberations were going on in London, Holland attacked Belgium. The latter was newly born and unprepared for war; she was vanquished and the Treaty recorded the result of her defeat. The five Powers, when fixing the frontiers of Belgium, deprived her of part of Limburg and Luxemburg, but in compensation decided that Belgium should be perpetually neutral and guaranteed her this neutrality. The whole political situation of Belgium therefore rested on this guaranteed neutrality. The present war destroyed it. Of the five Great Powers only two—France and Great Britain—loyally fulfilled their obligations. Two others—Germany and Austria—violated their undertaking; and Russia latterly had failed.

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xxvii, p. 990.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xxxvii, p. 1320.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. xxvii, p. 1000.

⁴ Treaty of May 31, 1815, concerning formation of Netherlands by union of Holland and Belgium, *ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 136.

It was the violation of the Treaty of 1839 which brought about the state of war between Belgium and Germany. The regime of neutrality was therefore broken and could not be revived. Neutrality depended on the balance between the five Great Powers. This balance was now upset. It rested on the equal confidence on the part of Belgium towards the five Great Powers, a confidence which could not now exist. The war had destroyed the foundations of Belgium's political status, and economically had ruined the country.

3. The Belgians therefore asked the Allied and Associated Powers, at whose side they had fought, and in particular the two Powers—signatories to and guarantors of the Treaties of 1839—to help them to set up a strong and prosperous Belgium, restored to full and complete political and economic sovereignty. This demand was in accord with the seventh point of President Wilson's Declaration to Congress on the 8th January 1918.⁵ The Belgians were asking the Great Powers to furnish them with conditions of stability which might enable them to encounter new dangers. Belgium was at the sensitive point of Western Europe, protecting the coast of the North Sea, and consequently Great Britain and the Northern frontier of France. The security of Belgium was therefore in the hands of France and Great Britain and the interests of all three Powers were bound up together.

4. The regime of the Scheldt and the Eastern frontier of the country were for Belgium obvious causes of weakness. The Scheldt was the vital artery of Belgium, connecting Antwerp with the sea. This River almost exclusively served Belgian interests, and yet Belgium did not control it. Both shores of the Western estuary of the Scheldt belonged to Holland. On the left bank, close to the mouth, Holland possessed a thinly populated tongue of land cut out of Belgian territory. This area was conquered by the United Provinces when they freed themselves from Spain in the sixteenth century, and kept it to give them control of the River. In 1648 the Treaty of Münster assigned this territory to Holland. This enabled her to close the Scheldt and to bring about the death of Antwerp for two centuries. In 1795 the French proclaimed the liberation of the Scheldt and attached this tongue of territory to the Department of the Scheldt, that is to say to Belgian territory. At the present time Holland was sovereign over the mouth of the River. She possessed only one port on the western bank—Ter Neuzen—the work and activity of which were purely Belgian. This Dutch sov-

Claims to
Complete
Sovereignty

Question of
the Western
Mouth of
the Scheldt
A. Historical

⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 12.

sovereignty over the mouth of the River was only limited by a few servitudes in favour of Belgium, which servitudes had been created by the Treaty of 1839.

The dangers of this situation for Belgium were great in time of war. Holland, being absolute mistress of the mouth of the Scheldt, had in 1914, as soon as war was declared, closed the River for all military traffic. The Belgians had been unable to send military supplies to Antwerp during the siege, and this had hastened its fall and, in addition, driven nearly 30,000 Belgian troops to take refuge in Holland and to suffer internment. Had the Scheldt been free for military purposes and had Great Britain been able to use it to land war stores, the whole course of the war would doubtless have been modified; at the very least the fall of Antwerp would have been delayed.

Economically too, in time of war, this state of things was dangerous to Belgium. The war-time regulation of buoys was established by the Dutch. They extinguished navigation lights and thereby almost put an end to all navigation. Should Holland, at any time, be engaged in a war in which Belgium remained neutral, the Dutch would be in a position to close the stream, or Holland's enemy could block its mouth. In both cases the result would be disastrous for Antwerp.

M. Hymans said that he would like to explain the disadvantages of the conventional régime of the Scheldt in time of peace. The Treaty of 1839 had subjected pilotage, buoying, and

**C. Disadvantages
in Time of
Peace**

the preservation of channels, to the common action of the two countries. All measures considered requisite by Belgium for the upkeep and management of the River required joint agreement and Dutch consent. The Belgians could, therefore, do nothing if Holland exercised her right of veto. Holland had little interest in the development of navigation in the Western Scheldt; on the contrary she was interested in checking this development in favour of Rotterdam. History showed that the naval policy of Holland had always aimed throughout the centuries at the ruin of the Port of Antwerp. Even when Holland consented to the undertaking of works for the upkeep of the River, it was Belgium that paid for them, even should they be carried out on Dutch territory and the Dutch executed the works without Belgian co-operation. Each time the Belgians had asked for authority to carry out works they had been met with delays and administrative procrastination which led to long and difficult diplomatic conversations between Brussels and The Hague. Further, the Treaty of 1839 only took into consideration the preservation of the channels, and made no provision for improvements,

enlargements, or alterations. In future, in order to maintain Antwerp up to the level of its technical needs, it would be necessary to alter and deepen the channels to permit of the access of modern ships. The Belgian technical departments had already undertaken an extensive study of these questions. Belgium, therefore, was exposed to great risk in the future, seeing that Holland, on the basis of the Treaty of 1839, could refuse to permit these works in order to save Rotterdam from competition.

M. Hymans said that he would like to draw the attention of the meeting to two other striking anomalies. Holland, in respect to piloting, the establishment of buoys, etc., had on the completely Belgian portion of the stream, the same rights as Belgium on the Dutch portion, although Holland had no interest whatever in the matter. Consequently, as mistress of the Lower Scheldt, Holland could undertake any works she pleased without consulting Belgium, even should these works be detrimental to Belgian interests. The regime of the Scheldt therefore might safely be characterised as unreasonable and unjust, and M. Hymans thought that all were agreed in recognizing this.

Belgium asked for the free disposal of the river and absolute sovereignty over the western Scheldt as far as the Sea, both in time of peace and time of war. This stream, on the banks of which there was only one Dutch port, must belong entirely to Belgium; it must be free to execute all necessary works appertaining to it. The security of Belgium in the future port of Antwerp required no less. This, moreover, was in accordance with Belgian national sentiment and in particular with the unanimous desire of Naval circles in the country.

5. M. Hymans said that he wished to explain the question of the canal linking Ghent to the Scheldt and the sea. In this case too the shape of the land brought about serious difficulties which had been brought to notice in 1830 by the Belgian plenipotentiaries at the London Conference. This canal first crossed Belgian territory, then entered Dutch grounds on the bank of the Scheldt which it reached at Ter Neuzen. Holland was, therefore, mistress of the Northern part of this canal and the port of Ter Neuzen. This port in reality only served Belgium's interest and had been constructed at Belgium's expense. It was the fore port of Ghent which had now become the third naval port of Belgium.

The Treaty of 1839 only considered the free use of this canal by both countries. The Belgians had widened the canal in Belgian territory in order that ships of deep draft would be able to go up

D. Demand for
Sovereignty
Over the
Western
Scheldt

Canal From
Ghent to
Ter Neuzen

as far as Ghent, but they had failed to get the Dutch to make similar improvements on their part of the canal. The Dutch had also refused to establish buoys and navigation lights. This refusal on the part of the Dutch had given rise to a number of negotiations which had often been most difficult to conduct. Questions of compensation, completely divorced from the question of the canal had even at times been raised.

Belgium, therefore, claimed both absolute sovereignty over this canal and free disposal of the port of Ter Neuzen. M. Hymans said he wished also to draw attention to the military aspect of this question. The war had shown that the real centre of existence for Belgium was not Antwerp but that part of Flanders limited by the Scheldt and the sea. This being so, the Dutch ownership of the western bank gave Holland a bridge-head which might enable her to turn the line of the Scheldt.

6. PRESIDENT WILSON said that he was deeply interested in the statement made by M. Hymans whose argument had been convincing. He would like to know his opinion, however, and to discover in what way Holland might be approached seeing that she had remained neutral during the war, and had no representative at the Conference. In what way could Holland be brought to discuss the question?

M. HYMANS replied that Holland was one of the signatories of the Treaty of 1839 in common with France and Great Britain. He asked the two Great Powers, the only survivors of the European Concert of 1836 to 1839, and the Allied and Associated Powers by whose side Belgium had fought, to establish in principle that the revision of that treaty was necessary and to summon Holland, one of the signatories, to collaborate in this revision. Belgium was in no way hostile to Holland but wished to live in good relationship with her, but it had not been concealed from the Dutch that the Belgians had important problems to discuss and solve with them. If these problems remained unsolved, the future relationship of the two countries might be embittered. He, therefore, asked that Holland should be summoned to negotiate with Belgium the revision of the Treaty of 1839 which was signed by her, and he begged the Great Powers to assist Belgium in these negotiations.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he could see quite well [how] a modification of the regime of the river could be negotiated with Holland, but the radical solution resulting from the account given by M. Hymans was the restoration to Belgium of the left bank—how could Holland be brought to agree to this?

A. Claim to
Sovereignty
Over the
Canal and
Port of
Ter Neuzen

M. HYMANS said that he had thought it right to place before the meeting, all the elements of the problem, but left it to the Conference to find the solution. He would point out, however, that Holland had shown latterly that she was disposed to discuss these questions; the recent speech from the throne had been quite explicit in this respect as it had regarded the neutrality of Belgium to be dead, and the revision of the Treaty of 1839 to be necessary. The solutions of these problems would have to be considered with Holland. What he was asking the Great Powers to do was to support Belgium in the discussion.

MR. BALFOUR said the real difficulty consisted in that a neutral country was to be asked to modify a treaty and to surrender territory without any offer of compensation.

M. HYMANS said that he would at a later stage make a suggestion on the subject of compensation but would like first to speak on the subject of Limburg as this matter was closely connected with the question of the Scheldt.

7. MR. HYMANS said he proposed to show the close connection of this question with that of the Scheldt and Antwerp. The Treaty of 1839 had taken from Belgium a part of Limburg as a territorial indemnity due to the King and Grand Duke, in exchange for a portion of Luxemburg which had been attributed to Belgium. The Treaty said "The King and Grand Duke shall possess either in his capacity of Grand Duke of Luxemburg or to be united to Holland the following territories." The King and Grand Duke furthermore was to obtain an agreement with the German Confederation for the application of these clauses. The portion of Limburg yielded by Belgium remained attached to the Germanic Federation until its dissolution in 1867, and Maestricht was for a long time a Federal Fortress.

Dutch Limburg yielded by Belgium made a long salient on the bank of the Meuse between Belgian Limburg and Germany. Holland possessed the whole of the right bank of the stream and the bridge-head of Maestricht on the left bank.

Mr. Hymans said that he had previously pointed out the necessity for Belgian sovereignty over the Scheldt in order to ensure the development of Antwerp. It was equally necessary to ensure direct water communication between Antwerp and the Meuse, and thence between the Meuse and the Rhine. These communications could only be established by passing through Dutch Limburg.

MR. BALFOUR asked what were the reasons preventing access to the Rhine south of Limburg.

The Limburg
Question:
(a) The
Historical
Aspect

(b) The
Geographical
Aspect

(c) Water
Communication
Between Ant-
werp, the
Meuse & the
Rhine

MR. HYMANS replied that the reasons were of a geological order. Belgian technical experts had been studying this question long before the war. At present communication with the Meuse was very imperfect. It was effected through a canal which left the Meuse at Liege and crossed the Dutch enclave of Maestricht, (whence it drew water from the Meuse) ending at Antwerp after crossing the Belgian carpine [*Campine?*]. Passage through this Dutch enclave, only 5 miles broad, engendered all kinds of difficulties, and involved no less than four examinations by the Customs. Further, in Dutch territory the canal was extremely narrow. This produced such a congestion of traffic that this part of the trip took from three days to 1 month. The Belgians were unable to widen this canal in Dutch territory, and therefore could not improve it in their own territory. They could not increase the flow of water in it, though very insufficient, as the supply was derived from Dutch ground.

Belgian water communications with the Rhine are also most important. It was necessary to have a canal connecting Antwerp with the Rhine. This question had been studied for a long time. Many routes had been proposed, all for technical reasons passing close to Ruremonde and reaching the Rhine in the region of Duisburg. Here again it was necessary to pass through Dutch Limburg. The Treaty of 1839 gave Belgium a right of passage but when some 30 years ago Belgium built the Gladbach railway line, Holland declared that Belgian rights were exhausted. This means of communication was now quite inadequate and a waterway was now required to facilitate relations between Antwerp and Alsace Lorraine, and Switzerland. It was indispensable that this waterway should be subject to Belgian sovereignty.

From the military point of view the shape of Limburg yielded to the Dutch was such that both the Belgian and Dutch frontiers were equally indefensible. This was proved during the war. Holland made no attempt to defend this territory. In 1914 Belgium had been particularly alarmed at the thought that Germany, by invading Dutch Limburg, could cut the Belgian forces off from Antwerp and Liege, and thus cause the line of the Meuse to fall. In 1919 [1918] when the German Armies were defeated, the Dutch allowed 75/100,000 German troops, with all their transport and spoil, to cross Dutch Limburg. This led to a formal protest by the French, British and Belgian Governments. Belgian Limburg was therefore an open door seriously threatening the line of the Meuse.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the canal between the Rhine and the Scheldt would compete with any Dutch waterway.

(d) Military
Importance
of Limburg

M. HYMANS replied that this was quite likely to be true, and that Holland would not regard the project favourably if it tended to diminish the importance of Rotterdam. The Germans, moreover, by way of reprisal against Belgium, would certainly seek to divert commercial traffic towards Holland and Rotterdam.

8. M. Hymans said that he would now return to the question put by President Wilson:—How were these territorial problems to be settled by negotiation with the Dutch? Holland had remained neutral, and was not represented at the Conference. He had himself the best feelings towards the Dutch but he thought that their neutrality should not permit them to refuse to negotiate. Neutral countries had to some extent been the profiteers of the war. They had not suffered like the invaded countries, and Holland, more than any other had grown rich, especially by supplying Germany. She had accorded a most generous welcome to Belgian refugees, but it must not be forgotten that by defending her own independence, Belgium had preserved the independence of Holland. Holland would have been the first victim. It was possible to say to the Dutch that the Treaty of 1839 signed with them had now collapsed and that its revision must be discussed. Belgium had intended only to apply to France and Great Britain, the loyal and faithful custodians of the Treaty, but the negotiation would be a hard one to conduct. Belgium could not afford to remain isolated and had preferred to place the question immediately before all the Great Allied and Associated Nations which now represented the new international order.

9. The question of compensation to Holland had been raised by Mr. Balfour with great justification. It was true that Belgium had nothing to offer but there were possibly other solutions which might satisfy Holland. Economic or Colonial compensations had been thought of. But, in close proximity to Holland there was a chance of compensation which might be more attractive to that country. Prussian Guelderland was inhabited by a population with close affinities to the Dutch, and still speaking a Dutch dialect. He would also draw attention to another territory strategically and economically of far greater importance, namely, Eastern Friesland, and the County of Bentheim, stretching between Guelderland and Emden. These territories lost their independence in the 18th Century, when they were conquered by Prussia. The Frisian race inhabiting them was the same as that of Northern Holland, and a Frisian Nationalist movement in this area had latterly become manifest. A modification of frontier in this direction would give Holland a very strong defensive line,

Method of
Negotiation
With Holland

Possible Com-
pensations for
Holland

the Ems. The threat to Holland constituted by the pocket of Bentheim would disappear. This pocket would allow a German attack to reach the banks of the Zuyder Zee in 24 hours and thus to cut Holland in two. From the economic point of view also, this solution would be advantageous to Holland. It would cancel the danger of the diversion of the traffic for Rotterdam to the port of Emden. The Germans had a project for linking Emden to the Rhine by canal. The realisation of this project would be disastrous for Rotterdam. Further, Holland would gain a useful port at Emden protected by a belt of islands, the principal of which was Borkhum, of which the Germans meant to make a new Heligoland, and which served them during the war as a submarine base. There was also another projected canal which was to link Emden to the mouths of the Weser, of the Elbe and even to the Kiel Canal. This project was a powerful conception once favoured by Bismarck. On the 5th May, 1895, when receiving a Delegation of German shipbuilders, Bismarck declared that he had always thought that the Baltic Canal should be continued up to the Gulf of Jade and thence to the Gulf of Dollart, thence to Emden. This would be child's play in comparison with what had been done in Holstein. The German fleet would be three times more powerful if it could emerge from these ports and from Kiel as well as from Emden.

In 1912 Dr. Groh, a German engineer, in a book concerning Maritime Canals entitled "Holland a Federal German State: an easy technical conquest" said that communication between the Rhine and the Ems would enable the German fleet to cross Holland and come out in front of the English Channel. "Then," he said, "We shall take England by the throat."

M. Hymans said, that the proposal he made appeared to him to offer numerous military and economic advantages, not only to Holland, but also to the Allies. He had therefore taken an opportunity of submitting it to the consideration of the Conference.

10. M. HYMANS said that the whole history of Luxemburg linked up to Belgium, with which it had been associated for centuries. In 1815, the territory had been constituted a Grand Duchy and given to the Nassau family in compensation for the property taken from them and given to Prussia. At the same time Luxemburg was attached to the Germanic Confederation. Nevertheless it continued to form a part of the Belgian provinces in all respects. Deputies from Luxemburg sat at The Hague and were considered to belong to the 55 Belgian Deputies. When the revolution broke out in 1830, it spread in Luxemburg at the same time as in Belgium. Deputies from Luxemburg continued to sit with Belgian Deputies until 1839. The treaty signed

The Luxemburg
Question:
(a) Historical
Considerations

that year cut Luxemburg into two parts, and was considered to be a mutilation. It provoked among the people of Luxemburg the most emphatic and moving protests, comparable to those of the Alsatians and Lorrainers in 1871. In the years that followed, many appeals were made to King Leopold and the Great Powers. The status of Luxemburg was finally fixed in 1867. Luxemburg then became a neutral unarmed state, containing only 200,000 souls. It seemed specially designed to become the ground for a concentration of German Armies against Belgium and the natural corridor for an invasion of France, as was shown in 1914. The maintenance of such a state of things meant a permanent peril for Belgium and France.

Economically, Luxemburg was closely attached to Germany. In 1842, Luxemburg entered the Zollverein. In 1872, Germany got possession of the Luxemburg railways. Lastly, a German dynasty gained possession of the Grand Ducal throne. The favour this dynasty showed to Germany during this war was well known. Since the Armistice, however, Luxemburg had severed its economic connection with the Zollverein and regained the free disposal of its railways.

It was a political danger for Europe to maintain this political condition. Detached from the Zollverein, Luxemburg was too small to survive alone, and must lean on one of its neighbours. He would, therefore, say to the Powers that it was the Belgian solution that was the just one, as it corresponded with past history and rested on natural affinities and sympathies. He thought he was entitled to say that France did not claim Luxemburg. He would, therefore, ask the Conference to facilitate the *rapprochement* of the two countries, Belgium and Luxemburg. There was no desire on the part of Belgium to do violence to Luxemburg. All that was asked was a friendly *rapprochement* by free consent. At the present moment, there was anarchy in Luxemburg. The Grand Duchess had abdicated in favour of her sister, Charlotte, whom the Governments had not yet recognised and who, to gain recognition, wished to appeal to a referendum. Solicited by various forms of propaganda, the natives of Luxemburg were perplexed and did not know which way to turn. M. Hymans thought that this condition of things would last until the people knew how the Powers were disposed towards them. He would like the Allied and Associated Powers to indicate to the Luxemburg Government that they were not disposed to recognise the new Grand Duchess and that they suggested a conversation with the Belgian Government, with the object of seeking, without any constraint, the means of bringing the two countries into closer relations. He felt sure that, as soon as Luxemburg realised that the country was not going to

(b) Economic
Considerations

(c) Belgian
Proposal
Concerning
Luxemburg

France, it would turn to Belgium quite naturally. Belgium, on her side, eagerly desired this *rapprochement* and hoped that the Powers would help to bring it about. The failure of this aspiration would provoke the deepest disappointment in Belgium.

M. VANDERVELDE said that there was no difference of opinion on this subject.

MR. LANSING asked whether Belgium would be favourable to a referendum of the population of Luxemburg.

(d) Question of
Referendum

M. HYMANS said that the Grand Ducal Government was now suggesting a referendum on the dynastic question alone and not on the eventual union of the country with France or Belgium. Under present conditions, he thought that the referendum would not obtain a considered view of the people. Public opinion was uncertain and would be influenced by interested propaganda. He disclaimed any idea of violence and the solution he had proposed was in accordance with this union. Should the Great Powers urge the Luxemburg Government to enter into conversation with the Belgian Government in order to discover in common whether a *rapprochement* was possible and under what conditions, M. Hymans thought that the freedom of the Luxemburg people would be safeguarded. If the conversation led to no solution, the Luxemburg Government would be free to seek some other.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked with what authority in Luxemburg M. Hymans would propose to converse, seeing that the present Government was not recognised.

M. HYMANS replied that the Grand Duchess was not recognised. The Government of Luxemburg was the same as before. It still had a majority in the Chamber. The present Grand Ducal Government might organise a referendum in favour of the maintenance of a political constitution dangerous to European public order, but a people could not be permitted to neglect its international obligations. There were, in his opinion, three solutions:—

- (1) The maintenance of the present dynasty, which would be contrary to European order.
- (2) Union with Belgium.
- (3) Union with France.

Since France did not claim union, only the Belgian solution remained.

11. M. Hymans said he would like to make mention of certain Walloons Cantons taken from Belgium in 1815 by Prussia. He specially mentioned that of Malmedy, where French was spoken, the newspapers were printed in French and pro-Belgian manifestations of an undoubted character had recently taken place.

Walloons
Cantons

There was also the small neutral territory of Moresnet which should be united to Belgium.

12. M. Hymans said that if the questions of the Rhine were to be raised at the Conference, he reserved the right of defending Belgium's political and economic interests.

Rhine
Questions

In concluding, M. Hymans said that he wished to observe that the Treaties of 1815, 1831 and 1839 had also served Prussian policy in its thrust towards the Meuse. He hoped he had

Conclusions succeeded in convincing the meeting that these treaties must be revised and that the Belgian claims

were legitimate. Belgium had demanded no guarantees when she took up arms. She had done her whole duty, but she had suffered grievously and was still suffering. Her industry was ruined and could not revive for many months. Belgium was not asking for the price of her services, and was animated by no spirit of conquest or imperialist ambitions. All Belgium asked from the Great Allied and Associated Powers was the conditions necessary to ensure the future and prosperity of the country.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

12 FEBRUARY, 1919.

**Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council at 11:00
a. m., Wednesday, February 12, 1919, Held in M. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris**

PRESENT**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson
Mr. R. Lansing

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Bal-
four, O. M., M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount
Milner, G. C. B., G. C.
M. G.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon.

Secretaries

Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison

Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Han-
key, K. C. B.
Mr. E. Phipps

M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Beurn

ITALY

H. E. M. Orlando
H. E. Baron Sonnino

Secretaries

Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele

JAPAN

Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

*Joint Secretariat***AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Col. U. S. Grant

BRITISH EMPIRE

Major A. M. Caccia,
M. V. O.

FRANCE

Capt. A. Portier.

ITALY

Major A. Jones

JAPAN

M. Saburi

ALSO PRESENT**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Gen. Tasker H. Bliss
Admiral Benson
Maj. Gen. McAndrew
Lt. Comdr. Carter
Captain de Marenches

BRITISH EMPIRE

Field Marshal Sir Doug-
las Haig, K. T.
Lieut. Gen. The Hon.
Sir Henry [Herbert?]
Lawrence, K. C. B.
Maj. Gen. the Hon. C. J.
Sackville-West, C. M. G.
Maj. Gen. Thwaites, C. B.
Rear Admiral Hope, C. B.
Capt. Fuller, R. N., C. B.,
D. S. O.
Mr. Keynes, C. B.

FRANCE

M. Klotz
M. Loucheur
M. Clémentel
M. Leygues
Marshal Foch
Marshal Petain
Gen. Degoutte
Gen. Belin
Admiral de Bon
Lt. Odend'hal
M. de Lasteyrie
Gen. Weygand

ITALY

H. E. M. Crespi
H. E. General Diaz
General Cavallero
Admiral Grassi

JAPAN

General Nara
Colonel Nagai
Captain Fujioka
Capt. de Vaisseau Nomura
Capt de Vaisseau Yamamoto

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU having declared the meeting opened, called for the report of the Committee which had assembled at Marshal Foch's Headquarters in accordance with the decision of the Supreme War Council, dated 10th February, 1919.¹

Terms for Renewal of the Armistice With Germany:
(a) Conclusions of Committee Assembled in Accordance With the Decision of Supreme War Council Dated 10th, Feb. 1919

(GENERAL WEYGAND then read the conclusions of the Committee assembled in accordance with the decision of the Supreme War Council of the 10th February, 1919. For full text, see Annexure "A".)

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired whether it was thought advisable by the Conference to discuss the report at once.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought the sooner this was done, the better.

(It was agreed that the report should be discussed forthwith).

M. ORLANDO expressed the desire to ask a question in regard to the report just read. The concluding paragraph of the Committee's report contained the following declaration: "The members of the Committee are of the opinion that naval and military terms of peace should be drawn up immediately by a Commission appointed for the purpose, and shall be imposed on the enemy." He understood that "the naval and military terms of peace" therein referred to were not the same as the conditions contained in the body of the report, which were purely provisional. The two sets of conditions constituted, in fact, two entirely separate propositions.

MR. BALFOUR agreed that there were evidently two quite different questions to be decided, namely:—First, how should the execution by the Germans of the unfulfilled promises be assured. Second, what was to be the future policy of the Associated Governments in regard to the renewal of the Armistice: should the Armistice constantly be renewed, with new clauses and new conditions, or were the final Naval and Military Terms to be drawn up immediately and imposed on the enemy? The two questions should be kept quite distinct.

M. ORLANDO remarked that that was exactly the distinction he had meant to emphasise.

M. CLEMENCEAU held that the final peace terms must not now be discussed. The Committee had certainly made that suggestion; but

(b) Mr. Balfour's Suggestion for Naval & Military Terms of Peace To Be Imposed on Germans

¹ BC-27, p. 952.

this report contained no indication as to what the naval or military terms of peace should be. The question would no doubt eventually have to be referred to the Committee for advice. But the Council was not in a position that day to discuss peace terms. On the other hand, the first of Mr. Balfour's two points, namely, the enforcement of the conditions already accepted by the Germans, called for an immediate decision, as Marshal Foch would have to confer with the Germans almost immediately for the renewal of the Armistice.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that the armistice would expire at 5.0 a. m. on the 17th February next, and the renewal would have to be signed on the 16th. He would therefore be obliged to leave Paris on the 14th or 15th.

M. CLEMENCEAU resuming said that only two days would therefore be available for a decision to be reached. Obviously, more than two days would be required to decide the final naval and military clauses to be included in the Treaty of Peace. Consequently, the consideration of that question would have to be postponed, but the conditions for a renewal of the armistice must at once be decided.

MR. BALFOUR agreed that it was impossible to discuss then and there the final peace terms; but the general policy which should govern their arrangements in regard to the renewal of the armistice, in view of arriving at the final peace terms was quite another question. Doubts had been expressed as to the advisability of using the renewal of the armistice each month as a means of getting new terms out of the Germans. From time to time some slight modifications might be desirable and necessary. For instance, the question of Poland was one which called for immediate action, but many of the members of the Council held the view that it was inexpedient to introduce new terms every time the armistice was renewed. No satisfactory end could, however, be put to that method of procedure until the conditions of the final peace terms had been decided, and, he agreed, that a decision on that question could not be reached on that day. His proposal, therefore, was that only inevitably small changes, or no changes whatever, should be made in the armistice until the Allies were prepared to say to Germany: "These are the final naval and military terms of peace, which you must accept in order to enable Europe to demobilise and so to resume its life on a peace footing and re-establish its industries."

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Mr. Balfour's proposal for the first time seemed to suggest to him a satisfactory solution. All along his difficulty had been that little and irritating secondary demands were continually being added to the armistice conditions whilst at the same time reports were being received to the effect that the previously accepted terms had not been fulfilled. Each time he had

asked the question "What will be the result of adding these new conditions? How can the enforcement of the unfulfilled conditions be secured?" And he had been conscious of the fact that either might involve a renewal of hostilities. He was perfectly prepared to renew the war if the Germans refused to accept the final terms of peace, decided upon by the Allies. But he was not prepared to renew hostilities because the Germans might refuse to accept some little portion of the eventual peace terms. Each time something was asked for which, if not accepted, meant the renewal of the war; but each condition by itself was not worth the renewal of the war. On the other hand, a refusal to accept the Allies' final terms of peace would be worth renewing the war, and ultimately the Allies would have to insist on the acceptance of their peace terms. Moreover, renewal of the armistice, with certain small additional conditions merely meant a repetition and a continuance of endless debates with the Germans as to the reason why they had been unable to comply with the accepted conditions, close technical distinctions being raised in regard to the meaning of those conditions. It seemed to him that this procedure placed the Allied Governments in the undignified position of debating with the Germans, while conscious all the time that a stop could be put to the debate by a renewal of hostilities. There could be no desire to debate with the Germans and, therefore, the final conditions to be imposed must be decided upon. That was business, as compared with the present policy which meant asking for things that formed only a part of the programme and not the whole programme. Personally he was deeply interested in the fulfilment of the entire programme, and he was ready to employ the whole strength of the American army to obtain the acceptance of the whole of the naval and military terms of peace: but he was not prepared to make use of that Army for the little pieces. It was reported that Germany had failed to fulfil part of the terms of the Armistice. What was to be done? It was suggested that more conditions should be imposed on the enemy at the next renewal of the Armistice. The enforcement of the new conditions would, however, inevitably lead to more debates and further discussions with the Germans. Would it not be better, as had been suggested, to go to Spa and to say to the Germans: "The present situation is altogether unsatisfactory. You have failed to keep your promises. You have failed to carry out the terms of the Armistice. The Armistice will be renewed, on the present terms, for a period which will be terminated on a few days' notice. Meanwhile the final Military and Naval terms of peace will be drawn up and presented to you for acceptance on the understanding that non-acceptance of the whole

of the terms would mean an immediate resumption of hostilities."

The proposal he had just made had been suggested to him that morning and it appeared to him as a thoroughly sound and statesmanlike idea.

M. CLEMENCEAU protested that yet once more, in his long career, he felt compelled with great regret to state that his views differed very considerably from those he had just heard. It had been stated that the Germans had not carried out the terms of the Armistice, but that it would merely be irritating to the Germans if difficulties were constantly raised about the non-fulfilment of secondary demands.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that M. Clemenceau should have said: "future secondary demands."

M. CLEMENCEAU accepted the correction and said that he had a great many remarks to make on that point. He proposed to begin his argument at the end, by referring to the proposals put forward by the Economic and Military Committee.

According to President Wilson's proposal, the Allies would condescend to explain to the Germans that the Naval and Military terms of peace would be drawn up and presented to them for acceptance as soon as possible. But the military terms depended largely on the other terms. If the differences existing between the thirty odd nations represented at the Conference were settled; if the creation of the League of Nations gave the guarantees that were expected from it, the military terms would be different from what they would be if no agreement were reached on these various points. Consequently, he believed the military terms could not be separated from the political, economic and financial terms.

Next, President Wilson had said: "I am ready to employ the whole strength of the American Army to obtain acceptance of the final conditions of peace. As to secondary questions—well, let them go. For vital questions, I am ready to renew the war, if necessary." If President Wilson would allow him to say so he thought that would be putting the question in an academic, theoretical and doctrinal light. In practice the question would present itself quite differently, for the final conditions of peace would only be settled after a large proportion of the troops had been sent home, when the Americans, the English and the Italians had gone. What would be the Allies' military situation when the present accepted demobilisation schemes had been carried out? The scheme relating to the forces to be maintained in the occupied territories until the signature of peace provided for the employment of 51 French, 10 British and 10 American divisions. After the frightful losses suffered by the French nation both materially, financially and in men, when it still had sufficient

strength to maintain 51 divisions at the front, was that the moment to say to the Germans: "If you are not in an accommodating humour, we shall start fighting again"? The final military conditions to be imposed might be extremely difficult, and it might be that the enemies, having been left free to act on the other side of the frontier, a great deal of blood would have to be shed to conquer them a second time. He thought that problem had not received sufficient consideration. In his opinion, it had been presented in too theoretical, too academic a form. But the fact must be faced that during 4 years of war the countryside of France had been devastated and subjected to the worst kind of savagery. At the end of that time, the enemy had been forced to surrender at discretion. But, left to themselves, the Germans had created order, just as the Russians had created disorder. The Germans had succeeded in forming a Government, and the first words spoken in the National Assembly had been: "Deutschland über Alles". The second thing done had been to place all power in the hands of the accomplices of William II. News had been received that morning that Scheidemann, one of William's most direct agents, was to govern Germany. Could it be imagined that he would alter his views though he might speak in favour of the League of Nations and of universal brotherhood? No, he did not think his hearers would allow themselves to be deceived. Let them read the German newspapers. It would be seen that they breathed nothing but threats. Ebert had said: "We will not accept terms which are too hard". And why was all this done? To exercise a detrimental influence on our moral[e], to frighten us, to make us fear that, if the Germans were angered, the war might begin again. Nobody was less desirous than himself of seeing the war begin again, but it must not be forgotten that we were still at war. War continued in the minds of men; the same minds that had made the war of 1914. The German nation had not suffered from invasion, its aggressive moral[e] had been preserved intact. On the other hand, the Allied Conference could not have acted differently, nor more quickly, than it had done. Vital preliminary work had to be done. It had, however, been accused of impotence by the press, and probably the Germans had come to think that the Allies were quarreling and that they were incapable of action. He would implore the Council not to confirm the Germans in that idea. The Germans must not be allowed to think that they would be able to face successfully France's 51 divisions after the Allied troops had dispersed.

Returning to his starting-point, complaints had been made that the Germans were not carrying out the armistice terms. But they must be compelled to carry them out; as to that, all were agreed.

Then it had been said, (it was the echo of a sentiment he had read in German newspapers), that there must be no fresh terms, otherwise, the Germans would get angry, would start discussions. That argument might hold good if the new conditions to be imposed were either frivolous or due to the sudden impulse of the moment. But, in reply, he need only draw attention to the Polish question, to which Mr. Balfour very rightly attached great importance, even though it was a new question, only a few days old. Now, provided the wishes of the Allies were plainly expressed, it would be impossible for the Germans to rise. Marshal Foch and Marshal Pétain would agree that the Germans could not at the present moment embark on an offensive against the Allies. Would the Polish question be worth an offensive? He thought so. But if the Germans were told that an attack on Poland would be followed by an immediate advance of the Allied troops along the entire Western front, Germany would at once comply with the Allies' conditions. He would here recite his *mea culpa*, for the matter concerned him directly. He wished to repeat what he had already said, namely, that the fortune of war had been such that neither American nor British territories had suffered, whilst the territory of France had been so ravaged that it would seem as though recovery would be impossible. The first wish of the French frontier peasants had been to get back the cattle which had been stolen from them by the hundred and by the thousand, and which they could watch grazing on the German side. These peasants kept on saying "We have been victorious, of course, but could not the Germans be asked to give us back our cattle?" Well that was not a question of world-wide importance. The world would still continue to go round, even if the unhappy peasants were not granted the means of making good—(and in how fragmentary a fashion)—the disasters caused by the war. Nevertheless Mr. Balfour would not, as a philosopher, contradict him when he said that there was such a thing as a philosophy of war, when events accumulated in the human brain and put it out of gear, destroying the balance of entire nations. The barbarians of whom history spoke took all that they found in the territories invaded by them, but destroyed nothing; they settled down to share the common existence. Now, however, the enemy had systematically destroyed everything that came in his way. As M. Klotz had said in his report, nothing had been left standing. France would be unable to compete against Germany for two years. It had been stated that Germany would be supplied with raw materials; but the industries of France had been scientifically destroyed, not for military reasons, but in order to prevent France from recovering in peace time. That was how matters stood. It

was true that Italy had also suffered a great deal, but no comparison was possible, as it was the richest districts of France that had been destroyed. France had lost 3,000,000 men, either killed or mutilated, and it is truly necessary that some compensation should be obtained.

The Conference had worked conscientiously up to the present and had dealt with questions of the highest order. The purest idealism had been represented there, as well as more material interests; but the world was waiting. The Supreme Council would meet again in a fortnight or three weeks; by that time no one must be able to say: "The Associated Governments will not make up their minds to give us that satisfaction to which we are entitled".

This state of mind must not be allowed to develop. It could not be said that the French people were concerned with material interests to the exclusion of all others. If the French people deserved any reproach it was rather for erring in the opposite direction; for they are apt to be carried away by ideas, regardless of terrestrial affairs. But the people of France were attached to the soil, they were accustomed to work on the soil, and they now implored the representatives of the Allied and Associated peoples to consider this aspect of the question. If no heed were given to such requests, a time would come when small, supposedly secondary, questions would accumulate and create a state of mind which would drive the people to insist on their demands with an amount of energy such as he should not like to see. Indefinite postponements would appear to the Germans as a proof of weakness. He was aware that President Wilson considered the Armistice to be a threat continually hanging over the heads of the Germans. But he (M. Clemenceau) knew the Germans better, and he would assure the Council that they will not take it thus. The Germans must, of course, be spoken to with moderation and equity, but also with firmness and decision; otherwise the Council would be obliged to meet again in a fortnight's time under less favourable conditions.

In speaking at such length—a proceeding justified by the importance of the question—he had not contradicted any arguments either of President Wilson or Mr. Balfour. He had merely wished to convey his own opinions which coincided with those of the entire French nation. France would suffer most from this indefinite prolongation of the Armistice. He was continually being assailed with requests for a speedy conclusion of peace, and that was the reason why he had been somewhat emphatic in his suggestions. He should like a decision to be reached as soon as possible. The Germans would be compelled to give satisfaction for the violation of the Armistice terms, described at length in General Weygand's report.

The Allies should remain firm on these points, including also the terms rendered necessary by the Polish question and such other questions that might arise, seeing that, on President Wilson's own proposal, an Economic Committee had been attached to Marshal Foch. He urged that the policy so far followed should be continued. The degree of pressure to be exerted would be made to fit each case as it arose. But the Germans must not be told: "Go on, Do as you like, Perhaps we shall some day threaten to break off relations; but just now we will not be firm". Germany would continue her preparations, and after the Allied troops had dispersed, Marshal Foch might perhaps find himself confronted by more German troops than might have been anticipated.

In conclusion he wished to apologise for having spoken at such length, but it was necessary to say these things.

MR. BALFOUR said that M. Clemenceau had made a speech which everybody would regard as most impressive, even though it must inevitably have lost by translation. He thought, however, there was a real misunderstanding, not on all, but on most of the points raised, which he hoped to remove. All were agreed that in regard to the past the Germans must be compelled to carry out the engagements. The wishes of the Allies in regard to Poland must also be complied with. M. Clemenceau had, however, been greatly moved (and not unnaturally) by the declaration made by Marshal Foch's Committee at the end of their report. That report had only been distributed in the Council Chamber that morning; and he himself had not seen it when he had drawn up his proposals.

M. Clemenceau apparently wished to introduce into the armistice certain conditions which would compel the Germans to restore cattle, sheep, etc., which had been stolen from the unhappy peasants in the ravaged districts of France. In his opinion, that proposal belonged to the general question of reparations, which would be included in the final peace terms, and it could not be separated from similar questions, such as reparations due for the destruction of spindles and weaving machinery. But even if it were decided that the question should not be postponed until the general peace treaty came to be drawn up, such proposals should, he thought, be discussed separately with the Germans, who should be informed that the supply of raw materials would be made conditional on the return of the cattle. He need only assure M. Clemenceau that everybody felt most deeply for the general suffering which France had had to endure.

The fundamental misunderstanding which existed lay, however, in the fact that M. Clemenceau believed that the policy suggested was

(c) Mr. Bal-
four's speech
without delay
Final Naval
and Military
Terms of
Peace

one dictated by a desire to put off a decision and to yield to the Germans until such time as the British and American troops had been withdrawn from France. That was not only not the policy proposed, but the whole object of his proposal was to hasten the time when the Germans would have been compelled to demobilise their forces to such a degree as to render them helpless. Speed and thoroughness was what they were aiming at. The long succession of months spent, not in bringing about a peace, but in settling small additional conditions to the terms of the armistice, was postponing the final settlement in a dangerous manner. It was, therefore, with the object of reaching a complete and a rapid end that his proposals had been put forward. Consequently when M. Clemenceau pointed to the small number of American and British troops which would be left when the final solution would come—that was the very reason why he wished to hasten the settlement so that demobilisation of the Allied forces could be carried out without fear and misgiving, after the Germans themselves had been compelled to demobilise.

His plan might be good or it might be bad, but its object was to get over the danger which M. Clemenceau foresaw, so that Germany would no longer be able to resist, and the Allies would then be in a position to exact those reparations which might be thought to be just.

He wished, therefore, to submit the following resolution for discussion at the meeting to be held that afternoon. It embodied the general policy, which he thought did not in reality differ in substance from M. Clemenceau's, though differing in form:—

“The Supreme War Council agree that:

(1) The armistice with Germany shall be renewed on the present terms for an undefined period terminable by the Allied and Associated Powers at days' notice.

(2) Detailed and final naval, military, and air conditions shall be drawn up at once by a Committee to be presided over by Marshal Foch and submitted for the approval of the Supreme War Council: These, when approved, will be presented for signature to the Germans.

(3) After the signature of these preliminaries of peace Germany will be permitted to receive such controlled quantities of food, and raw materials for the rehabilitation of her industry, as shall be deemed just, having regard to the prior claims of Allied countries, especially those on whose industries Germany has deliberately inflicted damage.

(4) The question of the quantities of food and raw material to be allowed to Germany after the signature of the preliminaries of peace shall be referred to the Economic Council for examination and report.”

(It was agreed to adjourn the discussion until 3.0 p. m. that afternoon. The technical, Military and Naval Advisers were requested to be in attendance at 5.0 p. m.).

Annexure A

Conclusions of Committee Assembled in accordance with the Decision of Supreme War Council on 10th February, 1919

The Committee assembled at Marshal Foch's Headquarters in accordance with the decisions of the 10th February 1919 of the Supreme War Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, and consisting of:—

America	General Bliss, Mr. Norman Davis.
France	M. Clémentel, General Degoutte.
Great Britain	Lord Robert Cecil, General Thwaites.
Italy	M. Crespi, Brigadier-General Cavallero.

with whom were associated in accordance with the decision of the above Council the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied forces.

Marshal Pétain.
General Diaz.
General McAndrew (representing General Pershing.)
Admiral Benson.
Admiral de Bon.
Admiral Hope.
Admiral Grassi.

has the honour to submit to the Supreme War Council the following report:—

I. INFRINGEMENT BY GERMANY OF SUCCESSIVE CONVENTIONS OF THE ARMISTICE AND OF THE PROTOCOLS ANNEXED TO THE ARMISTICE

(1) *Repatriation of Alsatians-Lorrainians still incorporated in the German Army.*

The principle of this repatriation has been formally established by article 3 of the Convention of the Armistice of November 11, 1918.

But, owing to the sluggishness, the delays and even the refusals opposed by the German Authorities, it has not been executed. The Alsatians-Lorrainians incorporated in units stationed in the interior of the German territory or in those forming part of the Armies of the East, of Ukraine and of Southern Russia, have not been repatriated.

Such is the situation *de facto*, three months after the signature of the above-mentioned Convention.

It must be further remarked that it has been impossible to obtain from the Germans any information regarding the number of Alsatians-Lorrainians remaining incorporated in the German Army.

The whole of these facts constitutes a violation well characterised of Article 3 of the Convention of November 11.

Annex No. 1 gives the analysis of the documents concerning this question.

(1) It should be mentioned, however, that after the present report was adopted, the following telegram has been received from Spa :—

“German Commission gave this morning intimation that Alsatians Lorrainians were the first on the list of repatriation of the German troops of Nikolaiewsk”.

(2) *German behaviour in Poland.*

This includes on the one side :

(a) The organisation on the Eastern frontiers of Germany of two important military groups, one in the region of Königsberg, the other in the province of Posen, under the command of Field-Marshal Hindenburg.

(b) The obstacles brought about by the German troops returning from Ukraine against the anti-bolshevist action of the Poles in the region of Vilna-Pinsk.

This behaviour compelled the Allied and Associated Governments to send the telegram of February 2 to the German High Command, announcing the forwarding to Poland of an Inter-Allied Mission, and advising formally the said Command not to use force against the Poles.²

The answer of the German Government, formulated by Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, states word for word that Germany declines to execute the order of its adversaries.³

On the other hand, M. Dmowski, representative of the National Polish Committee, has brought the proof that the German High Command had signed with the Ukrainian Government a Convention, the clauses of which are contrary to the engagements taken by the German Government with the Allied and Associated Powers.

According to this convention, the Germans promise :

—to forbid the Poles access to the region Brest-Litovsk, Pinsk, Goloby, Kowel, Vlodava;

—to hand over this region to the Ukrainians as fast as it is evacuated by the German troops;

—not only to make no obstacle to the operations of the Ukrainians against the Poles in Galicia, but also to cover these operations;

—by this convention, the Germans formally recognise the maintenance of the Brest-Litovsk treaty.

² For the content of this telegram, see appendix C to BC-25 (SWC-3), p. 924

³ See annex II, p. 987.

Although the copy of this document which fell in our hands does not bear any date of signature, it is nevertheless evident that it refers to the present time, since the orders mentioned in it are to be carried out from January 31.

Furthermore the Germans have continued, after November 11 to make requisitions and to order coercive measures in Poland.

The above-mentioned behaviour and this secret Convention between the Germans and the Ukrainians constitutes a violation of articles 12, 13, 14, 15 of the Armistice Convention.

(See Annex II, note from Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, and Germano-Ukrainian Military Convention).

3°) *Revictualling of Poland.*

On January 21, 1919, by telegram n° 1740/C. R., the German Government was advised, through the President of the C. I. P. A.⁴ of Spa, of the measures taken by the Allied and Associated Governments to ensure, in accordance with article 16 of the Armistice Convention of November 11, the revictualling in foodstuffs of Poland.

On February 1st, the German Government gave their answer on the subject. In this document, they state that they cannot guarantee the safety of the food transports for Poland; they ask that the revictualling of the German ; . . . of the Eastern Provinces should begin at least at the same time as the transports of food for Poland: they propose in addition that the rolling stock necessary for this transport should be levied on the number of engines and railway trucks handed over by Germany to the Allies.

This reply is a violation of article 16 of the Convention of November 11, as it refuses to guarantee the safety of the food transports. It is otherwise a proof, owing to the other questions that it tries to bring up, (revictualling of Germany and handing over of railway material), of the ill-will of the German Government to execute the terms of the Convention that it signed.

(See Annex III, telegrams exchanged with C. I. P. A. and reply of the German Government concerning the revictualling of Poland).

4°) *Repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War.*

Clause 4 of the Convention of Armistice of January 16 is not executed.

(See Annex IV, telegram from General Nudant.)

5°) *Violation of Naval Conditions of Armistice.*

The Germans have failed in the following respects to comply with the terms of Armistice concluded at Trèves on 16 January, 1919:—

⁴ Abbreviation for "Commission Interalliée Permanente d'Armistice" (Inter-allied Permanent Armistice Commission).

(a) The Germans refuse to provide crews for twenty submarines, as they say the vessels are not in commission. They state that they refused to provide crews for these submarines at Trèves on 16 January, 1919. P. A. N. A. C.⁵ states that the German refusal regarding these crews was not accepted and that the Germans signed an engagement to the effect that they would provide crews.

(b) The Germans have commenced to break up several submarines instead of surrendering them in accordance with the terms of the Armistice. The Inspection Sub-Commission are now in Germany investigating this question, and so far as the investigation has proceeded it appears that 15 boats have had their engines removed.

(c) The Germans now say they have insufficient tugs to transfer 21 submarines from Germany to England by 17th February, 1919, although they signed an engagement to transfer the submarines by that date when at Trèves on 16 January, 1919.

(For further details, *vide* attached Annex V).

6°) *Questions relating to the surrender of the Mercantile Marine.*

While the German authorities have sought to reopen certain questions for discussion and have interpreted differently from ourselves certain possibly ambiguous phrases in the agreement, the Committee cannot say on the evidence now before them that the Germans have yet committed any act which can be construed as an infringement of their engagements under the Armistice. They have in fact handed over, or are about to hand over, a substantial amount both of freight and passenger tonnage.

7) *Financial Clauses.*

The German authorities, as set forth below, have not completely executed certain of their engagements under the Armistice, whether by reason of their practical difficulties or by wilful default.

(a) Whereas the German Government undertook under the Armistice to restore immediately all documents, cash and securities taken by them, they have in fact delivered so far only an insignificant quantity alleging by way of excuse that the political crisis at home and transport difficulties have rendered more rapid compliance impossible.

(b) Whereas under Article 1 of the Financial Protocol concluded in connection with the Armistice Renewal of December 13th, the German Government undertook not to grant authorisations for the export of securities and other valuables without the previous agreement of the Allies, such securities have in fact been allowed to leave Germany in certain cases. In justification of this the German Government plead that under the strict wording of the agreement they have done nothing contrary to it, in as much as they did not

⁵ Abbreviation for "Permanent Allied Naval Armistice Commission."

agree to prohibit the export of securities and the mere refusal to grant authorisations in circumstances where the law requires no authorisation is naturally not equivalent to prohibition. This trick was protested against by the Allied Financial Representatives at the January Conference at Trèves and the German authorities then promised to submit revised proposals. These revised proposals have just been received but have not yet been examined.

(c) Under Article IV of the Financial Protocol of Trèves of the 13th December the German authorities undertook to examine in agreement with the Allies the question of what measures could be taken for the restoration with the least possible delay of Allied property which had been sequestered. These negotiations have not yet been initiated and the German authorities have declared that they propose to discuss at the same time the question of sequestered property, whether Allied or enemy, in invaded districts generally.

II. MEANS OF ENFORCING COMPLIANCE

As regards the means of enforcing compliance, the Committee has decided to submit separately to the Supreme War Council the conclusions of each sub-Committee, military and economic.

(A) CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE ECONOMIC SUB-COMMITTEE

The Committee, without expressing any opinion as to the desirability of those methods or their appropriateness to the acts to be remedied, find that the following are the methods open to the Allied and Associated Powers of putting pressure upon the German Authorities in order to compel them to fulfil their engagements under the Armistice and its renewals:—

1. *Economic Methods.*

(i) to withhold altogether pending compliance all supplies of food including those already promised.

(ii) to delay these supplies and proportion their rate of delivery to the rate at which the conditions so far infringed are complied with.

(iii) to permit the first consignments of food already promised, but to intimate that Germany cannot expect any further supplies unless and until she mends her behaviour.

(iv) to impose, subject to any engagements which may have been entered into with neutral governments, a strict and absolute blockade upon trade to and from Germany in the Baltic. But the Committee doubt if this last method would practically produce much effect upon Germany. There has been very little relaxation of the blockade since the Armistice, and to withdraw this small relaxation would

not make the blockade substantially stricter than it is at present as far as Germany is concerned, while it would produce considerable hardship on the neutrals.

While the Committee is of opinion that, assuming the conditions in Germany are as serious as some, but by no means all, observers think, very considerable and effective pressure could be exerted upon Germany by withholding supplies of food, they desire to point out that any proposal to take action on such lines requires careful consideration in conjunction with its possible reaction on the internal condition of Germany. The Committee is itself doubtful whether it would be prudent to make use of this weapon except in the event of clear, unmistakable and deliberate infringement of the armistice on points of substance and importance.

(B) CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE MILITARY SUB-COMMITTEE

The following measures are submitted for the decision of the Supreme War Council:—

(1) To impose at once upon Germany fixed conditions as regards a military and naval status, comprising,

(a) the limitation of personnel to a strength of 25 Infantry Divisions, of which

5 for the Eastern front
5 for the Western front
5 for the Southern front
10 in reserve in the interior of Germany
5 cavalry divisions.

(b) The limitation of armaments by land, by sea and in the air and, consequently, the putting out of action of war material in excess.

(c) The Control of these measures.

(d) The regulation of the situation in the East of Germany so as to assure the future destiny of Poland. With this object in view.

To demand of Germany the cessation of all hostile movements and to insist that both German and Polish forces should stop on either side of the line.

(Map to be produced showing above mentioned line).

The dissolution of the groups which have just been formed in the East against Poland and the limitation of the forces maintained in these regions and in Eastern Prussia to a strength of 5 divisions.

The hastening of the evacuation of Polish territory by German troops coming from the Ukraine, so that such evacuation shall be completed by the 1st. March.

To occupy and operate the base at Dantzig, and the railway Dantzig-Mława as well as the railway and the waterway Dantzig-Thorn (application of Article 16 of the Convention of the 11th. November.)

To transport to Poland the Polish Army in France.

If these measures are agreed to by the Allied and Associated Governments, the following clauses will be the substance of the Convention the acceptance of which will be demanded of Germany.

(The draft of this Convention will be printed separately).

If the Germans refuse to accept these conditions, the Allied plenipotentiaries will declare that negotiations are broken off, that the armistice is ended and that, in consequence on the following date the Allies will reserve to themselves complete freedom of action.

The Allied and Associated Governments will then take the following measures.

(i) *Economic Measures.*

The blockade will be resumed with the greatest severity; therefore the measures which are now being carried out for the supply of food to Germany will cease.

(ii) *Military Measures.*

The Allied High Command will resume the unrestricted use of all its means of action.

The whole Committee decided at the conclusion of the meeting to add to their report the following declaration :—

“However, the members of the Committee desire to express this, their opinion: to obtain as rapidly as possible a final result and to put a stop to the difficulties which are constantly renewed by the Germans, the members of the Committee are of the opinion that Naval and Military terms of peace should be drawn up immediately by a Commission appointed for the purpose, and shall be imposed on the enemy.”

ANNEX I

On the 12th January General Nudant reported bad faith shown by the German Armistice Commission regarding the repatriation of men of Alsace-Lorraine.

On the 16th January Marshal Foch sent General Dupont ⁶ a telegram telling him to organise the repatriation of men of Alsace-Lorraine with the *Kriegsministerium* and to exact the greatest diligence from the German Government.

On the 23rd January General Winterfeldt ⁷ declared that on the 8th January fresh instructions had been sent by the *Kriegsministerium* to the Army of the East and to the authorities in the interior, but that a reply had not yet been received.

⁶ Gen. Charles Joseph Dupont, chief of the French mission at Berlin for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

⁷ Gen. H. K. A. Winterfeldt, member of the German Armistice Commission.

On the 27th January Marshal Foch asked General Nudant to obtain the repatriation of men of Alsace-Lorraine in Southern Russia, giving them priority in the repatriation scheme of German elements in that region.

On the 28th January General Dupont, replying to a question asked by General Desticker,⁸ reported that, in spite of the demands sent twice a day by him to the *Kriegsministerium*, he could obtain no information about the men of Alsace-Lorraine to be repatriated, either in the armies of the East or in the interior. He shows that it is a case of flagrant bad faith on the part of the *Kriegsministerium* in this matter and considers that only measures of coercion will obtain the looked for result; with this intent he proposes to retard the repatriation of the German prisoners of war.

On the 3rd February the German Commission rejected the proposal to repatriate the men of Alsace-Lorraine in Russia more rapidly than other German soldiers "as neither the means of transport nor the morale of the troops allowed of this being done."

On the 4th February, Marshal Foch insisted on his injunctions in this matter and declared that he would suppress the transports supplied for repatriation if satisfaction was not given.

ANNEX II

*Cypher Telegram, General Nudant, President C. I. P. A., to
Marshal Foch, Paris*

No. 367/M

SPA, 10 February, 1919, 1 p. m.

No. 544

The German Commission sent this morning a reply of Brockdorff-Rantzau to telegram No. 934 Guerre of the 2nd February.⁹

The Commission sent to Poland by the Associated Powers can only exercise its functions outside the limits of Germany as shown by the Convention of the Armistice. The German Government reserves to itself the formal rights of sovereignty within those limits. Germany is resolved to keep engagements made with the Poles according to Wilsonian principles, but will not tolerate such engagements being forced on them by German subjects of Polish origin.

The German Government reserves to itself the right of intervening in the case of Polish rebellions in Eastern Prussian provinces as long as all the Polish armed forces have not left territory actually

⁸ Gen. Pierre Henri Desticker, Chief of Staff to Marshal Foch.

⁹ For the content of this telegram, see appendix C to BC-25 (SWC-3), p. 924.

German. The ultimate nationality of these territories which Marshal Foch calls German Poland can only be settled at the treaty of Peace. Germany till then refuses to accept the injunctions of her adversaries on the subject of the attitude of her authorities in these territories.

Convention With the German General Command

A large number of German formations are now concentrated within the sector Goloby-Kovel-Pinsk-Brest-Litowsk-Wlodawa. In order to allow the German General Command to evacuate without hindrance these formations to Germany, a measure which will only be possible if the troops in the Ukraine Republic abstain from taking any action within the above sector against the Poles and also if the aforesaid sector does not fall in the course of evacuation into the hands of the Poles, the German General Command and the Command of the Republican troops of the Ukraine have agreed to sign the following Convention :—

(1) The German Command assures to the Authorities of the Assembly military control in this sector and engages itself not to allow the Poles to enter the said sector until the end of the evacuation and hands over to the authorities of the Ukraine the control and the use of the liberated territories as the German troops leave them.

(2) The operations of our troops against the Poles in the direction of Wladimir-Wolynsk-Sokal will proceed without opposition on the part of the Germans, moreover the right flank of our troops shall be made secure by the Germans according to the terms of the present Convention, in the sector occupied by them, against all attacks and surprises by the Poles.

(3) During the whole duration of the operations in the direction of Wladimir-Wolynsk-Sokal the right of using the railway lines Goloby-Kowel-Wladimir-Wolynsk for the purpose of transporting food and munitions of war is assured to the troops of the Ukraine.

(4) Free passage in the above mentioned territory as well as in the west of the Bug River is assured to the citizens of the Ukrainian Republic on the presentation of certificates issued by the Ukrainian authorities.

(5) The German and Ukrainian General Commands must from the 31st January issue orders in the sense of the aforesaid Convention.

(6) The present Convention does not deal with the future of the territory situated to the East of the River Bug which according to the terms of the Treaty signed at Brest-Litowsk on the 9th February 1918 belongs to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Republic of the people. The present Convention bears the signature of the Command of the 21st Corps, General Gipseek, for the Germans and is countersigned by the chief of the military mission., Major Muhlheim.

ANNEX III

Telegram, Field Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies to General Nudant, President of the Permanent Inter-Allied Armistice Commission, Spa

No. 1740/C.R.

G.Q.G.A., 20 January, 1919.

The Inter-Allied Supply Council is about to send to Dantzig the necessary provisions to remedy the present critical food situation in Poland. In accordance with Article 16 of the Armistice Convention of the 11th November, ask the President of the German Armistice Commission to make urgent representations to the German Government to assure the transport of at least 3,000 tons of food-stuffs daily from Dantzig to the Polish frontier.

The German Government must insure the absolute protection of this transport, the carrying out of which will be controlled by the Allied delegates.

Please report with as little delay as possible the measures taken by the German authorities.

WEYGAND

Telegram, General Nudant to Etat-Major Bacon

No. 496

From SPA, 27 January, 1919.

Reply to Telegram No. 3564/C.R.

(1) The German Government is ready in principle to allow food destined for Poland (of the Congress) to pass. But it seems doubtful whether the bad condition of the railways and the great shortage of rolling stock will permit of the flow of traffic without hindrance as far as the German-Polish frontier.

(2) Germany asks to be assured that the material supplied for the transport of these provisions shall be immediately returned.

(3) The German Commission reserves to itself the right of making other communications on this subject later on.

Telegram, Field Marshal Commander-in-Chief of Allied Armies (D.G.C.R.A.) to President C.I.P.A., Spa

No. 3790/C.R.

G.Q.G.A., 31 January, 1919.

A continuation of telegram No. 3564/C.R. and in reply to telegram 496 of the 27th January.

First, the arrangements made by the German Government to allow the passage of food into Poland are noted.

Secondly, it is noted that the rolling material supplied by the Germans for the transport of these provisions shall be immediately returned.

P.O. The Director General of C.R.A.
PAYOT

Translation

*Representative of the German Government to General Nudant,
President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission*

In the full séance of the Armistice Commission at Spa on the 21st January 1919, General Nudant produced a note on the despatch of provisions to Poland in which the German Government was asked to ensure the transport of at least 3,000 tons of provision daily from Dantzig for the Polish frontier. Before the despatch of this note the representative of the Polish Minister had asked the management of the Dantzig railways to enter into negotiations with him on this subject. The management of the Dantzig railways refused to enter into negotiations, not having the power to do so; at the same time they accepted the request of the Polish Government. In consequence the despatch of at least 300 waggons and if possible of 500 waggons of food *per diem* had been contemplated (such food arriving at Dantzig on American ships) from Dantzig to the frontier station of Ilowo and even from that station as far as the territory of Poland according to the agreement. This transport will be carried out by the Administration of the Prussian Railways. The Prussian Minister of Public works informed us of this request made by the Polish Minister of Communications. At the same time the Minister of Public Works is not without knowledge that owing to the difficulties of exploitation, resulting in the first place from the lack of means of exploitation and from the lack of coal, it was not possible to furnish the supplementary means for this transport unless the necessary locomotives and waggons were put at the disposal of the Prussian railways.

To say nothing of the difficulties regarding the transport it must also be mentioned that technically it is impossible, considering the trans-shipment installation at Dantzig and its port (quays, warehouses, stations etc.) and considering the present labour situation to trans-ship daily more than from 1000 to 1500 tons from the ships into the waggons. Even to reach this number special measures are necessary which have already been arranged for.

As daily discharge of 3000 tons would necessitate the use of 10 extra waggons and the existing organisation of the port does not allow of it, as Dantzig, a Baltic port, does not lend itself to the use of large Atlantic steamers drawing a great deal of water.

Consequent on the above and in compliance with the orders that I have received with the knowledge of the Allied Governments I am instructed also to make it known to the Allied Governments that the German Government cannot undertake the transport asked for by the Polish Government. Such transport would necessitate a super-addition of labour and means of exploitation and an expenditure of coal which in face of the existing extreme difficulties of exploitation could not be supplied.

The German Government therefore proposes that the Allies should agree that the locomotives and trucks required for this transport should be levied from the number of locomotives and trucks to be surrendered by the Germans, and should be kept for this purpose until a convenient date, a date which will be reached after the end of the carrying out of this transport.

Moreover it may be said that the Poles will not be able to give up locomotives. If there was no trans-shipment of transport at Illowo by the Poles, the German Government would be obliged, in view of the continual intervention by the Poles in the running of the German railways, above all by the retention of the material for exportation, to insist in addition that the Polish Government should supply Germany with a number of locomotives and trucks equal to the number of those entering Polish territory.

Considering the very difficult situation as regards coal in Germany the German Government wishes to state that it trusts the Allies will take into account in case this transport takes place the rise in the consumption of coal which will result from it, when the time comes to fix the extent of their demands in coal from Germany, and above all that they should authorise the transport of coal by sea from the North Sea Ports and from Stettin to the Baltic ports.

The German Government considers it understood that the expenses of transport, that is to say the cost of trans-shipment from the ships to the waggons based on local tariffs will be charged to the Allied Governments.

General Nudant has emphasised in the note mentioned at the beginning of this letter, the importance of the German Government guaranteeing the safety of this transport. Naturally the German Government will take the necessary measures to guarantee the transport from a military point of view, but I am instructed to make it known to the Allied Governments that the President of the Province of Eastern Prussia has expressed his fears that the population in this province in their excited state and suffering from hunger, will assume a hostile attitude in the case of food being transported and destined for Poland, and that it would not be possible to stop the people attacking the transports. The German Government therefore asks

the Allied Government[s] to consider whether it would not be possible simultaneously with the transport of food destined for Poland, to commence carrying out the transport of food for the German population, and particularly for Dantzic.

VON HANIEL

SPA, 1 February, 1919.

ANNEX IV

General Nudant to Marshal Foch 370/N

Telegram No. 480/P. G. 2

SENlis, 11. 2. 19., 2:30 p. m.

I have received a report from General Dupont of which I consider it necessary to give the substance:—

(1) The repatriation of Russian prisoners of war which the German Government promised to stop still continues by dribblets. The greater part of these are enrolled in the Bolshevik Armies.

(2) The Polish repatriation which had been promised is still not being carried out.

(3) Russian Bolshevik agents circulate in Eastern Prussia and enroute [*recruit*] Russian prisoners of war on the spot.

(4) The Bolshevik campaign in Russian prisoners of war camps which General Ewart¹⁰ tried to put a stop to, continues with a tacit agreement of the German authorities. A Russian Bolshevik Office working in Berlin which General Dupont had closed carries on a secret activity.

(5) There is no hostility between the Germans and the Bolsheviks. Numerous and reliable proofs show that these two parties are accomplices probably with a view to fighting the Poles.

All the information rests on certain proofs of which some have been brought to me by Commandant Penaucier proceeding from Berlin to Paris.

E. M. A.
2nd Bureau.

ANNEX V

German Submarines

A thorough inspection of the submarines in Germany was carried out in December by a Sub-Commission of the Allied Naval Armistice

¹⁰ Maj. Gen. Sir Richard Ewart, Chief of the British Military Mission at Berlin; President, Inter-Allied Commission for Repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War, January–May, 1919.

Commission, and as a result the supplementary clause was inserted in the Agreement for prolongation of armistice on 16 January, 1919.

On 23 January, 1919 (one week later) Admiral Goette was directed to report by W/T details of the steps being taken to carry out Article XXII as amplified.

No reply having been received on 25 January, a minimum performance expected before a further renewal of the Armistice on 17 February was telegraphed to Germany. The demand and the German reply were:—

DEMAND

- (1) 49 to be sent to Harwich forthwith, under their own power or to be towed.
 3 Russians—special arrangements will be made.
 Submarine dock and lifting vessels to be sent over unless required for taking to pieces submarines under construction.
- (2) The hulls of not less than 50 of those under construction to be broken up.
- (3) As regards remainder, all propelling and auxiliary machinery, motors, torpedo and mine tubes, periscopes, guns and mounting- to be removed.

GERMAN REPLY

24 submarines have been disarmed; of these:—

- 21 will be escorted to England, but shortage of tugs prevents any guarantee that this can be completed by 17 February.
- 3 too far advanced in disarmament to be towed. Will be completely dismantled.

24

Others are accounted for as follows:—

24

- 1 in Norway—will probably be brought over on 1 February.
- 1 in Holland.
- 5 in Spain awaiting diplomatic negotiations.
- 10 late Mediterranean, transferred on 12 January.
- 3 late Mediterranean, with engine defects, will be towed over when tugs are available.
- 20 newly-built—no crews available—at disposal of A. N. A. C.

64

All remaining submarines in Germany will be disabled, and work is in progress.

Salvage vessels *Vulcan* and *Cyclops* cannot be transported during winter months. Floating docks for submarines are not arranged for oversea transport. Both salvage vessels and docks at disposal of A. N. A. C.

The proposal that the newly-built submarines should be taken to England by German seamen was refused at Trèves on 16th. January, 1919.

When above has been carried out Germany claims to have fulfilled terms of Armistice and supplementary conditions.

To this A. N. A. C. telegraphed further on 3 February:

At Trèves it was pointed out that the number which could proceed under own power or be towed was 64. Of these 16 have been surrendered, and the three Russians may be broken up, leaving 45 to be surrendered.

Germany is required to execute completely the amended Article XXII. without further discussion and to reassemble those submarines which have been wilfully rendered unfit for sea and tow them over.

*Copy of Telegram to Afloat, Aberdeen, No. 926, Date 30.1.19.
Sent 1845.*

926. Following intercepted from Admiral Goette to PANAC 1213 G. M. T. Reference your query timed 1220 of 23.1.19, the requirements of the Armistice Treaty and of the Trèves supplements thereto dated January 16 are being carried out as follows:

(1) Of 24 submarines, including submarine cruisers and mine layers, which have been disarmed, 21 will be escorted to a harbour to be named by you. No guarantee can be given that the ferrying over of these vessels can be carried out by February 17, as only a small number of suitable tugs (?) is at our disposal. Time and method of bringing over the individual groups will be reported. A special proposal is to follow regarding three submarines of this group which are as yet not ready for towage.

(2) *U. 757* (as received) will probably be brought over from Christiania Fjord on February 1st. Details will be reported. A special proposal follows concerning the giving up *U. B. 6* from Holland. As regards the giving up of the five submarines lying in Spain, the agreement of the Spanish Government has not yet reached us. From the German point of view there is nothing against their being handed over.

(3) Ten, formerly Mediterranean submarines, were brought over on January 12; apart from these, three submarines in an attempt to bring them over on January 12 developed engine room defects. These boats will be towed over as soon as tugs are available. Time will be reported.

(4) 20 newly built boats, which had not yet been put in commission, are lying in the stocks at your disposal.

(5) All remaining submarines lying in Germany including submarine cruisers and mine layers, will be disabled. Work is in progress. [The construction of the salvage vessels *Vulcan*]¹¹ and

¹¹ These words supplied from the copy of the text appearing in Miller, *My Diary*, vol. XIV, p. 366.

Cyclops makes it impossible for them to be transported across the high seas during the winter months. The floating docks for submarines are not arranged for overseas transport. Both salvage vessels and submarine docks are at your disposal.

Copy of Telegram From Admiralty to Coastguard W/T Rosyth

Repeat C-in-C. G.F. Date 3 February 1919. Sent 1715.
From ANAC to C-in-C., H.S.F., for Admiral Goette.

Reference your 1213 of 30 January¹² and 1336 of 1 February,¹³ the conditions upon which the Armistice was renewed at Trèves demanded the surrender of all submarines which could proceed to sea or be towed, and it was pointed out that this number was 64.

German protest was not accepted and the document was signed by the German delegates.

Of these 64, 16 have been surrendered, and the three Russian submarines may be broken up, leaving 45 to be surrendered.

You are required to completely execute the amended Article 22 of Armistice without further discussion, and to re-assemble those submarines which have been wilfully rendered unfit for sea, and to tow them over.

A report of the distinguishing numbers of the above 45 boats (see my message 1300 of 25 January) is to be furnished by W/T forthwith. You will report before midnight 6th/7th February whether you intend to comply with the above demand. If not, the Allies and United States will be informed accordingly.

(1715)

Copy of Telegram No. 955

To C-in-C., G. F. Date 1.2.19. Sent 1957

955. From Admiral Goette to PANAC. 1336 G. T. In clear German.

Your question concerning W/T 1220 of 23.1.19 is already answered by W/T 1213 of 28.1.19. On behalf of my Government I reply to your W/T 1300 of 25.1.19 as follows—

(1) My statement of 7.1 that your question of 2.1 concerning the delivery of submarines could not be replied to without more explanation has, up to now, been ignored. The German Government was compelled, therefore, to take the necessary measures for carrying

¹² The German communication quoted in telegram No. 926, *supra*.

¹³ The German communication quoted in telegram No. 955, *infra*.

out the new obligation imposed at the meeting at Trèves on 16.1.19, with regard to Article 22 of the Armistice conditions, without your explanations. You have been informed of these measures by my W/T 1213 of 28.1.19.

(2) In the case of the three submarines mentioned in para. 1 of the above-named W/T, for which a special proposal was to be made, their disarmament has already advanced so far that it is impossible to fit them up again for towing purposes. They will be completely dismantled.

(3) All other measures, of which you were informed by W/T 1213 of 28.1.19, cannot possibly be cancelled and are being carried out. The complete dismantling of the ships which, according to the agreement at Trèves on the 16.1.19 were not to be handed over, is now proceeding rapidly. It is not proposed to restore such dismantled ships into a state in which they could steam or be towed.

(4) The proposal that the newly-built submarines should be taken across by German seamen was refused at Trèves on 16.1.19 in a written protest. As you have already been informed, there are twenty such submarines on the stocks and they are at your disposal. A list of them will be communicated to you.

(5) Time of departure of separate groups will be communicated to you.

(6) When the measures reported in W/T 1213 of 28.1.19 have been carried out, Germany will have fulfilled the obligations contained in the terms of the Armistice and the supplementary conditions. Confirmation is requested.

Dep. Note. I. D. 25 W/T 1213 of 28.1.19 should read W/T 1213 of 30.1.19.

I. D. 25

Copy.

From the Allied Naval Armistice Commission to the Secretary of the Admiralty

4 FEBRUARY 1919.

The attached messages which have passed between the Allied Naval Armistice Commission and the German Admiral Goette are forwarded for special perusal.

The Allied Naval Armistice Commission observes a distinct reluctance on the part of Germany to fulfil Art. XXII of the Terms of Armistice (*re* surrender of submarines). Also, they have been informed that the surrender of German merchant shipping is proceeding very slowly, if at all, in regard to the large and important passenger ships.

The Commission recommends that, before the Armistice is renewed (it has to be signed by p. m. 16 February), the Supreme War Council may be pleased to consider what penalty should be imposed for non-performance in regard to the two points mentioned in para. 2 above.

M. E. BROWNING.
Vice-Admiral.
 A. GRASSET,
Contre-Admiral.
 S. S. ROBINSON,
Rear-Admiral.

Extract From Telegram, No. 153, of 5 February, From Admiralty, London, to Admiralty, Paris

The Board considered that there are no suitable naval penalties that can be applied to enforce compliance with armistice terms, and that any penalties applied must be of a military character, and that they should represent this to the Supreme War Council.

Copy of Telegram From Admiralty to C. G. W/T Rosyth and C-in-C., G.[F.]

23. 1. 19.

ANAC to C-in-C., German H.S.F. for Admiral Goette.

Report by W/T details steps that are now being taken to carry out Article XXII. of Terms of Armistice as amended on 16 January. (1920)

Copy of Telegram

25. 1. 19.

884. From ANAC to C-in-C., H.S.F. for Admiral Goette.

Referring to my 1220 of 23 January, to which no reply has been received, the following minimum performance is expected before the Armistice is again renewed on 17 February.

Firstly, there is now a total of 49 submarines to be surrendered, which can proceed to sea under their own power or be towed (the disposal of the three Russian submarines at Kiel is under consideration). These 49 are to be sent to Harwich forthwith, the numbers in each batch sent over being reported. The submarine dock and lifting vessels are also to be sent over unless required for the taking to pieces of the hulls of submarines under construction, in which case they may be retained for a period which is to be reported.

Your attention is called to the fact that the Allied Naval Armistice Sub-Commissions report that some of the submarines in this category have been rendered unready for sea since the December inspection. These are to be reconditioned at once.

The 49 submarines mentioned above are as follows: Wilhelmshaven one U.C. Bremen Vulcan Yard two U, three U.B. Vegesack five U. Hamburg Blohm and Voss one U, ten U.C. Vulcan two U, two U.B. Cuxhaven one U.B. Heligoland two U.C. Kiel eight U, one U.B., three U.C. Germania Yard five U, three U.B.

Secondly, the hulls of not less than fifty submarines of those under construction either in the water or on the stocks are to be cut to pieces, those most advanced being selected.

Thirdly, as regards the remaining submarines, all propelling and auxiliary machinery, motors, torpedo tubes, mine tubes, periscopes, guns and mountings are to be removed.

Addressed Coastguard Wireless Rosyth.

Repeated to C-in-C., G.F. 884.

(1800)

*Non-compliance on the Part of Germany With the Terms
of Armistice*

NAVAL CLAUSES AFFECTING SUBMARINES

(a) 11 November, 1918. (Original article).

XXII. The surrender at the ports specified by the Allies and the United States of all submarines at present in existence (including all submarine cruisers and minelayers), with armament and equipment complete. Those which cannot put to sea shall be denuded of crew and equipment, and shall remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. Submarines ready to put to sea shall be prepared to leave German ports immediately on receipt of wireless order to sail to the port of surrender, the remainder to follow as early as possible. The conditions of this Article shall be completed within 14 days of the signing of the Armistice.

(b) 13 December, 1918.

Breaches Committee

Naval Clauses.

XXII. Submarines *U. 80*, *U. 82*, and *U.B. 77* have still to be towed to Harwich. Five submarines in Spain, one in Norway, one in Holland, have still to be surrendered.

GERMANY'S REPLY

We do not yet know the reason for the non-internment of submarines *U. 80*, *U. 82*, and *U.B. 77*. Inquiries are being undertaken

with a view to their immediate surrender. With regard to the submarines interned in Spain, Norway, and Holland, Germany has no power to dispose of them. However, Germany will not put forward any protest on account of violation of neutrality if, on the demand of the Allies, the submarines interned in Spain, Norway and Holland, are surrendered to the Entente.

In no case can the fact that the vessels have not been surrendered be interpreted as an *infraction* of the Armistice conditions.

(c) *16 January, 1919.*

5. Naval Clauses.

Article XXII. of the Armistice Agreement of 11 November, 1918, shall be supplemented as follows:—

In order to ensure the execution of such clause, the German authorities shall be bound to carry out the following conditions, viz.,

All submarines capable of putting to sea or of being towed shall be handed over immediately and shall make for Allied ports. Such vessels shall include submarine cruisers, minelayers, relief ships and submarine docks. All submarines which cannot be surrendered shall be completely destroyed or dismantled under the supervision of the Allied Commissioners.

Submarine construction shall cease immediately, and all submarines in course of construction shall be destroyed or dismantled under the supervision of the Allied Commissioners.

Minutes of the Meeting of the Representatives of the Five Great Powers at 3 p. m., and of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council at 5 p. m., Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, February 12, 1919

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson
Mr. Lansing

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries

Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison

Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B.
Mr. H. Norman

M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn

ITALY

H.E. M. Orlando
H.E. Baron Sonnino

JAPAN

Baron Makino
H.E. M. Matsui

Secretaries

Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele

Joint Secretariat

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Lieut. C. Burden

BRITISH EMPIRE

Capt. E. Abraham

FRANCE

Capt. A. Portier

ITALY

Major A. Jones

JAPAN

M. Saburi

ALSO PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Gen. Tasker H. Bliss
Admiral Benson
Maj. Gen. McAndrew
Lt. Comdr. Carter
Captain de Marenches
Mr. Hoover
Mr. Baruch
Mr. Davis
Mr. McCormick

BRITISH EMPIRE

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, K.T.
Maj. Gen. [*Lieut. Gen.?*]
Sir Henry [*Herbert?*]
Lawrence, K.C.B.
Maj. Gen. Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C.M.G.
Maj. Gen. Thwaites, C.B.
Rear Admiral Hope, C.B.
Capt. Fuller, R.N.

FRANCE

M. Klotz
M. Loucheur
M. Clementel
M. Leygues
Marshal Foch
Marshal Petain
Gen. Weygand
Gen. Degoutte
Gen. Belin
Admiral de Bon
Lt. de Vaisseau
Odend'hal
M. de Lasteyrie

ITALY

H E. M. Crespi
H E. Gen Díaz
Gen Cavallero
Admiral Grassi

JAPAN

Gen. Nara
Col. Nagai
Capt. Fujioka
Capt. de Vaisseau Nomura
Capt. de Vaisseau Yamamoto

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux

1. M. CLEMENCEAU, in opening the Meeting, suggested that the discussion should be continued from the point at which it left off in the morning.¹

Renewal of
Armistice:
Reduction of
German forces

PRESIDENT WILSON said that after reflecting on the morning's proceedings he had come to the conclusion that the difference of opinion was reduced to one point. That point was one of great importance. Mr. Balfour had made the difficulty quite clear by saying that we should not delay until our forces were so reduced that we could not compel the Germans to accede to our demands. This was the point that he had himself sought to make clear. By reducing our forces month by month, and by renewing the armistice month by month, we might be led to a stage at which Germany could resist with some prospect of success. He wished to be sure the danger point was past before reducing the Allied forces to the extent mentioned in the morning. Should trouble arise, he would be quite willing to re-mobilise the American forces, but this might be difficult, and it would certainly be a lengthy process, as the troops would have scattered to their homes. The longer we dealt with the Germans on this plan, the longer their hopes would have to grow. This might lead them to a false sense of self-confidence, and the German Government's forces might consolidate in a way which it was not at present possible to forecast, and the ancient pride and boastfulness of Germany might gain a new lease of life. The point under discussion in the morning concerning which no agreement had been reached was the question whether the military terms of peace could be isolated from the other conditions of peace. Peace, it had been said, was one fabric with one pattern. The plan of general disarmament, which had been alluded to, seemed to render it difficult as a provisional measure to prejudge what should be the relative strengths of national forces. Disarmament contained two elements—(1) the maintenance of an adequate force for internal police; (2) the national contribution to the general force of the future League of Nations. At present we did not contemplate that Germany should make any contribution to the latter force. We need therefore not take that element into considera-

¹ See BC-29, *supra*.

tion. All we need contemplate was the amount of armed force required by Germany to maintain internal order and to keep down Bolshevism. This limit could be fixed by the military advisers. In general, he felt that until we knew what the German Government was going to be, and how the German people were going to behave, the world had a moral right to disarm Germany, and to subject her to a generation of thoughtfulness. He therefore thought it was possible to frame the terms of Germany's disarmament before settling the terms of peace. He was encouraged in this belief by the assurance that the military advisers could produce a plan in 48 hours. It might take more than 48 hours for the heads of Governments to agree on this plan. It was not his idea that the armistice should be protracted very much longer, but a definite term could not be fixed until the Governments had matured their judgment regarding the disarmament of Germany. Once this point was settled, the Germans could be given short notice to accede to our demands under pain of having the armistice broken. The main thing was to do this while our forces were so great that our will could not be resisted. The plan he proposed would make safety ante-date the peace. He thought that this brought the two views into accord as regards the purpose in the minds of both parties to the morning's debate.

Before concluding, he wished to draw M. Clemenceau's attention to a statement made by the papers that the French Government had stopped demobilisation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this was not true.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the rumour was general throughout France, and some of his friends on their way to the front had found people much alarmed at the prospect of a renewal of the war. This feeling rendered people uneasy about re-starting their ordinary lives, and these rumours were very much to our disadvantage. He thought it important to put a stop to mischief of this kind. He was himself convinced that the rumours were unfounded but after all the world was full of accomplished liars, and he wished to spoil their game.

He regretted that he had not put his views in the morning in so complete a manner.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the purpose pursued by President Wilson was exactly the same as his own. He was therefore prepared to accept his proposal. Before doing so, however, he would like more precise information on certain points. We were to ask the experts to state as quickly as possible the conditions of the disarmament of Germany. The American experts, President Wilson had said, were ready. The French were also ready.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that the English were ready, too.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in these conditions their report could be obtained very soon. But the thought struck him that President Wilson was going away in a few days, and the date of his return was uncertain. Though the report of the experts might be received in a short time, he would not like to discuss a matter of such importance in the absence of President Wilson. Doubtless President Wilson would be away for a month. The delay therefore would be of considerable extent. There would be a further month of demobilisation, and a critical diminution of our forces. He was not discussing the question in principle, but only seeking a way out of the difficulty. At present the armistice was being renewed month by month, but the Allies had a right to break it at any moment after 48 hours' notice. There was not therefore a very great difference between the two systems, save that the one at present enforced was established for a slightly longer period. If the President had been staying, he would have raised no objection to the indeterminate prolongation of the armistice, but, as he was going, the difficulty arose, as he was quite unwilling to discuss the matter while President Wilson was away. He would therefore suggest that things should be left as they were, and that the armistice should be renewed as heretofore. This would not prevent us from giving a stern warning to the Germans at the next renewal that severer conditions would be made at the end of the month. This modification of President Wilson's proposal did not mean any disagreement. It was quite clear that the five Governments were united. In dealing with the Germans, we must be careful not only of the substance, but also of the form. The slightest appearance of hesitation would be immediately interpreted by them as a sign of weakness and an encouragement to make use of it. President Wilson's plan he again wished to repeat satisfied him completely. He only wished to get more precision as to the date.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that M. Clemenceau had paid him an undeserved compliment. In technical matters most of the brains he used were borrowed: the possessors of these brains were in Paris. He would, therefore, go away with an easy mind if he thought that his plan had been adopted in principle. He had complete confidence in the views of his military advisers. If the military experts were to certify a certain figure as furnishing a marginal safety, he would not differ from them. The only other question was to decide whether this was the right time to act. On this point, he was prepared to say yes. In another month's time, the attitude of Germany might be more uncompromising. If his plan were agreed on in principle, he would be prepared to go away and leave it to his colleagues to decide whether the programme drafted by the technical advisers was the right one. He did not wish his absence to stop so important,

essential and urgent work as the preparation of a preliminary peace. He hoped to return by the 13th or 15th March, allowing himself only a week in America. But he did not wish that, during his unavoidable absence, such questions as the territorial question and questions of compensation should be held up. He had asked Colonel House to take his place while he was away.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was completely satisfied.

M. PICHON asked whether it would not be possible to obtain the report of the experts before the departure of President Wilson.

LORD MILNER pointed out that the question had already been studied and the figure of 25 divisions had been laid down as the maximum Germany should maintain.

M. ORLANDO said that he was extremely glad of this agreement. He had felt that the difference was rather in the form than in the substance. It remained, however, to decide whether the Armistice should be renewed *sine die* or with a fixed term.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this question remained open.

M. ORLANDO said it must also be decided whether the Germans were to be given a warning that the reduction of their forces was to be imposed on them. He, himself, had asked Marshal Foch whether the reduction to 25 divisions corresponded to the maximum force which could safely be left to Germany as its final establishment. Marshal Foch had replied in the affirmative. Italy, before the war, had 25 divisions on a peace footing. Germany was a far larger country, and he was therefore inclined to think that 25 divisions must be the minimum required for internal order.

M. SONNINO asked whether there should not be in the Armistice a clause enabling the Allies to exercise some supervision over the disarmament required, and to force the Germans to accept an organization of this kind.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the military experts appeared to have means of obtaining knowledge.

M. SONNINO said that Marshal Foch appeared to have doubt on this subject. We should be in a position to obtain week by week, or even day by day, knowledge of the measures taken by Germany to fulfil our demands.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that it might not be possible for the Governments to make a decision in 48 hours. For instance, the naval program put up on the previous occasion contained some very "large orders." It would need very careful consideration. The Governments, therefore, could not be ready in time for the next renewal of the Armistice, but unless the Germans were told to be ready for something more drastic on the next occasion, they would think that the Allies were weakening. It would, therefore, he thought, be more

prudent to renew the Armistice indefinitely and say that final terms would be put forward at the next renewal. It might not be possible for the Governments to be ready in a month. He, therefore, advocated a renewal *sine die*, coupled with the warning suggested above. The Armistice would then be ended by the formulation of definite preliminary terms of peace on military conditions. The question of the Kiel Canal and the question of the cables, included in the naval report, would have to be dissociated from the purely naval conditions to be imposed at the close of the Armistice. These matters concerned the ultimate peace.

MR. BALFOUR said that, before lunch, he had circulated a series of resolutions which he thought might, perhaps, bring the discussion to a head and meet, perhaps, all the objections raised. Since listening to the discussion, he had re-drafted these resolutions and he proposed to read them, as amended, to the Meeting. Mr. Balfour then read the following:—

The Supreme War Council agree that:—

(1) As a condition of the renewal of the armistice Marshal Foch shall stipulate that the Germans shall desist from all offensive operations against the Poles, whether in Posen or elsewhere.

(2) The Armistice with Germany shall be renewed for a short period terminable by the Allied and Associated Powers at three days' notice.

(3) Detailed and final naval, military, and air conditions of the preliminaries of peace shall be drawn up at once by a Committee to be presided over by Marshal Foch and submitted for the approval of the Supreme War Council; these, when approved, will be presented for signature to the Germans, and the Germans shall be at once informed that this is the policy of the Associated Governments.

(4) After the signature of these preliminaries of peace, Germany will be permitted to receive such controlled quantities of food, and raw materials for the rehabilitation of her industry, as shall be deemed just, having regard to the prior claims of Allied countries, especially those on whose industries Germany had deliberately inflicted damage.

(5) The question of the quantities of food and raw material to be allowed to Germany after the signature of the preliminaries of peace shall be referred to the Economic Council for consideration and report.

PRESIDENT WILSON questioned whether it would be good policy to forewarn the Germans at the next renewal of the Armistice of the intentions embodied in paragraphs (4) and (5).

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, for his part, he would be very unwilling to do so, as the Allies would seem to be offering the Germans an inducement.

MR. BALFOUR then suggested that only Clauses (1), (2) and (3) should be given to Marshal Foch for communication to the Ger-

mans; Clauses (4) & (5) could be accepted by the Governments as fixing their future policy when the military terms of a preliminary peace had been accepted by Germany.

(The above Clauses were then accepted, with the reservation that only Clauses (1), (2) and (3) should be communicated by Marshal Foch to the Germans.)

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the military advisers should be summoned and that these clauses should be communicated to them. He pointed out that it would not be sufficient to tell the Germans to reduce their forces to a fixed number of divisions. Napoleon had done this and the Prussians had passed the whole population through the formations allowed them. It was, therefore, essential that the military experts should lay down what was to be Germany's military law. It might, further, be necessary to control those operations by means of High Commissioners appointed by the Allies.

MR. BALFOUR added that a similar provision must be made concerning munitions.

(It was, therefore, decided that, after a short adjournment, the military experts should be summoned.)

2. MR. BALFOUR said that, before adjourning, he wished to draw the attention of the Meeting to two subjects, the first of which was the Commission arising out of M. Hymans' statement.² He had framed a draft resolution on this subject, which he proposed to read. Mr. Balfour then read the following:—

Commission on
Belgian Terri-
torial Claims

A. That an expert Commission, composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, be appointed to consider and advise on the following questions arising out of the statement made at the Quai d'Orsay on February 11th., by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs on the claims of Belgium, namely:—

(1) The proposed transfer of the town and district of Malmédy to Belgium.

(2) The definite incorporation in Belgium of the town of Moresnet.

(3) The possible rectification in favour of Holland of the German-Dutch frontier on the lower Ems, as a compensation to Holland for meeting Belgian claims in regard to sovereignty over the mouth of the Scheldt and the southern part of Dutch Limburg.

B. That the question of securing for Belgium in times of peace the full rights and liberties which, according to the statement made at the Quai d'Orsay on February 11, by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, she claims in regard to:

² At meeting of February 11; see BC-28, p. 957.

(a) the navigation and control of the waters of the Scheldt in its entire course.

(b) the Ghent-Terneuzen canal, and

(c) the communication by canals and railways between Antwerp and the Rhine and Meuse and Dutch Limburg

be referred to the Commission on the International Control of Ports, Waterways and Railways.

(This resolution was accepted without discussion.)

3. MR. BALFOUR, continuing, said that the second subject to which he wished to draw the attention of the Meeting was the method of dealing with reports sent by the Polish Commission. He proposed to institute a Committee of Experts representing the five Great Powers to follow the work of the Commission and to study the results obtained. This Committee would only send up to the Supreme Council big questions requiring their decision. If all the reports were separately sent to each of the Capitals, confusion would ensue. If all communications came direct to the Council, the Council would be overwhelmed by a quantity of unnecessary material. It was, therefore, desirable to have a Committee to sift this material, to answer the bulk of the correspondence and only refer when necessary to the Council.

Committee To
Deal With Reports
From Polish
Commission

(The following resolution was then adopted:—

It is agreed that a Committee, composed of one representative each of the Governments of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan (?), be appointed to deal with all reports and requests for instructions from the Commission sent to Poland. On matters of high policy, the Committee will refer to the Conference of the Associated Powers.)

Notification of
Names to the
Secretary-
General

4. It was further decided that the nominees of the various Governments should be certified to the Secretary-General as soon as possible.

(5) M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a demand from the Poles that at the next renewal of the Armistice the Germans should be required to return agricultural implements stolen from the Poles. He felt that as a similar provision had been made in favour of the French and Belgian peasants, this request could not in fairness be refused.

Polish Demand
for Return of
Agricultural
Implements

PRESIDENT WILSON said that, even at the risk of seeming hard-hearted, he thought it would be best not to undertake this. The Poles were technically on German territory. The Allies might have moral right on their side, but the Germans would have the law on theirs.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it would not be possible to put pressure on the Germans outside the Armistice and say to them: "You cannot expect us to assist you as long as you keep goods stolen from our friends".

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that this should be referred to the Economic Council.

- (6) M. CLEMENCEAU agreed to this provided the question of the return of French cattle should also be referred to that Council.

Return of
French Cattle

(It was therefore decided that the question of the return of agricultural implements to the Poles, and the question of the return of French cattle should be referred to the Economic Council.

For recommendations on these subjects see Annexures "A" and "B").

- (7) M. CLEMENCEAU said that there were now Civil Commissioners attached to Marshal Foch. He wished to know whether it was understood that these Civil Commissioners were not to meet the Germans independently. The war was not yet over, and he felt that only soldiers should have direct intercourse with the enemy. The Governments could give orders to Marshal Foch, but on technical questions it would be difficult to give orders to civilian experts.

Civil Commis-
sioners attached
to Marshal Foch

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he would agree provided that it were well understood that Marshal Foch consulted the Civil Commissioners whenever economic questions arose.

- (8) On M. Clemenceau's proposal it was agreed, without discussion, that the Allies should resume commercial relations with Turkey and Bulgaria.

Resumption of
Commercial
Relations With
Turkey &
Bulgaria

(The meeting then adjourned for a short time and was resumed on the entry of the military advisers.)

M. CLEMENCEAU read the first 3 clauses of the Resolution concerning the renewal of the Armistice.

- (9) MARSHAL FOCH asked whether the first clause should not be made more definite. The expression "or elsewhere" made it difficult to put a stop to offensive operations by the Germans. They might, for instance, undertake movements not directly against the Poles, but in such a manner as to make the position held by the Poles untenable.

Line of Demarcation
Between
German & Polish
Armies

Marshal Foch explained this with the help of a map.

(It was then agreed that Marshal Foch be authorised to settle a line of demarcation between the German and Polish Armies without prejudice to the future frontiers of Germany and Poland.)

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Poles complained of German action against the civil population as well as against the armed forces.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this matter could not be settled by Marshal Foch and suggested that if further complaints arose the question should be reconsidered by the Council.

(This was agreed to.)

(10) M. CLEMENCEAU explained the intentions of the Governments in connection with clause 2, and asked the military and naval experts to get to work immediately and to keep in close touch with himself.

Period of
Renewal of
Armistice

(11) PRESIDENT WILSON proposed that the members of the Committee to advise on the disarmament of Germany should be named at once.

Nominees for
Naval, Military
& Air Committee

(It was decided that the Naval, Military and Air Advisers should sit together in one Committee, which should be composed, in addition to the Commanders-in-Chief, of three representatives from each of the Great Powers.)

The following nominees were then appointed :—

United States of America

General Bliss.
Admiral Benson.
General Mason N. Patrick.

British Empire

General Sir H. H. Wilson.
Admiral Wemyss.
General Sykes.
(Or their representatives)

France

General Degoutte.
Admiral de Bon.
General Duval.

Italy

General Cavallero.
Admiral Grassi.
(& a third to be nominated later)

Japan

(The Japanese delegates remain to be chosen.)

(12) It was agreed that Marshal Foch should obtain from M. Clemenceau the text for the renewal of the Armistice, which should be presented to the Germans.)

Instructions to
Marshal Foch

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 13 February, 1919.

Annexure "A"

Demand of the Polish Government

I. INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL MATERIAL

On January 16th 1919, the prolongation of Armistice up to February 17th 1919 was signed by Marshal Foch. In this agreement we find the following paragraph:—

"The machines, spare parts, industrial or agricultural tools, all kinds of accessories and, generally speaking, any industrial or agricultural implement, taken away, from the territories that had been occupied by the German armies on the Western Front, under any pretence, by the German military or civil authority, will be held at the disposal of the Allies in order to be returned to their original place".

It is essential that, for the next prolongation of Armistice, an absolutely similar article should be stipulated as regards Polish interests.

Instead of the words:

"On the Western Front"

should be written:

"On the territory of the Kingdom of Poland, created at the Congress of Vienna, as well as in the Governments of Grodno, Kowno, Wilno and Minsk".

At the end of the article, it would be desirable to stipulate:

"The material taken away will have to be sent to the Polish Government and to the places indicated by the latter".

OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

After examination, the Commission have given out the following opinion:—

1. That the restitution of the material of which the Poles have been robbed by the Germans in violation of all principles of international right is, in the name of equity, fully justified.

2. That the insertion of a clause approving of this restitution in the forthcoming act of renewal of the armistice would, even if it were not carried into immediate execution, be a source of moral comfort to the Polish nation and a guarantee likely to encourage the efforts in view of the resumption of the economical activity and stay numerous Polish labourers out of work from the Bolshevist tendencies to which unemployment might incline them.

The Commission think it desirable that the proposal be inserted in the Armistice Act.

II. ROLLING STOCK

The Poland of the Congress possesses 11.000 freight cars instead of 34.000. Galicia 6.000 cars instead of 20.000.

To ensure the supplies of the country and enable it to start at least partially its industry, it would be necessary to ask from Germany for Poland at least 25.000 freight cars and a corresponding number of engines, in order to replace the rolling stock that Poland has been obliged to surrender.

ADVICE OF THE COMMISSION

Poland—Rolling Stock.

The Commission consider as fair, as Poland has been deprived of 40.000 cars, that at least 25.000 should be restored to her.

Financial Aid.

The financial aid which the Poles are asking for from the Entente Governments and the banking establishments comprises the sending of delegates authorised to arrange for a loan.

The Commission is in favour of waiting before they send these delegates till they have studied the situation at Warsaw and have made out the state of mind of the Polish Government.

 Annexure "B"

RETURN OF FRENCH CATTLE

PARIS

The President du Conseil, Ministre de la Guerre, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

I have the honor to inform you, in accord with the Ministers of Agriculture and of the Liberated Regions, that I deem it fitting in the next agreement concerning a renewal of the Armistice, for you to demand that the Germans take all steps toward handing over to us:

DOMESTIC ANIMALS

5,200 Horses:—

The enemy has taken 400,000 from the devastated regions, whereas he himself had 4,523,000 before the war. We thus claim only 1/77 of what was taken away from us, and 1/870 of what the enemy possessed in 1914.

204,000 Cattle:—

The enemy took 1,000,000 from us, and before the war he had 20,182,000. We thus claim only $1/5$ of what was taken from us, and $1/10$ of what the enemy possessed in 1914.

101,000 Sheep and goats:—

The enemy took 1,000,000 from us, and before the war he himself had 9,214,000. We thus claim only $1/10$ of what he took away, and $1/91$ of what he possessed in 1914.

345,000 Rabbits and poultry:—

The enemy took 10,000,000 from us. Before the war he had 77,103,000. 345,000 are asked for. We thus only ask for $1/29$ of what he took away, and for $1/223$ of what he possessed in 1914.

SEED

150,000	quintals	of spring oats.
25,000	"	of spring barley.
4,000	"	of beet-root for fodder.
4,000	"	of sugar beet.
1,000,000	"	of potato plants.
100,000	"	of gross-grained vegetable (peas, vetches etc.)
5,000	"	of garden seed.

The quantities of oats and barley above-given represent only $1/57$ of the losses due to devastation, and $1/765$ of the annual German production before the war (134,000,000 quintals).

As to potatoes, $1/11$ of the losses are asked for, which is only $1/541$ of the annual German production of before the war (541,000,000 quintals).

The Economic Commission will be empowered to fix the conditions of quality and delivery, as well as to apportion the figures stipulated above as to domestic animals according to species and age.

It will also determine the varieties and the quantities of each variety of seed and plants to be turned over.

**Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room
at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 13 February, 1919, at
3 p.m.**

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson
Mr R. Lansing

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A J. Bal-
four, O. M., M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount
Milner, G. C. B., G. C.
M. G.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries

Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison

Lt. Col. Sir. M. P A.
Hankey, K C. B.
Mr. E. Phipps.

M. Dutasta
M Berthelot
M. de Bearn

ITALY

H E. M. Orlando
H. E. Baron Sonnino

Secretaries

Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele.

JAPAN

H. E. M. Matsui

Joint Secretariat

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Col. U. S. Grant

BRITISH EMPIRE

Major A. M. Caccia,
M. V. O.

FRANCE

Capt. A. Portier

ITALY

Major A. Jones

JAPAN

M. Saburi.

ALSO PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Dr. Westermann
Mr. Shotwell

BRITISH EMPIRE

Maj. Gen. His Highness
the Maharajah of Bika-
ner, G. C. V. O., etc.
Major the Hon. W. Orms-
by Gore
Mr. A J. Toynbee.

FRANCE

M. Coue
Capt. Coulonge

ITALY

M. Tosti
Major Mazzolini

Present during hearing of question (3)	Dr. Bliss,
" " " " " (4)	Dr. Bliss, M. Chekri Gamen, Chief " " " " " the Central " " " " " Syrian Mardan Bey, Mussulman represent- ative. M. Chehade, Orthodox represent- ative and an Israelite repre- sentative of the Committee.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether the representatives of the Great Powers to form part of the Poland and Belgium Committees, respectively, had been appointed.

*Appointing
Representative
Committees on
Poland and
on Belgium*

The following names were communicated:—

(i) *Committee on Poland.*

Great Britain:	Sir W. Tyrrell.
France:	M. Jules Cambon.
Italy:	Count Vannutelli-Rey.
Japan:	M. Otchiai.

(ii) *Committee on Belgium.*

Great Britain:	Sir Eyre Crowe.
	Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley.
France:	M. Tardieu.
	M. Laroche.
Italy:	M. Ricci-Busatti.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he regretted that through an omission the American representatives to sit on these two Committees had not yet been chosen. But he would submit the names to the Secretariat-General during the course of the afternoon.^{1a}

M. ORLANDO said that the name of the second representative to sit on the Belgian Committee would shortly be submitted.²

¹ A correction issued on February 17, 1919, reads as follows:

For list of Members of the Syrian Commission substitute the following:—

M. Chekri Ganem	Chief Representative of the Central Syrian Committee.
M. Anis Schenade	Orthodox Greek.
Jamil Mardam Bey	Moslem.
Dr. Georges Samne	Greek Melchite.
Nejil Bey Maikarzel . . .	Maronite.
Dr. Tewfik Farhi	Hebrew.

^{1a} Dr. Isaiah Bowman was appointed American representative to the Commission of Polish Affairs; Dr. Charles H. Haskins and Col. S. D. Embick were appointed American representatives to the Commission for Belgian and Danish Affairs.

² Count Vannutelli-Rey was named as the second Italian representative.

2. M. ORLANDO asked permission to make a statement in connection with the decision taken yesterday on the subject of the immediate disarmament of Germany. The import of that decision would be to anticipate the final disarmament of Germany, for it was not intended to renew the Armistice but to draw up and accept the military terms of the eventual peace treaty. The decision reached in regard to Germany raised the analogous question of Italy and Austria-Hungary, the question which was of particular importance to Italy. He quite realised that the two cases were not altogether analogous, especially as the old Austro-Hungarian Empire no longer existed and had been replaced by a number of nationalities, some friendly, and some hostile to the Allies. But, as a question of form, Italian public opinion might not passively accept the situation, which was open to the interpretation that on the Western front peace had been declared, whereas on the Italian front, a state of war still existed. He was anxious to prevent the spread of such an impression. He wished, therefore, to suggest that the Inter-Allied Military Commission, appointed to draw up the military terms of peace with Germany, should be instructed also to study the similar question as between Italy and Austria-Hungary. He did not suggest that the decision in regard to the German terms should in any way be altered or delayed; but he did ask that the Italian military advisors should be authorised to bring the question of the Austrian military terms before the Inter-Allied Military Commission.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that M. Orlando had made a reasonable and right request; the suggestion had already occurred to him and he gladly accepted M. Orlando's proposal.

(It was agreed:—

That the conditions of the Armistice with Austria-Hungary should be examined by the military Inter-Allied Committee, assembled under the Presidency of Marshal Foch, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme War Council, dated 12th February, 1919, with a view to determine what changes,³ if any, were necessary in order to arrive at the final military terms of peace with Austria-Hungary, following the procedure adopted in the case of Germany.)

(At this stage Dr. Bliss⁴ entered the Council Chamber).

3. M. CLEMENCEAU welcomed Dr. Bliss and called on him to make his statement.

Syria: Statement
by Dr. Bliss

DR. BLISS then read the following statement:—

³ According to a correction issued later, the word "measures" should be substituted for the word "changes."

⁴ Rev. Howard S. Bliss, President of the Syrian Protestant College, Beyrout, Syria.

"Mr. President, Gentlemen,

I shall not detain you long. My deep interest in the people of Syria, irrespective of race, creed or condition, bred from a long residence among them—in fact I was born on Mt. Lebanon—is my only excuse for detaining you at all.

First, a preliminary word as to the people themselves. They are intelligent, able, hospitable and lovable, but with the sure defects of a long oppressed race; timidity, love of flattery, indirectness. They also have the defects characteristic of people who are face to face with the results of civilisation without having passed through the processes of modern civilisation. They lack balance, they are easily discouraged, they lack political fairness, they do not easily recognise the limitations of their own rights. They must therefore be approached with sympathy, firmness and patience. They are capable of nobly responding to the right appeal. And they will grow into capacity for self-determination and independence.

My plea before this body on behalf of the people of Syria is this: that an Inter-Allied or a Neutral Commission, or a Mixed Commission, be sent at once to Syria in order to give an opportunity to the people of Syria—including the Lebanon—to express in a perfectly untrammelled way their political wishes and aspirations, viz: as to what form of Government they desire and as to what power, if any, should be their Mandatory Protecting Power.

My plan is based upon the ground that the 12th point of President Wilson's 14 points and the declarations made by France and Great Britain in November, 1918,⁵ have committed the Allies and the United States to the granting of such an opportunity of self-expression to the people freed from the Turkish yoke to so express themselves. The declaration is as follows:—

"The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in waging in the East the war let loose upon the world by German ambition is to ensure the complete and final emancipation of all those peoples so long oppressed by Turks, and to establish national Governments and Administration which shall derive their authority from the initiative and free will of the peoples themselves. To realise this France and Great Britain are in agreement to encourage and assist the establishment of Native Governments in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, as also in those territories for whose liberation they are striving and to recognise those Governments immediately they are effectively established. Far from wishing to impose on the peoples of these regions this or that institution they have no other care than to assure, by their support and practical aid, the normal working of such governments and administrations as the peoples shall themselves have adopted: to guarantee impartial and even justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the

⁵ Vol. II, p. 274.

country by arousing and encouraging local initiative, to foster the spread of education, to put an end to those factions too long exploited by Turkish policy—such is the part which the two Allied Governments have set themselves to play in liberated territories.’

I maintain that such an opportunity for self expression has not as yet been given. Up to the time I left Beirut, viz: January 9th, 1919, the stringency of the censorship of the Press and of the Post Office, the difficulty of holding public or private meetings for the discussion of political problems, and the great obstacles in travelling, had made it practically impossible for the people, suffering from centuries of intimidation, and now timid to a degree, to express their opinions with any sort of freedom. It is true that a Lebanese delegation has succeeded in reaching Paris and is here to-day. I know these gentlemen, several of whom are my pupils, but there are many other groups besides this particular delegation, including other groups from the Lebanon, who would have gladly been here to speak for themselves and others had they been as fortunate as this group in being able to organise themselves and to find the means of travelling hither.

The point is this. Up to January 9th (the date of my leaving) no notice of any arrangements had been published anywhere in Syria, so far as I know, looking to anything like a general poll of the people of Syria (always including the Lebanon) or even anything like an attempt had been made to secure a widespread knowledge of public sentiment. I did hear more or less of a list of names that was being made up attached to various petitions in favour of this or that programme, but although in a position to hear of any Official or thorough or systematic general plan to ascertain the wishes of the people, no such report came to my knowledge. Many interested citizens of Beirut and the Lebanon were never approached for the purpose of ascertaining their political desires.

I therefore plead that the above mentioned Commission should be sent out as soon as possible by the Peace Conference with ample powers given to them and of course with the wholehearted support granted to them by the French and British authorities now in Syria. The ascertaining of the desires of the people should proceed either without the presence of any foreign Power (and this is impracticable) or in the presence of both French and British Authorities under whom Syria has been living for the past four months.

The people are easily frightened and intimidated even where there is nothing to fear from any source; hence these precautions. The advantage of knowing what the people wish would be a boon to the power eventually becoming the Mandatory power as well as to the people of Syria. One word as to the work of the Commission. Their

task will not be an easy one. They must approach it, in my opinion, in the spirit of brotherly sympathy, infinite patience, frankness and goodwill. In the hands of fair and openminded men, resourceful, shrewd and generous—men who can make clear their honest purpose to a timid but intelligent people—very valuable results can be secured. The result of this enquiry will be, I am convinced, the discovery of the desire for the erection of a state or states looking eventually to complete independence but at present seeking the guardianship of a Mandatory Power.

Both the state or states and the Mandatory Power should be under the control of the League of Nations. Unless in this state or states there should be an absolute separation between religion and the state, most serious results must inevitably arise. The Government on the one hand, religion on the other, can best pursue their majestic tasks apart. Surely Oriental if not general history is making that abundantly clear.

One word more. Unless the Mandatory Power working under the League of Nations approaches its great task in the spirit of lofty service, her splendid opportunity to lead an aspiring people to independence will be for ever lost. But once let the same superb spirit sustain her and the League of Nations as has animated the Allies and the United States in working together for the establishment of freedom in the world, the task, though difficult, will be accomplished."

M. PICHON asked whether Dr. Bliss' proposal applied to all the populations who had been living under Ottoman rule in the Ottoman Empire—in Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Armenia, or did these proposals apply only to Syria?

DR. BLISS replied that he spoke only for Syria where he had been born, and where he had been living. He knew the conditions existing in that territory. He thought his remarks should apply also to other religions and to other populations: but as regards Syria he spoke from his own personal knowledge of the country.

MR. BALFOUR said that M. Pichon had just referred to the case of other peoples who had been under Ottoman rule, and enquired from Dr. Bliss whether he would apply his system without qualification to Armenia also, although the Armenians were in a minority as compared with the Mussulmen, so that self-determination would probably not lead to an improvement in the conditions of the Armenian minority.

DR. BLISS thought that the question must be examined in a large way. The Committee sent to these countries should not merely be a machine, adopting the same method everywhere in attempting to determine the wishes of the people. The Committee must use its

brains and develop some method which would do the largest justice to the various people concerned. But he wished to make his point perfectly clear that he merely spoke for Syria, because he lived there and knew what had been done there. On the other hand, he thought that the proposal should apply to all liberated areas.

MR. BALFOUR said that from the early part of Dr. Bliss' evidence, he gathered that the authorities in Syria had prevented the free use of the Posts, Telegraphs, and Communications. The authorities had also prevented all deputations, but one, from coming to Paris, and they had hampered the free communication of the wishes of the populations to the statesmen assembled at the Peace Conference. He enquired from Dr. Bliss whether he knew exactly by whom, and for what reasons, these limitations on free communications, had been imposed.

DR. BLISS replied that Syria was under military occupation and presumably a censorship was essential where military operations were being undertaken. The restriction[s] he had referred to were, therefore, necessary to safeguard the integrity of the military operations. But as a result the people had been hampered by the existence of these regulations. Regulations made for military reasons prevented anything like free interchange of political opinion, especially among the timid people of Syria. The application of the Censorship, especially in regard to Postal matter and Newspapers, combined with the difficulties placed in the way of public and private meetings were such as to render political life impossible. There were several Syrians living abroad in Egypt, France, North and South America, and in other parts, all of whom were devoted to Syria. These people had left Syria on account of the oppression of the Turks; but it was most desirable that there should be a free interchange of views between people in Syria and their sympathisers and fellow citizens abroad to enable them to formulate their desires. At the present moment that was prevented by the difficulties of travel and the Postal restrictions.

MR. BALFOUR enquired what, in Dr. Bliss' judgment, was the general character of the opinions, whose free expression had thus been prevented by military necessities.

DR. BLISS replied that he was unable to answer the question. The people had encountered great difficulties in reaching conclusions owing to the numerous restrictions imposed by the Military Authorities. The Syrians were very honest and childlike; they had suddenly found themselves in the presence of a new situation; and they wondered what they were going to get out of it. They felt the golden hour was passing away, never to return. They felt aggrieved that other nationalities had been more fortunate in being able to send

delegations to put their case before the Peace Conference; whereas, they themselves, rightly or wrongly felt that they had been hampered in giving expression to their wishes by the stringency of the censorship, the difficulty of holding public meetings and the great obstacles in travelling.

MR. BALFOUR enquired from Dr. Bliss whether, with his intimate knowledge of the population, he had been able to form any judgment as to what were their views.

DR. BLISS thought that his own personal impressions would probably not be of any great value. He would prefer to leave the question to be answered by the suggested Commission, who would carry out its enquiries on the spot.

LORD MILNER pointed out that the military censorship which apparently prevented this timid people from expressing their views was British. Were these views being suppressed because they might be unpleasant to the British?

DR. BLISS replied that the facts were that those—the bolder men among the people—who tried to express their opinions were not able to do so on account of the stringency of the censorship. Consequently, if a Commission were sent to Syria to ascertain the wishes of the people, it should pursue its work freed from the preventive force due to the censorship of press and post-office. He himself was present at that meeting simply to plead for a principle; the determination of the wishes of the people. He did not ask that his own word should be taken, or that of anybody else; but in view of the fact that no opportunity had yet been given to the people to express their views, he thought the only solution would be the appointment of an Inter-Allied Commission, whose duty it would be to find the true opinion of the people. Those who lived in Syria would gladly accept a Mandatory Power, feeling that they had thereby been given an opportunity; and they would honestly work with the Mandatory Power, whether French, American or British, in the best possible way, feeling confidence in the fact that the promise held out to the people to express themselves had been fulfilled. Otherwise, if the opportunity, which the people had a right to claim in view of President Wilson's 12th Point and the Franco-British Declaration of 1918, were not given, the probable outcome would be discontent, sullenness, resentment and even bloodshed.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that anybody reading the evidence given by Dr. Bliss would suppose that the British censorship had been exercised to prevent opinions unfavourable to Great Britain being expressed. If this was a correct interpretation of Dr. Bliss' statement an enquiry should be held. On the other hand, if the statement was incorrect, it should be contradicted.

DR. BLISS replied that the censorship of the papers published in Beirut was exercised by the French Military authorities, and he presumed that the censorship arrangements had been carried out by the local authorities with the approval of General Allenby. But the effect of the censorship was that the people did not feel that they had a free opportunity of expressing themselves and his plea was that something should be done to enable them to have that free opportunity.

LORD MILNER said that he still felt some uneasiness as to what had been said, especially as a matter of national honour was involved. The impression left in his mind was that the British censorship was being used to suppress the expression of pro-French or other non-British sympathies.

DR. BLISS replied in the negative. The censorship was being used to suppress the expression of all opinions.

LORD MILNER agreed but insisted that the point was whether he, Dr. Bliss, thought the censorship had the effect of suppressing one opinion rather than another. Great Britain was, for the moment, the predominant military power in Syria and exercised the right of censorship. Did Dr. Bliss consider that the British Military Authority had used its powers in order to influence opinion in a special pro-British direction?

DR. BLISS replied that quite the contrary was the case. The existence of the censorship, however, made it difficult for the people to give proper expression to any views.

(Dr. Bliss having completed his evidence was invited to remain in the Council Chamber during the discussion of the Syrian question.)

(The Members of the Syrian Commission:—⁶

M. Chekri Gamen	Chief Representative of the Central Syrian Committee.
Mardan Bey	Mussulman Representative.
M. Chedade	Orthodox "

and

An Israelite Representative of the Committee then entered the Council Chamber.)

(4) M. CLEMENCEAU having introduced the members of the Syrian Commission to the Conference called upon M. Chekri Ganem to make his statement.

Claims of Syrian
Commission to
Syria

M. CHEKRI GANEM then read the following statement:—

(This statement will be issued separately.)⁷

(It was then agreed to adjourn the further hearing of the Syrian question to a later date.)

⁶ For correction issued on February 17, 1919, see footnote 1, p. 1014

⁷ This statement appears on p. 1024.

(5) **PRESIDENT WILSON** asked permission to make a statement on the question of women representation. He had recently received a visit from a group of ladies, representing the suffrage associations of the Allied countries who had assembled here in Paris, under the Chairmanship of Mrs. Fawcett of Great Britain. These ladies had brought him a resolution, and had asked him to bring it to the notice of the Conference. The resolution contained a proposal to the effect that a Conference of women should be appointed to consider the conditions of children and women throughout the world.⁸ He sincerely desired to give effect to the views expressed by the representatives of the Suffrage Associations of the Allied countries. He wished, therefore, to enquire whether the Conference would agree to the appointment of a Commission consisting of one representative of each of the five Great Powers and four representatives of the Smaller Powers to report on the conditions and legislation concerning women and children throughout the world, and to determine whether any international regulations should be issued. This Commission to be entitled to invite the suffrage associations of the Allied countries to nominate some of its members to attend in an advisory and consultative capacity.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether the question could not be referred to the existing Inter-Allied Commission on International Labour Legislation.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that **M. Clemenceau's** proposal would hardly give satisfaction to the Suffrage Associations, as they asked for recognition. He did not wish to urge this against the opinion of the Conference, but in his judgment recognition should be given.

MAHARAJA BIKANER expressed the view that the question raised by **President Wilson** would present considerable difficulties in all oriental countries, for reasons which it would be unnecessary for him to explain at the present moment.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that the enquiry should be restricted to European countries and America.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had no objections to offer to an enquiry being carried out into the conditions of woman and child labour: but he would strongly object to any enquiry being held into the political status of women.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the women were chiefly interested in the latter question.

⁸ A correction of this portion of the minutes was issued later in which the preceding sentence was omitted and the following substituted:

The resolution contained a proposal to the effect that a commission should be appointed by the Peace Congress to enquire into and report upon the international aspect of the position of women and children throughout the world.

MR. BALFOUR said he had long been in favour of women suffrage, but he felt considerable alarm at the thought that the Peace Conference should extend its activities to a consideration of that question.

BARON MAKINO remarked that there had been a suffrage movement in Japan, but it was insignificant.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that the Inter-Allied Commission on International Labour and [*sic*] Legislation had already enquired into matters relating to women and children, with the exception of the Suffrage question. He, personally, was in favour of women suffrage, but he did not think it would be good politics to take up this question at the present moment. He thought interference by the Peace Conference would hardly lead to good results.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he did not wish to press the matter unless there was a chance of obtaining practical unanimity. Under the circumstances, therefore, he would withdraw his proposal.

(President Wilson's proposal regarding women's position in the world was withdrawn.)

(6) PRESIDENT WILSON reported that the Committee to formulate plans for the League of Nations hoped to complete their labours that night. He wished to suggest, therefore, that a call be prepared for a Plenary Conference to be held tomorrow afternoon for the submission of the scheme and in order that full explanations might be given. The conclusions reached by the Commission would very quickly become generally known, and, therefore, in his opinion, the final draft should be placed at once before the Plenary Conference. He asked, therefore, that a notice be prepared for issue on the following morning, if the Commission's report were then found to be ready for submission to the Plenary Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether it was not intended that the report should, in the first place, be submitted for consideration to the Conference of the Great Powers. According to President Wilson's proposal the Plenary Conference would receive the report before it had been examined by the present meeting.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied that in the ordinary course of events the best plan would perhaps have been to circulate the Commission's report in the first place to the Conference of the Great Powers. He would point out, however, that the League of Nations Commission was not a Commission of the Conference of the Great Powers but of the Plenary Conference. Consequently, the first report ought, as a matter of fact, to go to the Plenary Conference. In accordance with his proposal the Plenary Conference would be asked to receive the report, and the Chairman of the Commission would then give the necessary explanations. That is to say, the report would be sub-

Report of
League of Na-
tions Commission

mitted by himself, and some of his colleagues on the Commission would subsequently give additional explanations.

MR. BALFOUR thought that it would be a great advantage if President Wilson could explain the scheme to the Plenary Conference before he left for the United States of America. He would do this as Chairman of the League of Nations Commission and not as a member of the Conference of the Great Powers. The members of the latter Conference would not be committed to the scheme in any way. He, therefore, saw no objection to President Wilson's proposal.

M. CLEMENCEAU understood the proposal to be that the report of the League of Nations Commission would be presented to the Plenary Conference by its chairman (President Wilson), who would give certain explanations, after which the Conference would adjourn.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that this was his proposal, though he did not quite know how other members of the Plenary Conference could be stopped from making speeches if they wished to do so. But in any case no decision would be taken.

(It was agreed that a Plenary Conference should, if possible, be held at 3:30 p. m. on the afternoon of Friday, 14th February, 1919,⁹ in order to place before it the report of the League of Nations Commission. It was agreed that individual notices to this effect should be issued to each of the Delegates to the Peace Conference.)

. (The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 14 February, 1919.

[*Statement by M. Chekri Ganem*]

MR. CHAIRMAN AND GENTLEMEN: I beg leave to present the credentials and papers of myself and my colleagues, Messieurs Anis Schéhadé, Orthodox Greek, of Beyrout; Jamil Mardam Bey, Moslem, of Damascus, who represented that town at the Arabian Congress at Paris in 1913, on which occasion he acted as Secretary and I as Vice-Chairman; Dr. Georges Samné, Greek Melchite of Damascus; Nejl Bey Maikarzel, Maronite, of the Lebanon; Dr. Tewfik Farhi, Hebrew of Damascus; all members of the Council of the Central Syrian Committee of which I have the honour to be Chairman, which is composed of Syrians of all religions and sect, and is duly authorised to represent the Syrian and Syrio-Lebanese Committees and Associations in the United States of America, Europe, Australia and Africa (including Egypt). In the name of those I represent, whose numbers may be estimated at over one million, I have the honour

⁹ For minutes of this Plenary Session, see p. 208.

to explain to your Excellencies the situation of Syria, whose fate lies with you to decide.

Of all the countries now in process of evolution (according to the expression of the President of the United States) and striving for the natural and admitted right of every individual and every nation to liberty, that country whose cause I am not come to plead before you, but whose situation and aspirations I wish to set forth, that country is the only one which is so fortunate as to have clearly defined frontiers—the Taurus, Sinai, the desert and the Mediterranean.

Its nationality is just as clearly defined as its frontiers. The race is as distinct as it could possibly be in this theatre of invasions.

Apart from language, the factors welding this nation into one are the soil on which it has sprung up, whence it has derived similarity of physical and moral form and been inspired by the same ideals; its traditions and customs; its common fate throughout the course of centuries; and, above all perhaps, its sufferings—for common suffering is the greatest bond of union.

Now there are few small nations who have suffered so much as the people of Syria, if one accepts the theory that the capacity for pain increases in proportion to moral development.

Gentlemen, one reads and hears it said that of all the problems submitted to your consideration, the Syrian problem is one of the most involved. This is doubtless a great honour: but one of which we are not jealous. For if the question were really what it is said to be, if it really constituted a problem, we should not dare to speak, so far would our responsibility exceed our powers. We hope that it appears to you as it does to us Syrians, not so much a problem as a question that can be decided almost as soon as asked.

We therefore think we may put the question quite simply, concisely, and in all confidence.

And what is it? The members of the Conference are asked to decide, conscientiously and after due consideration of the facts:—

(1) Whether Syria can be constituted, within its natural frontiers, into a democratic State distinct from the other Arabic-speaking countries.

(2) Whether that State can be left to itself from the time of its creation, or whether it will require the external support of a highly civilized Power.

(3) What should be the nature of such support, and by what Power should it be rendered?

If the first of these three points is decided in the affirmative, it will necessitate arriving at a decision on the others—namely, whether

Syria is entitled to a free existence, and whether you will grant it to her.

It would seem, however, that there are certain conditions which a country must fulfil before it can claim its right, which, although belonging to all alike, must nevertheless be subordinated to the higher general interests and limited by law, like the liberty of individual persons.

The first condition is the material and moral capacity of the country to exercise immediate or gradual independence.

The second condition is the geographically independent situation of the country—a question of easily definable and defensible frontiers, of harbours by which a country breathes and lives, and of agricultural districts and industrial centres capable of maintaining the trade of those ports.

Syria seems to fulfil these conditions, provided she receives the assistance that she will need at the outset to enable her to recover from the centuries of darkness and oppression which culminated during the present war.

Do you desire unimpeachable testimony as to her moral capacity? It may be found, apart from the evidence of fact, in the writings of an eminent British statesman, Lord Cromer, whose authority, derived from long residence in the East, nobody will deny. In his "Modern Egypt", Part 4, Chapter 36, he says:—

"Whether from a moral, social or intellectual point of view, the Syrian stands on a distinctly high level. He is rarely corrupt. There are many gradations of Syrian society. A high-class Syrian is an accomplished gentleman, whose manners and general behaviour admit of his being treated on a footing of perfect social equality by high-class Europeans. His intellectual level is also unquestionably high. He can do more than copy the European. He can understand why the European does what he does, and he is able to discuss with acuteness whether what is done is wisely or unwisely done. He is not by any means wanting in the logical faculty. It would, in a word, be wholly incorrect to say that he merely apes civilisation. It may be said with truth that he really is civilised."

That, gentlemen, is clear and it is conclusive. The high-class Syrian may perhaps be conceded a still finer attribute (which illustrates the correctness of the opinion formed by Lord Cromer), namely, that of recognising that the majority of his compatriots, having little experience of liberty, are not yet capable of exercising it without serious danger to themselves. He has not the courage born of ignorance. Not only does his ambition confine itself modestly within the frontiers which nature has assigned to his country, without attempting even the moral domination of his less-educated neighbours, but he is wise enough to distrust himself and seek a friendly

shoulder on which to lean, and a guide in the somewhat difficult paths of liberty.

Is this not a guarantee for the Allies and their associates? Is it not a more striking proof of his moral capacity than if he straightway declared himself capable of self-government and even (as in the recent case of a valiant and amiable neighbour) of governing others.

As regards the second condition—the frontiers are visible to everyone. They have been too clearly defined by nature to admit of any real discussion, still less of dispute. Nature has traced the contours and wisely fixed the limits of our land, and if she made Syria a small country, it was doubtless to make it all the better, and above all, that nobody should be tempted to diminish it. And then, does not the League of Nations believe that it ought also to afford some protection to the setting and the background within which the nations are evolving and whose image they reflect?

Syria is so harmonious in its form! Its members are in such perfect proportion to the body, and the head, which ought to govern the members, is so well set in its place! It surmounts the body and gives it the exact finish that it needs. In making Damascus, with its desert shield, the capital of Syria, history has obeyed the laws of that faultless logician, nature, whose will it is that everything should hold together and defend itself against destruction.

As to ports, those lungs of a country, we possess sufficient to ensure our existence. Here again, nature has favoured right proportions. With a few more, we should have breathed too freely; with a few less, we should have been stifled or our life would have been precarious. Under modern management our ports would soon attain prosperity, if the agricultural districts and industrial and commercial centres, rejoicing in a sense of security hitherto unknown, were to be interconnected by roads and railways, provided always that they formed an organic whole and contributed jointly to the common weal.

There remains one condition, that of nationality. It is certainly of primary importance, and if it has not been mentioned previously, it is because the question appears to us less open to discussion than any other.

Before the upheaval which has brought about the welcome change in the status of the nations of the East, anyone who had disputed this point would have been overwhelmed by the most vigorous and unanimous protests.

We hold fast to our nationality, as to our frontiers, in the hope that at a near or distant date they may form the framework of our liberated country.

We hold to it as one clings to anything which one has defended and guarded at the cost of the greatest suffering, and we hold to it

all the more tenaciously because this nationality—which has no official existence—brought upon us all kinds of insults in the countries into which we were forced to disperse. For everywhere, gentlemen, both in our own country and elsewhere, we were regarded as strangers.

Thus we remained Syrians in spite of everything and the sub-title of Ottoman, by which we were disguised in official documents, had the same effect upon us as the title of German upon an Alsatian, or that of Austrian upon the inhabitants of the Trentino or Trieste.

Moslems, Druses, Christians of all sects, Jews—we were all Syrians.

But, during the war, currents preceding the march of Arab contingents and fanned by the wings of the victories in Palestine, have induced certain elements in the interior to await their liberation from the new Malek. The result has been a revival of that religious feeling which had so long predominated in these quarters in the past, that it found in these tendencies new and unexpected fuel for a fresh outbreak. Use was made of this pretext to maintain (arguing from the unity of language and religion) that there was no distinction between Syrian nationality and that of the Arabs. These gratuitous assertions had already been answered by the celebrated Rector of Aberdeen University, Sir George Adam Smith, in a pamphlet published last year, entitled "Syria and the Holy Land", in which he asserts insistently in several parts of the work that the Syrians are not Arabs. This intentional confusion is most regrettable and dangerous, for it threatens to revive amongst us the rift created by the Turks, fostered by rivalries under foreign influence, and which we had the right to hope had been bridged, not only by the corpses of the Syrians who were executed, and the four or five hundred thousand who died of famine and want, but by the union we had founded, and by that of the Powers who, having once been rivals, had now become friends and allies.

But we think that this foreign accretion of Arab nationalism, into which it is wished to merge the Syrian—this new factor of a solely religious character which we refuse to believe inspired or suggested—will disappear if matters are replaced in their logical order. And if the cause disappears, the effect will also vanish. For artifice cannot resist nature, and if light accentuates colours it also abolishes shades.

Unity of language—unity of religion? If the former were to determine nationality, that, Gentlemen, would carry us much too far. The new and old worlds would have to be re-divided, and one-third of Switzerland and half of Belgium joined to France. And if unity of belief had to be taken into consideration, you would have to undertake a new distribution of nations and create religious States with Popes in place of Kings and Councils in place of republican and

democratic Governments. No: neither unity of language nor unity of religion constitutes nationality, especially where a triple barrier, such as that existing between Arabia and Syria, separates two countries and two nations. A desert which places Damascus at least 1500 kilometres from Mecca forms the geographical barrier; the social barrier consists of different traditions, habits and customs; whilst education, teaching and culture form the moral barrier.

What affinities exist between the native of the Hedjaz and the Syrian, the nomad and the settler on the soil? and, apart from a similarity of language (more apparent than real) imposed by the first conquests, what reasons can be adduced for annexing, even by ties of nominal suzerainty, an educated people to a race less advanced, if one may say so, in the ways of civilisation, or a people of enlightened progress, open to every conception of liberty, to a race rooted to its primitive organisation; or even for giving the latter supremacy by installing Emirs in Syria—at Damascus and Aleppo—who would be feudatories of the King of the Hedjaz, Shereef of Mecca?

Is there any such preponderance of Arab elements in Syria as might explain or justify this idea? If there are, or have ever been any Arab infiltrations, these racial elements are quickly absorbed. They become so completely Syrianised that the only Arab domination since the conquest in 635 A. D. hardly lasted, as such, 22 years—that is to say one generation.

Mon'Aouia, Governor of Damascus, when proclaimed Kaliph founded a definitely Syrian dynasty, entered into conflict with Mecca, and crushed for ever even the religious hegemony of the Hedjaz. And when history shows that throughout the centuries and under every successive domination, Damascus always strove to place herself at the head of an independent Syrian Kingdom, it proves the identification of that town with Syria and also illustrates, by a striking and decisive example, the inviolability of Hedjaz rule in our country.

To annex Syria to Arabia would be to do violence to the very soil from which the race and its history have sprung. To annex Damascus to Arabia, with or without Aleppo, would, if we may say so, be a grave political error, involving (and this would be for us a direct and mortal wound) the mutilation of our country, the unity of which has never been denied in spite of all the vicissitudes of its sad history. And, in order to benefit interests which might be satisfied elsewhere, destruction would be brought upon the harmonious whole to which we have already referred, the beauty of which consists in its general aspect and in which the race, by assimilating successive invasions, has acquired a uniform and homogeneous character and a peculiar degree of intellectuality.

Gentlemen, other considerations of a political and moral nature, outweighing the sacrifices of our country (whose long martyrdom nevertheless deserves a better fate) are worthy of your attention. We have already alluded to them; allow us to refer to them once more.

It cannot have escaped your notice, although you may only have observed from afar the recent development of events in the East, that if an inconsiderable proportion of our Moslem population has accepted with some favour the principle of a Hedjaz Government, it has done so because it has been led to see in it the first foundations of a great Moslem (not Arabian) Empire, with the Hedjaz dynasty at the head. The separatist movement which developed in Syria in 1912 rallied Syrians of every faith around the principle of a modern Government, which would respect religions whilst not imposing itself in their name, but the events of 1918 led certain elements to desert the cause which they had so lately served.

The religious movement, profoundly felt among the invaders, but vaguely realised by the ignorant and oppressed invaded people, and repudiated on the spot by the more enlightened high-class Syrian Moslems, is nevertheless a movement which must be watched, unless we wish to see the revival of limitless hopes which, although and because they can never be realised, would create an agitation prejudicial not only to others, but to the Moslems themselves. There is no doubt that already, in certain quarters, eyes are turned in that direction and elsewhere, looking for a further extension of the Empire of Islam, towards Africa and towards India. If too much liberty is allowed to individuals or to little groups far from the centre of power, some policies recoil upon themselves and cause irreparable reaction.

Should we speak thus if it were likely that this movement might encourage progress and benefit humanity at large? Accustomed as we are to sacrifice, we should wrap ourselves in a cloak of silence explained and vouched for by our faith in the march of humanity towards the maximum of liberty and of light.

But history is there to teach us what may be expected from any kind of theocratic Government, founded on the confusion of civil and religious power.

Alas, we have not to look far back to find the story of Turkish rule and European interventions to protect minorities written in a series of capitulations, wars and protectorates. "The history of tomorrow will not differ from that of yesterday", writes an European with regard to Eastern affairs; and the Moslems of Damascus say the same thing. No, it will not differ, however strong in character and liberal-minded the heads of the régime may be. In fact, it is not a question of men, but of principles and dogmas. It is for the

Powers to say whether they wish, by pursuing in our country and that of the Arabs, the clerical policy which they prohibit in their own, and which is feared by the great mass of our people, to create afresh that old division between members of the same nation and inaugurate in the East, and perhaps elsewhere, an era of agitation, unrest, and irredentism, which sooner or later will force them again to intervene.

Syria having once been constituted a State with integrity of territory and national unity, will it be possible to leave it to itself from the outset, or will it require the support of a highly civilised foreign Power.

Gentlemen, there is not a single sincere and educated Syrian, in Syria itself or abroad, who has not already replied to the second part of this question in the affirmative. The contrary has only been maintained by a few reactionaries or by some mistaken youths, under the somewhat Bolshevik formula improvised by the Secretary of a foreign delegation, (whose august Chief and Prince—already calls us his people) of:—

“Let us massacre one another, so long as we are free. It is only by killing each other that we shall attain total independence.”

We ourselves consider that there are other and less extreme means of educating a nation and that the massacres and anarchy which one might almost say are hoped for, would only result in the ruin of our country and, finally, in the subjection of the weakest, or our seizure by a watchful and enterprising neighbour.

Our apprenticeship has been hard—who denies it? The number of various religions that we profess, in each of which the disintegrating action of our oppressors has led its adherents to band together by nationalities, still engenders among the people mistrust, rivalries and dissension, all of which hinder our political unity. Even our national unity would have no chance of existing for any length of time unless under a most tactful government, respecting local autonomies. At every point when the nature of the country favoured defence against the invader, small groups, which have entirely escaped Turkish domination, have been formed. The largest is that of Mount Lebanon, which has assumed the official form of an autonomous government. The Druse Mountain and the country of the Ansariehs, although not enjoying the same privileges, are of a similar type and really possess independence in practice. The existence of these groups, far from being an obstacle to the establishment and working of a democratic government composed of autonomous provinces, would seem, on the contrary, likely to facilitate them. It carries with it solid guarantees for the future, for it con-

firms the vitality of the Syrian nation, the elements of which have been able victoriously to resist the policy of disintegration pursued by its masters. The policy of the Ottoman Government has always, sometimes with success, been to set these groups one against the other, so that they might be mutually weakened. It has never succeeded in stifling those national virtues which it is left to friendly hands to free and to unite.

We also need to be armed for the economic contest. We lack the capital, the experts, the agricultural and industrial machinery and implements, which are necessary for the development of the resources of our country. Freed from the servitude of a thousand years, we must have recourse to a protective guardianship to complete our national unity, to achieve our political education, and to reconstitute a country worthy of the Powers that honour us with their trust and, above all, worthy of the special Power that will have lent us its generous support.

For, having broken our bonds, would you refuse us the support we need for our first steps? You would not raise us up only to leave us to stumble in the wreck of our fetters?

Gentlemen, both our interests and our reason lead us to admit that we shall need foreign collaboration.

We require no other proofs than the documents, telegrams, letters, resolutions and petitions, which we now produce,¹⁰ and the perusal of which will enlighten you as to the general opinion in Syria on this subject.

What must be the nature of this support and by whom will it be rendered?

International collaboration has been mentioned. The idea may have been discarded, in which case we should applaud the decision. Past examples are certainly not such as to persuade us to choose this course. Not to mention Crete, Tangiers, or Albania, take the experiment made in the Lebanon itself during the last half century. It has been only too conclusive. Even when reduced to a "lesser evil", as in the Lebanon, this multiple protectorate resulted in conflicts of influence, dividing the population of the over-protected country into as many parties as there were protectorates, thus lowering the moral level and enfeebling the collective energy of the people. If applied to Syria, this régime would have the same disastrous consequences, in a greater and more serious degree.

Duality of influence, even more than multiplicity of supporters, must be avoided in our case, both from humanitarian motives and in the interests of the Powers themselves. It would aggravate dis-

¹⁰ The documents referred to do not accompany the minutes.

sensions which would but acquire more bitterness by definition, and, by preventing our country from working out its own destiny, would create that moral disintegration which precedes territorial dismemberment. In that case, it would be better to proceed with the latter at once, gentlemen, by admitting the claims of the Hedjaz and allowing its representative the right (now somewhat extensively exerted under your eyes) of treating Syria as a conquered country and committing acts of sovereignty there, a sovereignty which appears to be somewhat premature.

Is there any need to remind you, gentlemen, that the Hedjaz was but yesterday a Turkish province, whose deputy to the Parliament at Constantinople was this very Emir Feysul, and that it has already found in its independence the reward for its efforts in the war? What right, then, can he claim to play the part of master in our country? In fact, he dismisses and appoints officials, chosen with a view to making people believe he is acting under high and powerful inspiration. (He even tried at first to nominate the very Governor of the Lebanon). His soldiers attack and plunder villages, and carry away hostages as at Kaoubaba. He hoists the Hedjaz flag everywhere, counting upon its effect on the ignorant classes of the people. And he, the representative of the Hedjaz, presents himself everywhere as the mouthpiece of all those who speak Arabic, in Asia and perhaps elsewhere. He says, in the name of Syria, "We are ready to pay for European support in cash. We cannot sacrifice in exchange for it any part of the liberty we have just gained for ourselves by force of arms."

Gentlemen, by sanctioning this state of affairs, by giving the little Arab contingent which entered Damascus the rights of the conquerors of old, by giving his flag an exaggerated importance (which might increase his prestige among the uneducated, but would rank him with the brigand bands, and we would state roundly that in our eyes he deserves better than that), by doing this, will you have solved this question in accordance with your principles?

The truth—the whole truth—is your due. And, knowing that we should speak to you face to face, we have thought it well to have recourse to none of the vain subtleties or other means by which one lowers oneself without honouring those who are addressed. The truth, moreover, cannot offend any of the Powers who are our arbitrators and our judges. The truth sheds light and you do not fear the light. You have become one single family through the blood shed in common, which sometimes creates closer ties than those of relationship itself. Gentlemen, you have brought in your train and helped to spread in Syria a ferment of discord, a crop of intes-

time divisions and possibly of conflicts in your own family. There is still time to stop its progress through a country which has been too much tried, too much reduced to throw it off as stronger constitutions might have done.

You will not allow the question to be solved in this manner, even temporarily, nor permit us to be torn between three influences, the smallest of which is the most active and threatens, by its attitude, to compromise the greatest, most respected and most admired of the three. We have owed so much to the latter during the last few months, and we expect so much of it, sure of its loyalty, its high disinterestedness and the spirit of humanity and justice by which its government is imbued.

What we need, Gentlemen, in order that the hateful heritage Turkey has bequeathed us may disappear with its yoke, is that the territory of Syria may be placed integrally beneath the moral aegis of a single Power. Our national unit and our future depend on that unity of influence.

Is it necessary to consult the people?

It is hardly likely that, in the state of chaos following the upheaval which has broken the bonds of the people of the East, a reference of this kind would at present give conclusive results. It would in part be falsified by factors which you now know to be foreign to the true interests of the country, such as the religious exaltation of a section of the Moslem population (which unfortunately, has received a fresh impetus); the reaction of the Christian element; the partly Moslem military occupation of a country which by long custom is inclined to bow before the conqueror, even though he belongs to a notoriously inferior race.

It would be more reasonable that the Powers, in their wisdom, should appoint that one among them which appears specially qualified to carry out the noble mission of helping a small country to lift itself up and of accustoming the eyes of its inhabitants to the bright light of liberty.

Valuable aid may be obtained in arriving at this choice:—

(1) by considering that if the people had been consulted before the war, the name of one of the Powers now assembled would have received the immense majority of the votes, or even have been adopted unanimously;

(2) by referring to the documents which we have just had the honour to lay before you.

Even if the opinion of my colleagues and myself had differed from that of our mandatories, we should still have considered it our duty to execute our clear mission, which is to request your Excellencies,

in the terms of the documents submitted¹¹ that France may be charged with the reconstitution of an integral, independent, federated Syria.

We concur in the addition made by many groups (those of the Syrians in Egypt, for instance), namely:—A Syria completely separated from Arabia proper, and provided with a national Syrian constitutional and democratic Government, the constitutional head of which shall be vested with no religious character.

Is there any need to give the reasons for our choice and to state the claims of France to our confidence and our friendship?

It seems to us that this would be superfluous. The century-old traditions that unite our two nations, the affinities of temperament and culture which find eloquent testimony in that diffusion of the French language which has made it our second mother tongue—these are matters of common knowledge.

Apart from the American University of Beyrout, to which we owe a great number of our élite and which is entitled to very special gratitude on our part (of which we beg to assure it, and will prove should we become our own masters)—it is the French schools from which we have received our education and which have taught us to realise our own powers.

The absence of any Imperialist party in France, her relative proximity to our country, incline us to her with the more fervour. We know that France understands how to confine her activity to that of a guide or arbitrator.

She, alone, in our opinion, is competent to obtain the whole effect for which we hope. At the same time, as a Moslem Power numbering 20 to 25 millions of Moslems amongst her subjects, and as age-long protectress of the Christians of the East, she brings both Moslems and Christians the guarantee of impartiality afforded not only by her ideals of liberty and justice, but by her own position. She will be a guide speaking a language we understand, who will unite us in order to lead us towards our common destiny. She will be the arbiter before whom all mistrust will vanish and all conflict cease.

This statement, Gentlemen, draws to its close. It is for you to say whether Syria shall become an actuality. The soul of Syria exists. It depends on you whether the body which it is to animate shall be whole and vigorous.

Whatever may be the interests at work around her, you would not wish them to weigh in the scales of your justice and so heavily as her own. Have not all the Powers adopted the principle laid down by President Wilson?

¹¹ The documents referred to do not accompany the minutes.

It remains to know whether France will accept this charge.

Yes, without doubt, if we invoke her traditions and when we recall not only her ancient declarations and promises, but those made more recently by M. Raymond Poincaré in 1912, when, as Prime Minister, he declared that:—"I need not say that in Syria and the Lebanon we have traditional interests which we intend shall be respected. The English Government has formally declared to us that it has no intentions or designs or political aspirations of any kind in those regions. We shall abandon none of our traditions, we shall forfeit none of the goodwill we have acquired there."

A few days later, Sir Edward Grey, then British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated in the House of Commons that he recognised the special interests of France in Syria. Then followed the declarations of M. George Leygues, Minister of Marine, M. Stephen Pichon and M. Georges Clemenceau, who connects the ancient royal France, the France of the Revolution and the Empire, to the Republican France of to-day, and who has told us that his Government intends to assure the future of Syria by its own efforts.

Such formal assurances, not to say engagements, ought to set our minds at rest. But, remembering the French policy, and having witnessed the prodigious effort made by that admirable country during the war, and the simplicity, the modesty with which she has accomplished her task, we are apprehensive lest she may show in the peace negotiations what I may call the bashfulness of her heroism in the war, and fail to use not only her sympathy, but the weight of her authority and her persuasive eloquence with her Allies in defending our little Syria from the dismemberment which menace[s] its territory, its posts, its towns in certain provinces, and from decapitation.

And if, to our misfortune, by reason of interests which may doubtless be superior, it were decided—contrary to the hopes we have placed in you all—that our country should be dismembered and handed over in part to a juvenescent neighbouring State, which, since it has been a belligerent, intends to exact the price of its belligerency from a people which thought itself protected by the rights of nations—then what shall we say, what can we do?

We are a very small nation; very weak, much tried, very unfortunate. Will our extreme weakness be our strength in your eyes? Syria will evidently be what you wish it to become. We have not four divisions in the line, not the smallest weapon in our hands. And even if we had any, the gratitude we owe you would prevent our wielding it.

But our swordless hand will point you to our dead, who, though not fallen in battle, are none the less victims of this war and of your enemies.

We have not had a hundred thousand combatants, but we can number nearly four hundred thousand dead. We have not occupied towns nor cut railways, but many among us, unknown heroes, simple and retiring like their comrades in the Legion, have fallen for the same cause as your soldiers in the Dardanelles, in Macedonia and on the Western Front. In all the Allied countries, our compatriots have enlisted in the American, Australian, Canadian, English or French ranks, thus asserting their nationality. In certain countries like Brazil, they have even formed small Legions, which have fought under your banners.

Should we have no other claim than that of a people long subject to oppression, you would still owe us justice.

But if your desire is, in any case, to help in creating a Moslem Empire, the world is vast, and there are even territories of unheard of richness which adjoin the Hedjaz and extend to the Sea. They no longer have their old rulers, and are inhabited for the most part by Moslems and Bedouins. Once more, the world is vast, and routes can be carved out towards the farthest ends of the earth and ports be secured, without necessarily reducing our country, which in itself is so small and so modestly enclosed within its frontiers.

What is it that we ask? Nothing but to be allowed to stay at home. And if we have been asked for nothing, it is because others were ready to take everything, or nearly everything, from us. With what right? Are we to be constrained to believe in the right of the strongest?

May we say one word as regards Palestine—although the subject is said to be a thorny one?

Palestine is incontestably the Southern portion of our country. The Zionists claim it. We have suffered too much from sufferings resembling theirs, not to throw open wide to them the doors of Palestine. All those among them who are oppressed in certain retrograde countries are welcome. Let them settle in Palestine, but in an autonomous Palestine, connected with Syria by the sole bond of federation. Will not a Palestine enjoying wide internal autonomy be for them a sufficient guarantee?

If they form the majority there, they will be the rulers. If they are in the minority, they will be represented in the government in proportion to their numbers.

Is it necessary, in order to establish them, to dismember Syria, to take from it its means of access and its historic safeguard against any invasion (which always took that route), and to constitute a State in the midst of a country which, as a consequence, would be hostile to them.

Agreements have also been mentioned which were concluded even before our deliverance, some cutting us in pieces and taking away our ports, Haifa and St. Jean d'Acres; others giving our capital to the Hedjaz. Whatever we may have said, we have truly the greatest and most respectful sympathy for that new kingdom and its new king, as well as for the princes, his sons. We admire their courage and we love them for what they have been led to do for us. But as they speak our language they doubtless know the proverb: "If I love thee, O my bracelet, I love my arm still more."

We beg you, Gentlemen, not to take umbrage at our language, which is doubtless hardly in accord with that usually employed at your meetings. We tender our humble and respectful apologies if we have cried out under the threat of the knife. We also regret to have taken up so much of the time which you require for so many other important and complex questions. But, once more, the complications which make our question such a simple problem—and we beg you to remember this—are only of an external nature. We ourselves can, therefore, do nothing towards solving it. You, and you alone, can do much. You can do everything. But if our hopes are not to be realised, and we are to be disintegrated and condemned (this time irremediably, since the condemnation will come from you), then we would make one last request, that we may be handed back to Turkey. She will massacre us a little more, but with her we shall at least preserve a hope of one day being able to escape.

When the indiscretions of the press brought us with the rough outlines of the agreements of 1916,¹² which made our hearts bleed, our compatriot, Jamil Mardam Bey, comparing our sufferings under the Turks to those which we might expect if our country were thus pieced out, reminded us of this verse:

"There was a day when I wept—
And now I weep for that day."

Gentlemen, will you, our only hope, who in our eyes represent justice, right and human mercy, will you leave us to weep for our sad and grievous past?

¹² *Current History* (March 1920), vol. XI, p. 499.

**Minutes of the 14th Session of the Supreme War Council Held in
M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, February 14, 1919, at 6:30 p. m.**

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson
Mr. R. Lansing

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Bal-
four, O. M., M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Mil-
ner, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries

Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison

Lt. Col. Sir M.P.A.
Hankey, K.C.B.
Sir P. Loraine, Bt.

M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot

ITALY

H. E. Baron Sonnino

Secretary

Count Aldrovandi

JAPAN

H.E. M. Matsui

Joint Secretariat

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Col. U. S. Grant

BRITISH EMPIRE

Captain E. Abraham

FRANCE

Captain A. Portier

ITALY

Major A. Jones

JAPAN

M. Saburi

ALSO PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

General Bliss

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. W. S
Churchill, M.P.
General Sir H. H. Wilson,
G.C.B., D.S.O.
Maj. General W. T.
Thwaites, C.B.

FRANCE

General Belin
General Alby
General Le Rond

ITALY

General Cavallero

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux

1. M. CLEMENCEAU declared the meeting open.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was sorry to be responsible for calling together a meeting at that unusual hour. He had, however, two urgent matters to put before the Council which he thought required solution before President Wilson's departure. The first related to the passage of troops and supplies through Holland.

Passage of
Troops and
Supplies Through
Dutch Territory

Mr. Balfour said all his Military advisers assured him that there were no means of maintaining the British forces on the Rhine other than transit of troops and stores through Dutch territory. The reason for this was the extreme congestion of the railways in Belgium and Northern France. He did not feel, however, that Great Britain should act alone on such a question and he therefore wished to ask the Council to approve the joint action suggested in the following identic telegram :—

"The 5 allied and associated Powers consider it of vital importance to the interests of the general Peace which they are earnestly striving to conclude at the earliest possible moment, that the preliminary arrangements already entered into with the enemy to this end, shall be effectually carried out.

Those arrangements provide, among other things for the occupation of the German territories left of the Rhine by allied and associated troops, and necessarily cover all measures which are essential for the purpose of effecting and maintaining such occupation, including the actual transport of the troops and supplies to their destination.

Owing to the extreme congestion of the railways in Belgium and Northern France the most serious difficulties are being encountered in carrying out the arrangements which have been agreed upon by both parties and which cannot be allowed to fail except at the risk of gravely imperilling the early establishment of a satisfactory peace.

A ready means exists to meet this difficulty; and that is the utilisation of the communications by rail and by water across Holland.

The German Government having assented to the arrival of the troops on German territory cannot be, and in fact are not, interested in the routes to be followed in journeying to the Rhine, and no question of an infringement of any rule of neutrality therefore arises out of the transit of the troops across Dutch territory.

In these circumstances, the 5 Powers, sensible of the solemn duty which lies upon them to see that their efforts directed to the speedy conclusion of a durable peace for the benefit of the whole community of nations, call upon the Netherlands Government to co-operate with them to this end by facilitating in every way the movements of troops and supplies across Dutch territory strictly for the purposes agreed upon with the German Government under the terms of the Armistice.

The matter is so grave and so urgent that the 5 Powers must press upon the Netherlands Government the necessity of immediate action, failing which the responsibility for the state of things which may ensue and which may endanger both the general peace and the flow of food and supplies into the countries of Western Europe, will fall upon the Netherlands Government.["]

GENERAL ALBY said that an agreement had been reached with the Dutch concerning the passage of food, but not, as far as he knew, to the passage of troops.

GENERAL BLISS, in reply to an enquiry from President Wilson, said that he had been trying to get into communication with General Pershing but had not succeeded. However, he had been told during the afternoon that an assistant to General Mosely who had been charged with the negotiations for General Pershing had stated that the matter had been arranged with the Dutch Government at the Hague. According to this account, permission had been obtained for the creation of an American base at Rotterdam and for the conveyance of troops and supplies on the Rhine for the use of the American Army of Occupation.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether he might be authorised to wait until the news was confirmed. He assumed that the Dutch would be ready to do for the British what they had done for the Americans.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the news was still unofficial.

MR. BALFOUR thought that if it turned out to be correct no joint action need be taken. If, on the other hand, the Dutch were still unwilling, he asked them whether the joint action proposed in the identic telegram would be approved.

SIR HENRY WILSON pointed out that the Dutch allowed troops to pass down the Rhine away from Germany, but not up towards Germany.

BARON SONNINO asked what the Allied and Associated Powers could do if the Dutch should refuse.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that means of pressure would be found.

(It was decided that the joint action proposed by Mr. Balfour should be taken if the Dutch Government had not already conceded the principle of free passage.)

2. MR. BALFOUR said that the second point to which he wished to draw the attention of the Council was that of the proposed Meeting with the various Russian Governments at Prinkipo.

Meeting of the
Russian Repre-
sentatives at
Prinkipo

He only wished to introduce the subject, and he asked Mr. Winston Churchill, who had come over for the purpose, to explain the present views of the

British Cabinet.

MR. CHURCHILL said that on the previous day there had been a Cabinet Meeting in London, at which great anxiety had been manifested concerning the Russian situation, particularly in respect to the policy of the Prinkipo meeting. In view of the imminent departure of President Wilson, the Cabinet had asked him to go over and obtain some decision as to the policy on this matter. Mr. Lloyd George had expressed a wish to know whether the Allied policy

which had led to the suggestion of the meeting at Prinkipo was to be pursued or, if not, what policy was to be substituted for it. If it were possible to go on with the original policy, so much the better; but if only the Bolsheviks were to attend the Conference, it was thought that little good would come of the meeting. The military aspect of the case must be considered. Great Britain had soldiers in Russia who were being killed in action. Their families wished to know what purpose these men were serving. Were they just marking time until the Allies had decided on policy, or were they fighting in a campaign representing some common aim? The longer the delay continued, the worse would be the situation of the troops on all the Russian fronts. The Russian elements in those forces were deteriorating rapidly because of the uncertainty of the support they might expect from the victorious Allies. The Allied troops were intermingled with these Russian troops, which were weakening and quavering, and they were themselves becoming affected. If the Prinkipo meeting were not going to procure a cessation of arms, this unsatisfactory condition might last an indefinite time.

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the opinion that a matter of such importance could not be settled at a short and unexpected meeting.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that since Mr. Churchill had come over specially to anticipate his departure, he felt that he should express what his personal thoughts on the subject were. Among the many uncertainties connected with Russia, he had a very clear opinion about two points. The first was that the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers were doing no sort of good in Russia. They did not know for whom or for what they were fighting. They were not assisting any promising common effort to establish order throughout Russia. They were assisting local movements, like, for instance, that of the Cossacks, who could not be induced to move outside their own sphere. His conclusion, therefore, was that the Allied and Associated Powers ought to withdraw their troops from all parts of Russian territory.

The second related to Prinkipo. The policy tending to a meeting at Prinkipo had been instituted in order to find out what the people in Russia were thinking and purposing to do. As far as he was concerned, he would be quite content that informal American representatives should meet representatives of the Bolsheviks. In their reply the Bolsheviks offered a number of things which had not been asked for, such as repayment of debts, concessions and territorial compensations. This answer was not only uncalled for, but might be thought insulting. What the Allies had in mind was the establishment of peace in Russia as an element of the world's peace. The

first condition of the meeting asked for by the Allies was the cessation of attacks by Russian troops on the communities outside their borders. If the other Russian Govts. would not come to Prinkipo to meet the Allies, why should the Allies not imitate Mahomet, and go to them? What we were seeking was not a *rapprochement* with the Bolsheviks, but clear information. The reports received from Russia from various official and unofficial sources were so conflicting that it was impossible to form a coherent picture of the state of the country. Some light on the situation might be obtained by meeting the Russian representatives.

MR. CHURCHILL said that complete withdrawal of all Allied troops was a logical and clear policy, but its consequence would be the destruction of all non-Bolshevik armies in Russia. These numbered at the present time about 500,000 men and though their quality was not of the best, their numbers were nevertheless increasing. Such a policy would be equivalent to pulling out the linch-pin from the whole machine. There would be no further armed resistance to the Bolsheviks in Russia, and an interminable vista of violence and misery was all that remained for the whole of Russia.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the existing forces of the Allies could not stop the Bolsheviks, and that not one of the Allies was prepared to reinforce its troops.

M. SONNINO asked whether the Allies might not continue to supply arms to the non-Bolshevik elements?

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that they made very little use of them when they had them.

MR. CHURCHILL agreed that none of the Allies could send conscript troops to Russia. He thought, however, that volunteers, technical experts, arms, munitions, tanks, aeroplanes, etc. might be furnished.

PRESIDENT WILSON understood the problem was to know what use would be made of these forces and supplies. In some areas they would certainly be assisting reactionaries. Consequently, if the Allies were asked what they were supporting in Russia they would be compelled to reply that they did not know. Conscripts could not be sent and volunteers probably could not be obtained. He himself felt guilty in that the United States had in Russia insufficient forces, but it was not possible to increase them. It was certainly a cruel dilemma. At present our soldiers were being killed in Russia, if they were removed many Russians might lose their lives. But some day or other the Allied troops would have to be withdrawn; they could not be maintained there for ever and the consequences to the Russians would only be deferred.

LORD MILNER pointed out that the only troops that could at present be removed were those in Siberia. The troops on the Archangel

Front were ice-bound and could not, for the time being, be removed. Should the Allies proceed to remove their troops immediately from Siberia there might be an overwhelming concentration of Bolsheviks on the Archangel Front.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that there were no considerable Bolshevik forces in Siberia.

MR. LANSING observed that the Bolsheviks had a large army in Eastern Russia at the point of contact with the Anti-Bolshevik Siberian Forces.

MR. CHURCHILL said that he would like to know whether the Council would approve of arming the Anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia should the Prinkipo Conference prove a failure.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he hesitated to express any definite opinion on this question. He had explained to the Council how he would act if alone. He would, however, cast in his lot with the rest.

(The meeting adjourned and it was agreed that the subject should be considered again at the conversation to be held the following afternoon).

VILLA MAJESTIC, [PARIS,] February 15, 1919.

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¹This is primarily a subject index; no attempt has been made (except in a few instances) to include names of persons. Directories of the various delegations are printed on pp. 1-153 of this volume.

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